Eco Science

ECOSCIENCE: POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT PAUL R. EHRLICH STANFORD UNIVERSITY

ANNE H. EHRLICH STANFORD UNIVERSITY

JOHN P. HOLDREN UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

W. H. FREEMAN AND COMPANY San Francisco

POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT: DIMENSIONS OF THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT /

Nor can the public-service functions of the environment be safely replaced by technology if technology destroys them. Often the foresight, scientific knowledge, and technological skill that would be required to perform this substitution just do not exist. Where they do exist, the economic cost of an operation on the needed scale is almost invariably too high; and where the economic cost at first seems acceptable, the attempt to replace environmental services with technological ones initiates a vicious circle: the side effects of the additional technology disrupt more environmental services, which must be replaced with still more technology, and so on.

THE PROSPECTS: TWO VIEWS The foregoing brief survey of the dimensions of the human predicament suggests a discouraging outlook for the coming decades. A continuing set of interlocking shortages is likely—food, energy, raw materials—generating not only direct increases in human suffering and deprivation, but also increased political tension and (perversely) increased availability of the military wherewithal for LDCs to relieve their frustrations aggressively. Resort to military action is possible, not only in the case of LDCs unwilling to suffer quietly, but, with equal or greater likelihood, in the case of industrial powers whose high standard of living is threatened by denial of external resources. The probability that conflicts of any origin will escalate into an exchange of nuclear weapons, moreover, can hardly fail to be greater in 1985's world of perhaps fifteen or twenty nucleararmed nations than it has been in the recent world of five. The growth of population—very rapid in the LDCs, but not negligible in most DCs, either—will continue to compound the predicament by increasing pressure on resources, on the environment, and on human institutions. Rapid expansion of old technologies and the hasty deployment of new ones, stimulated by the pressure of more people wanting more goods and services per person, will surely lead to some major mistakes—actions whose environmental or social impacts erode well-being far more than their economic results enhance it.

This gloomy prognosis, to which a growing number of scholars and other observers reluctantly subscribes, has motivated a host of proposals for organized evasive action: population control, limitation of material consumption, redistribution of wealth, transitions to technologies that are environmentally and socially less disruptive than today's, and movement toward some kind of world government, among others. Implementation of such action would itself have some significant economic and social costs, and it would require an unprecedented international consensus and exercise of public will to succeed. That no such consensus is even in sight has been illustrated clearly by the diplomatic squabbling and nonperformance that have characterized major international conferences on the environment, population, and resources, such as the Stockholm conference on the environment in 1972, the Bucharest Conference on World Population in 1974, the Rome Food Conference in 1974, and the Conferences on the Law of the Sea in the early 1970s. One reason for the lack of consensus is the existence and continuing wide appeal of a quite different view of civilization's prospects. This view holds that humanity sits on the edge of a technological golden age; that cheap energy and the vast stores of minerals available at low concentration in seawater and common rock will permit technology to produce more of everything and to do it cheaply enough that the poor can become prosperous; and that all this can be accomplished even in the face of continued population growth. In this view—one might call it the cornucopian vision—the benefits of expanded technology almost always greatly outweigh the environmental and social costs, which are perceived as having been greatly exaggerated, anyway. The vision holds that industrial civilization is very much on the right track, and that more of the same—continued economic growth— with perhaps a little luck in avoiding a major war are all that is needed to usher in an era of permanent, worldwide prosperity.' 'Outstanding proponents of this view include British economist Wilfred Beckerman (Two cheers for the affluent society, St. Martin's Press, London, 1974): British physicist John Maddox (The doomsday syndrome, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1972); and American futurologist Herman Kahn (Tltc next 2OO years, with William Brown and L«on

William Morrow, New York, 1976).

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DIRECT ASSAULTS ON WELL-BEING /

this, perhaps 2 micrograms is retained. Smokers may absorb 0.2 micrograms per cigarette, making a pack per day equivalent to twice the absorption in the diet. An intake of 5 pans per million cadmium in air for 8 hours delivers a lethal dose, and 1 part per million for 8 hours is dangerous. The recommended Threshold Limit Value (recommended not to be exceeded in work environments) in the United States is 100 parts per billion (0.1 ppm), although it is unlikely that this level is harmless. Part of the cadmium problem is that the fraction not excreted immediately has an exceedingly long half-life in the body—around several hundred days—so that low doses received over a long period can lead to accumulation of a high body-burden. The U.S. drinking water standard for cadmium is 10 parts per billion, a level that is not infrequently exceeded. Major toxic effects due to cadmium poisoning have been documented in industrial workers and in villages in Japan whose water supply was contaminated with drainage from a cadmium mine. Acute cadmium poisoning received the name Itai-Itai or "ouch-ouch" disease in Japan, because of the painfulness of the associated bone and muscle abnormalities. Effects on people at lower dose rates are still undocumented, but are suspected. There is every reason to believe that cadmium is accumulating steadily in the environment, and its known characteristics as a persistent cumulative poison in the body give much reason for concern.123

FLUORIDES Fluoridation of public water supplies for partial protection against tooth decay is an emotion-charged subject. The scientific evidence supporting the efficacy and safety of mass fluoridation at the generally recommended level of 1 milligram per liter of water (1 ppm) is not as good as it ought to be, but neither is there convincing evidence that it is harmful.124 Although there are certainly some cranks in the antifluoridation school, there are also some 12!

For a discussion of the difficulties of dealing in an economic framework with cadmium and pollutants with similar characteristics of accumulation and longevity, see C. L. Nobbs and D. W. Pierce, The economics of stock pollutants: The example of cadmium. 134

NAS, Fluorides; World Health Organization, Fluoride and human

health.

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serious and competent scientists and responsible laymen who have been unmercifully abused because of the position they have taken on this controversial issue. Perhaps the strongest argument against mass fluoridation of drinking water is that individual treatment with fluoride is simple and can be supplied cheaply on public funds for those wishing to use it. There is no question that fluoride is toxic in high concentrations, and fluoride pollution from a variety of industrial activities is a significant problem. Fluorides are discharged into the air from steel, aluminum, phosphate, pottery, glass, and brick works. These sources together emit perhaps 150,000 tons of hydrogen fluoride annually, and the same activities emit some tens of thousands of tons of fluorides annually into waterways.125 Intentional addition of fluorides in fluoridation programs makes a modest but not negligible contribution of perhaps 20,000 tons per year to the human-caused fluoride inputs to the environment. The main problems encountered in trying to evaluate health threats from fluoride pollution are familiar ones: the boundary between safe and unsafe levels is a fuzzy one; some individuals are more sensitive than others; and fluorides may act in combination with other pollutants to do damage at concentrations where the fluorides alone would not be harmful. Fluorides have been shown to concentrate in food chains, and evidence suggesting a potential for significant ecological effects is accumulating.126 Harm to terrestrial plants and algae at concentrations encountered in polluted environments has been documented, and the ability of certain plants and microorganisms to synthesize particularly toxic organic fluorides has been demonstrated. The toxicity of inorganic and organic fluorides to soil organisms is essentially unexplored and is a potential danger point.

CHEMICAL MUTAGENS Many chemicals found in the environment are considered hazardous because they, like ionizing radiation (discussed in the following section), are able to cause 12

'Edward Groth III, Fluoride pollution. '"Ibid.

688 / UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL DISRUPTION

length of the growing season substantially. Not surprisingly, then, there is a strong and well-documented connection between weather and agricultural production nationally and worldwide—"good" weather means high yields; "bad" weather means low yields. Furthermore, increased variability in weather can be as disruptive of agriculture as changes in mean conditions.221 This phenomenon is the reason that no rapid change in climate is likely to be an improvement; the crops grown in a given region generally are quite closely adapted to the typical weather pattern—the climate—in that region. Therefore, any significant change tends to be, from the standpoint of growing a particular crop, a change from good weather to bad. Farming practices —time of planting, in particular—are also based on expected weather patterns. Naturally, patterns of agriculture could be modified to follow at least some kinds of climatic change, if the change were gradual enough. Artificially induced climatic change might be quite rapid, however, as indeed some natural changes apparently have been in the past. As discussed in Chapter 7, there is no leeway in the world food situation to absorb a significant climate-induced drop in production over broad areas of the world. Whatever adjustments in crop characteristics and cultivation patterns might eventually be made in response to rapid climate change would come too late to save hundreds of millions from famine. Another, somewhat more speculative respect in which climate change could lead to great increases in human misery is by altering the abundance and the geographical distribution of various disease-producing organisms. As is the case with crops, the degree to which such organisms and the other organisms that transport them (vectors) thrive is governed by such environmental conditions as temperature and moisture, in terms of both averages and extremes. Changes in climatic patterns therefore might give certain of those organisms access to human populations that have no prior evolutionary experience with them and hence little or no resistance to them. Alternatively, such changes might remove checks on the abundance of organisms preexisting in an area, to the extent that a previously minor hazard becomes a 22 'For more extensive discussion and more reviews of recent statistics, see Chapter 7 and Schneider and Mesirow, The getiesis strategy.

plague. (This is true of pathogens that attack crops and trees, as well as those that attack people.)222 It is obvious, of course, that sustained climatic change either in the form of a new glaciation or a prolonged wanning that involved substantial melting of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets would change the pattern of human settlement as well as that of agriculture. The melting of half the volume of present ice sheets would raise sea level by about 40 meters, enough to flood most coastal cities and cover many fertile coastal plains. Such extensive melting would require enormous amounts of energy, however, and so could not occur overnight. If climate changed so drastically that an additional 5 percent of all the solar energy now reaching Earth's surface were absorbed in the melting of ice (compared to the fraction of a percent presently absorbed in summer melting of ice that is restored in winter), sea level would rise about 1.1 meters per year.223 A climate change great enough to produce this result would damage world agriculture so severely that the effect of the initial change in sea level would hardly be noticed by comparison.

Intentional Modification of Weather and Climate The idea of influencing the weather intentionally dates back to the rain dances and related rituals of many nontechnological civilizations. Modifying the weather by technological means, however, had its real beginnings in 1946, when it was demonstrated that seeding clouds with dry ice or silver iodide could produce precipitation when none would have occurred naturally. Thirty years later, rainmaking was rather widely practiced in some parts of the world, but many details of its effectiveness and side effects remained controversial. Rainmaking works under some meteorological conditions but not under others; sometimes the attempt may actually pro222 See ]. M. May, Influence of environmental transformation in changing the map of disease, in The careless technology, Farvar and Milton, eds.; G. H. Hepting, Climate and forest diseases, in Man's impact, Matthews, Kellogg, and Robinson, eds., pp. 203-226. 223 This figure is readily obtained from the following data: heat of melting of ice, 330 megajoules per cubic meter of water produced; area of oceans, 360 X 1012 square meters; solar energy reaching Earth's surface, 2.7 X 101B megajoules per year.

DISRUPTION OF ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS /

duce less precipitation than would have occurred naturally. How far downwind of the seeding activity the effects persist is not known, and the genuine possibility of decreasing needed rainfall on neighboring regions (including neighboring nations) poses serious political problems.224 Seeding has been used not only to produce rain, but also, under varying circumstances, to dissipate cold fog (by initiating formation of ice crystals that fall out), to suppress hail (by fostering formation of many small particles rather than fewer large ones), and to steer hurricanes and/or weaken the winds associated with them. These measures, too, have the potential for inadvertent side effects and for transferring bad weather to one's neighbors. Indeed, Honduras blamed its disastrous hurricane (Fifi) of 1974 on just such activity by the United States, although there is no evidence to support the claim and the United States weather bureau denied it. The practice of altering hurricanes contains the remarkable possibility that intentional weather modification on one scale will lead to unintentional climate modification on another. This is so because those tropical storms play a crucial role in the global climatic balance by transporting energy from the warm tropics into the cooler middle latitudes. Systematic disruption of that function would unquestionably produce significant alterations of climate over large regions, in forms not nowpredictable in detail. Intentionally modifying not merely the local phenomena that make up the weather, but also the climate over large regions, has been discussed for years. We might hope that the rather primitive state of knowledge concerning climatic machinery and how civilization may unintentionally be modifying it would discourage all groups from any deliberate intervention for a long time to come, but governments and other bodies have all too often shown themselves incapable of sensible restraint. Among the schemes that have been mentioned are: sprinkling soot on the Arctic sea ice to melt it, causing warmer but probably more snowy winters in the Arctic

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region; damming the Bering Strait, another way of causing the Arctic sea ice to melt; damming the Gulf Stream between Florida and Cuba; and creating a layer of stratospheric dust to counteract global warming due to carbon-dioxide buildup.225 In all these cases, present knowledge is inadequate to show that the unintended consequences would not exceed the intended ones. Naturally, the possibility of using weather modification as a weapon has not escaped the notice of military planners. The only known instance of actual use of such techniques, as of 1977, was the use of cloud seeding by the United States in Vietnam between 1967 and 1972. The aim of those operations was to inhibit the movement of troops and supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The actual physical effect was probably minimal: 5 or 6 centimeters may have been added to the typical monsoon rainfall of about 50 cm.226 The international political impact of the precedent of American use of weather as a weapon may be much greater. As understanding of climatic processes increases, the possibilities of misusing the new knowledge for weaponry become more awesome. The possibility of using chemicals to poke holes deliberately in another nation's ozone shield is now obvious enough, and intentional manipulation of storms and droughts does not seem entirely farfetched. Geophysicist Gordon MacDonald has emphasized the possibility that environmental warfare using climate modification could be carried out covertly over a period of years without the victims' being aware of the cause of their misfortunes.227 The potential for destruction, both intentional and inadvertent, associated with climatic warfare is second only to that of biological and nuclear war (and even this ranking may eventually prove to be questionable). It is therefore of the greatest importance to outlaw the use of weather- and climate-modification weapons by international agreement, notwithstanding the obvious difficulties of monitoring and enforcement. The Soviet Union and the United States submitted a joint proposal for a 22s

224

For good introductions to the subject of weather modification, see National Academy of Sciences, Weather and climate modification: Problem!, and prospects, 1966, and Weather and climate modification: Proble»is and progress, 1973, Washington, 0.C-

See Kellogg and Schneider, Climate stabilization. "The Vietnam operations and other important elements of military weather modification are described in G. J. F. MacDonald, Weather as a weapon, Technology Review, vol. 78, no. 1 (Oct./Nov. 1975), pp. 57-63. 22'Ibid.

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pact prohibiting environmental warfare to the Geneva disarmament talks in August 1975. The pact would rule out "military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to another state."228 This wording would preclude not only modification of weather and climate for military purposes, but also the intentional production of earthquakes, tidal waves, and ecological imbalances of various kinds.

THERMONUCLEAR WARFARE Much has been written, especially by military theoretician Herman Kahn, on the effects of thermonuclear warfare, the possibilities of limited thermonuclear warfare, and so on.229 Since modern societies seem bent on continuing to prepare for such conflicts, we have little sympathy for those of Kahn's critics who feel that it is immoral to try to analyze the possible results. It would be pleasant (but probably incorrect) to assume that if everyone were aware of the terrible magnitude of the devastation that could result from a nuclear war, the stockpiles of fission and fusion weapons would soon be dismantled. This does not mean that Kahn's analysis is sound—quite the contrary. It has the major flaw of grossly underrating the possible environmental consequences of those projected wars. In addition to the instantaneous slaughter of millions of people and the demolition of property, the effects of any large thermonuclear exchange would inevitably constitute an enormous ecological and genetic disaster—especially for a world already on the edge of nutritional and environmental catastrophe. Consider the effects that even a rather limited nuclear exchange among the United States, USSR, China, and various European powers would have on the world food supply. Suddenly, international trade would be greatly reduced, and the developed world would be in no position to supply either food or technological aid to the less developed. No more high-yield seed, no more fertilizers, no more grain shipments, no more tractors, no 225

Ibid., p. 63. Herman Kahn, On tJiermonuclear war; and On escalation.

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more pumps and well-drilling equipment, trucks, other manufactured products or machines would be delivered. Similarly, the LDCs would not be able to send DCs minerals, petroleum, and food products. The world could be pitched into chaos and massive famine almost immediately, even if most countries were themselves untouched by the nuclear explosions. But of course no country would be left unscathed. All over the world radiation levels would rise, possibly preventing cultivation of crops in many areas. Blast effects and huge fires burning in the Northern Hemisphere would send large amounts of debris into the atmosphere, conceivably dwarfing the volcanic and pollution effects previously discussed.230 The entire climate of the Earth could be altered, especially since large holes would probably be punched in the ozone layer. In many areas, where the supply of combustible materials was sufficient, huge fire storms would be generated, some of them covering many hundreds of square kilometers in heavily forested or metropolitan areas. Something is known about such storms from-experience during World War II. On the night of July 27,1943, Lancaster and Halifax heavy bombers of the British Royal Air Force dropped 2200 metric tons of incendiary and high-explosive bombs on the city of Hamburg. Thousands of individual fires coalesced into a fire storm covering about 15 square kilometers. Flames reached 4500 meters into the atmosphere, and smoke and gases rose to 12,000 meters. Winds, created by huge updrafts and blowing in toward the center of the fire, reached a velocity of more than 240 kilometers per hour. The temperature in the fire exceeded 787° C, high enough to melt aluminum and lead. Air in underground shelters was heated to a point where, when they were opened and oxygen was admitted, flammable materials and even corpses burst into flame. The shelters had to cool for ten days to two weeks before rescuers could enter. Anyone interested in further details of what a small fire storm is like is referred to Martin Caidin's excellent book, The night Hamburg died.2*1 From his account, we 2M The extent of fires is a matter of some controversy—see W. S. Osburn, Jr., Forecasting long-range ecological recovery from nuclear attack. 231 Ballantine, New York, 1960. For a literary view, see Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse five, which describes the results of a similar raid on Dresden (Dell, New York, 1971).

DISRUPTION OF ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS /

can imagine the ecological consequences of generating numerous fire storms and burning off a substantial portion of the Northern Hemisphere. In areas where conditions led to the development of fire storms, the removal of all vegetation would not be the only effect; the soil might be partly or completely sterilized, as well. There would be few plant communities nearby to donate the seeds for rapid repopulation, and rains would wash away the topsoil. Picture what now happens on defoliated California hills during the winter rains, and then imagine the vast loads of silt and radioactive debris being washed from immense bare areas of northern continents into offshore waters, the site of most of the ocean's productivity. Consider the fate of aquatic life, which is especially sensitive to the turbidity of the water, and think of the many offshore oil wells and supertankers that would be destroyed by blast in the vicinity of large cities and left to pour their loads of crude oil into the ocean. Think of the runoff of solvents, fuels, and other chemicals from ruptured storage tanks and pipelines. And radioactivity from nuclear reactors, fuel reprocessing plants, and other nuclear-power facilities would be added to that of the bombs themselves. Ecosystems would be assaulted as they are assaulted in peacetime (as we have seen, radiation stresses do not differ greatly from others), but the scale of the assault and its rapidity would be unprecedented. Recovery would inevitably be much slower than from other kinds of ecocatastrophes.232 The human survivors of any large-scale thermonuclear war would face a severely devastated environment. If a full-scale war were waged in which a substantial portion of United States and Soviet weapons were detonated, most of the survivors would be in the Southern Hemisphere. They would lack many of the tools needed to maintain a modern civilization, since much technology would be irretrievably lost. If the technological structure of society were destroyed, it would be almost impossible for survivors to rebuild it because of resource depletion. Most high-grade ores and rich and accessible fossil-fuel deposits have long since been used up. Technology itself 232

E. P. Odum, Summary, in Ecological effects of nuclear mar, G. M. Woodwell, ed., pp. 69-72. See also NAS, Long-term, which is incomplete and has poorly-thought-through conclusions but contains useful data and bibliographies.

is necessary for access to what remains. Only if enough scrap metals and stored fuel remained available would there be a hope of reconstruction, which would have to begin promptly before those stocks rusted, drained away, or were lost in other ways. Even more serious, banks of plant genetic material would certainly be destroyed or lost through lack of care, making the regeneration of high-yield agriculture difficult or impossible. From what is known of past large disasters, it seems unlikely that survivors, without outside assistance, would be able psychologically to start rapid reconstruction.233 If there were extensive use of nuclear weapons in both hemispheres, or if chemical or biological weapons were used simultaneously, the survivors would probably consist of scattered, isolated groups. Such groups would face genetic problems, since each would possess only a small part of humanity's genetic variability and would be subject to a further loss of variability through inbreeding. Studies of human populations have shown that inbreeding increases infant mortality. In addition, it appears that prenatal damage increases linearly with the degree of inbreeding.234 In such a situation it is problematical whether culturally and genetically deprived groups of survivors could persist in die face of much harsher environmental conditions than they had faced previously. In short, it would not be necessary to kill every individual with blast, fire, radiation, nerve gas, and padiogens in order to force Homo sapiens into extinction.

ECOLOGICAL ACCOUNTING Many existing and potential forms of ecological disruption have been described in this chapter, sometimes in rather technical detail. It may be helpful at this point to summarize the relevance of these considerations to human welfare. In other words, just what could an ecological catastrophe mean for human beings? The various ways in which the biosphere supports human life were outlined at the beginning of the chapter. 233 There is a fascinating literature on reactions to and recovery from catastrophes. See A. H. Barton, Communities in disaster: A sociological analysis of collective stress situations, especially the last chapter. •""L. L. Livaili-Siorza and W. F. Bodmer, The genetics of Human populations, W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1971.

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71 6 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

many benefits of specialization and division of labor, of economies of scale in the use of technology, of cultural diversity, and so on. The optimum population size, then, lies somewhere between the minimum and maximum possible sizes.

THE OPTIMUM POPULATION Biochemist H. R. Hulett has made some interesting calculations bearing on the subject of an optimum population. He assumed that the average United States citizen would not consider the resources available to him or her excessive, and he then divided estimates of the world production of those resources by the American per-capita consumption. On this basis, Hulett concluded: " . . . it appears that (about) a billion people is the maximum population supportable by the present agricultural and industrial system of the world at U.S. levels of affluence."1 By Hulett's criteria, then, even ignoring depletion of nonrenewable resources and environmental deterioration, the population of the Earth is already 3 billion people above the present optimum. Since decisions that determine population size are made, consciously and unconsciously, by the people alive at a given time, it seems reasonable to define the optimum size in terms of their interests. Accordingly, one might define the optimum as the population size below which well-being per person is increased by further growth and above which well-being per person is decreased by further growth. Like most definitions of elusive concepts, this one raises more questions than it answers. How is well-being to be measured? How does one deal with the uneven distribution of well-being and particularly with the fact that population growth may increase the well-being of some people while decreasing that of others? What if a region is overpopulated in terms of one aspect of well-being but underpopulated in terms of another? What about the well-being of future generations? One cannot define an optimum population for any part of the 'Optimum world population. Note that there is a large volume of conventional economic literature in existence that focuses on a narrowly denned economic optimum. This literature is of little interest to the discussion here (see, e.g., Spengler, Optimum population theory).

world at any time without reference to the situation in all other parts of the world and in the future. No complete answers are possible, but it is time that such questions be seriously addressed. The following observations are intended mainly to stimulate further discussion. Priorities The physical necessities—food, water, clothing, shelter, a healthful environment—are indispensable ingredients of well-being. A population too large and too poor to be supplied adequately with them has exceeded the optimum, regardless of whatever other aspects of wellbeing might, in theory, be enhanced by further growth. Similarly, a population so large that it can be supplied with physical necessities only by the rapid consumption of nonrenewable resources or by activities that irreversibly degrade the environment has also exceeded the optimum, for it is reducing Earth's carrying capacity for future generations. If an increase in population decreases the well-being of a substantial number of people in terms of necessities while increasing that of others in terms of luxuries, the population has exceeded the optimum for the existing sociopolitical system. The same is true when population increase leads to a larger absolute number of people being denied the necessities—even if the fraction of the population so denied remains constant (or even shrinks). It is frequently claimed that the human population is not now above the optimum because if the available food (and other necessities) were in some way equitably distributed there would be enough for everyone.2 But it is only sensible to evaluate optimum population size in terms of the organisms in the population under consideration, not in terms of hypothetical organisms. Thus, if an area of Africa has more lions than the local prey can support and the lions are starving, then there is an overpopulation of lions even though all the lions could have enough to eat if they evolved the capacity to eat grass. Grossly unequal distribution of food and other goods is characteristic of contemporary Homo sapiens just as 2 For example, Barry Commoner, How poverty breeds overpopulation (and not the other way around), Ramparts, August/September 1975.

HUMANITY AT THE CROSSROADS /

Their results showed that some form of disaster lies ahead unless all the factors are controlled: population growth, pollution, resource consumption, and the rate of capital investment (industrialization). This was hardly a new conclusion in 1972. Indeed, the argumentation and evidence for this general world-view had been accumulating steadily since the time of Mai thus (see Box 13-2), and a rash of books drawing substantially similar conclusions had appeared in the decades following World War II.C What accounts, then, for the extraordinary response—both disparaging and laudatory—that these views elicited when they appeared in Limits to Growth in 1972? Several factors contributed: first, the status of M.I.T. as virtually a worldwide synonym for careful scientific analysis; second, the sponsorship of the project by the vaguely mysterious Club of Rome, an international collection of influential academicians, industrialists, and public figures; third, the extraordinarily direct and lucid style with which the authors presented their conclusions; and fourth, the major role played in the underlying analysis by a "computer model" of the world. Of these factors, the last was almost certainly the most important. The book appeared at a time when the capabilities of large computers had already become part of public conventional wisdom (or folklore), but when the idea that computer results are no better than the information fed into them was not so widespread. Thus the notion that a computer had certified the bankruptcy of growth gave the conclusion public credibility, and at the same time provided a target for indignant economists and others who saw the outcome as an illustration of the syndrome known in the computing trade as "garbage in, garbage out.'"* How do computer models in general, and the Limits model in particular, actually work? The 'For example, William Vogt, Road to survival; Fairfield Osbome, Our plundered planet; Harrison Brown, The challenge of man's future; Georg Borgstrom, The hungry planet, Macmillan, New York, 1965; Paul Ehrlich, The population bomb, Ballantine, New York, 1968; Preston Cloud, ed., Resources and man, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1969; P. R. Ehrlich and A. H. Ehrlich, Population resources, environment, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1970. 'See, for example, K. Kaysen, The computer that printed out W*O*L*F, Foreign Affairs, 1972, which tries but fails to stick the "garbage" label on Limits to Growth, missing the point in major respects.

Resources*-^

Food per capita

1900

1950

2000

2100

FIGURE 12-2

The "standard" world model run assumes no major change in the physical, economic, or social relationships that have historically governed the development of the world system. All variables plotted here follow historical values from 1900 to 1970. Food, industrial output, and population grow exponentially until the rapidly diminishing resource base forces a slowdown in industrial growth. Because of natural delays in the system, both population and pollution continue to increase for some time after the peak of industrialization. Population growth is finally halted by a rise in the death rate due to decreased food and medical services. (After Meadows et al., 1972.)

idea behind computer modeling is to simulate in a general way the behavior of complicated physical systems. The technique is used when the situation of interest is too complicated to analyze with equations solvable with pencil and paper, or with laboratory or field experiments on a reasonable scale; and when it is too time-consuming or too risky simply to observe the real system and see what happens. Systems or processes that meet these conditions and that accordingly have been studied with computer models include the global meteorological system, various ecosystems, the safety systems of nuclear reactors, the growth of cities, and the evolution of galaxies. In all such cases, models are constructed by identifying what seem to be the most important (Continued)

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HUMANITY AT THE CROSSROADS / 733

technology would reduce resource input and pollutant output per unit of material standard of living to zero. The first assumption is contrary to all recent experience; doublings of agricultural productivity have required triplings and quadruplings of technological inputs. The second assumption is impossible in principle since it violates the second law of thermodynamics, one of the most thoroughly verified laws of nature. All one could safely conclude from this work is that Forrester's model is "sensitive" to the introduction of miracles into the assumptions. Presumably, the more sophisticated model in Limits to Growth would also be "sensitive" in this way, but that is hardly a defect. The most detailed critique of the Limits model was performed by a group at the University of Sussex, England, and was published together with a reply by the authors of Limits of Growth in a book called Models of Doom.11 The Sussex ^ critics accused the Limits group of leaving out economics and social change, of underestimating the power of technology, and of daring to make policy recommendations on the basis of a flawed model. The response of the Limits group was that their model probably overestimated the effectiveness of the price mechanism rather than underestimated it, that evidence of the limitations of technology has been accumulating rapidly, that in the absence of any perfect models one must make policy recommendations with the best ones available, and that social change (which is hard to model) is precisely what they were trying to stimulate by their recommendations. On the issue of whether the model overstated or understated the imminence of disaster, we might add that the simplistic treatment of environmental risks probably understated the danger more than other flaws overstated it. Probably the most imposing attempt to construct a more realistic model than that in Limits was described in 1974 inMankindat the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome, by M. Mesarovic and E. Pestel. This model divided the world into ten political/geographical regions, modeling each of these on five "strata": (1) physical environment; (2) technology; (3) eco*H. Cole, C. Freeman, M. Jahoda, K. Pravitt, eds., Models of doom. Universe Books, New York, 1973.

nomic systems; (4) institutional and social responses; and (5) individual needs and responses. Notwithstanding Turning Point's occasional gratuitous disparagement of the oversimplification in Limits to Growth (difficult to understand in view of its obvious debt to the earlier work), the conclusions were strikingly similar: continuation of recent trends in population growth, industrialization, and environmental disruption will lead to disaster; deliberate and massive social and economic change will be necessary-to avoid this outcome. The added sophistication of Turning Point's regional disaggregation, showing the problems that can arise from such interactions as competition among regions for scarce resources, should be welcomed. At the same time, it seems fair to say that the net effect of this added degree of detail is to make the prognosis more pessimistic than that in Limits, not less so. Basically, regional disaster or negative interactions leading to wars seem more imminent than a uniform global disaster, which was the only kind the aggregated model in Limits could reveal. (This, of course, is another conclusion that many analysts have reached over the years without benefit of computer modeling). Obviously, the model in Turning Point is still far from perfect. Certainly neither it nor other computer models can be used to predict the future in detail. Nevertheless, computer modeling seems a useful way to acquire or communicate insights about the implications of present trends, and it has the great advantage of requiring that assumptions about relevant relationships be made explicit. Surely this is an improvement over the situation most likely to prevail when people think about the future of a complicated world—the "models" in their heads are full of assumptions that are not only unstated but perhaps even unrecognized. In short, those critics who believe the world cannot be modeled should stop thinking about the future entirely, for implicitly all who do are modeling in their heads. The purpose of caring at all where humanity is going, of course, whether one finds out with or without the aid of a computer, is not prediction for its own sake. It is, rather, that if we do not like the projected consequences of present trends and values, we can take conscious action to change course.

Of all things people are the most precious. CHAPTER

—Mao Tse Tung

13

Population Policies permit the death rate to increase, which, of course, will inevitably occur by the agonizing "natural" processes already described if mankind does not rationally reduce its birth rate in time. Even given a consensus that curbing population growth is necessary and that limiting births is the best approach, however, there is much less agreement as to how far and how fast population limitation should proceed. Acceptance of the first goal listed above requires only that one recognize the obvious adverse consequences of rapid population growth—for example, dilution of economic progress in less developed countries, and aggravation of environmental and social problems in both developed and less developed countries. Economists and demographers, many of whom will not accept

Any set of programs that is to be successful in alleviating the set of problems described in the foregoing chapters must include measures to control the growth of the human population. The potential goals of such measures in order of possible achievement are: 1. Reduce the rate of growth of the population, although not necessarily to zero. 2. Stabilize the size of the population; that is, achieve a zero rate of growth. 3. Achieve a negative rate of growth in order to reduce the size of the population. Presumably, most people would agree that the only humane means of achieving any of these goals on a global basis is by reducing the birth rate. The alternative is to 737

738 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

the third goal at all and ascribe no urgency to the second, generally do espouse the first one (at least for the LDCs). Accepting the second^goal simply means recognizing that Earth's capacity to support human beings is limited and that, even short of the limits, many problems are related to population size itself rather than only to its rate of growth. Accepting the idea that stabilizing the size of the population is urgently necessary requires recognizing that the limits are already being approached and that, although technological and cultural change may eventually push the limits back somewhat, the prudent course is to halt population growth until existing problems can be solved. Virtually all physical and natural scientists accept the ultimate inevitability of halting population growth, and most of them accept the urgency of this goal. Much of the first part of this book has been an exposition of why the "inevitable and urgent" position is reasonable. The most controversial goal is the third one listed above—reducing the size of the human population. Accepting this goal implies a belief that there is an optimum population size and that this optimum has already been exceeded (or will have been exceeded by the time population growth can be stopped). It also implies that each society has a right—indeed a responsibility—to regulate its population size in reference to the agreedupon optimum. In a world where the right (and the responsibility) of married couples to determine their own family size has become a widely accepted notion only in the past generation or two, the idea that nations have such a right or obligation is a truly radical one. Unfortunately, humanity cannot afford to wait another quarter century for the idea to gain complete acceptance. Given the threat to the environment posed by today's population in combination with today's technology, and given the menace this situation represents to an already faltering ability to provide enough food for the people now alive, it is clear that the human population is already above the optimum size. (How/ar above the optimum is more difficult to determine; see Chapter 12). It is, of course, conceivable that technological and social change will push up the optimum in the time it takes to bring population growth to zero. More probably, however, the population size will have to be reduced eventually to below today's level if a decent life is to be assured for everyone.

Whether this view of long-term necessity is accepted or not, of course, the goal of any sensible population policy for the immediate future is the same—to gain control over growth. This chapter describes the recent evolution of population policies, explores some potential (but still largely unexploited) means of achieving such control over population growth, and discusses the interacting effects of other policies (especially development policies) on population growth.

FAMILY PLANNING An essential feature of any humane program to reguias the size of the human population must be provision :: effective means for individuals to control the number i^~ timing of births. This approach is commonly terrzez "family planning," and family planning programs h='; been introduced in many LDCs in the past two decades with the goal of providing the means of birth control:: the people. These are the main population policies zc~ in existence. The family planning movement, however, historically has been oriented to the needs of individuals ST.: families, not of societies. Although birth control :; essential for achieving population control, family planing and population control are not synonymous. Before proceeding to an examination of the important differ e~;c between the two, some historical perspective on the practice of birth control and the family planning movement is in order.

Birth Control Many birth control practices are at least as old as recorded history. The Old Testament contains obvious references to the practice of withdrawal, or coitus interruptus (removal of the penis from the woman's vagina before ejaculation). The ancient Egyptians used crude barriers to the cervix made from leaves or cloth, and even blocked the cervical canal with cotton fibers. The ancient Greeks practiced population control through their social system as well as through contraception; they discouraged marriage and encouraged homosexual rela-

BOX 13-1 Institutionalized Infanticide in the Eighteenth Century* Where the Number of lusty Batchelors is large, many are the merry-begotten Babes: On these Occasions, if the Father is an honest Fellow and a true Church of England-Man, the new-born Infant is baptized by an indigent Priest, and the Father provides for the Child: But the Dissenters, Papists, Jews, and other Sects send their Bastards to the Foundling Hospital; if they are not admitted, there are Men and Women, that for a certain Sum of Money will take them, and the Fathers never hear what becomes of their Children afterwards . . . in and about London a prodigious Number of Infants are cruelly murdered unchristened, by those Infernals, called Nurses; these detestable Monsters throw a Spoonful of Gin, Spirits of Wine, or HungaryWater down a Child's Throat, which instantly 'This material is quoted from George Burrington's pamphlet "An answer to Dr. William Brakenridge's letter concerning the number of inhabitants, with the London bills of mortality," London, J.Scott (1757).

tionships, especially for men. The condom, or penis sheath, dates back at least to the Middle Ages. Douching, the practice of flushing out the vagina with water or a solution immediately after intercourse, has had a similarly long history. Abortion is a very ancient practice and is believed to have been the single most common form of birth control in the world throughout history, even during the past century when it was illegal in most countries. The simplest, most effective, and perhaps the oldest method of birth control is abstention; but this method seems to have been favored mainly by older men, particularly unmarried members of the clergy. Infanticide, which is viewed with horror today by prosperous people in industrialized societies, has probably always been practiced by societies lacking effective contraceptive methods.1 It was a rather common practice among the ancient Greeks, and the Chinese and Japanese are known to have used it for centuries, especially in times of famine. In agrarian or warlike societies, female infanticide has often been practiced to provide a greater proportion of men or to consolidate upper classes. Only a century or two ago, infanticide was widely practiced in 'Mildred Dickeman, Demographic consequences of infanticide in man.

strangles the Babe; when the Searchers come to inspect the Body, and enquire what Distemper caused the Death, it is answered, Convulsions, this occasions the Article of Convulsions in the Bills of Mortality so much to exceed all others. The price of destroying and interring a Child is but Two Guineas; and these are the Causes that near a Third die under the Age of Two Years, and not unlikely under two Months. I have been informed by a Man now living, that the Officers of one Parish in Westminster, received Money for more than Five Hundred Bastards, and reared but One out of the whole Number. How surprizing and shocking must this dismal Relation appear, to all that are not hardened in Sin? Will it not strike every one, but the Causers and Perpetrators with Dread and Horror? Let it be considered what a heinous and detestable Crime Child-murder is, in the Sight of die Almighty, and how much it ought to be abhorred and prevented by all good people.

Europe in an institutionalized, although socially disapproved system sometimes called "baby farming" (Box 13-1).2 Infanticide rarely takes the form of outright murder. Usually it consists of deliberate neglect or exposure to the elements. Among the Eskimos and other primitive peoples who live in harsh environments where food is often scarce, infanticide was, until recently, a common practice, as greater importance was placed on the survival of the group than on the survival of an additional child. There is a strong suspicion that female infanticide persists in parts of rural India. It exists even in our own society, especially among the overburdened poor, although intent might be hard to prove. Certainly "masked infanticide" is extremely common among the poor and hungry in less developed countries, where women often neglect ill children, refuse to take them to medical facilities, and may even show resentment toward anyone who attempts treatment. According to Dr. Sumner Kalman of the Stanford University Medical Center, the average poor mother in Colombia—where 80 percent or more of a large family's income may be needed to provide ^William L. Langer, Checks on population growth: 1750-1850.

BHHBBBBHBI

BOX 13-2 Thomas Robert Malthus, 1766-1834 The name Malthus and the terms Malthusian and neo-Malthusian are so completely identified with concern about population pressure that a note about the man seems appropriate. Robert Malthus enjoyed what was certainly one of the happiest personal situations ever devised by man; he was an eighteenth-century English country gentleman of independent means. His youth and early manhood were spent in the last years of the Enlightenment, the Age of Reason, a time when learned and wise men saw themselves on the threshold of a world of concord among men and nations in which want and oppression would not exist. Man's imminent entry into this paradise was to be achieved through his discovery of the immutable Laws of Nature which were thought to be such that they could be understood by the human faculty of Reason. All discord, want, and cruelty-were held to result from an ignorance of these Laws, which led man to their disobedience. It was an age of very great hope when Nature and Reason were enshrined. Malthus' father, Daniel, the very embodiment of these values, was well connected in the intellectual and philosophical circles of the time, being a close associate of David Hume and a correspondent, friend, and finally, an executor of Jean Jacques Rousseau. In 1784, after a preparation through home tutoring, Malthus entered Cambridge, where in 1788 he graduated with first-class honors in mathematics. With graduation he took Holy Orders in the Church of England but remained at Cambridge, where he achieved his M.A. in 1791 and became a Fellow of his College in 1793. In 1796 he became curate of the church at Albury, where his father resided, and settled down to country life.

sterilization had become the single most popular method. By 1970 one-quarter of American women over 30 either were sterilized or their husbands were; by 1973, 23 percent of married couples of all ages relied on sterilization for birth control. Most of the women not using birth control in the 1965 and 1970 surveys were subfertile, pregnant, or planning to use contraceptives only when their families were complete. Moreover, despite the official position of the Roman Catholic church, Catholic women in these surveys showed a level of use of

These were the years of the French Revolution, years that Dickens called "the best of times, the worst of times." Neither the Revolution's war, internal and external, nor even its Terror yet dampened the ambience of optimism that characterized the world of thought. In 1793 William Godwin published his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and the next year saw the appearance of the Marquis de Condorcet's Essay on the Progress of the Human Spirit, both of which sought to demonstrate that man's progress from darkness, superstition, and cruelty into the light of Concord through Reason was almost complete. Daniel Malthus, like most of the thoughtful men of the time, was much taken by these writings, but Robert could not share his enthusiasm. Cambridge had not, as he put it, given him "that command over his understanding which would enable him to believe what he wished without evidence." The concern that haunted Robert was population growth. How could a perfect society be achieved, let alone maintained, if population was constantly pressing against resources? Finally, Robert committed his misgivings to writing so he could present them systematically to his father. Daniel was so impressed with the arguments that he encouraged his son to publish them, which he did anonymously in 1798, under the tide, An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society With Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet and Oilier Writers. His speculations centered on the proposition that man's "power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence. . . . " This he propounded with strict immutability and mathematical regularity characteristic of the Natural

"artificial" contraceptives nearly as high as that of non-Catholic women.8 How much of recent U.S. population growth was due to unwanted births has been a matter for debate among demographers. The National Fertility Study of 1965 indicated that 17 percent of all births between 1960 and 8 Charles F. Westoff, Changes in contraceptive practices among married couples, in Westoff, ed. Toward the end of growth, population in America; C. F. Westoff and L. Bumpass, The revolution in birth control practices of U.S. Roman Catholics.

742

Laws of the Age of Reason as "population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio . . . " The first Essay challenged the visions of an age and the reactions were immediate and predictably hostile, though many listened. The controversy led to the publication in 1803 of an enlarged, less speculative, more documented, but equally dampening second essay. This one was signed and bore the title, An Essay on the Principle of Population or a View of its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness with an Inquiry into our Prospects Respecting the Future Removal or Mitigation of the Evils it Occasions.* Malthus added to and modified the Essay in subsequent editions, but it stood substantially unchanged. In 1804 he accepted a post at the East India Company's college at Haileybury which prepared young men for the rule of India, where he remained until his death. His marriage, in the same year, ultimately produced three children. The ironies in Malthus' life are obvious. He was one of eight children. He occupied a position of comfort in an intellectual atmosphere of optimism, but was compelled by the rigor of his intellect to argue that nature condemned the bulk of humanity to live in the margin between barely enough and too little. Finally, his message as a teacher fell on the ears of future colonial bureaucrats who would guide or preside over the destinies of India. Since the conversations between Robert Malthus and his father almost two centuries ago, two sets of factors which were beyond their ken *Reprinted with numerous other articles on the same topic in Philip Appleman, ed., An essay on the principle of population.

have emerged. The first set combined to put elements into a population-subsistence relationship that Malthus could not have foreseen. On one hand, the introjiuction of massive death control procedures—immunization, purification of drinking water, the control of disease-carrying organisms., imprnvpfj sanitation, etc.—have removed many of the checks that Malthus assumed_ as "natural." On the other hand, developments in agriculture—high-yield plant strains, the powering of equipment with fossil fuels, the use of new techniques of fertilization and pest control—have massively increased food production. The second set of factors has become widely significant only in the last quarter century and evident to most laymen only in the last decade. These are the deleterious effects on the biosphere resulting from agriculture and industry. With our planet" s population bloated by death control and sustained only poorly through an agriculture based on nonrenewable resources and techniques which buy short-run, high yields at the expense of long-run, permanent damage to the "Earth's power to produce subsistence," we face a prospect inconceivable in the Age of Reason. Malthus looked into a dismal future of "vice and misery" begot of an uncontrolled, and, to his mind, uncontrollable population growth. We look into one where the dismal is compounded with peril, not because humanity cannot control its population, but because it will not.** "This box is a modification of an essay supplied to us by historian D. L. Bilderback. For further reading about Malthus, see particularly John Maynard Keynes, Essays in biography; ]. Sonar, Malthus and his avrk, 2d ed., 1924; G. F. McCleary, The Mahhusian population theory; and. of course, Malthus' First and Second Essavs.

However, another distinguished demographer, Judith Blake, pointed out that the high incidence of unwanted births calculated by Westoff for the U.S. during 19601965 was caused in large part by births occurring disproportionately to women who already had several children.10 During those six years, there were unusually small proportions of first and second children born and unusually large proportions of births of higher orders (which are more likely to be unwanted). Hence, due to

1965 were not wanted by both parents and 22 percent were not wanted by at least one parent. The incidence of unwanted births was found, not unexpectedly, to be highest among the poor, to whom birth control and safe abortion were least available. Demographer Charles Westoff estimated that eliminating such a high proportion of unwanted births might reduce the U.S. rate of natural increase by as much as 35 to 45 percent.9 9 L. A. Westoff and C. F. Westoff, From now to zero: fertility, contraception and abortion in America.

'"Reproductive motivation and population policy.

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/ THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

the age composition of the population, the total proportion of unwanted births in the U.S. was higher for those years than it has been at other times. During the late 1960s, such changes as the increasing use of the pill and lUDs and relaxation of restrictions against voluntary sterilization substantially reduced the incidence of unwanted births of all orders. Results of the 1970 National Fertility Study confirmed this change, indicating that only about 14 percent of births between 1965 and 1970 were unwanted.1' Most of the reduction in fertility in that period was due to reductions in unwanted and unplanned births. Since 1970, the extension of family planning services to the poor and the reversal of abortion laws (see below) have evidentlyfurther extended the trend, as attested by record low fertility rates. There is no question that providing better contraceptives and simplified sterilization procedures, legalizing abortion, and ensuring that all are easily available to all members of the population reduces the incidence of unwanted pregnancy—a socially desirable end in itself. But even if a perfect contraceptive were available, the contraceptive-using population probably never will be perfect. People forget, are careless, and take chances. They are also often willing to live with their mistakes when the mistakes are babies. The complete elimination of unwanted births therefore is probably not possible. Nor does that alone account for the dramatic drop in the U.S. birth rate in the early 1970s. Rather, it appears that a significant change in family-size goals took place around that time, especially among young people who were just starting their families.12 Changing attitudes in the United States. Public surveys taken between 1965 and 1972 revealed a growing awareness of the population problem on the part of the American public. In 1965, about half of the people interviewed in a Gallup Poll thought that U.S. population growth might be a serious problem; in 1971, 87 percent thought that it was a problem now or would be by the year 2000. In January 1971 only 23 percent of "Charles F. Westoff, The modernization of U.S. contraceptive practice; Trends in contraceptive practice: 1965-1973; The decline of unplanned births in the United States. I2 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Fertility history and prospects of American women: June 1975.

adults polled thought four or more children constituted the ideal family size, in contrast to 40 percent in 1967. One of the three most commonly given reasons for favoring small families in 1971 was concern about crowding and overpopulation; the others were the cost of living and uncertainty about the future. In October 1971, a survey sponsored by the U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future disclosed a still greater level of concern about the population explosion among Americans. Specifically, it was discovered that: 1. Over 90 percent of Americans viewed U.S. population growth as a problem; 65 percent saw it as a serious •problem. 2. Over 50 percent favored government efforts to slow population growth and promote population redistribution. 3. Well over 50 percent favored family limitation even if a family could afford more children. 4. About 56 percent favored adoption after births of two biological children if more were desired. 5. Only 19 percent felt that four or more children were the ideal number for a family; 45 percent favored two or less. The mean was 2.33. 6. Only 8 percent thought the U.S. population should be larger than its current size. Concurrent with the rise in public concern about population growth, ^ZeroJ'opulation Growth^ Inc., was founded in late 1968 to promote an end to U.S. population growth through lowered birth rates as soon as possible and, secondarily, to encourage the same goal for world population. The organization hoped to achieve this by educating the public to the dangers of uncontrolled population growth and its relation to resource depletion, environmental deterioration, and various social problems; and by lobbying and taking other political action to encourage the development of antinatalist policies in the government. Since its founding, ZPG has taken an active role in promoting access to birth control for all citizens, legalized abortion, women's rights, and environmental protection. More recently it has begun to explore changes in U.S. immigration policies. ZPG has clearly been a factor in changing attitudes toward family size and population control.

POPULATION POLICIES / 745

The growth of the \yr>tn^n's Hhpr^p'nn movement in the U.S. since 1965 has almost certainly been another important influence on attitudes (and thus on birthrates) through its emphasis on opportunities for women to fulfill themselves in roles other than motherhood. Many young women today are refreshingly honest about their personal lack of interest in having children and their concern for obtaining opportunities and pay equal to those of men. Such attitudes were virtually unthinkable in the United States before 1965. The women's movement was a potent force behind the liberalization of U.S. abortion laws, and has also actively campaigned for the establishment of low cost day-care centers for children and tax deductions for the costs of child care and household work. Such facilities and policies lighten the costs of childbearing, but they also encourage mothers to find work outside the home. The experience of many societies suggests that outside employment of mothers discourages large families more than the existence of child-care facilities encourages them. Both the growing concern about the population problem and the ideas of women's liberation doubtless contributed to changing attitudes toward family size in the 1970s. The economic uncertainty of the period may also have been a factor. While it may never be possible to determine the causes exactly, the achievement of subreplacement fertility in the United States is one of the most encouraging developments since 1970.

POPULATION POLICIES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES Although birth control in some form is almost universally practiced in developed countries, very few have formulated any explicit national policies on population growth other than regulation of migration. Some European countries still have officially pronatalist policies left over from before World War II, when low birth rates led to concern about population decline. Of course, many laws and regulations enacted for economic, health, or welfare reasons have demographic effects: for instance, those governing the availability of contraceptives, sterilization, and abortion; marriage and

divorce; income taxes and family allowances; and immigration regulations. The United States The United States has no specific population policy, although various laws, including those regulating immigration and the administration of income taxes, have always had demographic consequences. Most tax and other laws were until recently implicitly pronatalist in effect. In the late 1960s this situation began to change as state laws restricting the distribution of contraceptive materials and information were repealed and as abortion laws were relaxed in several states. In 1970 Congress passed the Family Planning Services and Population Research Act, established the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, and passed the Housing and Urban Development Act, which authorized urban redevelopment and the building of new towns. In 1972, an amendment to the Constitution affirming equal rights for women passed Congress, but as of 1977 it was not yet ratified by the required number of states. The Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970 had the goal of extending family planning counselling and services to all who needed them, particularly the poor. It also provided funds for research on human reproduction. Some 3.8 million women were being provided with family planning services by 1975, 90 percent of whom had low or marginal incomes. Another 1.9 million were being served by private physicians. But it has been estimated that another 3.6 million eligible women (including about 2.5 million sexually active teenagers) were still not receiving needed help in the mid-1970s. Particularly neglected were women in rural areas and small towns. Governmentsubsidized services have been provided through local health departments, hospitals, and private agencies (primarily Planned Parenthood), most of which are located in urban areas. A leveling-off of increases in clients in 1974 and 1975 over previous years has been attributed mainly to lack of increased funding by the government rather than to lack of need.13 1 'Marsha Corey, U.S. organized family planning programs in F 1974; Joy G. Dryfoos, The United States national family planning program, 1968-74; The Alan Guttmacher Institute. Organized family planning sen-ices in [he United States: FY 1975; T. H. Firpo and D. A. Lewis, Family planning needs and services in nomnetropolitan areas.

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/ THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

Since 1967, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) has been permitted to include family planning assistance in its programs. Funding for overseas family planning assistance has been steadily increasing since then, and by fiscal 1976 had reached a level of $201.5 million.14 The U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future presented its findings and recommendations in 1972 in the areas of demographic development, resource utilization, and the probable effects of population growth on governmental activities.15 After two years of study, the Commission concluded that there were no substantial benefits to be gained from continued population growth, and indeed that there were many serious disadvantages. Besides recommending the liberalization of abortion laws and numerous other population-related policies, the report strongly recommended that contraceptives be made available to all who needed them, including minors; that hospital restrictions on voluntary sterilization be relaxed; that sex education be universally available; and that health services related to fertility be covered by health insurance. It also recommended policies to deal with immigration, population distribution, and land use. Perhaps most important, the Commission stated: Recognizing that our population cannot grow indefinitely, and appreciating the advantages of moving now toward the stabilization of population, the Commission recommends that the nation welcome and plan for a stabilized population.16 Unfortunately, apart from expressing strong disagreement with the recommendations on abortion, President Nixon took no action on the Commission's report, nor did President Ford show any inclination to do so. The abortion question was made moot by the Supreme Court's decision in 1973 (see section on abortion below). Congress has contented itself mainly with expanding U AID in an Interdependent World, War on hunger special supplement, June 1975; see Phyllis T. Piotrow, World population crisis: The United States response for an historical account of U.S. involvement in overseas population programs. "Population and the American future. ^Population and the American future. By a "stabilized population," the Commission meant a stationary one.

federal family planning services. Thus, although the United States has not hesitated to advocate the establishment of official antinatalist population policies in less developed countries, it has not established one for itself. The current low fertility of American women seems to have taken the urgency from the zero population growth movement—even though that fertility trend could easily reverse itself at any time. Given its present age composition, the U.S. still could reach the higher population projections of the Census Bureau (Chapter 5) if another baby boom occurred. In the mid-1970s, however, no consensus for immediate ZPG existed, and interest in population problems has been focused on aspects other than the birth rate—primarily on distribution and immigration. Social objections to ZPG. The proposal to stop population growth naturally aroused considerable opposition on religious, social, and economic grounds. The role of religion in determining attitudes toward population growth, as well as toward the environment and resource limitation, is discussed in more detail in Chapter 14. The primary social argument that has been raised against halting U.S. population growth is that it would substantially change the nation's age composition.17 As the population stabilized, the median age would increase from about 28 to about 37. Less than 20 percent of the population would then be under 15, and about the same percentage would be over 65 years old. At present, about 25 percent of the population is under 15, and 11 percent is over 65. It is assumed that such an old population would present serious social problems. Figure 5-15 (Chapter 5) shows the age compositions of the U.S. in 1900 and 1970 and how it would look in a future stationary population. It is true that old people tend to be more conservative than young people, and they seem to have difficulty adjusting to a fast-changing, complex world. In an older population there would be relatively less opportunity for advancement in authority (there would be nearly as many 60 year-olds as 30 year-olds—so the number of potential l7 Ansley J. Coale, Man and his environment, Science, vol. 170, pp. 132-136 (9 Oct. 1970).

POPULATION POLICIES / 747

chiefs would be about the same as the number of Indians). There would also be many more retired people, a group already considered a burden on society. But even those who raise this argument must realize its fundamental fallacy. In the relatively near future, growth of the human population will stop. It would be far better for it to stop gradually through birth limitation than by the premature deaths of billions of people. (In the latter case, there would be other, much more serious problems to worry about). Therefore, if this generation does not initiate population control, we simply will be postponing the age composition problems, leaving them to be dealt with by our grandchildren or great grandchildren. Our descendants will be forced to wrestle with these problems in a world even more overcrowded, resource-poor, and environmentally degraded than today's. Moreover, the assumption that an older population must be much less desirable than a younger one is questionable in this society. Today, chronic underemployment and high unemployment are exacerbated by a labor pool constantly replenished by growing numbers of young people, which forces early retirement of the old, making them dependents on society. Many of our current social problems, including the recently skyrocketing crime rates and serious drug problems, are associated with the younger members of the population. If population growth stopped, the pressure of young people entering the labor pool would decline, while crime and unemployment problems could be expected to abate, as would the need for forced retirement of older workers. Old people today are obsolete to a distressing degree. But this is the fault of our social structure and especially of our educational system. The problem with old people is not that there are or will be so many of them, but that they have been so neglected. If underemployment were reduced, outside interests encouraged during the middle years, and education continued throughout adult life (as suggested in Chapter 14), older people would be able to continue making valuable contributions to society well into their advanced years. Maintaining the habits of active interest in society and learning new, useful skills might effectively prevent obsolescence and the tendency to become conservative and inflexible with advancing age. Thus, although there may be some disadvantages to an

older population, there are also some definite advantages. While the proportion of dependent retired people grew, that of young children would shrink. The ever-rising taxes demanded in recent decades to support expanding school systems and higher educational facilities would cease to be such a burden; indeed, that has begun to happen already. The same is true of resources now devoted to crime control and other problems primarily of young people. Some of that money could be diverted instead to programs to help the aged. Moreover, the growth in the proportion of senior citizens (the numbers will not change; they are already born) will be far more gradual than the decline in numbers of babies and small children that has already occurred, allowing ample time for society to adjust to the change. In the meantime, if birth rates remain low, the overall dependency ratio of the population will decline. In 1970 there were 138 dependents for every 100 workers in the United States; by 1980 the ratio will drop to about 118 and may be 112 or less by 1990.18 Even after the numbers of the aged begin to rise in the population, the dependency ratio will remain relatively low. As Kingsley Davis pointed out, the highest proportion (about 75 percent) of people in productive ages (15—65) is found in a population that is making the transition from growth to ZPG. The proportion is nearly as high in a stationary population (about 63 percent).19 And if years of productivity were extended to 70 and beyond, the proportion would be even higher, of course. By contrast, in very rapidly growing LDC populations, the proportion of people in their productive years (15 to 65) can be 50 percent or less. Economic objections to ZPG. The economic objections to ZPG are based upon the realization that a nongrowing population implies at least a much more slowly growing economy, if not a nongrowing one. This thought strikes fear in the breasts of most businessmen and economists, even though a perpetually growing economy is no more sustainable than a perpetually growing population. The implications of a steady-state economy are discussed in Chapter 14; here we limit 18 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population of the United States: Trends and prospects 1950-1990. "Zero population growth: the goal and the means, no. 4, 1973, pp. 15-30.

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/ THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

ourselves to some of the aspects more obviously related to population growth.20 In 1971, economist J. J. Spengler noted the economic advantages and disadvantages of ZPG.21 One of the advantages is increased productivity per person, partly because of greater capital available for investment, and partly because of a reduced dependency ratio. Other advantages include stabilized demand for goods and services; increased family stability as a result of there being fewer unwanted children; reduction of costs of environmental side effects; and opportunities to minimize the effects of population maldistribution. On the minus side, Spengler mentioned the problems associated with the changed age structure and pointed out that there would be a relative lack of mobility for workers and less flexibility in the economy because there would be fewer entrants into the labor force. He was also concerned that there might be a tendency toward inflation, due in part to increases in the service sector and in part to pressure to raise wages more than rising productivity justified. Recent events, as population growth has slowed (though there is not yet a decline in growth of the labor pool), suggest that Spengler may be right about the inflation pressures, although many other influences clearly are involved too. And certainly there are ways to compensate for those pressures. The question of labor shortage for an expanding economy in a stationary population has also been raised. But, as economist Alan Sweezy has pointed out, workers (and their families) are the main consumers as well as the producers.22 And, as mentioned above, the productive portion of a population is largest in stationary and transitional populations. There was speculation by economists during the 1930s and 1940s that consumption patterns would be drastically, and presumably adversely, changed if population growth stopped. But a recent study comparing consumption patterns in the U.S. population of 1960/1961 (when it was growing relatively fast) with those of a M

For a further discussion, see U.S. Commission on Population Growth, Population and the American future, vol. 2. 2 'Economic growth in a stationary population. PRB selection no. 38, Population Reference Bureau, Inc., Washington, D.C., July 1971; see also Spengler, Population and American future. 22 Labor shortage and population policy.

projected stationary population indicated thai -Jr.; changes would be surprisingly minor.23 The most nobble difference was that there would be proportions..; more households (called spending units by economists) IT. an older stationary population; families would be small;: but more numerous. Many of the changes in acruil spending patterns would balance each other; in a stationary population there would be a greater demand for housing, for instance, but a lower demand for clothing and transportation. In no case were the changes more than a few percent. Differential reproduction and genetic quality. A common concern about population control is that it will in some way lead to a reduction in the genetic quality of Homo sapiens.24 This concern is often expressed in such questions as "if the smart and responsible people limit their families while the stupid and irresponsible do not. couldn't that lead to a decline of intelligence and responsibility in humanity as a whole?" The technically correct answer is "no one knows"; the practical answer is "there is no point in worrying." No one knows, because it is not at all clear what, if any; portion of the variation in traits like "intelligence" or "responsibility" (however defined, and definition is difficult and controversial) is influenced by genetics. The most intensively studied example of such "mental" traits is performance on various so-called intelligence tests, and it has not been possible to demonstrate unambiguously that genes make any significant contribution to an individual's scores.25 There is no point in worrying about it because, even if these traits had a substantial genetic component and people with "bad" genes greatly outproduced people with "good" ones, it would take a great many generations (hundreds of years at a minimum) for the differential reproduction to produce a socially significant effect. Moreover, if such an effect were discovered, it could then 2! D. Eilenstine and J. P. Cunningham. Projected consumption patterns for a stationary population. 24 For discussion of this question, sec papers in C. J. Bajema (cd). Natural selection in hitman populations. 25 See especially Leon J. Kamin, The science and politics of IO for a critique of the twin data on which most of the evidence for the heritability of IQ rests.

749

be reversed either by reversing the selective pressures (for example, encouraging reproduction of those with high IQ test scores) or, more likely, by modifying the social environment in order to improve the performance of those with poor scores ("bad" genes). Note that we have put quotation marks around "good" and "bad." It is common for nonbiologists to think that heredity is a fixed endowment that rigidly establishes or limits skills, abilities, attitudes, or even social class. In fact, heredity is at most one of two sets of interacting factors, the other being the cultural and physical environment. When heredity does play a significant role (and it often may not), it is the product of this interaction that is of interest, and that product may be modified very effectively by changing the environment.26 There is therefore no need for deep concern about the possible genetic effects of population control. Another related issue that seems to encourage a pronatalist attitude in many people is the question of the differential reproduction of social or ethnic groups. Many people seem to be possessed by fear that their group may be outbred by other groups. White Americans and South Africans are worried there will be too many blacks, and vice versa. The Jews in Israel are disturbed by the high birth rates of Israeli Arabs, Protestants are worried about Catholics, and Ibos about Hausas. Obviously, if everyone tries to outbreed everyone else, the result will be catastrophe for all. This is another case of the "tragedy of the commons," wherein the "commons" is the planet Earth.26a Fortunately, it appears that, at least in the DCs, virtually all groups are exercising reproductive restraint. For example, in the United States fertility in the black population has consistently been higher than white fertility (black mortality has also been higher). Since birth control materials and information began to be made available to low-income people in the late 1960s, black fertility has been declining even more rapidly than white fertility. By 1974, black women under 25 expected to have essentially the same number of children as white 26 A detailed explanation for the layman of the complex issues of the inheritance of intelligence can be found in P. Ehrlich and S. Feldman, Race bomb. See also F. Osborn and C. J. Bajema, The eugenic hypothesis, for an optimistic evaluation of the genetic consequences of population control. 26a Garrett Hardin3 The tragedy of the commons.

women their age: an average of 2.2 (see Box 13-3).27 The ideal situation, in our opinion, would be for all peoples to place a high value on diversity. The advantages of cultural diversity are discussed in Chapter 15; the reasons for avoiding a genetic monoculture in Homo sapiens are essentially the same as those for avoiding one in a crop plant—to maintain resistance to disease and a genetic reservoir for potential adaptation to changed environments in the future. The advantages also include the possibility of aesthetic enjoyment of physical diversity.28 Some day we hope that whites will become distressed if blacks have too few children, and that, in general, humanity will strive to maximize its diversity while also maximizing the harmony in which diverse groups coexist. Distribution and mobility. Obscuring the population controversy in the United States in the late 1960s was the tendency of some demographers and government officials to blame population-related problems on population maldistribution. The claim was that pollution and urban social problems are the result of an uneven distribution of people, that troubled cities may be overpopulated, while in other areas of the country the population has declined.29 The cure promulgated in the 1960s was the creation of "new cities" to absorb the 80 million or so people then expected to be added to the U.S. population between 1970 and 2000. It is of course true that there is a distribution problem in the United States. Some parts of the country are economically depressed and have been losing population—often the most talented, productive, and capable elements—while other areas have been growing so rapidly that they are nearly overwhelmed. Patterns of migration and settlement are such that residential areas have become racially and economically segregated to an -'Frederick S. Jaffe, Low-income families: fertility changes in the 1960s; Population Reference Bureau, Family Size and the Black American. -sThere is more genetic variation within groups of human beings than between them, but some of the inter-group variation may be biologically important (and is more widely recognized by lay persons). 29 For instance, demographer Conrad Taeuber, who supervised the 1970 U.S. Census, in a speech delivered at Mount Holyoke College in January 1971 (quoted in the New York Times, Jan. 14, 1971).

BOX 13-4 Abortion in the United States Before 1967, abortion was illegal in the United States except when the mother's life was endangered by continuing the pregnancy. Only six years later, the situation had been completely reversed, legally if not everywhere in practice. Yet the change was not effected overnight; it was the result of changed public attitudes in response to a growing reform movement. By the end of 1970, 15 of the 50 states had at least partially moderated their abortion laws. Most of these new laws permitted abortion only in cases where bearing the child presented a grave risk to the mental or physical health of the mother, where the pregnancy was a result of incest or rape, and where (except in California) there was a substantial likelihood that the child would be physically or mentally defective. To obtain an abortion, a woman usually had to submit her case to a hospital reviewing board of physicians, a time-consuming and expensive process. Although the laws ostensibly were relaxed to reduce the problem of illegal abortions, hospital boards at first interpreted the changes in the law so conservatively that they had little effect. The number of illegal abortions per year in the U.S. during the 1960s has been variously estimated at between 200,000 and 2 million, with 1 million being the most often quoted figure. This amounted to more than one abortion for every four births. At that time, there were estimated to be 120,000 illegal abortions per year in California; in the first year after the passage of California's "liberalized" law there were just over 2,000 legal ones. The figures were similar for the other states. In 1970 Hawaii, Alaska, and New York passed new laws essentially permitting abortion on request, and Washington State legalized abortion on request not by legislation but by referendum. Meanwhile, several other states began to interpret their relatively restrictive laws much more liberally, and the legal abortion rate rose considerably. These changes in state laws were preceded and accompanied by an erosion of public opposition to abortion. Table 13-1 shows the changes in public disapproval as revealed in polls taken between 1962 and 1969 for demographer Judith Blake. A poll taken early in 1970 asked: Should an abortion be available to any woman who requests one? In apparent contradiction to the earlier opinions, more than half of those interviewed said yes. Although most respondents did not approve of abortion except for the more serious reasons, the majority apparently felt that mothers should be free to make their own decisions.

Continuing this trend, a poll conducted in 1971 for the U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future found that 50 percent of the adults interviewed felt that the decision to have an abortion should be made by the woman and her doctor, 41 percent would permit abortions under certain circumstances, and only 6 percent opposed abortion under all circumstances. Similar results have been obtained in subsequent surveys." In January 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision on an abortion case which in effect legalized abortion on request nationwide, at least for the first trimester (13 weeks), with restrictions on the second trimester being permitted in the interest of protecting women's health. Only in the last ten weeks of pregnancy, (when the child, if born, had a chance of survival) the court ruled, could states prohibit abortion except "to preserve the life or health of the mother."6 The number of legal abortions performed in 1972 (before the Supreme Court decision) was about 600,000; in 1975 it was about one million—approximately the estimated previous number of illegal abortions. At least two-thirds of these abortions probably would have been obtained illegally if legal abortions had been unavailable.1" Nor had illegal abortions entirely disappeared—25 of the 47 deaths from abortions in 1973 were from illegal ones (those not performed under proper medical supervision)—although the incidence of such deaths clearly had been drastically reduced by 1975.d Yet, three years after the Supreme Court decision, there were still large discrepancies from one region to another and between medical facilities in providing abortion services. An ongoing national study by the Gutrmacher Institute1' in 1975 concluded that between 260,000 and 770,000 women who needed abortions in 1975—20 to 40 percent of the women in need— "W. R. Arney and W. H. Trescher, Trends in Attitudes toward abortion, 1972-1975. 'For a lively account of the campaign to change U.S. abortion laws, see Lawrence Lader, Abtmion II: making the revolution. ''Edward Weinstock, et al., Legal abonions in the United States since the 1973 Supreme Court decisions; Abortion need and services in the United States, 1974-1975, Family Planning Perspectives, vol. 8, no. 2, March 1976. ''Richard Lincoln, The Institute of Medicine reports on legalized abortion and the public health. e Part of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. The 1976 Study was titled: Provisional estimates of abortion need and services in the year following the Supreme Court decisions: United States, each state and metropolitan area. The 1976 Study was Abortion 1974-1975—need and services in the United States, each state and metropolitan area.

TABLE 13-1 Change in Disapproval of Abortion (all white respondents) were still unable to obtain them. More than half of all abortions after 1973 were carried out in specialized clinics, while public hospitals (which provide most medical services to the poor) were lagging even behind private hospitals in providing services. Only one in five U.S. public hospitals reported performing any abortions in 1975. Thus in many areas it was substantially more difficult for poor women to obtain abortions than for middle-class or wealthy women, even though government funds were available to cover the costs. Teenagers, who account for about onethird of the need for abortion services and for a large and growing portion of the illegitimate birth rate, also seem to have poor access to safe abortions. Finally, abortion services were found to be generally less available in the southern and central regions of the U.S. than on either coast. In the United States, the majority of abortion recipients are young and/or unmarried. There is some debate over the degree to which legal abortion has affected American fertility overall, but it seems to have had a significant effect on the rate of illegitimate births. In 1971 reductions in illegitimate births in states with legal abortion ranged as high as 19 percent, while in most states without legal abortion they continued to increase/ Following the Supreme Court decision, the rising rate of illegitimacy halted briefly, then began again. The rise was accounted for by an increase in teenage pregnancy. There is no evidence that abortion has replaced contraceptives to any significant degree, despite the apprehensions of antiabortion groups on this score. Most women seeking abortion have a history of little or no contraceptive practice, and many are essentially ignorant of other means of birth control. Those who return for subsequent abortions have been found to be still ignorant of facts of reproduction, using contraceptives improperly, or to have been poorly guided by their physicians." Paralleling the trend toward liberalized abortion policies in the U.S. has been the growth of right-to-life groups who are adamantly opposed to abortion. These groups have lobbied actively against reform of state laws and, since the Supreme Court decision, have tried to persuade Congress to reimpose sanctions against abortion through Constitutional amendments. Under their pressure, Congress has removed funds for ']. Sklar and B. Berkov, Abortion, illegitimacy, and the American birth rate. "Blame MD mismanagement for contraceptive faihirej Family

Planning Perspectives, vol. 8, no. 2, March/April 1976, pp. 72-76.

Percentage of disapproval Reason for abortion

Mother's health endangered Child may be deformed Can't afford child No more children wanted

1962

16 29 74 -

1965

15 31 74 -

1968

1969

10 25 72 85

Source: Judith Blake, Abortion and public opinion.

abortion services from Foreign Aid grants to LDCs. In 1976, Congress also passed a law forbidding federal assistance for abortions in the U.S., a move that denies these services to lowincome women—precisely the group whose chances for a decent and productive life are most likely to be jeopardized by an unwanted child. Whether the courts will consider such a discriminatory law constitutional is another question. Right-to-life groups have also played a part in harassing clinics, hospitals, and other organizations that provide abortion. This activity often embarrasses clients and possibly has also discouraged other institutions from providing abortion services. Action by right-to-life groups in Boston resulted in the trial and conviction for manslaughter in early 1975 of physician Kenneth Edelin following a late-term abortion (about 20 weeks). The prosecution maintained that the fetus might have survived if given life-supporting treatment. (The conviction was overturned in December 1976 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.)" The consequence of the original verdict nevertheless was to discourage late secondtrimester abortions (31 states already had laws against them except to protect the mother's life or health; in most states abortion by choice was available only through the 20th week). Unfortunately, this change also will affect mainly the poor and/or very young women, who through ignorance or fear are more likely to delay seeking an abortion until the second trimester. In 1976, a Right-to-Life political party was formed, centering on the abortion issue. Its candidate, Ellen McCormack, entered primaries in several states, but never succeeded in winning more than 5 percent of the vote. Most Americans, it appears, accept the present legal situation at least as the lesser of evils. * Time and Nesisweek, March 3, 1975. Both magazines covered the trial and the issues it raised in some detail. See also Barbara Culliton's thoughtful article, Edelin trial; jury not persuaded, and Edelin conviction overturned, Science, vol. 195, January 7, 1977, pp. 36-37.

13 25 68 79

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/ THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

abortion on the grounds that it will encourage promiscuity—exactly the same reason given in Japan for banning the pill and the IUD. There is no evidence to support either point of view on promiscuity, but, even if there were an increase, it would seem a small price to pay for a chance to ameliorate the mass misery of unwanted pregnancies—especially since the main ostensible reason for social disapproval of promiscuity is the production of unwanted children. Many Protestant theologians hold that the time when a child acquires a soul is unknown and perhaps unimportant. They see no difficulty in establishing it at the time of "quickening," when movements of the fetus first become discernible to the mother; or at the time, around 28 weeks, when the infant, if prematurely born, might survive outside its mother's body. To them, the evil of abortion is far outweighed by the evil of bringing into the world an unwanted child under less than ideal circumstances. To a biologist the question of when life begins for a human child is almost meaningless, since life is continuous and has been since it first began on Earth several billion years ago. The precursors of the egg and sperm cells that create the next generation have been present in the parents since they were embryos themselves. To most biologists, an embryo or ajetus is no more a complete human being than a blueprint is a complete building.55" The_fetus, given the opportunity to develop properly before birth, and given the essential early socializing, experiences and sufficient nourishing food during the crucial early years after birth, will ultimately develop into a human being. Where any^ of these is lacking,jjie_ resultant individual will be deficient in some respect. From this point of view, a fetus is only a potential human being, with no particular rights. Historically, the law has dated most rights and privileges from the moment of birth, and legal scholars generally agree that a fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution^ until it is born and living independent of its mother. From the standpoint of a terminated fetus, it makes no difference whether the mother had an induced or a spontaneous abortion. On the other hand, it subsequently makes a great deal of difference to the child if an abortion ""Garrett Hardin, Abortion—compulsory pregnancy?

is denied and the mother, contrary to her wishes, is forced to devote her body and life to the production and care of the child. In Sweden, a study was made to determine what eventually happened to children born to mothers whose requests for abortions had been turned down. When compared to a group of children from similar backgrounds who had been wanted, more than twice as many of the unwanted youngsters grew up in undesirable circumstances (illegitimate, in broken homes, or in institutions); more than twice as many had records of delinquency, or were deemed unfit for military service; almost twice as many had needed psychiatric care; and nearly five times as many had been on public assistance during their teens.56 In a 1975 study in Czechoslovakia, nine-year old children whose mothers had been denied abortions were compared with carefully matched "controls."57 The unwanted children tended to have more problems of health and social adjustment and to perform less well in school than did their peers who had been Wanted. Further, it appeared that the disadvantages of being unwanted—initially, at least—affected boys more strongly than girls. There seems little doubt that the forced bearing of unwanted children has undesirable consequences not only for the children and their families, but for society as well, apart from the problems of overpopulation. The latter factor, however, adds further urgency to the need for alleviating the other situations. An abortion is clearly preferable to adding one more child to an overburdened family or an overburdened society, where the chances that it will realize its full potential are slight. The argument that a decision is being made for an unborn person who "has no say" is often raised by those opposing abortion. But unthinking actions of the very same people help to commit future unheard generations to misery and early death on an overcrowded planet. One can also challenge the notion that older men, be they medical doctors, legislators, or celibate clergymen, have the right to make decisions whose consequences are borne largely by young women and their families. There are those who claim that free access to abortion '"Lars Huldt, Outcome of pregnancy when legal abortion is readily available. 57 Z. Dytrych, et al.. Children born to women denied abortion.

POPULATION POLICIES / 761

will lead to genocide. It is hard to see how this could happen if the decision is left to the mother. A mother who takes the moral view that abortion is equivalent to murder is free to bear her child. If she cannot care for it, placement for adoption is still possible in most societies. Few people would claim that abortion is preferable to contraception, not only because of moral questions, but also because the risk of subsequent health problems for the mother may be greater. Death rates for firsttrimester, medically supervised abortions are a fraction of those for pregnancy and childbirth but considerably higher in later months.58 Large and rapidly growing numbers of people nevertheless feel that abortion is vastly preferable to the births of unwanted children, especially in an overpopulated world. Until more effective forms of contraception than now exist are developed, and until people become more conscientious in use of contraceptives, abortion will remain a needed back-up method of birth control when contraception fails. Attitudes on abortion have changed in most countries in recent years, and they can reasonably be expected to change more in the future. The female part of the world's population has long since cast its silent vote. Every year over one million women in the United States, and an estimated 30 to 55 million more elsewhere, have made their desires abundantly clear by seeking and obtaining abortions. Until the 1970s, these women were forced to seek their abortions more often than not in the face of their societies' disapproval and of very real dangers and difficulties. Millions still must do so. There is little question that legalized abortion can contribute to a reduction in birth rates. Wherever liberal laws have been enacted, they have been followed by lowered fertility. Longstanding evidence is available from Japan and Eastern Europe, where abortion was the primary effective form of birth control available for some years after liberalization, and where the decline in fertility was substantial. The extent of decline is bound to be related to the availability of other birth control methods; but even in the United States and England, where contraceptives have been widely available, the decline in fertility after reversal of abortion policies was significant. )8

Tietze and Murstein, Induced abortion.

According to at least one study, availability of abortion (legal or illegal) may be necessary in order for a population to reach and maintain fertility near replacement level, given current contraceptive technology and patterns of sexual behavior.59 Liberalization of abortion policies in those countries where it is still largely or entirely illegal is therefore justifiable both on humanitarian and health grounds and as an aid to population control.

POPULATION POLICIES IN LESS DEVELOPED NATIONS In response to rising alarm during the 1950s over the population explosion in less developed countries, both private and governmental organizations in the United States and other nations began to be involved in population research and overseas family planning programs. First among these, naturally, was the International Planned Parenthood Federation.,, which grew out of the established national groups. By 1975 there were Planned Parenthood organizations in 84 countries, supported by their own governments, private donations, government grants from developed countries, or some combination of these sources.60 Various other private and governmental organizations followed Planned Parenthood, into the field, including the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Population _ Council, the U.S. Agency for International development (AID), and agencies of several other DC governments. International organizations such as the World Bank and various UN agencies, particularly the UN Fund for Population Activities,, had joined bv 1970, The 1960s brought a great proliferation of family planning programs in LDCs, which were assisted or administered by one or another of these groups. Most assistance from DCs was provided through one of the international or private organizations. In 1960 some $2 million was spent by developed countries (and the U.S. was not then among them) to assist LDC family planning programs; by 1974 5 'C. Tietze and J. Bongaarts, Fertility rates and abortion rates: simulations of family limitation, Studiesin family planning, vol. 6, no. 5, May 1975, p. 119. '"Population Reference Bureau, World population growth and response, pp. 243-248.

TABLE 13-2

Family Planning in LDCs Population (millions, 1975) 400+

Have an official policy to reduce population growth rate

Have official support of family planning for other reasons

Neither have policy nor support family planning

People's Republic of China (1962) India (1952, reorganized 1965) Indonesia (1968)

Brazil (1974)

50-100

Mexico (1974) Pakistan (1960, reorganized 1965) Bangladesh (1971)

Nigeria (1970)

25-50

Turkey (1965) Egypt (1965) Iran (1967) Philippines (1970) Thailand (1970) South Korea (1961) Vietnam (1962 in North)

Zaire (1973)

Burma Ethiopa Argentina

15-25

Morocco (1968) Taiwan (1968) Colombia (1970)

Tanzania (1970) South Africa (1966) Afghanistan (1970) Sudan (1970) Algeria (1971)

North Korea Peru

10-15

Nepal (1966) Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (1965) Malaysia (1966) Kenya (1966)

Venezuela (1968) Chile (1966) Iraq (1972) Uganda (1972)

Tunisia (1964) Barbados (1967) Dominican Republic (1968) Singapore (1965) Hong Kong (1973) Jamaica (1966) Trinidad and Tobago (1967) Laos (1972, possibly discontinued) Ghana (1969) Mauritius (1965) Puerto Rico (1970) Botswana (1970) Fiji (1962) El Salvador (1968) Gilbert and Ellice Islands (1970) Guatemala (1975) Grenada (1974) Bolivia (1968, reorganized 1973) Costa Rica (1968) El Salvador (1968)

Cuba (early 1960s) Nicaragua (1967) Syria (1974) Panama (1969) Honduras (1966) Dahomey (1969) Gambia "(1969) Rhodesia (1968) Senegal (1970) Ecuador (1968) Honduras (1965) Benin (early 1970s) Haiti (1971) Papua-New Guinea (1969) Paraguay (1972) Liberia (1973) Lesotho (1974) Western Samoa (1971) Madagascar (1974) Sierra Leone (early 1970s) Swaziland (1969) Togo (early 1970s) Zambia (early 1970s) Cambodia (1972, possibly discontinued) Guyana (1975) Surinam (1974) Uruguay (1971) Other small Caribbean countries (1960s)

100-400

Less than 10

Cameroon Angola Malawi Jordan Lebanon Saudi Arabia Syria Yemen Mali Upper Volta Mozambique Burundi Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo Equatorial Guinea Guinea-Bisseau Ivory Coast Libya Mauritania Niger Rwanda Seychelles Somalia Namibia Israel

Sources: Berelson, Population control programs; Nortman, Population and family planning programs, 1975; Population Reference Bureau, World population growth and response.

POPULATION POLICIES

At the other extreme, Brazil and Argentina have policies generally promoting growth. Brazil does permit private family planning groups to operate, however, especially in the poverty-stricken Northeast. Argentina, having a relatively low birth rate and feeling threatened by rapidly growing Brazil, in 1974 banned dissemination of birth control information and closed family planning clinics. Since the practice of birth control is well established in the Argentine population, the action is not likely to have great effect except perhaps to raise the already high abortion rate, mostly illegal. Asia. Asia includes over half of the human population and is growing at about 2.3 percent per year. Both mortality and birth rates are generally lower than those in Africa, and both have been declining in several countries. Asia presents a widely varied picture in regard to population policies. At one extreme, China, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea are pursuing strong family planning policies, in several cases reinforced by social and economic measures, some of which are described below. All of these countries have recorded declines in birth rates, some of them quite substantial. Family planning programs have also been established in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Malaysia, and the Philippines, but the impact, if any, on birth rates is negligible so far. A few rapidly growing countries, notably Cambodia and Burma, currently are pursuing pronatalist population policies, although family planning is privately available in the latter country. Other "centrally planned" countries in Southeast Asia seem to be following China's example in population policies; North Vietnam has had a family planning program for some time, which presumably was extended to South Vietnam when the nation was unified. Policies in North Korea are unknown. Middle Eastern nations are still largely pronatalist in their outlook, with the exceptions of Turkey and Iran which have national family planning programs. Several countries, including Afghanistan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, are interested in establishing family planning services for health and welfare reasons. The remaining countries favor continued growth, although they may tolerate family planning

activity in the private sector. Among these is Israel, for obvious reasons. At the furthest extreme is Saudi Arabia, which has outlawed importation of contraceptives. Nearly all Middle Eastern countries are growing rapidly with relatively high, although declining death rates. The United Nations. For many years, the United Nations limited its participation in population policies to the gathering of demographic data. This, however, was instrumental in developing awareness of the need for population policies, especially among LDCs, whose governments often had no other information about their population growth. Since the late 1960s the UN has taken an active role in coordinating assistance for and directly participating in family planning programs of various member nations, while continuing the demographic studies. A special body, the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), advises governments on policies and programs, coordinates private donors and contributions from DC governments, and sometimes directly provides supplies, equipment, and personnel through other UN agencies. In 1967 the UN Declaration on Social Progress and Development stated that "parents have the exclusive right to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children."67 The statement affirmed the UN's increasing involvement in making family planning available to all peoples everywhere and contained an implicit criticism of any government policy that might deny family planning to people who wanted it. The statement has sometimes been interpreted as a stand against compulsory governmental policies to control births; however, the right to choose whether or not to have children is specifically limited to "responsible" choices. Thus, the Declaration also provides governments with the right to control irresponsible choices. In 1974 the United Nations' World Population Conference, the first worldwide, government-participating forum on the subject, was convened in Bucharest. Publicity attending the event gave an impression of enormous disagreement among participating groups. But in fact it provided a valuable forum for an exchange of "Declaration on Population, Teheran, 1968, Studies in Family Planning, no. 16, January, 1967.

786 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

large, relatively untapped pool of intellectual and technical talent; tapping that pool effectively could help reduce population growth and also would provide many other direct benefits to any society. Social pressures on both men and women to marry anoL have children must be removed. As former Secretary of_ Tptprjnr Stewart Udall observed, "All lives are not enhanced by marital union; parenthood is not necessarily a fulfillment for every married couple."98 If society were convinced of the need for low birth rates, no doubt the stigma that has customarily been assigned to bachelors, spinsters, and childless couples would soon disappear. But alternative lifestyles should be open to single people, and perhaps the institution of an informal, easily dissolved "marriage" for the childless is one possibility. Indeed, many DC societies now seem to be evolving in this direction as women's liberation gains momentum." It is possible that fully developed societies may produce such arrangements naturally, and their association with lower fertility is becoming increasingly clear. In LDCs a childless or single lifestyle might be encouraged deliberately as the status of women approaches parity with that of men. Although free and easy association of the sexes might be tolerated in such a society, responsible parenthood ought to be encouraged and illegitimate childbearing could be strongly discouraged. One way to carry out this disapproval might be to insist that all illegitimate babies be put up for adoption—especially those born to minors, who generally are not capable of caring properly for a child alone.100 If a single mother really wished to keep her baby, she might be obliged to go through adoption proceedings and demonstrate her ability to support and care for it. Adoption proceedings probably should remain more difficult for single people than for married couples, in recognition of the relative difficulty of raising children alone. It would even be possible to require **&1976: Agenda for tomorrow. Judith Blake, The changing status of women in developed countries; E. Peck and J. Senderowitz (eds.), Pronatalism, tlie niyth of mom and apple pie; Ellen Peck, The baby trap. 100 The tragedy of teenage single mothers in the U.S. is described by Leslie Aldridge Westoff in Kids with kids. The adverse health and social effects of teenage child-bearing in an affluent society have recently been documented by several studies. One good sample can be found in a special issue of Family planning perspectives, Teenagers, USA.

pregnant single women to marry or have abort perhaps as an alternative to placement for adopticr.. depending on the society. Somewhat more repressive measures for discouraging large families have also been proposed, such as assigning public housing without regard for family size and removing dependency allowances from student grants at military pay. Some of these have been implemented u: crowded Singapore, whose population program has been counted as one of the most successful. All socioeconomic measures are derived from knowledge of social conditions that have been associated with low birth rates in the past. The more repressive suggestions are based on observations that people have voluntarily controlled their reproduction most stringently during periods of great social and economic stress and insecurity, such as the Depression of the 1930s.101 In a sense, all such proposals are shots in the dark. Not enough is known about fertility motivation to predict the effectiveness of such policies. Studies by demographer Judith Blake102 and by economist Alan Sweezy103 for instance, have cast serious doubt on the belief that economic considerations are of the greatest importance in determining fertility trends. Sweezy has shown that the decline of fertility in the 1930s in the United States was merely a continuation of an earlier trend. If their views are correct, then severely repressive economic measures might prove to be both ineffective and unnecessary as a vehicle for population control, as well as socially undesirable. At the very least, they should be considered only if milder measures fail completely. Involuntary Fertility Control The third approach to population limitation is that of involuntary fertility control. Several coercive proposals deserve discussion, mainly because some countries may ultimately have to resort to them unless current trends in birth rates are rapidly reversed by other means.104 Some

99

""Richard A. Easterlin, Population, labor force, and long swings in economic growth. Further discussion of Easterlin's ideas can be found in Deborah Freedman, ed., Fertility, aspirations and resources: A symposium on the Easterlin hypothesis. 102 Are babies consumer durables? and Reproductive motivation. ""The economic explanation of fertility changes in the U.S. 104 Edgar R. Chasteen, The case for compulsory birth control.

I

POPULATION POLICIES / 787

involuntary measures could be less repressive or discriminatory, in fact, than some of the socioeconomic measures suggested. In the 1960s it was proposed to vasectomize all fathers of three or more children in India. The proposal was defeated then not only on moral grounds but on practical ones as well; there simply were not enough medical personnel available even to start on the eligible candidates, let alone to deal with the new recruits added each day! Massive assistance from the developed world in the form of medical and paramedical personnel and/or a training program for local people nevertheless might have put the policy within the realm of possibility. India in the mid-1970s not only entertained the idea of compulsory sterilization, but moved toward implementing it, perhaps fearing that famine, war, or disease might otherwise take the problem out of its hands. This decision was greeted with dismay abroad, but Indira Gandhi's government felt it had little other choice. There is too little time left to experiment further with educational programs and hope that social change will generate a spontaneous fertility decline, and most of the Indian population is too poor for direct economic pressures (especially penalties) to be effective. A program of sterilizing women after their second or third child, despite the relatively greater difficulty of the operation than vasectomy, might be easier to implement than trying to sterilize men. This of course would be feasible only in countries where the majority of births are medically assisted. Unfortunately, such a program therefore is not practical for most less developed countries (although in China mothers of three children are commonly "expected" to undergo sterilization). The development of a long-term sterilizing capsule that could be implanted under the skin and removed when pregnancy is desired opens additional possibilities for coercive fertility control. The capsule could be implanted at puberty and might be removable, with official permission, for a limited number of births. No capsule that would last that long (30 years or more) has yet been developed, but it is technically within the realm of possibility. Various approaches to administering such a system have been offered, including one by economist Kenneth

Boulding.105 His proposal was to issue to each woman at maturity a marketable license that would entitle her to a given number of children—say, 2.2 in order to have an NRR = 1. Under such a system the number could be two if the society desired to reduce the population size slowly. To maintain a steady size, some couples might be allowed to have a third child if they purchased "decichild" units from the government or from other women who had decided not to have their full allotments of children or who found they had a greater need for the money. Others have elaborated on Boulding's idea, discussing possible ways of regulating the license scheme and alternative ways of alloting the third children.106 One such idea is that permission to have a third child might be granted to a limited number of couples by lottery. This system would allow governments to regulate more or less exactly the number of births over a given period of time. Social scientist David Heer has compared the social effects of marketable license schemes with some of the more repressive economic incentives that have been proposed and with straightforward quota systems.107 His conclusions are shown in Table 13-5. Of course, a government might require only implantation of the contraceptive capsule, leaving its removal to the individual's discretion but requiring reimplantation after childbirth^ Since having a child would require positive action (removal of the capsule), many more births would be prevented than in the reverse situation. Certainly unwanted births and the problem of abortion would both be entirely avoided. The disadvantages (apart from the obvious moral objections) include the questionable desirability of keeping the entire female population on a continuous steroid dosage with the contingent health risks, and the logistics of implanting capsules in 50 percent of the population between the ages of 15 and 50. Adding a sterilant to drinking water or staple foods is a suggestion that seems to horrify people more than most proposals for involuntary fertility control. Indeed, this I05

7°fe meaning of the 20lh century, pp. 135-136. ""Bruce M. Russert. Licensing: for cars and babies; David M. Heer, Marketing licenses for babies; Boulding's proposal revisited. 107 Ibid.

\

J

TABLE 13-5

Evaluation of Some Relatively Coercive Measures for Fertility Reduction ___ __ Financialjtueutwe^ystems Marketable license systems Monthly tex\ /" CBqby licenses^ ./Monthly subsidy\ ~\ One-time tax \ on persons \ f to persons jj that may be sold \ with more than I 1 for excess babies J or lent at interest V vi ith no more than I Boulding proposal two children^/ \_ over two / to the government \^ two children _x for baby licenses

Effect

Restriction on individual liberty Effect on quality of children's financial support Effectiveness and acceptability of enforcement mechanisms

Effectiveness for precise regulation of the birth rate

C

Quota systems

Identical quota for all couples

Moderately severe

Moderately severe

Very severe

Unknown

Unknown

Probably beneficial

Slightly beneficial

Fairly effective enforcement

Fairly effective enforcement

Effective enforcement at possible price of depriving some children of a family environment

Low

Low

Low

Effective enforcement at possible price of depriving some children of a family environment Moderate

Moderately severe

Moderately severe

Moderately severe

Probably beneficial

Probably beneficial

Effective enforcement at possible price of depriving some children of a family environment Moderate

Effective enforcement at possible price of depriving some children of a family environment High

Source: Adapted from David Heer, Marketing licenses.

would pose some very difficult political, legal, and social questions, to say nothing of the technical problems. No such sterilant exists today, nor does one appear to be under development. To be acceptable, such a substance would have to meet some rather stiff requirements: it must be uniformly effective, despite \videly varying doses received by individuals, and despite varying degrees of fertility and sensitivity among individuals; it must be free of dangerous or unpleasant side effects; and it must have no effect on members of the opposite sex, children, old people, pets, or livestock. Physiologist Melvin Ketchel, of the Tufts University School of Medicine, suggested that a sterilant could be developed that would have a very specific action—for example, preventing implantation of the fertilized ovum.108 He proposed that it be used to reduce fertility levels by adjustable amounts, anywhere from 5 to 75 percent, rather than to sterilize the whole population completely. In this way, fertility could be adjusted from time to time to meet a society's changing needs, and there would be no need to provide an antidote. Contraceptives would still be needed for couples who were highly ""Fertility control agents as a possible solution to the world population problem, pp. 687-703.

motivated to have small families. Subfertile and functionally sterile couples who strongly desired children would be medically assisted, as they are now, or encouraged to adopt. Again, there is no sign of such an agent on the horizon. And the risk of serious, unforeseen side effects would, in our opinion, militate against the use of any such agent, even though this plan has the advantage of avoiding the need for socioeconomic pressures that might tend to discriminate against particular groups or penalize children. Most of the population control measures beyond family planning discussed above have never been tried. Some are as yet technically impossible and others are and probably will remain unacceptable to most societies (although, of course, the potential effectiveness of those least acceptable measures may be great). Compulsory control of family size is an unpalatable idea, but the alternatives may be much more horrifying. As those alternatives become clearer to an increasing number of people in the 1980s, they may begin demanding such control. A far better choice, in our view, is to expand the use of milder methods of influencing family size preferences, while redoubling efforts to ensure that the means of birth control, including abortion and

806 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

existing institutions; there is neither the time nor the leadership to dismantle them completely and replace them with others. Today's institutions must be bent and reshaped but not destroyed. No one is more acutely aware than we are of the difficulties and hazards of trying to criticize and comment constructively on such broad areas as religion, education, economics, legal and political systems, and the psychology of individuals and societies. We believe, however, that in order for people to translate into effective and constructive political action what is now known about the roots of the crisis, new, far-reaching and positive programs must be undertaken immediately. In this chapter and the next, we therefore depart from the realm of relatively hard data in the physical, biological, and social sciences to embark on an exploration of the many other areas of human endeavor that are critically important to a solution of our problems.' In doing so we are making the assumption that many reforms are essential. The dangers of making the opposite assumption are beautifully set forth in the following quotation from biologist Garrett Hardin's article, "The Tragedy of the Commons": It is one of the peculiarities of the warfare between reform and the status quo that it is thoughtlessly governed by a double standard. Whenever a reform measure is proposed it is often defeated when its opponents triumphantly discover a flaw in it. As Kingsley Davis has pointed out, worshippers of the status quo sometimes imply that no reform is possible without unanimous agreement, an implication contrary to historical fact. As nearly as I can make out, automatic rejection of proposed reforms is based on one of two unconscious assumptions: (i) that the status quo is perfect; or (ii) that the choice we face is between reform and no action; if the proposed reform is imperfect, we presumably should take no action at all, while we wait for a perfect proposal. But we can never do nothing. That which we have done for thousands of }'ears is also action. It also produces evils. Once we are aware that the status quo is action, we can then compare its discoverable advan'Many of these topics are treated in greater depth in Dennis C. Pirages and Paul R. Ehrlich. Ark II:.SodaI response to environmental imperatives; its footnotes and bibliographies provide further access to the pertinent literature, especially in political science.

tages and disadvantages with the predicted advantages and disadvantages of the proposed reform, discounting as best we can for our lack of experience. On the basis of such a comparison, we can make a rational decision which will not involve the unworkable assumption that only perfect systems are tolerable.

RELIGION Religion, broadly denned, would include all the belief systems that allow Homo sapiens to achieve a sense of transcendence of self and a sense of the possession of a right and proper place in the universe and a right and proper way of life. In short, everyone wants to feel important and in tune with a right-ordered world. The attempt to achieve a sense of well-being in these terms is so pervasive among human cultures that it may be counted as a necessity of human life. With religion so broadly denned, political parties, labor unions, nation states, academic disciplines, and the organized structure of the environment-ecology movement would have to be counted among our religious institutions. Certainly, t representatives of all those groups have struggled to protect and propagate their views as assiduously (and sometimes as fiercely) in our time as Genghis Khan, the Christian Crusaders, or the Protestant Christian missionaries did in theirs. In this discussion, however, we limit our attention to those groups customarily called the world's_great religions, the traditions of belief and practice belonging to members of the Tudeo-Christian. Moslem, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions. Religion must always be viewed in its two parts: the first and more readily evident element being the formal structure of authority and administration that in our Western tradition is called "the church;" and the second, more elusive, and in the long run more important element, the system of attitudes called, in the Western. manner, "die faith," In our treatment of the two parts, we concentrate upon the relationship between organi/.pH religion and population control because that is the area where contemporary social needs and imperatives have most clearly come into conflict with cherished traditional values usually promulgated and supported by religions. Moreover, humane population control calls for the

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 807

integration of contraceptive techniques into culturally accepted sexual practices, and sexual practice is the area of human activity that is typically most extensively regulated by taboo. Thus, the acceptance or rejection of birth control and various methods of carrying it out have been important issues in organized Western religion for several decades. Our treatment of religious attitudes also focuses upon perceptions of the environment, because how an individual perceives and treats the world is determined by his or her overall view of his or her place in that world. The Christian concept of life in this world, as voiced by Saint Paul, that "here we have no abiding city," for example, conceivably could help explain why some people show rather little concern for the long-term future of the global environment or for the well-being of future generations. Most of our attention is on the Western. Judeo-.. Christian religious tradition because it is primarily within that tradition that the population-resourceenvironment crisis has been engendered.

Organized Religious Groups and Population Control Within the theological community in the Western world, there has recently been a heartening revolution in thought and action on such varied social concerns as the quality of life in urban areas, civil rights for minority groups, and the war in Vietnam. Since the late 1960s, environmental deterioration and the population explosion have become important concerns. Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish clergy have come more and more to the_^ forefront of public activities in these areas, often at considerable personal sacrifice and risk. Conspicuous among clergy who have risked their careers have been Catholic theologians who opposed the official pronatalist position of the Vatican. For example, Father John A. O'Brien, a distinguished professor of theology at Notre Dame University in Indiana, edited the excellent book Family planning in an exploding population in 1968,. He also was a leader in criticizing Pope Paul VFs 1968 encyclical, Humanae Vitae, which reiterated the church's condemnation of contraceptives. Commenting on the encyclical, Father O'Brien wrote, "Since

the decision is bound to be reversed by his [Pope Paul's] successor, it would be far more honorable, proper and just for the Pope to rescind it himself."2 Ivan Illich, who_ renounced his priesthood after a contrnversy nv^r birthcontrol in Puerto Rico^ wrote that the encyclical "lacks courage, is in bad taste, and takes the initiative away from Rome in the attempt to lead modern man in Christian humanism."3 Thousands of others, from cardinals to lay people, have also spoken out. Since its publication, the encyclical has caused immense anguish among Catholics, millions of whom have followed their consciences and used contraceptives, often after a period of intense soul-searching.4 Indeed, clergyman sociologist Father Andrew7 Greeley attributes the recent substantial erosion in religious practices and church support among American Catholics almost entirely to Humanae Vitae.5 Adamant opposition to birth control by the Roman Catholic Church and other conservative religious groups for many years helped delay the reversal in developed countries (including the United States) of laws restricting access to contraceptives and the extension of familyplanning assistance to LDCs. Support of outdated dogma among Catholic spokespeople still sometimes hinders effective attacks on the population problem in Catholic countries and in international agencies that support family-planning programs. Thus, as late as 1969, elderly Catholic economist Colin Clark claimed on a television program that India would, in a decade, be the most powerful country in the world because of its growing population! He also wrote, "Population growth, however strange and unwelcome some of its consequences may appear at the time, must be regarded, I think, as one of the instruments of Divine Providence, which we should welcome, not oppose."6 By the mid-1970s, however, the influence of such persons was on the wane— so much so that a reaffirmation by Pope Paul of his anti-population-contrn], dngrna, at the 1974 World Food Conference in Rome vyas greeted by almost universal ridicule. Within the church, Pope -Reader's Digest, January 1969. 'Celebration oj aizartness. *F. X. Murphy and J. F. Erhart, Catholic perspectives on population issues.. Population Bulletin, vol. 30 (1975), no. 6. ^Catholic schools in a declining church, Sheed & Ward, Mission, Kans., 1976. 6 'Los Angelas Times, November 9, 1969.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 811

about the disappearance of public land and the consequent disappearance of the frontier, Frederick Jackson Turner, then at the University of Wisconsin and subsequently at Harvard, observed: American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities . . . furnish the forces dominating American character.14 A generation earlier, E. L. Godkin, editor of the Nation, had written that the American frontier population had "spread itself thinly over a vast area of soil, of such extraordinary fertility that a very slight amount of toil expended on it affords returns that might have satisfied even the dreams of Spanish avarice."15 Traditional North American (and, to some extent, European) attitudes toward the environment thus are not exclusively products of our religious heritage, although that doubtless played an important part. These attitudes may just spring from ordinary human nature, which in Western culture was provided with extraordinary social, political, technical, and physical opportunities, particularly connected with the nineteenth-century American frontier. Such opportunities were bound to engender optimism, confidence in the future, and faith in the abundance of resources and the bounty of nature. That they also produced habits of wastefulness and profligacy was not noticed. Past institutions in the United States, rarely dealt with environmental problems; if they were recognized at all, they were usually considered to be someone else's responsibility. In the twentieth century, as the growing population became increasingly urban and industrialized, the en-^ vironmental effects multiplied, and the nation was rather suddenly confronted with a crisis. How today's Americans ultimately resolve the environmental crisis will depend on much more than changes in philosophical outlook, but such changes unquestionably must precede or at least accompany whatever measures are taken. Individual conduct is clearly capable of being modified and directed by an appropriate social environment—the 14 The significance of the frontier in American history, in The early writings of Frederick Jackson Turner, ed- F. J. Turner. 1 'Aristocratic opinions of democracy.

change in reproductive habits in the United States testifies to that, as does the great increase in environmental consciousness, t Tnfnrrunately. the e,pvirrmmental problem may prove more difficult because it requires changing more than the attitudes and behavior of individuals: those of firmly established, powerful institutions— primaril business and governmental organizations— must

hp

How large a role organized religion may play in guiding the needed changes in individual attitudes toward the environment or in influencing the behavior of _ other institutions is still uncertain. Many religious groups have already shown leadership, including some already mentioned in connection with populationrelated issues. A particularly hopeful sign was the_ concern expressed in January 1976 by the NationalCouncil of Churches about the ethics of using and . spreading the technology of nuclear power, and the discussion promoted by the World Council of Churches^ on_the mirier ijjgiigjn,^L nr l rhp relation of energy policy _ to the prospects for adjust and sustainable^ world.16 Ecological Ethics Many persons believe that an entirely new philosophy must now be developed—one based on ecological realities. Such a philosophy—and the ethics based upon it—would be antihumanist and against Judeo-Christian tradition in the sense that it would not focus on an anthropocentric universe.17 Instead, it would focus on human beings as an integral part of nature, as just one part of a much more comprehensive system. This is not really a new perspective. In one sense, Western philosophy has been a continuous attempt to establish the position of Homo sapiens in the universe, and the extreme anthropocentrism of thinkers like Karl Marx and John Dewey has been strongly attacked by, among others, Bertrand Russell.18 Russell, for example, 1 'See The plutonium economy: A statement of concern, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1976, pp. 48—49; P. M. Boffey, Plutonium: its morality questioned by National Council of Churches, Science, vol. 192, pp. 356—359 (April 23, 1976); Paul Abrecht, ed., Facing up to nuclear power. Anticipation, no. 21, October 1975, pp. 1-47. 17 See Frank E. Egler, The zcay of science: A philosophy of ecology for the layman; and George S. Sessions, Anthropocentrism and the environmental crisis. The latter is a good, brief summary with a useful bibliography. 1B A hiswry of Wesiem philosophyj the debate is summarized in Sessions, Anthropocentrism.

828 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

and Donald Lunde, which has enjoyed great success as a college text and is highly recommended for any adolescent or adult who wants to understand his or her sexuality. The Brain Drain Our educational system is failing to produce not only those competent to teach sex education, but also the ecologists, agricultural scientists and technicians, social scientists, paramedical personnel, and various other specialists needed to help solve the pressing problems of the world—especially in the less developed countries. Indeed, for decades there has been a brain drain. Trained personnel from the LDCs, especially medical doctors, are understandably attracted to the United States and other DCs, where they can earn a good living. Ironically, this often happens because, despite their great needs for trained people, LDCs may have no jobs for them. That many individuals from the LDCs who are educated in the DCs do not wish to return to their homelands is even sadder. Although some DCs, notably the Soviet Union, virtually force a return to the homeland, most do not. One relatively simple and humane solution would be for the DCs to establish and help staff more training centers •within the LDCs. This should have the additional benefits of training local people to work on problems of local significance and of familiarizing visiting faculty members from the DCs with those problems. Changing the Educational Structure While a great deal can be done to improve the educational system within the general framework now recognized, more fundamental changes will probably be required if large technological societies are to discover ways to govern themselves satisfactorily while solving or preventing the social and environmental problems that now threaten to destroy them. Ivan Illich has suggested the abolition of formal education and the making of educational materials and institutions available to all on a cafeteria basis.52 To those struggling in the present system, the idea has considerable appeal; but even Illich ''-Deschooling society.

recognizes the enormous drawbacks inherent in such an unstructured approach. We would suggest another strategy, one that expands on ideas already current in education. First of all, we think that a major effort should be made to extend education throughout the life span, rather than attempting to cram all education into the first fifteen to twentyfive years. It is becoming widely recognized that maturity and experience are often a benefit in learning. Students who have dropped out, worked, and then returned to school generally do so with renewed vigor and increased performance. Experience in the real world can lead students to avoid much wasted effort in the educational world. A program of encouraging interruption of education, perhaps for one or two years during or directly after high school and another two years after receiving an undergraduate degree might be a good start. For example, a student interested in becoming a physician might spend two years after high school doing clerical work in a hospital or doctor's office or serving as an orderly. When his or her undergraduate education was completed, two additional years could be spent working with a doctor as a paramedic. Similarly, individuals going into business, government, science, bricklaying, plumbing, or whathave-you should have a chance to try out their chosen professions and trades at the bottom before completing their educations." The benefits of the program would be many, including better understanding of the problems faced by associates (a doctor who has been an orderly should have more insight into the situation of the orderlies), and fewer cases of people committing themselves to careers too early, with too little knowledge of what the commitment involves, and discovering the error too late to make another choice. Students who, on completing high school, were unsure of what their futures should be, could try out several possibilities. What about youngsters who have no desire to go beyond high school or vocational school? Should their educations end at that point? In the United States, for instance, nearly 1 adult in 5 reportedly lacks "those skills and knowledges which are requisite to adult compe"For a more detailed discussion of restructuring our educational system, see Dennis C. Pirages and Paul R. Ehrlich, Ark II: Social response to environmental imperatives, chapter 6.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 829

tence."54 We believe that a technological society, especially a democracy, cannot afford such a large proportion of poorly educated citizens. Every citizen should be drawn into the problems of societal decision-making. We would suggest that all people be required to take sabbatical leaves every seventh year, which could be financed in various ways depending on the choice of activity (this and the employment "problems" created by such a program are considered under "Economic and Political Change"). Each person would be required to spend the year bettering society and himself or herself in a way approved by the individual's immediate colleagues, A physician might petition his or her county medical society for permission to study new surgical techniques or anthropology. A garbage collector might petition coworkers to permit him or her to take a year's course in sanitary engineering or recycling techniques at a university. A secretary might apply to the government for a grant to spend a sabbatical serving on an ad hoc citizens' committee to evaluate the direction of research in high-energy physics. A business executive might apply for one of the open sabbatical chairs that could be established on the city council (as well as in all other legislative bodies). A flight instructor might persuade the local pilot's association to appoint him or her to one of the exchange positions in the local Federal Aviation Administration office, with an FAA counterpart being required (if qualified) to take over the instructor's job for a year. All bureaucrats should be required to take some of their sabbaticals as nongovernmental workers in the areas they administer and all professors to take some of theirs outside the groves of academe —or at least outside their own fields. The details of such a program would be complicated, but its benefits, we believe, would far outweigh its costs. A growing rigidity of roles in our society must be broken, and virtually everyone must be brought into its decision-making processes. Indeed, the discontent expressed today by many groups is based on their feeling of being cut off from participation in important decisions that affect their lives. Some moves in dus general direction have been made in the People's Republic of China, where city people and 54

Based on a U.S. Office of Education study, reported in Time, November 10, 1975, p. 6.

academics have been forced to join rural communes and participate in completely different work from what they had done before. It would be interesting to know what success the Chinese have had. We would certainly not advocate forcing people to change their occupations against their wishes, any more than we would advocate adopting the Chinese communist system of government. But the basic idea behind this policy seems valuable, and an adaptation of it that fit our political system might well be worth exploring. As an example of how citizen participation in political decision-making can work, a group of scientists led by ecologist C. S. Holling at the University of British Columbia have involved local businessmen, politicians, and private citizens in a computer simulation of a prospective development project, as an experiment in the results of citizen decision-making.55 Everyone contributed to the assumptions of the model, and all were satisfied with the model created. Then various people were allowed to try out their pet development plans on the model. When a politician found that his or her plan led to environmental disaster, the politician had to acknowledge the error. The politician could not blame the model because he or she had been involved in building what was believed to be a realistic one. We believe that it is possible, at least in theory, to get away from a we-they system of running the country, to give everyone a chance to participate. Grave problems would unquestionably accompany the attempt, but since we are both morally committed to some form of democracy and intellectually convinced that the present system is both undemocratic and lethally ineffectual, we see no choice but to trv a change.

THE LEGAL SYSTEM Perhaps the greatest potential for reversing environmental deterioration in the United States and for bringing our population growth under control lies in the effective utilization of our legal system.56 A law may be defined as '^Personal communication. Much of this section is based on discussions with attorney Johnson C. Montgomery, whose death in December 1974 was a loss deeply felt bv people in the ZPG movement. 56

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 833

framework of existing laws and the agencies that administer them. In some sense the easiest route to improvements in environmental protection would seem to be the passage of more comprehensive controls and the establishment of streamlined procedures for administering them. Almost certainly, the courts would have no constitutional objections to any reasonable legislative limitations on the activities of polluting industries—for example, requirements that effluents be purified, reduced, or eliminated. The courts could even sustain statutes that would put certain corporations out of business. There are two major difficulties in getting effective legislative action. First is the notion that if a higher government authority (for example, the United States Congress) enacts a law regulating a certain activity, it may have preempted the field so that a lesser government authority (for example, a state) cannot enact legislation dealing with the same subject. This has led the tobacco and automobile industries to push for federal regulation in order to avoid the enactment of possibly morerestrictive state laws. Inconsistencies in laws of different jurisdictions create a problem for industry, and there is no easy answer. A national economy does require national standards; it would be extremely difficult for the automobile manufacturers to satisfy fifty different statutory schemes to regulate automobile pollution. Yet some local problems are so severe that they require more drastic solutions than need be applied to the country at large. Thus California (and only California) is permitted tougher automobile emission standards than those established by the Environmental Protection Agency for the rest of the nation. The second difficulty with legislative action is that legislators are often not cognizant of new problems, and some are notoriously at the beck and call of established pressure groups, such as the automobile manufacturers and the oil industry. Furthermore, in those situations where a legislature has taken action, the action has generally consisted of setting up regulatory agencies like the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, or the Federal Communications Commission. Such agencies in time have tended to become dominated by the industries they are intended to regulate—ultimately the foxes wind up minding the

chickens.61 Nevertheless, as public pressure has grown, the public has already seen and can expect to see more results from legislation and from regulatory agencies than it has in the past. In the early 1970s steps were taken in the United States toward placing stricter controls on the release of pollutants into air and water. The Clean Air Act (as amended in 1970) and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments (1972) set national pollution standards for air and water.62 As we discussed in Chapter 11, however, it was clear by the mid-1970s that the high expectations of environmentalists were not to be realized—at least not as rapidly as they had hoped. There remains a need for establishing and implementing a nationwide (to say nothing of worldwide) program drastically limiting emissions of harmful materials from industry, automobiles, homes, and other sources. National Environmental Policy Act. A major landmark in the fight for environmental quality in the United States was the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (familiarly known as NEPA)63, which became law on January 1,1970. The bill was modeled in large part after the Employment Act of 1946, which "declared a responsibility in the Federal Government to maintain a prosperous and stable national economy."64 In a similar vein, NEPA declared a responsibility in the federal government to restore and maintain environmental quality. NEPA created in the Executive Office of the President a three-member Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which was charged with assisting and advising the president in the preparation of the annual Environmental Quality Report and with carrying out a number of other survey and advisory capacities for monitoring the quality of the environment and the influence of government agencies and actions on it. 6! For a fascinating description of industry-government "cooperation" on air pollution, see J. C. Esposito, Vanishing air, which, although somewhat out of date, gives the flavor of interactions among politicians, agencies, and businessmen. "For a useful citizen's guide to these acts, see J. Cannon, A clear view. "The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, public law 91-190, January 1, 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4321-4347). "Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality, 1972, p.222.

834 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

The key provision of NEPA, however, is its famous Section 102(C): The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this act and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall— (C) Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on— (i) The environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) Alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and on the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes. This is the section of NEPA that established the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which provided a crucial legal lever for public intervention on the side of the environment. The vast majority of environmental suits have been in the area of public law (concerning the relationship of citizens to the government) in contrast to private law (which deals with the relationship of citizens

with one another). An early instance was the famous Storm King case,65 a lawsuit brought by an environmental group against the Federal Power Commission, which had granted Consolidated Edison of New York a permit to build a pumped-storage hydroelectric plant below scenic Storm King Mountain on the Hudson River. The 1965 decision in the Storm King case helped establish the standing (a position from which to assert legal rights or duties) of individuals or groups with records of concern for the environment—in other words, it established that environmentalists could sue to protect environmental values from the adverse effects of administrative decisions. That legal step forward was followed by a half-step back in another public law case (the Mineral King case), in which the Sierra Club sued to prevent Walt Disney Productions from turning a lovely part of the Sierra Nevada into a plastic wonderland.66 In the Mineral King case, the United States Supreme Court held that members of the Sierra Club had to use the area in question in order to gain standing; the interest of the club members in preserving the wilderness was not sufficient cause to stop the Disney project. (For a novel approach to the question of standing—an approach that would have served the environment well in the Mineral King case— see Box 14-2.) In the context of concerned groups having standing in environmental cases, NEPA's requirement of environmental impact statements (and the required public airing of the EIS) has proven to be a godsend. A series of cases brought by groups such as the Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Sierra Club, and the Natural Resources Defense Council have determined that an EIS is to provide "full disclosure" of the environmental implications of any impending decision, that it must set forth opposing views on significant environmental issues raised by the proposal, that it must contain a full analysis of costs and impacts of alternatives, and that it must balance adverse environ"Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference versus Federal Power Commission, 1965.354 F 2d 608. For a brief discussion of the case, see J. Holdren and P. Herrera, Energy, pp. 181-183. "Sierra Club versus Morton, 1972, U.S.L.W. 4397. For good discussions of the question of standing and environmental law in general, see ]. E. Krier, Environmental law and its administration; and C. D. Stone, Should trees have standing? Toward legal rights for natural objects.

BOX 14-2 A Note on Standing The legal machinery and the basic legal notions needed to control pollution are already in existence. Slight changes in the legal notions and diligent application of the legal machinery are all that are necessary to induce a great reduction in pollution in the United States. One change in those notions that would have a most salubrious effect on the quality of the environment has been proposed by law professor Christopher D. Stone in his celebrated monograph, Should trees have Standing?* In that tightly reasoned essay, Stone

points out the obvious advantages of giving natural objects standing, just as such inanimate objects as corporations, trusts, and ships are now held to have legal rights and duties. If this were done, questions such as that of the standing of the Sierra Club in the Mineral King case, mentioned earlier, would disappear—for, as Justice William O. Douglas pointed out in his dissenting opinion in that case, Sierra Club versus Morton would "be more properly labeled as Mineral King v. Morton."

*Originaliy published in 1972 in the Southern California Law Review; available as a book, which also reprints the U.S.

Supreme Court's opinions in Sierra Club versus Morton (the Mineral King controversy).

mental effects against the benefits of the proposal.67 Failure to conform fully to the requirements has been the basis of numerous successful lawsuits in which projects have been stopped until proper environmental impact statements were prepared. The strength of NEPA lies in the formal commitment of the government to environmental quality and the required public airing of potential impacts by the EIS procedures. In the five years 1970 through 1974, more than 6000 impact statements were filed. In the opinion of the CEQ, by 1974 NEPA had "succeeded in its objective of incorporating an environmental perspective into the decision-making process of Federal agencies."68 This statement seems accurate to us, both because it agrees with our impressions and because, when it was made, Russell W. Peterson, one of the brightest and most straightforward of Washington bureaucrats, was chairman of the CEQ.68a In addition, the general approach of NEPA has been adopted by local and state governments. By 1974 twenty-one states and Puerto Rico had adopted the EIS process, as had governments in such nations as Australia, Canada, and Israel.69 One of the most impressive of the state acts is California's 1970 Environmental Quality Act (amended), which requires impact state67

CEQ Environmental Quality, 1972, pp. 242-246. '"CEQ, Environmental Quality, 1974, p. 372. This report has a good brief historical account of the evolution of NEPA (pp. 372—413). 68a ln 1976 he resigned and in 1977 was succeeded by Charles Warren, a California State legislator with a thorough understanding of environmental issues. President Carter's appointment of Warren continues the tradition of excellence in this position. 6 'Ibid., pp. 399-413.

ments on all projects, private or government, that will significantly affect the environment. In the mid-1970s some 6000 statements were being filed annually.70 As far-reaching and successful as NEPA has been in this context, some weaknesses are also evident. While it has raised consciousness of the environment in government agencies and in the business community, concrete results in terms of prevention and repair of environmental deterioration have been less apparent. Thus far, NEPA has been mainly an instrument for disseminating information rather than one for guiding policy. It cannot, in itself, lead to the cancellation of a project—even though citizens groups have repeatedly employed it to delay projects where EIS provisions have not been meticulously followed. Indeed, a key flaw in the act as first applied was that its enforcement depended entirely upon the public, and the public could use it only to delay, not to halt, projects that would have massive negative impacts on the environment.71 As far as NEPA was concerned, the Army Corps of Engineers legally could plow the United States under, or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission could permit the country to be totally contaminated with lethal amounts of radioactive wastes, as long as the EIS requirements of the law were followed scrupulously. In applying NEPA, the courts seem to be moving toward substantive rather than procedural re70 In California they are technically known as environmental impact reports (EIR). "D. W. Fischer, Environmental impact assessment as an instrument of public policy for controlling economic growth. The appendix to the article contains an informative critique of NEPA.

836 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

view, however. This means that projects may be halted for reasons other than failure to follow the EIS provision meticulously.72 Several landmark court cases have clarified the obligations of government agencies under NEPA. In Calvert Cliff's coordinating committee versus AEC (1971), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the Atomic Energy Commission could not exclude water quality considerations from its environmental impact statement merely because the power plant in question had already received a certificate of compliance with federal water quality regulations from the state. The court found that the "crabbed interpretation" of NEPA by the AEC would prevent the AEC from making a balanced determination of the best course of action. In Scientists' Institute for Public Information versus AEC (1973), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled in connection with the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) that comprehensive environmental impact statements must be prepared for acknowledged programs, not merely for individual facilities; that is, the combined impact of many LMFBRs and the associated facilities had to be examined in advance since the AEC had acknowledged that it had a program and not a single facility in mind. In Sierra Club versus Morton (1974), involving fossil-fuel development on the Great Plains, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals defined requirements for a programmatic environmental impact statement in certain circumstances even where an agency had not recognized its actions as a program. NEPA was one important step in the right direction, and it may become a prime weapon in the fight for environmental quality. But it will prove inadequate unless ways are found to introduce comprehensive environmental planning throughout the nation, in which legal standards for balancing environmental values against other values are applied to all projects with significant impact, government or private. How this might be accomplished—and some existing legislation is leading in this direction—is discussed further in "Economics and Political Change." That section also discusses the possibility that relatively simple legislation dealing with the consumption of resources might even72

J. E. Krier, personal communication.

tually replace much of the cumbersome ad hoc system that is now evolving for the control of environmental impact. Environmental Protection Agency. Contrary to a rather widespread misimpression, the Environmental Protection Agency was not created by NEPA but rather by an administrative reorganization that took place in December 1970. It consolidated the Federal Water Quality Administration (formerly in the Department of Interior); the National Air Pollution Control Administration (formerly in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, HEW); the pesticide registration, research, and standard-setting programs of the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration; the solid-waste management programs of HEW; and some of the functions of the Federal Radiation Council and the Atomic Energy Commission for setting standards for radiation exposure. The EPA was given all the functions and responsibilities necessary to carry out the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; and under its first administrator, William D. Ruckelshaus, it made a reasonably rapid start at doing so.73 His successor, Russell E. Train, continued to build an increasingly effective organization in an often difficult political environment. Unlike CEQ, which is a small advisory group in the Executive Office of the President, the EPA is a large operating agency with a staff in 1976 of 8800 people and estimated budget outlays in that year of $3 billion. I: maintains research laboratories in several parts of the country. The best concise record of the accomplishments as well as the shortcomings of the EPA are the CEQ's annual reports on the state of the nation's environmentOccupational Safety and Health Act. As noted in Chapter 10, workers are often exposed to much higher concentrations of dangerous substances than are considered acceptable for the population at large. The m&:.~ legal protection for workers is provided under :h; Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which authorized the Labor Department to establish standard: for exposure of workers to hazardous pollutants, to ;

See CEQ, Environmental quality, 1970 and 1971.

provide training programs, and to set up a system for reporting occupational illness and injury. These duties are carried out by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) does research for and recommends standards to OSHA. Three types of standards for exposure to pollutants can be set by OSHA: consensus standards adopted from a list provided by a group of government and industrial scientists, permanent standards, and temporary emergency standards. Permanent standards generally include, in addition to the eight-hour limits for worker exposure provided by consensus standards, regulations covering work practices, monitoring, and medical surveillance. Temporary standards are effective only for a six-month period, an interim during which permanent standards are developed. By_1975, consensus standards had been set for about, 400 chemicals, and OSHA and NIOSH were moving to change them to permanent standards. Permanent standards had already been established for asbestos, vinyl chloride, and a group of fourteen carcinogens; and permanent standards have been proposed for arsenic, coke-oven emissions, and noise. Some groups feel that those standards are not strict enough; for example, a chemical workers union unsuccessfully challenged in court those established for the fourteen carcinogens. It seems certain that a constant tug-of-war will ensue between consideration of the costs (real or imagined) to industry of lowering workers' exposure to hazards and consideration of the legitimate desires of workers to protect their health. In view of the large numbers of people directly or indirectly involved (remember, hazardous materials like asbestos and plutonium can be taken home inadvertently by workers, placing their families and friends at risk), it seems clear that OSHA's activities are a long-overdue step in the right direction.

Population Law The impact of laws and policies on population size and growth has, until very recently, largely been ignored by the legal profession. Thejirst cojnprehensive treatment of population law was that of the late Johnson C.

Montgomery.,74 "" arrnrnpy who was president of Zero Population Growth, and whose ideas are the basis of much of the following discussion. To date, there has been no serious attempt in Western countries to use laws to control excessive population jrowth^although there exists ample authority under which population growth could be regulated. For example, under the United States Constitution, effective, population-control programs could be enacted under the clauses that empower Congress to appropriate funds to provide for tlie(general welfare and to regulate comor under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.^5 Such laws constitutionally could be very broad. Indeed, it has been concluded thaL compulsory population-control laws, even including laws requiring compulsory abortion, could be sustained under the existing Constitution if the population crisis, became sufficiently severe to endanger the society. Few today consider the situation in the United States serious enough to justify compulsion, however. The most compelling arguments that might be used to justify government regulation of reproduction are based upon the rapid population growth relative to the capacity of environmental and social systems to absorb the associated impacts. To provide a high quality of life for all, there must be fewer people. But there are other sound reasons that support the use of law to regulate reproduction. It is accepted that the law has as its proper function the protection of each person and each group of people. A legal restriction on the right to have more than a given number of children could easily be based on the needs of the first children. Studies have indicated that the larger the family, the less healthy the children are likely to be and the less likely they are to realize their potential levels of achievement.76 Certainly there is no question that children of a small family can be cared for better and can "Population explosion and United States law. 7! "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." ;6 Joe D. Wtay, Population pressure on families: Family size and child-spacing, in Roger Revelle, ed.. Rapid population growth: Consequences and policy- implications, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971; R. B. Zajonc. Family configuration and intelligence. Science, vol. 192, pp. 227-236 (April 16/1976).

838 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

be educated better than children of a large family, income axul oti^er tV\\Yvg,s \3*im^, ec\ua\, TVve VaNv CQM\d

properly say to a mother that, in order to protect the children she already has, she could have no more. (Presumably, regulations on the sizes of adopted families _ would have to be the same.1 A legal restriction on the right to have children could^ also be based on a right not to be disadvantaged by excessive numbers of children produced by others., Differing rates of reproduction among groups can give rise to serious social problems. For example, differential rates of reproduction between ethnic, racial, religious, or economic groups might result in increased competition for resources and political power and thereby undermine social order. If some individuals contribute to general social deterioration by overproducing children, and if the need is compelling, they can be required by law to exercise reproductive responsibility— just as they can be required to excercise responsibility in their resourceconsumption patterns— providing they are not denied equal protection. Individual rights. Individual rights must be balanced against the power of the government to control human reproduction. Some people— respected legislators, judges, and lawyers included— have viewed the_ right to have children as a fundamental and inalienable _ right. Yet neither the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution mentions a right to reproduce. Nor does the UN Charter describe such a right, although a resolution of the United Nations affirms the "right responsibly to choose" the number and spacing of children (our emphasis). In the United States, individuals have a constitutional right to privacy and it has been held that the right to privacy includes the right to choose whether or not to have children, at least to the extent that a woman has a right to choose not to have children. But the right is not unlimited. Where the society has a "compelling, subordinating interest" in regulating population size, the right of the individual may be curtailed. If society's survival depended on having more children, women could be required to bear children, just as men can constitutionally be required to serve in the armed forces. Similarly, given a crisis caused by overpopula-

tion, reasonably necessary laws to control excessive reproduction could be enacted. It is often argued that uie T\g\vx to Yvave ctuldtetv v& so personal that the government should not regulate it. In an ideal society, no doubt the state should leave family size and composition solely to the desires of the parents. In today's world, however, the number of children in a family is a matter of profound public concern. The law regulates other highly personal matters. For example, no one may lawfully have more than one spouse at a time. Why should the law not be able to prevent a person from having more than two children? The legal argument has been made that the First Amendment provision for separation of church and state prevents the United States government from regulating family size. The notion is that family size is God's affair and no business of the state. But the same argument has been made against the taxation of church property, prohibition of polygamy, compulsory education of and medical treatment for children, and many similar measures that have been enacted. From a legal standpoint, the First Amendment argument against family-size regulation is devoid of merit. There are two valid constitutional limitations on the kinds of population-control policies that could be enacted. First, any enactments must satisfy the requirements of due process of law; they must be reasonably designed to meet real problems, and they must not be arbitrary. Second, any enactments must ensure that equal protection under the law is afforded to every person; they must not be permitted to discriminate against anyparticular group or person. This should be as true of laws giving economic encouragement to small families as it would be of laws directly regulating the number of children a person may have. This does not mean that the impact of the laws must be exactly the same on everyone. A law limiting each couple to two children obviously would have a greater impact on persons who desire large families than it would on persons who do not. Thus, while the due-process and equal-protection limitations preclude the passage of capricious or discriminatory laws, neither guarantees anyone the right to have more than his or her fair share of children, if such a right is shown to conflict with other rights and freedoms.

890 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

the programs were selfless); American resources have been devoted mainly to providing additional material goods for ourselves and to an expensive and dangerous arms race, rather than to improving the lot of our fellow human beings.

Latin America and the United States: Problems of Paternalism The pattern of relationships among DCs and LDCs prevailing until recently is exemplified by the behavior of the United States toward Latin America in this century. The United States has long claimed a special relf ti^n^'pwith its neighbors to the south, but this more often than not has meant a desire for exclusive exploitation rights._ The one-sidedness of the agreement has not gone unno-_ ticed by Latin Americans. When Sol Linowitz resigned in 1969 as U.S. ambassador to the Organization of Ampric-iffl Staffis, he warned of the possibility of "a series of Vietnams" in Latin America. The same year Nelson A. Rockefeller,,then governor of New York, was sent on a fact-finding tour south of the border for President Nixon. He was greeted with a violence that underlined the Linowitz warning. Rockefeller was, of course, an especially ironic choice since his family's association with Standard Oil is so much a jymbol of U.S. economic imperialism. But one does not have to look far for more fundamental reasons for his hostile reception. Population growth in Latin America was proceeding at an average of 2.9 percent per year during the first eight years of the Alliance for Progress, while per-capita economic growth only averaged about 1.5 percent per year, a full percentage point below the Alliance target. A large portion of the Latin American population was then—and still is—for the most part living in appalling poverty. For millions, diets were inadequate, infant and child mortality sky-high, and decent housing often nonexistent. If 10,000 houses had been built per day in Latin America between 1969 and 1979, something on the order of 100 million of our southern neighbors (more than one-fourth of the expected population there) would still not be adequately housed. Although land reform has begun in some countries—most recently in Peru—10

percent of the people in Latin America still owned 90 percent of the land in 1976. And in most Latin American countries, progress toward an equitable distribution 01 income has been slow, especially for the rural populations. Development in most of Latin America has scarcely touched the poor. The rich-poor gap has widened in many countries, especially the richer ones such as Brazil and Mexico, and national economies have tended to become two-tiered. The upper tier consists of large landholders and the urban upper and middle classes, especially in such industrial centers as Sao Paulo and Mexico City. In the lower tier are The urban poor ancL peasants, bypassed by modernization. In Mexico City, for example, a skilled worker in 1976 earned more than $500 a month, including benefits. But outside the city, minimum wages for farm workers were $5 a day, and because of underemployment many earned as little as $100 per year.12 In several countries, notably Brazil, Peru, and Paraguay, there is a third, even lower tier—primitive Indians, who are being systematically exterminated as roadblocks _ in the path of progress. In Paraguay, which is heavikunder U.S. influence, there have been charges of United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA1 complicity' in those programs.'3 True or not, that such charges are widely believed south of the border says something about U.S.-Latin American relations. Latin America's political instability is legendary (Figure 15-2). Between 1961 and mid-1976 political changes were made by military force in Argentina, Bolivia. Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Peru—in some countries more than once. This political turmoil cannot all be blamed on the United States, but American behavior in Latin America has done little to foster stability there. Although the days when United States corporations directly controlled small countries are over, a huge reservoir of ill will remains from those days, when those corporations openly took what they wanted of the mineral and agricultural wealth of the continent. This 12 A no-nonsense mood takes hold in Mexico, U.S. News and World Report, June 21, 1976, pp. 63-66. For a description of the situation in Brazil, see Robert Harvey, Brazil: The next nuclear power? 13 John Hillaby, Genocide in Paraguay.

62.3

UNITED STATES

S1710

110.2

TYPES OF GOVERNMENTS Constitutional Military regime 0m Civilian dictatorship

©

Number of government changes since 1944

Population 1976 est. (in millions)

Annual growth •

Per capita G.N.P. (in U.S. dollars) 1976 $1000

Private, direct long-term investments, value at end of 1973 (millions, U.S. dollars)

widespread resentment was deepened by revelation of CIA involvement in Chile before the 1974 coup that overthrew the Allende government in Chile. Moreover. North American economic exploitation of Latin America is even now far from finished. While some United States multinational companies are now so well-behaved that they can serve as examples of benevolence, having made significant contributions to their host nations, they still

FIGURE 15-2 Latin American summary: population, per-capita gross national product, amounts of American investment, forms of government, and numbers of government changes since 1944 (excluding those resulting from elections, unless they have been interspersed with coups).

drain vast amounts nf natural-resource capital from those nations. And the actions of some other United Stales multinational firms have had dramatically undesirable effects, especially on the poorest segments of the populations.14 "For example, see R. J. Earner and R. E. Mullet, Global reach: The piwurr of the multinational corporations, chapter 7; and Robert J. Ledogar,

Hungry for profits: U.S. food and drug multinationals in Latin America.

RICH NATIONS, POOR NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

ties, the two most powerful DCs, the United States and USSR, have approached aid differently. The United States, with a vast store of capital to draw on, has seen the problems of the LDCs primarily in terms of a shortage of capital. The Soviets, on the other hand, because of their relatively recent history of revolution and the more recent successful revolutions in two LDCs—China and Cuba—tend to emphasize the export not of capital but of political change, of revolution. Unhappily, many nations threw off the yoke of colonial exploiters after World War II only to have it replaced by home-grown repressive governments. Political scientist Harlan Cleveland put it succinctly: "Nor did freedom for nations lead directly to freedom for individuals. Colonial rule was often supplanted by military rule, Czars were succeeded by commissars, white domination gave way to black dictatorships, extraterritoriality was pushed out by totalitarianism."55 The need for dramatic political change in many countries is obvious—but most recent changes have been in the wrong direction. Haiti (with a per-capita GNP of $70 in 1972) had no chance while it was under dictator Frangois Duvalier, and its present prospects seem no better. The assumption of "emergency powers" by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India in 1975, including suppression of dissent, did not encourage optimism for the political future of that troubled country. The autocratic regimes, military or civilian, in many Latin American and African nations, many of them beset by terrorism and revolutionary activity, seem barely able to keep the peace and their seats in power, let alone do much to improve the lives of their peoples. Tales of severe repression and torture of dissidents in Brazil and Chile—both countries that ostensibly have a great deal going for them—horrify outsiders and frighten off tourists (if not foreign investors). Democracy is a fragile form of government, especially where it is not backed by appropriate traditions and some degree of economic equity. Economic equity may be especially important, and a fundamental aspect of equity is landholding. In many nominal democracies, land reform unquestionably is sorely needed to give the people incentive to improve their agricultural practices "Our coming foreign policy crisis, p. 11.

and a chance to participate in the modernization process. Revolution is one potentially effective way to achieve land reform. Both the capitalist and revolutionary points of view on aid have a certain validity, but both are also sadly deficient. If real progress in helping LDCs is to be made, both superpowers will have to change their ways. The United States must stop supporting assorted dictators around the world merely because they claim to be anticommunist. It must accept that in many countries most of the people might well be better off under regimes that the U.S. perceives as communist than under their present regimes. In Latin America, in particular, the need for social justice as a first step toward economic development has been widely recognized (but rarely implemented). If badly needed reforms do not take place peacefully, they will sooner or later be attempted by revolution. It is imperative that U.S. officials in LDCs realize that their contacts within those countries are all too often unrepresentative of the people as a whole. The attitudes of the governing classes in the capitol cities are unlikely to resemble those of peasants or of the masses in urban slums. There is, of course, no doubt that corporate interests, sensitive to the resource limits of the United States and motivated by the desire for profits, play a substantial role in shaping American foreign policy. The interlocking directorates of the government and various industrial giants are well known. Executives move freely from big business into administrative positions in the government, while high-level bureaucrats and military leaders are welcomed into executive positions with corporations doing business with the government. In 1969, for instance, each of the top twenty defense contractors in the United States employed an average of 65 retired military men of the rank of colonel, navy captain, or higher.56 The military-industrial complex, among other things, wishes to assure the United States control over the resources it_ deems essential—and in the process often has attempted, to control the destinies of LDCs. It is evident that the LDCs can undertake and would profit from having control over their own resources and destinies. The contrary view has often been held in the "Dennis C. Pirages and Paul R. Ehrlich, Ark II: Social response to environmental imperatives.

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determined to narrow the gap between the rich and the past as doctrine by the DCs. For example, there weredire poor. The OPEC revolution has shown that traditional (and erroneous) warnings that the Egyptians would be_ unable to run the Suez Canal when they took it over from — international politicoeconomic relationships can be dramatically and profoundly altered. And even if, as some the British in 1956. The success of OPEC surely has put claim, the case of oil is unique, the self-interest of the rich* that fairy tale to rest once and for all! nations is clearly tied to the condition of the poor. As Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that there is much tn he gained in attempting to shatter the power of international Harlan Cleveland has written, "If two-thirds of the corporations, many of which, among other things, are world simply failed to cooperate in international arheavily engagsjjjn the exploitation of LDC resources.^A ^ rangements that require general consent—nuclear saife primary reason is that it probably would be impossible in " guards, weather watch, crop forecasting, public health* the absence of supporting changes in attitude in DC narcotics control, environmental monitoring, and mea^ societies. As long as economic standards reign supreme, sures against hijacking and terrorism— everybody would lose, but the world powers would likely lose the most."j7 economic power will tend to become concentrated; only more fundamental changes will suffice. And those In short, for the world commons to operate for changes must be made with great care. International benefit of all people requires it to be administered corporations supply planning, coordination, capital, and cooperatively —and the poor can demand a price for their expertise in their operations within LDCs; considerable cooperation. More positively, there is general agreement economic hardship could result from a sudden dissoluamong the rich that poverty should be wiped out— and tion of those giants. But they could be quickly stopped that consensus would make selfishness a more difficult from draining capital away from the LDCs; after all, the course (although one that certainly might yet be taken). extraction of capital goes against the West's conventional International politics in the near future will most wisdom of what is required to eliminate poverty in those likely he focused on the question of whether the rich and_ the poor can strike a new planetary bargain, to us^Harlan nations. Russia should face the facts of life, too. The Soviets Cleveland's term. Can the developed countries show the blame most of the problems of the world on capitalist necessary self-restraint and the less developed countries imperialism, but that just is not supported by the die necessary changes in attitudes and organization to evidence. Revolution is at best a partial answer; it cannot rearrange the relationships among nations successfully?, remove the biological and physical constraints upon There are some hopeful signs. development, although it may well remove some of the A group consisting of most Third World nations. social and economic barriers. At worst, as noted above, calling themselves the Group of 77, in 1974 presented a revolution only replaces one despotism with another. case to the United Nations for a New International Furthermore, the Soviet Union's intervention in other Order. In May 1974 the United Nations General As-^ countries in defense of what it perceives as its vital sembly adopted by consensus a Declaration on the^ interests has been fully as blatant and brutal as that of the Establishment of a New Economic Order, whose stated capitalist imperialists, as the Soviet invasion of Czechoaims include: "to correct inequalities andredress existing slovakia in 1968 so clearly demonstrated. It is ironic that injustices and ensure steadily accelerating economicthe USSR, in Angola and elsewhere, now seems to be development, peace and justice for present and future, emulating the grand imperialism pioneered in the ninegenerations."58 teenth century by western European powers and the The Declaration called for stabilization of commodity United States. prices and markets for them and for establishment of a But the differing approaches of the United States (as link between those prices and prices paid for manufacwell as other Western nations) and the USSR, which tured products imported from DCs. It also called for dominated international politics in the first two decades "Our coming foreign policy crisis, p. 13. after World War II, must now share the stage with the 5 "The new economic order. Nae Internationalist, October 1975 '•"policies of the LDCs themselves, which are increasingly special issue on this subject).

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restraint of research into synthetic substitutes for commodities, which have already damaged markets for some products, such as sisal, jute, and rubber. (Higher prices and diminishing resources of petroleum will eventually undermine this activity, but that is little comfort to LDCs today.) Finally, the New Economic Order would encourage the development of producer associations and trade unions among LDCs in order to negotiate favorable trade terms more effectively. Such trade associations, while not having the clout of OPEC (where conditions were uniquely suitable for setting up a cartel), have already been established for several commodities, including bananas, cocoa, coffee, copper, phosphates, tea, and tin.59 The reaction to the New Economic Order among DCs, especially at first, was generally negative, and the United I States was the most recalcitrant. But it soon became obvious that the demands of the Group of 77 could not be ignored. United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim told a later United Nations conference in Lima, Peru: "the New Economic Order is the price of peace."60 In September 1975, in an address before the United Nations, by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the United States officially took a stand favoring new bargains, including a "fundamental structural improvement in the relationship of the developing countries to the world trading system . . . such as preferences, favorable concessions, and exceptions which reflect their economic status."61 Kissinger also urged the world community to address the basic problems of access of LDCs to capital markets, the transfer of technology, and "the principles to guide the beneficial operation of_ transnational enterprises." He pointed out the need for controlling population growth, for increasing food reserves, and for reducing food wastage, and he pledged the United States to contribute to a program of action if all nations "met in a spirit of common endeavor/' The speech ended with some interesting rhetoric: My government does not offer these propositions as ""New Internationalist" guide to UNCTADIV, New Internationalist, April 1976, pp. 6-7. M The New Economic Order, New Internationalist, 1975. '''Address by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinyer (delivered bv Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan), seventh special session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 1,1975. Reprinted in the Nevi York Times, September 2, 1975, p. 20.

an act of charity, nor should they be received as if due. We know that the world economy nourishes us all, we know that we live on a shrinking planet. Materially as well as morally, our destinies are intertwined. . . . There remain enormous things for us to do. We can say once more to the new nations: We have heard your voices. We embrace your hopes. We will join your efforts. We commit ourselves to our common success. Although the speech did not indicate awareness of many of the concerns of this chapter, it did indicate a growing power within the United States government of persons who realize the degree to which all nations are__ interdependent and understand that the future of the United States depends on how well the entire world deals _ with the population-resource-environment crisis.No doubt the success of the OPEC cartel's embargo and raising of oil prices also had much to do with the United, States change of heart toward trig aspirations of poor countries. History makes it difficult to he)ieve that the. change in attitude could have been accomplished without the bludgeon of OPEC oil or some similar weapon in the __ control of the nonindustrial nations. How much action will follow the rhetoric remains to be seen. And how ready the LDCs are to put aside their own rhetoric and join in common solutions to common problems also is in doubt. Unfortunately, less than three_ months after the Kissinger speech, the use of the United Nations as a forum for divisive propaganda on the part of the Eastern and Third World blocks reached an extreme with the unfortunate ^'Zionism is racism/62 declaration. That declaration strengthened, at a critical time, isolationist forces in the United States who already ered both the United Nations and foreign aid utterly _ . useless. The declaration was followed a few months later _j by a failure of Third World and communist nations to join the Western nations in a worldwide condemnation of international terrorism or to agree to oppose it and refuse cooperation with extortionists. Thereis £eal danger that the past colossal failures of both the\ United Nations] and foreign-assistance efforts will lead to a withdrawal of the United States from efforts to help solve vital international problems. It would behoove all governments to remember that, with"Time, November 24, 1975.

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out the wholehearted collaboration of the United States, western Europe, the USSR, and the People's Republic of China, any resolution of world problems is extremely unlikely. And failure to resolve them will most likely lead to war.

POPULATION, RESOURCES, AND WAR_ Desmond Morris some years ago observed, " . . . the best solution for ensuring world peace is the widespread promotion of contraception and abortion . . . moralizing factions that oppose it must face the fact that they are engaged in dangerous war mongering."63 As he suggested, population-related problems may be increasing the probability of a thermonuclear Armageddon. Avoiding such a denouement for civilization is the most pressing political-economic problem of our time. In 1969 the world saw in a microcosm what may be in store: Two grossly overpopulated Central American countries, El Salvador and Honduras, went to war against each other. El Salvador had an estimated population of 3.3 million, a population density of 160 people per square kilometer, with a doubling time of 21 years. Honduras had a population of 2.5 million, a density of only 22 per square kilometer, and the same doubling time as El Salvador. More significant statistics have been provided by the Latin American Demographic Center; they show that in El Salvador the population density per square kilometer of arable land was 300 persons, while in Honduras it was only 60 persons. Almost 300,000 Salvadorans had moved into Honduras in search of land and jobs because of overpopulation and resulting unemployment at home. Friction developed among the immigrants and the Honduran natives; El Salvador accused Honduras of maltreating the Salvadorans; and the problem escalated into a brief but nasty war. The conflict was ended by the intervention of the Organization of American States (OASV In a precedent-shattering move, the OAS recognized demographic factors in its formula for settling the dispute—an international body acknowledged that population pressure was a root cause of a war.64 '"'The naked ape, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967. "Population Bulletin, December 1969, pp. 134-135.

Systematic analyses of the role of population pressures in generating wars, carried out by political scientist Robert C. North and his colleagues at Stanford University, have supported earlier conclusions based on anecdotal evidence. Statistical studies of the involvement of major European powers in wars in modern times have revealed very high correlations among rates of population growth, rising GNP, expanding military budgets, and involvement in wars, although technical considerations make drawing conclusions about causes and effects hazardous. In more detailed multivariate analyses. Professor North found a complex causal chain involving population growth in relation to static or slowly growing resources, technological development, a tendency to invest energy beyond previous boundaries of society, and increases in the presumed needs and demands of a populace. Writing about the root causes of World War I, North and political scientist Nazli Choucri of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology concluded: Our most important finding is that domestic growth (as measured by population density and national income per capita) is generally a strong determinant of national expansion. Our investigations have identified strong linkages from domestic growth and national expansion to military expenditures, to alliances, and to international interactions with a relatively high potential for violence.65 In ancient times such tendencies were somewhat buffered by oceans, mountain ranges, deserts, vast distances, and slow means of travel. Rome could raze Carthage but not China or the cities of South American and Central American Indians. Today, however, with vast increases of population and unprecedented developments in technology, transportation, and communications, the peoples of the world are cheek by jowl, and there is little geographical buffering left. North pointed out that states in nonaggressive phases, like modern Sweden, tend to share certain characteristics: "A relatively small and stable population, a relatively high and steadily developing technology, and good access to ^Nations in conflict: National growth and intertiational violence.

RICH NATIONS, POOR NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

In our view, the most serious risk associated with nuclear power is the attendant increase in the number of countries that have access to technology, materials, and facilities leading to a nuclear weapons capability. . . . If widespread proliferation actually occurs, it will prove an extremely serious danger to U.S. security and to world peace and stability in general.860 The Ford group recommended that the U.S. defer the recycle of plutonium and the commercialization of the breeder reactor and that it seek "common supplier action to ban the export of such technology." It recommended also that the U.S. and other supplier nations provide assured supplies of slightly enriched uranium to other countries at favorable prices, a plan whose drawbacks we have already mentioned above. In April 1977, President Carter announced a nuclear policy for his administration essentially congruent with the Ford Study's recommendation. While we applaud the progress represented by the positions taken by the Flowers, Ranger, and Ford reports and by the Carter administration's position, our own preference is for a stronger stance. We believe there should be an absolute embargo on the export of enrichment and reprocessing technology by any nation.86d The United States should cajole and, if necessary, coerce its allies into compliance, using every incentive and/or peaceful sanction at its disposal. (The possibilities are considerable, not least of which is the fact that West Germany and France will be dependent on U.S. enriched uranium for their own nuclear power programs into the 1980s.) Since the Soviets are also intensely concerned about proliferation, there is a chance that they would cooperate. Countries that have power reactors but no enrichment or reprocessing capability could be supplied with low-enriched uranium by the sort of consortium mentioned above, but there is reason to question whether any additional power reactors should be exported by anyone. A universal embargo on reactor exports may seem a drastic measure—certainly drastic enough to require rewriting the NPT—but lowering the probability of a nuclear holocaust is a desperately important task. """Spurgeon Kceny et al.. Nuclear power issues and choices. See also the chapter on proliferation in A. Lovins, Soft energy paths: Toward a durable peace. 8sd

The sort of pussyfooting that characterized attempts to stem proliferation before 1977 was not merely a scandal but a threat to the survival of civilization. Chemical, biological, and environmental weapons. Even if humanity does manage to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it still must deal with the ever-increasing deadliness of conventional weapons and the prospective horrors of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) and environmental warfare. Biological and chemical weapons, which could be nearly as destructive_ of lives as nuclear arms, seem to have some prospects of being eventually considered "conventional."87 Environmental warfare is newer and potentially perhaps even more threatening.88 Achieving disarmament. The third element of difficulty in changing the rules of international relations is uncertainty about the best way to achieve disarmament and security in a world where in the past security has_ usually been provided by brute force^either threatened or overtly exercised. Unfortunately, the effort going into the study of peaceful means to world security has been infinitesimal compared with that going into military research, although almost no area needs greater immediate attention. The basic requirement is evident: once again it is a change in human attitudes so that the in-group against which aggression is forbidden expands to include all human beings. If this could be accomplished, jjeciirity might HP provided by an armed international organization, a global analogue of a police force. Many people have recognized this as a goal, but the way to reach it remains obscure in a world where factionalism seems, if anything, to be increasing. The first step necessarily jnyn1'""' partiaj (surrender of sovereignty^ to an intematinpal organization.JJut it seems probable that, as long as most people fail to comprehend the magnitude of the danger,that step will be impossible. At the very least, societies 87 J. P. Perry Robinson, The special case of chemical and biological weapons; see also Bo Holmberg, Biological aspects of chemical and biological weapons. 88 For example, see Chapter 11 and Frank Barnaby, The spread of the capability to do violence: An introduction to environmental warfare: Jozef Goldblat, The prohibition of environmental warfare; and BhupenCtra M. Jasanij Environmental muUificauon; New weapons of war?

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must learn to weigh the risks inherent in attempting to achieve controlled disarmament against the risks of continuing the arms race. An attempt at disarmament could lead to a war, or to the destruction or domination of the United States through Chinese or Soviet "cheating." But, if disarmament were successfully carried out, and if an international police force were established, the reward _ would be a very much safer world in which resources would be freed for raising the standard of living for all people.81} No problem deserves more intensive study and international discussion. The dynamics of disarmament appear to be even more complex than those of arms races. Nevertheless, in 1970 the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the only United States agency charged with planning in this area, had a budget of only a few million dollars (contrasted with $80 billion for "defense"). Representative John F. Seiberling of Ohio put it succinctly: ^'The , Pentagon has 3000 people working on arms sales to other countries while the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has 12 people monitoring arms sales. That gives you an idea of where the executive branch priorities are."90 Moreover, the ACDA is heavily influenced by the Department of State bureaucracy, still a stronghold of cold-war thinking. It has been suggested that an important step toward disarmament could be taken by the pstahHshmpnT nf an internationaljiisarmament control organization, which would serve as a clearinghouse for informtinn nn the quantity and quality of weapons in various nations and would thus help to detect cheating on international-agreements.91 As a semi-independent Unir*^ Nflfi""' agency, such an organization could play a vital role— buL so far there has been no significant effort to establish one. Diverting the military to peaceful purposes. Thefourtfa element of difficulty involves economics and the 89 See, for example, Ronald Huisken, The consumption of raw materials for military purposes; and Ruth L. Sivard, Let them eat bullets! The military budgets of the United States and USSR in 1973 were greater than the combined annual income of more than 1 billion people in thirty-three of the poorest nations and almost 20 times the value of all foreign aid from all sources. 90 Quoted in San Francisco Chronicle and Examiner, November 9. 1975. "Alva Myrdal, The international control of disarmament.

military establishment. Although this will be discussed in terms of the United States, there is every reason to believe that an analogous situation exists in the Soviet Union, the other military superpower. Civilians should realize that peace and freedom from tension are not viewed as an ideal situation by many members of the _ military-industrial-government complex. By and large, professional military officers, especially field grade and higher, hope for an end to international tensions about as fervently as farmers hope for drought. When there is an atmosphere of national security, military budgets are usually small, military power minimal, and military promotions slow. The founders of the United States, recognized that the military services were unlikely Jo, w_ork against their own interests, so they carefully, Established ultimate civilian control over the army and navy^ It worked rather well for a long time. But times have changed. Wars are no longer fought with simple, understandable weapons like axes, swords, and cannon. Now a nation needs weapons systems with complex and often arcane components, such as acquisition radar, VTOL fighters, Doppler navigators, MIRVs, cruise missiles, and nuclear submarines. Such systems cannot be produced rapidly, on demand, by a few government contractors. Long-term planning is required, involving not only the military services but also a large number of industrial organizations that supply various components. Those organizations, not unnaturally, often hire re^ tired military officers to help them in their negotiations, with the government; where decisions on appropriations for armaments are made. The necessary intimacy of the military and industry in development and procurement, of weapons led Dwight D. Eisenhower to "~"'" rhp ff m _ military-industrial complex^ The term militaryindustrial-labor-government complex sometimes seems more accurate. In his heavily documented 1970 book. Pentagon capitalism, industrial engineer Seymour Melman of Columbia University showed that even that term is inadequate to describe the Frankenstein's monster that has hppn created.92 This complex seems to have an aversion to peace, but it '2See especially Melman's chapter 7.

RICH NATIONS, POOR NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT /

uses of outer space and Antarctica. More recently, there have been extensive negotiations on a treaty to control the use of oceans. [

j.aw of the Seap What has been described as "the greatest international conference ever held"126 met in Caracas in summer 1974 to begin work on a treaty dealing with the control of the oceans. The second session of the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)127 reached no final agreements, but in its tortuous proceedings several trends could be discerned. The emphasis was on dividing up the pie—on how to allocate rights to exploit the oceans rather than how to protect their vital functioning in the ecosystems of Earth. The less developed nations were anxious to "augment their meager natural resources with none of the unpleasant connotations of economic aid."128 The overdeveloped countries, on the other hand, were primarily trying to retain as much as possible of their hegemony over the seas (which they, far more than the LDCs, have the ability to exploit). A dominant trend has been toward establishing a 200-mile economic zone, which would effectively balkanize most of the oceans' known wealth. One view is that this would lead to having humanity's common heritage decimated piecemeal as individual nations exercised dominion over all living and nonliving resources within their zones. About the only good thing that can be said about the 200-mile zone is that its establishment might lead eventually to more rational use of those resources since their individual ownership by nations would at least tend to avoid the problems involved in multilateral exploitation of a commons. Other topics discussed in detail at the ongoing conference have been rights of passage through straits, the rights of landlocked nations to a share of oceanic resources, the establishment of an international authority '"Elizabeth Mann Borgese, Report from Caracas, the law of the sea, Center Magazine, November/December, 1974. I27 The first session in New York in 1973 dealt only with procedures: the first and second conferences in 1958 and 1960 had accomplished little but reveal the complexities of the problems and the diverse positions of states and blocs (see Edward Wenk, Jr., The politics of the ocean, chapter 6). 13S C. R. Pinto of Sri Lanka, quoted in Time, July 29,1974. It has been suggested that "The uses of international commons should be taxed for the benefit of the poorest strata of the poor countries" (Barbara Ward, The Cocoyoc Declaration}, but there is thus far little sign that this will occur.

for the mining of seabed minerals outside the economic zones, the responsibility of nations to control pollution originating from their shores and to protect the marine environment, and the establishment of means of settling disputes and enforcing agreements. A third eight-week session of UNCLOS in Geneva in May 1975 produced a draft treaty, which was not voted on by the participating nations but was instead considered the basis for further negotiation.12'' The draft extended the territorial waters of all nations to 12 miles from shore, provided for a 200-mile economic zone, specified means to control polluting activities, and encouraged the transfer of technology from rich to poor nations. The most controversial provision was for an International Seabed Authority, controlled de facto by the LDCs (who would be a majority in the agency), that would regulate deep-sea mining. The United States has held out for "private initiative" to share in managing the seabed resource. Further negotiations are scheduled for 1977. In part, their success will depend on what unilateral actions are taken by nations in the meantime. The United States, for example, has extended its jurisdiction over fisheries up to 200 miles from shore, which conforms with the draft treaty. Several other countries, including Mexico and Canada, have followed suit. But legislation being con^ sidered by Congress on deep-sea mining does not conform to the draft treaty. This places U.S. negotiators, who have tried to dissuade other nations from taking unilateral action, in an awkward position. If Congress passes such legislation, it could have a less than salubrious effect on future negotiations—especially if American firms are permitted to begin deep-sea mining before the treaty is finally passed and ratified. On the other hand, these unilateral actions may be pushing negotiators to examine other alternatives. By 1977, Elizabeth MannBorgese was envisioning a third possibility for the Seabed Authority as "a comprehensive and flexible system of joint ventures, acceptable to states and companies under the control of the [Ajuthority and for the benefit of all countries, especially the poorer "'.Material in this paragraph is based primarily on Deborah Shapley, Now, a draft sea law treaty: But what comes after? '"•Quoted in Claiborae Pell, The most complex treaty ever negotiated in history, World Issues, vol II, no. 1 (February/March), 1977.

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The complexity and comprehensiveness of the treaty account for the lengthiness of the negotiations. But, unfortunately, even a definitive treaty may fail to provide the kind of apparatus required to administer, conserve, and distribute the resources of the seas in a way that is equitable and that fully protects the vitally important ecosystems of the oceans, just because an exploitative view of the environment continues to dominate all such discussions. U.N. Environment Program. The exploitative view of the environment first surfaced explicitly at the international level at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm in 1972. That gathering featured platitudes from the ODCs, who are busily engaged in looting the planet and destroying its ecological systems, and demands from the LDCs that they get a piece of the action. One could only take heart that the__ world's nations even took the condition of the environment seriously enough to attend such a conference. That they did was a tribute to the brilliance, persuasiveness, and persistence of one man, Canadian businessman, Maurice Strong, secretary general of the conference. Strong became the first executive director of the United Nations Environment Program (UNF.P). the, major positive result of the Stockholm conference. UNEP was given only a small budget, and its headquarters was tucked away in Nairobi, perhaps in the hope that it would not make waves. Under Strong's leadership, it nevertheless began to serve several vital functions. For instance, it has established the Earth Watch monitoring system to serve as an international clearinghouse for environmental information. Earth Watch is explicitly designed also to help bridge the gap between scientists and technologists on one hand and political decisionmakers on the other.130 The kinds of information to be collected include an international register of toxic chemicals, which list properties of those chemicals, their uses, their effects, and their known or inferred pathways in the environment. UNEP's very location in Nairobi (the first such United Nations agency headquartered in an LDC) has resulted in its first major contribution—an enormous and growing ''"Maurice Strong, A global imperative for the environment.

interest and concern in poor nations about environmental problems.131 This concern was already well established in some areas among the people132 but had been notably absent in most LDC governments. Under Strong's leadership a list of high-priority areas was established at UNEP: (1) human settlement, health, habitat, and well-being; (2) land, water, and desertification; (3) trade, economics, technology, and the transfer of technology; (4) oceans; (5) conservation of nature, wildlife, and genetic resources; (6) energy. A program has been started in each area, and by early 1975 more than 200 projects had been initiated, projects that according to Strong were designed "to create a leverage to move the programme towards our prjor-ities."U3 Unfortunately for UNEP. Maurice Strong left theagency in 1975; whether the
Toward a Planetary Regime International attempts to tackle global problems— or at least to start a dialogue among nations— have proliferated in recentjear|. Besides(the UNCTAPLaw ofthe Sea,^ and(EnvIroninenTal conference^ the United Nations has sponsored World Population and World, Food conferences (discussed earlier) in 1974, a conference on the Status of Women in 1975. the pahirat Crmferpnrp nf 1976 (dealing with the problems of cities), and^a, conference on Water Resources in 1977. A Conference on Science and Technology is scheduled for 1978, and it is expected to create a new agency for World Science and. Technplogv Development. The agency's mission will be to facilitate the transfer of needed technologies to LDCs and to foster development of indigenous scientific and technological education and research in those ~coun tries.134 n 'Rogcr Lewin, Environment in a developing world; Jon Sigurdson, Resources and environment in China; Conor Reilly, Environmental action in Zambia. 132 For example, see Amil Agarvval, Ghandi's ghost saves the Himalayan trees. '"Lewin, Environment in a developing world, p. 632. 134 Salam, Ideals and realities.

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»^P

Superficially, it usually appears that such conferences do little more than highlight the political differences between rich and poor countries, but in fact they can lead to constructive action on the problems discussed. Because of the diversity of interests and viewpoints of individual nations, and because of the inequities of the world economy, it seems to take an unconscionably long time to reach a consensus on dealing with each problem. But an important Step often is tn nhtain agreement that a ttrpblem exists, first of all, and, second, that international action is appropriate and necessary. Each of the conferences named has been the culmination of this process; but what counts for the future is whether agreement can be reached on solutions to the problems and whether controls can be established before it is too late. (Regulation of one vital global common^ has not yet been seriously discussed—that commons is the atmosphere. Even more than the resources of the oceans, the_ atmosphere is shared by all human beings—and other organisms as well. It is crucial to preserve the atmosphere's quality and the stability of global climate.135 But that these are now threatened and should be protected by international agreement is only beginning to be recognized in a few quarters. Should ^Law of theSelftbe successfully established, it could serve as a model for a future(Law of the Atmoj (^sphere)to regulate the use of airspace, to monitor climate change, and to control atmospheric pollution.} Perhaps^ those agencies, combined with UNEP and the United, Rations population agencies, might eventually be devel^ oped into a Planetary Regime—sort of an international superagency for population, resources, and environment. "Such a comprehensive Planetary Regime could control the development, administration, conservation, and distribution of all natural resources, renewable or nonrenewable, at least insofar as international implications exist. Thus, the Regime could have the power to control pollution not only in the atmosphere and the oceans, but also in such freshwater bodies as rivers and lakes that cross international boundaries or that discharge into the oceans. The Regime might also be a logical central agency for regulating all international trade, perhaps including assistance from DCs to LDCs, and including S. H. Schneider and L. E. Alesirow, The genesis strategy.

all food on the international market. ^^^~ ^r The Planetary Regime might be given responsibility for determining the optimum population for the world and for each region and for arbitrating various countries' shares within their regional limits. Control of population size might remain the responsibility of each government, but the Regime should have some power to enforce the agreed limits. As with the Law of the Sea and other international agreements, all agreements for regulating population sizes, resource development, and pollution should be subject to revision and modification in accordance with changing conditions. The Planetary Regime might have the advantage over earlier proposed world government schemes in not being primarily political in its emphasis—even though politics would inevitably be a part of all discussions, implicitly or explicitly. Since most of the areas the Regime would control are not now being regulated or controlled by nations or anyone else, establishment of the Regime would involve far less surrendering of national power. Nevertheless, it might function powerfully to suppress international conflict simply because the interrelated global resource-environment structure would not permit such an outdated luxury.

What the Human Community Can Do Humanity has reached a critical point in its history. Either the fissioning of societies into two distinct groups—rich and poor—will proceed, leading inevitably to conflict and possibly to economic collapse of some regions, at least; or serious efforts will be made to bring the two groups closer together. With regard to the latter course, as we have discussed at some length, there are plenty of ideas on how to go about it. The main obstacles are, as usual, social, political, and economic. Too few people in ODCs are convinced of the absolute necessity of reducing their consumption of material and environmental resources—of de-development. Too few people in all countries appreciate the environmental and resource constraints within which society must operate. And too many people with power oppose changing the present course because, for the time being, they are profiting from the status quo. And it may not be possible

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to change the course of human society until those powerful people are fully convinced that their benefits will vanish unless they do. Assuming that the formidable obstacles can nevertheless be overcome and the two separate "worlds" started on the appropriate paths—the rich world begins to de-develop, and the poor world undertakes grass-roots development—full cooperation between the two groups will be required to make it work. Biologist Charles Birch, paraphrasing Garrett Hardin, described such cooperation as "mutual concern mutually agreed upon."136 The LDCs cannot succeed without substantial assistance from ODCs, and the ODCs will continue to need commodities and resources from LDCs to maintain their industrial structures, even if those structures are made vastly more efficient and are partially transferred to LDCs. The most crucial decades are those just ahead, in which there must be a transition to a size-controlled (eventually declining) population, an internationally regulated Planetary Regime for the global commons, and something resembling the "dynamic equilibrium economy" espoused by Herman Daly and Emile Benoit. Certain guiding principles for national behavior have been proposed by many individuals as being essential to the establishment of a genuine world community in which such cooperative measures could be carried out. As outlined by United States Assistant Secretary of State John Richardson, Jr., a consensus is emerging: 1. Governments ought to promote the general welfare of those they govern, not merely enlarge their own and the nation's power; 2. Starvation anywhere is unacceptable; 3. Torture by governments anywhere is unacceptable; ^'"Confronting the future, p. 348.

4. The use of nuclear and biological weapons is unacceptable; and 5. Political, cultural, and ideological diversity— within some limits—ought to be tolerated.138 Managing the ttansition-itL-what some people ha^ecalled atystainable worlds9 without; a. major catastrophe of some kind (war, mass famine, pandemic, ec-nlngical disaster, or economlccollapse), will require far more than, good luck. It will require careful planning and hedging against such unpredictable eventualities: Schneider and Mesirow's "Genesis strategy." (The Genesis strategy is based on the biblical story in which Joseph warned the pharaoh of Egypt that seven fat years would be followed by seven lean years, and he advised the pharaoh to store up grain during the fat years to tide the population over when famine came.) Thus, high priorities must bf given, by the international community to building up food reserves,topreventing and repairing major environment tal damage, tp^ protecting the ocean and atmospheric commons, to preventing high casualties from natural disasters (earthquakes, volcanic explosions, hurricanes, and such), to protecting populations against disease, to avoiding conflict between nations, and to that essential concomitant of all of these {^population controjp There is movement toward these precautionary measures, but so far the movement is dishearteningly slow. Humanity cannot afford to muddle through the rest of the twentieth century; the risks are too great, and the stakes are too high. This may be the last opportunity to choose our own and our descendants' destiny. Failing to choose or making the wrong choices may lead to catastrophe. But it must never be forgotten that the right choices could lead to a much better world. '"Preparing for a human community, Department of State News Release, May 18, 1976. '"Birch, Confronting the future; Dennis Pirages, A sustainable society: Social and political implications.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS / 1003

have often slipped into the work uncredited. Their assistance has been extraordinary. The help of our good friend and attorney, Johnson C. Montgomery, was sorely missed after his death in December 1974. Much of the material on legal matters still bears the stamp of his thinking— especially his pioneering work on the legal aspects of population control. Peggy Craig, Claire Shoens, and other staff members of the Falconer Biology Library at Stanford have once more been of enormous assistance to us. Their highly competent and cheerfully given help has time and again permitted us to solve difficult bibliographic problems. Reuben Pennant has patiently Xeroxed reference materials and several drafts of manuscript. Thanks for invaluable reference work are also due Mari Wilson, librarian for the Energy and Resources Information Center at the University of California at Berkeley. Typing chores for this edition have been handled expertly by Darryl Wheye at Stanford and Sue Black, Linda Elliott, Linda Marczak, George Moon, Becky New, Debbie Tyber, and Denise Wior at Berkeley. Seemingly endless proofreading of galleys was accomplished with the able assistance of Robert Wise and Kim Binette (in Hawaii), and Susan Mann, Glenn Lunde, Jennifer

Montgomery, and Julia Kennedy (all of Palo Alto and Stanford). We are especially grateful to Julie, who devoted many hours of spare time for six weeks to the job. Julie, Jenny, and Glenn also helped in assembling the chapter bibliographies. Jane Lawson Bavelas at Stanford once again helped us with myriad aspects of the work. Judith Quinn, our project editor, has done a superb job of polishing the manuscript, dealing cheerfully with the numerous crises inevitable in the final stages of a project of this scale. Her skill and patience have made our task much easier. The reader doubtless will appreciate the skill and attention to detail that Jean Mclntosh devoted to the indices, as we appreciated her good humor in the face of preposterous time pressures. Fina re would like to express our deep appreciation tcftheri Holdren^ who put up with many "social" evenings that were long working sessions on the manuscript _ of this book. She cheerfully gave us aid and comfort while continuing to balance with great success the needs of her children and the initial stages of her own career as a research biologist. We hope now that the book is in hand she will think the effort worth it.

ECOSCIENCE: POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT PAUL R. EHRLICH STANFORD UNIVERSITY

ANNE H. EHRLICH STANFORD UNIVERSITY

JOHN P. HOLDREN UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

W. H. FREEMAN AND COMPANY San Francisco

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SECTION

V The Human Predicament: Finding a Way Out

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We have presented a survey of the "hard" sciences associated with the human predicament in the first eleven chapters of this book; the final section considers various aspects of societal response to that predicament. Chapter 12 is relatively brief and transitional. In it are examined the difficult question of how optimum population size might be defined and the ways in which population growth, increasing affluence1 and faulty technologies interact to generate environmental ^impjict. The conclusion that all of these causes are inextricably intertwined—that responsibility for the predicament cannot be ascribed to any one of them in isolation—provides fundamental background for the chapters that follow. Given this "web of responsibility," how can the world society change its collective behavior in order to permit civilization to persist into the indefinite future? What changes now can assure that in the future people will live reasonably secure and happy lives, supported by properly functioning ecological and social systems? One step is obvious. The necessity of restraining the growth of the human population has long been evident to thoughtful people. Chapter 13 deals witn ways' in which this has been attempted in the past, how it might be dealt with in the future, and the current controversy about population control and development. Questions of technology (how effective and safe are contraceptives?), motivation (how can people be persuaded to use contraceptives, sterilization, or abortion?), and morality (should they?) are strongly interconnected. And these issues are not divorced from others equally knotty—poverty, racial discrimination and political power, to mention a few. While achieving population control rapidly would be very difficult if only for the numerical reasons given in Chapter 5, the difficulty is compounded by various social problems discussed in Chapter 13.

THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT / 713

Chapter 14 focuses on American society and its institutions. The United States serves as a model for all developed countries—the one that in most respects has developed farthest, for better or for worse. If developed countries are to exercise leadership in a revolution of human attitudes and behavior, the most appropriate source for such leadership is the United States. And if such a revolution is to occur, it must involve virtually all parts of the sociopolitical system because of the pervasive nature of the crisis now building. Institutions that help individuals to relate to their environments—religion, science, medicine, education, and the law-all are sorely in need of modification to reflect the new realities of existence in the last part of the twentieth century. And the economic and political systems through which individuals have their major impact on the environment require equally drastic revision. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 15, the international system as presently constituted offers little hope of resolving the human predicament. A world divided by a vast and widening gap in wealth and income seems even less capable of solving serious problems than is a nation divided into rich and poor—especially while the poverty-stricken vastly outnumber the wealthy. Some possibilities for reorganizing the world, first to reduce and then to eliminate the gap between rich and poor, is the theme of that chapter. Our conclusion is that the only hope for closing the gap involves changing the ways of life of both the affluent and the hungry. The affluent must recognize that their futures are heavily dependent on the fate of the poor; the poor must accept new goals if their condition is to improve rather than deteriorate. Ever present in any consideration of the international situation is the threat of nuclear Armageddon. A thermonuclear war is one event that would make almost all the issues and arguments raised in this book academic. Sadly, the probability of such a denouement may well be increasing—and this adds special urgency to the need for changing the ways in which nations interact. In Chapter 14 and Chapter 15 especially, we frequently leave the solid ground of facts and venture into the quicksand of opinion and speculation. To do otherwise would be to omit topics that we feel may hold the key to the survival of society. No one can demonstrate "scientifically" that a given modification of the legal system of the United States or of the development goals of Kenya or Brazil will lead to an improvement in the prognosis for humanity, but we do not consider this a valid reason for not discussing such changes. We hope that at the very least our ideas in these and similar areas will stimulate discussion, which in turn may lead to action. For, as should be obvious, we are not sanguine about the prospects for civilization if it continues down its present path.

Maximum welfare, not maximum population,^ is our human objective. 2 CHAPTER

—Arnold Toynbee, Man and hunger, 1963

12

Humanity at the Crossroads

The maximum size the human population can attain is determined by the physical capacity of Earth to support people. This capacity, as discussed earlier, is determined by such diverse factors as land area; availability of resources such as energy, minerals, and water; levels of technology; potential for food production; and ability of biological systems to absorb civilization's wastes without breakdowns that would deprive mankind of essential environmental services. Of course, no one knows exactly what the maximum carrying capacity of Earth is; it would certainly vary from time to time in any case. Presumably, the capacity would be sustainable at a very high level for a short period by means of rapid consumption of nonrenewable resources. In the longer term,

a lower capacity would be determined by the rate of replenishment of renewable resources and the accomplishments of technology in employing very common materials. Whatever the maximum sustainable human population may be, however, few thoughtful people would argue that the maximum population could be the same as the optimum. The maximum implies the barest level of subsistence for all. Unless sheer quantity of human beings is seen as the ultimate good, this situation certainly cannot be considered optimal. The minimum size of the human population, on the other hand, is that of the smallest group that can reproduce itself. Like the maximum, the minimum size is also not the optimum. It would be too small to permit the

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71 6 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

many benefits of specialization and division of labor, of economies of scale in the use of technology, of cultural diversity, and so on. The optimum population size, then, lies somewhere between the minimum and maximum possible sizes.

THE OPTIMUM POPULATION Biochemist H. R. Hulett has made some interesting calculations bearing on the subject of an optimum population. He assumed that the average United States citizen would not consider the resources available to him or her excessive, and he then divided estimates of the world production of those resources by the American per-capita consumption. On this basis, Hulett concluded: " . . . it appears that (about) a billion people is the maximum population supportable by the present agricultural and industrial system of the world at U.S. levels of affluence."1 By Hulett's criteria, then, even ignoring depletion of nonrenewable resources and environmental deterioration, the population of the Earth is already 3 billion people above the present optimum. Since decisions that determine population size are made, consciously and unconsciously, by the people alive at a given time, it seems reasonable to define the optimum size in terms of their interests. Accordingly, one might define the optimum as the population size below which well-being per person is increased by further growth and above which well-being per person is decreased by further growth. Like most definitions of elusive concepts, this one raises more questions than it answers. How is well-being to be measured? How does one deal with the uneven distribution of well-being and particularly with the fact that population growth may increase the well-being of some people while decreasing that of others? What if a region is overpopulated in terms of one aspect of well-being but underpopulated in terms of another? What about the well-being of future generations? One cannot define an optimum population for any part of the 'Optimum world population. Note that there is a large volume of conventional economic literature in existence that focuses on a narrowly defined economic optimum. This literature is of little interest to the discussion here (see, e.g., Spengler, Optimum population theory).

world at any time without reference to the situation in all other parts of the world and in the future. No complete answers are possible, but it is time that such questions be seriously addressed. The following observations are intended mainly to stimulate further discussion. Priorities The physical necessities—food, water, clothing, shelter, a healthful environment—are indispensable ingredients of well-being. A population too large and too poor to be supplied adequately with them has exceeded the optimum, regardless of whatever other aspects of wellbeing might, in theory, be enhanced by further growth. Similarly, a population so large that it can be supplied with physical necessities only by the rapid consumption of nonrenewable resources or by activities that irreversibly degrade the environment has also exceeded the optimum, for it is reducing Earth's carrying capacity for future generations. If an increase in population decreases the well-being of a substantial number of people in terms of necessities while increasing that of others in terms of luxuries, the population has exceeded the optimum for the existing sociopolitical system. The same is true when population increase leads to a larger absolute number of people being denied the necessities—even if the fraction of the population so denied remains constant (or even shrinks). It is frequently claimed that the human population is not now above the optimum because if the available food (and other necessities) were in some way equitably distributed there would be enough for everyone.2 But it is only sensible to evaluate optimum population size in terms of the organisms in the population under consideration, not in terms of hypothetical organisms. Thus, if an area of Africa has more lions than the local prey can support and the lions are starving, then there is an overpopulation of lions even though all the lions could have enough to eat if they evolved the capacity to eat grass. Grossly unequal distribution of food and other goods is characteristic of contemporary Homo sapiens just as 2 For example, Barry Commoner, How poverty breeds overpopulation (and not the other way around), Ramparts, August/September 1975.

HUMANITY AT THE CROSSROADS / 731

Their results showed that some form of disaster lies ahead unless all the factors are controlled: population growth, pollution, resource consumption, and the rate of capital investment (industrialization). This was hardly a new conclusion in 1972. Indeed, the argumentation and evidence for this general world-view had been accumulating steadily since the time of Mai thus (see Box 13-2), and a rash of books drawing substantially similar conclusions had appeared in the decades following World War II.C What accounts, then, for the extraordinary response—both disparaging and laudatory—that these views elicited when they appeared in Limits to Growth in 1972? Several factors contributed: first, the status of M.I.T. as virtually a worldwide synonym for careful scientific analysis; second, the sponsorship of the project by the vaguely mysterious Club of Rome, an international collection of influential academicians, industrialists, and public figures; third, the extraordinarily direct and lucid style with which the authors presented their conclusions; and fourth, the major role played in the underlying analysis by a "computer model" of the world. Of these factors, the last was almost certainly the most important. The book appeared at a time when the capabilities of large computers had already become part of public conventional wisdom (or folklore), but when the idea that computer results are no better than the information fed into them was not so widespread. Thus the notion that a computer had certified the bankruptcy of growth gave the conclusion public credibility, and at the same time provided a target for indignant economists and others who saw the outcome as an illustration of the syndrome known in the computing trade as "garbage in, garbage out."d How do computer models in general, and the Limits model in particular, actually work? The c

For example, William Vogt, Road to survival; Fairfield Q^OQrrxz, Our plundered planet; Harrison Brown, The challenge of man's future; Georg Borgstrom, The hungry planet, Macmillan, New York, 1965; Paul Ehrlich, The population bomb, Ballantine, New York, 1968; Preston Cloud, ed., Resources and man, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1969; P. R. Ehrlich and A. H. Ehrlich, Population resources, environment, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1970. rf See, for example, K. Kaysen, The computer that printed out W*O*L*F, Foreign Affairs, 1972, which tries but fails to stick the "garbage" label on Limits to Growth, missing the point in major respects.

Resources

\ A J<

\

PopulationN, X

Food per capita

1900

2000

FIGURE 12-2

The "standard" world model run assumes no major change in the physical, economic, or social relationships that have historically governed the development of the world system. All variables plotted here follow historical values from 1900 to 1970. Food, industrial output, and population grow exponentially until the rapidly diminishing resource base forces a slowdown in industrial growth. Because of natural delays in the system, both population and pollution continue to increase for some time after the peak of industrialization. Population growth is finally halted by a rise in the death rate due to decreased food and medical services. (After Meadows et al., 1972.)

idea behind computer modeling is to simulate in a general way the behavior of complicated physical systems. The technique is used when the situation of interest is too complicated to analyze with equations solvable with pencil and paper, or with laboratory or field experiments on a reasonable scale; and when it is too time-consuming or too risky simply to observe the real system and see what happens. Systems or processes that meet these conditions and that accordingly have been studied with computer models include the global meteorological system, various ecosystems, the safety systems of nuclear reactors, the growth of cities, and the evolution of galaxies. In all such cases, models are constructed by identifying what seem to be the most important (Continued)

"1 HUMANITY AT THE CROSSROADS / 733

technology would reduce resource input and pollutant output per unit of material standard of living to zero. The first assumption is contrary to all recent experience; doublings of agricultural productivity have required triplings and quadruplings of technological inputs. The second assumption is impossible in principle since it violates the second law of thermodynamics, one of the most thoroughly verified laws of nature. All one could safely conclude from this work is that Forrester's model is "sensitive" to the introduction of miracles into the assumptions. Presumably, the more sophisticated model in Limits to Growth would also be "sensitive" in this way, but that is hardly a defect. The most detailed critique of the Limits model was performed by a group at the University of Sussex, England, and was published together with a reply by the authors of Limits of Growth in a book called Models of Doom.1' The Sussex ** critics accused the Limits group of leaving out economics and social change, of underestimating the power of technology, and of daring to make policy recommendations on the basis of a flawed model. The response of the Limits group was that their model probably overestimated the effectiveness of the price mechanism rather than underestimated it, that evidence of the limitations of technology has been accumulating rapidly, that in the absence of any perfect models one must make policy recommendations with the best ones available, and that social change (which is hard to model) is precisely what they were trying to stimulate by their recommendations. On the issue of whether the model overstated or understated the imminence of disaster, we might add that the simplistic treatment of environmental risks probably understated the danger more than other flaws overstated it. Probably the most imposing attempt to construct a more realistic model than that in Limits was described in 1974 in Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome, by M. Mesarovic and E. Pestel. This model divided the world into ten political/geographical regions, modeling each of these on five "strata": (1) physical environment; (2) technology; (3) eco*H. Cole, C. Freeman, M. Jahoda. K. Pravitt, eds., Models of doom. Universe Books, New York, 1973.

nomic systems; (4) institutional and social responses; and (5) individual needs and responses. Notwithstanding Turning Point's occasional gratuitous disparagement of the oversimplification in Limits to Growth (difficult to understand in view of its obvious debt to the earlier work), the conclusions were strikingly similaj': continuation of recent trends in population growth, industrialization, and environmental disruption will lead to disaster; ddibexatc-and-,massive social and economic change will be necessary- to avoid this outcome. The added sophistication of Turning Point's regional disaggregation, showing the problems that can arise from such interactions as competition among regions for scarce resources, should be welcomed. At the same time, it seems fair to say that the net effect of this added degree of detail is to make the prognosis more pessimistic than that in Limits, not less so. Basically, regional disaster or negative interactions leading to wars seem more imminent than a uniform global disaster, which was the only kind the aggregated model in Limits could reveal. (This, of course, is another conclusion that many analysts have reached over the years without benefit of computer modeling). Obviously, the model in Turning Point is still far from perfect. Certainly neither it nor other computer models can be used to predict the future in detail. Nevertheless, computer modeling seems a useful way to acquire or communicate insights about the implications of present trends, and it has the great advantage of requiring that assumptions about relevant relationships be made explicit. Surely this is an improvement over the situation most likely to prevail when people think about the future of a complicated world—the "models" in their heads are full of assumptions that are not only unstated but perhaps even unrecognized. In short, those critics who believe the world cannot be modeled should stop thinking about the future entirely, for implicitly all who do are modeling in their heads. The purpose of caring at all where humanity is going, of course, whether one finds out with or without the aid of a computer, is not prediction for its own sake. It is, rather, that if we do not like the projected consequences of present trends and values, we can take conscious action to change course.

Of all things people are the most precious. CHAPTER

—Mao Tse Tung

13

Population Policies permit the death rate to increase, which, of course, will inevitably occur by the agonizing "natural" processes already described if mankind does not rationally reduce its birth rate in time. Even given a consensus that curbing population growth is necessary and that limiting births is the best approach, however, there is much less agreement as to how far and how fast population limitation should proceed. Acceptance of the first goal listed above requires only that one recognize the obvious adverse consequences of rapid population growth—for example, dilution of economic progress in less developed countries, and aggravation of environmental and social problems in both developed and less developed countries. Economists and demographers, many of whom will not accept

Any set of programs that is to be successful in alleviating the set of problems described in the foregoing chapters must include measures to control the growth of the human population. The potential goals of such measures in order of possible achievement are: 1. Reduce the rate of growth of the population, although not necessarily to zero. 2. Stabilize the size of the population; that is, achieve a zero rate of growth. 3. Achieve a negative rate of growth in order to reduce the size of the population. Presumably, most people would agree that the only humane means of achieving any of these goals on a global basis is by reducing the birth rate. The alternative is to 737

738

/ THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

the third goal at all and ascribe no urgency to the second, generally do espouse the first one (at least for the LDCs). Accepting the second^goal simply means recognizing that Earth's capacity to support human beings is limited and that, even short of the limits, many problems are related to population size itself rather than only to its rate of growth. Accepting the idea that stabilizing the size of the population is urgently necessary requires recognizing that the limits are already being approached and that, although technological and cultural change may eventually push the limits back somewhat, the prudent course is to halt population growth until existing problems can be solved. Virtually all physical and natural scientists accept the ultimate inevitability of halting population growth, and most of them accept the urgency of this goal. Much of the first part of this book has been an exposition of why the "inevitable and urgent" position is reasonable. The most controversial goal is the third, one listed above—reducing the size of the human population. Accepting this goal implies a belief that there is an optimum population size and that this optimum has already been exceeded (or will have been exceeded by the time population growth can be stopped). It also implies that each society has a right—indeed a responsibility—to regulate its population size in reference to the agreedupon optimum. In a world where the right (and the responsibility) of married couples to determine their own family size has become a widely accepted notion only in the past generation or two, the idea that nations have such a right or obligation is a truly radical one. Unfortunately, humanity cannot afford to wait another quarter century for the idea to gain complete acceptance. Given the threat to the environment posed by today's population in combination with today's technology, and given the menace this situation represents to an already faltering ability to provide enough food for the people now alive, it is clear that the human population is already above the optimum size. (How far above the optimum is more difficult to determine; see Chapter 12). It is, of course, conceivable that technological and social change will push up the optimum in the time it takes to bring population growth to zero. More probably, however, the population size will have to be reduced eventually to below today's level if a decent life is to be assured for everyone.

Whether this view of long-term necessity is accepted or not, of course, the goal of any sensible population policy for the immediate future is the same—to gain control over growth. This chapter describes the recent evolution of population policies, explores some potential (but still largely unexploited) means of achieving such control over population growth, and discusses the interacting effects of other policies (especially development policies) on population growth.

FAMILY PLANNING An essential feature of any humane program to regies the size of the human population must be provision :f effective means for individuals to control the number ,-_ r timing of births. This approach is commonly te—s; "family planning," and family planning programs h=v; been introduced in many LDCs in the past two decades with the goal of providing the means of birth control:: the people. These are the main population policies - :~ in existence. The family planning movement, however, historically has been oriented to the needs of individuals sni families, not of societies. Although birth control 15 essential for achieving population control, family ff-*:ning and population control are not synonymous. Befcre proceeding to an examination of the important different between the two, some historical perspective on the practice of birth control and the family planning movement is in order.

Birth Control Many birth control practices are at least as old as recorded history. The Old Testament contains obvious references to the practice of withdrawal, or coitus interruptus (removal of the penis from the woman's vagina before ejaculation). The ancient Egyptians used crude barriers to the cervix made from leaves or cloth, and even blocked the cervical canal with cotton fibers. The ancient Greeks practiced population control through their social system as well as through contraception; they discouraged marriage and encouraged homosexual rela-

BOX 13-1 Institutionalized Infanticide in the Eighteenth Century* Where the Number of lusty Batchelors is large, many are the merry-begotten Babes: On these Occasions, if the Father is an honest Fellow and a true Church of England-Man, the new-born Infant is baptized by an indigent Priest, and the Father provides for the Child: But the Dissenters, Papists, Jews, and other Sects send their Bastards to the Foundling Hospital; if they are not admitted, there are Men and Women, that for a certain Sum of Money will take them, and the Fathers never hear what becomes of their Children afterwards . . . in and about London a prodigious Number of Infants are cruelly murdered unchristened, by those Internals, called Nurses; these detestable Monsters throw a Spoonful of Gin, Spirits of Wine, or HungaryWater down a Child's Throat, which instantly *This material is quoted from George Burrington's pamphlet "An answer to Dr. William Brakenridge's letter concerning the number of inhabitants, with the London bills of mortality," London, J. Scon (1757).

tionships, especially for men. The condom, or penis sheath, dates back at least to the Middle Ages. Douching, the practice of flushing out the vagina with water or a solution immediately after intercourse, has had a similarly long history. Abortion is a very ancient practice and is believed to have been the single most common form of birth control in the world throughout history, even during the past century when it was illegal in most countries. The simplest, most effective, and perhaps the oldest method of birth control is abstention; but this method seems to have been favored mainly by older men, particularly unmarried members of the clergy. Infanticide, which is viewed with horror today by prosperous people in industrialized societies, has probably always been practiced by societies lacking effective contraceptive methods.1 It was a rather common practice among the ancient Greeks, and the Chinese and Japanese are known to have used it for centuries, especially in times of famine. In agrarian or warlike societies, female infanticide has often been practiced to provide a greater proportion of men or to consolidate upper classes. Only a century or two ago, infanticide was widely practiced in

strangles me Babe; when the Searchers come to inspect the Body, and enquire what Distemper caused the Death, it is answered, Convulsions, this occasions the Article of Convulsions in the Bills of Mortality so much to exceed all others. The price of destroying and interring a Child is but Two Guineas; and these are the Causes that near a Third die under the Age of Two Years, and not unlikely under two Months. I have been informed by a Man now living, that the Officers of one Parish in Westminster, received Money for more than Five Hundred Bastards, and reared but One out of the whole Number. How surprizing and shocking must this dismal Relation appear, to all that are not hardened in Sin? Will it not strike every one, but the Causers and Perpetrators with Dread and Horror? Let it be considered what a heinous and detestable Crime Child-murder is, in the Sight of the Almighty, and how much it ought to be abhorred and prevented by all good people.

Europe in an institutionalized, although socially disapproved system sometimes called "baby farming" (Box 13-1).2 Infanticide rarely takes the form of outright murder. Usually it consists of deliberate neglect or exposure to the elements. Among the Eskimos and other primitive peoples who live in harsh environments where food is often scarce, infanticide was, until recently, a common practice, as greater importance was placed on the survival of the group than on the survival of an additional child. There is a strong suspicion that female infanticide persists in parts of rural India. It exists even in our own society, especially among the overburdened poor, although intent might be hard to prove. Certainly "masked infanticide" is extremely common among the poor and hungry in less developed countries, where women often neglect ill children, refuse to take them to medical facilities, and may even show resentment toward anyone who attempts treatment. According to Dr. Sumner Kalman of the Stanford University Medical Center, the average poor mother in Colombia—where 80 percent or more of a large family's income may be needed to provide

'Mildred Dicfccman, Demographic consequences of infanticide in

man.

^William L. Langer, Checks on population growth: 1750-1850.

Family Planning: A Short History

FIGURE

13-1

This machine makes oral contraceptive pills at the rate of 10,000 tablets per minute. The operator wears a protective mask to avoid inhaling steroids, which could cause hormonal changes. (Photo courtesy of Syntex Laboratories, Inc.)

food alone—goes through a progression of attempts to limit the number of her children. She starts with ineffective native forms of contraception and moves on to quack abortion, infanticide, frigidity, and all too often to suicide.3 The development of modern methods of contraception and the spread of family planning have eliminated the need for such desperate measures as infanticide and self-induced abortion in most developed nations and among the wealthier classes of most less developed countries. But modern methods of birth control are still by no means available to every potential parent in the world. The most effective contraceptives—oral contraceptives (Figure 13-1), lUDs, and safe, simple sterilization— have been available even to the affluent only since the early 1960s. A description of the modern methods of birth control most used today and others still under development can be found in Appendix 4 in the back of this book. 'Modern methods of contraception. Bulletin of the Santa Clara County (Calif.) Medical Association, March 1967.

During the Industrial Revolution in England, an early advocate of limiting the size of families through contraception was labor leader Francis Place. Realizing that a limited labor pool would be likelier to win high wages and better working conditions from employers than would a plentiful supply of workers, in 1822, Place published a treatise, Illustrations and Proofs of the Principle of Population, which reached large numbers of people.4 This was followed by a series of handbills that urged birth control in the interest of better economic and physical health and also described various contraceptive methods. Additional books on birth control appeared both in England and the United States during the 1830s and continued to circulate until the 1870s, when legal attempts were made to suppress them in both countries. The attempt failed in England, but in the United States the "Comstock Law" was passed by Congress in 1873. It forbade the dissemination by mail of birth control information, classing it as "obscene literature." Many states also passed laws against birth control literature, known as "little Comstock laws," and in 1890 importation of such literature was outlawed.5 America's heroine in the family planning movement was Margaret Sanger, a nurse. Her main objective was to free women from the bondage of unlimited childbearing through birth control, and her efforts thus were a part of the women's emancipation movement. In 1916 Mrs. Sanger opened the first birth control clinic in Brooklyn, for which she was arrested and jailed. As a result of her case, however, court decisions subsequently permitted physicians to prescribe birth control in New York for health reasons. These were the first of many such decisions and changes in state laws that ultimately permitted the sale and advertisement of contraceptive materials and the dissemination of information about birth control. But the change was slow. The last such court decision was made in 1965, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. In 1966 the 'Reprinted in 1930 by Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston. 5 \V. Best and L. Dupre, Birth control. Much of the historical material in this section is based on this source.

POPULATION POLICIES / 741

Massachusetts legislature repealed the last of the state Comstock Laws. Margaret Sanger and others who joined her rapidly growing birth control movement (first known as the Birth Control League, later as the Planned Parenthood Federation) after World War I led the fight for these legal changes and for support from medical, educational, health, and religious organizations. Counterparts to Margaret Sanger existed in many other countries, especially in northern and western Europe, and planned parenthood movements became independently established in several nations. Their founders, like Mrs. Sanger, were motivated primarily by concern for the health and welfare of mothers and children, and their campaigns emphasized these considerations. Concurrently, intellectual organizations concerned primarily with population growth, known as Malthusian Leagues, were also promoting birth control. These, of course, were intellectual descendants of Robert Malthus, who first put forth warnings about the dangers of overpopulation (see Box 13-2). They were active in several European countries; but after World War I, when European birth rates had reached quite low levels, Malthusian concerns seemed to lose relevance and the movement died out. The birth control movement in the United States was at first opposed by the medical profession. As the health and welfare benefits of family planning became apparent, the medical profession moved to a position of neutrality. In 1937 the American Medical Association (AMA) finally called for instruction on contraception in medical schools and medical supervision in family planning clinics. But it was not until 1964 that the AMA recognized matters of reproduction, "including the need for population control," as subjects for responsible medical concern.6 Religious opposition to the birth-control movement was initially even stronger than medical opposition. The Roman Catholic church still opposes "artificial" methods of birth control, but Planned Parenthood clinics cooperate in teaching the rhythm method to Catholics who request it. Acceptance of birth control came gradually from the various Protestant and Jewish groups after initial opposition. Official sanction was given by the 'Best and Dupre, Birth control.

Anglican (Episcopal) Communion in England and the United States in 1958, by the Central Conference of American Rabbis (Reform) in 1960, and by the National Council of Churches in 1961. Birth rates in America and Europe had already begun to decline long before the first birth-control clinics were established (Chapter 5). Nevertheless, the familyplanning movement, particularly in the United States, probably deserves some credit for today's relatively low birth rates. It certainly played a great role in increasing the availability of contraceptives and birth control information. This was accomplished not so much through Planned Parenthood clinics, which never have reached more than a small fraction of the total population, but through the removal of restrictive laws, the development of medical and religious support, and the creation of a social climate in which birth control information could circulate freely. Since passage of the U.S. Family Planning Act in 1970, Planned Parenthood clinics have been a major provider of free and low-cost contraceptive services to low-income people through government grants. Throughout its history, the emphasis and primary concern of the family planning movement has been the welfare of the family; it has stressed the economic, educational, and health advantages of well-spaced, limited numbers of children." Its policy has been to provide information and materials for birth control in volunteerstaffed clinics, serving any interested client, but primarily the poor who could not afford treatment by a private physician. Once the movement was established in the United States, little effort was made to recruit clients, beyond the routine promotion that accompanied the opening of a new clinic. For the United States this policy was apparently adequate; this nation is now overwhelmingly committed to the idea of family planning and the practice of birth control. Contraceptive practice in the United States. By 1965, survey results showed that some 85 percent of married women in the United States had used some method of birth control. Most by then favored the more effective methods such as the pill. Among older couples, 'These advantages are very real, as the World Health Organization has recently confirmed. See Dr. Abdel R. Omran, Health benefits for mother and child.

Laws of the Age of Reason as "population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio . . . " The first Essay challenged the visions of an age and the reactions were immediate and predictably hostile, though many listened. The controversy led to the publication in 1803 of an enlarged, less speculative, more documented, but equally dampening second essay. This one was signed and bore the title, An Essay on the Principle of Population or a View of its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness with an Inquiry into our Prospects Respecting the Future Removal or Mitigation of the Evils it Occasions* Malthus added to and modified the Essay in subsequent editions, but it stood substantially unchanged. In 1804 he accepted a post at the East India Company's college at Haileybury which prepared young men for the rule of India, where he remained until his death. His marriage, in the same year, ultimately produced three children. The ironies in Malthus' life are obvious. He was one of eight children. He occupied a position of comfort in an intellectual atmosphere of optimism, but was compelled by the rigor of his intellect to argue that nature condemned the bulk of humanity to live in the margin between barely enough and too little. Finally, his message as a teacher fell on the ears of future colonial bureaucrats who would guide or preside over the destinies of India. Since the conversations between Robert Malthus and his father almost two centuries ago, two sets of factors which were beyond their ken *Reprinted with numerous other articles on the same topic in Philip Appleman, ed., An essay on the principle of population.

have emerged. The first set combined to put elements into a population-subsistence relationship that Malthus could not have foreseen. On one hand, the introjiuction of massive death control procedures— immunization, purification ater, the control of disease-carrying nrpanisim., improved. sanitation, etc. — hqve removed many of the cheCRs that Malthus assumed^ as natural." On the other hand, developments' in agriculture— high-yield plant strains, the powering of equipment with fossil fuels, the use of new techniques of fertilization and pest control—have massively increased food production. The second set of factors has become widely significant only in the last quarter century and evident to most laymen only in the last decade. These are the deleterious effects on the biosphere resulting from agriculture and industry. With our planet's population bloated by death control and sustained only poorly through an agriculture based on nonrenewable resources and techniques which buy short-run, high yields at the expense of long-run, permanent damage to the "Earth's power to produce subsistence," we face a prospect inconceivable in the Age of Reason. Malthus looked into a dismal future of "vice and misery" begot of an uncontrolled, and, to his mind, uncontrollable population growth. We look into one where the dismal is compounded with peril, not because humanity cannot control its population, but because it will not.** **This box is a modification of an essay supplied to us by historian D. L. Bilderback. For further reading about Malthus, see particularly John Maynard Keynes, Essays in biography; J. Bonar, Malthus and his viork, 2d ed., 1924; G. F. McCleary, The Mahhusian population Theory; and, of course, iMalthus' First and Second Essavs.

1965 were not wanted by both parents and 22 percent were not wanted by at least one parent. The incidence of unwanted births was found, not unexpectedly, to be highest among the poor, to whom birth control and safe abortion were least available. Demographer Charles Westoff estimated that eliminating such a high proportion of unwanted births might reduce the U.S. rate of natural increase by as much as 35 to 45 percent.9

However, another distinguished demographer, Judith Blake, pointed out that the high incidence of unwanted births calculated by Westoff for the U.S. during 19601965 was caused in large part by births occurring disproportionately to women who already had several children.10 During those six years, there were unusually small proportions of first and second children born and unusually large proportions of births of higher orders (which are more likely to be unwanted). Hence, due to

9 L. A. Westoff and C. F. Westoff, From now to zero: fertility, contraception and abortion in America.

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Reproductive motivation and population policy.

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the age composition of the population, the total proportion of unwanted births in the U.S. was higher for those years than it has been at other times. During the kte 1960s, such changes as the increasing use of the pill and lUDs and relaxation of restrictions against voluntary sterilization substantially reduced the incidence of unwanted births of all orders. Results of the 1970 National Fertility Study confirmed this change, indicating that only about 14 percent of births between 1965 and 1970 were unwanted." Most of the reduction in fertility in that period was due to reductions in unwanted and unplanned births. Since 1970, the extension of family planning services to the poor and the reversal of abortion laws (see below) have evidently further extended the trend, as attested by record low fertility rates. There is no question that providing better contraceptives and simplified sterilization procedures, legalizing abortion, and ensuring that all are easily available to all members of the population reduces the incidence of unwanted pregnancy—a socially desirable end in itself. But even if a perfect contraceptive were available, the contraceptive-using population probably never will be perfect. People forget, are careless, and take chances. They are also often willing to live with their mistakes when the mistakes are babies. The complete elimination of unwanted births therefore is probably not possible. Nor does that alone account for the dramatic drop in the U.S. birth rate in the early 1970s. Rather, it appears that a significant change in family-size goals took place around that time, especially among young people who were just starting their families.12 Changing attitudes in the United States. Public surveys taken between 1965 and 1972 revealed a growing awareness of the population problem on the part of the American public. In 1965, about half of the people interviewed in a Gallup Poll thought that U.S. population growth might be a serious problem; in 1971, 87 percent thought that it was a problem now or would be by the year 2000. In January 1971 only 23 percent of "Charles F. Westoff, The modernization of U.S. contraceptive practice; Trends in contraceptive practice: 1965-1973; The decline of unplanned births in the United States. 12 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Fertility history and prospects of American women: June 1975.

adults polled thought four or more children constituted the ideal family size, in contrast to 40 percent in 1967. One of the three most commonly given reasons for favoring small families in 1971 was concern about crowding and overpopulation; the others were the cost of living and uncertainty about the future. In October 1971, a survey sponsored by the U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future disclosed a still greater level of concern about the population explosion among Americans. Specifically, it was discovered that: 1. Over 90 percent of Americans viewed U.S. population growth as a problem; 65 percent saw it as a serious problem. 2. Over 50 percent favored government efforts to slow population growth and promote population redistribution. 3. Well over 50 percent favored family limitation even if a family could afford more children. 4. About 56 percent favored adoption after births of two biological children if more were desired. 5. Only 19 percent felt that four or more children were the ideal number for a family; 45 percent favored two or less. The mean was 2.33. 6. Only 8 percent thought the U.S. population should be larger than its current size. Concurrent with the rise in public concern about population growth, Zero_Population Growth^Inc., was founded in late 1968 to promote an end to U.S. population growth through lowered birth rates as soon as possible and, secondarily, to encourage the same goal for world population. The organization hoped to achieve this by educating the public to the dangers of uncontrolled population growth and its relation to resource depletion, environmental deterioration, and various social problems; and by lobbying and taking other political action to encourage the development of antinatalist policies in the government. Since its founding, ZPG has taken an active role in promoting access to birth control for all citizens, legalized abortion, women's rights, and environmental protection. More recently it has begun to explore changes in U.S. immigration policies. ZPG has clearly been a factor in changing attitudes toward family size and population control.

POPULATION POLICIES /

The growth of the wnmpn's Hhpr^p'nn movement in the U.S. since 1965 has almost certainly been another important influence on attitudes (and thus on birthrates) through its emphasis on opportunities for women to fulfill themselves in roles other than motherhood. Many young women today are refreshingly honest about their personal lack of interest in having children and their concern for obtaining opportunities and pay equal to those of men. Such attitudes were virtually unthinkable in the United States before 1965. The women's movement was a potent force behind the liberalization of U.S. abortion laws, and has also actively campaigned for the establishment of low cost day-care centers for children and tax deductions for the costs of child care and household work. Such facilities and policies lighten the costs of childbearing, but they also encourage mothers to find work outside the home. The experience of many societies suggests that outside employment of mothers discourages large families more than the existence of child-care facilities encourages them. Both the growing concern about the population problem and the ideas of women's liberation doubtless contributed to changing attitudes toward family size in the 1970s. The economic uncertainty of the period may also have been a factor. While it may never be possible to determine the causes exactly, the achievement of subreplacement fertility in the United States is one of the most encouraging developments since 1970.

POPULATION POLICIES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES Although birth control in some form is almost universally practiced in developed countries, very few have formulated any explicit national policies on population growth other than regulation of migration. Some European countries still have officially pronatalist policies left over from before World War II, when low birth rates led to concern about population decline. Of course, many laws and regulations enacted for economic, health, or welfare reasons have demographic effects: for instance, those governing the availability of contraceptives, sterilization, and abortion; marriage and

divorce; income taxes and family allowances; and immigration regulations. The United States The United States has no specific population policy, although various laws, including those regulating immigration and the administration of income taxes, have always had demographic consequences. Most tax and other laws were until recently implicitly pronatalist in effect. In the late 1960s this situation began to change as state laws restricting the distribution of contraceptive materials and information were repealed and as abortion laws were relaxed in several states. In 1970 Congress passed the Family Planning Services and Population Research Act, established the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, and passed the Housing and Urban Development Act, which authorized urban redevelopment and the building of new towns. In 1972, an amendment to the Constitution affirming equal rights for women passed Congress, but as of 1977 it was not yet ratified by the required number of states. The Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970 had the goal of extending family planning counselling and services to all who needed them, particularly the poor. It also provided funds for research on human reproduction. Some 3.8 million women were being provided with family planning services by 1975, 90 percent of whom had low or marginal incomes. Another 1.9 million were being served by private physicians. But it has been estimated that another 3.6 million eligible women (including about 2.5 million sexually active teenagers) were still not receiving needed help in the mid-1970s. Particularly neglected were women in rural areas and small towns. Governmentsubsidized sendees have been provided through local health departments, hospitals, and private agencies (primarily Planned Parenthood), most of which are located in urban areas. A leveling-off of increases in clients in 1974 and 1975 over previous years has been attributed mainly to lack of increased funding by the government rather than to lack of need.13 13 Marsha Corey. U.S. organized family planning programs in F 1974; Joy G. Dryfoos, The United Stales national family planning program; 1968-74; The Alan Guttmacher Institute, Organized family planning services in the United States: FY 1975: T. H. Firpo and D. A. Lewis, Family planning needs and services in nonmetropolitan areas.

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Since 1967, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) has been permitted to include family planning assistance in its programs. Funding for overseas family planning assistance has been steadily increasing since then, and by fiscal 1976 had reached a level of $201.5 million.14 The U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future presented its findings and recommendations in 1972 in the areas of demographic development, resource utilization, and the probable effects of population growth on governmental activities.15 After two years of study, the Commission concluded that there were no substantial benefits to be gained from continued population growth, and indeed that there were many serious disadvantages. Besides recommending the liberalization of abortion laws and numerous other population-related policies, the report strongly recommended that contraceptives be made available to all who needed them, including minors; that hospital restrictions on voluntary sterilization be relaxed; that sex education be universally available; and that health services related to fertility be covered by health insurance. It also recommended policies to deal with immigration, population distribution, and land use. Perhaps most important, the Commission stated: Recognizing that our population cannot grow indefinitely, and appreciating the advantages of moving now toward the stabilization of population, the Commission recommends that the nation welcome and plan for a stabilized population.16 Unfortunately, apart from expressing strong disagreement with the recommendations on abortion, President Nixon took no action on the Commission's report, nor did President Ford show any inclination to do so. The abortion question was made moot by the Supreme Court's decision in 1973 (see section on abortion below). Congress has contented itself mainly with expanding 14 AID in an Interdependent World, War on hunger special supplement, June 1975; see Phyllis T. Piotrow, World population crisis: The United States response for an historical account of U.S. involvement in overseas population programs. "Population and the American future. ^Population and the American future. By a "stabilized population," the Commission meant a stationary one.

federal family planning services. Thus, although the United States has not hesitated to advocate the establishment of official antinatalist population policies in less developed countries, it has not established one for itself. The current low fertility of American women seems to have taken the urgency from the zero population growth movement-even though that fertility trend could easily reverse itself at any time. Given its present age composition, the U.S. still could reach the higher population projections of the Census Bureau (Chapter 5) if another baby boom occurred. In the mid-1970s, however, no consensus for immediate ZPG existed, and interest in population problems has been focused on aspects other than the birth rate—primarily on distribution and immigration. Social objections to ZPG. The proposal to stop population growth naturally aroused considerable opposition on religious, social, and economic grounds. The role of religion in determining attitudes toward population growth, as well as toward the environment and resource limitation, is discussed in more detail in Chapter 14. The primary social argument that has been raised against halting U.S. population growth is that it would substantially change the nation's age composition.17 As the population stabilized, the median age would increase from about 28 to about 37. Less than 20 percent of the population would then be under 15, and about the same percentage would be over 65 years old. At present, about 25 percent of the population is under 15, and 11 percent is over 65. It is assumed that such an old population would present serious social problems. Figure 5-15 (Chapter 5) shows the age compositions of the U.S. in 1900 and 1970 and how it would look in a future stationary population. It is true that old people tend to be more conservative than young people, and they seem to have difficulty adjusting to a fast-changing, complex world. In an older population there would be relatively less opportunity for advancement in authority (there would be nearly as many 60 year-olds as 30 year-olds—so the number of potential "Ansley J. Coale, Man and his environment, Science, vol. 170, pp. 132-136 (9 Oct. 1970).

POPULATION POLICIES / 747

chiefs would be about the same as the number of Indians). There would also be many more retired people, a group already considered a burden on society. But even those who raise this argument must realize its fundamental fallacy. In the relatively near future, growth of the human population will stop. It would be far better for it to stop gradually through birth limitation than by the premature deaths of billions of people. (In the latter case, there would be other, much more serious problems to worry about). Therefore, if this generation does not initiate population control, we simply will be postponing the age composition problems, leaving them to be dealt with by our grandchildren or great grandchildren. Our descendants will be forced to wrestle with these problems in a world even more overcrowded, resource-poor, and environmentally degraded than today's. Moreover, the assumption that an older population must be much less desirable than a younger one is questionable in this society. Today, chronic underemployment and high unemployment are exacerbated by a labor pool constantly replenished by growing numbers of young people, which forces early retirement of the old, making them dependents on society. Many of our current social problems, including the recently skyrocketing crime rates and serious drug problems, are associated with the younger members of the population. If population growth stopped, the pressure of young people entering the labor pool would decline, while crime and unemployment problems could be expected to abate, as would the need for forced retirement of older workers. Old people today are obsolete to a distressing degree. But this is the fault of our social structure and especially of our educational system. The problem with old people is not that there are or will be so many of them, but that they have been so neglected. If underemployment were reduced, outside interests encouraged during the middle years, and education continued throughout adult life (as suggested in Chapter 14), older people would be able to continue making valuable contributions to society well into their advanced years. Maintaining the habits of active interest in society and learning new, useful skills might effectively prevent obsolescence and the tendency to become conservative and inflexible with advancing age. Thus, although there may be some disadvantages to an

older population, there are also some definite advantages. While the proportion of dependent retired people grew, that of young children would shrink. The ever-rising taxes demanded in recent decades to support expanding school systems and higher educational facilities would cease to be such a burden; indeed, that has begun to happen already. The same is true of resources now devoted to crime control and other problems primarily of young people. Some of that money could be diverted instead to programs to help the aged. Moreover, the growth in the proportion of senior citizens (the numbers will not change; they are already born) will be far more gradual than the decline in numbers of babies and small children that has already occurred, allowing ample time for society to adjust to the change. In the meantime, if birth rates remain low, the overall dependency ratio of the population will decline. In 1970 there were 138 dependents for every 100 workers in the United States; by 1980 the ratio will drop to about 118 and may be 112 or less by 1990.18 Even after the numbers of the aged begin to rise in the population, the dependency ratio will remain relatively low. As Kingsley Davis pointed out, the highest proportion (about 75 percent) of people in productive ages (15-65) is found in a population that is making the transition from growth to ZPG. The proportion is nearly as high in a stationary population (about 63 percent).19 And if years of productivity were extended to 70 and beyond, the proportion would be even higher, of course. By contrast, in very rapidly growing LDC populations, the proportion of people in their productive years (15 to 65) can be 50 percent or less. Economic objections to ZPG. The economic objections to ZPG are based upon the realization that a nongrowing population implies at least a much more slowly growing economy, if not a nongrowing one. This thought strikes fear in the breasts of most businessmen and economists, even though a perpetually growing economy is no more sustainable than a perpetually growing population. The implications of a steady-state economy are discussed in Chapter 14; here we limit I8 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population of the United States: Trends and prospects 1950-1990. "Zero population growth: the goal and the means. no. 4, 1973, pp. 15-30.

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ourselves to some of the aspects more obviously related to population growth.20 In 1971, economist J. J. Spengler noted the economic advantages and disadvantages of ZPG.21 One of the advantages is increased productivity per person, partly because of greater capital available for investment, and partly because of a reduced dependency ratio. Other advantages include stabilized demand for goods and services; increased family stability as a result of there being fewer unwanted children; reduction of costs of environmental side effects; and opportunities to minimize the effects of population maldistribution. On the minus side, Spengler mentioned the problems associated with the changed age structure and pointed out that there would be a relative lack of mobility for workers and less flexibility in the economy because there would be fewer entrants into the labor force. He was also concerned that there might be a tendency toward inflation, due in part to increases in the service sector and in part to pressure to raise wages more than rising productivity justified. Recent events, as population growth has slowed (though there is not yet a decline in growth of the labor pool), suggest that Spengler may be right about the inflation pressures, although many other influences clearly are involved too. And certainly there are ways to compensate for those pressures. The question of labor shortage for an expanding economy in a stationary population has also been raised. But, as economist Alan Sweezy has pointed out, workers (and their families) are the main consumers as well as the producers.22 And, as mentioned above, the productive portion of a population is largest in stationary and transitional populations. There was speculation by economists during the 1930s and 1940s that consumption patterns would be drastically, and presumably adversely, changed if population growth stopped. But a recent study comparing consumption patterns in the U.S. population of 1960/1961 (when it was growing relatively fast) with those of a M

For a further discussion, see U.S. Commission on Population Growth, Population and ike American future, vol. 2. 2 'Economic growth in a stationary population, PRB selection no. 38, Population Reference Bureau, Inc., Washington, D.C., July 1971; see also Spengler, Population and American future. 22 Labor shortage and population policy.

projected stationary population indicated that ths changes would be surprisingly minor.23 The most notable difference was that there would be proportional; more households (called spending units by economists in an older stationary population; families would be smaller but more numerous. Many of the changes in acr.;;! spending patterns would balance each other; in a stationary population there would be a greater demand for housing, for instance, but a lower demand for clothing and transportation. In no case were the changes more than a few percent. Differential reproduction and genetic quality. A common concern about population control is that it will in some way lead to a reduction in the genetic quality of Homo sapiens.^ This concern is often expressed in such questions as "if the smart and responsible people limit their families while the stupid and irresponsible do not, couldn't that lead to a decline of intelligence and responsibility in humanity as a whole?" The technically correct answer is "no one knows"; the practical answer is "there is no point in worrying." No one knows, because it is not at all clear what, if any. portion of the %'ariation in traits like "intelligence" or "responsibility" (however defined, and definition is difficult and controversial) is influenced by genetics. The most intensively studied example of such "mental" traits is performance on various so-called intelligence tests. and it has not been possible to demonstrate unambiguously that genes make any significant contribution to an individual's scores.25 There is no point in worrying about it because, even if these traits had a substantial genetic component and people with "bad" genes greatly outproduced people with "good" ones, it would take a great many generations (hundreds of years at a minimum) for the differential reproduction to produce a socially significant effect. Moreover, if such an effect were discovered, it could then 2 "'D. Eilenstine and J. P. Cunningham, Projected consumption patterns for a stationary population. -•'For discussion of this question, see papers in C. J. Bajema (ed), Natural selection in human populations. 35 See especially Leon J. Kamin, The science and politics of 10 for a critique of the twin data on which most of the evidence for the heritability of IQ rests.

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be reversed either by reversing the selective pressures (for example, encouraging reproduction of those with high IQ test scores) or, more likely, by modifying the social environment in order to improve the performance of those with poor scores ("bad" genes). Note that we have put quotation marks around "good" and "bad." It is common for nonbiologists to think that heredity is a fixed endowment that rigidly establishes or limits skills, abilities, attitudes, or even social class. In fact, heredity is at most one of two sets of interacting factors, the other being the cultural and physical environment. When heredity does play a significant role (and it often may not), it is the product of this interaction that is of interest, and that product may be modified very effectively by changing the environment.26 There is therefore no need for deep concern about the possible genetic effects of population control. Another related issue that seems to encourage a pronatalist attitude in many people is the question of the differential reproduction of social or ethnic groups. Many people seem to be possessed by fear that their group may be outbred by other groups. White Americans and South Africans are worried there will be too many blacks, and vice versa. The Jews in Israel are disturbed by the high birth rates of Israeli Arabs, Protestants are worried about Catholics, and Ibos about Hausas. Obviously, if everyone tries to outbreed everyone else, the result will be catastrophe for all. This is another case of the "tragedy of the commons," wherein the "commons" is the planet Earth.268 Fortunately, it appears that, at least in the DCs, virtually all groups are exercising reproductive restraint. For example, in the United States fertility in the black population has consistently been higher than white fertility (black mortality has also been higher). Since birth control materials and information began to be made available to low-income people in the late 1960s, black fertility has been declining even more rapidly than white fertility. By 1974, black women under 25 expected to have essentially the same number of children as white 26 A detailed explanation for the layman of the complex issues of the inheritance of intelligence can be found in P. Ehrlich and S. Feldman, Race bomb. See also F. Osborn and C. J. Bajema, The eugenic hypothesis, for an optimistic evaluation of the genetic consequences of population control. ""Garret! Hardin, The tragedy of the commons.

women their age: an average of 2.2 (see Box 13-3).27 The ideal situation, in our opinion, would be for all peoples to place a high value on diversity. The advantages of cultural diversity are discussed in Chapter 15; the reasons for avoiding a genetic monoculture in Homo sapiens are essentially the same as those for avoiding one in a crop plant—to maintain resistance to disease and a genetic reservoir for potential adaptation to changed environments in the future. The advantages also include the possibility of aesthetic enjoyment of physical diversity.28 Some day we hope that whites will become distressed if blacks have too few children, and that, in general, humanity will strive to maximize its diversity while also maximizing the harmony in which diverse groups coexist. Distribution and mobility. Obscuring the population controversy in the United States in the late 1960s was the tendency of some demographers and government officials to blame population-related problems on population maldistribution. The claim was that pollution and urban social problems are the result of an uneven distribution of people, that troubled cities may be overpopulated, while in other areas of the country the population has declined.29 The cure promulgated in the 1960s was the creation of "new cities" to absorb the 80 million or so people then expected to be added to the U.S. population between 1970 and 2000. It is of course true that there is a distribution problem in the United States. Some parts of the country are economically depressed and have been losing population-often the most talented, productive, and capable elements—while other areas have been growing so rapidly that they are nearly overwhelmed. Patterns of migration and settlement are such that residential areas have become racially and economically segregated to an

-'Frederick S. Jaffe, Low-income families: fertility changes in the 1960s; Population Reference Bureau, Family Size and the Black American. - rel="nofollow">&There is more genetic variation within groups of human beings than between diem, but some of the inter-group variation may be biologically important (and is more widely recognized by lay persons). 29 For instance, demographer Conrad Taeuber, who supervised the 1970 U.S. Census, in a speech delivered at Mount Holyoke College in January 1971 (quoted in the Nets York Times, Jan. 14, 1971).

BOX 13-3 Poverty, Race, and Birth Control in the United States* The entrance of the United States government into the field of birth control through the extension of family planning services to the poor aroused a controversy quite out of proportion to its potential effect on the national birth rate, particularly in the black community, some members of which perceived it as a policy of "genocide" against racial minorities. In the United States, birth rates have long been higher among the poor and among nonwhites (blacks, orientals, and native Americans) than among the nonpoor and among whites. High birth rates are generally associated with low economic and educational levels in most countries, including the United States. At the same time, the poor and nonwhites also have had consistently higher death rates, especially among infants and children. Above the poverty level, the birth rate difference between races diminishes, and college-educated nonwhites have fewer children than their white peers. In recent years (especially since the national family planning program was established) the birth rates of the poor and nonwhites have been declining even more rapidly than those of the population as a whole.** Although there is conflicting evidence regarding desired family size among the poor, several surveys conducted in the 1960s indicated that poor couples wished to have only slightly more children than middle-class couples, and nonwhite couples in most socioeconomic classes wanted fewer children than comparable whites did. This was especially true among the younger couples in their prime childbearing years. At the same time, the incidence of unwanted children among the poor and near-poor in the early 1960s was estimated to be as high as 40 percent. For nonpoor couples the incidence was about 14 percent.1' The reasons for this disparity between desires and actual reproductive performance appear to have lain less in the lack of knowledge of contraceptives than in the unavailability of effective ones. The poor who used birth control tended to use cheaper and less reliable methods than did members of the middle "Source: Population Reference Bureau, Family size and the black American; Robert G. Weisbord, Genocide? birth control and the black American, Greenwood, Westport, Conn., 1975. For a discussion of the social and biological meanings of race. see Ehrlich and Feldman, Race bomb. **P. Cutright and F. S. Jaffe, Family planning program effects on the fertility of low-income U.S. women. *L. A. WestofF and C. F. Westoff, Front now to zero.

750

class. Because poor people simply could not afford the more effective contraceptives, and because no family planning information or services were provided through welfare health services until the late 1960s, most low-income people were until then deprived of effective methods of birth control. Between 1965 and 1970, fertility among the poor and near-poor declined by 21 percent, doubtless due in part to the new services that by 1970 were reaching an estimated 1.5 million women. The greatest fertility decline occurred among nonwhite women below the poverty level. As family planning services have expanded, nonwhite fertility has continued to drop rapidly. Despite the tendency of black militants to regard the provision of birth control information and services to the poor as a policy of "genocide" against blacks, and although the potential for abuse exists, it should be emphasized that the government's present program is basically intended to benefit the poor, and poor children in particular. In this connection it is unfortunate that the government chose to label its policy as a "population control" measure, which it is not; rather it was a logical and long overdue extension both of the family planning movement and of the welfare program. Fears of discrimination have been aroused in areas where middle-class social workers of people operating birth control clinics in poor neighborhoods have put pressure on women to accept birth control services. There have also been cases of black women being sterilized without informed consent, and laws have been proposed for compulsory sterilization of welfare mothers. Hence black fears of genocide are not altogether unfounded. The recent decline in black fertility, however, may have defused much of the white prejudice against "black welfare mothers." The best way to avoid either the appearance or the actuality of discrimination in administration of birth control services is to have the services administered by residents of the same neighborhoods they serve as far as possible. Although many middle-class Americans favor population control for others, especially the poor, they must realize that it is really their own excessive reproduction that accounts for most of the U.S. population growth rate. Furthermore, the middle class and the wealthy are responsible for the high rate of consumption and pollution, which are the most obvious symptoms of overpopulation in the United States.

extreme degree. This trend could be expected to have many undesirable social consequences (one has been the school-busing controversy). Central cities are being economically strangled and abandoned, while industry and members of the taxpaying middle class flee to the suburbs. But some social scientists have advanced the notion that, rather than being the cause of our social problems, maldistribution and migration might be symptoms of a deeper, more general malady.30 Population maldistribution is different from, although related to, the problem of absolute growth, and it demands a different set of solutions. Nevertheless, the distribution situation would certainly be exacerbated by a continuation of rapid population growth. Unfortunately, the proposal to create new cities has several drawbacks. The scale of the project alone is dismaying. New cities would have to be built at the improbable rate of one the size of Spokane (Figure 13-2), Washington, per month until the end of the century just in order to absorb the population growth that in the late 1960s was projected for that period. In order to provide space alone for that many more people, the United States would have to sacrifice substantial amounts of land now in agricultural production. Three hundred Spokanes would occupy about 10 million acres, which is equivalent to the land producing the entire U.S. cotton crop. Wasteland or grazing land could be used instead, but most people would not find such areas desirable places to live, and shortage of water might also be a limiting factor. Furthermore, new cities would not necessarily reduce pollution; rather, they would provide additional foci of environmental deterioration. Thus the net effect on total environmental impact nationwide, aside from redistributing it, would be beneficial only if careful planning were used to minimize commuting and other destructive activities in the new communities. Peter Morrison of the Rand Corporation has pointed out several social and economic disadvantages of new cities.31 The first difficulty is the enormous cost of building each new city, including the creation of a solid economic base to attract: immigrants, in competition with '"Peter Morrison, Urban growth, new cities, and the population problem. ''Ibid; U.S. Commission on Population Growth, Population and the American future, vol. 5.

751

FIGURE 13-2

An aerial view of Spokane, Washington. If the population of the United States had continued to grow as fast as it did in the late 1960s, a city of this size would have to be built each month between 1970 and the end of the century to accommodate the additions to the population. (Photo courtesy of Spokane Chamber of Commerce.)

older cities. The populations of new cities, unless controlled by explicit resettling policies, might be even more homogenous than that of today's suburbs and would tend to be even more mobile. Thus new cities would be quite unstable and would tend to intensify, rather than relieve, the problems of social segregation. Morrison suggested that a better solution to distribution problems would be to revitalize existing cities and form policies that encouraged migration in desired directions. People who move to new areas are usually attracted to better job opportunities or higher wages. Most go where they already have friends or relatives, a factor that militates against the successful establishment of new cities. Most migration in the United States occurs between urban areas; relatively few people now move from rural to urban areas. Such policies as local tax situations that encourage or discourage the development of industries, and differences among states in welfare benefits have considerable potential influence on migration. Since passage of the Population Act in 1970, the government has encouraged the development of new

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/ THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

cities by providing funds and guaranteeing loans to developers. Some new communities have been developed within old cities—Roosevelt Island in New York and Cedar-Riverside in Minneapolis, for example—but most are built some distance from older centers. The new community program was plagued with funding problems in the early 1970s, partly because of President Nixon's penchant for impoundment of funds, and partly because of HUD's fondness for red tape and failure to come through with promised technical and planning assistance or aid in starting transportation and school systems. Despite these obstacles, several new towns have come into being. The best of them incorporate housing for all income levels and try to attract minority groups. At least one new town, Woodlands, Texas, was planned by ecological architect Ian McHarg with an eye to preserving the local forest and recycling the water supply.32 The issue of new cities has faded somewhat since 1970, possibly because it has become increasingly difficult just to finance the maintenance of existing cities and suburbs, without taking on the even greater burden of building new ones. Another limiting factor may have been the 1973/1974 energy crisis, which starkly illuminated many of the faults of today's settlement and commuting patterns. Lowering population growth rates and some abatement of internal migration may also have caused politicians to view the need as less urgent than it seemed a few years earlier. Nevertheless, the problem remains of accomodating the tens of millions of people who will be added to the U.S. population by the end of the century. In addition, the numerous social difficulties caused by present and past movements of people must be solved and efforts made to prevent their being intensified in the future. Between 1950 and 1970, one American in five moved each year, about 22 percent of these to a different state. Disproportionate numbers of the people who move are young couples in their twenties and their children. The destructive effects of such mobility on people and on communities have been vividly described by Vance Packard." People are not inclined to develop loyalty or civic concern toward a town in which they feel themselves temporary residents. The community thereby "New towns in trouble. Time, March 24,1975. r 'A nation of strangers; see also Urie Bronfenbrenner, The origins of alienation.

loses potential support from many of its most active and talented citizens. High mobility may be hardest on children. When children cannot establish community roots, it is not surprising that they grow up alienated from older generations and from society at large. As a result of undirected migration since World War II, many urban areas in the United States have experienced severe problems. Some cities have grown enormously while others have lost population. Peter Morrison has described the demographic effects of rapid growth on one city, San Jose, California, which tripled its population between 1950 and 1970, and population decline on another, St. Louis, Missouri.34 San Jose's mostly young, extremely mobile population provides the advantages of a highly flexible job market and a low rate of dependency (retirees and jobless poor). But the city's population has grown almost faster than urban services such as sewers, schools, and streets could be provided for it. No time was available for planning; developers put up houses wherever land was available. In the early 1970s, San Jose looked at itself and was appalled: a classic example of unplanned urban sprawl—"slurbia" it is called in the vernacular. St. Louis, by contrast, is an acute example of central city decay. The central city's population declined by 17 percent during the 1960s, while the surrounding suburbs grew by 29 percent. Those who moved out were predominantly young families, leaving behind a rising proportion of aging and retired people and disadvantaged minorities, especially blacks. High and middleincome families, both black and white, departed for suburbs or other cities, leaving the city of St. Louis to support a high proportion of low-income people on an inadequate tax base. One approach to ameliorating the problems of overburdened cities is to encourage people to return to rural areas and small towns and cities. Such a policy, however, might require considerable revamping of American agricultural and industrial employment systems, as well as of local welfare policies that inadvertently stimulate migration from rural areas to cities. Such explicit policy "Urban growth and decline: San Jose and St. Louis in the 1960s. Another recent study, in which many of the economic, social and environmental effects of unplanned urban growth are examined, is Irving Hoch. City size effects, trends, and policies.

POPULATION POLICIES / 753

changes, although there are many powerful arguments in their favor, have only begun to appear, and those have come mainly from the private sector as business firms relocated in smaller cities and towns. There has been considerable discussion of reorganizing welfare policies on a federal standard so that no locality will provide more attractive benefits than any other, but to date the discussion has not been turned into action. Even without policy changes, however, a reversal of the centuries-long trend toward urbanization in the U.S. may now have occurred spontaneously.35Fed up with the growing disadvantages of life in large cities—rising crime rates and declining levels of services and amenities—millions of Americans have moved from cities to rural areas and small towns. A surprisingly large number of them have taken up farming, but with varied success. Some of this back-to-the-farm movement derives from the earlier hippie movement and from a growing desire among young, well-educated people for a more selfsufficient, independent way of life than is possible in a large city. Eventually, this change in life-style and personal goals may influence large companies and the government to develop policies that encourage decentralization and discourage unnecessary mobility.

Policies and Practices in Other Developed Countries Explicit population policies are the exception rather than the rule in most developed countries.36 Where laws affecting demographic trends have existed, they have generally been indirect, most commonly regulating or prohibiting abortion or the distribution of contraceptive information and materials. As in the United States, most such laws until recently have been pronatalist in intent. Nevertheless, a predominant social trend throughout the twentieth century has been the growth in acceptance of the idea of family limitation. Canada. Canada's population policies have generally followed the same lines as those in the United States, "Roy Reed, Rural areas' population gains now outpacing urban regions; Americans on the move. Time, March 15, 1976. 36 Bernard Berelson, ed.. Population policy in developed countries.

with the exception that family allowances—small allotments to subsidize support of children—have been provided for decades. Prohibitions on distribution of contraceptive devices or information were repealed in 1969, and soon afterwards a government family planning program was launched. Regulation of abortion was also liberalized somewhat in 1969, but the new law has been applied very conservatively. Easy access to abortion is by no means a reality in Canada.37 The Canadian birth rate is slightly higher (15.7 in 1975) than that of the United States and has also been dropping rapidly. A major factor in Canadian population growth has been immigration, which in the 1960s made up about one-third of the nation's annual growth. In the early 1970s immigration increased as fertility declined. Traditionally liberal immigration policies are currently being reevaluated with a view to tightening restrictions and reducing the inflow.38 Western Europe. Western European countries generally have no official population policies other than pronatalist policies left over from before World War II when birth rates were very low.39 Many of these countries still have family allowances to help support children in large families. Predominantly Catholic European countries still banned or restricted contraceptives and abortion as late as the 1970s. In Europe, widespread practice of coitus interruptus has been given the major credit for lowering birth rates during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with illegal abortion also playing an important role. In most of Western Europe by the 1970s, coitus interruptus and the condom were still the most used contraceptive methods, followed by the pill and the rhythm method. Among Western European countries, only in England and Scandinavia are other contraceptive devices as well known and readily available as they are in the United States. The condom is still the most commonly used device, however, and withdrawal is much more widely practiced than it is in America. However, use of the pill is increasing.40 "Margot Zimmerman, Abortion law and practice—a status report. "Wendy Dobson, National population objectives are slowly taking shape. 39 Much of the information on current policies come from Richard C. Shroeder, Policies on population around the world. 40 Norman B. Ryder, The family in developed countries.

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Sweden is an exception among European countries in that it has had an official population policy since the 1930s. This policy provided for sex education (including birth control) in schools, permitted abortion in some circumstances, and offered family planning services as part of the national health organization. In addition, Sweden was the first country to have a program to assist other family planning programs abroad. England, since 1974, has provided contraceptives and abortions through its National Health Service, and Parliament has begun discussion of developing an antinatalist policy. England also provides some family planning assistanceto LDCs, mostly its former colonies. Even though birth control has been illegal to some degree in most Catholic countries, late marriage, high rates of illegal abortion, and the use of withdrawal and the rhythm method have helped keep birth rates down. Planned parenthood groups have long existed in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands in a quasi-legal status, but until recently they were hampered by laws restricting the dissemination of information and materials. When France legalized contraceptives in the late 1960s, family allowances were also increased. Birth control devices are still entirely illegal in Ireland, although a movement for change has begun. They are also essentially illegal in Spain and Portugal. Italy has legalized the pill for "medical purposes" (presumably to combat the extremely high illegal abortion rate—see next section), and condoms are available "for disease prevention." In 1971, Italian laws prohibiting the dissemination of birth control information were declared unconstitutional, thus opening the way for much greater access to contraceptives. In 1975 a new law authorized local governments to establish "family centers" to counsel citizens on family matters, including family planning.4' Immigration policies are also being reevaluated in several Western European countries. In recent years, much of the labor force (11 percent in France and West Germany, 7 percent in Britain, and 37 percent in Switzerland) has been composed of "guest workers" — temporary migrants from poorer countries in Southern Europe, Northern and Central Africa, and the Middle 4!

Brenda Vumbaco, Recent law and policy changes in fertility control.

East.42 The worldwide economic recession in the mid1970s led to an intensification of the controversy, especially in Switzerland, which has twice considered outright deportation of all immigrants (thus throwing many firms, dependent on migrants, into panic).43 So far such proposals have been rejected, although many social problems continue to be blamed on the foreigners in most of these countries. Should economic conditions seriously worsen, such xenophobic policies could be revived and even implemented. Eastern Europe and USSR. In the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, the substantial postWorld War II declines in fertility were achieved mostly through abortion, which is provided by their national health services. These countries now also distribute contraceptives, including the pill, partly in an effort to reduce the abortion rate. This policy seems to be succeeding in some countries, although abortion is still the primary means of birth control. Discouragement of early marriage, an emphasis on training, education, and the full outside employment of women also undoubtedly strongly encourage the small family trend. Extremely low birth rates in Eastern European countries have caused a reversion to more pronatalist policies —especially a tightening of abortion laws—in response, apparently, to concern about future labor supplies. Communist ideology officially calls for a pronatalis: posture, and the Soviet government periodically exhorts its people to have more children. Interestingly, however, the Russians have cautiously begun to recommend lower fertility in rapidly growing less developed countries.44 Oceania. Australia and New Zealand have historically regarded themselves as underpopulated. Consequently their policies until recently were pronatalist and pro-immigration. These policies are currently being reevaluated as the public becomes aware of the world population problem, and neither country any longer "Clyde H. Farnsworth, The doors are closing to world's immigrants. New York Times, December 22, 1974. 43 A bout of xenophobia, Time, October 28, 1974. 44 Boris Urlanis, The hour of decision, Uncsco Courier, July/August 1974, pp. 26-29. The author is described as "the USSR's leading demographer."

POPULATION POLICIES / 755

subsidizes the transport costs of immigrants. A Zero Population Growth movement was founded in Australia in 1971. As former English colonies, both countries have long had family planning organizations and access to contraceptives. Their birth rates have been well within the usual DC range, although their growth rates have been inflated by high immigration rates. As in many European countries and the United States, the birth rates in Australia and New Zealand have been declining toward replacement levels since 1970. Japan. Japan, the only fully industrialized country in Asia, reduced its birth rate rapidly to DC levels after World War II, largely by legalizing abortion. A policy of encouraging the use of contraceptives has since reduced the abortion rate without changing the birth rate, even though Japan has been slow to legalize the pill and the IUD. The social policy on population, which was promoted through massive educational and communications programs in the 1950s, very strongly discouraged having a family with more than 2 children. Accordingly, fertility has been close to replacement levels since then. Around 1970, alarmed by an apparent labor shortage, Japanese industry began campaigning for more births. The crude birth rate rose during the mid-1970s, but the rise was essentially an artifact of age composition; the postwar baby boom children born before legalized abortion halved the birth rate (1945-1955) were then in their twenties—the prime reproductive years. The recession of 1974 effectively seems to have silenced the campaign for higher fertility. At the same time, the growth of both environmental concern and a women's liberation movement in Japan may have a fertilityreducing effect in future years. Abortion The most controversial method of birth control without question is abortion, which is surrounded by legal, ethical, and moral dilemmas. Despite this, it seems to have been practiced in all societies and is probably still the commonest method of birth control today, especially in LDCs. Until the early 1970s, abortion was illegal in most countries, including the United States (see Box

13-4). Disapproval of the practice probably originated with the Judeo-Christian ethic, yet it was not made illegal until the nineteenth century. Then it was oudawed on the grounds that it was dangerous to the mother— which it was before sterile techniques were developed. When performed today under appropriate medical circumstances by a qualified physician, however, abortion is much safer than a full-term pregnancy. The death rate in the United States for legal abortion in the first trimester (first three months of pregnancy) is less than 2 in 100,000. For second-trimester abortions the rate rises to 12 per 100,000, still only half die maternal death rate for childbirth.45 But danger to the mother escalates alarmingly when the abortion is illegal, as it still is in many countries. The amount of risk varies according to the circumstances, which may range from self-inducement with a knitting needle or, almost equally hazardous, unsterile help from untrained people, to reasonably safe treatment by a physician in a hotel or clandestine clinic. Changing abortion laws in DCs. Before abortion was legalized in the United States, bungled illegal abortions were the greatest single cause of maternal deaths, accounting for a conservatively estimated 300 or more deaths per year.46 They still are in those countries where abortion remains illegal or not yet widely available. In Italy, for example, contraceptives were entirely banned until 1971, and the illegal abortion rate at that time was estimated to be equal to or higher than die birth rate—800,000 to 1.5 million per year—and costing as many as 3000 lives per year.47 Most of these abortions were self-inflicted or accomplished with the aid of a sympathetic but untrained friend. When a woman with a hemorrhage was brought to a hospital, she was automatically given tetanus and penicillin shots. She never "Family planning perspectives, Abortion-related deaths down 40 percent. . . . See also C. Tietze and S. Lewit. Legal abortion, whose figures for abortion mortality, derived from the U.S. and the U.K., show abortion mortality risks approximate!}' equal to childbirth between the twelfth and sixteenth weeks, and somewhat higher thereafter. Both sources agree on the low risks of first trimester abortions. "Christopher Tietze, The effect of legalization of abortion on population growth and public health. For an excellent overview of the changing legality of abortion worldwide and related social issues, see Tietze and Lewitj Legal abortion. J7 Rcportcd by David Burlington fui NBC News, February 5, 1975.

BOX 13-4

Abortion in the United States

Before 1967, abortion was illegal in the United States except when the mother's life was endangered by continuing the pregnancy. Only six years later, the situation had been completely reversed, legally if not everywhere in practice. Yet the change was not eifected overnight; it was the result of changed public attitudes in response to a growing reform movement. By the end of 1970, 15 of the 50 states had at least partially moderated their abortion laws. Most of these new laws permitted abortion only in cases where bearing the child presented a grave risk to the mental or physical health of the mother, where the pregnancy was a result of incest or rape, and where (except in California) there was a substantial likelihood that the child would be physically or mentally defective. To obtain an abortion, a woman usually had to submit her case to a hospital reviewing board of physicians, a time-consuming and expensive process. Although the laws ostensibly were relaxed to reduce the problem of illegal abortions, hospital boards at first interpreted the changes in the law so conservatively that they had little effect. The number of illegal abortions per year in the U.S. during the 1960s has been variously estimated at between 200,000 and 2 million, with 1 million being the most often quoted figure. This amounted to more than one abortion for every four births. At that time, there were estimated to be 120,000 illegal abortions per year in California; in the first year after the passage of California's "liberalized" law there were just over 2,000 legal ones. The figures were similar for the other states. In 1970 Hawaii, Alaska, and New York passed new laws essentially permitting abortion on request, and Washington State legalized abortion on request not by legislation but by referendum. Meanwhile, several other states began to interpret their relatively restrictive laws much more liberally, and the legal abortion rate rose considerably. These changes in state laws were preceded and accompanied by an erosion of public opposition to abortion. Table 13-1 shows the changes in public disapproval as revealed in polls taken between 1962 and 1969 for demographer Judith Blake. A poll taken early in 1970 asked: Should an abortion be available to any woman who requests one? In apparent contradiction to the earlier opinions, more than half of those interviewed said yes. Although most respondents did not approve of abortion except for the more serious reasons, the majority apparently felt that mothers should be free to make their own decisions.

Continuing this trend, a poll conducted in 1971 for the U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future found that 50 percent of the adults interviewed felt that the decision to have an abortion should be made by the woman and her doctor, 41 percent would permit abortions under certain circumstances, and only 6 percent opposed abortion under all circumstances. Similar results have been obtained in subsequent surveys." In January 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision on an abortion case which in effect legalized abortion on request nationwide, at least for the first trimester (13 weeks), with restrictions on the second trimester being permitted in the interest of protecting women's health. Only in the last ten weeks of pregnancy, (when the child, if born, had a chance of survival) the court ruled, could states prohibit abortion except "to preserve the life or health of the mother."6 The number of legal abortions performed in 1972 (before the Supreme Court decision) was about 600,000; in 1975 it was about one million—approximately the estimated previous number of illegal abortions. At least two-thirds of these abortions probably would have been obtained illegally if legal abortions had been unavailable.1" Nor had illegal abortions entirely disappeared—25 of the 47 deaths from abortions in 1973 were from illegal ones (those not performed under proper medical supervision)—although the incidence of such deaths clearly had been drastically reduced by 1975.1* Yet, three years after the Supreme Court decision, there were still large discrepancies from one region to another and between medical facilities in providing abortion services. An ongoing national study by the Guttmacher Institutee in 1975 concluded that between 260,000 and 770,000 women who needed abortions in 1975—20 to 40 percent of the women in need— "W. R. Arney and W. H. Trescher, Trends in Attitudes toward abortion, 1972-1975. 'For a lively account of the campaign to change U.S. abortion laws, see Lawrence Lader, Abortion II: making the revolution. '"Edward Weinstock, et al., Legal abortions in the United States since the 1973 Supreme Court decisions; Abortion need and services in the United States, 1974-1975, Family Planning Perspectives, vol. 8, no. 2, March 1976. ''Richard Lincoln, The Institute of Medicine reports on legalized abortion and the public health. Tan of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. The 1976 Study was titled: Provisional estimates of abortion need and services in the year following the Supreme Court decisions: United States, each state and metropolitan area. The 1976 Study was Abortion 1974-1975—need and services in the United States, each state and metropolitan area.

TABLE 13-1

Change in Disapproval of Abortion (all white respondents) were still unable to obtain them. More than half of all abortions after 1973 were carried out in specialized clinics, while public hospitals (which provide most medical services to the poor) were lagging even behind private hospitals in providing services. Only one in five U.S. public hospitals reported performing any abortions in 1975. Thus in many areas it was substantially more difficult for poor women to obtain abortions than for middle-class or wealthy women, even though government funds were available to cover the costs. Teenagers, who account for about onethird of the need for abortion services and for a large and growing portion of the illegitimate birth rate, also seem to have poor access to safe abortions. Finally, abortion services were found to be generally less available in the southern and central regions of the U.S. than on either coast. In the United States, the majority of abortion recipients are young and/or unmarried. There is some debate over the degree to which legal abortion has affected American fertility overall, but it seems to have had a significant effect on the rate of illegitimate births. In 1971 reductions in illegitimate births in states with legal abortion ranged as high as 19 percent, while in most states without legal abortion they continued to increase/ Following the Supreme Court decision, the rising rate of illegitimacy halted briefly, then began again. The rise was accounted for by an increase in teenage pregnancy. There is no evidence that abortion has replaced contraceptives to any significant degree, despite the apprehensions of antiabortion groups on this score. Most women seeking abortion have a history of little or no contraceptive practice, and many are essentially ignorant of other means of birth control. Those who return for subsequent abortions have been found to be still ignorant of facts of reproduction, using contraceptives improperly, or to have been poorly guided by their physicians." Paralleling the trend toward liberalized abortion policies in the U.S. has been the growth of right-to-life groups who are adamantly opposed to abortion. These groups have lobbied actively against reform of state laws and, since the Supreme Court decision, have tried to persuade Congress to reimpose sanctions against abortion through Constitutional amendments. Under their pressure, Congress has removed funds for

abortion services from Foreign Aid grants to LDCs. In 1976, Congress also passed a law forbidding federal assistance for abortions in the U.S., a move that denies these services to lowincome women—precisely the group whose chances for a decent and productive life are most likely to be jeopardized by an unwanted child. Whether the courts will consider such a discriminatory law constitutional is another question. Right-to-life groups have also played a part in harassing clinics, hospitals, and other organizations that provide abortion. This activity often embarrasses clients and possibly has also discouraged other institutions from providing abortion services. Action by right-to-life groups in Boston resulted in the trial and conviction for manslaughter in early 1975 of physician Kenneth Edelin following a late-term abortion (about 20 weeks). The prosecution maintained that the fetus might have survived if given life-supporting treatment. (The conviction was overturned in December 1976 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.)'1 The consequence of the original verdict nevertheless was to discourage late secondtrimester abortions (31 states already had laws against them except to protect the mother's life or health; in most states abortion by choice was available only through the 20th week). Unfortunately, this change also will affect mainly the poor and/or very young women, who through ignorance or fear are more likely to delay seeking an abortion until the second trimester. In 1976, a Right-to-Life political party was formed, centering on the abortion issue. Its candidate, Ellen McCormack, entered primaries in several states, but never succeeded in winning more than 5 percent of the vote. Most Americans, it appears, accept the present legal situation at least as the lesser of evils.

1. Sklar and B. Berkov, Abortion, illegitimacy, and the American birth rate. "Blame MD mismanagement for contraceptive failure, Family Planning Perspectives, vol. 8, no. 2, March/April 1976, pp. 72-76.

* Time and Nescstceek, March 3, 1975. Both magazines covered the trial and the issues it raised in some detail. See also Barbara Culliton's thoughtful article, Edelin trial; jury not persuaded, and Edelin conviction overturned, Science, vol. 195, January 7, 1977, pp. 36-37.

Percentage of disapproval Reason for abortion

1962

1965

1968

1969

Mother's health endangered Child may be deformed Can't afford child No more children wanted

16 29 74 -

15 31 74 -

10 25 72

25 68

85

79

Source: Judith Blake, Abortion and public opinion.

13

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admitted having had an abortion; under Italian law she had committed a crime and could be sent to prison. Some years ago in a confidential survey of 4000 married women of all classes, all admitted to having had abortions, most of them many times.48 A movement is now underway to loosen the laws against abortion in Italy, following the limited legalization of the pill in 1971, despite strong opposition from the Vatican and conservative political elements. The Italian constitutional court in early 1975 ruled that abortion is legal if doctors determine that the pregnancy threatens the physical or mental health of the mother. Before the 1970s, variations on the Italian abortion tragedy prevailed in several other Western European countries. In France, contraceptives were available but not openly, and the illegal abortion rate and attendant rates of death and injury nearly matched those of Italy. In late 1974, abortion was legalized in France, shortly after a new law was passed greatly increasing public access to contraceptive devices and information. Similar reversals have occurred in many DCs since 1965. West Germany, Denmark, and Austria legalized abortion on request between 1973 and 1975, although its status in Germany was changed by a court decision and remains to be reestablished by legislation. In 1975 Sweden changed its already moderately liberal law to allow abortion up to the twelfth week as a decision for the woman alone to make. Finland, Norway, and Iceland have long had liberal policies, but they fall short of availability on request. Laws against abortion in Greece and the Netherlands have been neither observed nor enforced and soon may be reversed. The same was formerly true of Switzerland, which in 1975 moved to liberalize its abortion laws. Great Britain has in effect permitted abortion on request since 1967. Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and Ireland still had very restrictive laws in 1976.4' In most of Eastern Europe, abortion has long been legal and usually subsidized by the state. Abortion has been legal since 1920 in the Soviet Union, and in most Eastern European countries (except Albania) since the •"L. Zanetti, The shame of Italy. "Zimmerman, Abortion, law and practice; C. Tietze and M. C. Murstein, Induced abortion: a factbook, 1975. These two are the major sources for what follows.

1950s. Abortion brought birth rates so low that Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary tightened their regulations in 1973. Romania severely restricted access to abortion in 1966, with the result that its birth rate virtually doubled the following year. Since then, the birth rate has declined toward the 1966 level, indicating an increase in illegal abortions. The rates of hospitalizations and deaths from abortion complications have also risen substantially. Meanwhile the huge cohort of children born in 1967 has caused havoc in the Romanian school systems.50 Canada has relaxed its abortion law somewhat; practice is considerably short of "on request," but widely liberal interpretation of the new law might make it close. Canadians denied abortions often go to the United States. Australia is moving toward liberal policies, although access varies by state. New Zealand remains restrictive, but discussion of change has begun. Abortion in LDCs. The tragedy of illegal abortion thus is rapidly becoming a thing of the past in most of the developed world, but change is coming more slowly in much of the less developed world. In some countries the problem of illegal abortion is increasing because the need for abortion seems to be rising. There are important exceptions, particularly China, where abortion has been liberally provided by medical services since 1957. In India abortion was legalized in 1972, but there was so little publicity that even large segments of the medical community as well as the public were unaware of it for the first few years. For those who knew, high costs and excessive red tape were effective deterrents. For at least the first three years, the number of legal abortions was extremely low (41,000 in the first five months), while the number of nonmedical illegal abortions was appallingly high (at least 4 million a year).51 Elsewhere in Asia, abortion has been legalized in South Korea (1973), North Vietnam (1971), Hong Kong (1972), and Singapore (1969, further liberalized in 1974). Abortion is firmly illegal in Taiwan, but apparently easily obtainable from medical practitioners, nonetheless. Laws are still restrictive in Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the Philippines, but there are signs 50 Teitze and Murstein, Induced abortion; Charles F. Westoff, The populations of the developed countries. 51 The abortion dilemma, Atlas, November 1974, pp. 16-18.

POPULATION POLICIES / 759

that they may soon be changed in several of these countries. In the Middle East and North Africa, laws are generally very restrictive, except in Tunisia (which has had abortion on request in the first trimester since 1973) and Cyprus, which partially liberalized its law in 1974. Israel's tough anti-abortion law was weakened by a challenging court decision in 1952 and is seldom observed today. Abortions reportedly are also available through medical facilities in Egypt despite a strict anti-abortion law. In Africa south of the Sahara, abortion is generally prohibited (the exceptions being Zambia since 1972 and some liberalization in South Africa). Ironically, these restrictive laws are holdovers from colonial times; they are not rooted in local culture.52 Abortion is still illegal in most Latin American countries, although laws have recently been relaxed to permit it under certain circumstances in El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru. Abortion essentially on request is available only in Uruguay and Cuba (since 1968 in both cases). Illegal abortion is rampant in Latin America. Contraceptives are legally available in most Latin American countries, but in practice only accessible to the rich. The illiterate poor, who make up a large share of the Latin American population are generally unaware of the existence of birth control other than by ancient folk methods, and could not afford modern methods even if they knew of them. There are exceptions where governments and volunteer organizations such as Planned Parenthood have established free birth control clinics (see next section). Although these can help, they as yet reach only a small fraction of the population, mainly in cities. In rural areas where hunger and malnutrition are often widespread, a failure of primitive birth control methods leaves women with no alternative but to practice equally crude forms of abortion. In the 1960s bungled abortions were estimated to account for more than 40 percent of hospital admissions in Santiago, Chile. In that country, an estimated onethird of all pregnancies end in abortion. In Mexico, "Sue Tuckwell, Abortion, the hidden plague.

400,000 women per year are treated in hospitals for illegal abortions; the abortion rate is conservatively estimated at one-fourth the birth rate.53 For South America as a whole, some authorities believe that onefourth of all pregnancies end in abortion; others estimate that abortions outnumber births. Liberalizing abortion laws in various countries has been shown to have two important effects. The first is a very large decline in maternal deaths and morbidity (illness) associated with illegal abortion. The degree of reduction of death and illness depends on the degree of change in the law, the previous rate of illegal abortions, and how they were usually performed (i.e., self-inflicted under unsanitary circumstances or performed clandestinely by medical personnel). The number of annual abortion deaths in the U.S. dropped from over 150 per year before 1970 to 47 (25 of which were from illegal abortions) in 1973; in England the decline was from 60 before 1968 to 11 in 1974.54 Declines in many European countries and LDCs, where crude self-abortion has been more common, will probably be much greater. Conversely, the number of deaths in Romania, where abortion regulations were tightened, rose from about 70 in 1965 to over 370 in 1971.» The other result of liberalizing abortion laws is to provide such services safely to low-income women. When abortion is illegal, the rich can usually still obtain a safe illegal procedure or can afford to travel to another country where legal abortion is available. The poor have no such options; it is they who suffer most either from the burdens of large families or from dangerously unsafe illegal abortions. The moral issue. The greatest obstacles to freely available, medically safe abortion in many developed countries and in Latin America are the Roman Catholic Church and other religious groups that consider abortion immoral. The crux of the Catholic argument is that the embryo is, from the moment of conception, a complete individual with a soul. In the Catholic view, induced abortion amounts to murder. Some Catholics also oppose 53 /4r/as, The abortion dilemma; Tuckwell, Abortion, p. 20. '4C. Tietze and M. C. Murstein, Induced Abortion: a factbook. The rate of abortion deaths was declining during the 1960s, especially after 1967 when several states relaxed laws to permit more legal abortions. "Ibid.

POPULATION POLICIES / 761

will lead to genocide. It is hard to see how this could happen if the decision is left to the mother. A mother who takes the moral view that abortion is equivalent to murder is free to bear her child. If she cannot care for it, placement for adoption is still possible in most societies. Few people would claim that abortion is preferable to contraception, not only because of moral questions, but also because the risk of subsequent health problems for the mother may be greater. Death rates for firsttrimester, medically supervised abortions are a fraction of those for pregnancy and childbirth but considerably higher in later months.58 Large and rapidly growing numbers of people nevertheless feel that abortion is vastly preferable to the births of unwanted children, especially in an overpopulated world. Until more effective forms of contraception than now exist are developed, and until people become more conscientious in use of contraceptives, abortion will remain a needed back-up method of birth control when contraception fails. Attitudes on abortion have changed in most countries in recent years, and they can reasonably be expected to change more in the future. The female part of the world's population has long since cast its silent vote. Every year over one million women in the United States, and an estimated 30 to 55 million more elsewhere, have made their desires abundantly clear by seeking and obtaining abortions. Until the 1970s, these women were forced to seek their abortions more often than not in the face of their societies' disapproval and of very real dangers and difficulties. Millions still must do so. There is little question that legalized abortion can contribute to a reduction in birth rates. Wherever liberal laws have been enacted, they have been followed by lowered fertility. Longstanding evidence is available from Japan and Eastern Europe, where abortion was the primary effective form of birth control available for some years after liberalization, and where the decline in fertility was substantial. The extent of decline is bound to be related to the availability of other birth control methods; but even in the United States and England, where contraceptives have been widely available, the decline in fertility after reversal of abortion policies was significant. 58

Tietze and Murstein, Induced abortion.

According to at least one study, availability of abortion (legal or illegal) may be necessary in order for a population to reach and maintain fertility near replacement level, given current contraceptive technology and patterns of sexual behavior.59 Liberalization of abortion policies in those countries where it is still largely or entirely illegal is therefore justifiable both on humanitarian and health grounds and as an aid to population control.

POPULATION POLICIES IN LESS DEVELOPED NATIONS In response to rising alarm during the 1950s over the population explosion in less developed countries, both private and governmental organizations in the United States and other nations began to be involved in population research and overseas family planning programs. First among these, naturally, was the International Planned Parenthood Federatiork which grew out of the established national groups. By 1975 there were Planned,, Parenthood organizations in 84 countries, supported by their own governments, private donations, government grants from developed countries, or some combination of these sources.60 Various other private and governmental organizations followed Planned Parenthood into the field, including the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Population _ Council, the U.S. Agency for International development (AID), and agencies of several other DC governments. International organizations such as the World Bank and various UN agencies, particularly the UN Fund for Population Activities,, had joined bv 197CL The 1960s brought a great proliferation of family planning programs in LDCs, which were assisted or administered by one or another of these groups. Most assistance from DCs was provided through one of the international or private organizations. In 1960 some $2 million was spent by developed countries (and the U.S. was not then among them) to assist LDC family planning programs; by 1974 59 C. Tietze and J. Bongaarts, Fertility rates and abortion rates: simulations of family limitation, Studies in familv planning, vol. 6, no. 5. May 1975, p. 119. ^Population Reference Bureau, World population growth and response, pp. 243-248.

TABLE

13-2

Family Planning in LDCs Population (millions, 1975) 400+

Have an official policy to reduce population growth rate

Have official support of family planning for other reasons

Neither have policy nor support family planning

People's Republic of China (1962) India (1952, reorganized 1965) Indonesia (1968)

Brazil (1974)

50-100

Mexico (1974) Pakistan (1960, reorganized 1965) Bangladesh (1971)

Nigeria (1970)

25-50

Turkey (1965) Egypt (1965) Iran (1967) Philippines (1970) Thailand (1970) South Korea (1961) Vietnam (1962 in North)

Zaire (1973)

Burma Ethiopa Argentina

15-25

Morocco (1968) Taiwan (1968) Colombia (1970)

Tanzania (1970) South Africa (1966) Afghanistan (1970) Sudan (1970) Algeria (1971)

North Korea Peru

10-15

Nepal (1966) Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (1965) Malaysia (1966) Kenya (1966)

Venezuela (1968) Chile (1966) Iraq (1972) Uganda (1972)

Tunisia (1964) Barbados (1967) Dominican Republic (1968) Singapore (1965) Hong Kong (1973) Jamaica (1966) Trinidad and Tobago (1967) Laos (1972, possibly discontinued) Ghana (1969) Mauritius (1965) Puerto Rico (1970) Botswana (1970) Fiji (1962) El Salvador (1968) Gilbert and Ellice Islands (1970) Guatemala (1975) Grenada (1974) Bolivia (1968, reorganized 1973) Costa Rica (1968) El Salvador (1968)

Cuba (early 1960s) Nicaragua (1967) Syria (1974) Panama (1969) Honduras (1966) Dahomey (1969) Gambia (1969) Rhodesia (1968) Senegal (1970) Ecuador (1968) Honduras (1965) Benin (early 1970s) Haiti (1971) Papua-New Guinea (1969) Paraguay (1972) Liberia (1973) Lesotho (1974) Western Samoa (1971) Madagascar (1974) Sierra Leone (early 1970s) Swaziland (1969) Togo (early 1970s) Zambia (early 1970s) Cambodia (1972, possibly discontinued) Guyana (1975) Surinam (1974) Uruguay (1971) Other small Caribbean countries (1960s)

100-400

Less than 10

Cameroon Angola Malawi Jordan Lebanon Saudi Arabia Syria Yemen Mali Upper Volta Mozambique Burundi Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo Equatorial Guinea Guinea-Bisseau Ivory Coast Libya Mauritania Niger Rwanda Seychelles Somalia Namibia Israel

Sources: Berelson, Population control programs; Nortman, Population and family planning programs, 1975; Population Reference Bureau, World population growth and response.

POPULATION POLICIES

•the amount was over $200 million, more than half of it from USAID. Yet less than two percent of all foreign assistance goes to LDC family planning programs, and most LDCs allot less than one percent of their budgets to it.61 During the 1960s national family planning programs were established in some 25 LDCs, while 17 other governments began supporting or assisting the activities of private Planned Parenthood organizations. The early 1970s saw a further proliferation of these programs until by 1975,34 less developed countries officially favored the reduction of population growth, and 32 more supported family planning activities for other reasons. Some 55 additional LDCs still did not support family planning, or in a few cases opposed it. But the combined 1973 populations of the pro-family planning countries were nearly 2.5 billion, whereas the total combined population of the anti-family planning nations was only about 250 million.62 Table 13-2 shows details. Government Policies in LDCs So far family planning programs are the primary policies that have been brought into action against the population explosion in most LDCs. Outstanding exceptions are the People's Republic of China,63 Indonesia, India, Pakistan, South Korea, Singapore, Tunisia, Egypt, and a few other countries where other social and economic policies have been adopted to supplement family planning.64 However, many family planning programs have been established and are even being supported by governments for reasons other than reduction of population growth, usually to protect the health and welfare of mothers and children. Although no country has yet adopted attainment of ZPG as a goal, many have aimed at an ultimate reduction of growth rates to DC levels— around 1 percent per year or less. A few countries, by "Dorothy Nortman, Population and family planning programs: A factbook, 1974. Population Reference Bureau, World population growth and response. W D. Nortman, Population and family planning programs, 1974 and 1975. "See Edgar Snow, Report from China—III: population care and control, for an early report on China. More recent reports have generally confirmed that first impression: for example, Pi-Chao Chen, China: population program at the grass roots, in Population: perspective 1973, H. Brown, J, Holdren, A. Sweezy, B. West, eds, M

Vumbaco, Recent law and policy changes.

contrast, still want to increase their usually already rapid growth. Many others are beginning to reevaluate their pronatalist policies as consequences of rapid growth become increasingly evident. The following discussion sums up these various approaches by continent.65 Africa. Africa, an extremely diverse continent, growing at about 2.6 percent per year, includes some of the world's poorest and most rapidly growing nations. Because high mortalities, especially of infants, are also commonly found in these countries, concern over rapid growth and action to curb it have developed only relatively recently in most of them. Indeed, some African governments remain staunchly pronatalist. The belief that more people are needed for development is common among African nations south of the Sahara. Policies in Cameroon, Malawi, and Upper Volta still frankly favor growth, while Zambia and the Malagasy Republic have only recently reversed their positions (in 1975). Concern about poorly controlled migration is greater in many of these countries than concern about high birth rates. In general, family planning on a private basis has long been available in former African colonies of England, but not in those of such Catholic countries as France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Portugal. Former English colonies were among the first to establish national family planning policies, although emphasis in some cases is put on health and family welfare justifications. Kenya and Ghana have two of the oldest and strongest family planning programs in subSaharan Africa, and both have goals of reducing population growth. Interest in family planning at least for health reasons is growing in most former English colonies, although a few such as Malawi still discourage or ignore the activities of private family planning organizations. Nigeria, the most populous and one of the richest (in terms of resource endowment) African countries, was only beginning to show interest in family planning for health reasons in 1976, despite rapid growth. "For country-by-country details of policies and recent demographic trends, Population Reference Bureau, World population growth and response, prepared with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development, is invaluable.Schroeder and Vumbaco each provide useful summaries, as does the more recent D. Nortman and E. Hofstatter, Population and family planning programs: a factbook, 1976.

763

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In South Africa and Rhodesia, the dominant European populations have traditionally practiced birth control. These countries are now trying to extend family planning services to their African populations. South Africa's family planning is offered through its Planned Parenthood affiliate and funded by the government; Rhodesia's services are government-supported, but operated by several private international groups. Former French colonies have begun to relax their prohibitions to allow the commercial sale of contraceptives and to support some family planning activities. The first family planning clinics in French-speaking continental Africa have been established in Senegal, whose government is beginning to show interest in family planning. Most former French colonies, however, remain complacent about their rates of population growth. An exception is Mauritius, an island nation with one of the highest population densities in the world (see Chapter 5). Mauritius has a vigorous and comparatively successful family planning program. Since the 1950s, the growth rate has been reduced to about 2.1, despite an unusually low death rate of 7 per 1000 population. The Portuguese colonies, Mozambique and Angola, remained pronatalist and strongly opposed to birth control until they achieved independence in 1975. Establishment of population programs must await the stabilization of the new governments. Some North African countries have initiated family planning programs; Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco have fairly strong, antinatalist policies. Tunisia, in particular, has ventured beyond family planning to legalize sterilization (considered immoral and against Moslem law in most Islamic countries) and abortion, to limit financial allowances for children to four per family, raise the legal marriage age, and ban polygamy. In addition, women's rights, usually very restricted in Moslem societies, are being promoted. Some other North African countries— Algeria, Libya, Mauritania—remain pronatalist or uninterested. Many African countries still have death rates above 20 per thousand, and some even more than 30. A number of demographers and family planning officials believe that interest in population control will remain low in those countries until the death rates have been substantially

reduced, especially among infants and children. R is vitally important to change this point of view so that efforts can be made to lower birth rates along with death rates; that most family planning efforts have begun in African countries as a part of maternal and child health services is an encouraging sign. Latin America. Latin America as a region, despite having some of the highest population growth rates in the world (about 2.9 percent for the entire region), has also been very reluctant to accept a need for population control. This is probably due in part to the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, but there is also a widespread belief, at least in South America, that the continent still contains vast untapped resources of land and minerals, that the answer to all problems is development, and that more people are needed for development. Latin American politicians, moreover, tend to view proposals originating in the United States for birth control with understandable suspicion. Some seem to believe the U.S. is trying to impose a new and subtle form of imperialism.66 In some countries, this reaction has even had the effect of inhibiting the teaching of demography and family planning in universities. Latin American economists and politicians have come to accept family planning (often referred to as "responsible parenthood") mainly on health and welfare grounds and as a means of reducing the horrendous illegal abortion rate. Some leaders are beginning to realize, however, that the galloping population growth rate is swallowing all the economic progress each year, leaving a per-capita rate of progress of zero or less. A few countries have established essentially, though not always explicitly, antinatalist policies as a result—notably Chile. Colombia, several Caribbean countries, and all of the Central American countries. The efforts of some family planning programs in the Caribbean (mainly former British colonies) have been counted among the most successful, especially those of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. Birth rates have declined there since the early 1960s, and have declined as well in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela. "National Academy of Sciences, In starch of population policy: views from the developing world; Population policy in Latin America.

POPULATION POLICIES / 765

At the other extreme, Brazil and Argentina have policies generally promoting growth. Brazil does permit private family planning groups to operate, however, especially in the poverty-stricken Northeast. Argentina, having a relatively low birth rate and feeling threatened by rapidly growing Brazil, in 1974 banned dissemination of birth control information and closed family planning clinics. Since the practice of birth control is well established in the Argentine population, the action is not likely to have great effect except perhaps to raise the already high abortion rate, mostly illegal. Asia. Asia includes over half of the human population and is growing at about 2.3 percent per year. Both mortality and birth rates are generally lower than those in Africa, and both have been declining in several countries. Asia presents a widely varied picture in regard to population policies. At one extreme, China, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea are pursuing strong family planning policies, in several cases reinforced by social and economic measures, some of which are described below. All of these countries have recorded declines in birth rates, some of them quite substantial. Family planning programs have also been established in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Malaysia, and the Philippines, but the impact, if any, on birth rates is negligible so far. A few rapidly growing countries, notably Cambodia and Burma, currently are pursuing pronatalist population policies, although family planning is privately available in the latter country. Other "centrally planned" countries in Southeast Asia seem to be following China's example in population policies; North Vietnam has had a family planning program for some time, which presumably was extended to South Vietnam when the nation was unified. Policies in North Korea are unknown. Middle Eastern nations are still largely pronatalist in their outlook, with the exceptions of Turkey and Iran which have national family planning programs. Several countries, including Afghanistan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, are interested in establishing family planning services for health and welfare reasons. The remaining countries favor continued growth, although they may tolerate family planning

activity in the private sector. Among these is Israel, for obvious reasons. At the furthest extreme is Saudi Arabia, which has outlawed importation of contraceptives. Nearly all Middle Eastern countries are growing rapidly with relatively high, although declining death rates. The United Nations. For many years, the United Nations limited its participation in population policies to the gathering of demographic data. This, however, was instrumental in developing awareness of the need for population policies, especially among LDCs, whose governments often had no other information about their population growth. Since the late 1960s the UN has taken an active role in coordinating assistance for and directly participating in family planning programs of various member nations, while continuing the demographic studies. A special body, the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), advises governments on policies and programs, coordinates private donors and contributions from DC governments, and sometimes directly provides supplies, equipment, and personnel through other UN agencies. In 1967 the UN Declaration on Social Progress and Development stated that "parents have the exclusive right to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children."67 The statement affirmed the UN's increasing involvement in making family planning available to all peoples everywhere and contained an implicit criticism of any government policy that might deny family planning to people who wanted it. The statement has sometimes been interpreted as a stand against compulsory governmental policies to control births; however, the right to choose whether or not to have children is specifically limited to "responsible" choices. Thus, the Declaration also provides governments with the right to control irresponsible choices. In 1974 the United Nations' World Population Conference, the first worldwide, government-participating forum on the subject, was convened in Bucharest. Publicity attending the event gave an impression of enormous disagreement among participating groups. But in fact it provided a valuable forum for an exchange of "Declaration on Population, Teheran, 1968, Studies in Family Planning, no. 16, January, 1967.

BOX 13-6 China: An Apparent Success Story Any brief treatment of Chinese society is difficult and necessarily contains elements of overgeneralization. First of all, the huge geographical expanse and the vastness of the population—nearly a billion people—are difficult to envision. Second, the Chinese people possess a cultural diversity possibly as rich as that of Europe, and even older traditions. Finally, it seems that there is no overall, systematic keeping of vital statistics and population figures in China, and those statistics that do exist are not readily available to outsiders. The Chinese are traditionally xenophobic, and the Western intrusion of the last century and a quarter—from the Opium Wars through the United States debacle in Vietnam and Soviet pressure on northern Chinese borders—have only heightened this traditional aloofness. The available information is therefore fragmentary and has to some extent been filtered by a highly centralized and autocratic regime. Still, the accounts of foreign travellers in China and the release of official statements and figures allow some conclusions to be drawn about the nature of population policy in the People's Republic." Superficially, the expressed population policies of the People's Republic of China seem slightly schizophrenic. Official rhetoric preached abroad roundly condemns Malthusian ideas: "The poor countries have not always been poor. Nor are they poor because they have too many people. They are poor because they are plundered and exploited by imperialism."6 The same article goes on to blame "relative overpopulation and widespread poverty" in the United States and the Soviet Union on "ruthless oppression and exploitation which the superpowers practice at home." But, despite assertions that there is no such thing as overpopulation, China admits to having a policy of "planned population growth," with this rationale: We do not believe in anarchy in material production, and we do not believe in anarchy in human reproduction. Man must control nature, and he must also control his numbers. . "For a recent overview, see International Planned Parenthood Federation, China 1976: a new perspective. 'China on the Population Question, China Reconstructs.

We believe China's policy benefits many aspects of life—national construction, the emancipation of women, protection of mothers and women and children, proper bringing up of the young, better health for the people and prosperity for the nation. It is, in other words, in the interests of the masses of the people.''

In recent years, as China has begun to open up to the outside world, it has become increasingly clear not only that "birth planning," as it is called, is seriously advocated and supported by the government, but that it has begun to reap results. Exactly how successful the policy has been overall is impossible to say because there are no reliable nationwide population statistics. The last reasonably comprehensive census was conducted in 1953 (when a total mainland population of about 583 million was found), and estimates of vital rates since then are basically guesswork.1' Hence the estimates of total population in 1975 range from below 800 million to 962 million/ China specialist Leo Orleans has proposed a set of estimates and projections of China's population from 1954 to 1980, and his arguments in support of them are convincing. He suggests that the 1975 population was about 850 million, with a birth rate of 27 per thousand, a death rate of 12 per thousand, and a natural increase of 1.5 percent. These figures are slightly above those of the UN. China's efforts to curb population growth began in the 1950s following the release of the census results and a period of heated discussions of the pros and cons of birth control. An organized campaign implemented by the Ministry of Public Health was launched in 1957 but then was suspended in 1958 during the Great Leap Forward, an intensive effort at economic development. The period 1959-1961 was one of food shortage and economic crises, and, although established birth control clinics continued to Ibid.

rf Leo A. Orleans, China: Population in the People's Republic. This is an excellent source for historical background, although otherwise somewhat out of date. c Orleans, China's population figures: Can the contradictions be resolved? The lowest are based on casual statements by Chinese officials at the UN; the highest are from the World Population Estitnates of the Environmental Fund, which bases its estimates on the figures of John Aird, a demographer in the U.S. Department of Commerce Foreign Demographic Analysis Division.

POPULATION POLICIES / 771

function, there was no official encouragement for their use. While China was recovering from this crisis period, the government again began advocating "birth planning" to protect the health of mothers and children. An important part of this campaign was promotion of late marriage (23 to 25 for women, 25 to 28 for men) and the two-child family spaced by 3 to 5 years/ Both abortion and sterilization were legal from the start, but the middle 1960s were a period of active expansion of facilities (along with expansion of health care in general) and experimentation in improved techniques. It was men that the Chinese developed the vacuum technique for abortion, which has made the procedure much safer than before, and which has since been adopted around the world. Active research was also carried out on simplified sterilization procedures. It appears, for instance, that the Chinese may have been the first to do female sterilizations with very small incisions." China has all along manufactured all its own contraceptive devices and Pharmaceuticals, unlike other LDCs. The latest invention is the "paper pill," sheets of water-soluble paper impregnated with oral contraceptives, which are easy to transport, store, and distribute.* Each sheet contains a month's supply of "pills" in perforated squares that dissolve in the mouth when eaten. This development is expected to increase use of oral contraceptives considerably, especially in remote rural areas where the pills have been less accepted than in the cities. Virtually every method of birth control is being actively used in China: sterilization, abortion, the combined steroid pill and the progestin mini-pill, long-term injections, lUDs (the Chinese developed their own, a stainless steel ring), condoms, diaphragms, foams, and jellies. The various forms of birth control have long been available to the people in the major cities and their suburbs. During the 1960s, health care, including birth control services, was increasingly extended to more remote rural areas. As an indication of the success of the health care programs, the death rate for the entire country is estimated to have dropped from nearly 35 per Ti-Chao Chen, China's population program at the grass-roots level. 'Orleans, Family planning developments in China, 19601966: abstracts from medical journals. *Carl Djerassi, Fertility limitation through contraceptive steroids in the People's Republic of China.

1000 population in 1949 to about 17 per 1000 in 1970* and perhaps 13 in 1974.j Infant mortality, which fairly accurately reflects levels of both health care and nutrition, is thought to have been between 20 and 30 per 1000 births in 1974.k In some urban communes (which apparently do keep careful demographic statistics), the crude death rate is 5 or less, and an infant mortality rate of 8.8 per 1000 live births has been claimed for the city of Shanghai.' China's unique health care system, together with greatly improved distribution of the food supply, can claim credit for this remarkable change. At the time of the Revolution, a grossly inadequate corps of trained medical personnel existed, mainly concentrated in the large cities. While actively training thousands of doctors, paramedics, and nurses and establishing hospitals and health centers in smaller cities, the Chinese also promptly tackled sanitation and hygiene at the grass-roots level through educational campaigns. More recently, selected people have been given four to six months' basic medical training and assigned part-time to care for basic health needs in their production brigades. These individuals are called "native doctors" in the cities and "barefoot doctors" in the country. Their responsibilities include giving injections and innoculations, administering first aid and simple treatments for diseases, supervising sanitation measures, teaching hygiene in schools, and distributing contraceptive materials. For medical treatment beyond their competence (including abortions and sterilizations), the barefoot doctors refer patients to the nearest regional hospital. Barefoot doctors in turn are assisted by part-time volunteer health aides, usually housewives, whom they train themselves.'" It now appears that China is attempting to upgrade the quality of grass-roots health care by sending fully trained medical personnel from city hospitals on rotation to rural health centers, where, among other things, they provide additional training for local health workers. Some barefoot doctors have thereby become qualified to do abortions, IUD insertions, and steriliza'Orleans, China: Population in the People's Republic. 'Norman Myers, Of all things people are the most precious. "•Ibid. 'Joe Wray, How China is achieving the unbelievable. '"Pi-Chao Chen, China's population program at the grass-roots level; V. W. Sidel and R. Sidel, The delivery of medical care in China.

(Continued)

BOX 13-6 (Continued) tions, as well as other minor operations." Both child bearing and birth control are fully supported and helped in China, Paid maternity leave, time off for breast-feeding, free nursery care, and all needed medical attention are provided for mothers. Paid leave is also given for abortion, sterilization, and IUD insertions, and all birth control services are essentially free. While the means of birth control are provided through the health care system in China, primary responsibility for motivating couples to make use of them rests with the Revolutionary Committee (or governing council) of the production brigade or commune. Usually one member of the committee is the "responsible member" for birth planning.0 In rural areas, "women's cadres" — married women with children, who are known and respected by their neighbors—carry contraceptives and the pro-birth control message house to house." In some of the cities, low birth rates have been so enthusiastically adopted as a goal that neighborhoods collectively decide how many births will be allowed each year and award the privilege of having babies to "deserving couples."" Priority is given to newlyweds, then to couples with only one child who have waited the favored period of time for the second birth/ The result has been phenomenally low birth rates for these neighborhoods, ranging from 4 to 7 per 1000 population. The center city of Shanghai reportedly had a 1972 birth rate of 6.4, while that for the city plus suburbs was 10.8.s The 1972 birth rate for Peking was reported by Joe Wray to have been about 14 per 1000 population; Myers placed it at 18.8 for city and suburbs combined. Joe Wray has speculated that these low rates may have been helped by a relatively low proportion of women in their child-bearing years. Given the recent Chinese policy of sending urban young people to rural areas to work, this may be so, even though China's demographic history would indicate a relatively large and growing proportion of people in their teens and twenties for the country as a whole by 1975. Exiling young people "temporarily" to rural communes probably was done for political rea-

sons. Large numbers of urban youth are a potential source of insurgent trouble, especially if insufficient jobs are available. Scattering the young people in the countryside could effectively defuse that threat. Moreover, the relatively well-educated city youth could help spread the ideology of the central government to remote rural areas. But it appears that the policy may also have had demographic effects. Most of the city children are not happy down on the farm; consequently, they are reluctant to marry, settle, and raise families there. Nor are rural young people eager to marry the sophisticated city people with their strange ways.' The official Chinese position on birth planning—an ideal of late marriage and a small, well-spaced family of two children—appears to have been overwhelmingly accepted in cities and is rapidly gaining acceptance in rural areas, according to reports from foreign visitors." The prevailing attitude is that early marriage and having more than two children are prime examples of irresponsible behavior. Nevertheless, there is still resistance from older generations, especially mothers-in-law, who by tradition have long wielded considerable power within families and apparently still do. Besides official encouragement to limit families, there are other incentives built into the social and economic system as well. Emancipation of women and their incorporation as full working members of society was an early, important goal of the Revolution. It has apparently been realized to a great extent, especially among younger women, and undoubtedly exerts a powerful influence on childbearing. Pi-Chao Chen has pointed out disincentives to family limitation in the per capita grain allowance, which augments a family's supply when a child is added, and in the addition of another worker (preferably a boy who will remain in the family) to contribute to family income.1' But it has also been observed that, even though another worker may help increase a family's total income, that income must still be divided among all family members. Additional members reduce the share available per person."' Furthermore, since

"Chen, China's population program. "Wray, How China is achieving the unbelievable. "Han Suyin, The Chinese experiment. "Wray, Achieving the unbelievable; Han, Chinese experiment. Treedman and Berelson, The record of family planning programs. 8 Wray, Achieving the unbelievable; Myers, People are the most precious.

'Joseph Lelyveld, The great leap farmward. "Tameyoshi Katagiri, A report on the family planning program in the People's Republic of China; Sidel and Sidel, Medical care; Han, Chinese experiment; Myers, People are the most precious; Chen, China's population program; Wray, Achieving the unbelievable. ''Chen, China's population program. '"Sterling Wortman, Agriculture in China.

773

compulsory primary education is rapidly becoming the rule in China, children's productivity is inevitably deferred at least until the teenage years. While there is no question whatever about the Chinese leadership's position on birth planning, coercion does not appear to be a part of the program beyond the extensive use of peer pressure and the dissemination of propaganda on all levels. There were reports of curtailed maternal benefits, reduced grain rations, and discriminatory housing and employment assignments for parents of three or more children in some areas during the 1960s, but these measures seem to have been largely abandoned. Possibly they aroused more resentment than cooperation and were found to be less than beneficial to the children. By the mid-1970s, China's far-reaching population program evidently had been extended to the far corners of the nation—no mean trick in itself. What the results have been is impossible to assess with accuracy, but it is becoming increasingly clear that they are significant indeed. The remarkable vital rates prevailing in major cities have already been cited, but those of rural communes for which data exist, while higher than the cities', show significant reductions from pre-revolutionary levels (birth rate about 45, death rate 34 to 40, infant mortality above 200). * Reported birth rates for rural districts in the early 1970s range from as low as 14 in an area near Shanghai" to 20-24 in communes near Peking- and some others in more remote provinces.™ These areas generally report very low death rates also. Levels of contraceptive usage in urban and rural areas are compared in Figure 13-4. Certainly the communes visited by outsiders are among the most successful by Chinese standards, and so their birth and death rates should not be taken as representative of the entire country. But they may represent the leading edge of an established trend. That the policy has been so successful in many areas, especially where it is long established, indicates that similar success can be expected elsewhere in time. 'Orleans, China: Population in the People's Republic. "Katagiri, A report. 'Sidel and Sidel, Medical care. QS Chen, China's population program.

1. PERMANENTLY STERILIZED Tubal ligation Vasectomy 2. PRACTICING CONTRACEPTION Pill

3. NOT PRACTICING CONTRACEPTION

10

20

30

-0

COUPLES (%)

FIGURE 13-4

Contraceptive practices in an urban area (light grey) and in a rural area (dark grey) in China are compared; the urban sample is from the city of Hangchow, a provincial capital, and the rural sample is from a commune outside Peking. Sterilization is nearly three times commoner in the urban than in the rural sample, and substantially fewer rural males use contraceptives. The bias seems to be reflected in the difference between urban and rural birth rates: below 10 per 1000 in some urban areas and above 20 per 1000 in some rural ones. (From Sidel and Sidel, 1974.)

If available estimates of vital rates for all of China reflect reality, there has already been a substantial reduction in birth and death rates. Norman Myers of the FAO quotes birth rate estimates for large cities of between 10 and 19 per 1000 population, for medium-sized cities, 14 to 23, and for rural areas 20 to 35. He put the national 1974 birth rate at 29 and the death rate at 13, giving a natural increase of 1.6 percent per year. Comparison of these estimates with those of other Asian nations at similar levels of development is striking, to say the least. And no doubt other less developed countries—and perhaps some developed countries as well—can learn a great deal from the Chinese experience.66 M Chen, Lessons from the Chinese experience: China's planned birth program and its transferability.

780

customs are also subject to varying attitudes and mores. These conflicting attitudes allow societies to fine-tune their responses to external changes without having to change the basic ideological structure itself. Thus, when overpopulation threatens food supplies, for example, antinatalist behavior can be encouraged, and when epidemics or war have decimated a population, antinatalism can again be discouraged. Pronatalist attitudes are very strong in traditional societies because through most of humanity's evolutionary history they have been needed to maintain populations and to allow a moderate amount of growth when warranted. The sudden introduction of death control, Western morality, and access to communications and other resources, as Western technology impinged upon the .underdeveloped world in the wake of the colonial era and World War II, disrupted social perceptions of the consequences of high birth rates in those areas. The impact was characterized by "rapid and fluctuating changes in agricultural productivity, labor demand, urbanization, emigration, and military expansion, often coupled with introduced epidemic disease."83 Because most of these disturbed societies have adopted Western ideology, their traditional methods of controlling population have been abandoned and unfortunately replaced by less efficient and less desirable ones, mainly selfinduced abortion and disguised infanticide through neglect, abuse, and even starvation. Dickeman concludes that the world population can only be controlled when less developed societies are socially stabilized and integrated and the people can realistically assess their actual resource and ecological position. Then, she feels, the people will make reasonable family-size choices in accordance with that position. The Demographic Transition A great many social and economic factors have been associated in the past with declining fertility in various societies. Among them are the general level of education, the availability and quality of health care, the degree of urbanization, the social and economic status of women and the opportunities open to them for education and "Ibid.

employment outside the home, the provision of social security for old age, and the costs to families of raising and educating each child. The more extensive each of these factors is, the lower fertility generally will be. In addition, later marriage, lower tolerance for illegitimacy, low infant mortality, and extended breast-feeding all operate directly to reduce fertility. In most LDCs, levels of health care, education, and women's status remain low for the poor majority, while marriage comes early and infant mortality rates are high. Most family planning programs in the 1960s made little effort to influence any of these factors, as demographer Kingsley Davis pointed out in 1967.84 Those that tried to influence people at all confined themselves to emphasizing the economic and health advantages of small families to parents and their children. In the 1950s and 1960s, government officials, economic advisors, and many demographers believed that the process of economic development would automatically bring about the higher levels of education and urbanization in LDCs that have elsewhere been associated with declines in fertility, and thus would cause a "demographic transition" in LDCs. These people favored family planning because they thought it would facilitate the supposedly inevitable demographic transition, although they believed that no significant reduction in fertility could occur until the prerequisite (but unknown) degree of development had been reached. Numerous studies have established quite clearly that population growth is in itself a major barrier to economic development. Economist Goran Ohlin wrote in 1967: The simple and incontestable case against rapid population growth in poor countries is that it absorbs very large amounts of resources which may otherwise be used both for increased consumption and above all, for development . . . The stress and strain caused by rapid demographic growth in the developing world is actually so tangible that there are few, and least of all planners and economists of the countries, who doubt that per capita incomes would be increased faster if fertility and growth rates were lower . . . .85 "Population policy: will current programs succeed? See also Davis, Zero population growth: The Goal and the Means. ^Population control and economic development, p. 53.

The potential value of population control in aid programs to LDCs has also been studied intensively. The late economist Stephen Enke did much of the analysis, and his conclusions may be summarized in three points: (1) channeling economic resources into population control rather than into increasing production "could be 100 or so times more effective in raising per capita incomes in many LDCs"; (2) an effective birth control program might cost only 30 cents per capita per year, about 3 percent of current development programs; and (3) the use of bonuses to promote population control is "obvious in countries where the 'worth* of permanently preventing a birth is roughly twice the income per head."86 Enke's results were strongly supported by computer simulation work by systems analyst Douglas Daetz, who examined the effects of various kinds of aid in a labor-limited, nonmechanized agricultural society.87 His results brought into sharp question the desirability of aid programs not coupled with population control programs. They might provide temporary increases in the standard of living, but these would soon be eaten up by population expansion. In many circumstances, population growth and aid inputs may interact to cause the standard of living to decline below the pre-aid level. As a result of studies like Ohlin's, Enke's, and Daetz', family planning began to be incorporated into assistance programs for LDCs in the 1960s. But the purpose in most cases was only to reduce growth rates to more "manageable" levels by eliminating "unwanted births." This great faith of economists and demographers in the potential of industrial development to bring about a spontaneous demographic transition, which, aided by family planning, would reduce population growth and accelerate the development process, encouraged LDC governments to relax under the illusion that all their social and economic problems were being solved. Unfortunately, their faith was misplaced. Reliance on a demographic transition was misplaced for many reasons, not the least of which is uncertainty as to exactly what caused the original one in nineteenth""Birth control for economic development. *~ Energy utilization and aid effectiveness in non-mechanised agriculture: a computer simulation of a socioeconomic system. PhD. diss.. University of California, 1968.

century Europe.88 And, as was pointed out in Chapter 5, conditions in contemporary LDCs in many ways are markedly different from those in Europe and North America one to two centuries ago when fertility began to decline there. By the mid-1960s, although several LDCs had apparently reached quite advanced degrees of industrial development, there was little sign of a general decline in fertility. Birth rates dropped in some countries, but they remained high, or in a few cases even rose, in other, supposedly eligible countries. Because of this unexpected result, there has been some argument among demographers whether the theory of the demographic transition can even be applied to LDCs and whether there is good reason to hope that it will occur in most of them. An analysis of fertility trends in some Latin American countries (often cited as prime examples of nonconformity to demographic transition theory) by demographer Stephen Beaver indicates that a demographic transition has begun or is at least incipient in the countries he examined.89 But, he suggests, cultural and economic factors can cause time lags in the process. A considerably broader spectrum of factors may influence fertility than just reduced mortality (especially of infants), increasing urbanization, and industrialization, which are classically believed to be the primary causes of declining fertility. It is becoming increasingly clear that industrialization—the style of development undertaken by most developing countries—is not conducive to a demographic transition. This seems to be so because industry in most LDCs employs and benefits only a fraction of the population, creating a two-tiered society in which the majority are left untouched by modernization.90 Such unequal distribution of the benefits of modernization (access to adequate food, clothing, decent shelter, education, full-time employment, medical and health care, etc.) is most pronounced in rural areas, where some 70 percent of the population of LDCs live. ss Michael S. Teitelbaum, Relevance of demographic transition theory for developing countries; Alan Svreezy, Recent light on the relation between socioeconomic development and fertility decline. ^Demographic transition theory reinterpreted. '"James E. Kocher, Rural development; and James P. Grant, Development: the end of trickle down?

55

Ethiopia •-Afghanistan Sudan*

Algeria

Nigeria • "Kenya

• Iran . Morocco

• Iraq

• Tanzania Indonesia • • Nepal • Zaire

_. Uganda ~ Pakistan

• Colombia

Thailand •

cc

India Burma

Q_

•

Philippines •

• Bangladesh LU

North Korea

• Peru

South Vietnam •

South Africa

Turkey •

CC < LU

Venezuela

> Malaysia North Vietnam

03

• Mexico

• Brazil

Eg'ypt

35

I F

cc

CD

• China 30

Sri Lanka South Korea

25 • Taiwan

Argentina 20 75

100

150

250

400

600

1000

1500

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ($ PER CAPITA) FIGURE 13-5 There is an absence of any clear relation between the birth rate and the level of development (as measured by per-capital GNP) in the less developed countries with more than 10 million population. A decline in birth rates has occurred recently in a number of these nations. (From Demeny, 1974.)

Per capita Gross National Product is a statistic often used to measure the extent of "development" that has taken place in a given country; per-capita GNP, however, is an averaged figure that may conceal very large differences among income groups. And the correlation of degrees of development as measured by per-capita GNP with reduction in fertility is extremely mixed, to say the least (Figure 13-5). One explanation is that, in strongly two-tiered societies, birth control may be adopted by the affluent, educated minority, but not by the majority still living in poverty. The conclusion from this is that fertility will decline significantly only when the benefits of modernization are extended to all economic levels.

Economist Alan Sweezy has pointed out that, while this explanation may account for fertility declines in some instances, the expected declines have not occurred in some countries—notably in Latin America—even among the affluent and middle classes.90" He suggests that lingering strong traditions, including pro-natalist attitudes, may be a reason. In Latin America such traditions are supported by the Roman Catholic Church, which still officially opposes "artificial" methods of birth control and abortion. If a demographic transition should take place in ""'Economic development and fertility change.

POPULATION POLICIES

LDCs, a decline from present high fertility to replacement level alone would require considerable time, probably at least a generation. And time is running very short. If appropriate kinds of development and vigorous family planning programs had been initiated just after World War II, when death control and the ideas of economic assistance were first introduced in LDCs, the population problem might be of more manageable dimensions today. But plainly it would still be with us. Without such a history, even if the strongest feasible population control measures were everywhere in force today, the time lag before runaway population growth could be appreciably slowed, let alone arrested, would still be discouragingly long. For most LDCs it will be at least four generations before their populations cease to expand—unless catastrophe intervenes—because of the age composition of their populations. Even if replacement reproduction were attained by 2005, most LDC populations would at least double their 1970 populations, and some would increase 3.5-fold!*1 This built-in momentum virtually guarantees that, for many less developed countries, shortage of resources and the environmental and social effects of overpopulation will combine to prevent sufficient "development" to induce a demographic transition. Complacently counting on either a spontaneous demographic transition or on voluntary family planning programs—or even a combination—to reduce population growth and thereby ensure successful development would therefore be a serious mistake. The establishment of family planning programs may make it easier to improve social conditions in poor countries, but it is no substitute for appropriate development; and it is also clear that development alone cannot lead to a reduction of population growth on the needed scale.

POPULATION CONTROL: DIRECT MEASURES Before any really effective population control can be established, the political leaders, economists, national planners, and others who determine such policies must be convinced of its necessity. Most governments have 91 Thomas trejka, The future of population growth; alternative patlis to equilibrium.

/

been reluctant to try measures beyond traditional family planning that might be effective because they considered them too strong, too restrictive, and too much against traditional attitudes. They are also, reasonably enough, concerned about resistance from political opponents or the populace at large. In many countries such measures may never be considered until massive famines, political unrest, or ecological disasters make their initiation imperative. In such emergencies, whatever measures are economically and technologically expedient will be likeliest to be imposed, regardless of their political or social acceptability. A case in point was the sudden imposition in 1976 of compulsory sterilization in some Indian states and for government employees in Delhi, following two decades of discouraging results from voluntary family planning. People should long ago have begun exploring, developing, and discussing all possible means of population control. But they did not, and time has nearly run out. Policies that may seem totally unacceptable today to the majority of people at large or to their national leaders may be seen as very much the lesser of evils only a few years from now. The decade 1965-1975 witnessed a virtual revolution in attitudes toward curbing population growth among LDC leaders, if not necessarily among their people. Even family planning, easily justified on health and welfare grounds alone and economically feasible for even the poorest of countries, was widely considered totally unacceptable as a government policy as recently as 1960. Among objections to population control measures cited by demographer Bernard Berelson in 1969 were the need for improved contraceptive technology; lack of funds and trained personnel to carry out all proposed programs; doubt about effectiveness of some measures, leading to failure to implement them; and moral objections to some proposals such as abortion, sterilization, various social measures, and especially to any kind of compulsion.92 Most objections to population control policies, how92 See Berelson's Beyond family planning, for a conservative view of potential measures for population control. Since 1969, Berelson has found many formerly unacceptable measures to have become much more acceptable: for instance, An evaluation of the effects of population control programs; and Freedman and Berelson, The record of family planning programs, published in 1974 and 1975 respectively.

783

784

/ THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

ever, can be overcome or are likely to disappear with time and changing conditions; indeed man}' of them already have. Contraceptive technology has been improved in recent years (see Appendix 4). Promising methods of birth control that are not now technologically possible should also be developed, so that they can be made available.92" Further generous assistance from developed countries could remove remaining economic and lack of personnel barriers to population-control programs in LDCs. The effectiveness of a measure can only be evaluated after it has been tried. Moral acceptability is very likely to change as social and economic conditions change in most societies, as demonstrated by the reversal of abortion policies in many countries between 1967 and 1975. The struggle for economic development in the LDCs is producing considerable social upheaval, which will particularly affect such basic elements of society as family structure. Radical changes in family structure and relationships are inevitable, whether population control is instituted or not. Inaction, attended by a steady deterioration in living conditions for the poor majority, will bring changes everywhere that no one could consider beneficial. Thus, it is beside the point to object to population-control measures simply on the grounds that they might change the social structure or family relationships. Among proposed general approaches to population control are family planning, the use of socioeconomic pressures, and compulsory fertility control. Maximum freedom of choice is provided by traditional family planning; but family planning alone should not be regarded as "population control" when it includes no consideration of optimum population size for the society and makes no attempt to influence parental goals. The use of abortion and voluntary sterilization to supplement other forms of birth control can quite properly be included as part of family planning and made ""Unfortunately, this area is still being seriously neglected. It has been estimated that funds could fruitfully be tripled over 1974 levels to take advantage of existing knowledge and trained personnel in research on reproduction and development of new contraceptives. (M. A. Koblinsky, F. S. Jaffe, and R. O. Greep, Funding for reproductive research: The status and the needs.) See also Barbara J. Culliton, Birth control: Report argues new leads are neglected (Science, vol. 194, pp. 921 -922, November 26, 1976) for a discussion of a forthcoming Ford Foundation Report, Reproduction and human welfare.

available at costs everyone can afford. This, of course, has been done in a few countries with considerable apparent success (Table 13-4). Moreover, there is still a good deal of room for expansion of family planning services in LDCs, where they are not yet available to more than a fraction of most populations. Family planning programs not only provide the means of contraception, but, through their activities and educational campaigns, they spread the idea of birth control among the people. These programs should be expanded and supported throughout the world as rapidly and asfully as possible, but other measures should lie instituted immediately as well. Given the family size aspirations of people everywhere, additional measures beyond family planning will unquestionably be required in order to halt the population explosion—quite possibly in many DCs as well as LDCs. Socioeconomic Measures Population control through the use of socioeconomic pressures to encourage or discourage reproduction is the approach advocated by, among others, demographer Kingsley Davis, who originated many of the following suggestions.93 The objective of this approach would be to influence the attitudes and motivations of individual couples. An important aspect would be a large-scale educational program through schools and communications media to persuade people of the advantages of small families to themselves and to their society. Information on birth control, of course, must accompany such educational efforts. This is one of the first measures that can be adopted, and it has been increasingly employed in many of the more active family planning programs in LDCs. It has also been used in some DCs, notably the U.S. and England, mainly, but not entirely, by private groups such as Planned Parenthood and ZPG. As United States taxpayers know, income tax laws have long implicitly encouraged marriage and childbearing, although recent changes have reduced the effect somewhat. Such a pronatalist bias of course is no longer appropriate. In countries that are affluent enough for the majority of citizens to pay taxes, tax laws could be adjusted to favor (instead of penalize) single people, ''Davis, Population policy.

POPULATION POLICIES / 785

working wives, and small families. Other tax measures might also include high marriage fees, taxes on luxury baby goods and toys, and removal of family allowances where they exist. Other possibilities include the limitation of maternal or educational benefits to two children per family. These proposals, however, have the potential disadvantage of heavily penalizing children (and in the long run society as well). The same criticism may be made of some other tax plans, unless they can be carefully adjusted to avoid denying at least minimum care for poor families, regardless of the number of children they may have. A somewhat different approach might be to provide incentives for late marriage and childlessness, such as paying bonuses to first-time brides who are over 25, to couples after five childless years, or to men who accept vasectomies after their wives have had a given number of children.94 Lotteries open only to childless adults have also been proposed. The savings in environmental deterioration, education, and other costs would probably justify the expenditure. All of these measures, of course, suffer the drawback of influencing the poor to a greater degree than the rich. That would be unfortunate, since the addition of a child to an affluent family (which has a disproportionate impact on resources and environment) is in many ways more harmful to society than the addition of a child to a poor family. Adoption to supplement small families for couples who especially enjoy children can be encouraged through subsidies and simplified procedures. It can also be a way to satisfy couples who have a definite desire for a son or daughter; further research on sex determination should be pursued for the same reason. A special kind of social-security pension or bond could be provided for aging adults who have few or no children to support them in their old age. The latter idea, proposed in detail by economist Ronald Ridker, has been tried with some success on tea estates in southern India.95 As implemented, the plan made monthly deposits in a pension fund for each female worker enrolled in the plan as long as she spaced her

children at least three years apart and had no more than three. If more children were born, the payments were reduced. Since managers of the tea estates were already paying maternity and health benefits, the costs of the pension fund were at least partially offset by savings from those. A large majority of the women signed up for the program, and within the first four years there were substantial drops not only in fertility, but in infant mortality and in worker absenteeism.96 The first pilot project included only about 700 women; it remains to be seen whether implementation of the pension plan on other tea estates and in other situations in India will be equally successful. There are many possibilities in the sphere of family structure, sexual mores, and the status of women that can be explored.97 With some exceptions, women have traditionally been allowed to fulfill only the roles of wife and mother. Although this has changed in most DCs in recent decades, it is still the prevailing situation in most LDCs, particularly among the poor and uneducated. Anything that can be done to diminish the emphasis upon these traditional roles and provide women with equal opportunities in education, employment, and other areas is likely to reduce the birth rate. Measures that postpone marriage and then delay the first child's birth also help to encourage a reduction in birth rates. The later that marriage and the first child occur, the more time the woman will have to develop other interests. One of the most important potential measures for delaying marriage, and directly influencing childbearing goals as well, is educating and providing employment for women. Women can be encouraged to develop interests outside the family other than employment, and social life could be centered around diese outside interests or the couple's work, rather than exclusively within the neighborhood and family. Adequate care for pre-school children should be provided at low cost (which, moreover, could provide an important new source of employment). Provision of child care seems more likely to encourage employment outside the home, with concomitant low reproduction, than to encourage reproduction. Women represent a

M A study has been made o; :he economic feasibility of such a policy for the United States by Larry D. Barnett (Population policy: payments for fertility limitation in the U.S.). "Synopsis of a proposal for a family planning bond; and Saving accounts for family planning, an illustration from the tea estates of India.

"V. I. Chacko, Family planners earn retirement bonus on plantations in India. 97 Judith Blake. Demographic science and the redirection of population policy; Reproductive motivation; Alice Taylor Day, Population control and personal freedom: are they compatible?

786

/ THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

large, relatively untapped pool of intellectual and technical talent; tapping that pool effectively could help reduce population growth and also would provide many other direct benefits to any society. Social pressures on both men and women to marry and. have children must be removed. As former Secretary of __ Tptprjnr Stewart Udall observed, "All lives are not. enhanced by marital union; parenthood is not necessarily a fulfillment for every married couple."98 If society were convinced of the need for low birth rates, no doubt the stigma that has customarily been assigned to bachelors, spinsters, and childless couples would soon disappear. But alternative lifestyles should be open to single people, and perhaps the institution of an informal, easily dissolved "marriage" for the childless is one possibility. Indeed, many DC societies now seem to be evolving in this direction as women's liberation gains momentum." It is possible that fully developed societies may produce such arrangements naturally, and their association with lower fertility is becoming increasingly clear. In LDCs a childless or single lifestyle might be encouraged deliberately as the status of women approaches parity with that of men. Although free and easy association of the sexes might be tolerated in such a society, responsible parenthood ought to be encouraged and illegitimate childbearing could be strongly discouraged. One way to carry out this disapproval might be to insist that all illegitimate babies be put up for adoption—especially those born to minors, who generally are not capable of caring properly for a child alone.100 If a single mother really wished to keep her baby, she might be obliged to go through adoption proceedings and demonstrate her ability to support and care for it. Adoption proceedings probably should remain more difficult for single people than for married couples, in recognition of the relative difficulty of raising children alone. It would even be possible to require 9S 7976: Agenda for tomorrow. "Judith Blake, The changing status of women in developed countries; E. Peck and J. Senderowitz (eds.), Pronatalism, the myth ofnioni and apple pie; Ellen Peck, The baby trap. 100 The tragedy of teenage single mothers in the U.S. is described by Leslie Aldridge Westoff in Kids with kids. The adverse health and social effects of teenage child-bearing in an affluent society have recently betn documented by several studies. One good sample can be found in a special issue of Family planning perspectives, Teenagers. USA.

pregnant single women to marry or have abortions, perhaps as an alternative to placement for adoption, depending on the society. Somewhat more repressive measures for discouraging large families have also been proposed, such as assigning public housing without regard for family size and removing dependency allowances from student grants or military pay. Some of these have been implemented in crowded Singapore, whose population program has been counted as one of the most successful. All socioeconomic measures are derived from knowledge of social conditions that have been associated with low birth rates in the past. The more repressive suggestions are based on observations that people have voluntarily controlled their reproduction most stringently during periods of great social and economic stress and insecurity, such as the Depression of the 1930s.101 In a sense, all such proposals are shots in the dark. Not enough is known about fertility motivation to predict the effectiveness of such policies. Studies by demographer Judith Blake102 and by economist Alan Sweezy103 for instance, have cast serious doubt on the belief that economic considerations are of the greatest importance in determining fertility trends. Sweezy has shown that the decline of fertility in the 1930s in the United States was merely a continuation of an earlier trend. If their views are correct, then severely repressive economic measures might prove to be both ineffective and unnecessary as a vehicle for population control, as vrell as socially undesirable. At the very least, they should be considered only if milder measures fail completely. Involuntary Fertility Control The third approach to population limitation is that of involuntary fertility control. Several coercive proposals deserve discussion, mainly because some countries may ultimately have to resort to them unless current trends in birth rates are rapidly reversed by other means.104 Some 101 Richard A. Easterlm, Population, labor force, and long swings in economic growth. Further discussion of Easterlies ideas can be found in Deborah Freedman. ed., Fertility, aspirations and resources: A symposium on the Easterlin hypothesis. 102 Are babies consumer durables? and Reproductive motivation. ""The economic explanation of fertility changes in the U.S. io4 Edgar R. Chasteen, The case for compulsory birth control.

POPULATION POLICIES / 787

involuntary measures could be less repressive or discriminatory, in fact, than some of the socioeconomic measures suggested. In the 1960s it was proposed to vasectomize all fathers of three or more children in India. The proposal was defeated then not only on moral grounds but on practical ones as well; there simply were not enough medical personnel available even to start on the eligible candidates, let alone to deal with the new recruits added each day! Massive assistance from the developed world in the form of medical and paramedical personnel and/or a training program for local people nevertheless might have put the policy within the realm of possibility. India in the mid-1970s not only entertained the idea of compulsory sterilization, but moved toward implementing it, perhaps fearing that famine, war, or disease might otherwise take the problem out of its hands. This decision was greeted with dismay abroad, but Indira Gandhi's government felt it had little other choice. There is too little time left to experiment further with educational programs and hope that social change will generate a spontaneous fertility decline, and most of the Indian population is too poor for direct economic pressures (especially penalties) to be effective. A program of sterilizing women after their second or third child, despite the relatively greater difficulty of the operation than vasectomy, might be easier to implement than trying to sterilize men. This of course would be feasible only in countries where the majority of births are medically assisted. Unfortunately, such a program therefore is not practical for most less developed countries (although in China mothers of three children are commonly "expected" to undergo sterilization). The development of a long-term sterilizing capsule that could be implanted under the skin and removed when pregnancy is desired opens additional possibilities for coercive fertility control. The capsule could be implanted at puberty and might be removable, with official permission, for a limited number of births. No capsule that would last that long (30 years or more) has yet been developed, but it is technically within the realm of possibility. Various approaches to administering such a system have been offeredj including one by economist Kenneth

Boulding.105 His proposal was to issue to each woman at maturity a marketable license that would entitle her to a given number of children—say, 2.2 in order to have an NRR = 1. Under such a system the number could be two if the society desired to reduce the population size slowly. To maintain a steady size, some couples might be allowed to have a third child if they purchased "decichild" units from the government or from other women who had decided not to have their full allotments of children or who found they had a greater need for the money. Others have elaborated on Boulding's idea, discussing possible ways of regulating the license scheme and alternative ways of alloting the third children.106 One such idea is that permission to have a third child might be granted to a limited number of couples by lottery. This system would allow governments to regulate more or less exactly the number of births over a given period of time. Social scientist David Heer has compared the social effects of marketable license schemes with some of the more repressive economic incentives that have been proposed and with straightforward quota systems.107 His conclusions are shown in Table 13-5. Of course, a government might require only implantation of the contraceptive capsule, leaving its removal to the individual's discretion but requiring reimplantation after childbirth^ Since having a child would require positive action (removal of the capsule), many more births would be prevented than in the reverse situation. Certainly unwanted births and the problem of abortion would both be entirely avoided. The disadvantages (apart from the obvious moral objections) include the questionable desirability of keeping the entire female population on a continuous steroid dosage with the contingent health risks, and the logistics of implanting capsules in 50 percent of the population between the ages of 15 and 50. Adding a sterilant to drinking water or staple foods is a suggestion that seems to horrify people more than most proposals for involuntary fertility control. Indeed, this lG5

The meaning ofiht 20th csnmrv, pp. 135—136. Bruce M. Russect. Licensing: for cars and babies; David M. Heer, Marketing licenses for babies; Boulding's proposal revisited. '"Ibid. 106

J

TABLE

13-5

Evaluation of Some Relatively Coercive Measures for Fertility Reduction Effect

Restriction on individual liberty Effect on quality of children's financial support Effecti%7eness and acceptability of enforcement mechanisms

Effectiveness for precise regulation of the birth rate

Marketable license systems Financialjucentiaie^ystems Quota systems CBqby licenses'} /monthly subsidy\ / Monthly tax*\ .^ that may be sold One-time tax \ to persons X on persons \ f Identical quota or lent at interest \ uith no more than Jl with more than 1 1 for excess babies J Boulding proposal for all couples two / to the government \^ two children ^X N ^ f r o o children^/ \^^ over for baby licenses j ^^*^~~ , Very severe Moderately severe Moderately severe Moderately severe Moderately severe Moderately severe Probably beneficial

Probably beneficial

Unknown

Unknown

Probably beneficial

Slightly beneficial

Effective enforcement at possible price of depriving some children of a family environment Moderate

Effective enforcement at possible price of depriving some children of a family environment High

Fairly effective enforcement

Fairly effective enforcement

Effective enforcement at possible price of depriving some children of a family environment

Low

Low

Low

Effective enforcement at possible price of depriving some children of a family environment Moderate

Source: Adapted from David Heer, Marketing licenses.

would pose some very difficult political, legal, and social questions, to say nothing of the technical problems. No such sterilant exists today, nor does one appear to be under development. To be acceptable, such a substance would have to meet some rather stiff requirements: it must be uniformly effective, despite widely varying doses received by individuals, and despite varying degrees of fertility and sensitivity among individuals; it must be free of dangerous or unpleasant side effects; and it must have no effect on members of the opposite sex, children, old people, pets, or livestock. Physiologist Melvin Ketchel, of the Tufts University School of Medicine, suggested that a sterilant could be developed that would have a very specific action—for example, preventing implantation of the fertilized ovum.108 He proposed that it be used to reduce fertility levels by adjustable amounts, anywhere from 5 to 75 percent, rather than to sterilize the whole population completely. In this way, fertility could be adjusted from time to time to meet a society's changing needs, and there would be no need to provide an antidote. Contraceptives would still be needed for couples who were highly ""Fertility control agents as a possible solution to the world population problem, pp. 687-703.

motivated to have small families. Subfertile and functionally sterile couples who strongly desired children would be medically assisted, as they are now, or encouraged to adopt. Again, there is no sign of such an agent on the horizon. And the risk of serious, unforeseen side effects would, in our opinion, militate against the use of any such agent, even though this plan has the advantage of avoiding the need for socioeconomic pressures that might tend to discriminate against particular groups or penalize children. Most of the population control measures beyond family planning discussed above have never been tried. Some are as yet technically impossible and others are and probably will remain unacceptable to most societies (although, of course, the potential effectiveness of those least acceptable measures may be great). Compulsory control of family size is an unpalatable idea, but the alternatives may be much more horrifying. As those alternatives become clearer to an increasing number of people in the 1980s, they may begin demanding such control. A far better choice, in our view, is to expand the use of milder methods of influencing family size preferences, while redoubling efforts to ensure that the means of birth control, including abortion and

POPULATION POLICIES / 789

sterilization, are accessible to every human being on Earth within the shortest possible time. If effective action is taken promptly against population growth, perhaps the need for the more extreme involuntary or repressive measures can be averted in most countries. POPULATION CONTROL AND DEVELOPMENT Population control cannot be achieved in a social or economic vacuum, of course. To formulate effective population control measures, much greater understanding is needed about all peoples' attitudes toward reproduction, and how these attitudes are affected by various living conditions, including some that seem virtually intolerable to people in developed countries. Even more, it is essential to know what influences and conditions will lead to changes in attitudes in favor of smaller families. The economists and demographers who believed that urbanization and industrialization of LDCs would automatically induce a demographic transition in those societies seem to have been disastrously wrong. While they waited for the birth rate to fall, one billion people were added to the human population. At the very least, it is obvious that the causes of demographic transitions are far more complex than was once believed. But the social scientists may have been wrong mainly in their approach. Many aspects of modernization may indeed have important influences on reproductive behavior. Such influences, of course, fall outside the purview of population programs; they are an integral part of development as it affects—or fails to affect—each member of a society. When development is the kind that improves the living conditions of everyone down to the poorest farm worker, development that starts at the grass roots level, then there is hope that poverty, hunger, disease, and hopelessness might be reduced—and along with them the desire for many children.109 The general problems of LDC development are discussed in detail in Chapter 15, but its indirect effects on fertility are worth mentioning here. While no one factor of development can be singled out as ever having ""William Rich, Smaller families through social and economic progress; Kocher, Rural development; Grant, Development.

"triggered" a decline in fertility—no particular level of infant mortality or per-capita GNP, for instance—a constellation of factors does often seem to be associated with such declines. Among these are rural development and land reform favoring small, family-owned farms; availability of adequate food, basic health care, and education (especially of women) to the entire population; industries favoring labor-intensive, rather than capitalintensive, means of production; and a relatively small income gap between the richest and poorest segments of the population.110 Table 13-6 compares some of these interrelated factors in nine less developed nations, four of which have shown significant drops in fertility since 1960 and five of which have not. While each of the nine countries, like nearly all LDCs, exhibits some of the salient factors listed above, those with substantially reduced fertility much more commonly manifest them. Understanding of the important influences on reproductive behavior and how they operate is so far sketchy at best. Achieving a solid base for population policy may be one of the most important— and perhaps most difficult—research assignments for the next decade. Since the goals of both development and population control are supposedly identical—an improvement in the well-being of all human beings in this and future generations—it seems only reasonable to plan each to reinforce the other. Emphasis accordingly should be placed on policies that would further the goals of both family limitation and development—for example, rural development and land tenure reform; increased agricultural output; universal primary education for children; old-age support schemes; and improved health care and nutrition, especially for mothers and children. Survival of human society nevertheless seems likely to require the imposition of direct population control measures beyond family planning in most LDCs. There is no guarantee that processes of modernization can quickly enough induce the necessary changes in attitudes that might bring growth to a halt. High priority should be given to stimulating those attitude changes and counteracting the effects of pronatalist traditions. "°Ibid. See also Freedman and Bcrclson, The record of family planning programs.

POPULATION POLICIES / 791

But while some people seek the best means of achieving population control, in other quarters the debate continues as to whether it is necessary—or even desirable.

Population Politics / am not sure that the dictatorship of the proletariat, especially if led by an elite, will solve the problem of social justice; I am certain starvation will not solve the problem of overpopulation. -Tom O'Brien, Marrying Malthas and Marx

Family planning programs have spread throughout the less developed world and are now established in the majority of less developed countries. Many countries, especially those with long-established programs that have been frustrated by lack of success in reducing birth rates simply through making means of birth control available, have progressed to measures beyond family planning. As could be expected, this has aroused opposition, informed and uninformed, from many quarters. Some groups see threats to their personal liberties; even more commonly, people see threats to their economic or political interests. In addition, there are many proponents of population control who strongly disagree on the most appropriate approach.'n By 1974, when the United Nations World Population Conference took place in Bucharest, the chorus of clashing viewpoints was almost deafening."2 Most press reports and coverage of the Conference by special groups conveyed an impression of enormous confusion and prevailing disagreement,113 1

' 'National Academy of Sciences, In search of population policy. "2J. Mayone Stycos, Demographic chic at the UN. "3The list of accounts is very long, even leaving out a plethora of anticipatory books and articles. Here is a partial one: Anthony Astrachan, People are the most precious; Donald Gould, Population polarized; P. T. Piotrow, World plan of action and health strategy approved at population conferences; Conrad Taeuber, Policies on population around the world; Brian Johnson, The recycling of Count Malthus; M. Carder and B. Park, Bombast in Bucharest; D. B. Brooks and L. Douglas, Population, resources, environment: the view from the UN; W. P. Mauldin, et al., A report on Bucharest; Marcus P. Franda, Reactions to America at Bucharest; Concerned Demography, Emerging population alternatives; International Planned Parenthood Federation, (IPPF) People, special issue, vol. 1, no. 3,1974; in addition, Ifff published a daily newspaper called Planet during the conference.

despite the ultimate ratification of a World Population Plan of Action and 21 resolutions.114 A very useful summary of all the various views of the population problem and how (or whether) to deal with it has been compiled by demographer Michael S. Teitelbaum.''' Because it is the best listing we have seen, we are borrowing Teitelbaum's outline for the framework of the following discussion.115

Positions Against Special Population Programs and Policies Pronatalist. This viewpoint favors rapid population growth to boost economic growth and an expanding labor supply, as well as to increase opportunities for economies of scale in small countries. Pronatalists believe there is strength in numbers (both political and military) and are more concerned about competition with rapidly growing neighboring countries or among segments of their own populations than about the disadvantages of rapid growth. This group now seems to be a diminishing minority. Revolutionist. Revolutionaries oppose population programs because they may alleviate the social and political injustices that might otherwise lead to the revolution they seek. This view is particularly common in Latin America.1'7 (Conversely, many politicians support family planning in the hope that it will dampen the revolutionary fires.) Anti-colonial and genocide positions. This group is very suspicious of the motives of Western population control advocates. Some believe that effective population programs would retard development and maintain LDCs in economic subservience to DCs. Others see population '"UnitedNarions, Report ofthe UN World Population Conference, 1974. "'Population and development: is a consensus possible? 11 'Bernard Berelson has also described the conflicting views on population in the Population Council Annual Report 1973, pp. 19—27, and The great debate on population policy. The latter was written as a dialog among three 'Voices," representing the family planning advocates, those who see "development" as the important issue, and academic critics of the family planning approach to population control. The dialog is informative, often witty, but unfortunately leaves the reader with an impression of much greater consensus than probably exists among the viewpoints. "7J. Mayone Stycos, Family planning: reform and revolution.

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/ THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

programs as an effort by DCs to "buy development cheaply." The most extreme position is taken by those who regard population control as a racist or genocidal plot against nonwhite citizens of LDCs. Holders of this position blame resource shortage and environmental problems exclusively on the greediness of rich countries. To the extent that high fertility in LDCs is a problem, they emphasize that it is due to their poverty, which in turn is caused by overconsumption in DCs.118 Accommodationist. This viewpoint is basically anti-Malthusian: because history shows that Earth is capable of supporting far more people than Malthus thought, he was wrong; these people believe that further improvements in agriculture and technology will permit accommodation of a much larger population than today's. To them what is called overpopulation is really underemployment; restructuring the economic system will allow societies to provide jobs and meet the basic needs of everyone, no matter how many. The slogan adopted by the New Internationalist for the Population Conference—"Look after the people and population will look after itself—epitomizes this position.119

Barry Commoner121 subscribes to it, but he quotes a formula devised by AID. Whether the relationship is as clear as is commonly believed has been called into question by Alan Sweezy, among others.122 The other side of this coin is social security-the need for children, especially sons, to support parents in old Status and roles of women. Social pressures defining the role of women as wives and mothers, with status attached primarily to that role, are a major cause of high fertility, according to this view. Large families are likely to prevail until alternative roles are made available to all women.124 The religious doctrinal position. There are two distinct, but not necessarily mutually exclusive views here. One is essentially fatalistic: "Be fruitful and multiply, God will provide." This view is common among both Western and Eastern religions. The other (mainly the Roman Catholic Church) sees population growth as a problem, but regards most forms of birth control as more or less immoral.125

Mortality and social security. This view concentrates on the significance of infant and child mortality in motivating reproductive behavior; if infant mortality were reduced, fertility would automatically decline. This view is also held in varying degrees by many propopulation control advocates as well as those against it.

Medical risk. People holding this view are more impressed by the risks that attend the use of contraceptives such as the pill and the IUD, and surgical procedures such as abortion and sterilization than by the risks run by not using them. (The risk of death from childbearing alone is considerably higher, especially among the poor in LDCs, than any of these, and both maternal and infant mortality are known to be reduced substantially by the use of birth control for birth spacing.)126 A milder version of this view is held by large segments of the medical profession who oppose the distribution of the pill without prescription and the insertion of ITJDs by paramedical personnel, despite the established safety of both procedures compared to the consequences of not using them.127

"8This perspective has been put forth by Barry Commoner, How poverty breeds overpopulation (and not the other way around); and Pierre Pradervand, The Malthusian man. Pradervand and Commoner, among others, also oppose present population programs on anticolonialist grounds. 119 Peter Adamson, A population policy and a development policy are one and the same thing. l20 Maaza Bekele, False prophets of doom. This article expresses this and the above three viewpoints dearly.

12 'Commoner, How poverty breeds overpopulation. '"Recent light. '"Mamdani, Myth of population control. '24Blake, Reproductive motivation; Day, Population control and personal freedom; Ceres, Women: a long-silent majority. 125 Pope Paul VI, Humanae Viiae. 126 A. Omran, Health benefits; Buchanan, Effects of childbearing; Eckholm and Newland, Health. '27Mauldin, Family planning programs and fertility declines.

The problem-is-population-distribution. Some people holding this view simplistically compare population densities of different regions without regard to available resources and means of support. They also focus on the serious problem of urban migration in LDCs and conclude that policies should concentrate on population redistribution rather than on birth control.120

POPULATION POLICIES /

Holistic development. Holders of this view are "demographic transition" believers who are convinced that social and economic development are responsible for whatever declines in fertility have occurred in LDCs, not family planning programs, which they consider a waste of effort and funds that should be put into development.128 Social justice. This position emphasizes redistribution of wealth within and among nations to improve the condition of the poor.129 It is related to the idea of grassroots development, but is somewhat more extreme in that many of its proponents feel that redistribution of wealth is the only policy that will reduce population growth and solve other problems as well.

Positions Supporting the Need for Population Programs and Policies Population hawks. Teitelbaum sums up this position as follows: . . . Unrestrained population growth is the principal cause of poverty, malnutrition, and environmental disruption, and other social problems. Indeed we are faced with impending catastrophe on food and environmental fronts.130 . . . Such a desperate situation necessitates draconian action to restrain population growth, even if coercion ' 28Bekele, False prophets; Commoner, How poverty breeds overpopulation. A more sophisticated form is Adamson's (A population policy)—at least he advocates development at the grass-roots level (see Social Justice section). 129 Pradervand, Malthusian man; some writers for Concerned Demography. 130 We, along with some colleagues, are considered among the principal proponents of this position (see especially P. Ehrlich, The population bomb, which is the most commonly cited source). Like most of the statements in this summary, this one is both exaggerated and oversimplified. We would not, for example, blame poverty or malnutrition principally on overpopulation, although it certainly contributes to their perpetuation. Likewise, population growth is one of three interacting causes of environmental deterioration; the others are misused technology and increasing affluence (see Chapter 12). As an aside, it is interesting that the first edition of the Population bomb, written almost a decade before this book, is still often cited both as if it reflected the situation in the mid-1970s and as if we still held precisely the same views today as we did then.

is required. "Mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon."131 . . . Population programs are fine as far as they go, but they are wholly insufficient in scope and strength to meet the desperate situation.132 Provision of services. This viewpoint holds that family planning programs are essential for reducing birth rates and that there is still a great unmet demand for birth control in LDCs; what is needed is to expand family planning services to meet the demand.133 Part of the failure of family planning is due to provision of inadequate contraceptive technologies.134 This position is held most strongly by administrators and associates of family planning programs and their donor agencies. Human rights. This position, held by virtually everyone who is in favor of family planning or other population control policies, derives from the idea that there is a fundamental human right for each person responsibly to determine the size of his or her family.135 Another right that has been recognized in many countries including the United States'36 is that of women to control their bodies. This is especially relevant to the issue of abortion, but applies also to contraception and sterilization. Family planning also contributes to health, especially of women and children; and one more human right is that to health care. Population programs plus development. Here again we quote Teitelbaum, who expressed it well: . . . Social and economic development are necessary but not sufficient to bring about a new equilibrium of population at low mortality and fertility levels. Special population programs are also required.137 J

'' Garrett Hardin, The tragedy of the commons. "Davis, Population policy; P. R. Ehrlich and A. H. Ehrlich, Population resources environment, W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1970 and 1972, chapter 10. '"Stj'cos. Demographic chic; Berelson, Effects of Population Control Programs. m Mauldin, Family planning programs and fertility declines. 115 UN Declaration on Population, Tehran, 1968, printed in Studies in Family Planning, no. 16, January 1967 and no. 26, January 1968. Teitelbaum omitted the important word "responsibly" in his discussion. 136 Supreme Court decision on abortion, 1973. 137 Advocates of this include Rich. Smaller families; James E. Kocher, Rural development; Grant, Development; and Lester R. Brown, In the human interest. 1

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While we are usually classified by others as "population hawks," we agree more closely with this position in terms of what should be done. What follows, however, is far too mild a statement on the urgency of ending population growth; Teitelbaum discusses only the social aspects and completely leaves out environmental and resource constraints on population growth: Too rapid population growth is a serious intensifier of other social and economic problems, and is one, though only one, of a number of factors behind lagging social and economic progress in many countries. Some countries might benefit from larger populations, but would be better served by moderate rates of growth over a long period than by very rapid rates of growth over a shorter period. An effective population program therefore is an essential component of any sensible development program. This general position (including the portion just quoted) is widely held by social scientists, politicians, economists, and quite likely by Teitelbaum himself. Like the blind men with the elephant, each viewpoint grasps a piece of the truth, but none encompasses all of it. As should be evident, the above positions are by no means mutually exclusive, and probably none is held monolithically by anyone. Rather, most people argue from several related positions at once. Some apparently violent disagreements, when analyzed, turn out to be only a matter of emphasis or of leaving something out of the picture. Teitelbaum, Berelson, and others see the germ of a consensus emerging from the debate. If so, and if the consensus produces an effective approach to the population problem that all can more or less agree on, the controversy will have been worthwhile. But to the extent that population policies are connected to the larger confrontation between the rich developed world and the poor less developed world (with waters frequently muddied by China and the Soviet Union who say one thing about population control and practice another), consensus may prove to be elusive. Even more important, LDCs are unlikely to take very seriously population goals and policies recommended by DCs that do not impose such goals and policies upon their own people.

World Population Plan of Action In view of the diversity of opinions held by various individuals and groups on population control, it is not surprising that the United Nations' World Population Plan of Action turned out to be a bulky, nearly unreadable document some 50 pages long.158 Summing it up is almost impossible; the 20 resolutions and numerous recommendations covered virtually every subject that might affect or be affected by population growth. In the initial statement of "Principles and Objectives," the Plan declared: The principal aim of social, economic and cultural development, of which population goals and policies are integral parts, is to improve levels of living and the quality of life of the people. Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. . . . It then proceeded to affirm the rights of nations to formulate their own population policies, of couples and individuals to plan their families, and of women to participate fully in the development process. It condemned racial and ethnic discrimination, colonialism, foreign domination, and war. And it also expressed concern for preserving environmental quality, for maintaining supplies and distribution of resources, and for increasing food production to meet growing needs. More specifically with regard to population policies, the following recommendations were made:139 • Governments should develop national policies on population growth and distribution, and should incorporate demographic factors into their development planning. • Developed countries should also develop policies on population, investment, and consumption with an eye to increasing international equity. • Nations should strive for low rather than high birth and death rates. • Reducing death rates should be a priority goal, aiming for an average life expectancy in all 1 "United Nations, Report of the UN World Population Conference, 1974. 1 "Adapted from a summary by Piotrow, World Plan of Action.

POPULATION POLICIES / 795

countries of 62 by 1985 and 74 by 2000, and an infant mortality rate below 120 by 2000. All nations should ensure the rights of parents "to determine in a free, informed and responsible manner the number and spacing of their children," and provide the information and means for doing so. Family planning programs should be coordinated with health and other social services, and the poor in rural and urban areas should receive special attention. Efforts should be made to reduce LDC birth rates from an average of 38 in 1974 to 30 per 1000 by 1985. Nations are encouraged to set their own birth rate goals for 1985 and to implement policies to reach them. Nations should make special efforts to assist families as the basic social unit. Equality of opportunity for women in education, employment and social and political spheres should be ensured. Undesired migration, especially to cities, should be discouraged, principally by concentrating development in rural areas and small towns, but without restricting people's rights to move within their nation. International agreements are needed to protect rights and welfare of migrant workers between countries and to decrease the "brain drain." Demographic information should be collected, including censuses, in all countries. More research is needed on the relation of population to various institutions and to social and economic trends and policies; on improving health; on better contraceptive technologies; on the relation of health, nutrition, and reproduction; and on ways to improve delivery of social services (including family planning). Education programs in population should be strengthened. Population assistance from international, governmental, and private agencies should be increased. The Plan of Action should be coordinated with

the UN's Second Development Decade strategy, reviewed every five years, and appropriately modified. Unfortunately, a sense of urgency about reducing population growth, which had been present in the draft Plan, was lost in the final version under the pressure of political disagreement. The environmental and resource constraints on population growth were essentially left out of conference discussions and hence omitted from the Plan of Action.140 Also, the value of family planning programs tended to be downgraded in favor of an overwhelming emphasis on "development" as the way to reduce birth rates. The conference may not have blazed any radically new trails in its recommendations, but it still cannot be accused of taking a strictly narrow view of the population problem. Its neglect of environmental and resource aspects and the political problems that will accrue to those limitations is deplorable, but social and economic aspects were fully explored. Probably the conference's greatest value was to expose participants (many of whom did hold narrow views or were uninformed about some of the issues) to the information and viewpoints of others. And the mere existence of a world conference helped draw world attention to the population issue and emphasized that nations have a responsibility to manage their populations. Before the conference most national governments still seemed to believe that population problems were neither their concern nor within their ability to control. The final Plan of Action was adopted by consensus of the 136 member nations (with reservations by the Vatican). Whether the resolutions and recommendations will be taken with the seriousness the problem warrants remains to be seen. For many countries it will not be easy, given the overwhelming problems their governments face. But on the answer hangs the future of humanity. It was repeatedly emphasized at Bucharest that population control is no panacea for solving the problems of development or social and economic justice. This is perfectly true, of course; but unless the runaway human WO

W. P. Mauldin et al., A report on Bucharest.

796 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

population is brought under control—and soon—the result will be catastrophe. What kind of catastrophe cannot be predicted, but numerous candidates have been discussed in this book: ecological collapses of various kinds, large-scale crop failures due to ecological stress or changes in climate and leading to mass famine; severe resource shortages, which could lead either to crop

failures or to social problems or both; epidemic diseases; wars over diminishing resources; perhaps even thermonuclear war. The list of possibilities is long, and overpopulation enhances the probability that any one of them will occur. Population control may be no panacea, but without it there is no way to win.

Recommended for Further Reading Blake, Judith. 1971. Reproductive motivation and population policy. BioScience, vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 215-220. An analysis of what sorts of policies might lower U.S. birth rate. Berelson, Bernard. 1974. An evaluation of the effects of population control programs. Studies in Family Planning, vol. 5, no. 1. An important contribution to the controversy by a distinguished demographer active in the family planning field. Chen, Pi-Chao. 1973. China's population program at the grass-roots level. Studies in Family Planning, vol. 4, no. 8, pp. 219-227. Also published in Population perspective: 1973, Brown, Holdren, Sweezy, and West, eds. Excellent summary'. Davis, Kingsley. 1973. Zero population growth: The goal and the means. Daedalus, vol. 102, no. 4, pp. 15-30. Useful critique of population policies, actual and proposed, especially of the United States. Katchadourian, H. A., and D. T. Lunde. 1975. Fundamentals of human sexuality. 2nd ed. Holt, New York. A superb text for sex education; useful for birth control information also. Kocher, James E. 1973. Rural development, income distribution and fertility decline. Population Council Occasional Papers. An important work on the connection between grass-roots development and fertility. Population Reference Bureau, Inc. 1975. Family size and the black American. Population Bulletin vol. 30, no. 4. A study of black reproductive behavior and attitudes in the U.S. —. 1976. World population grotvth and response 1965-1975: A decade of global action. A compendium on recent demographic trends and the evolution of population policies around the world. Revelle, Roger. 1971. Rapid population growth: Consequences and policy implications. Report of a study committee, National Academy of Sciences. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore. Contains a number of interesting papers on social and economic effects of population growth, but weak on environmental and resource aspects. Teitelbaum, Michael S. 1974. Population and development: Is a consensus possible? Foreign Affairs, July, pp. 742-760. An excellent discussion of the myriad viewpoints on population control.

ECOSCIENCE: POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT PAUL R. EHRLICH STANFORD UNIVERSITY

ANNE H. EHRLICH STANFORD UNIVERSITY

JOHN P. HOLDREN UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

a W. H. FREEMAN AND COMPANY San Francisco

The ecological constraints on population and technological growth will inevitably lead to social and economic systems different from the ones in which we live today. In order to survive, mankind will have to develop what might be called a steady state. The steady state formula is so different from the philosophy of endless quantitative growth, which has so far governed Western civilization, that it may cause widespread public alarm. <— -Rene Dubos, 1969 Mistrust of technology is an attitude that ought to be taken seriously. It has positive value in avoiding grave disasters. CHAPTER

-Roberto Vacca, 1974

14

Changing American Institutions Changing individual attitudes on population size in general and family size in particular is only part of the problem facing humanity today. This chapter and the next examine the need for institutional changes to meet the population-resource-environment crisis. Here we focus primarily on the institutions of the most influential country in the world. It is the United States that in the past few decades has been the leader in humanity's reckless exploitation of Earth; it was also in the United States that the resistance to that exploitation first became well organized. It seems unlikely to us that disaster can be averted without dramatic changes in the structure of many American institutions—changes that could support and consolidate gains in such areas as family size, resource conservation and environmental awareness that

have already been made on the basis of transformed individual attitudes. Many of the institutional problems discussed here also have relevance to other nations, especially other DCs that since World War II have emulated the United States in many respects. Readers in other countries, therefore, may find some of this text directly relevant, even though the focus is on the United States In Chapter 15 we expand nnr outlook to examine international institutions. All these institutions must be altered—and soon—or they and society as we know it will not survive. Whether significant changes in attitudes can occur fast enough to affect humanity's destiny is an open question. In our discussion we have held to one overriding principle: today's problems cannot be solved by destroying the 805

806 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

existing institutions; there is neither the time nor the leadership to dismantle them completely and replace them with others. Today's institutions must be bent and reshaped but not destroyed. No one is more acutely aware than we are of the difficulties and hazards of trying to criticize and comment constructively on such broad areas as religion, education, economics, legal and political systems, and the psychology of individuals and societies. We believe, however, that in order for people to translate into effective and constructive political action what is now known about the roots of the crisis, new, far-reaching and positive programs must be undertaken immediately. In this chapter and the next, we therefore depart from the realm of relatively hard data in the physical, biological, and social sciences to embark on an exploration of the many other areas of human endeavor that are critically important to a solution of our problems.1 In doing so we are making the assumption that many reforms are essential. The dangers of making the opposite assumption are beautifully set forth in the following quotation from biologist Garrett Hardin's article, "The Tragedy of the Commons": It is one of the peculiarities of the warfare between reform and the status quo that it is thoughtlessly governed by a double standard. Whenever a reform measure is proposed it is often defeated when its opponents triumphantly discover a flaw in it. As Kingsley Davis has pointed out, worshippers of the status quo sometimes imply that no reform is possible without unanimous agreement, an implication contrary to historical fact. As nearly as I can make out, automatic rejection of proposed reforms is based on one of two unconscious assumptions: (i) that the status quo is perfect; or (ii) that the choice we face is between reform and no action; if the proposed reform is imperfect, we presumably should take no action at all, while we wait for a perfect proposal. But we can never do nothing. That which we have done for thousands of years is also action. It also produces evils. Once we are aware that the status quo is action, we can then compare its discoverable advan'Many of these topics are treated in greater depth in Dennis C. Pirages and Paul R. Ehrlich, Ark IL.Social response to environmental imperatives; its footnotes and bibliographies provide further access to the peninent literature, especially in political science.

tages and disadvantages with the predicted advantages and disadvantages of the proposed reform, discounting as best we can for our lack of experience. On the basis of such a comparison, we can make a rational decision which will not involve the unworkable assumption that only perfect systems are tolerable.

RELIGION Religion, broadly defined, would include all the belief systems that allow Homo sapiens to achieve a sense of transcendence of self and a sense of the possession of a right and proper place in the universe and a right and proper way of life. In short, everyone wants to feel important and in tune with a right-ordered world. The attempt to achieve a sense of well-being in these terms is so pervasive among human cultures that it may be counted as a necessity of human life. With religion so broadly defined, political parties, labor unions, nation states, academic disciplines, and the organized structure of the environment-ecology movement would have to be counted among our religious institutions. Certainly, t representatives of all those groups have struggled to protect and propagate their views as assiduously (and sometimes as fiercely) in our time as Genghis Khan, the Christian Crusaders, or the Protestant Christian missionaries did in theirs. In this discussion, however, we limit our attention to those groups customarily called the world's j^reat religions, the traditions of belief and practice belonging to members of the Tudeo-Christian. Moslem, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions. Religion must always be viewed in its two parts: the firsthand more readily evident element being the formal structure of authority and administration that in our Western tradition is called "the church;" and the second, more elusive, and in the long run more important element, the system of attitudes called, in the Western. manner, "the faith." In our treatment of the two parts, we concentrate upon the relationship between organised religion and population control because that^ is the area where contemporary social needs and imperatives have most clearly come into conflict with cherished traditional values usually promulgated and supported by religions. Moreover, humane population control calls for the

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 807

integration of contraceptive techniques into culturally accepted sexual practices, and sexual practice is the area of human activity that is typically most extensively regulated by taboo. Thus, the acceptance or rejection of birth control and various methods of carrying it out have been important issues in organized Western religion for several decades. Our treatment of religious attitudes also focuses upon perceptions of the environment, because how an individual perceives and treats the world is determined by his or her overall view of his or her place in that world. The Christian concept of life in this world, as voiced by Saint Paul, that "here we have no abiding city," for example, conceivably could help explain why some people show rather little concern for the long-term future of the global environment or for the well-being of future generations. Most of our attention is on the Western. Juden-.. Christian religious tradition because it is primarily within that tradition that the population-resourceenvironment crisis has been engendered.

Organized Religious Groups and Population Control Within the theological community in the Western world, there has recently been a heartening revolution in thought and action on such varied social concerns as the quality of life in urban areas, civil rights for minority groups, and the war in Vietnam. Since the late 1960s, environmental deterioration and the population explosion have become important concerns. Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish clergy have come more and more to the_ forefront of public activities in these areas, often at considerable personal sacrifice and risk. Conspicuous among clergy who have risked their careers have_been Catholic theologians who opposed the official pronatalist position of the Vatican. For example, Father John JA. O'Briem a distinguished professor of theology at Notre Dame University in Indiana, edited the excellent book Family planning in an exploding population in 1968, He also was a leader in criticizing Pope Paul VI's 1968 encyclical, Humanae Vitae, which reiterated the church's condemnation of contraceptives. Commenting on the encyclical, Father O'Brien wrote, "Since

the decision is bound to be reversed by his [Pope Paul's] successor, it would be far more honorable, proper and just for the Pope to rescind it himself."2 Ivan Illich, who_ renounced his priesthood after a controversy over hirtbcpmrol in Puerto Rico., wrote that the encyclical "lacks courage, is in bad taste, and takes the initiative awayjrom^ Rome in the attempt to lead modern man in Christian humanism."3 Thousands of others, from cardinals to lay people, have also spoken out. Since its publication, the encyclical has caused immense anguish among Catholics, millions of whom have followed their consciences and used contraceptives, often after a period of intense soul-searching.4 Indeed, clergyman sociologist Father Andrew Greeley attributes the recent substantial erosion in religious practices and church support among American Catholics almost entirely to Humanae Vitae.5 Adamant opposition to birth control by the Roman Catholic Church and other conservative religious groups for many years helped delay the reversal in developed countries (including the United States) of laws restricting access to contraceptives and the extension of familyplanning assistance to LDCs. Support of outdated dogma among Catholic spokespeople still sometimes hinders effective attacks on the population problem in Catholic countries and in international agencies that support family-planning programs. Thus, as late as 1969, elderly Catholic economist Colin Clark claimed on a television program that India would, in a decade, be the most powerful country in the world because of its growing population! He also wrote, "Population growth, however strange and unwelcome some of its consequences may appear at the time, must be regarded, I think, as one of the instruments of Divine Providence, which we should welcome, not oppose."6 By the mid-1970s, however, the influence of such persons was on the wane—so much so that a reaffirmation by Pope Paul of his anti-popuiation-coptrol dngrna, at the 1974 World Food Conference in Rome was greeted by almost universal ridicule^ Within the church, Pope 2

ReaJcr's Digest, January 1969. 'Celebration of awareness. F. X. Murphy and J. F. Erhart, Catholic perspectives on population issues. Population Bulletin, vol. 30 (1975), no. 6. ^Catholic schools in a declining church, Sheed & Ward, Mission, 4

Kans., 1976. 6

Z,os Angeles Times, November 9, 1969.

808

/ THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

Paul's influence seems likely to decline as older members of the hierarchy are replaced by administrators more in touch with humanity and modern times. Growing numbers of priests and other clerics in the lower ranks of the hierarchy no longer condemn the use of contraceptives—some even condone abortion under some circumstances, although the hierarchy is, if anything, even more rigidly opposed to that. A great many Catholic laymen are ahead of the Church in changing their attitudes; by the mid-1970s more than 80 percent of Catholics in the United States approved of the use of contraceptives.7 The new look in attitudes is typified by those of Catholic' hinlfigisr Tnhn H Thomas of Stanford Univer- . siry, who in 1968 wrote to San Francisco's Archbishop Joseph T. McGucken: The Church must affirm that the birth rate most soon be brought in line with the death rate—i.e., a growth rate of zero. This is the responsibility of all people regardless of race or religion. The Church most recognize and state that all means of birth control are licit . . . (it) must put its concern for people, their welfare, and their happiness above its concern for doctrine, dogma, and canon law . . . It is time that the Church stop being like a reluctant little child, always needing to be dragged into the present. John Thomas was also a prime mover in promoting the Scientists' statement against the birth-control encyclical, which within five weeks in 1968 was signed by more than 2600 scientists.8 He was joined by two other Catholic biologists, Dennis R. Parnell (California State University at Hayward) and Brother Lawrence Corey (St. Mary's College, Moraga, California) in mailing the statement with their endorsement to the approximately 150 Roman Catholic bishops in the United States. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that physician John Rock, who played a leading role in developing the contraceptive pill, is a Catholic. He also participated in the theological debate on the morality of birth control until the encyclical was issued, effectively squelching the debate. Except for the Roman Catholic church, all major Western religious groups had by 1970 officially sanctioned "artificial" contraception, although some contin-

ued to oppose liberal abortion policies. Religious leaders of various faiths in the United States have helped overcome ancient cultural taboos related to reproduction by emphasizing the quality of human life rather than its quantity. Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish theologians, for example, have been active in promoting sex education in schools, and many Protestant and Jewish theologians and lay people have supported liberal abortion policies. Bishop C. Kilmer Myers, of the Episcopal diocese of California, for example, in the late 1960s established the Ad Hoc Metropolitan Planning Group, which has been deeply concerned with the problems of population and environment. The Social Ministry of the Lutheran Church in America promulgated a highly enlightened policy on population in the 1960s; Methodist groups were in the forefront of abortion-law reform in the United States. Thus, there is good reason to hope that organized Western religious groups may become a powerful force in working toward population control worldwide, especially as the human suffering caused by overpopulation becomes more widely recognized. i. Nop-Wcst£r3|i religions] The possible rolf*s of ponWestern r lisdous institutions in the population crisis are rnorejrohlemaTiral th^n rhar nf Western religion;. For

example, withimlslamic religTon)there is no organized, deep involvement in social problems, although Islamic scholars have tried to find religious justification for practicing birth control in some countries h; d-pressed _ by exploding populations. There are^t least 500 milliony • Moslem^ in the world (roughly half the number of ristians), more than 95 percent of whom live in Africa and Asia, with high concentrations in such problem regions as Indonesia and the Indian subcontinent. Pakistan, by establishing a government-supported familyplanning program as early as 1960, made it clear that Moslem countries can attempt to solve their population problems without religious conflict.9 Several other Moslem countries have since established family-planning programs and/or changed their laws to permit broader access to birth control. In the foreseeable future, however, it^ seems unlikely that Islam itself will bfrf)rr"' apositive force for population control.

7 s

Greeley, Catholic schools. J. J. W. Baker. Three modes of protest action.

9

M. Viorst, Population control: Pakistan tries a major new experiment.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 809

Much the same can be said of Buddhism, which—if those who also subscribe to Shinto, Taoism, and Confucianism are also counted as Buddhists—has perhaps 700 million adherents, most of them in Asia. The barriers to population control in Asia and the potential for accepting it both seem to be connected much more with social conditions than with religion. Therefore, it seems unlikely that changes in the religion would have any substantial effect on establishment of population policy, although religious support for small families might encourage acceptance of family planning. Similarly, it is hard to picture Hinduism, as an entity, becoming a force in population control. More than 99 percent of the 450 million or so Hindus live in Asia, mostly in India, Like Buddhism, it is a rather heterogeneous, relatively noninstitutionalized religion. There is still considerable opposition to population control among Hindus, perhaps based more on medical beliefs, local superstitutions, and a sense of fatalism than on anything inherent in the religious structure. For Westerners who favor population control, nnp n£ the best courses of action seems to lie in working with the already establisheoyreligious groupspto change people's^, attitudes toward population growth.. In the rest of the world, the relative fragmentation of religious groups, their lack of hierarchic organization, and their psychosocial traditions would seem to limit their capacity to influence population control efforts.

Religious Attitudes and the Environment In the United States, the unorthodox but constructive and quasi-religious attitudes first expressed widely in the 1960s by members of the whole-Earth, hippie movement may well help save the environment. The initial phase of the hippie movement was characterized by a groping and testing that produced, among other things, the dangerous macrobiotic diet and the horror of the Manson family. Aside from such excesses, however, the hippies borrowed many religious ideas from the East, particularly Zen Buddhism, combined them with the collectivist, passivist element from Christian tradition, and attempted to forge a code based on close personal relationships, spiritual

values, a reverence for life, group self-reliance, and an abhorrence of violence. By the mid-1970s this code had become well established in a more mature and praiseworthy form that might be called the independence movement. People in that movement are attempting to find simpler, more ecologically sound modes of existence, and to reduce their dependence on fancy, nonessential, and vulnerable technological gimmickry. Their unofficial publications such as Mother Earth News and CoEvolution Quarterly abound with suggestions for disconnecting oneself from the "effluent society." If any one idea binds members of the movement together, it is the belief—essentially religious—that human beings must cooperate with nature and not attempt to subdue nature with brute force. Many people in our society are unhappy with these attitudes, which go against long-cherished and religiously sanctioned political and economic beliefs. They feel that turning away from a consumer orientation has grave implications for the future of the economy. Others see in the independence movement the vanguard of a new social revolution that could lead to a very different, far better society. C*Lynn White, Jr., professor emeritus of history at t h e ] CUni versify of California, Los Angeles^nd past president of the American Historical Association^ has suggested that the basic cause of Western society's destructive jttitude toward nature lies in the Judeo-Christian tradition. He pointed out, for instance, that before the Christian era, people believed trees, springs. hills2 streams, and other objects of nature had guardian spirits. Those spirits had to be approached and placated before__ one could safely invade their territories: fBy destroying fgagan animisrnyhristianitv made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural . objects."1,0 Christianity fostered the basic ideas of "progress'^nd of time as something linear, nonseparat- __ ing, and absolute, flowing from a fixed point in the past to. an end point in the future. Such ideas were foreign to the Greeks and Romans, who had a cyclical and did not envision the world as having a beginning. Although a modern physicist's concept of time might be somewhat closer to that of the Greeks than to that of the '"The historical roots of our ecological crisis.

810 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

Christians, the Christian view is nevertheless the prevalent one in the Western world: God designed and started the universe for the benefit of mankind; the world is our . oyster;, made for human society to dominate and exploit.. Western science and technology thns can he seen to have their historical roots in the Christian dogma of human-_ ity's separation from and rightful mastery over nature^ Europeans held and developed those attitudes long before thp opportunity ^n exploit the Western hemisphere arrived.JThe frontier or cowboy economy that has characterized the United States seems to be a natural _ extension of that Christian world view/Therefore, White claimed, it may be in vain that so many look to science and technology to solve our present ecological crisis: Both our present science and our present technology are so tinctured with orthodox Christian arrogance toward nature that no solution for our ecologic crises can be expected from them alone. Since the roots of our trouble are so largely religious, the remedy must also be essentially religious, whether we call it that or not. A number of anthropologists and others have taken, issue with White's thesis, pointing out that environmental abuse is by no means unique to Western culture, and that animism had disappeared, at least in western Europe, before Christianity was introduced. As examples they cite evidence of ancient and prehistoric environmental destruction, such as the human-induced extinction of Pleistocene mammals and the destruction of the fertility of the Near East by early agricultural activity, as well as the behavior of non-Western cultures today. Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan of the University of Minnesota observed that there is often a large gap between attitudes toward the environment expressed in a religion or philosophy and the actual practices of the people who profess those attitudes." While Chinese religions, for example, stressed the view that man was a part of nature (rather than lord of it) and should live in harmony with it, the Chinese did not always live by that belief. Concern for the environment, especially preserving forests and protecting soils, were expressed throughout Chinese history, but Yi-Fu Tuan suggests that this may often 'Our treatment of the environment in ideal and actuality.

have been in response to destruction that had already taken place. The fact that China was a complex civilization complete with a bureaucracy and a large population doubtless militated against fulfillment of those ideals. By the twentieth century, China's once-plentiful forests had been nearly destroyed to build cities and clear land for agriculture. All that remained in most areas were small patches preserved around temples. Ironically, the present government, which explicitly rejects the traditional religions, has attempted to restore the forests on a large scale.12 Lewis W. Moncrief of North Carolina State Universityj^who might be described as an environmental anthropologist, feels that the religious tradition of the West is only one of several factors that have contributed,, to the environmental crisis.13 Along with some other anthropologists, he has suggested that an urge to improve one's status in society is probably a universal human characteristic and that expressing this urge through material acquisitiveness and consumption of resources is. if not universal, at least common to a great variety of cultures. Perhaps what is unique about Western culture in this regard is the degree of its success. Moncrief postulated several factors that he felt were just as influential as the Judeo-Christian outlook in determining European and North American behavior toward the environment. The first were the development of democracy and the Industrial Revolution, which together provided individual control over resources (if only a family farm) for a far greater proportion of the population than before and simultaneously provided the means to exploit those resources more efficiently. The existence of a vast frontier fostered the belief in North America that resources were infinite; all of our wasteful habits derive from that. Moncrief thinks it is no accident that the first conservation movement appeared just as the frontier was closing; Americans suddenly and for the first time began to realize that their resources were, after all, finite. In 1893, moved by a remark from the 1890 census J3 For an overview of present Chinese attitudes, see L. A. Orleans ana R. P. Suttmeier, the mass ethic and environmental quality, Science, vol. 170, pp. 1173-1176 (December 11, 1970); a related account of Japanese attitudes toward the environment is Masao Watanabe, The conception of nature in Japanese culture. 13 The cultural basis for our environmental crisis.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 811

about the disappearance of public land and the consequent disappearance of the frontier, Frederick Jackson Turner, then at the University of Wisconsin and subsequently at Harvard, observed: American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities . . . furnish the forces dominating American character.14 A generation earlier, E. L. Godkin, editor of the Nation, had written that the American frontier population had "spread itself thinly over a vast area of soil, of such extraordinary fertility that a very slight amount of toil expended on it affords returns that might have satisfied even the dreams of Spanish avarice."15 Traditional North American (and, to some extent, European) attitudes toward the environment thus are not exclusively products of our religious heritage, although that doubtless played an important part. These attitudes may just spring from ordinary human nature, which in Western culture was provided with extraordinary social, political, technical, and physical opportunities, particularly connected with the nineteenth-century American frontier. Such opportunities were bound to engender optimism, confidence in the future, and faith in the abundance of resources and the bounty of nature. That they also produced habits of wastefulness and profligacy was not noticed. Past institutions in the United States_ rarely dealt with environmental problems; if they were recognized at all, they were usually considered to be someone else's responsibility. In the twentieth century, as the growing population became increasingly urban and industrialized, the en-_ vironmental effects multiplied, and the nation was rather suddenly confronted with a crisis. How today's Americans ultimately resolve the environmental crisis will depend on much more than changes in philosophical outlook, but such changes unquestionably must precede or at least accompany whatever measures are taken. Individual conduct is clearly capable of being modified and directed by an appropriate social environment—the '"The significance of the frontier in American history, in The early writings of Frederick Jackson Turner, ed. f , J. Turner. "Aristocratic opinions of democracy.

change in reproductive habits in the United States testifies to that, as does the great increase in environmental consciousness. Unfortunately, the environmental problem may prove more difficult because it requires changing more than the altitudes and behavior of individuals: those of firmly established, powerful institutions—primarily business and governmental Organizations—must alSQhp i-hangerj

How large a role organized religion may play in guiding the needed changes in individual attitudes toward the environment or in influencing the behavior of _ other institutions is still uncertain. Many religious groups have already shown leadership, including some already mentioned in connection with populationrelated issues. A particularly hopeful sign was the^ concern expressed in January 1976 by the National^ Council of Churches about the ethics of using and _ spreading the technology of nuclear power, and the discussion promoted by the World Council of Churches^ onjhe nuclcar jssue_an,d_on. the relation of energy policy to the prospects for adjust and sustainable^ world.16 Ecological Ethics Many persons believe that an entirely new philosophy must now be developed—one based on ecological realities. Such a philosophy—and the ethics based upon it—would be antihumanist and against Judeo-Christian tradition in the sense that it would not focus on an anthropocentric universe.17 Instead, it would focus on human beings as an integral part of nature, as just one part of a much more comprehensive system. This is not really a new perspective. In one sense, Western philosophy has been a continuous attempt to establish the position of Homo sapiens in the universe, and the extreme anthropocentrism of thinkers like Karl Marx and John Dewey has been strongly attacked by, among others, Bertrand Russell.18 Russell, for example, '6See The plutonium economy: A statement of concern, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1976, pp. 48-49; P. M. Boffey, Plutonium: its morality questioned by National Council of Churches, Science, vol. 192, pp. 356-359 (April 23, 1976); Paul Abrecht, ed., Facing up to nuclear power, Anticipation, no. 21, October 1975, pp. 1-47. 1 'See Frank E. Egler, The way of science: A philosophy of ecology for the layman; and George S. Sessions, Anthropocentrism and the environmental crisis. The latter is a good, brief summary with a useful bibliography. "A history of Western philosophy; die debate is summarized in Sessions, Anthropocentrism.

812 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

jointed out Marx's .philosophical closeness to classical Judeo-Christian thought: His purview is confined to this planet, and, within this planet, to Man. Since Copernicus, it has been evident that Man has not the cosmic importance which he formerly arrogated to himself . . . There goes with this limitation to terrestrial affairs a readiness to believe in progress as a universal law . . . Marx professed himself an atheist, but retained a optimism which only theism could justify.19 is nnf primarily that of considering the human pngi'ti™ ir. thp ff^rnnc but rather of considering the roles played by human beings in the ecosphere. It takes a view diametrically opposed to_ the position expressed by Aristotle 2300 years ago^'Now, if Nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain^ the inference must HP that e has made all animals for

the sake of man."20 From the standpoint of ecological ethics., the world is, thus seen to be not humanity's oyster but a system that supports us, of which we are a part, and toward which we have moral responsibilities^ Ethical theorist Joseph Margolis has written: But it may well be that the ethical visions of the future—assuming the earth has a future—will be discarded as beneath debate if they do not include, centrally, an account of the ethics of the human use of the inanimate and non-human world. Such a discipline . . . might be called moral ecology. . . .21 Whether or not such a philosophy is incorporated into religious dogma is immaterial. What counts is that something like it has influenced many Americans and Europeans already, and may come to be accepted in other places as well. (In some cultures, of course—some native American world views and some aspects of Hinduism come to mind—the idea of humanity as a part of nature has always predominated.) The sooner an ethic based on respect for the natural world can be adopted, the better. The beneficiaries will be not only ourselves but our children and grandchildren. "Quoted in Sessions (ibid). ^Politics 1,88. 2 'Joseph Margolis, Values and conduct, p. 212.

The Conservation Movement The fascination and profound emotions — religious feelings— aroused in many people by wilderness areas, wildlife, and beautiful natural scenery are not easily explained to those who do not share them._ Disparate beliefs and attitudes are obvious every time conservationists find themselves defending aesthetic values against people who are equally dedicated to "progress." This divergence of views was elegantly summarized by the brilliant French anthropologist Claude _ Levi-StrausSj who noted that any secies of bug that people spray with pesticides is "an irreplaceable marvel, equal to the works of art which we religiously preserve in. museums."22 For many years now, people in the conservation movement have fought individually and in groups to halt, the extinction of animal species and the destruction of the last vestiges of the primitive areas of Earth. Some of the campaigns conducted by such organizations as the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, the Defenders of Wildlife, the Wilderness Society, and the Nature Conservancy in the United States, and by the World Wildlife Fund and similar organizations in other countries,22" have been successful. It is becoming clear, however, that in the long_ run the conservation movement as a whole has been fighting a losing battle. Perhaps the most obvious reason the battle is being lost is that conservation is a one-way street: each organism or place conserved essentially remains in perpetual jeopardy. Each gain is temporary, but every loss is permanent. Species cannot be resurrected; places cannot be restored to their primitive state. Consequently, even if the conservationists were evenly matched against the destroyers, the battle would probably remain a losing one. But, of course, the battle has been far from even. Powerful economic interests and government agencies, pushed by population pressures, have promoted the development of every possible inch of the United States by building dams in desert canyons, driving roads through the remaining wilderness areas, cutting the last "Discussion of the Special Commission on Internal Pollution, London, October 1975. 22a For an interesting history of the parallel (but quite different) growth of the conservation movement in the U.K., see Max Nicholson. The ecological breakthrough.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 813

of the.primeval forests, grilling for oil on the northern) C slope of Alaska} and so on. It is a tribute to the conservationists, past and present, that any of our primitive areas remain relatively unspoiled.^ Political and financial power tend to be arrayed against conservation, and, as people increase and resources dwindle, the situation seems bound to deteriorate further. In many parts of the world the situation is worse than in the United States; in a few it is better. There are encouraging signs that a new thrust is_ appearing in the conservation movement. Growing numbers of people have realized that conservation is a global problem, that in the long run it is not enough to such icnistpri trppc^p-c as a grove of redwood trees. If global pollution causes a rapid climatic change, the grove cannot long survive. Many conservationists now recognize that if the growth of the human population is not stopped, and the deterioration of the planetary environment is not arrested, nothing of value will HP conserved. This understanding and the growing general public awareness of the problems of the environment have given rise to a number of new organizations. Some of them, like Friends of the Earrh f FOF.1. are more militant offshoots of older conservation groups. Others, including^ Environmental Action (which grew from the organization that sponsored the first Earth Day in 1 970) ano* Kcology Action, are new. Zero Population Growth (ZPG1 is primarily concerned with the population problem but is also interested in the environmental consequences of it. ZPG, one branch of the Sierra Club. Environmental Action, and FOE have foregone the tax advantages of an apolitical posture in order to campaign and lobby for their goals, frequently combining their efforts on issues of common concern.VThey also cooperate in environ-/ Cmentalist lawsuits! (see "The Legal System," below) through organizations such as The Environmental Pe-_ fense Fund (EDFJ and the Natural Resources Defense _ Council (NRDC). Such organizations generally diifer from many of the older conservation groups in being more oriented to humanity as an endangered species than to preserving wilderness and wildlife only for their aesthetic and recreational values^ Sister organizations of FOE, as well as ZPG, have been established in other countries.

In Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, the environmental movement has established its own political parties, known in Britain as the Ecology Party, in France as Ecologie et Survie, in New Zealand as the Values Party, etc. These parties have succeeded in winning seats in Britain's Parliament and gaining significant percentages of the vote in several countries.2211 In March 1977, the ecology party in France won a nationwide average of 10 percent of the vote in municipal elections. In some towns in Alsace (where the party originated) they won 60 percent.220 It seems likely that conservationist and environmentaL organizations will become still more militant and morg united—especially in their global concerns. While important local battles must continue to be fought, more general programs of public education and political action should become predominant. Obviously, it is no longer necessary to plead for conservation only on aesthetic or compassionate grounds, since the preservation of the diversity of life and the integrity of the ecological systems of Earth is absolutely essential for the survival of civilization.

SCIENCE For many people, science and technology have taken on the aspect o^a religion) How often one hears statements beginning, "any society that can send a man to the moon can. . . ." and ending with some problem—usually immensely more complex and difficult than space travel—that science and technology are expected to solve!23 The population-food imbalance is a common candidate; others are various types of pollution or other, ecological problems. Three things are generally wrong with these statements of faith. First, science and technology have not yet reached the point relative to those problems that they had reached relative to the man-on-the-moon project by 22t)

Edward Goldsmith, Ecology—the new political force. —''Ecologists emerge as a potent force in French election, New York Times, March 20, 1977. - JOne book on the human predicament written from this point of view (but in which the science is often very weak) is John Maddox's The doomsday syndrome. See the retrospective review written three years later by John Woodcock. Doomsday revisited.

814 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

,1

1955. The general outlines of a solution are not clear to all competent scientists in the pertinent disciplines. Second, and equally important, there is no sign of a societal commitment to a crash program to solve those nonspace problems.fThjrd, any solutions to those problems would spell significant changes in the ways of * jff pf— millions of people, which the space program did not. The public, indeed, has developed a touching but misplaced faith in the ability of science and technology to pull humanity's chestnuts out of the fire. There is not the slightest question that with clever and cautious use of scientific and technological resources, a great deal of good could be accomplished. But can the required amount of cleverness and caution be found? Despite enormous scientific advances during the past thirty years, it is perfectly clear that the absolute amount of human misery has increased (because of the enormous growth in the numbers of poverty-stricken human beings), while the chances that civilization will persist have decreased. There has been an abundance of science and technology, but they have been unbalanced and out of control.

Priorities and Planning Tt has been estimated that more than 400.000 scientists and engineers^-about half the technical community of the world—are working on weapons of war. Each year, military research and development worldwide cost about $25 billion, some 4 times what is spent on medicaL research (and perhaps 1000 times that spent on ecological research).24 Medicine and public-health measures have attacked the death rate with vigor but for a long time ignored the birth rate, in the process threatening humanity with unprecedented catastrophe. Physics has produced nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, a legacy so weighty on the minus side of the balance that it is difficult to think of any serious pluses with which to counter it. Biology has provided weapons for biological warfare and has seen many millions of dollars poured into molecular genetics, a field offering little immediate J4 See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Why arms control fails. Of course, the causes of the lack of balance and control are complex, and we do not have space to discuss them here. For an introduction to the subject, see Robin Roy, Myths about technological change, New Scientist, May 6, 1976, pp. 281-282.

improvement in human welfare but possessing great potential for curing or preventing inborn defects or for curing cancer, and the like. The greatest contribution of molecular genetics to human welfare has been the Ames test (Chapter 10), which, ironically, will help protect humanity from the "triumphs" of organic chemistry! Meanwhile, support for environmental studies has been relatively insignificant, despite repeated warnings by ecologists for more than a quarter of a century that human action was threatening to destroy the life-support systems of the planet. The behavioral sciences -still in their infancy—have also languished despite their potential value in helping to solve human problems. Most of the fireat "advances" in technology, from DDT and X-rays to automobiles and jet aircraft, have caused serious problems for humanity. Some of those problems would have been difficult to anticipate (Box 14-1), but most were foreseen, were warned against, and could have been avoided or ameliorated with sensible societal planning. The question now is, how can such planning be done in the future so as to minimize the unfortunate consequences of technological "advances" made thus far—to say nothing of those yet to come? It is clear from the records of organizations such as the American Medical Association and the_AECJnow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC), and from statements by technological optimists and scientific politicians that scientists (like other groups in our population) cannot be relied upon to police themselves. Some way must be found to foster greater participation by other segments of society in the major decison-making processes affecting science and technology. This is essential, of course, to the survival of society, but it is also important as protection for scientists themselves. Burdens of guilt, like those borne by the physicists involved in developing atomic weapons, must be avoided wherever possible, or at least more broadly shared.

We are not in a position here to propose a detailed structure for controlling science and technology, but we can suggest some general directions. Gover lent agencies such as the Optional Science Foundation} and

•MM

BOX 14-1 Risks, Benefits, and New Technologies As previously indicated, it is common for unforeseen difficulties to arise with new technologies, and the more grandiose the technological enterprise, the greater the problems seem to be. Supertankers provide a classic example of the difficulties encountered in scaling up an already hazardous technology.* Oil tankers have always been prone to accident, but the frequency (and environmental consequences) of accidents have escalated dramatically as their size has increased. In 1945 the largest oil tankers were 18,000 deadweight tons (dwt). In the early 1960s the maximum size had risen to 100,000 dwt and by the end of that decade had exceeded 300,000 dwt. In the 1970s planners were looking forward to constructing tankers in the megaton range. Both the stresses imposed upon the structures of the larger ships and their different handling characteristics were unanticipated. Supertankers sometimes crack when being loaded and show a distressing tendency to disintegrate spontaneously at sea. The huge cleaning machines used to wash out their tanks after unloading apparently create minithunderstorms in the cavernous spaces. These thunderstorms even produce lightning, which can detonate oil fumes if the fume-air mixture is neither too rich nor too lean, blowing the tank or the ship apart. The hydrodynamic properties of the huge ships are such that they must begin "putting on the brakes" three miles before reaching a full stop. They are difficult to maneuver and their captains require special training. Yet because of their great draft they are often operated in waters where their keels extend to within two feet of the charted bottom. This is a dangerous practice both because hydrodynamic factors reduce maneuverability in shallow water and because in some areas the depth of the bottom is continuously changing. These factors, among others, have led to a rash of collisions and groundings, often with disastrous results. For example, in 1970 the relatively small supertanker Polycommander ran aground near the Spanish coast and ignited. Some 16,000 tons of oil burned, generating a fire storm whose updrafts carried oil high into the atmosphere and created a black rain along the coast, doing extensive damage to crops, livestock, homes, and gardens. Some of the difficulties with supertankers can "The discussion of tankers is based on N. Mostert's fascinating Supership and D_ F- Boesch et al.? Oil spills and the manna

environment, Ballinger. Cambridge, Mass., 1974.

be blamed on dangerous economies undertaken by the owners. Ships can be designed that are stronger, more maneuverable, and more resistant to explosion than most of those now in service. And personnel on many ships could be much better trained; many officers running ships registered under flags of convenience such as Panama and Liberia are not properly certified, and some have proven hopelessly incompetent. There is little doubt, either, that the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), a specialized United Nations agency, has proven ineffective as a regulatory body. But the familiar saga of profits-before-safetyor-environment, so characteristic of the energy industry, is not the whole story. The unanticipated characteristics of the big ships threaten both safety and profits, since the disaster rate has pushed insurance premiums toward uneconomic levels. What will happen as these ships age (they were designed to be written off after ten years) remains to be seen. The prospects are not cheering. One does not, however, have to turn to such exotica as the supertankers to see the impact of the unexpected in new technologies. The heavily regulated safety-oriented aviation industry provides more than enough examples. A classic was the series of fatal crashes of De Havilland Comet jets, caused by unanticipated fatigue failures of the cabin under pressurization, that lost the United Kingdom its lead in the race to develop passenger jet aircraft. The success of the United States industry (and its fine safety record) was due in no small degree to the Boeing 707, which, unlike the Comet, was not a novel design but had behind it a long operating history with military jet tankers of similar size and configuration. Design flaws have often led to one or more fatal crashes of new transport aircraft. Gas leaking into heating systems during transfer from one tank to another destroyed a Douglas DC-6 with the loss of fifty-two people, and it nearly destroyed another before the problem was identified and corrected. Unexpected stresses transmitted from propeller to wing caused the disintegration in midair of two Lockheed Electra propjets.** After correction of the problem, the aircraft had a fine safety record in civil and "Stephen Barlay, The search for air safety. The following material on T-tail jets is largely from this source also. For a balanced, rcadahlf account of aviation accidents in the prejet

age, see Robert J. Serling, The probable cause. (Continued)

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 81 7

by ecological systems. On the other hand, strip mining often permanently destroys the land, many pollutants are extremely slow to degrade, and the toxic effects of a nuclear power plant accident could persist for half a million years. 5. Uncertainty. How does one evaluate the unknowns? We do not pretend to have answers to these complex questions, of course, especially when both benefits and risks tend to be hard to identify, let alone quantify early in the development of a technology. We do suggest, however, that the tendency to develop and deploy technologies helter-skelter with little or no public airing—at least until capital and other commitments are such that the economics of an industry become a part of the issue—should be controlled somehow. In particular, the benefits should be

(J^ationai Institutes of Health] regularly employ ad hoc committees and panels of scientists to evaluate research programs and individual research projects. Universities also on occasion use such groups to evaluate programs or departments. Ad hoc panels of nonscientists might be integrated into these systems, drawn perhaps from citizens serving their sabbaticals (see "Education" below). Such panels could both advise agencies directly and report to a paragovernmental central body (perhaps elected), empowered to intervene whenever it was felt that the public interest was endangered. This power would extend to research under any auspices—government, military, university, or industry. The central body could also be charged with continually informing both government and the public of pertinent trends in science and technology. Increased awareness and scrutiny of science and technology will not, in themselves, suffice. Although laymen can become very knowledgeable about science and technology, as the performances of several congressmen involved in appropriations for scientific and technical projects have demonstrated, it is often very difficult or impossible for individuals, whether scientists or not, to foresee the consequences of certain trends. A second element is therefore required in the control system: an

most carefully considered, since in certain situations the maximum benefits may be rather clear while the maximum risks may be utterly unanticipated. A good example is the use of aerosol cans with fluorocarbon propellants to spray underarm deodorants. The risks of inhaling a fine mist of deodorant are not clear (but in our opinion it is not a good idea to inhale regularly a fine mist of anything except, perhaps, water), and the risks to the ozone layer are, at this writing, in some dispute. But it seems unlikely that the benefits of this sort of deodorant application (in comparison to many others) would be considered by a normal person to be worth any risk to life or health or to the integrity of Earth's ecological systems.ft "The whole question of the evaluation of hazards is considered in an important book by W. W. Lowrance, Of acceptable risk: Science and the determination of safety (Kaufmann, Los Altos, Calif., 1976.)

apparatus—possibly in the form of research institutes— concerned solely with such assessment and reporting to the central body suggested above, as well as to the general public. Perhaps a set percentage of all funds used in government, university, and industrial research should be assessed for the support of those organizations, which should be kept strictly independent of each of those three interests. Some of the work that might be done by such institutes would be an extension of the sort of programs now being run by systems ecologist fL E. F. Watt's group at the, University of California at Davis, by systems analysts Jay W. Forrester of the Massachusetts Institute of Tp^[innl-_ ogy, and Dennis and Donella Meadows of pan-month — Watt has forecast the dismal consequences of continuing various prevailing strategies of resource management and social policigs. The Meadows, Forrester, and their colleagues have shown most convincingly that many of the various proposed courses of action may have unexpected—and often very undesirable—results. The studies of this group were made familiar to the world by the publication of Limits to Growth2,5 (see Box 12-2). In addition to such broad-scope evaluations as those, "Potomac Associates, Washington, D.C., 1972.

818 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

some research institutes need to be investigating and reporting on much more detailed questions. For example, is medical research being done with adequate attention to the needs of all segments of the population and to birth control as well as death control? Are the benefits and risks of the breeder reactor being studied in proper depth? What are the possible dangerous consequences of further investigating the properties of a given virus or biocidal compound? These questions have been settled largely by the scientific community in the past, with results that can most charitably be described as mixed.26 For a long time the thrust in research was that whatever could be tried should be tried. Physicists exploded the first atomic bomb after Germany had been defeated and Japan's defeat was a certainty, although some of them apparently thought at the time there was a nonzero chance that the explosion would destroy all life on Earth.27 It is difficult to find parallels, outside nuclear weaponry, displaying quite this degree of willingness to risk total environmental disaster, but traces of it arguably are present in proposals to "wait and see" what the consequences of assaulting the ozone layer withfluorocarbonsor SST fleets will be. On the bright side, microbiolo^ists Paul Berg Stanley Cohen of Stanford and Herbert Boyer of the University of_ California in mid-1974 called on their colleagues to bring to a halt research on recombinant DNA, studies involving transfers of genetic material from one species to another.28 They recognized that hybrid microorganisms could cause extraordinarily virulent infectious disease and that the experimental work Ccould conceivably lead to the spread of r^sjsTanre rantibioticsjpr to the escape of bacterial strains carrying oncogenic (cancer-inducing) viruses. A distinguished molecular biologist^Robert Sinsheimerjhas written: ~6See, for example, the contrasiing views of F. J. Dyson, The hidden cost of saying "no!"; and P. R. Ehrlich, The benefits of saying "yes." J7 N. P. Davis, Lawrence and Oppenheimer. There is no doubt, in light of present knowledge of nuclear reactions, that the chance of igniting the atmosphere with a nuclear bomb and thereby extinguishing ail life on Earth is truly zero. A completely persuasive case on the point is made by H. A. Bethe, Ultimate catastrophe? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, June 1976, pp. 36-37. Bethe's further contention, however, that the scientists on the nuclear bomb project were completely sure of this in 1945, is not persuasive. 38 P. Berg, et al., Potential biohazards of recombinant DNA molecules.

Could an Escherichia coli strain [a variety of a ubiquitous bacterial resident on the human digestive tract] carrying all or part of an oncogenic virus become resistant in the human intestine? Could it thereby become a possible source of malignancy?yfmild such a_ strain spread throughout a human population? What would be the consequence if even an insulin-secreting strain became an intestinal resident? Not to mention the more malign or just plain stupid scenarios such as those which depict the insertion of the gene for botulinus toxin into Escherichia coh">M In early 1975 an international scientific meeting established a set of safety principles under which such research could be continued. The scientists at the meeting concluded that the more dangerous experiments should be deferred until special "crippled" strains of organisms could be developed—that is, strains with a very low probability of surviving outside the laboratory (experience has shown that there is no such thing as an "escape-proof" microbiological laboratory). Some of the scientists, however, argued against social control of the experiments, claiming an absolute right to free inquiry. Since that meeting, various attempts have been made to draft rules that would permit doing this dangerous research, and there has been continuing controversy.30 In these cases, scientists themselves have assessed the risks and then "voted" for all of humanity. With regard to the atomic bomb, the possible savings in American (and Japanese) lives by shortening World War II may have come into the calculus, and perhaps also the thought that sooner or later someone else would blow up an A-bomb without knowing for sure that it would not destroy the planet. But would the people of the planet (to say nothing of the other living organisms) have voted yes to taking, say, a one-in-a-million chance on oblivion in order to speed victory for the United States in World War II? (That the chances of killing all life on the planet turned out to be zero is beside the point—the scientists involved were not sure of that at the time.) "Troubled dawn for genetic engineering. The article also contains a good, brief, layperson's introduction to the technology of DNA manipulation. 30 Sinsheimer, Troubled dawn; Nicholas Wade, Recombinant DNA: NIH Group Stirs storm by drafting laser rules; Bernard Dixon, Recombinant DNA: Rules without enforcement?

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 81 9

Similarly, in the case of recombinant DNA, although scientists seem to be acting much more responsibly, we must still ask whether they are the appropriate ones to make the decision. No laboratory safeguards can g^uaran^. tee that an accidental escape will never occur. Are the possible benefits to medicine and agriculture of this research worth any risk of releasing a serious plague or cancer-inducing organism? We do not know the answer, but we think the franchise on the decision should be extended to include at least representatives of those who will be taking the risks and (perhaps) receiving the benefits.

( The Science Court ^ One danger in allowing scientists to decide an issue for society is that often the specialists in a field disagree violently on the proper course of action for society tn take, even though they may have no serious disagreement on the known salient facts. For example, qualified scientists have been assembled on both sides of issues. such as whether to develop the SST, ban the use of pesticides and aerosols, or develop nuclear power, to name a few. As Stephen Schneider and Lynne Mesirow observed regarding the SST battle: An interesting point here is that most of the bitter scientific antagonists in the SST debatejwere probably in far greater agreement on what was known and unknown scientifically, and on the odds that state-ofthe-art estimates would be correct, than they were over whether the evidence justified opposition to the planes. That is, the interpretation of the weight of the evidence that guided their opposition or support was based not only on the scientists' technical knowledge of the issues, but also on their personal philosophies— on whether or not they wanted the SSTs and on whether they thought the benefits of the project were worth the risks of ignoring the worst possibilities. This is not to suggest that most testimony was deliberately misleading, but rather that scientists, like most people, shade to some extent their perception of the merits of conflicting evidence with the shadow of their personal philosophy . . . . The issues facing future generations are too critical to permit the technical components to

be obscured in attacks on the personal philosophies of experts. . . ." As they pointed out, some mechanism is needed so the public and decision-makers can separate the technical opinions of scientists from their political opinions. One suggestion for opening up the process of ethical decision-making in science has been put forward by physicist Arthur Kantrowitz.32 He proposed that in science policy disputes (such as those over SSTs and ozone, DDT and ecosystems, the risks and benefits of recombinant DNA research) the technical aspects of the cases be, in essence, tried in a scientific court. The first step would be to separate the scientific from the moral and political questions. What might be done with genetic engineering technology is a disputable scientific question, in principle soluble by experiment; what should be done is a political-moral question not in principle amenable to experimental solution. Once the separation had been accomplished, then advocates of the different scientific points of view would "try" them before scientific judges. Thus, scientists convinced that DDT posed a serious threat to ecosystems could present their case, and the scientific advocates of the ecosystemic safety of DDT could present theirs. Each side could cross-examine the other. The judges would be selected for their neutrality on the issue, but would have the benefit of scientific training to help them evaluate the opposing views. The final step would be publication (within the limits of national security) of the opinions of the scientific judges. It is easy for anyone familiar with scientific disputes to attack these proposals. In some cases the separation of scientific from moral and political questions is difficult. Is the question "Are blacks genetically less intelligent than whites?" scientific or moral? We would claim that the very posing of the question is a political act about which a moral judgment can be made—but in theory it is a question amenable to experimental investigation. A thornier problem would be selection of judges. In many cases today, disputes concern the negative direct or indirect effects of technology on humanity or on the i!

77iegenesis strategy, pp. 188—189. See? for example. Controlling technology democratically.

2

820 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

ecosphere. The split within the scientific community on this is deep and bitter, and finding judges satisfactory to both technologists and environmentalists (for want of better terms) might often prove exceedingly difficult. In spite of the difficulties, we support Kantrowitz's proposal for the test establishment of an institution for_ making scientific judgments as described above.. The present methods of making such judgments are so bad that any promising alternative or modification deserves a chance. Installation of such a system will, as Kantrowitz points out, take place only over strong objections. It would threaten the vested interests of the politicians who wish to make politically expedient decisions supported by "facts" provided by their pet science advisers. And those scientists who have made lucrative careers and gained much personal power by telling politicians what they want to hear would not be pleased by the prospective dilution of their influence.33 Of course, even the most sophisticated scientific assessment apparatus could not avert all mistakes, but if it were backed by a growing feeling of social responsibility among scientists, it should be possible to improve the record greatly. In addition, ways must be found to increase public participation in technological decisionmaking—a need that is being increasingly recognized.34 The remainder of the solution of learning to live with science and technology is to leave plenty of margin for error. For safety, we must learn to operate somewhat below our capability: not to push ourselves and Earth's ecosystems to the absolute limit, and not to do research in areas where a single slip can produce catastrophe.

Scientific Societies Is there any way that scientific societies can improve the process of technology assessment? Unfortunately, scientists, like other professionals, have been slow to approach their social responsibilities corporately. For instance, the paramount scientific organization in the •gar United States is the quasigovernmenta^National Acacft 35 "Ibid., p. 508. M For example, see John P. Holdren, The nuclear controversy and the limitations of decision-making by experts.

of Sciences (NAS). Being elected to that organization is a high honor for a research scientist, and committees operating under its aegis often perform excellent studies on topics of broad interest to both scientists and society as a whole. Unfortunately, however, the NAS suffers from a number of difficulties that make some of its work suspect and often ^ive the public an erroneous impression of its conclusions.35 First of all, the NAS, under its charter, is advisory to . the government, and as a result its studies are often funded by government agencies. This has at times led to results being colored or suppressed. Similarly, the NAS also accepts funds from industry, another questionable procedure if results are to be unbiased. Since, however, the NAS must have funds if studies are to be done, its choices appear to be limited, and in fairness we might say that the objectivity of NAS studies has been fairly respectable, considering the constraints under which it operates. But, as Ralph Nader has stated, its "prestigious talents are all too often subverted from working in pursuit of the public interest."36 Perhaps a more fundamental problem is that, admittance being honorary, the NAS membership is generally elderly (the median age of its 866 members in 1970 was 62) and therefore likely to contain a rather conservative, status-quo-oriented sample of the universe of scientists. Worse yet, many of the most talented scientists among NAS members remain immersed in their own research, leaving those with a talent for politics to exercise the academy's influence, sometimes against the public good. Although periodically some interest is shown in "reformipg" rhp NA S it tp^mc h'flhly unlikely that any real will HP marip jn ffrst direction. Instead, other gfj^ptifir nrgam'yqrjons are gaining prominence that have open memberships, are member-supported, and are independent of government and big business; and they are beginning to give science a respected voice on social issues. Prominent among them is the(Federatioriof) "For a detailed critique, see P. Boffey. The brain bank of America. This commentary has been described as harsh by some academy members, but its fundamental validity seems indisputable to anyone who has observed the functioning of the NAS for any period. "Introduction to Boffey, The brain bank, p. xxiii. See also Harold Green's analysis of NAS president Philip Handler's defense of DDT, The risk-benefit calculus in safety determination; and Handler's reply, A rebuttal: The need for a sufficient scientific base for government regulation.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 821

CArnerican Scientists (FASX which has about 7000 mem-, bgrs (compared to the NAS 1000), including half of America's Nobel laureates. The FAS declines, rather than relies upon, government contracts, which may explain why its budget is only one five-hundredth as large as that of the NAS. But its voice is already more persuasive to many because of its independence.

Outer Space and the Environmental Crisis Repeatedly, since it has become clear that population growth was moving humanity into an ever-worsening _ crisis, the suggestion has been made that Han'" ^pif^^ seek relief from the pressures it was generating by (. migrating away irornTEartfi) That this is an unsatisfactory long-term solution follows immediately from arithmetic. Under any scenario of exponential growth at rates close to those on Earth today, everything in the visible, universe would have to be converted into human flesh in _ would a few thousand years, and a cosmic ball soon thereafter be expanding with the speed of light. At a more mundane level, biologist Garrett Hardin in 1959 published some simple calculations demonstrating the utter impracticality of launching spaceships from Earth on a large enough scale to solve human population problems by interstellar migration.37 Soon thereafter, physicist John Fremlin pointed out that, at then current, growth rates, any time humanity wished to "solve" the population problem by extraterrestrial migration, it would take only about a half -century to populate Venus, Mercury, Mars, the moon, and the moons of Jupiter and. Saturn to rhp same population density as Earth — since the surface areas of these planets and moons are not 3 times that of Earth, they would reach the Earth population density in less than two doubling times.38 Recently a new and rather different approach to solving human problems in outer space has been proposed, not by science fiction writers but by a respected professor of physics, Gerard K. O'Neill of Princeton University. The basic idea is to colonize not planetary "Interstellar migration and the population problem, Heredity, vol. 50 (1959), pp. 68-70. J8 How many people can the world support? New Scientist, October 29, 1964.

surfaces but space itself, drawing energy from the sun, and materials first from the moon and then from the asteroid belt. O'Neill and his colleagues have done extensive preliminary calculations and conclude that, without the development of radically new technologies: 1. We can cojonize space1 and do so without robbing or harming anyone and without polluting anything. 2. If work is begun soon, nearly all our industrial activity could be moved away from Earth's fragile hinspVipre within ]cfjfi than a century from now. 3. The technical imperatives of this kind of migration of people anrMrj^ffl-y

int

" sparg. are likely to

encourage self-sufficiency, small-scale governmen-_ talunits, cultural diversity and a high degree of independence/ 4. The ultimate size limit for the human race on the newly available frontier is at least 20,000 times its present value [about 500 years of growth at present rates].39 The general plans for O'Neill Colonies have been widely discussed and need not concern us in detail here.40 An ingenious plan has been devised for propelling materials excavated from the moon's surface to the assembly sites of the first colonies where the materials would be processed on the spot. The processing would take advantage of the abundant solar energy, convenient heat sink, and zero gravity of space. The colonies would be both self-replicating and virtually entirely selfsustaining. Oxygen, for instance, would be recovered from the lunar soil—although hydrogen to be combined into water would be one of the few imports from Earth. The first colony might well be a space manufacturing facility (SMF) established at Lagrange 5 (L5), a point in space that follows the Earth and the moon, has zero gravity, and about which thousands of colonies could move in quasielliptical orbits. The first products of the SMF could be huge solar power plants (Satellite Solar Powered Stations, SSPS)

"O'Neill. The colonization of space. For example, O'Neill, The colonization of space; Colonies in orbit, AVrc York Times Magazine, January 18, 1976; and The high frontier; Colonizing space. Time, May 26, 1975; Issac Asimov, Colonizing the heavens, Saturday Review, June 28,1975; Gwyneth Cravens, The garden of feasibility, Harpers, August 1975; Graham Chedd, Culonizaiiun ai Lagrangea, New Scientist, October 24, 1974, pp. 247-249. 40

822 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

which would beam low-density microwaves to Earth where they would be received by antenna arrays, converted to electricity, and fed into power lines.41 Subsequently, colonies could be built as space habitats of what at first seem to be daunting dimensions—for instance, cylinders of up to 16 miles in length and 4 miles in diameter, as in O'Neill's earlier plans, or perhaps spheres of similar volume, which he now thinks superior.42 The colonies would be shielded from cosmic radiation, would receive day-length sunlight with a system of mirrors, and would rotate to produce normal gravity on their inner surfaces. Within the colony, O'Neill envisions a very pleasant environment for up to 10,000 people, including large areas of "natural" environment with trees, grass, birds, bees, butterflies, and bodies of water. A wide variety of sports and diversions would be available, enhanced by the options of pursuing them at normal gravity on the inner surface of the station or at zero gravity at the rotational axis. Industry would be carried on largely at zero gravity, which provides great benefits;43 agriculture would be assigned to separate chambers where it could take advantage of an infinite variety of light regimes, gravities, atmospheres (including high CO2), and so on. The prospect of colonizing space presented by O'Neill and his associates has had wide appeal, especially to young people who see it opening a new horizon for humanity. The possible advantages of the venture are many and not to be taken lightly. In theory, many of humanity's most environmentally destructive activities could be removed from the ecosphere entirely; the population density of the Earth could be reduced; and a high quality of life could be provided to all Homo sapiens. It might even make war obsolete. What can one say on the negative side about this seeming panacea? At the moment the physical technology exists largely on paper, and cost estimates depend in part on numbers from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—not necessarily a dependable source.44 There appear to us, however, to be no more technical barriers inherent in the further develop4 'O'Neill, Space colonies and energy supply to the Earth. "O'Neill, personal communication, February 1, 1976. "See, for example, Harry C. Gates, Materials processing in space. "For example, Les Aspin, The space shuttle: Who needs it?

ment of the O'Neill technology than in others in which society has committed itself to large, open-ended and highly speculative investments—fusion power technology being a prime current example, the atomic bomb one from the relatively recent past. On the biological side, things are not so rosy. The question of atmospheric composition may prove more vexing than O'Neill imagines, and the problems of maintaining complex artificial ecosystems within the capsule—or anywhere—are far from solved. The microorganisms necessary for the nitrogen cycle and the diverse organisms involved in decay food chains would have to be established, as would a variety of other microorganisms necessary to the flourishing of some plants. "Unwanted" microorganisms would inevitably be included or would evolve from "desirable" ones purposely introduced. Furthermore, in many cases the appropriate desirable organisms for introduction are not even known. Whatever type of system were introduced, there would almost certainly be serious problems with its stability. Biologists simply have no idea how to create a large, stable artificial ecosystem. For a long time it is likely that the aesthetic senses of space colonists would have to be satisfied by artificial plants, perhaps supplemented with specimen trees and flower beds. The problems in the agricultural modules might be easier to solve but are far from trivial. Since, according to O'Neill, agricultural surface is relatively cheap to construct, it seems likely that early stations should have perhaps 4 times as much as is required to sustain the colony, and that it should be rather highly compartmented and diverse to minimize the chances for a disaster to propagate. A great deal of research will have to go into developing appropriate stable agricultural systems for space. The challenge is fascinating—especially because of the variety of climatic regimes possible, the potential for excluding many pests, and the availability of abundant energy. We can say, then, that although there appear to be no absolute physical barriers to the implementation of the O'Neill program, potentially serious biological barriers remain to be investigated. What about psychological, social, and political barriers? The question of whether Homo sapiens can adapt to the proposed space station environment seems virtually answered. Six thousand

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 823

men live for long periods on a navy supercarrier orders of magnitude smaller than a proposed space habitat, without women and without numerous amenities of life envisioned by O'Neill. Many city dwellers pass their lives in similarly circumscribed areas and in much less interesting surroundings (travel among stations and occasionally back to Earth is envisioned). There is little reason to doubt that most people would adapt to the strange situation of access to different levels of gravity. Whether or not society will support the venture is another matter. Much may depend on whether O'Neill's calculations45 on the profitability of the solar-power generating enterprise stand up under closer scrutiny and limited experiment. The strongest objections that will be raised against space colonization are that it cannot help humanity with the problems of the next crucial decades; that it will divert attention, funds, and expertise from needed projects on Earth; and that it is basically just one more technological circus like nuclear power or the SST. That space colonies will have no immediate impact is recognized by O'Neill, but he argues that society should look to medium-range as well as short-range solutions. Diversion of funds and expertise also do not seem to be extremely serious objections. There is, for instance, no sign that capital diverted from, say, a boondoggle like the B-l bomber would necessarily be put to "good" use. Equally, it does not follow that money for space colonies must be diverted from desirable programs. The expertise needed is superabundant—many trained aerospace engineers, for example, were unable to find appropriate employment in the mid-1970s. The possibility of diverting attention from immediate problems like population control is much more serious and can only be avoided by assiduous care on the part of O'Neill and other promoters of the project. Some of O'Neill's associates have done his cause grave harm by not realizing this. At every stage people must be reminded that, for the potential of space even to be explored, a functioning society and economy must be maintained for the next three decades. Environmentalists, including us, had a strong negative reaction to O'Neill's proposals when first presented with "Space colonies and energy supply.

them.46 The proposals smack of a vision of human beings continually striving to solve problems with more and bigger technology, always turning away from learning to live in harmony with nature and each other and forever dodging the question of What is a human being for? But, again, O'Neill's vision shares many elements with that of most environmentalists: a high-quality environment for all peoples, a relatively less populated Earth on which a vast diversity of other organisms can thrive in an unpolluted environment with much wilderness, a wide range of options for individuals, and perhaps time to consider those philosophical questions. The price of this would, of course, be a decision that a substantial portion of humanity would no longer dwell on Earth. Environmentalists often accuse politicians of taking too short-term a view of the human predicament. By prematurely rejecting the idea of space colonies, they could be making the same mistake.

MEDICINE By the 1970s members of the medical profession in the United States and elsewhere were becoming aware of the seriousness of the population problem and the role that medicine has played in creating it, as well as the role that profession must play if the problem is to be solved. More and more physicians now realize that medical intervention in lowering death rates must be balanced by intervention in lowering birth rates. In the United States, courageous doctors openly defied antique abortion laws and risked grave financial loss by performing vasectomies before the legal climate became favorable to those procedures. Interest in the problems of environmental medicine has been rising also, and medical doctors have been at the forefront in sounding warnings (often ignored) about the hazards of air pollution, water pollution, and other environmental threats to public health. On the debit side, the medical profession as a whole was tardy in backing even such elementary programs as the repeal of laws limiting sex education, the distribution of contraceptive information, and the establishment of *GSee, for example, Coevolution Quarterly, Spring 1976.

J

824 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

family-planning services for the poor. Furthermore, medical training has militated against abortion except under extremely limited circumstances, and the record of the profession (in contrast to those of some courageous individual physicians) in the area of abortion reform was atrocious. For some time after a so-called liberal abortion law was enacted in California, a substantial portion of the abortions in that state continued to be performed by a single group of doctors. Even two years after abortion was legalized nationwide in 1973, only 17 percent of public hospitals and a pitifully small number of private clinics offered abortion services.47 The medical profession should have taken the lead in abolishing not only the abortion laws but all of the pseudolegal hospital rituals attendant to performing abortions. The history of the medical profession's attitude toward voluntary sterilization in the past also has generally been reactionary and moralistic. For example, "quotas" based on a woman's age and the number of living children she had were commonly used to determine whether that woman could obtain voluntary sterilization in many United States hospitals during the 1960s.48 The doctor has the responsibility of establishing that a patient fully understands the consequences of sterilization and any possible temporary side eifects, and that he or she would not be physically harmed by the operation. But the doctor should have no right to make the ultimate decision whether an adult should be voluntarily sterilized. The American Medical Association is an extremely powerful organization and an enormous potential force for good. But, as in many other areas of social reform, such as in providing decent health care to all Americans, the AMA has conspicuously dragged its feet on the population controversy. Rather than leading the crusade for population-control measures, particularly those that pertain to medical practice, the AMA finally went on record as supporting these policies only after pressure was applied from outside by the public and from within by the younger members. Whether the medical profession in the United States will become a strong force for population control re47 Gutlmacher Institute, Provisional estimates of abortion need and services in the year following the Supreme Court decision, New York, 1975. "Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Population, resources, environment, 2 ed., W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1972, chapter 9.

mains to be seen. It has a great potential for helping to solve the population problem, both at home and through technical aid to other countries. Many medical professionals in the United States, for instance, have actively assisted in training programs for understaffed familyplanning and general public-health services in less developed countries. Such activities could be expanded and encouraged within the profession. In addition, the medical profession can be taken to task for concentrating far too little effort on "health care" and far too much on "disease care." Again with outstanding exceptions among individual physicians, organized medicine has, for example, failed to take any lead in questioning the public-health consequences of the largescale technologies used in agriculture, power generation, transportation, and other sectors of modern life. While medical and biological scientists have wasted billions of dollars in ill-conceived searches for cancer cures, the AMA has been largely silent about the environmental causes of the vast majority of cancers (see Chapter 10). It is high time that the medical profession as a whole threw its enormous prestige into the battle against environmental deterioration, particularly those aspects that threaten public health. Finally, we must note that the entire pattern of modern health care has been strongly attacked by that prince of intellectual iconoclasts, Ivan Illich. Illich claimed that modern medicine is destroying our health, turning us into "slaves of a monopolist international medical industry"—consumers of a product called health.49 As with Illich's devastating critique of education (see "Education"), his opinions deserve careful attention even if they are extremely heterodox, and even if his suggestions for change seem impractically individualistic.50

EDUCATION In the United States and around the world there clearly has been an almost total failure to prepare people to understand and make decisions relating to the populationresource-environment crisis. The universities, which 49

Medical nemesis: The expropriation of health. '"Other critiques of the medical system include Rene Dubos, The mirage of health; and Rick Carlson, The end of medicine.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 825

should be leading the way in education, have been too conservative and too compartmentalized. Unfortunately, most human problems do not fall neatly into such academic categories as sociology, history, economics, demography, psychology, or biology. The solutions to these problems require the simultaneous application of the best ideas from many academic disciplines. The failure to provide a multidisciplinary education partially explains the optimism of many physical scientists, economists, technologists, and others relative to the environmental crisis. Their kind of optimism is exemplified by a statement by physicist Gerald Feinberg, who wrote in 1968, "Most of our immediate problems will be solved in a relatively short time by the march of technology and the worldwide spread of those aspects of Western culture that are responsible for our high living standards.""

Consequences of Overspecialization There are many examples of such naive optimism mixed with cultural chauvinism that testify to the failure of schools to provide a broad appreciation of science and technology and to place them in a sociopolitical context. The illusion that the Green Revolution would save humanity from starvation, common in the early 1970s, illustrated a faith in science and technology characteristic of the "well-informed" layman. That faith is all too often shared by academicians who have acquired little insight into biology and into what is involved in raising crop yields or in establishing agricultural development in poor countries. Ignorance of the environmental consequences of population expansion leads many social scientists to underrate the significance of population growth in the DCs and the immediacy of the environmental threat. Such narrowness of outlook is not exclusive to any particular group of scientists. For example, an oceanographer, ridiculing some of the ecological problems associated with agriculture, once told an audience at the University of California at Berkeley that, with modern fertilizing techniques, soil only serves to prop plants up. The president of the United States National Academy of 5

'Quoted in Hhrlich and Ehrlich, Population, reso

p. 357.

Sciences, writing in the journal Science, at various times has attacked scientists who were trying to have DDT banned and has downplayed the health effects of air pollution and the probable overall impact of nuclear war. Many of the solutions put forth by technological optimists are based on ignorance of ecology, demography, anthropology, sociology, and other nontechnological fields. Those who see a panacea in nuclear agroindustrial complexes, for instance, are simultaneously required to ignore (among other things) economics, the scale of the food problem, the state of reactor technology, the potential ecological damage, and an entire spectrum of political and social complexities. Those few technologists who still propose migration (to Australia or to other planets) as a solution to the population problem, or who would accommodate surplus people in concrete cities floated on the sea, simply need remedial work in arithmetic. Even projects that might be technically feasible can provide no amelioration of the dilemmas of the near future, because rate problems guarantee too great a lag-time. \X7hen highly trained and presumably knowledgeable people are so uninformed, it is hardly surprising that the average person has difficulty evaluating the situation. Not only do most citizens of the United States and other developed countries lack even a skeleton of the necessary technical background, but many do not feel confident enough of their analytic abilities to do even the elementary "back-of-the-envelope" calculations that might permit them to decide which of two "experts" is correct on a given question. For instance, exposing as fraudulent the notion that the Alaskan oil field would be a panacea for American energy needs would require only dividing U.S. annual consumption of oil (6 billion bbl~l into known and _ estimated Alaskan reserves (9 billion and 45 billion bbl, respectively). Unfortunately., few people think nf rriflfcing such checks for themselves. Those who might, often would not know where to find the information on comsumption and reserves—high schools and universities turn out few students well versed in the use of libraries. The fast-aporoachinp problems of the future willrequire a citizenry equipped to make difficult choices and to_evaluate the qualities of leaders, whether in politics or_ business. Too few graduates of any educational level (high school to Ph.D.) today have the broad backgrounds

826 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

necessary to make such choices intelligently. Too few citizens understand the workings of the political and economic systems well enough in begin making apprn^ priate changes in those systems—such lessons are not taught in school.

as well. Such reforms, however, must continue to accelerate if the educational system is to contribute in any significant degree to improving civilization's chances. Without a growing cadre of well-educated people, the kinds of citizen-participation programs we suggest later in this chapter will not constitute much of an improvement over the present political system.

New Priorities for Education of the educational system in The States need to be reexamined. and new prioritjpff nppH tn be set. At present, the system is largely failinp to meet even the old stated goals. But such an overhaul of the educational system will require the cooperation of some elements of society who may see in it a threat to their own interests— from the small group of the ultra-rich, who control much of the power in the United States and who want no changes in the system, to entrenched university professors whose doctrinaire defense of rigid boundaries between their separate disciplines is one more obstacle to solving the world's problems. One would think that many of the needed educational reforms could be introduced relatively easily at the university level. Unfortunately, like all other mature, institutions, universities ^rp qnitp rreistant to rhnrcp<: '" their antiquated structures. Nevertheless, the possibility does exist of loosening the rigid departmental organization in order to provide some exchange of information and ideas among disciplines, even though the rate of movement is still very slow.ffianford University^ with, the help of th^Ford Foundation in 1970. developed an. jJ1TfintiSCiP*'narY ""dergraduate curriculum in (jlumaifr j" with the express purposes of avoiding the trap_ of disciplinary myopia and of preparing students to . engage pressing human problems. By 1975 the program included 350 undergraduate students and was the third most popular major on campus. In 1973, v^of California at Berkeley instituted a campuswide interdisciplinary graduate program it/Energy and Resources^ which now has tenured facultv^not assigned to anv^ department— a significant break with tradition. Many other colleges and universities have also instituted interdisciplinary programs of various sorts, while courses dealing with the problems of the survival of civilization are proliferating on lower educational levels

The Role of Students Perhaps the greatest hope for action in our universities and colleges lies with the students. Although the activism of the late 1960s has faded, students in the mid-1970s as a group are still much more socially aware than were the students of the 1950s and early 1960s. Many seem determined to change our society for the better and are actively working for political and social change. In our opinion and that of many colleagues, the majority of the most exciting and progressive changes in higher education during the 1960s had their roots in student activism. We hope that those former students, who are now beginning to take responsible roles in business and the professions, may in the 1970s and 1980s produce equally salutary changes in other institutions as well. To a large extent, recent college graduates and students today have more realistic views of the world than their parents because they do not see it through the rose-colored glasses that were constructed for earlier generations by society and its educational system. Those who matured just before World War II were young during a time when personal financial insecurity was an overriding consideration for much of the population. Since World War II, students have grown up in an era when, for most, financial security could be taken for granted, so other social issues could claim their attention. The period was also one of unprecedented change. The world was brougnt into students' homes through the medium of television, and they were forced into a global outlook by global threats to their personal safety. Many of these young people are change-oriented and concerned about other people, and they think about subtle problems that involve all of humanity. That they show such concern should not be viewed as anything but a hopeful sign.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 827

Although the educational system below the college level is in some ways less resistant to change than colleges and universities, it is similarly inadequate in preparing people for the realities of the world crisis. In some of the better school systems, however, there have been changes—sometimes at the initiative of students. Elementary and junior high school students in many areas have in various ways demonstrated their concern about environmental deterioration. Many teachers have encouraged interest in population growth and the environment, with or without administrative support. Since Earth Day 1970, in particular, there has been a widespread effort to introduce environmental concern into schools at virtually every level. Programs to encourage environmental and population education in schools have also been established at the federal level in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Sex Education A lack of adequate sex education is still a serious problem in the United States and many other countries. We face both a population problem and a venereal disease epidemic in the United States, and yet powerful groups are determined to keep the "facts of life" from our young people. No subject is more likely to bring out a mob of angry parents than the thought of introducing the most innocuous sex-education curriculum into a school, even if the program is endorsed by educators, psychiatrists, and clerics of many faiths. Some parents in our sex-saturated society even claim that a straight-foward description of sexual intercourse, of the sort that should be perfectly acceptable reading for any child, is part of a communist plot to destroy our youth! This is a vicious cycle, with a minority of ignorant or disturbed parents fighting to guarantee that their children grow up equally ignorant or disturbed. There are, of course, formidable barriers to reasonable sex education in schools, churches, and in the home. One is a lack of training for potential teachers, who must have a thorough understanding of the subject. The second is the nearly ubiquitous feeling that sex education must be tied up with moral judgments. In the face of massive ignorance and our current population crisis, however, it

is difficult to construct an argument against teaching about three basic aspects of sex in the schools. First, children must be thoroughly informed about the anatomy of sex organs and the physiology of sex and reproduction. Second, they must be taught the difference between "sex" and reproduction and about the methods of contraception. Third, they should be informed of the dangers of venereal disease. These straightforward factual matters are easy. Introducing the student to the role sex plays in society, the attitudes toward it in different religious and social groups, attitudes toward contraception, illegitimacy, marriage, divorce, virginity, and sex-as-just-plain-fun must be handled with great care and by specially trained teachers. But the cycle of the blind leading the blind, that of embarrassed and uninformed parents "educating" their children, must be broken somehow. The experience of Planned Parenthood and other organizations that help teenagers with sexual problems (often unwanted pregnancies) is that keeping youngsters ignorant does not prevent early experimentation with sex, as is usually the intention. On the contrary, informed youngsters seem much less likely to engage in sexual adventures before they are emotionally ready and are even less likely to find themselves incipient parents. One way in which school systems have successfully introduced sex-education programs is by giving parents a preview of the material. The parents are invited to evaluate the program—in fact, one purpose is to educate them. Such preparation of the adult population would seem essential to avoid perpetuating ignorance. A sexeducation program has even been initiated in West Germany for grandparents, who often care for children while parents work. Perhaps sex education should be promoted for all parents of preschool children in the United States. In recent years, at least, several frank and competent books have become available for those interested enough to educate themselves. For preadolescents, the book Wliere did I come from? by Peter Mayle is excellent, and for young women, Our bodies, ourselves by the Boston Women's Health Book Collective has produced a revolution of understanding. At a more comprehensive and intellectual level, we can recommend Fundamentals of human sexuality by psychiatrists Hcrant Katchadourian

828 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

and Donald Lunde, which has enjoyed great success as a college text and is highly recommended for any adolescent or adult who wants to understand his or her sexuality. The Brain Drain Our educational system is failing to produce not only those competent to teach sex education, but also the ecologists, agricultural scientists and technicians, social scientists, paramedical personnel, and various other specialists needed to help solve the pressing problems of the world—especially in the less developed countries. Indeed, for decades there has been a brain drain. Trained personnel from the LDCs, especially medical doctors, are understandably attracted to the United States and other DCs, where they can earn a good living. Ironically, this often happens because, despite their great needs for trained people, LDCs may have no jobs for them. That many individuals from the LDCs who are educated in the DCs do not wish to return to their homelands is even sadder. Although some DCs, notably the Soviet Union, virtually force a return to the homeland, most do not. One relatively simple and humane solution would be for the DCs to establish and help staff more training centers within the LDCs. This should have the additional benefits of training local people to work on problems of local significance and of familiarizing visiting faculty members from the DCs with those problems. Changing the Educational Structure While a great deal can be done to improve the educational system within the general framework now recognized, more fundamental changes will probably be required if large technological societies are to discover ways to govern themselves satisfactorily while solving or preventing the social and environmental problems that now threaten to destroy them. Ivan Illich has suggested the abolition of formal education and the making of educational materials and institutions available to all on a cafeteria basis.32 To those struggling in the present system, the idea has considerable appeal; but even Illich j2

Deschooling society.

recognizes the enormous drawbacks inherent in such an unstructured approach. We would suggest another strategy, one that expands on ideas already current in education. First of all, we think that a major effort should be made to extend education throughout the life span, rather than attempting to cram all education into the first fifteen to twentyfive years. It is becoming widely recognized that maturity and experience are often a benefit in learning. Students who have dropped out, worked, and then returned to school generally do so with renewed vigor and increased performance. Experience in the real world can lead students to avoid much wasted effort in the educational world. A program of encouraging interruption of education, perhaps for one or two years during or directly after high school and another two years after receiving an undergraduate degree might be a good start. For example, a student interested in becoming a physician might spend two years after high school doing clerical work in a hospital or doctor's office or serving as an orderly. When his or her undergraduate education was completed, two additional years could be spent working with a doctor as a paramedic. Similarly, individuals going into business, government, science, bricklaying, plumbing, or whathave-you should have a chance to try out their chosen professions and trades at the bottom before completing their educations.53 The benefits of the program would be many, including better understanding of the problems faced by associates (a doctor who has been an orderly should have more insight into the situation of the orderlies), and fewer cases of people committing themselves to careers too early, with too little knowledge of what the commitment involves, and discovering the error too late to make another choice. Students who, on completing high school, were unsure of what their futures should be, could try out several possibilities. What about youngsters who have no desire to go beyond high school or vocational school? Should their educations end at that point? In the United States, for instance, nearly 1 adult in 5 reportedly lacks "those skills and knowledges which are requisite to adult compe"For a more detailed discussion of restructuring our educational system, see Dennis C. Pirages and Paul R. Ehrlich, Ark II: Social response to environmental imperatives, chapter 6.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 829

tence."54 We believe that a technological society, especially a democracy, cannot afford such a large proportion of poorly educated citizens. Every citizen should be drawn into the problems of societal decision-making. We would suggest that all people be required to take sabbatical leaves every seventh year, which could be financed in various ways depending on the choice of activity (this and the employment "problems" created by such a program are considered under "Economic and Political Change"). Each person would be required to spend the year bettering society and himself or herself in a way approved by the individual's immediate colleagues. A physician might petition his or her county medical society for permission to study new surgical techniques or anthropology. A garbage collector might petition coworkers to permit him or her to take a year's course in sanitary engineering or recycling techniques at a university. A secretary might apply to the government for a grant to spend a sabbatical serving on an ad hoc citizens' committee to evaluate the direction of research in high-energy physics. A business executive might apply for one of the open sabbatical chairs that could be established on the city council (as well as in all other legislative bodies). A flight instructor might persuade the local pilot's association to appoint him or her to one of the exchange positions in the local Federal Aviation Administration office, with an FAA counterpart being required (if qualified) to take over the instructor's job for a year. All bureaucrats should be required to take some of their sabbaticals as nongovernmental workers in the areas they administer and all professors to take some of theirs outside the groves of academe —or at least outside their own fields. The details of such a program would be complicated, but its benefits, we believe, would far outweigh its costs. A growing rigidity of roles in our society must be broken, and virtually everyone must be brought into its decision-making processes. Indeed, the discontent expressed today by many groups is based on their feeling of being cut off from participation in important decisions that affect their lives. Some moves in this general direction have been made in the People's Republic of China, where city people and 54

Based on a U.S. Office of Education study, reported in Time, November 10, 1975, p. 6.

academics have been forced to join rural communes and participate in completely different work from what they had done before. It would be interesting to know what success the Chinese have had. We would certainly not advocate forcing people to change their occupations against their wishes, any more than we would advocate adopting the Chinese communist system of government. But the basic idea behind this policy seems valuable, and an adaptation of it that fit our political system might well be worth exploring. As an example of how citizen participation in political decision-making can work, a group of scientists led by ecologist C. S. Holling at the University of British Columbia have involved local businessmen, politicians, and private citizens in a computer simulation of a prospective development project, as an experiment in the results of citizen decision-making.55 Everyone contributed to the assumptions of the model, and all were satisfied with the model created. Then various people were allowed to try out their pet development plans on the model. When a politician found that his or her plan led to environmental disaster, the politician had to acknowledge the error. The politician could not blame the model because he or she had been involved in building what was believed to be a realistic one. We believe that it is possible, at least in theory, to get away from a we-they system of running the country, to give everyone a chance to participate. Grave problems would unquestionably accompany the attempt, but since we are both morally committed to some form of democracy and intellectually convinced that the present system is both undemocratic and lethally ineffectual, we see no choice but to try a change.

THE LEGAL SYSTEM Perhaps the greatest potential for reversing environmental deterioration in the United States and for bringing our population growth under control lies in the effective utilization of our legal system.56 A law may be defined as 55

Personal communication. "Much of this section is based on discussions with attorney Johnson C. Montgomery, whose death in December 1Q74 was a loss deeply felt by people in the ZFG movement.

830 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

a "rule of conduct for a community, prescribed by a governing authority and enforced by sanction." The sanction enforcing a law may be either a reward or a punishment. For instance, to control agricultural production, the government might pay a subsidy for not raising crops on part of his land (a reward) or jail a farmer who raises crops (a punishment). Where a government wishes to induce an affirmative action, a promised reward is often more effective than the threat of punishment. In the United States, constitutional questions involving due process, equal protection, and so forth are more likely to arise where punishment, rather than reward, is involved. Bonuses for not having children would certainly raise fewer constitutional questions than jail for overreproducers, for example. Law is also sometimes defined as codified custom. In a sense, legislators, police officers, and judges are merely social instruments for enforcing customary behavior. Historically they have also helped to create custom bydefining acceptable conduct. This has been especially true of legislators and is becoming increasingly true of judges. When the new problems of local and global overpopulation and environmental deterioration arose, they clearly demanded the establishment of new rules of conduct and new customs—in short, new laws. Just as the ancient laws relating to trespass had to be modified by the courts and by the legislatures to handle the new circumstances created by automobiles and airplanes, new devices are now being developed for dealing with pollution and population pressure. The laws of the free-enterprise system were failing to meet the needs of everyone everywhere as long as they permitted—let alone encouraged—unrestricted reproduction and pollution.

Environmental Law and Lawsuits Many aspects of environmental deterioration can be curbed or controlled through legal means. Probably the easiest form to control is pollution, whether caused by industry in the processes of mining and manufacturing or by individuals in their ordinary lives (air pollution from automobiles and home heating, for instance). Before 1965, there was relatively little control by law of pollution, and the existing regulatory mechanisms were

quickly becoming obsolete and inadequate as the volume and variety of pollutants multiplied. Fortunately, there are many legal precedents that have permitted society to oppose polluters legally. Two examples are the legal precepts of nuisance and trespass. Nuisance. Under common law (the law generally applicable in the United Kingdom and former British colonies) and under civil law (the law generally applicable in the rest of the Western world), the concept of nuisance has for centuries permitted governments to bring some of their coercive powers to bear on those who create excessive smoke, noise, odor, filth, and the like. In some jurisdictions access to sunlight and even an attractive view are among the aesthetic values protected by public administrators. Public administrators, however, in general have not been noted for their diligence in complaining about local businesses. Nuisances have more often been successfully stopped by individual citizens who have obtained injunctions to stop them. (Private citizens may receive money damages for injuries caused them by a nuisance.) Existing nuisance laws have presented a number of difficulties, however. First, the nuisance doctrine generally serves only to protect rights associated with real property. As matters now stand, a private nuisance can be stopped only by a person occupying adjacent or nearby property. Even in the most enlightened jurisdictions, little if anything can be done to protect people in the vicinity who do not own or occupy property. Second, the nuisance doctrine requires that a complainant show a causal relationship between the condition he or she is complaining about—for example, smoke or noise—and a direct injury to himself. Generally he has to show that the condition is the cause of injury. Obviously, if each of several polluters contributes a little to the overall problem, the nuisance doctrine is not much help. On the other hand, there is growing authority for the proposition that if a suit is filed against all the persons who are contributing to a nuisance, it is up to them to show to what extent each has contributed. Thus there have been successful cases involving river pollution in which all upstream contributors have been sued. Third, the nuisance doctrine is applied only if in the eyes of the court the polluter is causing more harm than

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 831

good. Unfortunately, it has been held by many courts that a so-called lawful business (paint manufacturing, for example) cannot constitute a nuisance. Today there is an increasing public tendency to recognize the dangers from pollution, however, and, in balancing them against economic considerations, to require businesses to do whatever a court or an administrative agency may think is economically reasonable. For instance, in the case of Boomer versus Atlantic Cement Company,*1 individual plaintiifs were awarded damages for cement dust falling on their property, but the court refused to issue an injunction that would halt the plant's operations, even though it found those operations created a nuisance. The court reasoned that the economic activities of the company were too valuable to the area and too many other people would be harmed if the plant were closed down. That the economic interests of the polluters are taken into consideration by government authorities, however, often leads to spurious arguments based on the notion that restrictions would foster unfair competition: "We can't compete with the Jones Company if we can't spray our crops with DDT." The answer to this argument of course is: "We will stop the Jones Company too." Often the best way of avoiding unfair-competition arguments is to pass legislation that affects an entire industry. For example, if a law were passed prohibiting the manufacture of all persistent insecticides (for instance, all those with half-lives of more than one week under average field conditions), the chemical companies would very quickly increase production of those that met the requirements and would develop new ones that would also break down rapidly. The serious defects in the existing nuisance laws might make it appear that they cannot really assist in controlling pollution, but that is not so. With relatively minor adjustments, those laws could be made very effective. These are among the changes that must be made: (1) expand the nuisance doctrine to include people who are hurt by the pollution but who do not occupy nearby property; (2) permit individuals to bring actions not only on their own behalf, but also on behalf of all other individuals in similar circumstances who are being damaged by pollution; (3) permit recovery of punitive "1970. 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 257 N.E. 2d 870, 309 N.Y.S. 2d 312.

damages (damages in excess of the dollar value of the injury suffered) in cases where the polluter could have avoided some or all of the pollution; (4) organize public-spirited scientists so that they might become a more readily available source of testimony. The real value of the nuisance laws is that they provide an existing framework within which to elaborate newer and more restrictive rules of conduct without also requiring the development of previously unrecognized rights and duties. Trespass. Another ancient legal doctrine, that of trespass, can also assist in stopping pollution. According to law, if you hit another person with your fist or with your automobile, or if you hike over another person's land, you have committed a trespass. Trespass is both a crime (a public offense) and a tort (an individual, private injury). For many years there have been metaphysical arguments concerning what constitutes a trespass—for example, whether it is necessary to be able to see whatever hits you or falls on your land. It has been said that rays of light cannot constitute a trespass, and in the past not even smoke could constitute a trespass. However, the old idea that it was necessary to be able to see, feel, and even weigh the offensive object is going out of style. The decision in one California case permitted recovery of substantial damages for lung injuries sustained by a motorist who drove through invisible chemical fumes emitted by a factory. One serious defect in applying the trespass laws to the control of pollution is that the most an individual can recover are the damages to that individual, which are generally limited to the monetary value of the private injuries. In one case, however, the Oregon Supreme Court permitted a private individual to collect punitive damages in addition to his actual personal damages. The court reasoned that some private wrongs are so evil that the wrongdoer should be punished as well as being forced to pay for the actual injury to the complainant. Punitive damages have long been recognized in our legal systems. If industries guilty of pollution are assessed for punitive damages, private individuals will have some incentive to initiate lawsuits against them. Recently, this possibility has induced some industries to curtail their

832 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

pollution. It has also induced some insurance companies to withdraw insurance against such suits, and a few states have contemplated the prohibition of insurance for pollution liability. Like nuisance laws, the trespass laws could be made much more effective merely by permitting an individual to sue for the value of the injuries sustained by all individuals similarly situated. Such suits are called class actions, and the individual represents not only himself or herself, but also all others similarly situated or in the same class. There exists ample authority for class actions in other circumstances. For example, a stockholder has long been able to bring a class action on behalf of all stockholders against a corporation or its officers or directors. Today, there is evidence that trespass laws will increasingly be used in what are essentially class actions against polluters. The suits against the Union Oil Company by the State of California and by individuals in connection with the 1969 oil leak in the Santa Barbara Channel were class actions. In 1973, however, the class-action approach to legal intervention to improve environmental quality received a setback. The United States Supreme Court declared that each member of a class must suffer damages of more than $10,000 (rather than pooled damages amounting to that much) before a federal court could hear an environmental lawsuit.38 Since such individual damage is rarely demonstrable, environmental class actions successfully prosecuted in federal courts will become relatively rare. Suits and interventions by public-interest groups. Perhaps the most impressive success story in the legal battle for the environment has been the rising influence of a relatively few organized public-interest groups that have been using the lawsuit and other forms of legal intervention in a persistent and systematic way. A pioneer in this respect has been the Environmental Defense Fund (EOF). This organization, composed of scientists, lawyers, and other citizens, has been going into the courts and appearing before government regulatory agencies since the late 1960s in its efforts to protect the environment. It started in 1966 by using the courts to stop spraying with DDT in Suffolk County, Long Island. 58

Zahn versus International Paper Company, 42 U.S.L.W. 4087.

As a result of the publicity accompanying the EDF suit, the state of Michigan rigidly restricted the use of DDT. Then, in an adversary-style hearing before the Wisconsin Department of Resources between December 1965 and May 1969, EDF was able to demolish the flimsy case of those attempting to defend continued use of DDT.59 Faced with the certainty of cross-examination, many of the scientists who usually defended the petrochemical industry were noticeably absent from the witness chair (although not from the public press). As a result of those hearings, DDT was banned in Wisconsin. EDF then carried its battle to the federal level, where it played a major role in persuading the Environmental Protection Agency to declare a virtually complete ban on use of DDT in the United States at the end of 1972 (see below).60 Originally a shoestring operation, EDF has gained considerable admiration and support from scientists and others aware of such environmental threats. Other groups, such as the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC, founded in 1970),^ have also become very active in taking environmental issues to court. In 1975 NRDC had a staff of four scientists and fourteen attorneys, and had on its docket more than 100 lawsuits and other legal actions of national significance. Environmental groups like Friends of the Earth and the Sierra Club have also been involved, alone or in coalition with other groups, in many such actions in defense of the environment, frequently in cooperation with the legal staffs of EDF or NRDC. Some of the most notable accomplishments of the legal actions undertaken by the growing and increasingly sophisticated collection of environmental public-interest groups are discussed in the sections that follow.

Legislation and Administrative Agencies Both the need for and the effectiveness of legal action by individuals and citizen groups are linked to the larger M Thc story of the EDF at Madison is told in a very lively fashion by H. Henkin, M. Merta, and J. Staples, The environment, ike establishment, and the law. ""The ban was lifted in 1974 so that DDT could be used against the tussock moth in the Northwest a very unfortunate decision. See Robert F. Harwood, Economics, esthetics, environment, and entomologists: The tussock moth dilemma.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 833

framework of existing laws and the agencies that administer them. In some sense the easiest route to improvements in environmental protection would seem to be the passage of more comprehensive controls and the establishment of streamlined procedures for administering them. Almost certainly, the courts would have no constitutional objections to any reasonable legislative limitations on the activities of polluting industries—for example, requirements that effluents be purified, reduced, or eliminated. The courts could even sustain statutes that would put certain corporations out of business. There are two major difficulties in getting effective legislative action. First is the notion that if a higher government authority (for example, the United States Congress) enacts a law regulating a certain activity, it may have preempted the field so that a lesser government authority (for example, a state) cannot enact legislation dealing with the same subject. This has led die tobacco and automobile industries to push for federal regulation in order to avoid the enactment of possibly morerestrictive state laws. Inconsistencies in laws of different jurisdictions create a problem for industry, and there is no easy answer. A national economy does require national standards; it would be extremely difficult for the automobile manufacturers to satisfy fifty different statutory schemes to regulate automobile pollution. Yet some local problems are so severe that they require more drastic solutions than need be applied to the country at large. Thus California (and only California) is permitted tougher automobile emission standards than those established by the Environmental Protection Agency for the rest of the nation. The second difficulty with legislative action is that legislators are often not cognizant of new problems, and some are notoriously at the beck and call of established pressure groups, such as the automobile manufacturers and die oil industry. Furthermore, in those situations where a legislature has taken action, the action has generally consisted of setting up regulatory agencies like the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, or the Federal Communications Commission. Such agencies in time have tended to become dominated by the industries they are intended to regulate—ultimately the foxes wind up minding the

chickens.61 Nevertheless, as public pressure has grown, the public has already seen and can expect to see more results from legislation and from regulatory agencies than it has in the past. In the early 1970s steps were taken in the United States toward placing stricter controls on the release of pollutants into air and water. The Clean Air Act (as amended in 1970) and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments (1972) set national pollution standards for air and water.62 As we discussed in Chapter 11, however, it was clear by the mid-1970s that the high expectations of environmentalists were not to be realized—at least not as rapidly as they had hoped. There remains a need for establishing and implementing a nationwide (to say nothing of worldwide) program drastically limiting emissions of harmful materials from industry, automobiles, homes, and other sources. National Environmental Policy Act. A major landmark in the fight for environmental quality in the United States was the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (familiarly known as NEPA)63, which became law on January 1,1970. The bill was modeled in large part after the Employment Act of 1946, which "declared a responsibility in the Federal Government to maintain a prosperous and stable national economy."64 In a similar vein, NEPA declared a responsibility in the federal government to restore and maintain environmental quality. NEPA created in the Executive Office of the President a three-member Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which was charged with assisting and advising the president in the preparation of the annual Environmental Quality Report and with carrying out a number of other survey and advisory capacities for monitoring the quality of the environment and the influence of government agencies and actions on it. "For a fascinating description of industry-government "cooperation" on air pollution, see J. C. Esposito, Vanishing air, which, although somewhat out of date, gives the flavor of interactions among politicians, agencies, and businessmen. 62 For a useful citizen's guide to these acts, see J. Cannon, A clear view. "The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, public law 91-190, January 1, 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4321-4347). ^Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality, 1972, p.222.

834 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

The key provision of NEPA, however, is its famous Section 102(C): The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this act and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall— (C) Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on— (i) The environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) Alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and on the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes. This is the section of NEPA that established the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which provided a crucial legal lever for public intervention on the side of the environment. The vast majority of environmental suits have been in the area of public law (concerning the relationship of citizens to the government) in contrast to private law (which deals with the relationship of citizens

with one another). An early instance was the famous Storm King case,65 a lawsuit brought by an environmental group against the Federal Power Commission, which had granted Consolidated Edison of New York a permit to build a pumped-storage hydroelectric plant below scenic Storm King Mountain on the Hudson River. The 1965 decision in the Storm King case helped establish the standing (a position from which to assert legal rights or duties) of individuals or groups with records of concern for the environment—in other words, it established that environmentalists could sue to protect environmental values from the adverse effects of administrative decisions. That legal step forward was followed by a half-step back in another public law case (the Mineral King case), in which the Sierra Club sued to prevent Walt Disney Productions from turning a lovely part of the Sierra Nevada into a plastic wonderland.66 In the Mineral King case, the United States Supreme Court held that members of the Sierra Club had to use the area in question in order to gain standing; the interest of the club members in preserving the wilderness was not sufficient cause to stop the Disney project. (For a novel approach to the question of standing—an approach that would have served the environment well in the Mineral King case— see Box 14-2.) In the context of concerned groups having standing in environmental cases, NEPA's requirement of environmental impact statements (and the required public airing of the EIS) has proven to be a godsend. A series of cases brought by groups such as the Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Sierra Club, and the Natural Resources Defense Council have determined that an EIS is to provide "full disclosure" of the environmental implications of any impending decision, that it must set forth opposing views on significant environmental issues raised by the proposal, that it must contain a full analysis of costs and impacts of alternatives, and that it must balance adverse environ65 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference versus Federal Power Commission, 1965.354 F 2d 608. For a brief discussion of the case, see J. Holdren and P. Herrera, Energy, pp. 181—183. "'Sierra Club versus Morton, 1972, U.S.L.W. 4397. For good discussions of the question of standing and environmental law in general, see J. E. Krier, Environmental law and its administration; and C. D. Stone, Should trees have standing? Toward legal rights far natural objects.

BOX 14-2 A Note on Standing The legal machinery and the basic legal notions needed to control pollution are already in existence. Slight changes in the legal notions and diligent application of the legal machinery are all that are necessary to induce a great reduction in pollution in the United States. One change in those notions that would have a most salubrious effect on the quality of the environment has been proposed by law professor Christopher D. Stone in his celebrated monograph, Should trees have Standing?* In that tightly reasoned essay, Stone

points out the obvious advantages of giving natural objects standing, just as such inanimate objects as corporations, trusts, and ships are now held to have legal rights and duties. If this were done, questions such as that of the standing of the Sierra Club in the Mineral King case, mentioned earlier, would disappear—for, as Justice William 0. Douglas pointed out in his dissenting opinion in that case, Sierra Club versus Morton would "be more properly labeled as Mineral King v. Morton."

*Originaily published in 1972 in the Southern California Lam Review; available as a book, which also reprints the U.S.

Supreme Court's opinions in Sierra Club versus Morton (the Mineral King controversy).

mental effects against the benefits of the proposal.67 Failure to conform fully to the requirements has been the basis of numerous successful lawsuits in which projects have been stopped until proper environmental impact statements were prepared. The strength of NEPA lies in the formal commitment of the government to environmental quality and the required public airing of potential impacts by the EIS procedures. In the five years 1970 through 1974, more than 6000 impact statements were filed. In the opinion of the CEQ, by 1974 NEPA had "succeeded in its objective of incorporating an environmental perspective into the decision-making process of Federal agencies."68 This statement seems accurate to us, both because it agrees with our impressions and because, when it was made, Russell W. Peterson, one of the brightest and most straightforward of Washington bureaucrats, was chairman of the CEQ.68a In addition, the general approach of NEPA has been adopted by local and state governments. By 1974 twenty-one states and Puerto Rico had adopted the EIS process, as had governments in such nations as Australia, Canada, and Israel.69 One of the most impressive of the state acts is California's 1970 Environmental Quality Act (amended), which requires impact state67

CEQ Environmental Quality, 1972, pp. 242-246. CEQ, Environmental Quality, 1974, p, 372. This report has a good brief historical account of the evolution of NEPA (pp. 372^13). ^"In 1976 he resigned and in 1977 was succeeded by Charles Warren, a California State legislator with a thorough understanding of environmental issues. President Carter's appointment of Warren continues the tradition of excellence in this position. M Ibid., pp. 399-413. M

merits on all projects, private or government, that will significantly affect the environment. In the mid-1970s some 6000 statements were being filed annually.70 As far-reaching and successful as NEPA has been in this context, some weaknesses are also evident. While it has raised consciousness of the environment in government agencies and in the business community, concrete results in terms of prevention and repair of environmental deterioration have been less apparent. Thus far, NEPA has been mainly an instrument for disseminating information rather than one for guiding policy. It cannot, in itself, lead to the cancellation of a project—even though citizens groups have repeatedly employed it to delay projects where EIS provisions have not been meticulously followed. Indeed, a key flaw in the act as first applied was that its enforcement depended entirely upon the public, and the public could use it only to delay, not to halt, projects that would have massive negative impacts on the environment.71 As far as NEPA was concerned, the Army Corps of Engineers legally could plow the United States under, or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission could permit the country to be totally contaminated with lethal amounts of radioactive wastes, as long as the EIS requirements of the law were followed scrupulously. In applying NEPA, the courts seem to be moving toward substantive rather than procedural re70 In California they are technically known as environmental impact reports (EIR). "D. W. Fischer, Environmental impact assessment as an instrument of public policy lor controlling economic growth. The appendix 10 ihe article contains an informative critique of NEPA.

836 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

view, however. This means that projects may be halted for reasons other than failure to follow the ELS provision meticulously.72 Several landmark court cases have clarified the obligations of government agencies under NEPA. In Calvert Cliff's coordinating committee versus A EC (1971), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the Atomic Energy Commission could not exclude water quality considerations from its environmental impact statement merely because the power plant in question had already received a certificate of compliance with federal water quality regulations from the state. The court found that the "crabbed interpretation" of NEPA by the AEC would prevent the AEC from making a balanced determination of the best course of action. In Scientists' Institute for Public Information versus AEC (1973), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled in connection with the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) that comprehensive environmental impact statements must be prepared for acknowledged programs, not merely for individual facilities; that is, the combined impact of many LMFBRs and the associated facilities had to be examined in advance since the AEC had acknowledged that it had a program and not a single facility in mind. In Sierra Club versus Morton (1974), involving fossil-fuel development on the Great Plains, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denned requirements for a programmatic environmental impact statement in certain circumstances even where an agency had not recognized its actions as a program. NEPA was one important step in the right direction, and it may become a prime weapon in the fight for environmental quality. But it will prove inadequate unless ways are found to introduce comprehensive environmental planning throughout the nation, in which legal standards for balancing environmental values against other values are applied to all projects with significant impact, government or private. How this might be accomplished—and some existing legislation is leading in this direction—is discussed further in "Economics and Political Change." That section also discusses the possibility that relatively simple legislation dealing with the consumption of resources might even2

J. E. Krier, personal communication.

tually replace much of the cumbersome ad hoc system that is now evolving for the control of environmental impact. Environmental Protection Agency. Contrary to a rather widespread misimpression, the Environmental Protection Agency was not created by NEPA but rather by an administrative reorganization that took place in December 1970. It consolidated the Federal Water Quality Administration (formerly in the Department of Interior); the National Air Pollution Control Administration (formerly in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, HEW); the pesticide registration, research, and standard-setting programs of the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration; the solid-waste management programs of HEW; and some of the functions of the Federal Radiation Council and the Atomic Energy Commission for setting standards for radiation exposure. The EPA was given all the functions and responsibilities necessary to carry out the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; and under its first administrator, William D. Ruckelshaus, it made a reasonably rapid start at doing so.73 His successor, Russell E. Train, continued to build an increasingly effective organization in an often difficult political environment. Unlike CEQ, which is a small advisory group in the Executive Office of the President, the EPA is a large operating agency with a staff in 1976 of 8800 people and estimated budget outlays in that year of $3 billion. I: maintains research laboratories in several parts of the country. The best concise record of the accomplishments as well as the shortcomings of the EPA are the CEQ's annual reports on the state of the nation's environment. Occupational Safety and Health Act. As noted in Chapter 10, workers are often exposed to much higher concentrations of dangerous substances than are considered acceptable for the population at large. The ma;r, legal protection for workers is provided under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which authorized the Labor Department to establish standard: for exposure of workers to hazardous pollutants. :c 7J

See CEQ, Environmental quality, 1970 and 1971.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 837

provide training programs, and to set up a system for reporting occupational illness and injury. These duties are carried out by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) does research for and recommends standards to OSHA. Three types of standards for exposure to pollutants can be set by OSHA: consensus standards adopted from a list provided by a group of government and industrial scientists, permanent standards, and temporary emergency standards. Permanent standards generally include, in addition to the eight-hour limits for worker exposure provided by consensus standards, regulations covering work practices, monitoring, and medical surveillance. Temporary standards are effective only for a six-month period, an interim during which permanent standards are developed. By_1975, consensus standards had been set for about. 400 chemicals, and OSHA and NIOSH were moving to change them to permanent standards. Permanent standards had already been established for asbestos, vinyl chloride, and a group of fourteen carcinogens; and permanent standards have been proposed for arsenic, coke-oven emissions, and noise. Some groups feel that those standards are not strict enough; for example, a chemical workers union unsuccessfully challenged in court those established for the fourteen carcinogens. It seems certain that a constant tug-of-war will ensue between consideration of the costs (real or imagined) to industry of lowering workers' exposure to hazards and consideration of the legitimate desires of workers to protect their health. In view of the large numbers of people directly or indirectly involved (remember, hazardous materials like asbestos and plutonium can be taken home inadvertently by workers, placing their families and friends at risk), it seems clear that OSHA's activities are a long-overdue step in the right direction.

Population Law The impact of laws and policies on population size and growth has, until very recently, largely been ignored by the legal profession. The first comprehensive treatment of population law was that of the late Johnson C.

Montgomery/4 an aitnrnpy who was president of Zero Population Growth, and whose ideas are the basis of much of the following discussion. To date, there has been no serious attempt in Western countries to use laws to control excessive population growth, although there exists ample authority under which population growth could be regulated. For example, under the United States Constitution, effective. population-control programs could be enacter) u."d,er the clauses that empower Congress to appropriate funds to provide for the(general welfare and to regulate come^ or under the equal-protection clause: _of_ the Fourteenth Amendment.^5 Such laws constitutionally could be very broad. Indeed, it has been concluded that_ compulsory population-control laws, even including laws requiring compulsory abortion, could be sustained _ under the existing Constitution if the population crisis, became sufficiently severe to endanger the society. Few today consider the situation in the United States serious enough to justify compulsion, however. The most compelling arguments that might be used to justify government regulation of reproduction are based . upon the rapid population growth relative to the capacity of environmental and social svstems to absorb the associated impacts. To provide a high quality of life for all, there must be fewer people. But there are other sound reasons that support the use of law to regulate reproduction. It is accepted that the law has as its proper function the protection of each person and each group of people. A legal restriction on the right to have more than a given number of children could easily be based on the needs of the first children. Studies have indicated that the larger the family, the less healthy the children are likely to be and the less likely they are to realize their potential levels of achievement.76 Certainly there is no question that children of a small family can be cared for better and can "Population explosion and United States law. 75 "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 76 Joe D. Wray, Population pressure on families: Family size and child-spacing, in Roger Revelle, ed.. Rapid population growth: Consequences and policy implications, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971; R. B. Zajonc, Family configuration and intelligence, Science, vol. 192, pp. 227-236 (April 16,1976).

838 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

be educated better than children of a large family, oxfcvir

. ec\\vaV. TVve \aNV

properly say to a mother that, in order to protect the children she already has, she could have no more. (Presumably, regulations on the sizes of adopted families ._ wpuld have to be the same.1) A legal restriction on the right to have children could also be based on a right not to be disadvantaged by excessive numbers of children produced by others.^ Differing rates of reproduction among groups can give rise to serious social problems. For example, differential rates of reproduction between ethnic, racial, religious, or economic groups might result in increased competition for resources and political power and thereby undermine social order. If some individuals contribute to general social deterioration by overproducing children, and if the need is compelling, they can be required by law to exercise reproductive responsibility— just as they can be required to excercise responsibility in their resourceconsumption patterns— providing they are not denied equal protection. Individual rights. Individual rights must be balanced against the power of the government to control human reproduction. Some people— respected legislators, judges, and lawyers included— have viewed the . right to have children as a fundamental and inalienable _ right. Yet neither the Declaration of Independence nor_ the Constitution mentions a right to reproduce. Nor does the UK Charter describe such a right, although a resolution of the United Nations affirms the "right responsibly to choose" the number and spacing of chil-, dren (our emphasis). In the United States, individuals have a constitutional right to privacy and it has been held that the right to privacy includes the right to choose whether or not to have children, at least to the extent that a woman has a right to choose not to have children. But the right is not unlimited. Where the society has a "compelling, subordinating interest" in regulating population size, the right of the individual may be curtailed. If society's survival depended on having more children, women could be required to bear children, just as men can constitutionally be required to serve in the armed forces. Similarly, given a crisis caused by overpopula-

tion, reasonably necessary laws to control excessive reproduction could be enacted. It is often argued that The t\gYix to Yiave ctexYdteu w so personal that the government should not regulate it. In an ideal society, no doubt the state should leave family size and composition solely to the desires of the parents. In today's world, however, the number of children in a family is a matter of profound public concern. The law regulates other highly personal matters. For example, no one may lawfully have more than one spouse at a time. Why should the law not be able to prevent a person from having more than two children? The legal argument has been made that the First Amendment provision for separation of church and state prevents the United States government from regulating family size. The notion is that family size is God's affair and no business of the state. But the same argument has been made against the taxation of church property, prohibition of polygamy, compulsory education of and medical treatment for children, and many similar measures that have been enacted. From a legal standpoint, the First Amendment argument against family-size regulation is devoid of merit. There are two valid constitutional limitations on the kinds of population-control policies that could be enacted. First, any enactments must satisfy the requirements of due process of law; they must be reasonably designed to meet real problems, and they must not be arbitrary. Second, any enactments must ensure that equal protection under the law is afforded to every person; they must not be permitted to discriminate against any particular group or person. This should be as true of laws giving economic encouragement to small families as it would be of laws directly regulating the number of children a person may have. This does not mean that the impact of the laws must be exactly the same on everyone. A law limiting each couple to two children obviously would have a greater impact on persons who desire large families than it would on persons who do not. Thus, while the due-process and equal-protection limitations preclude the passage of capricious or discriminatory laws, neither guarantees anyone the right to have more than his or her fair share of children, if such a right is shown to conflict with other rights and freedoms.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 839

It is often argued that a fetus or an embryo is a person who has a right to life, and therefore abortion as a birth-control measure must be rejected. Supporters of this argument point out that certain rights of a fetus have been legally recognized. For example, some states permit a fetus to recover money damages for personal injuries sustained before birth. Under some circumstances the common law has permitted a fetus, if subsequently born alive, to inherit property. The intentional killing of a fetus (through injury to the mother) has been declared by statute to constitute murder, although under the statute the fetus is not defined as a human being. Although some rights of the fetus after quickening have been protected in some states, most of those states require that the infant be born and living before the rights vested prior to birth actually are recognized and enforced. Most jurisdictions afford no protection to property rights or personal rights of the unquickened fetus, and no jurisdiction has protected the rights of embryos. Furthermore, analysis of the situations in which rights of the fetus have been recognized disclose that it is generally not the fetus's rights, but rather the rights of its parents or others that are being protected. For example, when a fetus did receive money damages for prenatal injuries, in reality it was the parents' and the society's economic interests that were being protected. Those who argue that a fetus has a right to life usually proceed from the assumption that life begins at or soon after conception. As stated elsewhere, the question, When does life begin? is misleading. Life does not begin; it began. The real question, from a legal as well as from religious, moral, and ethical points of view, is as follows: in what forms, at what stages, and for what purposes should society protect human life? Obviously overweight people regard their fat cells differently from their brain cells. A wandering sperm cell is not the same thing as a fertilized egg; nor is a fetus a child. Yet a fat cell, a sperm cell, a fetus, a child, an adult, and even a group of people are all human life. The common law and the drafters of the U.S. Constitution did not consider a fetus a human being. Feticide was not murder in common law because the fetus was not considered to be a human being, and for purposes of the Constitution a fetus is probably not a "person" within

the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, under the Constitution, abortion is apparently not unlawful, although infanticide obviously is. This is a very important distinction, particularly since most rights, privileges, and duties in our society are dated from birth and not from some earlier point in time. Capacity to contract, to vote, to be drafted, to obtain Social Security rights, drivers' licenses, and the like, are all dated from birth, which is a very convenient, relatively definite point in time from which to date most rights. Certainly, the moment of birth is easier to ascertain than the moment of conception, implantation, or quickening. Such an easily ascertainable point in time is a sensible point from which to date Constitutional rights, which should not depend upon imprecisions. The fact that a fetus is probably not a "person" with _ Constitutional rights does not, however, mean that_ y^ society has no interest in the fetus. Society does have an in ensuring that an appropriate number of healthy children are born. To protect the health of the mother, some regulation of abortion is still necessary and appropriate. For example, laws requiring that abortions be performed only by qualified medical personnel in appropriately licensed institutions now exist in most states, and there are regulations governing eligibility for insurance or other financial aid. \ Legal reform.) In predecessors of this book, we recommended a series of reasonable, constinitinnaj. and desirable lep;ai chants in rhp TTnir^ age population growth; 1. A federal statute could be enacted that would prohibit any restrictions on safe, voluntary coptra^p- _ tion, sterilization, and abortion, and the dissemination oL_ information about them., 2. State and federal governments could subsidize voluntary contraception, sterilization, and abortion^ \ .aws could require that birth-control clinics be opened at public expens_e in all suitable locations. They could also require that group and individual health insurance policies cover the costs of abortion and sterilization. i. Tax laws could be revised, and new laws could be _ passed that would provide incentives for late marriage,

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smaU families, and alternative roles for women. The tax disadvantage to single, childless persons could be_ jliminated. _ 4. State and federal laws could make sex education,. including instruction about contraception, mandatory in all schools, and the government could sponsor public education programs designed to encourage people to want fewer children. 5._ Federal support and encouragement for the development of more effective birth-control drugs and device; could be greatly increased. to report that between J97Q ?n(J We are all of these _changes took place, at least to Much of what remains to be done consists of extending or more fully implementing programs that now exist. The only real exception is mandatory sex education, but even on a voluntary basis the trend is toward expansion, and there is support and encouragement both from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and from private organizations such as the Sex Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS). If these relatively uncoercive policies should fail to maintain a low American birth rate, more coercive laws might well be written (see Chapter 13 for examples). At the moment, there might be little justification or public support for such laws, but if the resource and environmental situations are allowed to deteriorate, popular support might develop rapidly. There has been considerable talk in some quarters at times of forcibly suppressing reproduction among welfare recipients (perhaps by requiring the use of contraceptives or even by involuntary sterilization). This may sadly foreshadow what our society might do if the human predicament gets out of hand. We hope that population growth can be controlled in the United States without resorting to such discriminatory and socially disruptive measures. That, in fact, has been one purpose of this and our previous books— to stimulate population control by the least coercive means before it is too late. The decline in birth rates in the United States and other developed countries since 1970 is a most hopeful sign that population control can be easily achieved in those countries, but we must reiterate that the United States and most other DCs are still a long way from zero population growth.

BUSINESS, LABOR, AND ADVERTISING Although legal and legislative action are essential to the solution of pollution problems in the United States, it is to be hoped that American industries will not wait to be coerced into responsible behavior. In fact, a few industries took the initiative for cleaning up their effluents before it was legally required, and some found it possible to make profits from pollution by-products. Such unexpected bonuses are not possible in all cases, of course. Tax incentives and government subsidies for cleaning up pollution may be applied when costs are high, but in the long run abating pollution will best be achieved as a part of a complete overhaul of our tottering economic system. Meanwhile, many industrial organizations are exploring technological methods for dealing with various kinds of pollution; indeed, new companies have appeared whose entire business is pollution abatement or waste disposal of one sort or another. On the preventive side of the coin, environmental consulting firms have begun to appear. Their business is to advise communities and businesses in planning development with the least possible damage to the environment and the most benefit to the human inhabitants. Many of them are involved in writing the environmental impact statements required by the NEPA and several states. These trends and others, such as research on recyclable or biodegradable containers, should certainly be encouraged. Labor , Labor also has an important role to play in easing the pressure on the environment. In the United States an unfortunate "jobs versus the environment" attitude was promoted as the mid-1970s recession developed. Many business and labor leaders, believing that the only solution to problems of unemployment was to fire up the old ecologically destructive economic machine once again, lobbied for the relaxation of measures to protect the environment. The basic message of environmentalists that not only were many jobs threatened by the continuing rape of the environment, but that many lives, and indeed the persistence of civilization, were threatened also, obviously had not penetrated. Environmental protection in reality has proven to be

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 841

far more a creator of jobs than a destroyer. The Council on Environmental Quality in 1975 estimated that through 1974 fewer than 14,000 workers had lost their jobs as a result of environmental controls, most of them through closure of plants that were obsolescent, inefficient, and already only marginally profitable. In most cases environmental controls only hastened the inevitable. But, although a precise estimate would be difficult to make, it is clear that thousands more jobs have been created by environmental protection. Building and modernizing urban sewage systems alone provides perhaps 85,000 jobs for each $1 billion spent. People are needed to administer and enforce environmental programs and to build, install, operate, and maintain pollution abatement equipment, and so forth.77 Labor should be among the leaders in the movement to maintain environmental quality, even though workers, along with the rest of society, will have to pay part of the costs. Many more working people are exposed to environmental hazards, from poor safety standards in workplaces to smog, than are industrialists and bankers who work in plush, air-conditioned offices and can afford to live beyond the smog belt. In Australia, labor has moved into the forefront, battling against development of Australia's uranium deposits and against other projects deemed socially or environmentally injurious. Led by Jack Mundey, a leader in the building trades in New South Wales, "Green Bans" have been instituted, in which union members simply refuse to work on such projects.78 In 1974 many millions of dollars' worth of construction work was being held up by Green Bans in Sydney alone. If only such a sense of social responsibility pervaded the labor movement everywhere! There is every reason to believe that in years to come environmentalists and workers (two groups whose interests already greatly overlap) more and more will find their interests becoming congruent. For example, environmentalists are increasingly concerned about the energy-intensiveness of our economic system—as are many people in the labor movement as they see energy 77 Environmental quality—1975, pp. 533—536. See also Patrick Heffernan, Jobs and the environment. 78 ^l. Hardmann and P. Alanmng, Green bans; The Green Bans, Sierra Club Bulletin, April 1975, p. 18; R. Roddewig and J. S. Rosenberg, In Australia, unions strike for the environment.

being substituted for workers. The important idea that improvements in energy efficiency not only spare the environment (by reducing energy requirements) but also increase employment is well illustrated in the following discussion by Schipper: Compare, for example, two air conditioners of equal capacity, operating in similar homes under similar loads in the same climatic region, one requiring half the power of the other. If a consumer buys the more efficient unit, some of the money otherwise spent on energy is used for extra materials and labor, and this expenditure results in a more carefully constructed, more efficient air conditioner. Since manufacturing is generally more labor-intensive than electric utilities, the redirection of spending—from paying for electricity to investment in a more efficient unit— raises the total demand for labor per unit of air conditioning and still provides for the consumer's desire for comfort. [Moreover] when the consumer spends the money saved by energy conservation, the new purchase will require increased labor in comparison to buying electricity. The result is more goods or services and more employment, with less energy consumed.79 Higher energy costs, which are now resulting from the appearance in the balance sheets of the costs of depletion and pollution, increase the potential savings and employment benefits derivable from greater energy efficiency (see also Chapter 8). A reorientation of business, labor, and consumer values is obviously in order. Resources of all kinds are limited, but Americans behave as though they were not. The neglected virtues of economy and thrift must be restored to the pedestals that they once occupied in this country. Advertising Advertising plays a leading role in perpetuating the American system of consumerism. Whether the blame for this lies largely with industry or with the consumers is difficult to determine and probably does not much matter. What does seem evident is that advertising does not have to be mostly antienvironmental. In the late 1960s many advertisements began to appear featuring various companies' efforts at pollution abatement. Such 79

Lee Schipper, Raising the productivity of energy use.

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concern over the corporate image with respect to pollution was no doubt a necessary first step, but more than advertising of environmental protection is required. Environmentalists have been increasingly irritated byself-serving ads showing how Company XX has always been deeply involved in protecting the environment. Those emanating from oil companies—among the greatest destroyers of the environment—are especially galling. Ads from polluters posing as environmentalists have been christened "ecopornography." Much more acceptable are ads that offer useful information to consumers on how they can cooperate with business in environmentally beneficial projects, such as energy conservation or recycling materials. While we certainly do not condone heavy promotion of new versions of products whose environmental contribution is negligible or questionable, such as certain gasoline additives or disposable flashlights, we welcome ads that feature genuine improvements, such as unleaded gasolines or non-aerosol spray containers. Admittedly, the line dividing such cases is not always easy to draw. The advertising industry can do much more than it has so far to encourage its clients to promote products by stressing such qualities as durability, economy, and versatility. For example, automobile advertising should emphasize economy of purchase and operation, especially low gasoline consumption, durability, compactness, comfort (but not massiveness—interior room can be maintained even as weight is greatly trimmed), engine efficiency, safety, and low pollution emissions. For a time after the energy crisis of 1974 the trend was in that direction, but by 1976 there was a move back toward the bad old days. Advertising that stresses large size and high power in cars should be permanently discontinued. Beyond cooperating with clients in antipollution promotions, advertising companies could by agreement refuse to design ads promoting wasteful or polluting products—for example, ads featuring throwaway products, food in throwaway cans and bottles, or goods wrapped in unnecessary layers of packaging. Above all, every effort should be made to expunge from advertising the idea that the quality of life is closely related to the rate at which new products are purchased or energy is consumed. Advertising agencies can also make a contribution to

the population situation by refusing to produce ads featuring large families. Under pressure from population and women's organizations, some of the obvious changes have already been made in ads for many products. Other ways have been found to promote heavy-duty washing machines than as an item for large families—dormitories, hospitals, and other institutions use them also, for instance. Families with three or more children have lately been depicted as large families, and the two-child family appears the norm. Women are increasingly featured playing roles other than homemaker and mother, and the convenience of many goods is being stressed more as a value for working women than for the overburdened mother, as they once were exclusively. This trend should be encouraged. The critical problem, of course, is to find a way to swing both advertising clients and agencies in the right direction. While public utilities, for example, could and should be prohibited from promoting greater use of electric power through advertising, similar legal controls over all advertising would undoubtedly prove too cumbersome. A court decision in August 197180 held that, under the fairness doctrine, radio and television stations that carry advertising for big, high-horsepower cars also must broadcast information about the environmental threat such cars represent. The suit had been brought by Friends of the Earth and the Environmental Defense Fund after the Federal Communications Commission had ruled against such a policy. If it were widely applied, this interpretation of the fairness doctrine might discourage manufacturers and advertisers from promoting socially and environmentally undesirable products; to date, unfortunately, it has not been widely applied. The late 1970s and early 1980s will be crucial years for everyone. The business community in the United States and around the world is faced with a particularly difficult choice. It can continue to pursue the economic goals of the past decades until either an environmental disaster overtakes civilization or until governments and the public compel a change; or it can actively initiate novel approaches to production and industry, with a view to protecting the environment, preserving limited resources, and truly benefiting humanity. ""Washington, D.C. Court of Appeals.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 843

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually slaves to some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. —John Maynard Keynes, 1936 In relation to the population-resources-environment crisis, economics81 and politics can usually be viewed as two sides of a single coin. A very large number of political decisions are made on an economic basis, especially those relating to environmental and resource problems. Illustrating the influence of economics, Lord Keynes wrote (in the lines just preceding the epigraph of this chapter): "The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else."82 If anything, his statement is even more true today than it was then. Economics nevertheless is sometimes wrongly blamed for political problems. Although the major political division of the developed world—that between capitalist and communist nations—is thought to be based on differences in economic ideology, the actual differences are relatively few. A major cause of humanity's current plight lies not in the economic differences between those two political spheres but in the economic attitudes that they hold in common.

Gross National Product and Economic Growthmanship Economists are not unanimous in their views of economic growth. Some have perceived that perpetual economic growth is as impossible to sustain as perpetual "For a general review of orthodox economics, we recommend the latest edition of Paul A. Samuelson's fine text, Economics (latest edition at this writing, the tenth, 1976). For a more detailed treatment of environmental economics, see Richard Lecomber, Economic growth versus the environment. For the latter, familiarity with economic concepts such as indifference curves and inferior goods (explained in Samuelson) is required. 82 The general theory of employment, interest, and money, Harcourt, New York, 1964 (originally published in 1936).

population growth. Herman Daly in 1975 told a Congressional committee: In 1936 John Maynard Keynes remarked that "The part played by orthodox economists, whose common sense has been insufficient to check their faulty logic, has been disastrous to the latest act." The same words ring true in 1975. It is easy to be trapped by the excessive rigidity of our own values and goals. The South Indian Monkey Trap, for example, works solely on the basis of rigid goals. A hollowed-out coconut is filled with rice and fastened by a chain to a stake in the ground. There is a hole in the coconut just large enough to allow the monkey to insert its extended hand, but not large enough to permit withdrawal of his clenched fist full of rice. The monkey is trapped by nothing more than his refusal to let go of the rice, to reorder his goals, and to realize that in the given circumstances his freedom is more important than die fistful of rice. We seem to be trapped in a growthdominated economic system that is causing growing depletion, pollution, and disamenity, as well as increasing the probability of ecological catastrophe. We must open our collective fist and let go of the doctrine of perpetual growth, or else we will be caught by the consequences.83 In the 1967 edition of his classic economics text, by contrast, Paul A. Samuelson of M.I.T. wrote: "The ghost of Carlyle should be relieved to know that economics, after all, has not been a dismal science. It has been the cheerful, but impatient, science of growth."84 In 1976, viewing the prospects for continued economic growth in the United States and the rest of the world, he still found them cheering.85 The majority of economic theorists agree with Samuelson, as do most businessmen and politicians. Some economists besides Daly have questioned the growth ethic, however. For example, E. J. Mishan stated in 1967: The skilled economist, immersed for the greater part of the day in pages of formulae and statistics, does occasionally glance at the world about him and, if "Herman E. Daly, in testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, hearings on economic growth, October 23, 1975. ^Economics: An introductory analvsh, McGraw-Hill, Ne\v York, 1967. 8i Limits to growth: VX'hat lies ahead? Honolulu Advertiser, March 15. 1976. In fairness to Samuelson, part of his cheer was engendered by the declining rate of population growth in the United States.

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perceptive, does occasionally feel a twinge of doubt about the relevance of his contribution. . . . For a moment, perhaps, he will dare wonder whether it is really worth it. Like the rest of us, however, the economist must keep moving, and since such misgivings about the overall value of economic growth cannot be formalized or numerically expressed, they are not permitted seriously to modify his practical recommendations.86

GNP. In much of the world—indeed, in all countries with any aspirations toward modernization, progress, or development—a general economic index of advancement is growth of the gross national product (GNP). The GNP is the total national output of goods and services valued at market prices. Stated another way, it consists of the sum of personal and government expenditure on goods and services, plus the value of net exports (exports minus imports) and private expenditure on investment. It can be a very useful economic indicator. More important than what the GNP is, however, is what it is not: it is not a measure of the degree of freedom of the people of a nation; it is not a measure of the health of a population; it is not a measure of the equity of distribution of wealth; it is not a measure of the state of depletion of natural resources; it is not a measure of the stability of the environmental systems upon which life depends; it is not a measure of security from the threat of war. It is not, in sum, a comprehensive measure of the quality of life, although, unhappily, it is often believed to be. When the standards of living of two nations are compared, it is customary to examine their per-capita GNPs. Per-capita GNP is an especially unfortunate statistic. First of all, it is the ratio of two statistics that are at best crude estimates, especially in the LDCs where neither GNP nor population size is known with any accuracy. More important, comparisons of per-capita GNP overestimate many kinds of differences. For instance, a comparison of per-capita GNPs would lead to the conclusion that the average person in the United States lives almost 10 times as well as the average Portuguese and some 60 times as well as the average &
The costs of economic growtil, pp. i.t—x, Praeger, New York.

Burmese. This, of course, is meaningless, since virtually all services and some goods are? much cheaper in the LDCs, and GNP calculates only what enters the recorded money economy. Americans pay perhaps 5 or 10 times as much for farm labor, domestic help, haircuts, carpentry, plumbing, and so forth as do people in the LDCs, and the services in the United States may be of inferior quality. And yet, because of the accounting system, those services contribute between 5 and 10 times as much to our GNP as the same services do to the GNPs of, say, Burma or India. Furthermore, figures on the increase of per-capita GNP in LDCs do not take into account such things as rise in literacy rate, and thus may underrate the amount of progress a country has made toward modernization. Nor does the GNP measure many negative aspects of the standard of living. Although the average Burmese unquestionably lives much less well than the average person in the United States, the average American may cause 100 times as much ecological destruction to the planet. Another problem with GNP and per-capita GNP reckoning is that they are measures devised by and for DCs, in which accurate government record-keeping is an established tradition and virtually all of a society's productive activity enters the money economy, where it is recorded and can be totaled. Yet even in the United States, agricultural, dairy, and livestock production consumed on the farm either is ignored or loosely estimated in the calculation of our total food production. This does not significantly affect decisions based on food production because production for consumption on the farm represents only a small part of overall United States food production (even though it would still account for millions of dollars' worth of food). In an LDC, where subsistence agriculture, home manufacture of household items, barter, and money transactions too small and casual to be noted are the rule, an analysis of the overall situation by government-published production records can and commonly does lead to very serious misjudgements about the real condition of an economy and society. Finally, it must be remembered that the per-capita GNP statistic can and often does conceal gross inequities within countries in the distribution of goods and services. This makes it an even more fallible index of well-being.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 845

Growthmanship. A serious criticism that can be leveled at the majority of economists applies equally to most people and societies: they accept a doctrine of economic determinism. The myths of cornucopian economics, as opposed to the realities of geology and biology, have already been discussed, but the problem is much more pervasive than that. Economic growth has become ffe standard for progress, the benefit for which almost any social cost is to be paid. This prejudice in economic thought can be fully appreciated by a perusal of Samuelson's Economics. The book, of course, is oriented toward economic growth. The increasing scarcity of nonrenewable resources is presented in it only briefly as a problem of less developed countries. The eventual physical constraint placed on material growth by the conversion to heat of all the energy people consume is not discussed in the text, nor are the more imminent environmental constraints considered in our earlier chapters. Implicit in Samuelson's treatment of economic development is the idea that it is possible for 5 billion to 7 billion people to achieve a standard of living similar to that of the average American of the 1960s. Excessive technological optimism is explicit or implicit throughout the book. Nevertheless, Samuelson's text reveals more understanding of problems related to population size and environmental quality than the writings of many other economists. He does realize that growth of GNP must be "qualified by data on leisure, population size, relative distribution, quality, and noneconomic factors." In the 1970 edition, Samuelson added two chapters dealing with economic inequality, the quality of life, and problems of race, cities, and pollution. Furthermore, in 1969 Samuelson wrote: Most of us are poorer than we realize. Hidden costs are accruing all the time; and because we tend to ignore them, we overstate our incomes. Thomas Hobbes said that in the state of nature the life of man was nasty, brutish and short. In the state of modern civilization it has become nasty, brutish and long.87 Most economists subscribe to the "bigger and more is better" philosophy: the growing mixed economy is something to analyze, improve, and by all means to keep "Newsweek, October 6, 1969.

growing. In an article that appeared in the New York Review of Books, Nobel laureate economist Wassily Leontief of Harvard remarked, "If the 'external costs' of growth clearly seem to pose dangers to the quality of life, there is as yet no discernible tendency among economists or economic managers to divert their attention from this single-minded pursuit of economic growth."88 Indeed, when those external costs (various kinds of environmental and social deterioration) do come to the attention of economists, growth is seen as the way to deal with them. Walter Heller, once chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, has stated, "I cannot conceive a successful economy without growth."89 Accordingly, he urges expansion of the United States economy so that resources will become available to fight pollution. Heller, like many other economists, confuses more of the disease with the cure! That economists have clung to their "growthmania" is not surprising, however. After all, natural scientists often cling to outmoded ideas that have produced far less palpable benefits than the growing mixed economies of the Western world in the twentieth century. The question of whether a different economic system might have produced a more equitable distribution of benefits is not one that Western economists like to dwell on. Furthermore, the idea of perpetual growth is congruent with the conventional wisdom of most of the businessmen of the world; indeed, of most of the world's population. The people of the LDCs naturally wish to emulate the economic growth of the West, and they long for "development" with all its shiny accoutrements. Why should they be expected to know that it is physically and ecologically impossible for them to catch up with the United States when many of the "best informed" Americans are still unaware of that fact? Before attempting to pursue the Western pattern of development, perhaps they should contemplate Heller's belief that the best ""Quoted in Ehrlich and Ehrlich, Population, resources, environment, 2nd ed., p. 382. "'Undoubtedly an accurate statement. This quote and some of his other views are cited in E. F. Schumacher, Small is beautiful; Economics as if people mattered, pp. 111-112. For direct access to the views of Heller and other modern growthmen, see his Perspectives on economic growth. See also William Nordhaus and James Tobin who conclude in Is growth obsolete? that it is not, and that GNP is a pretty good measure of "secular progress." For a wonderful (if unintentional) parody of the writing of an uninformed economist, see Norman Macrae, America's third century.

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hope for pulling the United States out of its environmental difficulties is yet more growth—even though the United States already co-opts some 30 percent of the world's resource use. Under that prescription, even catching up would not suffice. New approaches to the national product. It is by now abundantly clear that the GNP cannot grow forever. Why should it? Why should we not strive for zero economic growth (ZEG) as well as zero population growth? As John Kenneth Galbraith pointed out in The new industrial state, it would be entirely logical to set limits on the amount of product a nation needs and then to strive to reduce the amount of work required to produce such a product (and, we might add, to see that the product is much more equitably distributed than it is today). Of course, such a program would be a threat to some of the most dearly held beliefs of this society. It would attack the Protestant work ethic, which insists that one must be kept busy on the job for forty hours a week. It is even better to work several more hours moonlighting, so that the money can be earned to buy all those wonderful automobiles, detergents, appliances, and assorted gimcracks that must be bought if the economy is to continue to grow. But this tradition is outmoded; the only hope for civilization in the future is to work for quality in the context of a nongrowing economy, or at least an economy in which growth is carefully restricted to certain activities.90 A number of interesting suggestions about GNP have been made by economist Edwin G. Dolan in his fine little 1969 book, TANSTAAFL: The economic strategy for environmental crisis, TANSTAAFL (which stands for There Ain't No Such Thing As A Free Lunch) contains a lucid consideration of population-environment economics, and we recommend it, even though we differ with the author on some points. Dolan, along with some other economists, would rename the GNP the gross national cost (GNC).91 Tor an informative, brief discussion of work, leisure, and ZEG, see Paul W. Barkley and David W. Seckler, Economic growth and environmental decay: The solution becomes the problem. See also Chapter 3 of Pirages and Ehrlich, Ark II.; Herman Daly, The economics of the steady state; and Fred Hirsch, Social limits to growth. 9! Kenneth E. Boulding has long championed that name change. Sec also the chapter on "GNP-Fetishism" in Victor A. Weisskopf s Alienation and economics.

More important, Dolan would distinguish between two types of GNC. Type I GNC would measure that fraction of GNC produced with renewable resources and recycling of wastes. Type II GNC would be that depending on the depletion of nonrenewable resources and the production of indestructible wastes. The problems of discrimination might be difficult (consider, for instance, calculating the energy component involved in the production of Type I GNC), but the basic ami is sound. As Dolan says, "Politicians and economists would then design their policies to maximize Type I and minimize Type II. In the eyes of world opinion a high Type I component would be a source of national pride, while high production of the Type II variety would be a source of shame." In a more technical vein, economists William Nordhaus and James Tobin, recognizing the problems inherent in GNP as a measure of what people value, have suggested some tentative (and sensible) modifications in GNP to produce a measure of economic welfare (MEW).92 Their discussion gives hope that better economic measures can and should be developed—even though it is obvious to them and other thoughtful economists that no single measure of economic welfare is ever going to be fully satisfactory.93 The problem of finding even a partially satisfactory measure of total welfare, or quality of life (QOL), is infinitely more difficult.93" Beyond the question of refining the concept of GNP as a measure (or perhaps, more realistically, of disseminating the limitations of its usefulness throughout the economic, business, and political communities, which all too often act as though maximizing GNP were the ultimate human value), lies a more important issue. That is the perception by many people that the relationship between GNP and QOL has become negative; as GNP rises, QOL declines.94 Since there is no agreed-upon measure of QOL, this perception is unlikely to be tested by classical economic methods—but that does not mean that the phenomenon is not real. Perhaps the attempts by economists to refine the "Is growth obsolete? "See, for example, Arthur M. Oltun, Social welfare has no price tag. 93 "An extensive discussion of the problem of defining QOL is contained in Peter W. House, The quest for completeness: Comprehensive analysis in modeling, indicators, gaming, planning and management. 94 P. R. Ehrlich and R. Harriman, How to be a survivor: A plan to save Spaceship Earth.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 847

concept of GNP or to define QOL95 eventually will permit a more precise tracking of the relationship, but it seems unlikely that human social systems or the ecological systems of the planet can afford to wait. We suspect that the era of indiscriminate growth will come to an end soon—preferably through political action generated by subjective perceptions of declining QOL by large numbers of people—but if not, by the intervention of ecocatastrophes. Hints of the former could be seen in such phenomena as the popularity in 1976 of California governor Jerry Brown's "limits to growth" campaign for the presidency. Cost-benefit analyses. One of the problems with growthmania is that for too long the penalties of growth have been ignored by the economic system. Cost-benefit calculations until very recently were done with too narrow an outlook and over too short a time span. For example, consider the history of a contemporary housing development. A developer carves up a southern California hillside, builds houses on it, and sells them, reaping the benefits in a very short time. Then society starts to pay the costs. The houses have been built in an area where the native plant community is chaparral (Chapter 4). Chaparral, known to plant ecologists as a "fire climax," would not exist as a stable vegetation type unless the area burned over occasionally. When it does, the homes are destroyed, and the buyers and the public start paying hidden costs in the form of increased insurance rates and emergency relief. Of course, there are hidden costs even in the absence of such a catastrophe. A housing development puts a further load on the water supply and probably will be a contributing political factor in the ultimate flooding of distant farmland to make a reservoir. Perhaps wind patterns cause smog to be especially thick in the area of the development, and as it begins to affect the inhabitants they and society pay additional costs in hospital bills and high life-insurance premiums. And, of course, by helping to attract more people into the area, the development helps to increase the general smog burden. "See, for example, Lowdon Wingo, The quality of life: Toward a microeconomic definition. See also the discussions in Chapter 12 and below of the connections between quality of life and diversity of personal options, and Richard Easterlin's fascinating Does economic growth improve the human lot?

Then there are the problems of additional roads, schools, sewage-treatment plants, and other community requirements created by the subdivision. While the builder may have put the roads in the subdivision, increased taxes must pay for increased upkeep on roads in the subdivision area, and eventually for new roads demanded by increasing congestion. Among the saddest phenomena of our time are the attempts by politicians and chambers of commerce to attract industry and developers to their areas to "broaden the tax base." The usual result, when the dust has settled, is that the people who previously lived in the area have a degraded environment and higher taxes. In short, the benefits are easily calculated and quickly reaped by a select few; the costs, on the other hand, are diffuse, spread over time, and difficult to calculate. For example, how would one assess the cost of weather modification by pollution, which might result in the deaths of millions from starvation? What is the value of an ecological system destroyed by chlorinated hydrocarbons? What is the value of one life lost to emphysema? The disparity between the few elements accounted for in present methods of cost-benefit analysis and the real costs borne by society is even more obvious when the problem of industrial pollution is considered. Here the benefit is usually the absence of a cost. Garbage is spewed into the environment, rather than being retained and reclaimed. The industry avoids real or imagined financial loss by this process. The term imagined loss is used because some industries have found that reclaiming pollutants has more than paid for the cost of retaining them. More often than not, however, the industry benefits from pollution, and the public pays the shortand long-term costs. Air pollutants damage crops, ruin paint, soil clothes, dissolve nylon stockings, etch glass, rot windshield-wiper blades, and so on. Pollutants must be removed, often at considerable expense, from water supplies. People with emphysema, lung cancer, liver cancer, and hepatitis must be given expensive hospitalization. Insurance costs go up. In these, and in myriad other ways, everyone pays. Perhaps the most subtle and least appreciated costs are those society must shoulder when it damages or destroys ecosystems that formerly performed essential free services. For example, destruction of natural areas, espe-

848

THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

daily forests, can change climate locally, often resulting in greater frequency and intensity of floods and droughts and a need for water management projects. Soil erosion can be greatly accelerated, leading to silting of streams and lakes, with damage to fisheries and polluted water supplies. With the loss of the air purifying functions of ecosystems, air pollution is increased.95'1 These costs are what accountants euphemistically call external diseconomies, because they are external to the accounting system of the polluter. A persuasive case can be made that, at an advanced stage of industrialization, the diseconomies far outweigh the benefits of growth. Such a case was made in detail by economist Ezra Mishan some years ago and refined since.96 That the costs to society of pollution and environmental destruction far exceed those of abatement or prevention is no longer in serious doubt. U.S. national pollution-control expenditures for 1972, both public and private, amounted to $19 billion; the annual costs of just air and water pollution were variously estimated (so far as they could be) in a range from $10 billion to $50 billion around 1970.97 And those estimates probably left out many of the indirect costs, which are often impossible to sort out from other causes, and some for which there is no price tag, such as aesthetic value. The simplest way to attack external diseconomies directly is to require industry to internalize them. Companies can be forced by law to absorb the costs of greatly reducing the release of pollutants. Profits would then be added on after all costs were paid. Clearly, the most sensible solution in most cases is for society to insist on pollution abatement at the source. It is cheaper in every way to curtail it there, rather than attempt to ameliorate the complex problems pollutants cause after they are released into the environment. Society, having permitted the pollution situation to develop, should also shoulder some of the burden of its correction. As a theoretical example, Steel Company X, located on the shores of Lake Michigan, is pouring filth into the lake at a horrendous rate. A study shows that it

would cost two dollars per share of common stock to build the necessary apparatus for retaining and processing the waste. Should the company be forced to stop polluting and pay the price? Certainly it must be forced to stop, but it seems fair that society should pay some of the cost. When Company X located on the lake, everyone knew that it would spew pollutants into the lake, but no one objected. The local people wanted to encourage industry. Now, finally, society has changed its mind, and the pollution must stop. But should Company X be forced into bankruptcy by pollution regulations, penalizing stockholders and putting its employees out of work? Should the local politicians who lured the company into locating there and the citizens who encouraged them not pay a cent? Clearly society should order the pollution stopped and pick up at least part of the bill. It would be a bargain in the long run; society is already paying a much higher cost for the pollution. Such a situation actually occurred in 1971. Congress refused to vote funds for the continuance of the SST project, in part because of environmental considerations. As mentioned earlier, the decision cost thousands of existing jobs and even more potential jobs. Society must find mechanisms to compensate people who lost jobs in such a way, and it must retrain and, if necessary, relocate them. Such dislocations are certain to occur more often and on a larger scale as polluting, energy-wasting, and socially dangerous industries and projects are phased out. Fortunately, time should be available to smooth the transitions in most situations. It has become obvious that one needed change in the economic system is to adopt a new method of costaccounting that fully incorporates such items as resource depletion and environmental degradation, even though such a change might involve grave political repercussions.

95a F. H. Bormann, An inseparable linkage: Conservation of natural ecosystems and the conservation of fossil energy. 9(> The costs of economic growth; Ills, bads, and disamenities: The wages of growth. 97 CEQ, Environmental quality, 1975, pp. 496-543.

The Bucky Fulfilling dreams of technologically based abundance of the sixties now seem adolescent and remote. —Hazel Henderson, Planning Review, April/May 1974

Economics, Resources, and the Environment

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Economist Kenneth Boulding once described the present economic system of the United States as a cowboy economy.9* The cowboy metaphor refers to a reckless, exploitive philosophy based on two premises: more resources are waiting just over the horizon, and nature has a boundless capacity to absorb garbage. For practical purposes, those premises were valid in the days of the American frontier. In that world it made some sense to seek rapid improvements in human welfare strictly through economic growth, with little regard for what kind of growth or for the sorts of waste that accompanied it. But today the old premises are wrong. It is now clear that physical resources are limited and that humanity is straining the capacity of the biological environment to absorb abuse on a global scale. The blind growth of a cowboy economy is no longer a viable proposition—even though, as noted above, an astonishing number of economists (and others) still cling to the belief that it is. The accepted measure of success in a cowboy economy is a large throughput. Throughput refers to the rate at which dollars flow through the economy and, insofar as dollar flow depends on the sale of physical goods rather than services, to the speed with which natural resources are converted into artifacts and rubbish. A conventional indicator of throughput is the GNP. Boulding has described a rational alternative to the GNP-oriented cowboy economy, calling this alternative the spaceman economy, in harmony with the concept of Spaceship Earth. Consistent with the finiteness of this planet's supply of resources and the fragility of the biological processes that support human life, such an economy would be nongrowing in terms of the size of the human population, the quantity of physical resources in use, and human impact on the biological environment. The spaceman economy need not be stagnant, however; human ingenuity would be constantly at work increasing the amount of actual prosperity and well-being derivable from the fixed amount of resources in use. Quite the opposite of the cowboy economy, which thrives on throughput, the spaceman economy would seek to minimize the throughput needed to maintain its stable stock of goods. This is an obvious goal for any economy as regards population. A given population size 96

The economics of the coming Spaceship Earth.

can be maintained by a high birth rate balanced by a high death rate (high throughput) or by a low birth rate balanced by a low death rate (low throughput). Most people would agree that the low-throughput situation is preferable. Applying this to material goods, the "birth rate" is the production rate and the "death rate" is the rate at which the goods wear out or become obsolete. A given level of affluence, measured in terms of the stock of goods per person, can be maintained by very different levels of resource flow. Thus, a society with one refrigerator for ever}' three people can maintain this level of affluence with refrigerators that need replacement every ten years (high throughput) or every forty years (low throughput). Quality of life in a spaceman economy. Could people's desires for material comforts and a high quality of life be met in a spaceman economy? There are good reasons to believe the answer is yes. With an unchanging number of people, society's efforts can be devoted entirely to improving conditions for the population that exists, rather than to struggling to provide the necessities of existence for new additions. Moreover, focusing attention on the quality of a fixed stock of goods in a spaceman economy is in many respects a more direct route to prosperity than emphasizing throughput in a cowboy economy. This is so because, as Boulding has argued, quality of stock is often a better measure of well-being than throughput. Most people would rather own one Rolls Royce than a succession of Fords. Furthermore, once a good diet, adequate housing, clean water, sanitation facilities, and a certain basic level of well-made material goods have been provided, quality of life becomes largely a matter of the availability of services and personal options. Services include education, medical care, entertainment and recreation, fire and police protection, and the administration of justice. Services do involve the use of material resources and do affect the environment. For example, commercial office space, much of it associated with the provision of services, is a major consumer of electricity for lighting, heating, and air conditioning. Nevertheless, there is great potential for improving and extending services while reducing the associated material, energy, and environmental demands.

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850 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

Personal options consist of access to a variety of landscapes, living accommodations, career possibilities, cultural environments, recreational opportunities, interpersonal relationships, degrees of privacy, and so forth. Personal options are an important part of the quality of an individual's life even when they are not exercised—it pleases us to know we could live in the country, even though we may choose to live in cities. Options also have value beyond the preferences of the majority of people in any given society. If the majority of citizens preferred an urban environment, that would not be sufficient reason to transform all living areas of the planet into urban environments—this is tyranny of the majority. Even those who enjoy neither canoeing nor golf should concede that a society with room for golf courses and free-flowing rivers is preferable to a society without those options. It is even reasonable to suppose that in human society diversity on a small scale (individual choice) promotes stability on a large scale (society as a whole). Insofar as personal options are part of quality of life, the spaceman economy is a clear choice over the cowboy economy. Population growth and the transformation of an ever larger fraction of the biosphere to maintain the growth of throughput are destroying options in the United States now and for the future. By stabilizing the population and reducing the level of environmentally disruptive activities associated with throughput of resources, the spaceman economy would preserve remaining options; by focusing on services and finding new ways that "people can live more gently on the Earth,"99 it would create new ones. ( Converting to a spaceman economyjHow can the world society make the transition from a cowboy economy to a spaceman economy? How do we get from here to there?_(Population controfcof course, is absolutely, essential, with an eventual target of a smaller population than today's.100 Another task that must be faced squarely is the ^redistribution of wealtl^ within and between nations. Otherwise, fixing the quantity of physical goods "See S. Page, Jr., and W. Clark, The new alchemy: How to survive in your spare time. lo °See, for example, Emile Benoit, A dynamic equilibrium economy, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1976; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, Population, resources, environment, 1st ed., p. 322.

in use would freeze the majority of human beings in state of poverty. Within rich countries such as the United States, the problem could be alleviated by a relatively moderate, amount of redistribution. Economist Herman Daly has called for the establishment of a distributist institution, which would limit the range of financial inequity in the United States. He suggests establishing maximum and minimum incomes, arguing, "Most people are not so stupid as to believe that an income in excess of say $100,000 per year has any real functional justification . . . especially . . . when the high paid jobs are also usually the most interesting and pleasant." He would also limit personal and corporate wealth and then "put responsible social Emits on the exercise of monopoly power by labor unions, since the countervailing monopoly power of corporations will have been limited."101 The critical question, of course, is how to get arnnnH the extraordinary power interests that would be unalter-_ ably opposed to maximum income limits and (if possible1) even more opposed to direct taxation of wealth^ Greed and the desire for power are extraordinarily strong forces against any serious attempts to curb income and wealth, and many conventional economists (with their hands firmly clenched on Daly's symbolic rice) would oppose such limitation on the grounds that it would kill the incentive system that keeps the economy growing. Daly suggests gradual implementation as a strategy—and perhaps that could be made to work, since the principles of progressive income taxation and some sort of "floor" under individual income are rather well established in our society. The real sticky wicket would be direct taxation of wealth, since that would threaten the entrenched power of the Rockefellers, Carnegies, Fords, Kennedys, and countless other beneficiaries of enterprising and acquisitive ancestors. But once some system of further redistribution were established in the United States, it would then be justifiable to implement a transition to a spaceman economy as quickly as possible. In the poor countries, a degree of careful expansion of productive activities—that is, continued economic growth sufficient to raise per-capita living standards—as ""Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, October 23, 1975, pp. 10 and 11; see also the book he edited, Toward a steady-state economy.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS /

well as massive transfers of goods and technical assistance from the rich countries (see Chapter 15) will be necessary before the notion of a spaceman economy can be seriously entertained. It is clear that redistribution alone would be insufficient to give all human beings an acceptable standard of living—at least, acceptable by today's DC standards. That would mean a per-capita GNP of only about $1000, even if population size were also frozen at 4 billion. Reducing throughput. The strategy of converting productive capacity from frivolous and wasteful enterprises to legitimate social needs should be accompanied, even in the short term, by efforts to minimize the throughput of resources associated with production. Herman Daly has suggested a specific mechanism for accomplishing such a reduction: putting strict depletion quotas on the natural resources of the United States.102 That is, limits would be placed on the total amount of each resource that could be extracted or imported by the United States each year. This would not only directly reduce the pressure Americans place on the resources of the planet, but would also automatically generate a trend toward recycling and pollution abatement. With resources scarce (and thus expensive), a premium would be placed on the durability of goods, recycling, and the restriction of effluents (which often contain "resources" not now economically recoverable). Environmental deterioration from the processes of resource extraction and transport would be reduced, as would that resulting from manufacturing resources into finished goods. Less energy is usually required to recycle materials than to start anew from basic resources. And depletion quotas on fossil fuels and fissionable materials would encourage the frugal use of energy. Limiting the amount of energy available would, of course, also tend to limit the weight and number of automobiles, encourage the use of mass transit, and promote the substitution of efficient high-speed trains for energetically wasteful short- and medium-haul jet airplanes. As Daly notes, a basic system of depletion quotas would have to be supplemented to some degree with such 102 The stationary state economy. See also his Toward a steady-state economy, for expansion of these ideas.

devices as taxes on effluents, but we agree with him that operating at the resource rather than the rubbish end of the system is fundamentally the better approach. It requires controls at many fewer points and thus would be simpler to institute, because it tackles the system where the materials are still concentrated rather than dispersed. One of the most difficult problems in implementing the Daly system would be dealing with imports. Obviously, quotas would have to be established on imported raw materials, or the primary result of the system would be merely to shift pressure from U.S. resources to the resources of the rest of the world. If American manufacturers alone were strictly rationed, there would surely be an upsurge in manufactured imports. Restrictions therefore would have to be placed on the import of manufactured goods, perhaps based on their "resource content." Those restrictions might best be put only on imports from other developed countries to encourage them to establish depletion quotas also. Restrictions could be omitted for certain manufactured goods from less developed countries wherever it seemed that access to United States markets would be a genuine economic help to the exporter. Another suggestion for a government system that could be employed to limit throughput has been put forward by two ecologists (described in Box 14-3). It is a more complex system than Daly's, but has the big advantage of making the public aware of the environmental impact of human activities. Daly claims that cornucopians should make no objection to schemes that limit resource depletion, for they are eternally assuring us that technological progress (such as substitutions for depleted resources) would be encouraged by rising resource prices, and that such advances would make resource supplies virtually infinite.103 Since depletion quotas would increase the price incentives, they could be viewed as a test of the faith of the technological optimists—a test that would simultadepletion quotas would increase the price incentives, they could be viewed as a test of the faith of the technological optimists—a test that would simultaneously conserve our resource heritage in case not enough technological rabbits appear from the hat. 101 See, for example, H. E. Goeller and A. Weinberg, The age of substitutability.

851

BOX 14-3 A Novel Scheme for Limiting Environmental Deterioration Two Australian ecologists, Walter E. Westman and Roger M. Gifford, have put forth a novel suggestion for maintaining the quality of the environment at any level desired by society.* They propose establishing a money-independent "price" on every activity that has a clear environmental impact. The basic nonmonetary unit would be the natural resource unit (NRU). NRUs would be distributed equally among individuals and by special means to business firms, government entities, and nonprofit organizations. The overall level of environmental impact would be regulated by government establishment of both the total yearly allocation of NRUs and the price in NRUs of every good, service, and activity of environmental significance. This would lead in effect to a "rationing" of rights to pollute, destroy habitats, add to population pressure, or extract natural resources. The advantages of such a system are numerous. Open, rather than covert, decisions on the quality of the environment would be made. Since NRUs would not be transferable, the system would be equitable—the rich would not be allowed greater per-capita impact than the poor. Individuals, however, would be able to accumulate NRUs throughout their lives and * Environmental impact: Controlling the overall level.

Daly summarized his distributive and throughputlimiting proposals as follows: In spite of their somewhat radical implications, these proposals are based on impeccably respectable conservative premises: private property and the free market. If private property is good, then everyone should share in it; and, making allowances for a range of legitimate inequality, no one should be allowed to hog too much of it, lest it become the instrument of exploitation rather than the barrier to exploitation that was its classical justification. Even orthodox economic theory has long recognized that the market fails to deal adequately with depletion, pollution, and distribution. These proposals supplement the market at its weak points, allowing it to allocate resources within imposed

could determine how to spend them free of arbitrary government decision-making. It might be possible, for instance, for an individual to have a second child or to fly a light aircraft 100 hours per year, but not both. Or one might decide to have an air-conditioned house, but if so, an overseas vacation might be possible only once every ten years. Instead of direct constraints being placed by society on activities, each person's life-style would be partially determined by a series of environmental trade-oifs of his or her own choosing. On the debit side would be the enormous bureaucratic problem of setting up the equivalent of a second monetary system, the great problem of assigning reasonable values to goods and activities, and the inevitable corruption and scheming that institution of such a plan would induce. Its authors present a most interesting discussion of its details and offer it in the full knowledge that it is not politically feasible at present. But it is hard to disagree with one of their major conclusions: "Although involving more planning and more governmental regulation than is currently deemed feasible or acceptable, we believe the mechanism would lead to less restriction of personal freedom in a steadystate society than would the current trend toward unsystematic imposition of governmental regulations."

ethical and ecological limits.104 Much additional effort by economists and others will be required to work out details of the changes required in order to minimize throughput in the economic system. One further step, however, is already clear. Both before and after depletion quotas are established, ways must be found to control advertising. Advertising plays a key role in promoting growthmania in the DCs. In those nations the basic human needs for food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and education are being met for perhaps 90 percent of the populations. In order to keep those economies growing, therefore, new "needs" must be created. E. F. Schumacher has written, "The cultivation 1041975 testimony, p. 12.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS /

and expansion of needs is the antithesis of wisdom. It is also the antithesis of freedom and peace. Every increase of needs tends to increase one's dependence on outside forces over which one cannot have control, and therefore creates existential fear. Only by a reduction of needs can one promote a genuine reduction in those tensions which are the ultimate cause of strife and war."105 The employment problem. Redirecting pioduction into more useful channels and reducing the throughput associated with production will entail considerable retraining and temporary unemployment in the work force. These problems will be all the more difficult in the United States because of the unemployment problem that already exists. The 4 to 10 percent unemployment figures commonly quoted as the economy cycles between boom and recession do not reveal the true seriousness of the problem. First of all, this overt unemployment is very unevenly distributed in the population. Racial minorities, young workers, women, and, above all, young minority workers suffer disproportionately. The pressure of unemployment at the younger end of the labor pool is probably a major reason that American society has been so rigid about retirement around the age of 65. Many talented people are removed from the labor force even though they may still be capable of ten years or more of productive work and do not wish to be "put out to pasture." The enforced separation of older people from their economic lives also clearly contributes to their general problems. Added to these components of the employment picture is disguised unemployment: people doing jobs that are either unnecessary or detrimental to society, or both. Anyone familiar with government, big business, universities, the military, or any large bureaucracy, knows how many people are just doing busywork or pushing paper. When those people are combined with workers who are engaged in such fundamentally counterproductive activities as building freeways, producing oversized cars and unneeded appliances, devising deceptive advertising, or manufacturing superfluous weapons systems, the number of people who are unemployed, underemployed, or misemployed is seen to make up a substantial portion of the work force. 105

'Small is beautiful, p. 31.

Of course, the whole employment problem would be badly aggravated if society attempted to discontinue too abruptly those jobs that are unnecessary or socially and environmentally destructive. Maintaining some of those activities is probably necessary in the short run while changes in employment patterns are worked out. But now is the time to start planning and maneuvering to phase out both disguised unemployment and destructive products without damaging society and without creating enormous levels of overt unemployment. The transition should be greatly assisted by the obvious potential for expanded employment in services such as health care and education (including adult education); in developing energetically efficient transportation systems for people and freight; in perfecting and deploying solar and other environmentally desirable energy technologies; in recycling and pollution-control industries; in environmental improvement activities such as reclamation of strip-mined land, reforestation, and the construction of urban parks; in converting the food production system to more wholesome, less wasteful and energy-consumptive practices; and in the development, production, and distribution of better contraceptives.106 The transition should also be eased somewhat because the numbers of new young job-seekers will begin to decline after 1980, because of the smaller number of births in the United States in the 1960s compared to the 1950s. And, if the trend of past decades in which workers have been increasingly replaced by fuel-burning machinery is reversed, the result obviously will be more jobs. In the longer term, even with greater use of labor instead of machines in some areas of the economy, the solution to the employment problem may well require a reduction in the amount of work done by each worker in order to create more jobs. Gradually shortening the work week (ultimately to twenty-five hours or less) or decreasing the number of work weeks per year (companies could have different spring-summer and fall-winter shifts) would accomplish this. There would be more time for leisure, which might be better enjoyed by a more educated population. There would also be more time for people both to obtain that education and to put it to good 106

See, for example, Patrick Heffernan, Jobs and the environment.

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within the agricultural sector—namely, the declining efficacy of pesticides with the development of resistance in pests—demanded greater attention to alternative methods of pest control. The committee was especially concerned with the impact of regulation on the development of new technologies to replace the conventional broad-spectrum chemicals that have dominated the pestcontrol scene since 1950. It is clear, of course, that the required technologies are unlikely to be generated within the chemical industry. The NAS report went on to point out: The products produced by the chemical industry appear admirably to meet the economic goals that we assume dominate the decision-making processes in private industry. Unfortunately, the sole example of overlap between the properties desired by the industry and those of the most promising alternatives would seem to be the observation that the industry favors short persistence over long by a wide margin. Conversely, however, industry favors a broad spectrum of biological activity over a narrow spectrum by almost the same margin.1'' In short, a compound that must be repeatedly applied, that kills natural enemies, and produces rapid evolution of resistance is preferred by pesticide manufacturers— merely because, in the process of not working, it can be recommended in ever-increasing doses and eventually can be replaced by another ecological sledgehammer marketed by the same industry. Pest-control techniques that were truly effective, of course, would be a disaster for the pesticide industry. Implementation of one regulatory recommendation of the NAS study, that the availability of alternatives should influence registration judgements, would be another serious blow for the industry, as well as a major step toward protecting humanity from its activities. Tougher regulations quite likely would cause some decline in traditional firms involved in manufacturing pesticides. Fortunately, as noted in Chapter 11, ecologically sound pest management (which would include sparing use of chemicals integrated with other techniques) would be more labor-intensive than the present broadcast-spray '"Ibid., vol. l,p. 139.

system. At least in theory, then, a transition to such management could be accomplished with a net gain of jobs in the economy, although many individuals would certainly have to be retrained. Economics versus environmental reality. Defensive reactions have also come from other industries whose activities contribute heavily to pollution. Representatives of the inorganic-nitrogen-fertilizer industry have given extensive testimony before Congress, most of which confirmed the belief of many biologists that the industry just cannot (or does not want to) grasp the dimensions of the problems that result from failure to maintain an adequate supply of humus in the soil. Manufacturers of fluorocarbons and aerosol cans have vigorously lobbied against restrictive legislation. Makers of nonreturnable containers and poisonous food additives have fought to continue marketing their products. The list is both interminable and understandable; no person or corporation likes to see income or economic survival threatened. It is most difficult to protect the environment when economists, industries, and government agencies team up to wreak havoc, as they did, in effect, in the case of the supersonic transport. Building and marketing a commercial SST was "justified" in the United States largely on the grounds that it was needed economically to protect the balance of payments. President Richard M. Nixon, in endorsing the nation's SST program in 1969, stated, "I want the United States to continue to lead the world in air transport." The economic penalties that would be incurred from damage caused by sonic booms were probably not included in the administration's consideration of whether to proceed with the project, nor were the psychological and emotional damages people would suffer, nor the possible effects on the world's climate (which themselves might cause heavy economic damage) from the operation of these high-altitude jets. Indeed, even the lethal possibility of reducing Earth's ozone shield took second place to the balance of payments. Fortunately, a combination of factors, including intensive lobbying on the adverse side effects of the SST by environmental organizations and testimony by several distinguished economists that it was an economic boon-

,

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS// 857

doggie, convinced Congress that the SST's disadvantages outweighed its very questionable advantages, and the U.S. program was killed in 1971. In 1975 the debate began anew when rights to land in the United States were requested for the AngloFrench SST, Concorde. The issue is still in doubt, but several things are apparent— the Concorde is extremely noisy, fuel-inefficient, and probably uneconomical. If it remains in service, it will be as a monument to government stupidity and the momentum of technological circuses. Government Planning The fragmentation of responsibility among government agencies in the United States makes a reasonable response to problems extremely difficult and planning to avert them virtually impossible. The lack of overall control of environmental matters and the virtual sibility of dealing with problems in any coordinated way are illustrated by the area of urban affairs, aspects of whirh now crime nnder rhp pirisdirtions of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as well as the Departments of Labor, Commerce, Interior, Justice, and Transportation, to name just the major ones. It is clear that the executive branch of me federal government badly needs reorganizing. Such coordinated planning as takes place in die federal government is largely confined to the preparation and review of the annual federal budget. It is fair to say diat the time horizons considered in this process are typically short and the emphasis on conventional economic indicators heavy. Resource and environmental matters accordingly receive less attention than they deserve.1 "a Some detailed suggestions on reforming the political structure of the United States to make it more responsive to the requirements of die population-resource-environment situation may be found in the bookHr^T/F12 We '' '"A sense of the planning inputs to and implications of the federal budgeting process is conveyed in the series of volumes, Setting national priorities, published annually by the Brookings Institution since 1970. The 1976 volume, edited by Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze, takes a longer-range perspective (10 years) on issues raised by the budget, and examines the problems of coordinated long-range planning in a government of divided powers. 2 " PiragcsandEhrlich.

discuss only one such reform here: die institutionalization of government planning. pie Center for the Study of Dpmnf-raric Institutions^ has an Ongoing prnjprf under the rfirertion nf ^ G Tugwell, designed to produce a modern constitution for __ the United States. The proposed constitution, now in its tfairty-diird draft^. deserves wide circulation and study. One of the features of the Tugwell constitution is a planning branch of die government, with the mission of • doing long-range planning. As should be apparent from Ct ft/T''M " the preceding discussion, without planning we believe diere is little chance of saving civilization from a downward spiral of deepening social and environmental disruptions and political conflicts. Human societies have shown little aptitude for planning so far, but it is a skill mat must soon be developed. "2a A private organization, California Tomorrow, sponsored a group of planners who produced a document that might serve as a preliminary model for the kind of planning that can be done. The California tomorrow plan: A first sketch presents a skeletal plan for the future of the^ state of California.''3 It describes "California zero," the California of today, and two alternative futures: California I is a "current-trends-continue" projection; California II is a projection in which various alternative courses of action are followed. The plan considers twenty-two major problem areas, including population growtii and various kinds of environmental deterioration, and looks at both the causes of the problems and policies to ameliorate them. California I is compared with California II, and suggestions for phasing into the California II projection are given. The details of the plan need not concern us here, but the subjects of concern in the plan are roughly those of this book. What is encouraging is that a private organization could put together a comprehensive vision of the future of one of the largest political entities in the world, proving that intelligent, broad-spectrum planning can be done. "J"A series of important books on the tools and prospects for comprehensive governmental planning appeared in 1976 and 1977 under the authorship of social scientist and modeler Peter W. House and colleagues: House, The quest far completeness; House and Williams, The carrying capacity of a nation; House and McLeod, Large scale models for poltcv evaluation; House, Trading-off environment, economics, and energy. 5 ''Alfred Heller, ed., The California tomorrow plan.

858 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

The next question is, how can "USA Zero" be started. toward "USA II"? It may well be necessary to form a new political party founded on the principles of population control, environmental quality, a stabilized economv, and dedication f
ajjartv should be national and intf matronal in k orientation, rather than basing its power on parochial issues as the current parties do. In 1854 the Republican party was created de novo, founded on the platform of opposition to the extension of slavery. It seems probable that in the 1980s and 1990s the environmental issue will become even more prominent than the slavery issue was in the 1850s, and a powerful new ecology party might be established, as has occurred in several other countries. It could, indeed, grow out of such political organizations as Zero Population Growth and Friends of the Earth. Obviously, such changes as those briefly proposed above will threaten not only numerous politicians of both major parties, but many economic institutions and practices. They are likely to be opposed by vast segments of the industrial state: by much of the oil and petrochemical industry, the steel industry, the automobile industry, the nuclear power industry, the construction industry, and by some labor unions, land developers, the Army Corps of Engineers, the USDA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the chambers of commerce, to name only a few. Even a cursory knowledge of the pervasiveness of and the degree of political control by these interests leads to the conclusion that the necessary changes in attitudes and behavior are extremely unlikely to occur among the individuals and organizations where it would be most helpful. But what is at stake is survival of a society and a— way of life_If these are to be preserved in recognizable form, cooperation of all elements of society, regardless of personal interests, will be required. Some social scientists believe such cooperation can be obtained by the systematic application of social and political sanctions.U3a We tend to agree, but doubt that even sanctions will work unless there is also a common goal—a realistic view of a desirable and attainable future—that all can strive toward. "**L. D. Nelson and ]. A. Honnold, Planning for resource scarcity.

SOME TARGETS FOR EARLY CHANGE Institutions are shaped by issues, and issues in turn are shaped and evolve in response to the character of the institutions that identify and grapple with them. Accordingly, our discussion of American institutions so far has been framed in the context of the broad issues in population and environment that we believe are central to the human predicament. It is useful now to arlrl tp the _discussion some rather more specific problem areas— pnergv policy, transportation and communications. and land use,—which need early attention, which will test tfae_ ability of institutional change to redirect technology and_ social energies in pursuit of saner ends, and which, in _ being grappled with, may serve to reshape further the institutions themselves. Along with population policy and pollution control, which have already received detailed attention in this and the preceding chapters, we view these problems as high-priority targets for early change. Energy Policy I Who should make energy policy? _How should it be carried out? What should be its goals? These are the principal questions on the policy side of energy, and they are interdependent. As unfortunately sometimes is forgotten, it is fruitless to try to answer the first two questions without already having some semblance of an answer for the third. The United States had an energy policy during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, but it was rarely articulated in public. In any event, the public was not paying much attention. The policy was the result of the goals of two groups—a few interested politicians and their appointees, whose goal was to see that energy was made available as cheaply as possible to meet whatever demand might materialize, and the owners and operators of energy companies (oil companies, coal companies, energy-equipment manufacturers, electric utilities, and so on), whose goal was to expand their businesses and their profits as rapidly as possible. The goals of the two groups coincided nicely. That the interests of private enterprise and of public

TABLE 14-1

Diversification in the Oil Industry (involvement of oil companies with other fuels) policy coincide is not necessarily a bad thing. As Adam Smith expounded the idea in his famous metaphor of the invisible hand, this is the way a free-market economy full of entrepreneurs is supposed to work. Unfortunately, the history of U.S. energy policy is one of the most telling available examples of what can go wrong with this ideal situation: the consolidation of economic interests into oligopoly and monopoly; the tightening influence of the economic interests over the policy-makers and regulators, and indeed the infiltration of the latter by the former; the resulting vigorous pursuit of policies that still serve private interests but have long since lost their relevance to the public interest. This complicated set of issues has been the focus of many analyses much more extensive than we can provide here.114 What follows is a brief overview of some of the most important topics: the character of the U.S. energy industry, government activity in energy, and energy prices and the poor. International aspects of energy policy are considered in Chapter 15. U.S. energy industry. The energy industry is an important sector of the U.S. economy by any measure: according to one tabulation, it accounts for 3 percent of the total employment, 4 percent of the national income, and 27 percent of the annual business investment in new plants and equipment.115 A different way of counting, which includes taxes and other items missed in the figures just given, is to add up all the money spent on energy by consumers. Such a tabulation must include both direct purchases (gasoline, electricity, natural gas, heating oil) and indirect purchases of energy (for example, the fraction of an airline ticket's price that pays for jet fuel, the part of the price of an automobile that pays for the energy needed to build it, the energy to run the hair drier at the beauty parlor, and so forth). The total "^Especially recommended as introductions to the subject are: David Freeman et al, A time to choose: The report of the Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, chapters 5-7, 9-11; J. Steinhart and C. Steinhart, Energy, chapters 13 and 14; N. Medvin, The energy cartel; Resources for the Future, U.S. energy policies: An agenda for research. "'David Freeman et al., A time to choose, p. 142. Included are production and processing of coal, oil, and natural gas, gas and electric utilities, pipeline transport, and wholesale and retail trade. Not included are manufacturers of energy-handling equipment, such as electricity generators and nuclear reactors.

Petroleum company Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon) Texaco Gulf Mobil Standard Oil of California Standard Oil of Indiana Shell Atlantic Richfield Phillips Petroleum Continental Oil

Rank in assets

Oil Gas shale

Tar Coal Uranium sands

1

X

X

X

X

X

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

X

X

X

X

—

X X X X X X X

X X X X

X _ —

X X — X

X

X

X X X X

— X

X

X

X

— X

X X

Source: N. Medvin, The energy cartel

computed this way was around 10 percent of the gross national product at pre-embargo (1973) energy prices. The greatest concentration of economic and pnHt power in the energy industry is found in the large oiL companies. Ten of the top twenty companies on Fortune magazine's 1975 list of the largest industrial corporations in the United States were oil companies, and the assets of those ten alone topped $154 billion. Their 1974 sales were $116 billion."6 Those companies have become large both by vertical integration and by diversification. The first term means that a single company is involved in many stages of processing an energy source—for example, exploration, production, refining, marketing. Diversification refers to involvement of a single company with several different resources—for example, oil, coal, uranium, oil shale. (Naturally, diversification can go beyond energy resources—some oil companies own movie theaters, for example.) A glance at Table 14-1 reveals tfaat_ the major oil companies are really energy companies, as aTl of them are involved with three or more different resources. As big as the major energy companies are, me concentration of the energy business in the few largest organizations does not quite qualify for the label anticompetitive under the usual rule of thumb, which is that 70 percent of the business be concentrated in the largest eight firms.117 The degree of concentration in various sectors of the U.S. energy industry is shown in Table ' "Fortune directory of the 500 largest industrial corporations, Fortune, vol. 91, no. 5 (May 1975), pp. 210-211. 11 'Freeman et al., A time to choose, p. 231.

_

x— x

X X

TABLE 14-2

Concentration in the United States Energy Industries (around 1970) Percentage of total activity

Industry

50

Crude-oil production

5y

Petroleum refining

Gasoline sales Interstate natural gas sales Coal production Uranium mining and milling Electric generating equipment

crucial activities in the hands of private enterprise. Increasingly, the same corporations that swear by the free-market system in some respects have shown themselves more than willing to abandon it selectively, campaigning for all manner of special subsidies, tax incentives, and privileges, while expecting the government to undertake the riskiest and most difficult parts of the energy enterprise. Thus the federal government finds itself providing most of the liability insurance for nuclear reactors, trying (without much success as of 1976) to persuade private industry to get into the uraniumenrichment business, underwriting most of the cost of a demonstration breeder reactor for the utilities, paying to bring the technology of sulfur control for coal and oil to a state of development deemed economically viable by the utilities, and so on. On the other hand, the idea of letting the government take over the energy business entirely is not particularly appetizing. The experiences of other nations where the energy industry has been nationalized shows that this is no guarantee against bungling and exploitation, as does the U.S. experience with government enterprises in other fields. At the same time, it seems clear that the goals of the energy companies have become increasingly removed from the public interest in the 1970s. More energy for its own sake (or for profit's sake) can no longer serve as the goal of national energy policy, and it is apparent that much tighter control over the energy industry by government is the minimum prescription for steering away from this outmoded view.

in 8 largest firms

52 43 40 79 100

Source: David Freeman et al.,A time to choose, p. 231.

14-2. The effective degree of concentration is probably higher than the figures reflect, however, because of the large number of joint ventures linking the major companies in collaborative enterprises. These include jointly owned or operated oil fields, pipelines, refineries, and a bewildering variety of other arrangements. Among the ten or fifteen largest oil companies, almost all of the possible two-company combinations in joint ventures are actually in existence.118 The political power of the major energy companies in practice is reflected in the special treatment by the government they have gained and largely preserved for themselves in the forms of the depletion allowance, foreign tax credits, and other tax dodges.1183 (The depletion allowance for all but the smallest producers was at last repealed in 1975.) Between 1962 and 1971 the five largest U.S. oil companies paid an average of 5.2 percent income tax on their profits, compared to an average corporate income tax for all industries of about 42 percent. The diiference could be regarded as a raid on the U.S. Treasury by those five companies in the amount of about $17 billion.119 (These five companies were all in the top ten U.S. corporations in profitability in 1976. Their after-tax profits totalled $6.2 billion.'19a) It may be argued, of course, that developing and marketing energy resources is an increasingly complicated and expensive business that only very large and financially vigorous corporations can handle. Indeed, this is precisely what the energy companies do argue. Yet it is not entirely clear what the American people as a whole gain by leaving those very profitable and also very

Government's role. The response of government to the growing complexity of energy issues over the past few decades has been piecemeal and uncoordinated. Each emerging set of problems, it seems, has led to creation of a new agency or assignment of responsibility to an existing one, without regard for the way pieces of the energy problem interaa with each other. The result is overlapping jurisdiction in some cases—in which conflicts arise among federal, state and local governmental entities—and no jurisdiction at all in others^ Some of the principal federal agencies involved in energy are listed in Box 14-4, along with synopses of their responsibilities that suggest some of the potential conflicts and ambiguities. Operating sometimes in collaboration with,

1 8

' Sec Medvin, The energy cartel, chapter 5 and Appendix 1. "'"See, for example, A. ]. Lichtenberg and R. D. Norgaard, Energy policy' and the taxation of oil and gas income. "'The figures are from Steinhart and Steinhart, Energy, p, 282. i isaMiit Moskowitz, The top ten money earners, San Francisco ChranicJe, April 2, 1977, p. 31.

860

, Some Federal Agencies Involved in Energy oil drilling, coal mining) on federal lands, including offshore • Maintains statistics on reserves and production of mineral energy resources • Produces and markets electric power through four regional administrations (Bonneville, Alaska, Southwest, Southeast)

Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) • Consults with other federal agencies on environmental impacts of their actions • Receives and evaluates environmental impact statements on energy facilities Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) • Develops and demonstrates new sources of energy supply • Analyzes and encourages eneigy conservation • Makes forecasts of energy needs and proposes strategies to meet them • Operates certain energy facilities (such as uranium-enrichment plants)

Federal Energy Administration (FEA) • Collects and verifies information about availability of energy to consumers • Regulates the mix of products from refineries • Allocates energy supplies in times of shortage • Makes forecasts and devises strategies Federal Power Commission (FPC) • Controls prices and standards of service for sales of electricity and natural gas across state lines • Licenses hydropower facilities on navigable waterways

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) • Devises and enforces standards for air and water quality, bearing on operation of power plants and automobiles Department of Commerce (DOC) • Devises and implements programs and standards for industrial energy conservation

Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) • Regulates interstate oil and coal-slurry pipelines

Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) • Devises and implements standards for energy conservation in buildings

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) • Devises and enforces standards for safety of nuclear-energy facilities Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) • Regulates management practices of electric utilities

Department of the Interior (DOT) • Controls energy development (for example,

sometimes at odds with these agencies is a host of congressional committees, themselves engaged in almost continuous jockeying with each other for jurisdiction and influence. In early 1977 President Carter proposed a sweeping reorganization of energy-related functions in the Executive Branch, centered around a new Department of Energy equal in status to Commerce, Interior, Treasury, and so on^Upon approval by Congress, the Department of Energy will replace the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Federal Power Commission, as well as assuming most of the energy-related responsibilities of the Department of Interior, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Interstate Commerce Commission,

and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Two new administrations would bp created wjthin th ment: the Energy Information Administration n and distributing information about energy suppljes and uses, and the Energy Regulatory Commission, covering economic regulation only. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Council on Environmental Quality would retain their powers as listed in Box 14-4. The confusion in Washington /which one may hope the Carter reorganization will reduce) is compounded, of course, by the existence of public utilities commissions in forty-six of the fifty states, with widely varying responsibilities in the energy field. About half of them control both public and investor-owned utilities (electricity and

861

862 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

natural gas, plus nonenergy activities); the other half control only the investor-owned utilities. Most set the rates charged for electricity and gas, to protect the consumer from the monopoly that the nature of distribution systems for gas and electricity makes almost inevitable. They are also generally responsible for assuring the safety of systems under their jurisdiction, one of several overlaps with other agencies. Jjovernment action in the energy field is not only encumbered by this enormous organizational cnmp|ex-_ ity, but it has often been enfeebled as well by internal conflicts of interest. These have arisen from the standard problem of infiltration of regulatory agencies by committed representatives of the regulated organizations, and also sometimes from the incorporation of promotional and regulatory functions within the same agencies. Perhaps the most visible example of the pitfalls of the latter situation was the Atomic Energy Commission,, which from its creation in 1946 was empowered both to_ regulate and to promote the peaceful and military^ applications of nuclear energy. Some of the difficulties that nuclear fission as an energy source faces in the late 1970s can be attributed to mistakes that arose from this inherent conflict and from the cozy relationship that evolved between the AEG and its supposed congressional watchdog, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, (JCAE).120 The AEC-JCAE combination for many years was the most active and visible agency connected with energy in Washington, and its vigorous promotion of nuclear fission to the near-exclusion of research on other energy sources left the United States in the 1970s with far fewer energy options than it could and should have had. The AEG was split in late 1974 into the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, on the one hand, and several divisions of the Energy Research and Development Administration on the other (see Box 14-4). The JCAE was stripped of its power in a Congressional committee reorganization in early 1977. Energy prices and the poor.. If it is obvious that energy in the United States has been underpriced, 120 Good critical histories are R. Lewis, The nuclear power rebellion: Citizens versus the atomic industrial establishment; P. Metzger, The atomic establishment.

encouraging overexploitation and waste, it is equally apparent that sharp price increases cause a disproportionate burden on the poor. The poor spend a larger fraction of their incomes on direct energy purchases than do higher-income groups, they are less able to cut back on energy consumption because a larger part of their consumption is for essential rather than discretionary uses, and they are less able to im'est money in insulation and other improvements that will reduce energy expenditures in the long run. 121 Increases in energy prices are not quite as regressive as they seem at first glance, however, because total energy expenditures (for direct purchases plus the "indirect" energy embodied in other goods and services) increase almost in direct proportion to income.122 Even so, the plight of the poor requires that special measures be taken to reduce the impact of higher energy prices on them. Such measures should include changing the rate structure for purchases of electricity and natural gas, so that small users pay less per unit of energy rather than more (compared with large users), as is now generally the case. Subsidies for the purchase of insulation and similar improvements could easily be paid for out of increased taxes on the profits of energy companies. It would not be difficult to design an energy tax and rebate system that actually served as an income redistribution device favoring the poor while discouraging heavy energy consumption in higher-income groups. In short, the special problems of the poor must be taken into account as energy prices rise, and they can be. Indeed, the nation would have to face up to the problems of the poor whether energy prices were rising or not. It would be doubly absurd if the government were to take the position, having failed to deal adequately with the problem of poverty directly, that its energy policy must revolve around holding energy prices low for everyone in order to deal with poverty indirectly. At the same time, there is no reason whatever that higher prices for energy, which are needed to help promote conservation and to pay for ameliorating energy's environmental damages, m According to Freeman et al., chapter 5, poor Americans spent 15 percent of their income on natural gas, electricity, and gasoline in the early 1970s, compared to 7 percent, 6 percent, and 4 percent for the lower middle class, upper middle class, and the well-off segments of the population. I32 R. Herendeen, Energy and affluence.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 863

must mean higher profits for the energy companies. Preventing this is a straightforward matter of tax policy. Directions for a rational energy policy. The main questions that energy policy must confront can be summarized: (1) How much energy should be supplied? (2) With what technologies should it be supplied? (3) Who should pay the associated costs? At issue under the first question are the costs and benefits to society of various levels of energy consumption and various rates of change in those levels (growth or decline). The second question—which should be viewed not as a search for the ideal energy source but as a search for the least undesirable mixture of sources—is important regardless of the answer to the first; a stabilized or even a reduced level of energy use would not absolve society from making difficult choices about how best to supply that level. Similarly, the third question-involving how prices, taxes, and regulation are employed to distribute the direct and indirect costs of energy use—is crucial no matter how the first two questions are answered. Still, the three questions are far from independent. If the answer to the question "How much?" is a great deal, the range of choice under "What technology?" diminishes; society may have to choose all the options at once, at great expense. And the greater the costs, the trickier is the question "Who pays?" On the question of how much should be supplied^ pur view is that the United States is threatened far more bv^ foe-hazards of too much energy, too soon, than by the. hazards of too little, too late. That the contrary view is so widely held seems to be the result of two factors: (1) The economic, environmental, and social costs of today's level of energy use, and of rapid growth in this level, have been seriously underestimated by most observers. (2) The economic and social costs of slower growth have been just as seriously overestimated. The underpinnings for these assertions are found in Chapters 8, 10, and 11. i "a T$e reiterate here in capsule form the relevant conclusions that we draw from that material.122b 122a A particularly cogent and eloquent formulation of the arguments for both points was recently published by Amory Lovins, Energy Strategy: The road not taken. I22b These arguments were first published in slightly abbreviated form in John P. Holdren, Too much energy, too soon, New York Times, Op-Ed page, July 23, 1975.

Rapid growth in energy use fosters expensive mistakes. Especially where the existing level of energy use is already high, rapid growth forces exploitation of highcost energy sources as well as low-cost ones, it strains available supplies of investment capital, and it encourages gambles on inadequately tested technologies. The pressure of growth favors streamlining of assessment and licensing processes, further enlarging the probability that some of the gambles will fail—at great economic, environmental, or social cost. Even at slower growth rates, increases in energy use may do more harm than good. While the productive application of energy fosters prosperity through the operation of the economic system, the environmental and social effects of the same energy flows undermine prosperity by means of direct damage to health, property, and human values, and by disrupting "public-service" functions of natural systems. Clearly, the benefits to well-being obtained through the economic side of the relationship by means of increased energy use could in some circumstances be completely cancelled by the associated damage to wellbeing through the environmental side. Not only has this outcome probably already occurred for some energy sources in some locations, but under continued growth it is eventually inevitable overall, irrespective of the energy sources chosen. Conservation of energy means doing better, not doing without. Fortunately, the slowing of energy growth, and even the eventual reduction of the total level of energy use, need not mean a life of economic privation for the public. The essence of conservation is the art of extracting more well-being out of each gallon of fuel and each kilowatt hour of electricity. Much progress in this direction can be made through changes that increase efficiency in industrial processes and electricity generation, and in energy-consuming devices in homes, commerce, and transportation. Of course, some kinds of energy conservation will require changes in individual behavior, and critics of conservation are quick to suggest that this implies a return to primitive existence. In a society whose members use 5000-pound automobiles for half-mile round trips to the market to fetch six-packs of beer, consume the beer in underinsulated buildings that are overcooled in summer and overheated in winter, and then throw the aluminum cans away at an energy loss

864 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

equivalent to one-third of a gallon of gasoline per six-pack, the primitive-existence argument strikes us as the most offensive kind of nonsense. Saving a barrel of oil is generally cheaper than producing a barrel. Slowing the growth of energy consumption by means of rational conservation measures can actually save a great deal of money. For, although technological improvements to increase energy efficiency often require some additional capital investment over conventional practice, this investment is usually less than the investment that would be needed to produce from new sources (offshore oil, nuclear fission, geothermal development) an amount of energy equal to that saved. In this sense, conservation is the cheapest new energy source. The money saved by conservation, of course, would in principle be available for some of this country's many other pressing needs. Less energy can mean more employment. The energyproducing industries comprise the most capital-intensive and least labor-intensive major sector of the U.S. economy. Accordingly, each dollar of investment capital taken out of energy production and invested in another activity, and each dollar saved by an individual by reduced energy use and spent elsewhere in the economy, is likely to benefit employment. We conclude therefore that the high rates of growth of energy use and electricity generation traditionally anticipated for the period between 1975 and 2000 are neither desirable nor necessary. They are not desirable because the economic, environmental, and social costs of such growth are likely to be severe; they are not necessary because the application of a modicum of technological and economic ingenuity can produce continued—indeed, growing—prosperity without them. Both in the short term and thereafter, then, the mainstay of a rational energy policy for this country should be learning to do more with less. Some efforts at more efficient use of energy will come about automatically through the impact of higher energy prices. Even without industry price-gouging, these are inevitable because of the technical intractability, in various respects, of the energy sources that remain. Price is likely not to be a sufficient incentive to wring from the socioeconomic system all the increased efficiency that is

possible and desirable, however, primarily because of certain differences in perceived interests of industries and consumers; regulations such as efficiency standards for appliances, automobiles, and buildings should therefore be used to supplement the price mechanism. And "lifeline" rates and other subsidies to the poor should be instituted to alleviate the impact of higher prices on those least able to make energy-saving adjustments. Knvirnnmentally1 the first step is to clean up the _ mainstays of the present energy budget, the fo°«j| Special attention must be given to finding environmentally tolerable ways to exploit the abundant resources of coal and possibly of oil shale. The environmental and social risks of fission, including the threat of terrorism and sabotage, either at the facilities or elsewhere by using stolen nuclear materials, deserve the most searching reevaluation before a national commitment is made to expand reliance on this source. In our own view, the threat posed by fission power to the fabric of the social and political system through the spread of radiological and explosive nuclear weapons— a threat that is a virtually inevitable concomitant of this energy technology— is qualitatively different from the risks of other energy technologies, and indeed a price not worth paying for the benefits of fission power. But the choice is more a social and political one than a technical one, and it should be made not by scientists but by the broader public. The many forms of solar energy deserve vigorous investigation to find the ones most benign environmentally and most practical technically. Attention should be focused not merely on centralized electric power stations but on the myriad possibilities for dispersed applications. Fusion and geothermal power also deserve further investigation to learn whether they can meet, in a practical way and at an affordable price, the conditions of low environmental impact so essential in any long-term energy source. It should be recognized by now that there is value in diversity in technological systems as well as in biological ones. Diversity is insurance against uncertainty, and for insurance one should be prepared to pay something. Society should not build only the cheapest energy technologies, nor even only the ones that seem on today's analysis most benign environmentally. If threats over-

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 865

looked or underrated today turn out to be important, altering a mix of energy technologies will be easier and less disruptive than abandoning a monoculture. At the same time, one should not conclude from an exaggerated preoccupation with diversity that society must develop all possibilities; the very value of diversity is to secure the flexibility to say no to those possibilities that clearly are unsuitable. Transportation Fuel burned for transportation in industrial nations accounts for 15 to 25 percent of all energy used by such countries. Including the energy used to manufacture and maintain the transportation systems would raise that figure to 25 to 40 percent of the total energy use (refer to Chapter 8 for details). Transportation's contribution to pollution may be taken at a first approximation to be proportional to its share of energy use; its impact on nonfuel resources is also large. Perhaps most important, transportation systems are major forces in determining the use of land and shaping the human environment. What have been the forces that have influenced this system, and how might they be changed for the better? The automobile. The introduction of annual automobile model changes by General Motors in 1923 quickly pushed most competitors out of business, reducing the number of automobile manufacturers in the United States from eighty-eight in 1921 to ten in 1935. Only four of any economic significance remain today. A few companies therefore have been able to manipulate both demand and quality in a way that has resulted in a continual high output of overpowered, overstyled, underengineered, quickly obsolescent, and relatively fragile automobiles. These characteristics of the automobile, together with the dominance of this form of personal mobility over many more sensible alternatives, are responsible for a remarkable array of demands on resources and environmental problems. For example, immediate relief from a major portion of our air-pollution problems and a substantial reduction in the demand for steel, lead, glass, rubber, and other materials would result from the replacement of existing automobiles with small, low-

horsepower, long-lasting cars designed for recycling. And, of course, the savings in petroleum would be spectacular. If the average size of the American cars on the road in 1970 were reduced to that of European cars, the gasoline saved would have run the cars of Europe for that year! To facilitate a shift to smaller cars, the U.S. government might remove tariffs and import restrictions on automobiles that meet strict exhaust-emission standards, so that small foreign cars would become even more attractive to American buyers. Heavy excise taxes on large Detroit products and reduced taxes on small, gas-economical ones would help shift buying habits in the domestic market. Gasoline consumption, exhaust emissions, and the components of air pollution produced by the wear of tires on asphalt and from the asbestos of brake linings would all be reduced by the use of smaller, lighter cars. Recycling old automobiles and building longer-lasting ones would reduce both the consumption and the environmental impact of obtaining resources, as well as reducing the pollution directly associated with automobile production. The rewards of such a program would not be limited to pollution abatement and the saving of petroleum and other resources. Because small cars need less room on the highway and in parking lots, transportation would through that change alone become pleasanter, safer, and more efficient. Of course, there would be several adverse consequences of even such a mild program of "automobile control." Between 10 and 20 percent of the American population derives its living directly or indirectly from the automobile: its construction, fueling, servicing, selling, and the provision of roads and other facilities for it. Not all of these jobs would be affected by conversion to smaller, more durable automobiles and to other forms of transportation, but many would be. In the long run, workers displaced from auto production could be employed in ways that would reduce reliance on environmentally destructive technological processes in other industries. Unless there were careful planning to ameliorate the consequences, such a conversion could have extremely disruptive effects on the national economy. The economy, however, is demonstrably capable of accommodat-

868 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

systems may make it simpler for the wealthy to live outside decaying cities; Amtrak makes it less desirable to live and work in small towns and rural areas. Such patchwork solutions will not work; the planning of our national transportation system must be comprehensive because of the massive social impact of that system. Stimuli for change. Despite the obviously growing need for an overhaul of the transport system in the United States, it seems unlikely it will be changed significantly for the better until the public becomes sufficiently fed up with smog, noise, delays, and danger that it is willing to forego further growth in both the automobile population and the gross national product. Emissions from automobiles have been lowered and certainly will be reduced even further, but until the public rebels against cars, their numbers will probably increase rapidly enough to keep the overall smog level dangerously high and gas consumption rising, as more and more land disappears under freeways. The problem is worst in the United States, but a similar trend exists in other DCs. (growing energy problems may eventually provide the needed catalyst for a rebellion against cars. One cheering sign by the mid-1970s was a dramatic increase in bicyling, leading even to the designation of bike lanes in the streets of some municipalities. Whatever can be done to stimulate a bicycle cult to rival die big-car cult should be done. If and when a transition can be made to a nongrowing population and economy, both the need for business travel and the pressure to build more vehicles and more goods should be reduced; perhaps then a rational and comprehensive land, air, and water transport129 system for the nation can be developed. The kinds of transport problems that now plague the DCs (the United States in particular) can (and we hope will) be totally avoided in most LDCs, where there is still an opportunity to build systems based primarily on a mix of low-cost mass transit and bicycles.130 1M In some areas, canals and other inland waterways can be very efficient in moving freight. See M. G. Miller, The case for water transport. ""See Ivan Illich, Energy and equity; and Allan K. Meier, Becafcs, bemos, lambros, and productive pandemonium, Technology Review, Jan. 1977, pp. 56-63.

Communications Unlike most other institutions, the communications system may have great potential for instituting positive change in individual attitudes and the direction of society.131 Television and radio seem to have universal appeal and with relatively little expenditure could have virtually universal coverage. If human problems are to be solved on a worldwide basis, some means of intercommunication among the peoples of the world must be employed. One possibility is for the DCs to supply LDCs with large numbers of small, transistorized TV sets for communal viewing in villages. Such sets could provide the information channels for reaching the largely rural populations of the less developed world. These channels could provide both a route for supplying technical aid and a means of reinforcing the idea that the people are members of a global community. Such a project is already underway in Indonesia,132 and a satellitebeamed program was used experimentally with great success in India until the satellite service was terminated in 1977.132a Isaac Asimov has described the potentialities of electronic communications as a "fourth revolution" on a par_ with rtje developments of speech, writing, and print-^ ing.133 Considering the enormous influence of radio and television in Western countries, their future impact in largely illiterate societies can hardly fail to be even greater. But that revolution will not realize its full potential nrrpl plpqfnnir communications are as wide-

viewing public into the communications network. Communications satellites. The first small commercial communications satellite station was launched in 1965, with one channel for television and 240 relays for voice transmissions. A much more sophisticated system, INTELSAT IV, was initiated in 1971 with the launch131 Scientific American, September 1973, was a special issue on communications that included several articles pertinent to this discussion. 2 " Cynthia Parsons, Indonesia studies best use of TV, Honolulu Advertiser, March 11, 1975. 1J2a India, however, planned to continue much of the rural program using ground stations (Yash Pal, A visitor to the village, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1977, pp. 55—56). '"The fourth revolution.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 869

ing of two satellites. By 1975 the INTELSAT IV system was complete with seven satellites in place, three over the Atlantic Ocean and two each over the Pacific and Indian oceans. Eighty-six member nations were being served by 80 Earth stations with 103 antennas in 58 countries.134 The system has permitted a number of countries that previously had had virtually no contact to communicate with each other by satellite. An interesting example is Chile and Argentina; the Andes were once too great a barrier. INTELSAT transmits data, transoceanic telephone and teletype messages, television broadcasts, and facsimilies of letters, newspapers, or photographs. Distributional satellites are also being established to relay messages within countries as a supplement to the international INTELSATs. Eventually, the hope is to develop a system for broadcasting directly to each home. This is not expected to become a reality before the 1980s, however, and even then many think it will be limited to the sort of service described above—programs beamed to schools, community centers, and villages, especially in LDCs. The potential for creating a true rglobal village" through such a communications network should not be ignored. Even apart from the opportunity to bring diverse peoples together for exchange of ideas and information, there is a great opportunity for a general lowering of hostilities. Familiarity breeds friendship far more often than contempt. ( Programming and propaganda. There remains, of^ course, the substantial ganger that a worldwide communications network will not be used for the humanity or will further erode cultural diversity. If, like the television system in the United States, it is employed to promote the ideas and interests of a controlling^, minority, the world would be better off without it.135 If it is used to create a global desire for plastic junk and thg Los Angelization of Earth, it would be a catastrophe. Concerns over this and related programming problems, have already been raised at the United Nations. One "'Information on INTELSAT is from Hughes Aircraft Company, Intelsat IV case history: vol. 2, The international satellite communications system: Intelsat IV, Hughes Aircraft Company, El Segundo, Calif., December 1974. A more recent source is Burton I. Edelson, Global satellite communications. Scientific American, February 1977, pp. 58-73. '"Pirages and Ehrlich, Ark H, pp. 200ff.

delegate, for instance, correctly pointed out that "Films considered the acme of art in one country [might be] judged pornographic in another."136 The problems of supplying channels for information are thus easily solved in comparison with the problems of determining what information should flow along those channels and in what format. Much programming ought to be informational, even if presented as entertainment. People in the LDCs need help in increasing agricultural production and improving public health, as well as information on the need for population control and the ways it may be achieved. Programming should be carefully designed by social scientists and communications experts thoroughly familiar with the needs and attitudes of the audiences in each country or locality. This is particularly important in the LDCs, where it will be especially difficult because of the lack of trained people and the radical change in attitudes that is required. Control of the communications media obviously should be public, with maximum safeguard against abuses and against the problems of "cultural homogenization." The problem of controlling "Big Brother" will be ever present in all societies. Educating people in the developed nations to the problems of population and environment is not too difficult, assuming time and space can be obtained in the media. Material can be more straightforward, since in most DCs there is already rather widespread awareness of many environmental problems. In the United States a great step could be taken merely by requiring that both radio and television assign some of their commercial time to short public-service "spots" calling attention to the problems of population, resources, and environment. This could be justified under the equal-time doctrine that put the antismoking message sponsored by the American Heart Association and the American Cancer Society on TV (see "Advertising" section). The FCC might be empowered to require that networks donate time for ads to awaken people to the population-resource-environment crisis. Such spots, sponsored by voluntary organizations like Planned Parenthood, ZPG, and the Sierra Club, have been moderately eifective in drawing public "'Paul Hofmann, Curb on world TV is debated at UN, New York Times, November 3, 1974.

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attention to the problems. Unfortunately, the advertising budgets available to these groups are puny compared to those of General Motors or Exxon. Long documentary specials, whether prepared by the networks or by educational stations, seem relatively ineffective in initiating awareness of a problem, although they are useful in providing detailed information. For the most part, they reach only those who are already aware that a particular problem exists. Most people want to be entertained; they do not want to hear bad news. Moving information instead of people. In the longer term, more ambitious exploitation of the potentialof communications systems may help to relieve pressure on energy supplies and other resources,. Specifically, it is far less costly in terms of energy to move information than to move people and things. Computer terminals coupled to television sets (for graphic display and face-to-face conversations) and to telephone lines (for data transmission) could eliminate the need for commuting to and from work in many kinds of jobs. Newspapers, which today are responsible for the consumption of great quantities of wood pulp, could be displayed a page at a time, under the control of the reader, on the computertelevision hookup. Scientific and business meetings, each of which now entails hundreds of thousands of passenger miles of fuel-gobbling jet travel, could be managed on closed-circuit television for a tiny fraction of the impact on resources. Of course, there are problems to be surmounted before such schemes can be implemented, not the least of which is the protection of privacy and confidential communications. Such difficulties can, in principle, be solved, and it seems clear that the communication-informationprocessing area is one field in which technological innovation can make important contributions to alleviating the resource-environment crunch.

Land Use Land use has become a catch phrase in the contemporary environmental debate, but the term calls forth very different images and priorities in the minds of different groups of people. This is so because so many of the

compelling social and environmental issues of the day are tied rather directly to how the land is used. Urban decay, the existence of ghettos, lack of access to decent low-cost housing, and the problem of busing of schoolchildren can all be viewed as interrelated consequences of prevailing patterns of urban land use. Another aspect of the pattern is suburbanization and the energy-intensive long commutes to work that go with it. The loss of prime agricultural land and recreational open space under settlements, industrial parks, transportation systems, and energy facilities is yet another dimension. And certainly the conflict of development of land versus continued provision of essential services by natural and lightly exploited ecosystems (perhaps most strikingly apparent today in the destruction of estuaries and wetlands) is a central ingredient of the human predicament in the long term. Increasingly, the opinions of thoughtful policymakers and observers are converging on the view that the resolution of the problems just enumerated will require a degree of comprehensiveness in land-use planning that exceeds anything contemplated previously in the United States. (Some other Western countries—the United Kingdom and Sweden, for example—have been flirting with comprehensive planning for longer.'37) Here comprehensive means integrating systematically society's social and environmental goals with the pattern of land use on regional and national scales. It is clear, of course, that such comprehensive planning, even if successful, is not a sufficient condition for the solution of social and environmental problems, but a strong case can be made that it is a necessary one. In the remainder of this section of text, we first discuss some goals of land-use planning and policy and, second, the tools for pursuing those goals and the obstacles that make the task a difficult one. CjGoalsTjThe planner's easiest task is setting down desirable goals (easy, at least as long as one does not inquire too closely about making them all compatible with each other). Here is our own partial list. 137 Peter Heimburger, Land policy in Sweden, Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning, Stockholm, 1976. On this and many other points raised here, see also the excellent book by William H. Whyte, The last landscape, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1970.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 871

1. Central cities should be restored to attractiveness and economic viability. In respect to location, absence of competing uses, value of existing structures, and potential for cultural and racial integration, they are much too valuable to waste. 2. Housing developments should be planned in ways that integrate low-cost and higher-cost units and that provide for community open space and resourceconserving community recreational facilities (instead of private)—swimming pools, workshops, darkrooms, and so on. 3. Settlement patterns and transportation systems should be integrated in ways that minimize commuting distances and reliance on the private automobile. 4. Construction of settlements should avoid areas especially prone to flood, fire, landslide, and earthquake. 5. Prime agricultural land should be defended absolutely against encroachment by all other potential uses. The world food situation and the high environmental impact of bringing marginal land under cultivation dictate this highest priority for good land already under agricultural use. 6. Land areas that have remained in wilderness or near-wilderness condition until now should be preserved as such, permitting them to serve aesthetic and ecological functions inconsistent with exploitation or development. More intelligent and efficient use of land already being exploited is preferable to further encroachments on wilderness. 7. Nonwilderness areas where ecological processes perform particularly crucial services in support of civilization should be identified, the extent and value of their services clarified, and the land withdrawn from uses of lesser value that are incompatible with the continued provision of the natural services. Filling of wetlands and estuaries for residential development is an example where even on present knowledge a complete prohibition clearly is justified. Tools and obstacles. On the assumption that the foregoing or some other set of goals were agreed upon by policy-makers, the question would remain what tools are available with which the goals might effectively be pursued. Among those that have been used or con-

templated for land-use management in the United States are: zoning ordinances; preferential tax assessment of different types of land; government purchases of open space; selective siting of facilities owned or substantially supported by government; control of building permits to establish local growth ceilings, moratoria, or timed development contingent on meeting specified conditions; use of the environmental impact statement to force consideration of adverse impacts and alternatives; and government-funded urban renewal projects.138 The use of zoning as a tool for land-use planning and management has suffered from three difficulties. The ffirs^ is fragmentation among the decision-making entities, rendering comprehensive planning or results impossible. In California alone, more than 1400 government entities are involved in zoning.139 Special-purpose agencies dealing with housing, air pollution, water pollution, energy development, and fish and game (to continue with the California example) separately pursue interests that should influence zoning decisions, but there is no general mechanism for exerting such influence and no effective machinery for coordinating the goals of the agencies. The result of this partial vacuum is fragmented control of zoning by local communities, most of which do so in pursuit of a perceived interest in local growth.140 Afseconcfrdifficulty with the zoning tool is the questionable constitutionality of zoning ordinances that are discriminatory in practice? even if not in intent. Keeping density down by zoning the land remaining in a community for single-family dwellings on two-acre lots may succeed in preserving a status quo that the current inhabitants cherish, but it excludes low-income people and thus preserves a residential stratification that is undesirable for society as a whole. The likelihood that zoning ordinances having this effect will eventually be found unconstitutional places in jeopardy other, more 118 A more extensive discussion of these tools than space permits here can he found in CEQ. Enrinmmental quality-1974. See also Elaine Moss, ed., Land use controls in the United States. 139 On this and other aspects of land-use planning in California, see the very useful study by the Planning and Conservation Foundation, The California land: Planning for people, Kaufmann, Los Altos, Calif., 1975. u °The dynamics of this process and the fallacies underlying the belief that such growth necessarily will be beneficial are examined perceptively by Harvey L. Molotch, The urban growth machine, in Environment, William Murdoch, ed., Sinauer, Sunderland, Mass., 1975.

872 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

enlightened uses of the zoning tool, as well perhaps as other land-use controls.14' C A third difficultjhvith zoning that also carries over into the other forms of control is the question of what forms of regulation really are legally a "taking," requiring compensation of the landowner. Involved here is the basic conflict between the rights of a holder of private property—one of the most cherished American traditions—and the public's interest in sound and coordinated management of land.142 Close to zoning in influence on land use is taxation, although the influence of taxes on use may be inadvertent more often than it is used as a tool. Certainly one of the major driving forces behind the development of prime agricultural land in the United States has been the almost universal practice of assessing land for taxation on the basis of the land's most valuable potential use. Unfortunately, agricultural land has lower market value than developed land. Thus the spread of suburbs has led to assessment of adjacent agricultural land at the value it would have if subdivided for residential or commercial development. This leads of course to taxes that the agricultural revenues from the land cannot support and forces the farmer to sell out. In this way, assessment of the land as a potential subdivision leads inevitably to realization of the potential. Some states have begun to experiment with legislation permitting agricultural lands to escape such discriminatory and crippling taxation. California's Williamson Act, one of the more widely publicized examples, has proven too narrow and restrictive to be of great value, however, and more comprehensive measures are needed.143 The imposition of ceilings or moratoria on local growth by a few communities around the United States—Petaluma and Pleasanton, California, and Mount Laurel, New Jersey, for example—has attracted much attention. These decisions have been implemented through control of building permits, made contingent in u! Some recent court decisions are described in CEQ, Environmental Quality, 1975, pp. 186-187. i42 An extended discussion of this point is found in Planning and Conservation Foundation, The California land. '"Planning and Conservation Foundation, The California land, p. 49. For a more general discussion, see CEQ, The impact of differential assessment of farm and open land, Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 1976.

some cases upon achieving in the community some specified level of adequacy of sewage systems, schools, water supply, or other factors. Like zoning practices, this approach has come under sharp legal scrutiny to determine its constitutionality.144 Possibly as important as all the tools that have been used by policy-makers to influence patterns of land use intentionally have been the inadvertent effects of government investments in certain kinds of growth-shaping facilities. Transportation systems—most notably the interstate highway system, but also airports, ports, and mass-transit systems—have been especially influential. So have water projects, sewage lines, and watertreatment plants, and centers of government research and bureaucracies.145 Unless these influences are thoroughly understood and taken into account deliberately and comprehensively, other approaches to land-use planning have little chance to succeed. All of the foregoing difficulties underline the necessity for a more coordinated approach to land use in the United States than any that has been implemented up until now. Balancing priorities among competing uses is at the core of the problem, and this can only be done in a sensible way on a regional (collections of counties or a state or states) or national level. An example of what might be accomplished if the political obstacles were overcome is offered by the remarkable California tomorrow plan, already discussed.146 The plan describes how trends now underway in California would lead, if unchecked, to significant disruptions in the well-being of the people of the state before the year 2000, and it describes a more sensible alternative future based upon a state zoning plan. The goals of the land-use plan are very similar to those listed above. Perhaps the most comprehensive approach to planning that has a reasonable chance of being enacted in the near future is the California Coastal Plan, produced on the mandate of a statewide ballot initiative in 1972 and delivered to the legislature in December 1975. The plan covers the 1600-kilometer California coastline in a strip extending inland to the coastal mountains, an average '"See, for example, CEQ, Environmental quality, 1975, and Molotch. The urban growth machine. M5 CEQ, The growth shapers: Land-use impacts of infrastructure investments. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C.. 1976. '•"Alfred Heller, ed., The California tomorrow plan.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 873

width of perhaps 8 kilometers. It takes account of the competing pressures of energy development, residential use, transportation, recreation, and ecological values, and offers guidelines and machinery for resolving the conflicts in a systematic way. As with all ambitious undertakings, it is no doubt possible to find flaws in the California tomorrow plan and in the much more detailed California Coastal Plan. The question, however, is not whether they are flawed but whether they represent a substantial improvement over the status quo. We believe that they do, and indeed that they are illustrative of the sort of thoughtful and systematic approach that must find application around the country if planning for the rational use of land is to emerge from the disarray that has characterized land use in the United States until now.

A QUESTION OF GOALS It is fitting to close this chapter with some reflections on the long-range goals of Western society. Can they be, as English economist Wilfred Beckerman apparently thinks, economic growth for the next 2500 years?147 Beckerman reasons that since growth has occurred since "the days of Pericles," there is "no reason to suppose that it cannot continue for another 2500 years." It turns out that he is wrong on both counts. Careful studies of economic conditions in England for the past 600 years or so, for example, show average growth rates on the order of 0.5 percent per year—one-tenth of the 5 percent envisioned by most growthmen for "healthy" economies. Social scientist Jack Parsons has done some interesting extrapolations that put long-continued economic growth in perspective. He extrapolated economic growth in England backward at the conservative rate of 1 percent per year. At the time of Pericles (490-424 B.C.), at that rate the annual income of the average household would have been 1.5 ten-millionths of a penny. Hence, even Beckerman's history is bad—growth cannot have gone on since the time of Pericles at even the "low" rate of 1 percent per annum. Careful historical analysis indicates 14

'Beckerman's views are cited by Jack Parsons in The economic transition, from which most of our figures on growth, past and future, are taken.

that fluctuation rather than constant growth has been the fundamental characteristic of Western culture's economic history. The purchasing power of builders' wages in southern England reached a peak between 1450 and 1500 that was not attained again until the late years of the nineteenth century.148 Economic boom clearly is not and cannot be a long-term phenomenon. Until about 1950, economic growth rates of more than 2 percent per annum were very unusual. The 4, 5, or even 6 percent growth rates that economists now seem to regard as the norm are in fact a phenomenon in which a few countries are exploiting much more than could conceivably be considered their fair share of the planet's resources over a time span of a quarter of a century. Assuming conservatively that human beings have had a 1-million-year tenure on Earth, it is clear that human societies have existed in what Beckerman would undoubtedly consider economic stagnation for 99.99 percent of that tenure. Economic growth—that is, per-capita increases in the availability of goods and services—throughout recorded history has been engendered by two sets of circumstances and/or a combination of them. The first such set is the development of widescale economic integration, which allows for the development of more efficient organization of resources, human and natural. The Hellenistic world, from Alexander the Great until the birth of Christ, was an example of such a set.149 So were the uniting of former British colonies into the United States and, later, the European Economic Community. The second and more common set of circumstances has been one in which some group on the periphery of a central cultural zone has managed to gain control over the exploitation of some vast hinterland and then serve as the broker between that resource-rich frontier and the high-consuming metropolis. For example, the rich and attractive Minoan culture on the island of Crete controlled the trade from Egypt and western Asia to the Greek lands to the north in the middle of the second millennium B.C. The Hanseatic League of the high Middle Ages had outposts from London to Novgorod 148 Phelps Brown and J. Hopkins, Seven centuries of the prices of consumables, compared with builders' wage rates, Ecanomica, NS vol. 23 (1956). November, pp. 296-314. I49 See Mikhail Rostovtzeff, Social and economic history of the Hellenistic world.

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that plucked herring, furs, lumber, and all manner of resources from the North Sea and Baltic basins and sold them to medieval Europeans, while ornamenting the cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Liibeck with an elegance and prestige still visible. The Dutch monopoly on the spice trade in the seventeenth century supported the artistic flowering that is best known to us in the work of Rembrandt van Rijn. Finally, the race for empire of recent centuries, characterized above all by British majesty and wealth before 1945, sponsored the most recent expansion, which allowed the citizens of the DCs to enjoy a now-declining affluence.150 Systems of economic integration are always very fragile, and the pattern of economic growth based on the hegemony of exploiters over the resource-rich frontier seems to carry the seeds of its own destruction. In order to exploit an area, it is necessary to organize it, either by organizing the indigenous population or by sending forth emigrants from the metropolis. What starts out as an organization for economic exploitation consistently tends to become an organization for political resistance to the metropolis and finally a cadre for political and economic independence. The Ariadne legend in Greek literature, retold in a sagacious reconstruction of its historical context by Mary Renault in The King Must Die, tells a story of the Greeks breaking the economic hold of the Minoans on their culture. The Iliad was probably the story of a postdecolonization war fought over control of the pottery trade, rather than over the beautiful Helen. The disintegration of the British Empire and the other European overseas empires of the recent past began even before the empires were fully formed. The loss of mastery over an erstwhile dependency does not necessarily mean that the resources of that area are lost to the metropolis as a whole. But it usually does mean comparatively hard times for the previous proprietors of the resources and a better deal for the new owners. Minoan culture was completely obscured until its rediscovery in the early years of this century. The development of Baltic powers reduced Hamburg, Bremen, and Liibeck to places of only local significance as Europe

moved into the modern period. Casual perusal of current daily newspapers will illustrate the cost to Britain of inflexibility in the face of change. Economic growth since the days of Pericles has been spastic and dependent rather than inexorable and selfgenerating as Beckerman would have it. When a society has achieved a transient economic integration or gained control over some neglected bonanza, its economy has grown. The bonanzas of our planet have pretty well been found by now, and those remaining are slipping ever more surely into the hands of proprietors resident in the lands where they occur—the OPEC nations, for example. Americans and Europeans will have to settle down to a lifestyle set against the background of a declining resource base. While today's technological sophistication may put us in a better position to ameliorate the effects of the end of the boom than were, say, the Minoans, it also gives us the means to destroy civilization in the process of squabbling over the tail end of the resources. Furthermore, those past booms did not end with the entire planet overpopulated and severe ecological constraints limiting what new technologies could be adopted—something invariably ignored by economic Pollyannas whose "historical perspective" rarely extends beyond the beginnings of the most recent boom.151 What are the prospects for the future? Setting aside the physical and biological constraints that were already beginning to limit growth by the mid-1970s, could sustained growth reasonably be expected for the next 2500 years? A simple calculation by Parsons shows Beckerman's view of the future to be as preposterous as his view of the past is fallacious. Again Parsons uses a modest 1 percent per annum growth rate. This gives a doubling time of 70 years—a lifespan—so that on the average each person is about twice as well off at death as at birth. At this rate a person's wages for an hour of work reach 1 million pounds (about $2 million) an hour in a little more than 1500 years, and at the end of Beckerman's 2500 years of growth, "a small child's pocket money, at say, 0.5 percent of the GNP per capita per week (one shilling and sixpence a week in 1970) would be five thousand million pounds."

""For a masterful account of the impact of the West's most recent resource capture, see Walter Prescott Webb, The great frontier. The historical discussion in this section owes much to historian D. L. Bilderback.

'"For example, see Glenn Hueckel, A historical approach to future economic growth. Hueckel's "historical" perspective extends about 200 years, not even to the beginning of the Western boom. Needless to say, the article shows a characteristically blissful ignorance of ecology.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 875

To emphasize the absurdity of there being 2500 more years of economic growth in England, Parsons describes what he calls the "millionaire barrier." At the 1 percent growth rate, the average person would have the living standard of a millionaire (income of £100,000 per year) just before 2400 A.D. At a "normal" growth rate of 5 percent per year, the millionaire barrier would be reached in 85 years. Parsons then asks the logical question: once everyone is a millionaire, who will generate the goods and services that everybody wants to consume? Our long-range goal, then, cannot be continued economic growth. Indeed, the main justifications for growth given by economists—that it will generate the economic power needed to "clean up the environment" and improve the lot of the poor—imply that the consequences of growth in the future will be precisely the opposite of what they have been in the past. We have already described the devastating effects of economic growth on the environment and the continuing efforts of growthmanic politicians and industrialists to destroy it with ever more energy use and ever more "development." The case for improving the lot of the poor through growth is equally preposterous. Although there has been considerable material improvement in the lot of the poor in industrial nations during the last century, the gap between poor and rich has not closed appreciably; indeed, in most countries (including the United States) it has widened over the past two decades.152 And, since poverty is a relative concept and there has been a revolution of rising expectations, "in the minds of persons with low incomes . . . a $4000 income for a family of four might be less tolerable in today's society than the pittance received by the poor in sixteenth-century England."153 Furthermore, the gap between rich and poor nations has grown during the recent period of rapid economic growth in the DCs. This gap is even greater than that indicated by national per-capita GNP statistics because the gap between the rich and the poor within LDCs has been growing very rapidly in many of those nations showing the most "development." Thus between 1950 and 1970 the ratio between the average income of the '"Pirages and Ehriich, Ark II, pp. 270-274. '"Ibid, p. 272.

richest 20 percent of the Brazilian population and that of the poorest 20 percent increased from 15/1 to 25/1.154 Similar increases in inequity of income distribution have occurred alongside economic growth in Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Ghana, to name a few. What, then, if not growth, should the long-range goals of society be? Haven't the economists explained that the opposite of growth is stagnation? The answer, of course, is that in noncancerous biological systems the opposite of growth is maturity. What a mature society should be like ought to be (but is not) a matter of wide discussion, and we are willing to make some suggestions. It will have a "dynamic equilibrium economy"155 in which pressures on nonrenewable resources will be very nearly nonexistent, and, of course, the population will be essentially stationary. Some mechanism will have been found to escape from bigness—perhaps through decentralization of government and industry or political fragmentation or reduction in population size or some combination of these. There seems to be a growing consensus that bigness is basic to our problems—that Americans may have gone to the point of social diseconomies of scale as well as material ones.156 According to some observers, hunting and gathering societies could be counted as truly affluent because individuals could fully supply their simple needs with a few hours of work each day.15? But, perhaps more important, groups were small enough that each member of a hunting-and-gathering society was a repository for virtually all the nongenetic information—the culture—of that society. Each person knew who he or she was and where he or she fit in society. Alienation was not a problem. Work was not an onerous diversion from pleasure, but a fulfilling part of life itself. In our conception of a mature society, there would be a considerably more equitable distribution of wealth and income than is found in most contemporary societies. Possibly this would be achieved by some formal mechanism.15S On the other hand, perhaps it could be achieved 154 James P. Grant, Development: The end of trickle down? Foreign Policy, fall 1973. 155 The term (though not the idea) was invented by Emile Benoit. '"Pirages and Ehriich, Ark II, p. 59. 157 For example, Marshall Sahlins, Stone age economics. 15s Such as the national council for the regulation of differential wages proposed by Wilfred Brown in The earnings conflict, Halsted Press, New York, 1973.

876 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

automatically as the society shifted away from the pursuit of bigness and the maximization of various indices developed by economists suffering from "physics envy," and moved toward maximizing things not amenable to statistical treatment, such as individual satisfaction and the quality of life. In a mature society the economic problem would in essence be solved. Can a transition to a mature society be achieved in the United States? The question is obviously open. But we

reiterate that a central question is that of scak. Can society escape the modern massiveness that threatens both the human environment and the human psyche today? It is probably no coincidence that the most intellectually stimulating book written by an economist in the 1970s was entitled Small is beautiful.1™

'''Schumacher.

Recommended for Further Reading BofTey, P. 1975. The brain bank of America. McGraw-Hill, New York. Critique of the National Academy of Sciences. Slightly too negative, but generally accurate. Bonjean, Charles M., ed. 1976. Scarcity and society, Social science quarterly, vol. 57, no. 2, September. This collection of essays by social scientists contains many articles pertinent to the issues raised in this chapter. Boulding, Kenneth E. 1966. The economics of the coming Spaceship Earth. In Environmental quality in a growing economy, H. Jarrett, ed. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore. A superb article about making the transition from a cowboy economy to a spaceman economy. Daly, Herman, ed. 1973. Toward a steady-state economy. W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco. A fine collection—see especially Daly's contributions. Ehrlich, Paul R., and Anne H. Ehrlich. 1974. The end of affluence. Ballantine, New York. Discusses many facets of the ending of economic growth. Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science, vol. 162 (December 13), pp. 1243-1248. A classic article. Heilbroner, R. L. 1974. An inquiry into the human prospect. Norton, New York. A distinguished economist looks at the human predicament, with special emphasis on political implications. Brief and highly recommended. Hirsch, Fred. 1976. Social limits to growth. Harvard Press, Cambridge, Mass. Argues that affluence breeds social dissatisfaction, generating socio-political limits on economic growth. Note especially the treatment of positional goals. Thought provoking. Holdren, John P. 1976. The nuclear controversy and the limitations of decision-making by experts. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March, pp. 20-22. What to do when expert consensus is impossible. Illich, Ivan. 1971. Deschooling society, Harper and Row, New York. A provocative book of interest to all those concerned with the future of the educational system.

ECOSCIENCE: POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT PAUL R. EHRLICH STANFORD UNIVERSITY

ANNE H. EHRLICH STANFORD UNIVERSITY

JOHN P. HOLDREN UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

W. H. FREEMAN AND COMPANY San Francisco

606 / UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL DISRUPTION

amid pleasant surroundings to life in such a horrible place. The aesthetic poverty of U.S. cities and suburbs has reached such a degree that most citizens are aware of it. Newspapers are replete with stories describing slums, ghettos, rats, trash, and garbage. This is one of the reasons why weekends and holidays invariably bring on a mass exodus from the cities. Unfortunately, frontier habits of thoughtless littering and defacement seem likely to reduce attractive rural areas and state and national parks to similar levels of ugliness. Studies with young animals and indirect evidence from young children indicate that the richness of the sensory environment early in life influences the extent of later mental development. Sensory stimulation in young rats resulted in measurably larger brain sizes in adulthood than in their sensorily deprived litter-mates, and it affected their learning and problem-solving abilities as well. Children who have been exposed to a variety of sights, sounds, and experiences when they are very young may learn faster and later on be more likely to develop attitudes of inquiry and exploration. Yet cities, once a rich source of varied sensory experiences, are becoming more monotonous and dismal. Modern urban development programs flatten blocks at a time—blocks that once included a mixture of buildings of different ages and styles—and then replace them with concrete monoliths that lack aesthetic quality. The variety of sounds, at least some of which were pleasing to hear, in smaller towns and on farms, is also coming to be replaced by an incessant din of traffic and construction. A zoologist with an interest in environmental psychology, A. E. Parr of the American Museum of Natural History, has written that city children of a generation or two ago spent much of their time exploring and participating in the activities of the city, while today children are confined to dreary schoolrooms, their homes, and the local park. Poorer ones may play in the streets, and in this respect perhaps they are luckier. But many of today's city children are being deprived of firsthand knowledge about the city they live in and how the social organizations within it function, which creates a sort of alienation from their surroundings. At the same time their surroundings are becoming more and more monotonous and less attractive. Children's urges toward inquisitiveness,

exploration, and ingenuity (qualities that will be desperately needed in the next generation) may thus be stifled outside the schools as well as in them.223 Suburbs are often better than the cities in aesthetic qualities and sensory stimulation, but not invariably so. Although the environment is usually more natural and includes trees and gardens, many suburbs tend to reduce everything to a common denominator. All the houses in a given area are similar, if not identical, and so are the gardens, parks, and shopping centers. Each modern real-estate development is generally inhabited by people of about the same age, educational level, type of employment, and economic status. There is not much opporrcnity for children to meet people whose points of vie— differ from their own or those of their parents. Although the children may be freer to explore in the suburbs than in the city, there is sometimes even less of interest to find there. The absence of men most of the time may result m an even greater alienation of youngsters (and wives a; well) from the functioning society. Of course, television may compensate somewhat for the lack of sensory ar.c social variety in children's lives, but it does not encourage inquisitiveness or offer opportunities for exploration. ingenuity, or direct experience. On the contrary, it may foster passiveness and a tendency to regard life a? = spectator sport.

THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT Today the population of Homo sapiens is the largest in the history of the species, it has the highest average density. and it contains a record number of undernourished and malnourished people. The population, or rather a small but important segment of it, is also unprecedented! v mobile. People are in continual motion around the globe. and they are able to move from continent to continent in hours. The potential for a worldwide epidemic (pandemic) has never been greater, but people's awareness of this threat has probably never been smaller. Contrary :c popular belief, "medical science" has definitely no; conquered epidemic disease, as recent experience with 22i

A. E. Parr, The five ages of urbanity.

DIRECT ASSAULTS ON WELL-BEING /

sapiens by Marburg virus occurred around laboratories where the nature of the threat was quickly recognized, and the disease contained (it was not susceptible to antibiotics). If it had escapedinto the human population at large, and if the disease had retained its virulencejasjL-

influenza, cholera, typhoid, yellow fever, and Lassa fever have shown.224 The behavior of viruses is not completely understood, but it is known that the spontaneous development of highly lethal strains of human viruses and the invasion of humanity by extremely dangerous animal viruses are possible. It is also known that crowding increases the chances for development of a virus epidemic. Should, say, an especially virulent strain of flu appear, it is doubtful that the United States and other developed countries could produce enough vaccine fast enough to save most of their populations. Needless to say, the problem would be even more severe in the LDCs. Certainly, little effort could be made to save most of humanity. Consider, for example, the difficulty the United States had in coping with the mild Asian flu epidemic of 1968. It was not possible to manufacture enough vaccine to protect most of the population, and the influenza death rate in 1968 was more than 4 times as high as that of 1967. Only 613 deaths were attributed to flu, but society paid a high price for the disease in extra medical care and loss of working hours. That the number of deaths was not higher was due primarily to the relatively mild character of the virus, rather than to modern medicine. More recently, the swine flu fiasco of 1976-1977 certainly did not build confidence that public health machinery will be able to cope competently with future epidemic threats. In 1967 an outbreak of a previously unknown disease occurred among a shipment of vervet monkeys that had been imported into laboratories in Marburg, Germany, and in Yugoslavia. This severe, hemorrhagic disease infected 25 laboratory workers who came into contact with the monkeys and their tissues. Seven of those people died. Five secondary infections occurred in individuals who came into contact with the blood of the original patients; all of those individuals survived. Humanity was extremely fortunate that the first infections of Homo

hay£_accurred. Among well-fed laboratory workers with expert medical care, 7 out of 30 patients died.225 Among hungry people with little or no medical care, mortality would be much higher. The infected monkeys passed dirough London airport in transit to the laboratories. If the virus had infected airport personnel, it could have spread around the world before anyone realized what was happening. In addition, it is hardly reassuring that infection of laboratory workers with viruses is a rather common occurrence, and the potential virulence of possible "escapees" from labs is increasing.226 The highly mechanized society of the United States is also extremely vulnerable to disruption by such events as power failures, floods, and snowstorms. What would happen if the nation were confronted with an epidemic that kept masses of sick people from work and caused the uninfected to stay home or flee the cities because of their fear of infection? This might slow or even stop the spread of the disease, but hunger, cold (in the winter), and many other problems would soon develop as the services of society ceased to operate. Almost total breakdown has been known to occur in much less complex societies than the U.S. in the face of the black death— breakdown that occurred among people far more accustomed to a short life, hardship, disease, and death than the population of the Western world today.227 The panic may well be imagined if Americans were to discover that "modern medical science" either had no cure for a disease of epidemic proportions, or had insufficient doses of the cure for everyone. The disease itself would almost certainly impede the application of any ameliorating

224 L. K. Altman, Hong Kong flu is affecting millions in wide areas around world, New York Times, January IS, 1970; H. Schwartz, Influenza: Yes you really had it; and H. Schwartz, Cholera now spreading to remote regions: Eruption is the most widespread since 1899 pandemic, New York Times, September 26,1971; B. Dixon, Typhoid bacilli learn a new trick; J. Lederberg, Yellow fever still is a menace, J. G. Fuller, Fever: The huntfor a nev) killer virus; T. Monath et al., Lassa virus isolation from Mastomys natalensis rodents during an epidemic in Sierra Leone.

-'-5R. E. Kissling et al. Agent of disease contracted from green monkeys. More recent cases contracted in parts of Africa (outside laboratories) have been reported, including several hundred deaths. (New outbreak of Marburg disease, New Scientist, October 28, 1976, p. 199.) 226 For example, R. P. Hanson, et al., Arbovirus infections of laboratory workers; N. Wade, Microbiology: Hazardous profession faces new uncertainties. 2 «W. L. Langer, The black death.

frnm person to r>f

an ppiHprpic resulting in

r,r ^,fr\ frji1i"ns of deaths might

607

608 / UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL DISRUPTION

measures. Distribution of vaccines, for instance, would be difficult if airlines, trains, and trucks were not running. In many parts of the world, public-health conditions are developing that have a high potential for disaster. The rats that live on stored grain in India have renewed the specter of a major outbreak of bubonic plague. Nitrate pollution of water is creating conditions in which dangerous soil organisms are brought into contact with human beings for the first time. The organism that has recently caused cases of a fatal meningitis has been identified as a soil-dwelling amoeba.228 It may be just the first of many such agents to appear seemingly from nowhere. Irrigation projects in the tropics and subtropics around the world are spreatjipft the conditions that promote the i parasitic diseas^schistosomiosis (bilharzia)} which, together withTmalarufe is one of the two most prevalent spfinm diseases on Earth.229 The broadcast use of chemotherajjy, and antibiotics has created a serious medical problem through tbf introduction of resistance I in_ bacteria juid other parasitesjjvlodification of the ^ ^climate wouid~alsp inevitably influence disease patterns^ \ for example, the length of time viruses remain infectious f is in part a function of humidity. A trend toward drying would encourage some, whereas others would thrive in increased rn";smrp .It is s*'l*r*prr(*dt_in addition, that Weather changes can trigger epidemics^30'; As if the threat of a natural pandemic were not gruesome enough, mere is always the threat of biological warfare or of an accidental escape of lethal agents from a biological warfare laboratory or, conceivably, from a laboratory engaged in genetic engineering experiments ~~x r (see inaterial on recombinant DNA research in Chapter^ I i4}j Although most laypeople have long been afraid of J thermonuclear war, they are just beginning to grasp the colossal hazard posed by chemical and biological warfare (CBW). Any country with one or two well-trained microbiologists and even a modest budget can build its own biological doomsday weapons. Constructing lethal 228

J. H. Callicott, Amebic meningo encephalitis. K. S. Warren, Precarious odyssey of an unconquered parasite; N. Ansari, Epidemiology and control of schistosomiasis. 250 K. E. F. Watt, Ecology and resource management, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1968, p. 162 ff. 229

viruses against which there is little or no resistance in human populations can easily be done in theory; it may already have been done in practice. There were at one time rumors of the development by the American CBW establishment of a pneumonic rabies, one that, instead of being transmitted by bite, is transmitted in the same way as the common cold: from person to person via exhaled droplets. This is certainly possible, since under special conditions (such as those that sometimes occur in caves full of rabid rats) rabies appears to have been transmitted through the air. Such a disease would be a disastrously effective weapon if it were transmitted by infected individuals before symptoms appear, since once they do appear, rabies is (with one notable recent exception) 100 percent fatal. Other possibilities for lethal agents are many —for example, anthrax, which even in its "natural" state can be transmitted by contaminated aerosols? plague, tularemia, Q-fever, and encephalitis, to name a few 231 — disseminated in their natural forms or in the form of special "hot" strains that are drug-resistant or superlethal. Besides direct assaults on human beingsovert or covert attacks on a nation's food supply might b; made by introducing plant diseases. The more crowded i population is, and the smaller its per-capita food supplies, the better a target it would be for a biological warfare attack. Why would nations develop such weapons? For tii-e same reason they develop others. They hope to immur.:z ; or otherwise protect their own populations and tfcs avoid a biological backlash. These weapons have s special appeal for small and poor powers, which x= themselves threatened by larger, richer ones and wnica lack the funds or the expertise to develop nuclear weapons.232 Chemical-biological weapons may never be used, but that does not rule out the possibility of an accident. Viru>: laboratories, especially, are notoriously unsafe. By 196". some 2700 laboratory workers had become accidentally infected with viruses transmitted by insects, and 107 had died.233 Their deaths were caused by just one group 2JI F. M. LaForce et al, Epidemiologic study of a fatal case of in anthrax; J. Lederberg, Swift biological advance can be bent to gsacciit 2i2 M. Meselson, Behind the Nixon policy for chemical and biologiai warfare. 233 Hanson, et al, Arbovirus infections.

DIRECT ASSAULTS ON WELL-BEING

of viruses. Fatal accidents occur in laboratories where work is done on other kinds of viruses, as well as other microorganisms. The inability of government CBW agencies to avoid accidents was made clear by the Skull Valley, Utah, CBW disaster of 1968, in which many thousands of sheep were poisoned when a chemical agent "escaped,"234 and by the possible escape of Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis from the Dugway, Utah, proving ground in 1967. Congressman Richard D. McCarthy of New York announced in 1969 that CBW agents were being transported around the country in small containers on commercial airliners! In 1969, President Nixon announced the unilateral renunciation by the United States of the use of biological warfare, even in retaliation.235 He directed that the stocks of biological agents be destroyed and that further work on. defenses against biological weapons be transferred from the Department of Defense to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Destruction of U.S. biological warfare materials was systematically carried out in 1970 and 1971, although in 1975 it was discovered that the Central Intelligence Agency had not destroyed some toxins in its possession. 234

P. M. Boffey, 6000 sheep stricken near CBW center. M. Meselson, Chemical and biological weapons, Scientific American, May 1970.

Some level of research might be continuing clandestinely in the United States (although the possibility seems remote), and it would be a simple matter for a future administration quickly to reestablish biological warfare capability. Indeed, with the rapidly increasing ability of biologists to manipulate the genetics of microorganisms, the possibilities for creating deadly agents seem endless.235 Furthermore, there is little sign that the U.S. action has led to the end of work on biological weapons elsewhere. Biological warfare laboratories are potential sources of a man-made "solution" to the population explosion. It is essential that some way be found to block all further work on biological weapons— the risk for humanity is simply too great. It should be clear now that humanity is creating an enormous array of hazards that directly threaten the health and welfare of all people. Unfortunately many of these hazards are poorly understood, and many undoubtedly remain unrecognized at present. The next chapter shows that the level of indirect threats to human welfare is just as high and the level of understanding just as low. 2S6

P. Berg et al., Potential biohazards of recombining DNA molecules.

2S5

Recommended for Further Reading Cairns, John. 1975. The cancer problem. Scientific American, November. A superb semi-popular review of environmental carcinogenesis. Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). Annual. Environmental quality. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Extensive data and discussion on recent measured levels of air and water pollution across the United States, as well as special topics in energy, land use, transportation, radiation, and environmental legislation and regulation. Huddle, N.; M. Reich; and N. Stiskin. 1975. Island of dreams: Environmental crisis in Japan. Autumn Press, New York. Well-documented and illustrated survey of the serious environmental problems of one of the world's most intensely industrial nations.

/

609

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 809

Much the same can be said of Buddhism, which—if those who also subscribe to Shinto, Taoism, and Confucianism are also counted as Buddhists—has perhaps 700 million adherents, most of them in Asia. The barriers to population control in Asia and the potential for accepting it both seem to be connected much more with social conditions than with religion. Therefore, it seems unlikely that changes in the religion would have any substantial effect on establishment of population policy, although religious support for small families might encourage acceptance of family planning. Similarly, it is hard to picture Hinduism, as an entity, becoming a force in population control. More than 99 percent of the 450 million or so Hindus live in Asia, mostly in India. Like Buddhism, it is a rather heterogeneous, relatively noninstitutionalized religion. There is still considerable opposition to population control among Hindus, perhaps based more on medical beliefs, local superstitutions, and a sense of fatalism than on anything inherent in the religious structure. For Westerners who favor population control, one a£ the best courses of action seems to lie in working with the already establishedQ'eligious group3)to change people's^ attitudes toward population growth.. In the rest of the world, the relative fragmentation of religious groups, their lack of hierarchic organization, and their psychosocial traditions would seem to limit their capacity to influence population control efforts.

Religious Attitudes and the Environment In the United States, the unorthodox but constructive and quasi-religious attitudes first expressed widely in the 1960s by members of the whole-Earth, hippie movement may well help save the environment. The initial phase of the hippie movement was characterized by a groping and testing that produced, among other things, the dangerous macrobiotic diet and the horror of the Manson family. Aside from such excesses, however, the hippies borrowed many religious ideas from the East, particularly Zen Buddhism, combined them with the collectivist, passivist element from Christian tradition, and attempted ro fnrge a code based on close personal relationships, spiritual

values, a reverence for life, group self-reliance, and an abhorrence of violence. By the mid-1970s this code had become well established in a more mature and praiseworthy form that might be called the independence movement. People in that movement are attempting to find simpler, more ecologically sound modes of existence, and to reduce their dependence on fancy, nonessential, and vulnerable technological gimmickry. Their unofficial publications such as Mother Earth News and CoEvolution Quarterly abound with suggestions for disconnecting oneself from the "effluent society." If any one idea binds members of the movement together, it is the belief—essentially religious—that human beings must cooperate with nature and not attempt to subdue nature with brute force. Many people in our society are unhappy with these attitudes, which go against long-cherished and religiously sanctioned political and economic beliefs. They feel that turning away from a consumer orientation has grave implications for the future of the economy. Others see in the independence movement the vanguard of a new social revolution that could lead to a very different, far _ better society.^ White, Jr., professor emeritus of history at t h e | ^University of California, Los Angeles^nd past president ~" of the American Historical Association, has suggested that the basic cause of Western society's destructive attitude toward nature lies in the Judeo-Christian tradition. He pointed out, for instance, that before the Christian era, people believed trees, springs, hills^ streams, and other objects of nature had guardian spirits. Those spirits had to be approached and placated before__ one could safely invade their territories: ^By destroying^) fpagan animismyhristianitv made it possible rn nature in a mood of indifference to the feelins of natural objects."10 Christianity fostered the basic ideas of ""progress"^and of time as something linear, nonseparating, and absolute, flowing from a fixed point in the past to. an end point in the future. Such ideas were foreign to the Greeks and Romans, who had a cyclical Tftprpp1' 0
810 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

Christians, the Christian view is nevertheless the prevalent one in the Western world: God designed and started the universe for the benefit of mankind; the world is our_ oyster, made for human society to dominate and exploit. Western science and technology thus can be seen to have their historical roots in the Christian dogma of human-_ ity's separation from and rightful mastery over nature^ Europeans held and developed those attitudes long before the nppominirv to exploit the Western hemisphere arrived. The frontier or cowboy economy that has characterized the United States seems to be a naturaL extension of that Christian world view/Therefore, White claimed, it may be in vain that so many look to science and technology to solve our present ecological crisis: Both our present science and our present technology are so tinctured with orthodox Christian arrogance toward nature that no solution for our ecologic crises can be expected from them alone. Since the roots of our trouble are so largely religious, the remedy must also be essentially religious, whether we call it that or not. A number of anthropologists and others have taken_ issue with White's thesis, pointing out that environmental abuse is by no means unique to Western culture, and that animism had disappeared, at least in western Europe, before Christianity was introduced. As examples they cite evidence of ancient and prehistoric environmental destruction, such as the human-induced extinction of Pleistocene mammals and the destruction of the fertility of the Near East by early agricultural activity, as well as the behavior of non-Western cultures today. Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan of the University of Minnesota observed that there is often a large gap between attitudes toward the environment expressed in a religion or philosophy and the actual practices of the people who profess those attitudes.11 While Chinese religions, for example, stressed the view that man was a part of nature (rather than lord of it) and should live in harmony with it, the Chinese did not always live by that belief. Concern for the environment, especially preserving forests and protecting soils, were expressed throughout Chinese history, but Yi-Fu Tuan suggests that this may often 'Our treatment of the environment in ideal and actuality.

^

have been in response to destruction that had already taken place. The fact that China was a complex civilization complete with a bureaucracy and a large population doubtless militated against fulfillment of those ideals. By the twentieth century, China's once-plentiful forests had been nearly destroyed to build cities and clear land for agriculture. All that remained in most areas were small patches preserved around temples. Ironically, the present government, which explicitly rejects the traditional religions, has attempted to restore the forests on a large scale.12 Lewis W. Moncrief of North Carolina State Universitv^who might be described as an environmental anthropologist, feels that the religious tradition of the. West is only one of several factors that have contributed,, to the environmental crisis.13 Along with some other anthropologists, he has suggested that an urge to improve one's status in society is probably a universal human characteristic and that expressing this urge through material acquisitiveness and consumption of resources is, if not universal, at least common to a great variety of cultures. Perhaps what is unique about Western culture in this regard is the degree of its success. Moncrief postulated several factors that he felt were just as influential as the Judeo-Christian outlook in determining European and North American behavior toward the environment. The first were the development of democracy and the Industrial Revolution, which together provided individual control over resources (if only a family farm) for a far greater proportion of the population than before and simultaneously provided the means to exploit those resources more efficiently. The existence of a vast frontier fostered the belief in North America that resources were infinite; all of our wasteful habits derive from that. Moncrief thinks it is no accident that the first conservation movement appeared just as the frontier was closing; Americans suddenly and for the first time began to realize that their resources were, after all, finite. In 1893, moved by a remark from the 1890 census 12 For an overview of present Chinese attitudes, see L. A. Orleans and R. P. Suttmeier, the mass ethic and environmental quality, Science, vol. 170, pp. 1173-1176 (December 11,1970); a related account of Japanese attitudes toward the environment is Masao Watanabe, The conception of nature in Japanese culture. I3 The cultural basis for our environmental crisis.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS

about the disappearance of public land and the consequent disappearance of the frontier, Frederick Jackson Turner, then at the University of Wisconsin and subsequently at Harvard, observed: American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities . . . furnish the forces dominating American character.14 A generation earlier, E. L. Godkin, editor of the Nation, had written that the American frontier population had "spread itself thinly over a vast area of soil, of such extraordinary fertility that a very slight amount of toil expended on it affords returns that might have ''tisfied even the dreams of Spanish avarice."I5 Traditional North American (and, to some extent, European) attitudes toward the environment thus are not exclusively products of our religious heritage, although that doubtless played an important part. These attitudes may just spring from ordinary human nature, which in Western culture was provided with extraordinary social, political, technical, and physical opportunities, particularly connected with the nineteenth-century American frontier. Such opportunities were bound to engender optimism, confidence in the future, and faith in the abundance of resources and the bounty of nature. That they also produced habits of wastefulness and profligacy was not noticed. Past^ institutions in the United States, rarely dealt with environmental problems; if they were recognized at all, they were usually considered to be someone else's responsibility. In the twentieth century, as the growing population became increasingly urban and industrialized, the en-_ virqnmental effects multiplied, and the nation was rather suddenly confronted with a crisis. How today's Americans ultimately resolve the environmental crisis will depend on much more than changes in philosophical outlook, but such changes unquestionably must precede or at least accompany whatever measures are taken. ^Individual conduct is clearly capable of being modified id directed by an appropriate social environment—the u The significance of the frontier in American history, in The early writings of Frederick Jackson Turner, ed. F. J. Turner.

15

Aristocratic opinions of democracy.

change in reproductive habits in the United States testifies to that, as does the great increase in environmental consciousness. Unfortunately, the ppvirnnmpntal problem may prove more difficult because it requires changing more than the altitudes and behavior of individuals: those of firmly established, powerful institutions—primaril business and governmental organizationS—

How large a role organized religion may play in guiding the needed changes in individual attitudes toward the environment or in influencing the behavior of._ other institutions is still uncertain. Many religious groups have already shown leadership, including some already mentioned in connection with populationrelated issues. A particularly hopeful sign was [the concern expressed in dfjnuarv 19f6^jby the OCouncil of Churches) about the ethics of using sprparHnp; rhp tprhnnlngv of nuclear power, and the

discussion promoted by thai World Council of Churches, nrrthe mic]ea.r issue and on foe relation of energy policy to the prospects for adjust and sustainablej,world.16 Ecological Ethics Many persons believe that an entirely new philosophy must now be developed—one based on ecological realities. Such a philosophy—and the ethics based upon it—would be antihumanist and against Judeo-Christian tradition in the sense that it would not focus on an anthropocentric universe.17 Instead, it would focus on human beings as an integral part of nature, as just one part of a much more comprehensive system. This is not really a new perspective. In one sense, Western philosophy has been a continuous attempt to establish the position of Homo sapiens in the universe, and the extreme anthropocentrism of thinkers like Karl Marx and John Dewey has been strongly attacked by, among others, Bertrand Russell.18 Russell, for example. i6 See The plutonium economy: A statement of concern, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1976, pp. 48-49; P. M. Boffey, Plutonium: its morality questioned by National Council of Churches, Science, vol. 192, pp. 356-359 (April 23, 1976); Paul Abrecht, ed., Facing up to nuclear power, Anticipation, no. 21, October 1975, pp. 1—47. 1 'See Frank E. Egler, The icay of science: A philosophy of ecology for the layman; and George S. Sessions, Anthropocentrism and the environmental crisis. The latter is a good, brief summary with a useful bibliography. tB A history of Western philosophy; the debate is summarized in Sessions, Anthropocentrism.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 813

of theprimeval forests,yrilling for oil on the northern) C slope of Alaska} and so on. It is a tribute to the conservationists, past and present, that any of our primitive areas remain relatively unspoiled.^ Political and financial power tend to be arrayed against conservation, and, as people increase and resources dwindle, the situation seems bound to deteriorate further. In many parts of the world the situation is worse than in the United States; in a few it is better. There are encouraging signs that a new thrust is appearing in the conservation movement. Growing numbers of people have realized that conservation is a global problem, that in the lon^ run it is not enough to surh isnlarpH treasures as a Prove of redwood trees. If global pollution causes a rapid climatic change, the grove cannot long survive. Many conservationists now recognize thaiLif the growth of the human popula^ tion is not stopped, and the deterioration of the planetary environment is not arrested, nothing of value will he conserved. This understanding and the growing general public awareness of the problems of the environment have given rise to a number of new organizations. Some of them, like Friends of the Earth (FOE1. are more militant offshoots of older conservation groups. Others, including. Environmental Action (which grew from the organization that sponsored the first Earth Day in 1970) and F.coiogy; Action, are new. Zero Population Growth (ZPG) is primarily concerned with the population problem but is also interested in the environmental consequences of it. ZPG, one branch of the Sierra Club. Environmental, Action, and FOE have foregone the tax advantages of an apolitical posture in order to campaign and lobby for their goals, frequently combining their efforts on issues of common concern.y'hev also cooperate in environ-) Cmentalist lawsuits) (see "The Legal System," below) through organizations such as The Environmental De-^ fense Fund (EDF) and the Natural Resources Defense__ Council (NRDC). Such organizations generally differ from many of the older conservation groups in being more oriented to humanity as an endangered species than to preserving wilderness and wildlife only for their aesthetic and recreational values^ Sister organizations of FOE, as well as ZPG, have been established in other countries.

In Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, the environmental movement has established its own political parties, known in Britain as the Ecology Party, in France as Ecologie et Survie, in New Zealand as the Values Party, etc. These parties have succeeded in winning seats in Britain's Parliament and gaining significant percentages of the vote in several countries.22b In March 1977, the ecology party in France won a nationwide average of 10 percent of the vote in municipal elections. In some towns in Alsace (where the party originated) they won 60 percent.221' It seems likely that conservationist and environmentaL organizations will become still more militant and more united—especially in their global concerns. While important local battles must continue to be fought, more general programs of public education and political action should become predominant. Obviously, it is no longer necessary to plead for conservation only on aesthetic or compassionate grounds, since the preservation of the diversity of life and the integrity of the ecological systems of Earth is absolutely essential for the survival of civilization.

(SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; For many people, science and technology have taken on ___ the aspect of{a religidfl) How often one hears statements beginning, "any society that can send a man to the moon_ can^. . ." and ending with some problem—usually immensely more complex and difficult than space travel—that science and technology are expected to solve!23 The population-food imbalance is a common candidate; others are various types of pollution or other. ecological problems. Three things are generally wrong with these statements of faith. First, science and technology have not yet reached the point relative to those problems that they had reached relative to the man-on-the-moon project by "''Edward Goldsmith, Ecology—the new political force. "''Ecologists emerge as a potent force in French election, New York Times, March 20, 1977. 23 0ne book on the human predicament written from this point of view (but in which the science is often very weak) is John Maddox's The doomsday syndrome. See the retrospective review written three years later

by John Woodcock, Doomsday revisited.

608 / UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL DISRUPTION

,fr

viruses against which there is little or no resistance in human populations can easily be done in theory; it may already have been done in practice. There were at one time rumors of the development by the American CBW establishment of a pneumonic rabies, one that, instead of being transmitted by bite, is transmitted in the same way as the common cold: from person to person via exhaled droplets. This is certainly possible, since under special conditions (such as those that sometimes occur in caves full of rabid rats) rabies appears to have been transmitted through the air. Such a disease would be a disastrously effective weapon if it were transmitted by infected individuals before symptoms appear, since once they do appear, rabies is (with one notable recent exception) 100 percent fatal. Other possibilities for lethal agents are/lO' many—for example^nthrax) which even in its "naturalvCI state can be transmitted by contaminated aerosols. plague, tularemia, Q-fever, and encephalitis, to name a _ jew231—disseminated in their natural forms or in the form of special "hot" strains that are drug-resistant or superlethal. Besides direct assaults on human beingj,. overt or covert attacks on aSarion's food supplt mjgbLbernade byintroducing plant diseases. The more crowded i population is, and me smaller its per-capita food supplies, the better a target it would be fos-a biolo;ges! J off warfare attack. ATTVocfe. °f\. Why would nations develop such weapons? For tfce same reason they develop others. They hope to immur.;ii feather changes can trigger epidemics.23^ or otherwise protect their own populations and fc; As if the threat of a natural pandemic were not avoid a biological backlash. These weapons have ; gruesome enough, there is always the threat of biological special appeal for small and poor powers, which see warfare or of an accidental escape of lethal agents from a biological warfare laboratory or, conceivably, from a themselves threatened by larger, richer ones and which laboratory engaged in genetic engineering experiments ~~x lack the funds or the expertise to develop nuclear r (seejnaterial on recombinant DNA research in Chapter") / weapons.252 J4]J Although most laypeople have long been afraid of J Chemical-biological weapons may never be used, but that does not rule out the possibility of an accident. Virus thermonuclear war, they are just beginning to grasp the laboratories, especially, are notoriously unsafe. By 196", colossal hazard posed by chemical and biological warfare some 2700 laboratory workers had become accidentally (CBW). Any country with one or two well-trained infected with viruses transmitted by insects, and 107 had microbiologists and even a modest budget can build its died.233 Their deaths were caused by just one group own biological doomsday weapons. Constructing lethal

measures. Distribution ofNyaccines) for instance, would be difficult if airlines, trains, and trucks were not_ ^running. In many parts of the world, public-health conditions are developing that have a high potential for disaster. The rats that live on stored grain in India have renewed the specter of a major outbreak of (bubonic plague/ Nitrate pollution of water is creating conditions in which dangerous soil organisms are brought into contact with human beings for the first time. The organism that has recently caused cases of a fatal meningitis has been identified as a soil-dwelling amoeba.228 It may be just the first of many such agents to appear seemingly from nowhere. Trrigarinri project8 in the tropics and subtropics around V the world are spreading the Conditions that promote the /.garasitic diseas^fchistosomiastTTbilharzia]^ which, to/ gether witHJlnalaris!^ is one of the two most prevalent serious diseases on Earth.229 The broadcast use of chemotheragy_and antibiotics has created a serious, medical problem through the inTrnffyfrinn r>f resistance^ JTL bacteria and other parasitesjModification of the ^climate would~also inevitablyjnjuencejdisease patterns^ for example, the length of time viruses remain infectious is in part a function of humidity. A trend toward drying would encourage some, whereas others would thrive in increased moisture. , Tt is smpfwi^ in addition, that

228

J. H. Callicott, Amcbic meningo encephalitis. K. S. Warren, Precarious odyssey of an unconquered parasite; N. Ansari, Epidemiology and control of schistosomiasis. 230 K. E. F. Watt, Ecology and resource management, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1968, p. 162 ff. 229

231 F. M. LaForce et al, Epidemiologic study of a fatal case of inhalaLi; anthrax; J. Lederberg, Swift biological advance can be bent to gescc-.^. 232 M. Meselson, Behind the Nixon policy for chemical and biolofjiaj warfare. 2 "Hanson, et al., Arbovirus infections.

DIRECT ASSAULTS ON WELL-BEING / 1609

of viruses. Fatal accidents occur in laboratories where work is done on other kinds of viruses, as well as other microorganisms. The inability of government CBW agencies to avoid accidents was made clear by the Skull Valley, Utah, CBW disaster of 1968, in which many thousands of sheep were poisoned when a chemical agent "escaped,"254 and by the possible escape of Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis from the Dugway, Utah, proving ground in 1967. Congressman Richard D. McCarthy of New York announced in 1969 that CBW agents were being transported around the country in small containers on commezaal airliners! In J969,^President Nixon announced the unilateral renunciation by the United States of the use of biological warfare, even in retaliation.235 He directed that the stocks of biological agents be destroyed and that further work onjiefenses _agajnst_ biologica^weapons be transferred from the Department of Defensgjp the Department of Health, Education and Welfare._Destruction of U.S._ biological warfare materials was systematically carried^ out in 1970 and 1971,^feougjC5(l9753it was discovered that the (Central intelligence Agency\had not destroyed some toxins in its possession. 234

P. M. Boffey, 6000 sheep stricken near CBW center. 'ific American, M. Meselson, Chemical and biologicalv Mav 1970.

Some level of research might bejgntinuing clandestinely in the United jtates ^although the possibility seems remote), and_it would be a simple matter for a future administration quickly to reestablish biological warfare-xapability. Indeed, with the rapidly increasing ability of biologists to manipulate the genetics of microorganisms, dtegossibilities for creating deadly agents jieem endless^* FurthermoreTthere^ is littksign that the U.S. action has led to the end of work on biological weapons elsewhere. Biological warfare laboratories are potential sources of a man-made "solution" to the population explosion^It is essential that some way be found to block all further work on biological weapons— the risk for humanity is simply too great. It should be clear now that humanity is creating an enormous array of hazards that directly threaten the health and welfare of all people. Unfortunately many of these hazards are poorly understood, and many undoubtedly remain unrecognized at present. The next chapter shows that the level ofTindirect threats to human/ welfare Is just as high and the level of understanding just as low. ;3

*P. Berg ct al., Potential biohazards of recombining DNA molecules.

J!5

Recommended for Further Reading Cairns, John. 1975. The cancer problem. Scientific American, November. A superb semi-popular review of environmental carcinogenesis. Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). Annual. Environmental quality. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Extensive data and discussion on recent measured levels of air and water pollution across the United States, as well as special topics in energy, land use, transportation, radiation, and environmental legislation and regulation. Huddle, N.; M. Reich; and N. Stiskin. 1975. Island of dreams: Environmental crisis in Japan. Autumn Press, New York. Well-documented and illustrated survey of the serious environmental problems of one of the world's most intensely industrial nations.

HE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

some research institutes need to be investigating and reporting on much more detailed questions. For example, is medical research being done with adequate attention to the needs of all segments of the population and to birth control as well as death control? Are the benefits and risks of the breeder reactor being studied in proper depth? What are the possible dangerous consequences of further investigating the properties of a given virus or biocidal compound? These questions have been settled largely by the scientific community in the past, with results that can most charitably be described as mixed.26 For a long time the thrust in research was that whatever could be tried should be tried. Physicists exploded the first atomic bomb after Germany had been defeated and Japan's defeat was a certainty, although some of them apparently thought at the time there was a nonzero chance that the explosion would destroy all life on Earth.21 It is difficult to find parallels, outside nuclear weaponry, displaying quite this degree of willingness to risk total environmental disaster, but traces of it arguably are present in proposals to "wait and see" what the consequences of assaulting the ozone layer with fluorocarbons or SST fleets will be. . On the bright side, microbiologists Paul Bers; and Stanley Cohen of Stanford and Herbert Boyer of the University of California in mid-1974 called_oji_ their to bring to a halt research orfcecombinanj ^studies involving transfers of genetic material from one species to another.28 They recognized that hybrid microorganisms could cause extraordinarily virulent infectious disease and that die experimental work (could conceivably lead to the spread ot antibioticsior to the escape of bacterial strains carrying. oncogenic (cancer-inducing) viruses. A distinguished molecular biologist L Robert Sinsheimerjhas written: """""""""•>^™—————•—_«••-—-—^*S53

>

B^BBMBW*""

~6See, for example, the contrasting views of F. J. Dyson, The hidden cost of saying "no!"; and P. R. Ehrlich, The benefits of saying "yes." ->7N. P. Davis, Lawrence and Oppenheimer. There is no doubt, in light of present knowledge of nuclear reactions, that the chance of igniting the atmosphere with a nuclear bomb and thereby extinguishing all life on Earth is truly zero. A completely persuasive case on the point is made by H. A. Bethe, Ultimate catastrophe? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, June 1976, pp. 36-37. Bethe's further contention, however, that the scientists on the nuclear bomb project were completely sure of this in 1945, is not persuasive. 28 P. Berg, et al., Potential biohazards of recombinant DNA molecules.

Could an Escherichia coli strain [a variety of a ubiquitous bacterial resident on the human digestive tract] carrying all or part of an oncogenic virus become resistant in the human intestine? Could it thereby become a possible source of maUgmancv? j^p^ld such a_ strain spread rhrnuphnnf a human population? What would be the consequence if even an insulin-secreting, strain became an intestinal resident? Not to mention the more malign or just plain stupid scenarios such as those which depict the insertion of the gene for botulinus toxin into Escherichia coli>M In early 1975 an international scientific meeting established a set of safety principles under which such research could be continued. The scientists at the meeting concluded that the more dangerous experiments should be deferred until special "crippled" strains of organisms could be developed— that is, strains with a very low probability of surviving outside the laboratory (experience has shown that there is no such thing as an^ "escape-proof' microbiological laboratory^. Some of the scientists, however, argued against social control of the experiments, claiming an absolute right to free inquiry. Since that meeting, various attempts have been made to draft rules that would permit doing this dangerous research, and there has been continuing controversy.30 In these cases, scientists themselves have assessed the risks and then "voted" for all of humanity. With regard to the atomic bomb, the possible savings in American (and Japanese) lives by shortening World War II mayhave come into the calculus, and perhaps also the thought that sooner or later someone else would blow up an A-bomb without knowing for sure that it would not destroy the planet. But would the people of the planet (to say nothing of the other living organisms) have voted yes to taking, say, a one-in-a-million chance on oblivion in order to speed victory for the United States in World War II? (That the chances of killing all life on the planet turned out to be zero is beside the point— the scientists involved were not sure of that at the time.) ''Troubled dawn for genetic engineering. The article also contains 2 good, brief, layperson's introduction to the technology of DNA manipulation. 30 Sinsheimer, Troubled dawn; Nicholas Wade, Recombinant DNA: NIH Group Stirs storm by drafting laxer rules; Bernard Dixon, Recombinant DNA: Rules without enforcement? ,

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 819

Similarly, in the case of recombinant DNA, although scientists seem to be acting much more responsibly, we must still ask whether they are the appropriate ones to make the decision. J4o laboratory safeguards can guaran^ tee that an accidental escape will never occur. Are the possible benefits to medicine and agriculture of this _ research worth any risk of releasing a serious plague or cancer-inducing organism? We do not know the answer, but we think the franchise on the decision should be extended to include at least representatives of those who will be taking the risks and (perhaps) receiving the benefits.

f The Science Court J One danger in allowing scientists to decide an issue for society is that often the specialists in a field disagree^ violently on the proper course of action for society to, take, even though they may have no serious disagreement on the known salient facts. For example, qualified scientists have been assembled on both sides of issues such as whether to develop the .SST, ban the use of pesticides and aerosols, or develop nuclear power, to name a few. As Stephen Schneider and Lynne Mesirow observed regarding the SST battle: An interesting point here is that most of the bitter scientific antagonists in the SST debate were probably in far greater agreement on what was known and unknown scientifically, and on the odds that state-ofthe-art estimates would be correct, than they were over whether the evidence justified opposition to the planes. That is, the interpretation of the weight of the evidence that guided their opposition or support was based not only on the scientists' technical knowledge of the issues, but also on their personal philosophies — on whether or not they wanted the SSTs and on whether they thought the benefits of the project were worth the risks of ignoring the worst possibilities. This is not to suggest that most testimony was deliberately misleading, but rather that scientists, like most people, shade to some extent their perception of the merits of conflicting evidence with the shadow of their personal philosophy . . . . The issues facing future generations arc too critical to permit the technical components to

be obscured in attacks on the personal philosophies of experts. . . .31 As they pointed out, some mechanism is needed so the public and decision-makers can separate the technical opinions of scientists from their political opinions. One suggestion for opening up the process of ethical decision-making in science has been put forward by physicist Arthur Kantrowitz.32 He proposed that in science policy disputes (such as those over SSTs and ozone, DDT and ecosystems, the risks and benefits of recombinant DNA research) the technical aspects of the cases be, in essence, tried in a scientific court. The first step would be to separate the scientific from the moral and political questions. What might be done with genetic engineering technology is a disputable scientific question, in principle soluble by experiment; what should be done is a political-moral question not in principle amenable to experimental solution. Once the separation had been accomplished, then advocates of the different scientific points of view would "try" them before scientific judges. Thus, scientists convinced that DDT posed a serious threat to ecosystems could present their case, and the scientific advocates of the ecosystemic safety of DDT could present theirs. Each side could cross-examine the other. The judges would be selected for their neutrality on the issue, but would have the benefit of scientific training to help them evaluate the opposing views. The final step would be publication (within the limits of national security) of the opinions of the scientific judges. It is easy for anyone familiar with scientific disputes to attack these proposals. In some cases the separation of scientific from moral and political questions is difficult. Is the question "Are blacks genetically less intelligent than whites?" scientific or moral? We would claim that the very posing of the question is a political act about which a moral judgment can be made—but in theory it is a question amenable to experimental investigation. A thornier problem would be selection of judges. In many cases today, disputes concern the negative direct or indirect effects of technology on humanity or on the T/Kgenesis strategy, pp. 188-189. 'ScCj for example. Controlling technology democratically.

760

/ THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

abortion on the grounds that it will encourage promiscuity— exactly the same reason given in Japan for banning the pill and the IUD. There is no evidence to support either point of view on promiscuity, but, even if there were an increase, it would seem a small price to pay for a chance to ameliorate the mass misery of unwanted pregnancies—especially since the main ostensible reason for social disapproval of promiscuity is the production of unwanted children. Many Protestant theologians hold that the time when a child acquires a soul is unknown and perhaps unimportant. They see no difficulty in establishing it at the time of "quickening," when movements of the fetus first become discernible to the mother; or at the time, around 28 weeks, when the infant, if prematurely born, might survive outside its mother's body. To them, the evil of abortion is far outweighed by the evil of bringing into the world an unwanted child under less than ideal circumstances. To a biologist the question of when life begins for a human child is almost meaningless, since life is continuous and has been since it first began on Earth several billion years ago. The precursors of the egg and sperm cells that create the next generation have been present in the parents since they were embryos themselves. To most biplogistSj an embryo or a fetus is no more a complete human being than a blueprint is a complete building.553 The_fetus, given the opportunity to develop properly before birth, and given the essential early socializing,, experiences and sufficient nourishing food during the crucial early years after birth, will ultimately develop __ into a human being. Where any of these is lacking, the_ resultant individual will be deficient in some respect. From this point of view, a fetus is only a potential human being, with no particular rights. Historically, the law has dated most rights and privileges from the moment of birth, and legal scholars generally agree that a fetus is not a^'person^within the meaning of thj[u.S. Constitution) until it is born and living independent of its mother. From the standpoint of a terminated fetus, it makes no difference whether the mother had an induced or a spontaneous abortion. On the other hand, it subsequently makes a great deal of difference to the child if an abortion giieuuc v r

is denied and the mother, contrary to her wishes, is forced to devote her body and life to the production and care of the child. In Sweden, a study was made to determine what eventually happened to children born to mothers whose requests for abortions had been turned down. When compared to a group of children from similar backgrounds who had been wanted, more than twice as many of the unwanted youngsters grew up in undesirable circumstances (illegitimate, in broken homes, or in institutions); more than twice as many had records of delinquency, or were deemed unfit for military service; almost twice as many had needed psychiatric care; and nearly five times as many had been on public assistance during their teens.*6 In a 1975 study in Czechoslovakia, nine-year old children whose mothers had been denied abortions were compared with carefully matched "controls."57 The unwanted children tended to have more problems of health and social adjustment and to perform less well in school than did their peers who had been wanted. Further, it appeared that the disadvantages of being unwanted—initially, at least—affected boys more strongly than girls. There seems little doubt that the forced bearing of unwanted children has undesirable consequences not only for the children and their families, but for society as well, apart from the problems of overpopulation. The latter factor, however, adds further urgency to the need for alleviating the other situations. An abortion is clearly preferable to adding one more child to an overburdened family or an overburdened society, where the chances that it will realize its full potential are slight. The argument that a decision is being made for an unborn person who "has no say" is often raised by those opposing abortion. But unthinking actions of the very same people help to commit future unheard generations to misery and early death on an overcrowded planet. One can also challenge the notion that older men, be they medical doctors, legislators, or celibate clergymen, have the right to make decisions whose consequences are borne largely by young women and their families. There are those who claim that free access to abortion 56 Lars Huldt, Outcome of pregnancy when legal abortion is readily available. 57 Z. Dytrych, et al.; Children born to women denied abortion.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 837

provide training programs, and to set up a system for reporting occupational illness and injury. These duties are carried out by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) does research for and recommends standards to OSHA. Three types of standards for exposure to pollutants can be set by OSHA: consensus standards adopted from a list provided by a group of government and industrial scientists, permanent standards, and temporary emergency standards. Permanent standards generally include, in addition to the eight-hour limits for worker exposure provided by consensus standards, regulations covering work practices, monitoring, and medical surveillance. Temporary standards are effective only for a six-month p , an interim during which permanent standards are developed. By 1975, consensus standards had been set for about, 400 chemicals, and OSHA and NIOSH were moving to change them to permanent standards. Permanent standards had already been established for asbestos, vinyl chloride, and a group of fourteen carcinogens; and permanent standards have been proposed for arsenic, coke-oven emissions, and noise. Some groups feel that those standards are not stria enough; for example, a chemical workers union unsuccessfully challenged in court those established for the fourteen carcinogens. It seems certain that a constant tug-of-war will ensue between consideration of the costs (real or imagined) to industry of lowering workers' exposure to hazards and consideration of the legitimate desires of workers to protect their health. In view of the large numbers of people directly or indirectly involved (remember, hazardous materials like asbestos and plutonium can be taken home inadvertently by workers, placing their families and friends at risk), it seems clear that OSHA's activities are a long-overdue step in the right direction.

Population Law • impact of laws and policies on population size and growth has, until very recently, largely been ignored by the legal profession. The^jjrst comprehensive treatment of population law was that of the late Johnson C.

/ 4 an arrnrnev who was president of Zero Population Growth^and whose ideas are the basis of much of the following discussion. To date, there has been no serious attempt in Western countries to use laws to control excessive population growth, although there exists ample authority under which population growth could be regulated. For example, under the United StatesCConstitutionJ effective^ population-control programs could be enacted U n df the clauses that empower Congress to appropriate funds to provide for the(general welfare and to regulate comor under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.^5 Such laws constitutionally could be very broad. Indeed, it has been concluded thaL compulsory population-control laws, even including laws requiring compulsory abortion, could be sustained. under the existing Constitution if the population crisis, became sufficiently severe to endanger the society. Few today consider the situation in the United States serious, enough to justify compulsion, however. The most compelling arguments that might be used to justify government regulation of reproduction are based, upon the rapid population growth relative to the capacity of environmental and social systems to absorb the associated impacts. To provide a high quality of life for all, there must be fewer people. But there are other sound reasons that support the use of law to regulate reproduction. It is accepted that the law has as its proper function the protection of each person and each group of people. A legal restriction on the right to have more than a given number of children could easily be based on the needs of the first children. Studies have indicated that the larger the family, the less healthy the children are likely to be and the less likely they are to realize their potential levels of achievement.76 Certainly there is no question that children of a small family can be cared for better and can "Population explosion and United States law. ""No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 76 Joe D. Wray, Population pressure on families: Family size and child-spacing, in Roger Revelle. ed.. Rapid population growth: Consequence; and policy implications, Johns Hopkins Press. Baltimore, 1971; R. B. Zajonc, Family configuration and intelligence. Science, vol. 192, pp. 227-236 (April 16/1976).

838 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

be educated better than children of a large family, income

oxKex ticvvn^s \ae\rvg, ec^ua\. TYve \av* co\iYd

properly savjo a mother that, in order to protect the children she already has, she could have no more. (Presumably, regulations on the sizes of adopted families. would have to be the same.1 A legal restriction on the right to have children could also be based on a right not to be disadvantaged by excessive numbers of children produced by others._ Differing rates of reproduction among groups can give rise to serious social problems. For example, differential rates of reproduction between ethnic, racial, religious, or economic groups might result in increased competition for resources and political power and thereby undermine social order. If some individuals contribute to general social deterioration by overproducing children, and if the need is compelling, they can be required by law to exercise reproductive responsibility—just as they can be required to excercise responsibility in their resourceconsumption patterns— providing they are not denied equal protection. Individual rights. Individual rights must be balanced against the power of the government to control human reproduction. Some people—respected legislators, judges, and lawyers included—have viewed the . ripht to have children as a fundamental and inalienable right. Yet neither the Declaration of Independence nor_ rnJtConstimtioijmentions a right to reproduce. Nor does the UN Charier describe such a right, although a resolution of the United Nations affirms the "right responsibly to choose" the number and spacing of chil-n dren (our emphasis). In the United States, individuals have a constitutional right to privacy and it has been held that the right to privacy includes the right to choose whether or not to have children, at least to the extent that a woman has a right to choose not to have children. But the right is not unlimited. Where the society has a "compelling, subordinating interest" in regulating population size, the right of the individual may be curtailed. If society's survival depended on having more children, women could be required to bear children, just as men can constitutionally be required to serve in the armed forces. Similarly, given a crisis caused by overpopula-

tion, reasonably necessary laws to control excessive reproduction could be enacted. It is often argued that tine ti^cvt to Vvave <3n.VXdTe.ti \s so personal that the government should not regulate it. In an ideal society, no doubt the state should leave family size and composition solely to the desires of the parents. In today's world, however, the number of children in a family is a matter of profound public concern. The law regulates other highly personal matters. For example, no one may lawfully have more than one spouse at a time. Why should the law not be able to prevent a person from having more than two children? The legal argument has been made that the First Amendment provision for separation of church and state prevents the United States government from regulating family size. The notion is that family size is God's affair and no business of the state. But the same argument has been made against the taxation of church property, prohibition of polygamy, compulsory education of and medical treatment for children, and many similar measures that have been enacted. From a legal standpoint, the First Amendment argument against family-size regulation is devoid of merit. There are two valid constitutional limitations on the kinds of population-control policies that could be enacted. First, any enactments must satisfy the requirements of due process of law; they must be reasonably designed to meet real problems, and they must not be arbitrary. Second, any enactments must ensure that equal protection under the law is afforded to every person; they must not be permitted to discriminate against any particular group or person. This should be as true of laws giving economic encouragement to small families as it would be of laws directly regulating the number of children a person may have. This does not mean that the impact of the laws must be exactly the same on everyone. A law limiting each couple to two children obviously would have a greater impact on persons who desire large families than it would on persons who do not. Thus, while the due-process and equal-protection limitations preclude the passage of capricious or discriminatory laws, neither guarantees anyone the right to have more than his or her fair share of children, if such a right is shown to conflict with other rights and freedoms.

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS / 839

It is often argued that a fetus or an embryo is a person who has a right to life, and therefore abortion as a birth-control measure must be rejected. Supporters of this argument point out that certain rights of a fetus have been legally recognized. For example, some states permit a fetus to recover money damages for personal injuries sustained before birth. Under some circumstances the common law has permitted a fetus, if subsequently born alive, to inherit property. The intentional killing of a fetus (through injury to the mother) has been declared by statute to constitute murder, although under the statute the fetus is not denned as a human being. Although some rights of the fetus after quickening have been protected in some states, most of those states require that the infant be born and living before the rights vested prior to birth actually are recognized and enforced. Most jurisdictions afford no protection to property rights or personal rights of the unquickened fetus, and no jurisdiction has protected the rights of embryos. Furthermore, analysis of the situations in which rights of the fetus have been recognized disclose that it is generally not the fetus's rights, but rather the rights of its parents or others that are being protected. For example, when a fetus did receive money damages for prenatal injuries, in reality it was the parents' and the society's economic interests that were being protected. Those who argue that a fetus has a right to life usually proceed from the assumption that life begins at or soon after conception. As stated elsewhere, the question, When does life begin? is misleading. Life does not begin; it began. The real question, from a legal as well as from religious, moral, and ethical points of view, is as follows: in what forms, at what stages, and for what purposes should society protect human life? Obviously overweight people regard their fat cells differently from their brain cells. A wandering sperm cell is not the same thing as a fertilized egg; nor is a fetus a child. Yet a fat cell, a sperm cell, a fetus, a child, an adult, and even a group of people are all human life. The common law and the drafters of the U.S. Constitution did not consider a fetus a human being. Feticide was not murder in common law because the fetus was not considered to be a human being, and for purposes of the Constitution a fetus is probably not a "person" within

the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, under the Constitution, abortion is apparently not unlawful, although infanticide obviously is. This is a very important distinction, particularly since most rights, privileges, and duties in our society are dated from birth and not from some earlier point in time. Capacity to contract, to vote, to be drafted, to obtain Social Security rights, drivers' licenses, and the like, are all dated from birth, which is a very convenient, relatively definite point in time from which to date most rights. Certainly, the moment of birth is easier to ascertain than the moment of conception, implantation, or quickening. Such an easily ascertainable point in time is a sensible point from which to date Constitutional rights, which should not depend upon imprecisions. le fact that a fetus is probably not a "person" with (Constitutional right^ does not, however, mean that _ society has no interest in the fetus. Society does have an . interest in pnsnring that an appropriate number of healthy children are born.. To protect the health of the mother, some regulation of abortion is still necessary and appropriate. For example, laws requiring that abortions be performed only by qualified medical personnel in appropriately licensed institutions now exist in most states, and there are regulations governing eligibility for insurance or other financial aid. \ Legal reform.) In predecessors of this book, we recommended a series of reasonable, constitution^)- and desirable legal cha"g^ '" the- Unit-pf] fif^t-ps tn f age population growth; 1. A federal statute could be enacted that would prohibit any restrictions on safe, voluntary tion, sterilization, and abortion, and the dissemination of information about them._ 2. State and federal governments could subsidize voluntary contraception, sterilization, and abortion, Laws cnuld require that birth-control clinics be opened at public expense in all suitable locations. They could also require that group and individual health insurance policies cover the costs of abortion and sterilization. . Tax laws could be revised, and new laws could be passed that would provide incentives for late marriage,

/-•*\

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS// 857

doggie, convinced Congress that the SST's disadvantages outweighed its very questionable advantages, and the U.S. program was killed in 1971. In 1975 the debate began anew when rights to land in the United States were requested for the AngloFrench SST, Concorde. The issue is still in doubt, but several things are apparent— the Concorde is extremely noisy, fuel-inefficient, and probably uneconomical. If it remains in service, it will be as a monument to government stupidity and the momentum of technological circuses. Government Planning The fragmentation of responsibility amonfi fioverniqent agencies in the United States makes a reasonable response to problems extremely difficult and planning to avert them virtually impossible. The lack of overall control of environmental matters and the virtual sibilitv of dealing with problems in any coordinated way are illustrated by the area of urban affairs., aspects of which now rnmp tinder the iurisHicrinns of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as well as the Departments of Labor, Commerce, Interior, Tustice, and Transportation, to name just the major ones. It is clear that the executive branch of the federal government badly needs reorganizing. Such coordinated planning as takes place in the federal government is largely confined to the preparation and review of the annual federal budget. It is fair to say that the time horizons considered in this process are typically short and the emphasis on conventional economic indicators heavy. Resource and environmental matters accordingly receive less attention than they deserve.111" Some detailed suggestions on reforming the political structure of the United States to make it more responsive to the requirements of the population-resource-environment situation may be found in the booklArk 7/|"2 We

^

'""A sense of the planning inputs to and implications of the federal budgeting process is conveyed in the series of volumes, Selling national priorities, published annually by the Brookings Institution since 1970. The 1976 volume, edited by Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze, takes a longer-range perspective (10 years) on issues raised by the budget, and examines tie problems of coordinated long-range planning in a government of divided powers. 1I2 Pirages and Ehrlich.

discuss only one such reform here: the institutionalization of government planning. Thej^enter ibr the Study of Democratic Institutions^ has an ongoing project under the direction of R. G. Tugwell, designed to produce a modern constitution for the United States.^ The proposed constitution, now in its, thirty-third draft^ deserves wide circulation and study. One of the features of the Tugwell constitution is a planning branch of the governmejit, with the mission of doing long-range planning. As should be apparent from the preceding discussion, without planning we believe there is little chance of saving civilization from a downward spiral of deepening social and environmental disruptions and political conflicts. Human societies have shown little aptitude for planning so far, but it is a skill that must soon be developed.112" A private organization, California Tomorrow, sponsored a group of planners who produced a document that might serve as a preliminary model for the kind of planning that can be done. The California tomorrow plan: A first sketch presents a skeletal plan for The future nfthe^ state of California.113 It describes "California zero," the California of today, and two alternative futures: California I is a "current-trends-continue" projection; California II is a projection in which various alternative courses of action are followed. The plan considers twenty-two major problem areas, including population growth and various kinds of environmental deterioration, and looks at both the causes of the problems and policies to ameliorate them. California I is compared with California II, and suggestions for phasing into the California II projection are given. The details of the plan need not concern us here, but the subjects of concern in the plan are roughly those of this book. What is encouraging is that a private organization could put together a comprehensive vision of the future of one of the largest political entities in the world, proving that intelligent, broad-spectrum planning can be done. "2;1A series of important books on the tools and prospects for comprehensive governmental planning appeared in 1976 and 1977 under the authorship of social scientist and modeler Peter W. House and colleagues: House, The quest for completeness; House and Williams, The carrying capacity of a nation; House and McLeod, Large scale models for policy evaluation; House, Trading-off environment, economics, and energy. '"Alfred Heller, ed, The California tomorrow plan.

}

ECOSCIENCE: POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT PAUL R. EHRLICH STANFORD UNIVERSITY

ANNE H. EHRLICH STANFORD UNIVERSITY

JOHN P. HOLDREN UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

W. H. FREEMAN AND COMPANY San Francisco

RICH NATIONS, POOR NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT /

uses of outer space and Antarctica. More recently, there have been extensive negotiations on a treaty to control the use of oceans. (

JLaw of the Sea.) What has been described as "the greatest international conference ever held"126 met in Caracas in summer 1974 to begin work on a treaty dealing with the control of the oceans. The second session of the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)127 reached no final agreements, but in its tortuous proceedings several trends could be discerned. The emphasis was on dividing up the pie—on how to allocate rights to exploit the oceans rather than how to protect their vital functioning in the ecosystems of Earth. The less developed nations were anxious to "augment their meager natural resources with none of the unpleasant connotations of economic aid."128 The overdeveloped countries, on the other hand, were primarily trying to retain as much as possible of their hegemony over the seas (which they, far more than the LDCs, have the ability to exploit). A dominant trend has been toward establishing a 200-mile economic zone, which would effectively balkanize most of the oceans' known wealth. One view is that this would lead to having humanity's common heritage decimated piecemeal as individual nations exercised dominion over all living and nonliving resources within their zones. About the only good thing that can be said about the 200-mile zone is that its establishment might lead eventually to more rational use of those resources since their individual ownership by nations would at least tend to avoid the problems involved in multilateral exploitation of a commons. Other topics discussed in detail at the ongoing conference have been rights of passage through straits, the rights of landlocked nations to a share of oceanic resources, the establishment of an international authority '"Elizabeth Mann Borgese, Report from Caracas, the law of the sea, Center Magazine, November/December, 1974. '"The first session in New York in 1973 dealt only with procedures; the first and second conferences in 1958 and 1960 had accomplished little but reveal the complexities of the problems and the diverse positions of states and blocs (see Edward Weak, Jr., The politics of the ocean, chapter 6). »«C. R. Pinto of Sri Lanka, quoted in Time, July 29,1974. It has been suggested that "The uses of international commons should be taxed for the benefit of the poorest strata of the poor countries" (Barbara Ward. The

Cocoyoc Declaration), but there is thus far little sign that this will occur.

for the mining of seabed minerals outside the economic zones, the responsibility of nations to control pollution originating from their shores and to protect the marine environment, and the establishment of means of settling disputes and enforcing agreements. A third eight-week session of UNCLOS in Geneva in May 1975 produced a draft treaty, which was not voted on by the participating nations but was instead considered the basis for further negotiation.12' The draft extended the territorial waters of all nations to 12 miles from shore, provided for a 200-mile economic zone, specified means to control polluting activities, and encouraged the transfer of technology from rich to poor nations. The most controversial provision was for an International Seabed Authority, controlled de facto by the LDCs (who would be a majority in the agency), that would regulate deep-sea mining. The United States has held out for "private initiative" to share in managing the seabed resource. Further negotiations are scheduled for 1977. In part, their success will depend on what unilateral actions are taken by nations in the meantime. The United States, for example, has extended its jurisdiction over fisheries up to 200 miles from shore, which conforms with the draft treaty. Several other countries, including Mexico and Canada, have followed suit. But legislation being considered by Congress on deep-sea mining does not conform to the draft treaty. This places U.S. negotiators, who have tried to dissuade other nations from taking unilateral action, in an awkward position. If Congress passes such legislation, it could have a less than salubrious effect on future negotiations—especially if American firms are permitted to begin deep-sea mining before the treaty is finally passed and ratified. On the other hand, these unilateral actions may be pushing negotiators to examine other alternatives. By 1977, Elizabeth MannBorgese was envisioning a third possibility for the Seabed Authority as "a comprehensive and flexible system of joint ventures, acceptable to states and companies under the control of the [Authority and for the benefit of all countries, especially the poorer ones. . . ,"> 2 > a '"Material in this paragraph is based primarily on Deborah Shapley, Now, a draft sea law treaty: But what comes after? 1 ^"Quoted its Claiborue Pell, The most complex treaty ever negotiated in history, World Issues, vol II, no. 1 (February/March), 1977.

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/ THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

The complexity and comprehensiveness of the treaty account for the lengthiness of the negotiations. But, unfortunately, even a definitive treaty may fail to provide the kind of apparatus required to administer, conserve, and distribute the resources of the seas in a way that is equitable and that fully protects the vitally important ecosystems of the oceans, just because an exploitative view of the environment continues to dominate all such discussions. U.N. Environment Program, The exploitative view of the environment first surfaced explicitly at the international level at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm in 1972. That gathering featured platitudes from the ODCs, who are busily engaged in looting the planet and destroying its ecological systems, and demands from the LDCs that they get a piece of the action. One could only take heart that the world's nations even took the condition of the environment seriously enough to attend such a conference. That they did was a tribute to the brilliance, persuasiveness, and persistance of one man, Canadian businessman. Maurice Strong, secretary general of the conference^ Strong became the first executive director of the United Nations Environment Program (ITNF.P)1 rhp major positive result of the Stockholm conference. UNEP was given only a small budget, and its headquarters was tucked away in Nairobi, perhaps in the hope that it would not make waves. Under Strong's leadership, it nevertheless began to serve several vital functions. For instance, it has established the Earth Watch monitoring system to serve as an international clearinghouse for environmental information. Earth Watch is explicitly designed also to help bridge the gap between scientists and technologists on one hand and political decisionmakers on the other.130 The kinds of information to be collected include an international register of toxic chemicals, which list properties of those chemicals, their uses, their effects, and their known or inferred pathways in the environment. UNEP's very location in Nairobi (the first such United Nations agency headquartered in an LDC) has resulted in its first major contribution—an enormous and growing ""Maurice Strong, A global imperative for the environment.

interest and concern in poor nations about environmental problems.131 This concern was already well established in some areas among the people132 but had been notably absent in most LDC governments. Under Strong's leadership a list of high-priority areas was established at UNEP: (1) human settlement, health, habitat, and well-being; (2) land, water, and desertification; (3) trade, economics, technology, and the transfer of technology; (4) oceans; (5) conservation of nature, wildlife, and genetic resources; (6) energy. A program has been started in each area, and by early 1975 more than 200 projects had been initiated^ projects that according to Strong were designed "to create a leverage to move the programme towards our pr;or-_ ities."133 Unfortunately for UNEP. Maurice Strong left^ the agency in 1975; whether the
Toward a Planetary Regime International attempts to tackle global problems—or at least to start a dialogue among nations—have proliferated in recent years. Besidesmie UNCTAjD^Law of the SeaT) andfEnvironmental conference^, the United Nations has_ sponsored World Population and World Food conferences (discussed earlier) in 1974, a conference on the Status of Women in 1975. the Pabitar Cnnfen-nrc nf 1976 (dealing with the problems of cities), and^a conference on Water Resources in 1971. A Conference on Science and Technology is scheduled for 1978, and it is expected to create a new agency for World Science and _ Technology Development. The agency's mission will be to facilitate the transfer of needed technologies to LDCs and to foster development of indigenous scientific and technological education and research in those "countries.134 '"Roger Lewin, Environment in a developing world; Jon Sigurdson, Resources and environment in China; Conor Reilly, Environmental action in Zambia. 132 For example, see Amil Agarwal, Ghandi's ghost saves the Himalayan trees. '"Lewin, Environment in a developing world, p. 632. 134 Salam, Ideals and realities.

RICH NATIONS, POOR NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT /

Superficially, it usually appears that such conferences do little more than highlight the political differences between rich and poor countries, but in fact they can lead to constructive action on the problems discussed. Because of the diversity of interests and viewpoints of individual nations, and because of the inequities of the world economy, it seems to take an unconscionably long time to reach a consensus on dealing with each problem. But an important Step often is tn nht{^r| agrpf mpnr That a Problem exists, first of all, and, second, that international action is appropriate and necessary. Each of the conferences named has been the culmination of this process; but what counts for the future is whether agreement can be reached on solutions to the problems and whether controls can be established before it is too late. [Regulation of one vital global common^ has not yet been seriously discussed—that commons is the atmosphere. Even more than the resources of the oceans, the_ atmosphere is shared by all human beings—and other organisms as well. It is crucial to preserve the atmosphere's quality and the stability of global climate.135 But that these are now threatened and should be protected by international agreement is only beginning to be recognized in a few quarters. Should jiLaw of the^e&be successfully established, it could serve as a model for a future(Law of the Atmc Csphere)to regulate the use of airspace, to monitor climate change, and to control atmospheric pollution.! Perhaps_ those agencies, combined with UNEP and the United_ Nations population agencies, might eventually be developed into a Planetary Regime—sort of an international superagency for population, resources, and environment. _ "Such a comprehensive Planetary Regime could control the development, administration, conservation, and distribution of all natural resources, renewable or nonrenewable, at least insofar as international implications exist. Thus, the Regime could have the power to control pollution not only in the atmosphere and the oceans, but also in such freshwater bodies as rivers and lakes that cross international boundaries or that discharge into the oceans. The Regime might also be a logical central agency for regulating all international trade, perhaps including assistance from DCs to LDCs, and including "*S. H. Schneider and L. E. Mesirow, The genesis strategy.

all food on the international market. . '^ The Planetary Regime might be given responsibility for determining the optimum population for the world and for each region and for arbitrating various countries' shares within their regional limits. Control of population size might remain the responsibility of each government, but the Regime should have some power to enforce the agreed limits. As with the Law of the Sea and other international agreements, all agreements for regulating population sizes, resource development, and pollution should be subject to revision and modification in accordance with changing conditions. The Planetary Regime might have the advantage over earlier proposed world government schemes in not being primarily political in its emphasis—even though politics would inevitably be a part of all discussions, implicitly or explicitly. Since most of the areas the Regime would control are not now being regulated or controlled by nations or anyone else, establishment of the Regime would involve far less surrendering of national power. Nevertheless, it might function powerfully to suppress international conflict simply because the interrelated global resource-environment structure would not permit such an outdated luxury.

What the Human Community Can Do Humanity has reached a critical point in its history. Either the fissioning of societies into two distinct groups—rich and poor—will proceed, leading inevitably to conflict and possibly to economic collapse of some regions, at least; or serious efforts will be made to bring the two groups closer together. With regard to the latter course, as we have discussed at some length, there are plenty of ideas on how to go about it. The main obstacles are, as usual, social, political, and economic. Too few people in ODCs are convinced of the absolute necessity of reducing their consumption of material and environmental resources—of de-development. Too few people in all countries appreciate the environmental and resource constraints within which society must operate. And too many people with power oppose changing the present course because, for the time being, they are profiting from the status quo. And it may not be possible

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