1st Disarmament

N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009

BACKGROUND GUIDE

D i s a r m a m e n t a n d International Security General

Assembly

Main

Committees

 2008-2009 International Model United Nations Association, Inc. Used and distributed under license.

N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009

Nick Stefanizzi

September 2008

Secretary-General Boston University

Rosa Akbari Director-General McGill University

Nancy Henry Conference Director Tufts University

Michelle Shevin Chief of Staff Barnard College

Cristina Rade Chief of External Relations Adelphi University

Ryan Burke Director of Security University of South Carolina

Matthew Low Under-Secretary-General University of California, Berkeley

Daniel Nowicki Under-Secretary-General Georgetown University

Deanna Maxfield Under-Secretary-General University of Southern California

Emily Robertson Under-Secretary-General Duke University

Dear Delegates, Welcome to NHSMUN 2009! My name is Daniel Nowicki and I’m the Under-Secretary General (USG) of General Assembly Mains Committees (known affectionately as GA Mains). I am a junior at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, where I’m studying international politics and security studies with a minor in international development. While I love Washington, New York will always be “the city” to me. Living right across the water in New Jersey for my formative years, I have come to New York often, especially in the past few years that I have been on NHSMUN staff. Like clockwork, we gather here each March to discuss the most pressing international issues of our generation. This semester I am studying abroad in Argentina’s beautiful metropolitan capital, Buenos Aires, where I will be living until December. If you enjoy traveling and have not yet visited South America, Bs. As. is your gateway city to some amazing natural wonders, great leather products, Texas-style steakhouses, and friendly people. On my free time, I enjoy playing fútbol with some porteño friends, adventure traveling, talking politics with my host family, visiting museums, and frequenting the many restaurants and clubs for which the city has become infamous. I find that I play in to the familiar Mark Twain saying of never letting “my schooling interfere with my education.” I suggest that from now until March you all find time to reflect on your academic, social and intellectual goals and discover that thing about which you are truly passionate. My international travel has not precluded me from completing my NHSMUN responsibilities. This conference holds a special place in my heart because of its wonderful staff, the intellectually stimulating topics, the high quality of debate, and of course, its delegates. Over this past year, I have edited the background guides in your respective committees and procedurally and substantively prepared directors for the rigors of chairing debate. At the conference, my job is to help you enjoy the substantive aspects of committee sessions. You can find me roaming the hallways of the Hilton, checking in on committees and bringing you completed draft resolutions from our administrative staff, among other tasks. Enjoy reading the attached background guide, research well, and get excited for March! Feel free to contact me with any questions about NHSMUN, and I’ll be happy to talk with you.

Lisa Cuesta Under-Secretary-General

Until then,

University of Pennsylvania

Daniel Nowicki [email protected] 732.522.2865

Jerry Guo Under-Secretary-General Dartmouth College

NHSMUN is a project of the International Model United Nations Association, Incorporated (IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-forprofit, all volunteer organization, is dedicated to furthering global issues education at the secondary school level.

Georgetown University 37th and O Streets McCarthy Hall #627 Washington, DC 20057

N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009

Nick Stefanizzi

September 2008

Secretary-General Boston University

Rosa Akbari Director-General McGill University

Nancy Henry Conference Director Tufts University

Michelle Shevin Chief of Staff Barnard College

Cristina Rade Chief of External Relations Adelphi University

Ryan Burke Director of Security University of South Carolina

Matthew Low Under-Secretary-General University of California, Berkeley

Daniel Nowicki Under-Secretary-General Georgetown University

Deanna Maxfield Under-Secretary-General University of Southern California

Emily Robertson Under-Secretary-General Duke University

Lisa Cuesta Under-Secretary-General University of Pennsylvania

Jerry Guo Under-Secretary-General Dartmouth College

NHSMUN is a project of the International Model United Nations Association, Incorporated (IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-forprofit, all volunteer organization, is dedicated to furthering global issues education at the secondary school level.

Dear Delegates, I am excited to welcome you to NHSMUN 2009. It is truly going to be an amazing conference! My name is Lad Williamson and I’ll be your Director for the Disarmament and International Security Committee, or to keep things simple, DISEC. DISEC is a large committee that is the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations. I’m a sophomore at Clemson University in South Carolina, where it is too humid for its own good. I am originally from the South, so I do say y’all and drink sweet tea, but I don’t like country music and I don’t have an outrageous accent, so I suppose the stereotypes end there. I’m studying Language and International Trade, with my language of choice being French, so hopefully I will be abroad sometime in the near future to give my French skills a run for their money. At Clemson I have continued to do Model UN and currently serve as President of our team. Other than that, I am a part of the Pi Kappa Alpha fraternity on campus and am a huge Clemson football fan. When I am not doing schoolwork or NHSMUN, I am generally playing the guitar, watching some sort of sporting event, or finding ways to spend my time outdoors. As Director, it is my responsibility to research the topics for this committee and provide you with enough information to get a good handle on the topics that will be discussed during committee. Last year I was the Assistant Director of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, and I must say that I am extremely excited to discuss both Conventional Weapons and the Weaponization and Space this year, as disarmament has always been a passion of mine. I hope that after reading this background guide you too will share that passion and excitement for what is to come at the conference. My duties as Director while at the conference are to maintain decorum and to help guide the flow of debate. I encourage each of you to bring thoughtful and innovative ideas to the conference. Don’t be afraid to break from the traditional norms and create new ideas; just remember to keep them within reason and within the authority of the First Committee. Although DISEC is large and sometimes intimidating, I hope that all of you will feel comfortable contributing. I can’t wait until the conference, so until then please feel free to contact me with any questions. I would love to hear from you! Sincerely, Lad Williamson [email protected] 149 Runneymede Dr Blythewoode, SC 292016

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION Delegate preparation is paramount to a successful and exciting National High School Model United Nations 2009 Conference. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in your committee; these papers are designed to give you a description of the topics and the committee. They will not give you a complete description of the topic areas and they will not contain the most up-to-date information, particularly in regards to rapidly evolving issues. We encourage and expect each delegate to fully explore the topics and be able to identify and analyze the intricacies of the issues. Delegates must be prepared to intelligently utilize their newly acquired knowledge and apply it to their own countries’ policy. You will find that your nation has a unique position on the topics that cannot be substituted for or with the opinions of another nation. The task of preparing and researching for the conference is challenging, but it can be interesting and rewarding. We have provided each school with a copy of the Delegation Preparation Guide. The Guide contains detailed instructions on how to write a position paper and how to effectively participate in committee sessions. (Note: some position papers have unique guidelines that are detailed within respective committees’ Background Guides.) The Guide also gives a synopsis of the types of research materials and resources available to you and where they can be found. A brief history of the United Nations and the NHSMUN conference are also included. The annotated rules of procedure complete the Delegate Preparation Guide. An essential part of representing a nation in an international body is the ability to articulate that nation’s views in writing. Accordingly, it is the policy of NHSMUN to require each delegate (or double-delegation team) to write position papers. The position papers should clearly outline the country’s policies on the topic areas to be discussed and what factors contribute to these policies. In addition, each paper must address the Research and Preparation questions at the end of the committee Background Guide. Most importantly, the paper must be written from the point of view of the country you are representing at NHSMUN 2009 and should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference. All papers should be typed and doublespaced. The papers will be read by the Director of each committee and returned at the start of the conference with brief comments and constructive advice. You are responsible for sending a copy of your paper to the Director of your committee. Additionally, your delegation is responsible for bringing a bound copy of all of the position papers—one for each committee to which your school has been assigned—to the conference (to be submitted during registration). Specific requirements of the bound copy have been sent to the faculty advisor/club president. In addition to position papers, each delegation must prepare one brief summary statement on the basic economic, political, and social structures of its country, as well as on its foreign policy. Please mail country summary statements to the Director-General of NHSMUN 2009 at the address below. All copies should be postmarked no later than February 16th and mailed to: Rosa Akbari, Director-General 3631 av. Henri-Julien Montréal, Québec H2X 3H4 Canada

Lad Williamson 104 Stonecrest Lane Clemson, SC 29630

(Country Summaries)

(Individual Position Papers)

Delegations are required to mail hard copies of papers to the Director-General and Directors. NHSMUN Staff will not consider e-mail submissions as an adequate substitution. Delegations that do not submit position papers to Directors or Summary Statements to the Director-General will be ineligible for awards. -3-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

COMMITTEE HISTORY A part of one of the original organs of the United Nations (UN), the First Committee is responsible for promoting regional and international security. As indicated in the Article 26 of the UN Charter, the Disarmament and International Security (DISEC) committee is charged with the duty “…to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.” The specific issues that fall under the auspices of the First Committee include “efforts to ban chemical weapons, disarmament of nuclear and conventional weapons, consideration of nuclear test bans and nuclear-weapon-free zones, dialogue on outer-space arms control, reduction of military budgets, and measures to strengthen international security.” Similar to most UN bodies, resolutions are passed within committee, with each member state holding one vote. Resolutions that pass are sent to the General Assembly (GA) and voted upon in a plenary session. These resolutions, however, are non-binding. The UN and other requested organizations affiliated with the UN commence the implementation of a resolution only if it passes through the GA. While no resolution passed in DISEC and/or the GA can be legally enforced, the First Committee often refers certain issues to the UN Security Council if immediate and enforceable action is deemed necessary. DISEC has an accomplished history, spanning from the implementation of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) to the curbing of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW). Recent initiatives have focused on nuclear weapons and other non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms issues, the disarmament of outer space and prevention of a space arms race, as well as ways to address emerging issues involving regional security, non-state actors, and terrorism.

-4-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

SIMULATION The Disarmament and International Security Committee, or the First Committee, is one of the largest and most prominent bodies at the United Nations. The First Committee represents the voices of all 192 Member States, demonstrating the importance of the decisions made by the committee. At NHSMUN, the First Committee will function as it does in the General Assembly hall in an attempt to make the simulation as realistic as possible. That said, DISEC will subsequently be one of the largest committees at NHSMUN. Knowing this, we must all work together—Dais and delegates—to ensure that all parties have an equal chance to voice their opinions and involve themselves in the committee’s proceedings. In a large committee such as ours, maintaining decorum is paramount to the flow of debate. I cannot stress this point enough. It is extremely frustrating to try to speak when people are carrying on discussions. Seeing as we want to protect each delegate’s right to voice his or her opinion, it is crucial that decorum be upheld. An effective delegate will take advantage of the few chances he or she has to voice opinion in front of the entire committee, while also utilizing the informal portions of debate to successfully mold ideas into concrete and viable solutions. In a large committee, one of the most cumbersome aspects of debate can be parliamentary procedure. Take the time to look over the NHSMUN Rules of Procedure beforehand and feel free to use it as a point of reference during committee session. The Director and Assistant Director are there to aid you in understanding all of these rules and procedures, so do not hesitate to ask before or during the conference. Additionally, as a GA Mains committee, delegates will have the privilege to defer all parliamentary questions to the third member of the dais, the Chair. The dais serves to oversee the flow of substantive work and procedure and to ensure that committee runs smoothly without interruptions. Delegates are equally obliged to come prepared substantively, contribute to the discussion, and maintain decorum. NHSMUN values genuine diplomacy and cooperation. If these goals can be achieved, committee will surely be a fun and engaging environment for discussion. Be mindful of other delegates and do your part to respect your peers while maintaining a productive discussion in committee. If decorum is maintained and discussion is continuous and productive, I can ensure that you will have an amazing time at NHSMUN 2009 –of course, the dais will also do its part to ensure that this happens. The Director, Assistant Director, and Chair can be used as a resource for any type of questions you may have; our job is to serve you and we are more than happy to help. Make sure to keep this in mind as you prepare for the conference in March and while you are at the conference so you can make it the most memorable experience.

-5-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TOPIC A In 1899, the first round of the Hague Peace Conferences convened in light of emerging military technologies thought to be more dangerous than their predecessors. These conferences were the first international attempts at arms control and were consistently called upon throughout the 20th century as the destructive capacity of weaponry continually increased. Released as The Reports to the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the documents called for the restriction of the use of “arms, projectiles, and calculated materials” that caused “unnecessary suffering” (Vagts 35). Although this first attempt at arms limitation did not mention specific weapons, classifications are needed today to target and define the most destructive weapons. Conventional weapons comprise a diverse category of armaments that include missiles, tanks, and warships, in addition to all weapons that are not small arms and light weapons (SALW) or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The role these conventional arms play in international politics is often overlooked, especially in recent years as the international community has focused on SALWs with more scrutiny. The legal and illicit trade, acquisition, and use of conventional weapons presents a significant challenge to regulatory regimes because of legislative loopholes that slow efforts toward reform. Finally, conventional arms acquisition and utilization by terrorist organizations and other non-state actors, neither of which are bound by any form of international arms control or law, is a significant threat to international security. It is the task of the First Committee to draft a new form of comprehensive international policy addressing this issue, building upon the current policies and legislation regarding conventional weapons across the international community. Finally, a quick note on terminology: in research, the group of weapons known as Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) may appear in inclusion with the conventional weapons category. The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) will focus solely on conventional weapons, separating them from SALW because the latter has more recently fallen into a group of its own. HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE Definitions Landmines One of the most devastating categories of conventional weapons is the landmine. Landmines have attracted much international attention because of their destructive capabilities and the severe injury they can inflict upon their victims. Landmines are commonly leftovers from conflict, and they detonate when triggered by an object in close proximity. The two main types of landmines are anti-tank landmines and anti-personnel landmines (NGO Committee). The first is designed to damage or destroy heavily armored vehicles and anyone operating them (NGO Committee). The second is specifically designed to maim, injure, or kill individuals that cross over it (NGO Committee). Landmines are weapons that are not necessarily designed to kill, but rather to cause injury and prolong suffering (NGO Committee). Landmines are indiscriminate, meaning they do not necessarily just have a damaging or deadly effect upon a specific target (NGO Committee). Rather, they impact any who activate them, whether that person is a member of a military or not. Landmines have drawn enough international attention to warrant a treaty devoted entirely to their prohibition: the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty. This treaty focuses only on anti-personnel mines and excludes antitank mines. The First Committee will have to consider the motivations for this and how to resolve the issue in future legislation. Another challenge with landmines is that they cost around US$5 to manufacture, but are extremely expensive to remove, even when relatively simple removal strategies such as metal detection are employed (Nagle 236). It is a very labor-intensive and precise process that takes significant. Data from 2005 show that more than 200,000 square kilometers of land on earth are covered with land mines (Nagle 234). In Angola, because of the massive numbers of landmines still active, roughly 40% of the population has -6-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

undergone some sort of amputation procedure as a result of landmine explosions (Caldwell 28). Finding and removing all deployed landmines worldwide may take decades at best. (Nagle 236). Landmines do not degrade with time; they are still dangerous decades and even centuries after their production. An example of landmine durability dates back to the 1960s, when landmines from the Civil War era were discovered in the United States, all of them still active and dangerous (Nagle 235). Given this fact, landmines are obviously a critically important group of conventional arms that require immediate attention from the First Committee. Missiles A missile is defined as an object that is “fired, thrown, or otherwise projected at a target” (NGO Committee). Missiles are highly complex weapons that can inflict massive damage upon not only on their targets, but also on anything within a close proximity to their explosion. Missiles can be divided into two main groups. The first is the cruise missile category, which has become overshadowed by the second and most threatening group, the ballistic missile category. Cruise missiles are unmanned jet-propelled “aircraft” that deliver a payload or warhead (Dutra 40). In general, cruise missiles are controlled by internal guidance systems that direct them toward their target. In some instances where the missile is used for short-range purposes, the missile may be controlled by a remote device (Dutra 40). The three main types of cruise missiles are short-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), and tactical cruise missiles (Dutra 41). Perhaps the most dangerous of these, LACMs, are used for a number of purposes, but for some nations are now a replacement for fighter pilots so to minimize casualties (Dutra 41). LACMs are able to deliver larger payloads more quickly, although at a greater cost per delivery. The true danger of LACMs is their ability to carry chemical, biological, or nuclear payloads, as well as their ability to deliver a standard explosive payload (Dutra 40). Through their accuracy in striking and ability to destroy vital infrastructure Cruise Missiles pose a significant threat militarily, which is bolstered by their additional ability to weaken air defenses by targeting in the air and on the ground (Dutra 45). Ballistic missiles, unlike cruise missiles, are not limited to use only at the regional level. The capability of ballistic missiles to travel across continents and substantial landmasses makes them even more threatening. Although cruise missiles may be more of a tactical and commonly used military instrument, ballistic missiles are capable of large-scale destruction. Ballistic missiles can be divided into four separate types, all classified differently based on the distance they can cover and the payload they can deliver; the four types are: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM); can travel under 1,000 km; Medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM); can travel between 1000-3,000 km; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM); can travel between 3500- 5,500 km; Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM); can travel 5,500 km and beyond (NGO Committee).

Of the four different levels, the most threatening is the intercontinental ballistic missile, as it is able to travel across the world delivering a massive payload, and is typically used for carrying nuclear warheads (NGO Committee). Like landmines, missiles of any type can be considered indiscriminate as to whom they injure or what they destroy. Though they are guided by computers, their impact radius is much greater than the single point they are targeted toward, creating the potential for large scale indiscriminate and collateral damage. More daunting, however, is the fact that ballistic missiles can cause much more damage than any other type of missile. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and their components worldwide has been monitored through the MTCR (Dutra 62). Cruise missiles, however, have not received the same amount of attention from the MTCR, as their threat assessment at the time of the creation of the MTCR was minimal in comparison to ballistic missiles (Dutra 63). Cruise missile proliferation is dangerous and has become much more simplified since the inception of MTCR in the 1980s (Dutra 67). Currently, they pose a significant threat to international security as their use and proliferation has not received as much international attention as other types of missiles.

-7-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Heavy Machinery and Mobile Conventional Weapons As defined by the UN Register of Conventional Arms under UNGA resolution 46/36L, there are six main types of conventional arms, excluding missiles and missile systems, which are targeted for registration by the organization (UN). They include “battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, and warships” (UN). Battle tanks and armored combat vehicles are both defined as “self-propelled” armored vehicles that have the capacity to travel long distances cross-country (UN). Additionally, these two vehicular types of conventional arms provide a protective capability, as well as the ability to transport multiple persons (UN). Large caliber artillery systems operate with a caliber no smaller than 75 millimeters, and can come in many forms, whether they are a simple shell, combinations of heavy artillery with rocket systems, howitzers, or large-caliber (120mm caliber or higher) mortars designed with the ability to engage surface targets through indirect fire (UN). These types of weapons are generally not portable which is the reason they are not classified as small arms and light weapons (SALW). Combat aircraft and attack helicopters are defined as conventional arms as well. They are generally outfitted with a combination of autocannons, missiles, bombs, electronic warfare pods, or surveillance pods. These craft are intended for direct fire. That is, their munitions are targeted at a specific target, rather than indirect fire, which does not rely on line of sight for an attack. The various pods that may be outfitted to performing “electronic warfare” and “reconnaissance missions,” and they may boast stealth technology as well (UN). Finally, warships are the largest of all conventional weapons, and the classification encompasses both submarines and traditional above-water ships (UN). A warship is defined as any submarine or sea-bound vessel which has a displacement of over 500 tons and is equipped for military use (UN). Additionally, any vessel or submarine with a displacement under 500 tons with the capacity to fire missiles or torpedoes is also included in this grouping (UN). Given the widespread use of these types of weaponry by all military powers, it will be particularly challenging to address their proliferation. A standard ban or limitation will not be effective here; the level of opposition in the international community would be staggering. The First Committee will have to develop an innovative solution that allows states to retain their ability to defend themselves, while still pare the destructive ability these weapons possess. Incendiaries, Blinding Laser Weapons, and Unexploded Ordinances Incendiaries, blinding laser weapons, and unexploded ordinances are the final group of conventional weapons, all of which are defined throughout the articles of the CCW. Protocol III of the CCW restricts the use of incendiaries, which are weapons that cause a superfluous and indiscriminate amount of damage through the usage of fire, as well as weapons which set objects on fire and damage objects in the immediate vicinity (Kaye 924). White phosphorous, or WP, is an incendiary that causes severe burns and is used in grenades or artillery shells. The use of blinding laser weapons is restricted by Protocol IV of the CCW (Kaye 924). These weapons are defined as any designed to cause permanent blindness to their target (Kaye 924). Both incendiaries and blinding laser weapons cause superfluous injury and harm to their targets, as their sole purpose is to maim or debilitate the target. Protocol V of the CCW addresses the question of unexploded remnants of war or unexploded ordinances (UXO). This is directed at cluster munitions or cluster bombs, which have become a major concern due to their destructive power (Allen). Cluster munitions are weapons which, when detonated, can destroy an area approximately the size of two football fields (Allen). Cluster munitions operate by dispersing sub-munitions or “bomblets” across target areas which then explode when the fuse activates the explosive (Lebanon/Israel). A variety of fuses are used, with proximity fuses that explode the bomblets above ground being very popular. Fuses often malfunction, which leaves unexploded bomblets in the target area. These remain in the aftermath of a conflict and are similar to landmines in their danger. -8-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

This function of cluster bombs to split first and then act similar to landmines increases their threat and their indiscriminate character is especially concerning (Lebanon/Israel). Currently, the international community is working to ban their use, trade, and stockpiling through an international convention on cluster munitions, having drafted a convention on 30 May 2008 in Dublin, Ireland (Diplomatic). Most recently cluster munitions have been used by the United States in its military campaign in Afghanistan with some significant consequences. The cluster bombs that were dropped by the US Armed Forces were marked by the color yellow when they split into bomblets, incidentally the same color as the packaged meals dropped by the US for the Afghan civilians (Caldwell 29). United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional W eapons (CCW C) Before drafting a new form of international policy addressing conventional weapons, it is necessary to consider past law and agreements on the topic. There are myriad documents that address the issue and the First Committee should draw the best ideas from these and incorporate them into any new policy. Several documents can be considered in this capacity, but delegates are encouraged to use existing documents as a springboard for their own ideas and policies to be included in drafted resolutions. Since the Hague Conferences, the number of weapons categorized as “conventional” has been expanded in light of the substantial technological advances of the 20th century. One group that provided an initial impetus for international action regarding conventional weapons was the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC was concerned with the serious injuries sustained by both civilians and soldiers due to the non-discriminate effects of conventional weapons in the field, especially those relating to landmines (Kitchen 39). Echoing the concerns of the ICRC, the United Nations Convention on Certain Convention Weapons (CCWC) was initially signed and ratified by 50 Member States in an attempt to prevent the use of weapons that would cause superfluous injury to their targets, coming into effect in 1983 (Kaye 923). Today, 107 Member States have signed and ratified the treaty and six have signed but not ratified the convention (meaning these six countries agree with the CCWC in principle but refuse to be bound to its protocols). The CCWC was the first notable attempt to combat the spread of conventional weapons after the Hague Conferences. The CCWC served as the initial identification of dangerous conventional weapons systems that utilized indiscriminate tactics and attempted to limit their use (Kaye 923). Despite suggestions for a new treaty, it remains the premier legislative convention addressing conventional weapons simply because no other international conventions on conventional weapons have been produced. The original CCWC contained three protocols limiting and preventing the use of certain conventional weapons. A fourth and fifth protocol were added after the First CCWC Review Conference in 1996 and the Second Review Conference in 2004, respectively. These five protocols are: I. II. III. IV. V.

Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments Protocol on Prohibitions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps, and Other Devices Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Kaye 927)

The original mandate of the CCWC specified that it had jurisdiction over cases of international or interstate conflict, but not smaller and more ambiguous intrastate conflicts (Kaye 927). When considering the last the dominance of intrastate conflicts within the past decade, it is obvious that the CCWC’s original mandate is inefficient. Also included within the CCWC was a stipulation for a review conference to be held no later than 2001. In 2002, following the Second CCWC Review Conference, the Convention was expanded to include smaller and more ambiguous conflicts, while emphasizing that intervention in such conflicts was not justified under the mandate of the CCW in order to protect national sovereignty (Kaye 927).

-9-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Other Notable International Legislation The CCWC provided a precedent for other treaties and conventions that banned the use of specific types of conventional weapons. During the 1990s, landmines and missiles were common topics of discussion as conventional weapons presented a recurring and significant threat to international security. The 1997 Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty was initially intended to serve as an amendment to the CCWC under Protocol II, which bans the use antipersonnel landmines (Laurance 226). The Mine Ban Treaty was a culmination of efforts by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), but its drafting process was fraught with wavering support from the United States (among others). Even when the United States declared a one-year moratorium on landmine use in 1992 and adopted the cause of the ICBL, it eventually refused to become a sponsor or signatory of the completed document as the US believed that it was in its best interest to retain the ability to use such weapons if deemed necessary (Kitchen 39). In addition, two international agreements for the prevention of the proliferation of dangerous missiles and monitoring their use and trade have been adopted. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was clandestinely organized during the Cold War by the United States and came into effect in 1987 (Dutra 59). The MTCR targets all missiles with a payload over 500-kilograms and an ability to travel over 300-kilometers (Dutra 59). The goal of the MTCR was to limit the risk of proliferation by establishing a core group of signatories authorized to make transfers of such weapons (Dutra 59). Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, 33 Member States have become signatories to the MTCR, including all of the declared nuclear weapons states (i.e. France, United Kingdom, United States, Russian Federation), except China. China, although in agreement with the major provisions of the treaty, continues to sell missiles and missile technology to states not party to the treaty, such as Iran, Pakistan, and Syria (Dutra 60). The International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation of 2002, also known as the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), was designed to extend the capabilities of the MTCR without limiting its membership. The HCOC promotes international transparency in arms testing and transfers and encourages Member States to either completely abandon or limit missile tests, development, and deployment. It also encourages its members to give all other signatories pre-launch notification for imminent missile deployments. Unlike other international disarmament treaties, there are no punitive measures or sanctions included in the HCOC. Its requirements are just politically obligatory, therefore serving as an accepted agreement between states rather than a legally binding document. Of these two treaties, the MTCR is considered the most efficient at actually regulating arms transfers and thereby curbing illicit conventional arms transfers. The political statement made by the HCOC is perhaps more powerful, however, as the HCOC allows non-MTCR countries the opportunity for input on this pressing international concern. The delegates of the First Committee should consider the effectiveness of these agreements and if any provisions from them should be addressed in a resolution or in new policy; it will clearly be necessary to shed some and keep only the best. United Nations Register of Conventional Arms Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, one of the greatest security threats that the international community has faced is what to do with the “excessive and destabilizing” stockpiling of conventional weapons that took place throughout the duration of the Cold War. Transparency and the use of confidence-building measures (CBMs) came under the review of the international community in 1988, when a resolution came before the General Assembly that promoted transparency for conventional arms transfers on a “universal and nondiscriminatory basis” (Laurance 223). The resolution presented the option of creating a UN body to register conventional arms transfers in order to maintain international transparency, but the members of the European Community (EC) tabled it in 1988. Negotiations to formally create such an organization intensified in 1991, when the UN Register of Conventional Arms became official through a vote of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) that December in the wake of the Gulf War (Laurance 225). The concept of both transparency and CBMs is simple and straightforward: to stimulate international peace and trust through openness and information sharing, especially information related to issues such as disarmament and state - 10 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

militaries. No international convention or treaty regarding the use and proliferation of conventional weapons has sufficiently answered the challenges of curbing illicit conventional arms transfers (Laurance 225). Additionally, no document or treaty has addressed the outstanding problem of the unregulated, yet legal, international transfer of conventional arms. Developed countries such as the United States and the Russian Federation, which thrive on the manufacture, import, and export of conventional arms have refused to become party to a treaty that would severely limit international arms transfers. Unlike the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Thread Reduction agreements of 1992 which dealt with the “understood threat” of chemical, biological, and nuclear stockpiles –treaties dealing with conventional weapons face supplier countries who enjoy high profit margin from sales as well as a sustaining demand for weapons from areas of conflict. The UN Register of Conventional Arms was officially created in 1991 in reaction to the advanced arms being used in conflicts in the Middle East. The problems associated with an unrestricted conventional arms trade were manifested in the 1990 Persian Gulf War, just before the inception of the Register. In the aftermath of the Gulf War it was almost unanimously accepted that the central cause for the war was the unrestricted conventional arms transfers to Iraq during the 1980s as it fought in the Iran-Iraq War Coincidently, most of this trade can be traced back to the five veto powers: China, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the former USSR. Though a substantial international debate followed the realization of this security threat after the Gulf War, little was done to actual mitigate the threat. The Register evolved from its original conception of monitoring arms transfers to incorporate the ability to report on the conventional arms holdings of nations. The purpose of the Register was not only to ensure that arms transfers were transparent and did not threaten international security, but to also ensure that the “excessive and destabilizing” stockpiling of conventional weapons does not occur. The framework of the Register consists of four theoretical components that work to ensure that international arms transfers do not lead to warfare and unnecessary violence. These components are not resolutions, but they define the purview and capabilities granted to the Register through UNGA Resolution 46/36L. (Laurance 225) The first component is data collection, whereby the UN gathers information on arms imports and exports, military holdings, and any weapons procurement, generally through the direct submission of such data from UN member states. The second component is the submission of additional data in order to put all of the information collected by the UN on conventional arms trade and holdings into context. In doing so, the UN seeks relevant policy and background information on all transfers and holdings or procurements from the states submitting data for analysis of any potential threats to international security. All of this information is obtained directly from data submission by states. The third component is the Register’s definition and identification of a threat to international security. This is the most analytical component of the Register, focusing on conventional weapons such as missiles or warships. The information obtained by the UN is analyzed to prevent “the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms.” To being this process, the Register created a general list of conventional weapon types that it saw as destabilizing and dangerous upon its inception in 1991. By utilizing this list, the Register is more effective in its analysis of conventional arms trafficking (Laurance 225). The fourth and final component of the Register is a consultative process in which member states are called upon to utilize the data collected by the Register for policy decisions and action. The Register was designed for member states to utilize the data collected to make informed policy decisions at the regional and sub-regional levels, as it believes those are the easiest levels where any destabilizing arms buildup can be recognized. Although the UN Register of Conventional Arms has increased transparency through its creation of a database of arms transfers, the Register cannot truly regulate the illicit or legal trade of conventional weapons without direct action from member states based on the information in the Register (Laurance 225). The delegates of the First Committee should bear this in mind and seek ways to incentivize the process and compel states to take direct action.

- 11 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

The W assenaar Arrangement The most recent document that has dealt with the global trade of conventional weapons is the Wassenaar Arrangement. Drafted in 1996, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is an attempt to restrict the trade of dual-use technologies, which are defined as those technologies with both civilian and military uses. One example of a simple type of dual-use technology is GPS, because it has military applications as well as every day uses for civilians. The United States in particular feared that the increasing trade of dual-use goods posed a threat to international security. In response, the United States was one of the key founders of the Arrangement and continues in its attempts to bolster the effectiveness of the Wassenaar system. The Wassenaar Arrangement attempts to control the trade of these technologies by limiting their distribution, fostering transparency amongst its members, and by requiring the notification of any “transfers or denials” to nations not party to the treaty (Jaffer 520). The Arrangement has been moderately effective, with only 33 member states party to the agreement. It also suffers from slow turnaround time in the dissemination of information and materials related to its members (Lloyd 323). The Arrangement’s scope is limited to dual-use technologies, which weakens its overall effectiveness in addressing the larger issue of the legal and illicit conventional arms trade (Jaffer 520). Reforming and Expanding International Conventional W eapons Legislation All existing legislation regarding conventional weapons has failed to produce a comprehensive solution to conventional weapons proliferation. Although the UN Register has been useful in tracking and recording arms transfers and procurement, it can do little to stop the trade of conventional weapons to “at risk” countries or those prone to using such weapons to commit human rights abuses (Laurance 243). This is because the UN Register has failed to gain the full support of the international community. Only half of UN member states contribute to the Register, leaving many arms transfers each year undocumented and undetected. If the UN Register is going to accomplish the objectives it was founded upon, it must see first that all of the UN member states submit data on all imports and exports of conventional arms. The signatories to the Wassenaar Arrangement constitute the closest organization that has come towards the regulation of international conventional arms transfers, as it focuses on a regional and international forum in its regulation (Laurance 243). The major problem with this agreement, however, is that it is a “supplier’s club,” meaning that the only states party to it are actually the suppliers, and the nations that heavily demand conventional weapons are not a part of the organization (Laurance 243). Additionally, there are concerns that Wassenaar, because it is not legally binding, cannot truly keep its 33 members from acting outside the auspices of the regime. There is also criticism over the absence of a pre-export consultation mechanism that would allow member states to make policy-based responses to exports they find unfavorable. Finally, the lack of an effective information-sharing system generally skews or misrepresents the data collected by the regime, because most of the annual data collected is not separated by transfer but instead is compounded. It is thus impossible to identify particular contracts of agreements with regard to this trade, which makes it doubly harder to put an end to it. The existing information-sharing system of Wassenaar is ineffective, because the notification system is very slow, and members not in agreement with a certain transfer or who have already denied an export find out that another member state has agreed to make a transfer only after the transfer has been verified (Lloyd 319, 323). In order for an effective type of regulation mechanism to be created, both sides of the arms trade must be examined, while taking into account the end use of such weapons (Laurance 243). Also, there is a lack of international action to truly enforce legislation with regard to terrorism and illegally armed groups, an area which must be addressed. The Wassenaar Arrangement does have strong policies for preventing dangerous stockpiling of conventional weapons, but these must be applied to more regional and sub-regional levels across the world to have a strong effect (Laurance 243). Given the destructive nature of terrorism in modern times, a global disarmament approach cannot rely solely on attempts to stop the proliferation of conventional arms internationally; it must also focus on regional solutions (Laurance 242).

- 12 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

CURRENT STATUS International Threat of Conventional W eapons The entire international community is involved with arms manufacture and trade. It would therefore be nearly impossible for any organization to maintain records of all of the various actors involved in either the manufacture or transfer of conventional weapons today. While exporting states receive a designation with the UN Register as the arms producers, most international arms defense contractors are supplied with parts from a number of other firms and states. For example, the AH-64 ‘Apache’ helicopter, manufactured by Boeing primarily for the United States Armed Forces, uses over 6,000 parts manufactured in several different states worldwide (Arms 12). Many conventional weapons, such as the Apache, are distributed worldwide and assembled by a host of countries, all under a single manufacturer. The use of military equipment once it has been purchased also causes complications in the effort to create a system of international arms controls. For example, the European Union (EU) has an arms embargo on Myanmar for what the EU describes its government’s use of weapons for internal repression. China has long been a supplier of armored vehicles to Myanmar. This is interesting, given the fact that the armored vehicles supplied by China are manufactured with engines acquired from the German company Deutz (Arms 7). Therefore, this challenge to effective international arms control will need to be addressed by the Committee in order to formulate a comprehensive resolution on Conventional Weapons. The Complexity of the Arms Trade: Licit and Illicit During the Cold War, there were two primary sources for weapons: the US and the former USSR. Today a far more complex system of international arms trade exists. Globalization has led to the proliferation of large multi-national defense contractors that serve many different clients. Corporations still consider the security interests of their “home country” when making business decisions, but even that is starting to fade. Technologies are no longer restricted to the home country of the contractor, as the Joint Strike Fighter project has shown. With transnational corporations having much to do with arms proliferation, the First Committee should consider measures to limit the spread of weapons, while still allowing these firms to do business. On the other side, illegally armed groups, including separatist movements and terrorist organizations, have entered warfare as major actors because of their ability to acquire weapons through the black market. This new component to conflicts is especially challenging because it is often connected to crime, and it has largescale human rights implications. It can also have transnational implications, as the conflicts that these groups become involved in are cross-border or have regional effects (Pythian 21). Delegates should consider this while drafting solution proposals for committee, as this can pose a significant challenge to efforts to control the proliferation and trade of conventional weapons. Political Rationale for Legal Trade Failures and mistakes in legal arms transfers worldwide often lead to the illicit trade of conventional weapons worldwide. Lost cargo, corruption, or delays can all lead to weapons falling into the hands of criminals. Since many of the illicit arms transfers worldwide take place through third-party and privatized arms manufacturers, this phenomenon is particularly difficult to track and eliminate. The world’s most powerful states, including all of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), are responsible for many of the conventional arms transfers to lesser-developed nations, including many that are currently embroiled in humanitarian crises and internal conflict (Stoel 1291). This can most clearly been seen in US reports on international arms transfers, in which it is stated that arms transfers by developed nations were overwhelmingly made to lesser-developed nations. It was also cited that the US and Russia have contributed to 56.9% of all outgoing arms transfers worldwide (Grimmet). There are a variety of justifications for this continued transfer of weaponry to developing states, but there are - 13 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

three different political strategies into which they can be summarized. First, these developed states believe that they are positively developing the defensive capabilities of the developing nations to which they send armaments (Stoel 1290). Supporting their defensive capabilities will make them into stronger states that will last longer. Second, giving developing states arms can create regional checks and balances for potential adversaries or states threatening the international balance of power or security (Stoel 1290). Finally, armsexporting states generally seek the favor of the developing states to which they export arms and hope to extend their influence (Stoel 1290). These justifications do not address the manufacture of the weapons in the first place. For this, we turn to the idea of deterrence. That is, the stockpiling and manufacture of weaponry creates a strong deterrent to any attack. No state or group will wish to attack a foe with overwhelming power unless it is prepared to accept a massive retaliation. By developing in this way, states can lay waste to plans for attack and actually further the efforts of global peace. Although it gets to the point in a roundabout way, it would be foolish to disregard this line of reasoning. Economic Rationales for Legal Trade Humans are inexorably motivated by various incentives, and these are more base than the political motivations discussed above. Money is a major motivational factor for these states and their corporations as well, and although most developed countries have trade restrictions and codes of conduct for arms transfers, defense contractors can heap influence upon the governments of developed states by lobbying (Stoel 1296). In the international forum, countries such as the United States have proven they are serious and committed to reducing arms transfers that propagate human rights violations and violence. Obstacles at the national and governmental level within developed conventional arms-exporting countries, however, prevent the creation of effective programs and laws to truly regulate international arms transfers (Stoel 1295-1296). The Illicit Side of Legal Arms Transfers The UN Register of Conventional Arms is currently the best outline for an organization that would regulate the international transfer of conventional weapons. There are still challenges to managing the link between legal trade of conventional weapons and the illicit trade of such weapons, though. For example, the United States and some EU nations have placed restrictions on arms trade with China, yet these governments have allowed companies within their borders to collaborate with Chinese companies to create a new Chinese attack helicopter. China has been accused of sending attack helicopters to Sudan, and although no official links have been made, such attack helicopters have been used in the ongoing conflict in Darfur (Arms 16-17) The term illicit trade refers to the trade that occurs beyond the auspices of such bodies as the UN Register of Conventional Arms and where the final destination or end use of the weapons is truly unknown. These secret transactions can easily be used to provide weapons to rebel groups, non-state paramilitary groups, and terrorists. The most obvious evidence of the harm an unregulated legal trade of conventional weapons can cause is seen usually when it is too late to stop the illicit and non-transparent trade of these weapons. It is seen in warzones and other areas, where major human rights violations and devastating attacks result from lack of supervision and undue aggression (Stoel 1285). The new state of East Timor is an example of the impact unregulated conventional weapons can cause (Craft 693). Nobel Peace Laureate and Timorese President Jose Ramos-Horta provided a detailed first-hand account of the illicit trade of conventional weapons in a statement describing guerilla warfare in an East Timorese village: “In the summer of 1978, with East Timorese guerrillas continuing to resist the Indonesia military occupation, the war struck my family. My sister Maria Ortensia was killed by a U.S.-made Bronco aircraft that was being used by Indonesian forces in East Timor for counterinsurgency. In the same year I lost two brothers, Nunu and Guilherme, the first killed by fire from a U.S.-designed M-16 automatic assault rifle made under license in Indonesia, and the second during a rocket and strafing attack by a U.S.-supplied helicopter on an East Timorese village”(Stoel 1285). Although countries such as the US and other major weapons suppliers do not bear responsibility for the - 14 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

casualties their weapons cause in the hands of others, misuse by others is not uncommon. The situation in East Timor began in 1975, when the Portuguese ended their colonization of the nation, leaving it as an independent nation (East). East Timor was annexed by Indonesia and resistance broke out from 1975 to 1999 (East). A violent repression by Indonesian military forces marked these decades, as over 200,000 people of East Timor were either killed by the military, famine, or poverty (East). The use of conventional weapons in the effort to suppress the rebellion of East Timor was common. Nearing the end of the struggle, Indonesian forces were reported to be using British helicopters and ground vehicles for their attacks on rebel parties (Stoel 1285). As a result of the conflict, East Timor was with one of the world’s weakest economies (East). East Timor is proof of the destructive capabilities of conventional weapons if they are not carefully monitored. Even today, East Timor is in crisis, feeling the long-term effects of nearly three decades of conflict (East). As such, delegates should consider the implications illustrated by this case and develop the necessary means to prevent the destabilizing effects of conventional armaments. Violence in Uzbekistan has also been fueled by oversights in legal arms trade. In May 2005, it was estimated that 750 people were killed by the Uzbek government in an instance of governmental repression (Tavernise). Demonstrators in the town of Andijan, including women and children, were shot down in masses by Uzbek troops, some outfitted with Land Rovers with several different types of mounted artillery and weaponry. The Land Rovers, made in the UK, were shipped from a Turkish company to the Turkish government, and were then gifted by the Turkish government to the Uzbek government. These vehicles are not protected by British export controls, and thus 70% of the Land Rovers in Uzbekistan at the time were manufactured in the UK were responsible, and some were responsible for contributing to the deaths of hundreds. It is important to emphasize that the British Government had no connection to the violence (Arms 14). This example shows how complicated the issue truly is; whether the UK actually bears any responsibility for the deaths is ambiguous, as there was no prior knowledge that they would have been used for such a thing, nor that they would have been shipped to Uzbekistan. The First Committee will have to carefully weigh the complicated supply chains that lead weapons to arrive at their final destinations. The situations in East Timor and Uzbekistan are examples of governments using conventional weapons to pursue violent ambitions. This represents one of the most serious issues with the legal trade of conventional arms: there is no binding international protocol for verifying or defining the end means of the importing state. Legal transfers can easily become illegal transfers based on the end means of the importing state, which is why the inclusion of an international end means verification requirement into international law is so crucial to the issue of conventional weapons. Delegates should carefully consider a realistic system for monitoring this aspect of the arms trade in order to develop a comprehensive resolution on conventional weapons. Illicit Arms Transfers Aside from the flaws in the legal system for the transfer of conventional arms, which leads to illegal ends, there can be defined several other different causes or contributors to the illegal transfer of conventional arms. Forged End-Use Certificates The forging of End-Use Certificates (EUC) is a contributor to illicit arms deals worldwide. EUCs are ways that importing states can verify that they are the end-user of the weapon and that no other third party will become involved in their use or trade. Both states and intermediaries such as companies must fill out these EUCs that are stipulated by the codes on arms importation by the importing state. Included with EUCs are End-User Acknowledgement agreements that ensure that all the goods shipped by the exporter reach the importer. The forging of EUCs is a problem, because there is no standard form for EUCs by which the entire international community must comply. Additionally, when exporting states allow intermediaries to control the transfer and transportation of arms, these EUCs become very important, so when smugglers or terrorists forge EUCs, illicit trafficking is not difficult. EUCs can be bought on the black market within a price range of roughly US$100,000 to US$150,000 today, yet the locales from which they are overwhelmingly purchased have not always remained constant. For example, during the 1980s Panama and Turkey were key states forging EUCs, while today, states like Paraguay and some Far-East states such as Thailand and Singapore are common sources for forged EUCs (Kozyulin 13-16) - 15 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Grey Zones and Post-Soviet States States in transition often do not have the power or the resources to enforce their laws effectively. In certain regions, separatist commanders or local leaders will implement new forms of governance and establish militias to maintain control. Flourishing black markets exist in these areas for arms trafficking, most of this trade connected with the drug trade, prostitution, and the “blood diamond” trade. These areas or regions are termed gray regions because they are under the jurisdiction of a national government, however, they are autonomous in nature with limited to no intervention by the national government in their affairs. Iraq is a prime example of a state that currently has a high possibility of becoming a grey zone, because the Iraq War has moved the Iraqi government into a transitional period. Several post-Soviet states, as well as other Middle Eastern, Asian, and African states can be indentified as grey zones (Kozyulin 16). The fall of the Soviet Union is in part responsible for the overwhelming promulgation of arms across Eastern Europe and into other parts of the world, such as the aforementioned regions. Many of the covert systems for arms transfers used by the Soviet Union during the Cold War between its satellite states and other Soviet allies in the Middle East and Africa are still used today by these states nearly two decades after the fall of the Soviet Empire and the separation of its satellite states into self-sustaining nation-states. Bulgaria, Poland, the Czech Republic, and the former Yugoslavia in particular are amongst the most prominent states still active in covert arms transfers due to the regional connections and experience they gained during the Cold War. Simply put, these operations are in no way new to these states, as they were routine for decades during the Cold War, so it is difficult to “change the sphere of activity” for a process which has been a part of the status quo for so long. Even beyond these countries, former American and British secret service members have been known to use their arms contacts and experience for covert arms transfers internationally (Kozyulin 16). Yugoslavia has several times been accused of attempting, whether successfully or unsuccessfully, to illegally send weapons to Iraq. Whether or not Yugoslavia was ever attempting to send weapons to Iraq is still unknown, but it is clear that Yugoslavia has continued to use its systems for illegal arms smuggling to move arms around the globe. In October 2002, a Tonga-registered cargo ship that was intercepted and confiscated offshore the Croatian coast by authorities was found to have over 200 tons of conventional weapons on board, including materials with which rockets could be made. It was determined that the ship was destined for Iraq, and the ship was found to have departed from a port in Yugoslavia (Kozyulin 19). Criminal Channels for Arms Trafficking As evidenced by the success of grey markets, criminals involved in the illicit trade of arms do not solely focus on the arms trade. Major channels of criminal activity include the trafficking of narcotics, arms, and humans – most commonly in the form of prostitution. By connecting these types of criminal activity, arms traffickers can more easily smuggle arms internationally because there becomes a greater network of contacts and channels through which they can move their arms. It is in this way that terrorists most easily acquire their weapons, since a substantial percentage of terrorist funding is derived from other criminal activities, such as the sale of narcotics and human trafficking (Kozyulin 16-17). The link between organized crime and illicit arms trafficking is made clear through the example put forth by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC). The rebel group FARC earns US$500 million a year from the drug trade alone. The Columbian government, however, has made it clear that FARC is also heavily involved in the illicit arms trade, trading drugs for guns. Between 1995 and 2001, the Columbian government has reported to have seized over 15,000 arms and more than 2.5 million rounds of ammunition. Since FARC is a separatist group funded by criminal activities, it is not difficult to understand how this intricate system of criminal trade channels is fruitful for criminals and terrorists worldwide (Stohl). Terrorist and Illegally Armed Groups’ Use of Conventional Weapons A threat to international security and stability is obviously posed by the unregulated and illicit transfer of conventional weapons. This threat is greatly increased if the recipients of these weapons are illegally armed groups and terrorist organizations. These groups are not bound to any sort of international law or treaty designed to regulate state relations. Instead, they often have intentions that are directed at civilians (Nagle - 16 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

232). Disguising their conventional weapons of choice as everyday objects like soccer balls or soup cans, terrorist organizations use the indiscriminate nature of conventional weapons to their advantage. (Nagle 232). One difference that distinguishes illegally armed groups or separatist groups from terrorists is their area of focus. Terrorist organizations are not bound to any specific region or area, and although they may focus exclusively on a single region, their reach is truly unlimited. This was made obvious foremost by the 9/11 attacks, the planning for which took place in the Middle East. Illegally armed groups differ in that they are usually bound to specific conflicts and have been marked as dangerous groups who, like terrorists, are not bound to a certain set of rules or code of conduct. There are certain nations today that have a greater reputation for certain types of separatist-related conventional weapons attacks. In Colombia, the threat of landmines is extremely prevalent. As of 2005, 31 of the nation’s 32 divided political departments were known to have active APLs within their borders, and Colombia is estimated to have 70,000 landmines, ranking fourth in the world behind Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Cambodia (Nagle 237). Still, APLs continue to be deployed in Colombia by illegally armed groups, resulting in the death or injury of a Colombian citizen every twelve hours (Nagle 236). Though Colombia’s armed groups claim they seek to regain governmental control from a corrupt regime, they still cause civilian deaths by planting mines in areas where civilians can be easily injured. For example, mines have been recorded detonating near creeks and farms, and even near schools and soccer fields where children are present (Nagle 240, 250). The terrorist threat from conventional weapons is equally as dangerous as that of illegal armed groups. In the 2006 summer skirmishes between Lebanon and Israel, Hezbollah used Chinese cluster bombs to attack Israel (Lebanon/Israel). Classified as a terrorist group by most of the world, Hezbollah has committed several attacks and bombings since its creation in 1982 that have utilized conventional arms (Council). The most recent 2006 skirmish with Israel shows that this group is still procuring arms illegally, and their use in response to Israeli attacks reveals that the group will use them in armed conflict (Council). Although it is unknown where Hezbollah acquired these weapons, there is speculation the arms were received from Iran and Syria (Lebanon/Israel). This short war in 2006 has not only led to further discussion on international legislation against cluster munitions, but also has confirmed suspicions in the international community that terrorist groups are acquiring more powerful conventional weapons and using them in modern warfare for indiscriminate destructive purposes (Lebanon/Israel). This will be an important considering for all delegates in working to draft a comprehensive resolution addressing conventional weapons. BLOC POSITIONS M ajor Arms Exporters The states that are most resistant to international regulations on conventional arms transfers are the worlds most developed countries, including the five permanent members of the UNSC. The United States and Russia dominated the international arms market from 2003 to 2006, collectively making 56.9% of the world’s arms transfer agreements during this time (Grimmett). Beyond these two major powers, European states such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy are among the top arms exporters worldwide (Grimmett). China is also responsible for many of the world’s conventional arms transfers, especially to countries which have recently raised international security concerns such as Iran (Grimmett). These states take a strong stance against additional regulation as these transfers constitute billions of dollars in sales for these exporters. M ajor Arms Importers Pakistan, India, and Saudi Arabia rank as the top three states for the value of arms transfers internationally among all developing country arms purchasers (Grimmett). The value of their purchases all rank in the billions, meaning that they heavily depend on these imports for their arms stockpiles. This group includes a wide array of nations across several continents, most significantly, spanning Asia, Latin America, and Africa - 17 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

(Grimmett). Specifically Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Taiwan, Chile, Venezuela, and South Korea are key arms importers, along with a host of other nations behind them (Grimmett). They are also opposed to increased regulation because of their dependence on arms trade to support their military initiatives. African Nations The African continent has a truly unique position in the realm of the conventional arms trade, as much of the continent is ravaged by violence caused by ethnic and political-based war. Africa suffers from separatist violence, in some states on a day-to-day basis, as the illicit arms trade there has fueled conflicts across the continent. The combination of Africa’s vast amount of rich resources and the weak nature of most of its states, fuels conflicts, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is because in Africa, the effect of the privatization of the arms industry on the black market for arms is particularly striking. The acquisition of conventional arms in Africa often occurs through complex operations involving a number of brokers, manufacturers, financiers, and suppliers, as well as a wide range of shipment points (Phythian 21). African states must have a more direct approach to the issue because the process of illicit arms transfers many times is often focused in Africa. African states often implicated with illicit transfers are Sudan, Libya, Chad, and several other SubSaharan and Great Lakes African states. Conflict and Post-Conflict States States that cannot truly control their entire territory because of a weak or ineffective government, a governmental collapse, or the lack of finances, organization, and infrastructure fall into this category. This also includes nations that do not have the means to protect their own arms stockpiles. Many times black markets and grey zones, centers for the illicit trade of arms, are extensive in this type of state, and ineffective border control makes arms smuggling both into and out of these states much less cumbersome. Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo are the best known failed states, with others such as Afghanistan and Iraq having become more recent centers for corruption. Failed states can be found across the international community on virtually every continent, with Australia being the exception. These states help perpetuate the illicit trade of conventional arms, though not always intentionally. Therefore their approach to this issue surely should be one of concern for their own wellbeing based on their internal situation and the impact the illicit arms trade has upon their society. COMMITTEE MISSION The threat of conventional weapons is more than just one concerning the lives of those already embroiled in warfare or intrastate conflict. Conventional weapons create pain and suffering that is unnecessary and affects more than just those who fall victim to their destructive power. That there is no international treaty or document that effectively deals with conventional weapons and all of their aspects, including transfers amongst states, is unacceptable. The unregulated legal trade and the illicit trade of conventional arms both contribute to the proliferation of such weapons worldwide. It is because of this that the First Committee must act on the issue of conventional weapons. The First Committee must produce a resolution to deal with this issue without imposing upon the legal rights of importing and exporting states, which have their own respective reasons and defenses for such trade. Also, this resolution must address the threat of terrorist organizations and illegally armed groups that acquire conventional weapons – specifically, the means by which these arms are obtained. Creativity, analytical thinking, and practicality are necessary, as such a task will require a resolution that can be accepted multilaterally. The framework provided by the international organizations and documents concerning conventional weapons such as the CCW and the Wassenaar Arrangement are a good starting point for the expansion, creation, or revision of conventional arms legislation. Assessing other types of weapons treaties, such as those dealing with SALW is also a strong starting point for these types of solutions. This issue can be broken down in any way desired, for example regionally, internationally, or by importing and exporting nations. It is up to the First Committee to find a way to eliminate the threat propagated by the free-flow of conventional weapons internationally. - 18 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

WEAPONIZATION AND SPACE TOPIC B INTRODUCTION With rapid advances in information and communication technologies since the beginning of the Cold War, modern warfare continues to distinguish itself from the relatively crude science of the first half of the 20th century. This advance in military technology has led to a new fear: the destructive power of advanced weapons systems, which leads to international security concerns. One such international security concern created by this technology is the possible deployment of weapons from Earth to destroy important international information and communication technologies, the most obvious being satellites. The weaponization of space through the physical placement of weapons in space, as well as the existence of weapons capable of reaching space from earth, lies at the heart of this major international concern. The advent of space technology during the Cold War and the looming threat of a nuclear showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) during that era created concern over the future of space weapons and their capabilities. Additionally, the development, use, and increasing reliance on space-based communication technology throughout the Cold War heightened fears that Earth-to-space weapons could be a devastating force if ever deployed and used. This threat is present even today and is compounded by the improvements in this technology since the end of the Cold War. It is the charge of the First Committee to address the weaponization of space, including the threat posed by non space-based weaponry that is capable of destroying valuable space-based communication and scientific tools. The weaponization of space is incomplete, and its ramifications are unknown. Accordingly, the First Committee must prevent a free-for-all proliferation of weapons in space while allowing states to address legitimate security concerns. Since many aspects of this topic will develop in the future, the Committee has the opportunity to issue a mandate and prevent a crisis before it even develops. HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE On October 4, 1957, the Soviets launched the first operating space satellite, Sputnik I. Its success heralded the beginning of the “space race” between the US and the Soviet Union. In response to the launch, the US performed successful outer space nuclear tests and detonations in the same year. These were both watershed events that transformed conventional definitions of international disarmament and security, as the weaponization of outer space added a new potential dimension to warfare. The expansion of technology into space became a reality in the midst of the Cold War and created an fear over future capabilities in outer space weaponry (Freeland 1094-1096). The United Nations and the Space Race The United Nations (UN) formed an ad-hoc committee to attempt to govern the uses of outer space in 1958, officially titled the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS). The committee was formed for the purpose of exploring the legal questions surrounding outer space, especially those dealing with international security. COPUOS, though not as influential today as it was at that time, does still exist as a part of the Outer Space Affairs Division of the UN. COPUOS was instrumental in providing the legal framework for future UN treaties concerning the issue of space weaponry – most importantly the Outer Space Treaty. Since the actual drafting of these treaties, however, the importance of COPUOS has declined. (Park 876). By 1961, the General Assembly (UNGA) proposed the expansion of the authority of the United Nations Charter and international law to encompass “outer space and celestial bodies” (Freeland 1095). In 1963, this recommendation had officially become a reality through UNGA Resolution 1962, also known as the “Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space” (Freeland 1095). Several states had different interpretations of what this resolution actually stood for, with some believing it to be an attempt to ban completely any militaristic operations in space, but it eventually became determined that the resolution did not seek to ban military operations in space. Instead, its purpose is - 19 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

to maintain space as a non-aggressive frontier for peaceful purposes, with military applications for defensive purposes being a legitimate use for space, an ideology most commonly tied to the Cold War superpowers (Freeland 1095). The US and USSR adopted this ideology because it allowed them to continue their expansion in space technologically and militarily. The first UN treaty asserting authority over outer space and any foreseeable use of space came in 1967, as the tensions caused by the space-based technological rivalry between the US and USSR began to become more antagonistic. The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of October 1967 was the first treaty in history to address the weaponization of space in an effort to restrict warfare. The OST did ban the use of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons of mass-destruction (WMDs) in outer space, but it did not restrict other types of weapons (Park 874-877). Also, the OST does not clarify whether space is a realm in which the premise of self-defense set forth by the UN Charter can be employed – meaning that nothing was made clear about the right to selfdefense in space, including the prospect of warfare based on the principle of self-defense. In addition to the OST, the UN has adopted four other supporting treaties governing practices in outer space: The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968), the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972), the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975), and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979). As a combined force, these five treaties, headlined by the OST, create a substantial framework for the governance of outer space (Freeland 10951100). There are several other notable international treaties and UN resolutions in place that deal with the weaponization of space, and these treaties demonstrated international dedication to preventing a space arms race. They were sometimes even specific. For example, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) drafted bilaterally by the US and USSR in 1972, was designed to halt the proliferation of “strategic offensive arms” through banning the use, development, and testing of ballistic missiles. It encompasses the realm of outer space, the seas, land-based or mobile missile systems, and aerial missile systems in its purview. Also worth noting is the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear tests in outer space, underwater, and in the atmosphere. There is has yet to be a focus specific to outer space (Freeland 1095-1100). Finally, there are four seminal UNGA Resolutions that specifically deal with the weaponization of space: The Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Use and Benefit and in the Interest of All States (1996), Principles Relating to the Use of Nuclear Power in Outer Space (1992), Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of Earth from Outer Space (1986), and Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting (1982). All of these treaties and resolutions act as support for the OST and its other four counterpart treaties, substantiating a significant legal framework for the uses of outer space (Park 874-877). There are a number of treaties concerning space, its uses, and the weaponization of space in particular, but their legal framework established primarily in the 1970s and 80s is outdated and does not fully address some of the more pertinent issues of the 21st century. Additionally, many of the major international treaties such as the ABM and Limited Test Ban Treaty do not address the weaponization of space as an issue in its own. Today, this topic demands much more focus than it has been given in the past because of the rapid advancement of space technology since the Cold War era. The Growth of Space W eaponry and Technology Speculations regarding the future of weapons’ capabilities in space were not addressed comprehensively throughout the 1960s and 70s. During that period, the most notable and historic advances in outer space were made when the USSR launched the first human being into outer space in 1961, followed by a subsequent launch by the United States in 1962. The rivalry of the two superpowers intensified significantly after these achievements, but it was not until the 1980s when the speculation of the two previous decades finally emerged as an issue of international concern. On March 23, 1983, US President Ronald Reagan shocked the world by announcing the start of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to protect the US from the missile threat posed by the USSR. The SDI was ostensibly meant to protect US borders from a ballistic - 20 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

missile attack by the USSR. Reagan’s SDI was coined “Star Wars”, after a futuristic space movie of the era. It was officially meant for defensive purposes, but it can be argued that the militaristic motives behind the initiative are still not peaceful. Although Star Wars dissolved with the end of Reagan’s presidency, SDI still remains an integral facet of the United States’ space program, although today it has been re-named the Missile Defense Agency (Freeland 1095-1102). The 1990 Gulf War in Iraq and Kuwait was the first real test of any type of space-based military operations. As a part of Operation Desert Storm, the United States Armed Forces used space-based technology in the form of satellite imagery technology as a platform for strategic planning throughout the war. This new technology allowed the US military to pinpoint their enemy from outer space and plan strikes more efficiently. This arguably allowed forces to focus their efforts only on military targets and limit civilian casualties. To further US innovation in space weaponry, in 1998 the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) announced a Long Range Plan that detailed US plans for the militarization of space, as well as for the future US domination of space. The Long Range Plan, also known as the Vision for 2020, is comprised of four parts, two of which were introduced initially in 1998, and two much more controversial plans which were introduced the following year. Entitled “space support” and “force enhancement,” these first two plans were meant to aid military operations on land, sea, and in the air from outer space. The more controversial “space control” and “force application” mission plans suggest the weaponization of space and its use for future warfare. Ultimately, these mission plans outlined a US-dominated outer space (Park 878881). The Commercialization of Space Although the United States and the USSR maintained exclusive control of outer space for multiple decades, the continuous advance of space technology partially shifted this control to multinational industry. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the stark changes in US political, military, and economic policies gave way to the widespread commercialization of space for business, other developed states, and even private use for individuals. Since 1996 it has been estimated that over 800,000 people are employed by the space industry. This shift has not only been beneficial to business and communications, but it has more recently become essential to the management of national economies. This has become especially true for developed nations such as the United States and Russia, as well as major European actors such as Great Britain, Germany, and France. The commercialization of space has led to billions of dollars in profits worldwide for a number of different investors (Park 878-881). Today the commercialization of space is quite clear, with companies such as Direct TV and Sirius broadcasting television and radio respectively via satellites, bringing the use of satellite technology right into your home or automobile. Types of W eaponry The rise in the commercialization of space signified the downfall of an era of almost monopolistic control by the US and the former Soviet Union of outer space. Now that space is accessible to such a widespread range of actors, many new security questions have arisen concerning the weaponization of space. New technology used for communication and information transfers, not only by state governments, but also by private companies such as news broadcasting corporations is vital for many things, from the management of national economies to assisting in performing simple daily tasks. The media group BBC, an international British owned news broadcasting corporation is an example of a private company which owns its own satellite. One way the BBC uses satellites is for long-range live news feeds. For example, anchors can conduct live interviews with reporters covering the Iraq War in Iraq from a news studio thousands of miles away. Since this technology has taken such an important place in the international community, its security is equally as important because much of the developed world has become dependent on satellites for these practical purposes. The commercialization of space has made the weaponization of space an even greater threat to the international community, because an attack on a single satellite used for communications could severely hamper the conduct of business or military affairs in a nation.

- 21 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Satellite Technology Since the first satellite launch by the USSR in 1957, civilian and military capabilities and uses for satellites worldwide have grown immensely. There are more than 800 active satellites currently in orbit, with the United States owning roughly half with over 400 satellites (“What’s…”). Russia and China are second and third respectively in number of satellites owned. Neither state has more than 100 active satellites in orbit (“What’s…”). The United States currently has more military based satellites than the rest of the world combined with over 100 military satellites in orbit (“What’s…”). There are three major types of satellites, low-Earth orbit (LEO), intermediate Earth orbit (MEO), and geosynchronous satellites that are in high orbit. Geosynchronous (GEO) satellites are generally television and communications, civilian type satellites, but do include some satellites for military uses such as communications and missile launch detection (“What’s…”). GEO satellites’ range makes them more difficult to reach with weapons from the earth as they are found typically 36,000 km above earth (“What’s…”). MEO satellites, mainly GPS and navigation satellites, are also out of range of most types of weapons fired from earth (Garwin 248-249). LEO satellites, however, are close enough to be reached by weapons such as a missile and additionally happen to be among the most important types of satellites for government and military use. They also include dual-use weather satellites (“What’s…”). The satellite systems in LEO are among the most important to international security, and have been known for several years as National Technical Means (NTM), with their name marking this importance. NTM are legally protected from attack by the ABM, as well as through the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) Agreements between the United States and Russia (Garwin 248-249). Some satellites have been termed dual-use technologies, meaning they have applications to both civilian and military operations (Park 885). Weather imagery, television broadcasts, mobile and fixed communications, and navigation systems are some of the most common civilian uses, all of which have been blended seamlessly into daily life in the 21st century (Garwin 243). Some of these also have practical military uses. For example, weather imagery may be used to strategize for combat based on weather conditions. Satellite intelligence (SATINT) allows commanders to missile launches nearly anywhere on earth within a minute of launch (Garwin 243). During the Gulf War, satellites helped to plan and strategize military operations on land, sea, and air. These types of satellites employed by the military have been coined Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, and are commonly used by military forces worldwide (Garwin 243). Most significantly, the introduction of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology in the 1990s via satellites revolutionized the capabilities of satellite technology both for military and civilian uses. GPS technology has the capability to pinpoint a target at a range of up to one millimeter of proximity (Garwin 244). Today, most missiles and bombs are controlled by GPS technology and are accurate within meters of the desired target. This technology is not necessarily readily available for civilian uses, though. In many instances, governments limit the civilian capabilities of GPS in terms of accuracy, reserving the higher resolution GPS systems only for military uses (Garwin 244). GPS has assuredly been used for positive and negative means since its inception, as terrorists can easily use GPS to plan attacks today. Satellite technology revolutionizes the way the world operates economically, politically, militarily, and socially by allowing communication and networking across thousands of miles in a matter of minutes, if not seconds. They will continue to have a significant international impact in all of these areas in years to come through further growth and technological expansion. The real issue surrounding satellite technology in relation to the weaponization of space is the security of the technology itself, as it is so vital to worldwide information sharing and communication. During the Cold War, some of the most common types of space-related weapons in production were anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) that could reach and effectively disable or destroy them. Although ASAT weapons are generally not physically located in space, these weapons’ capability to reach space makes them both significant and relevant to the weaponization of space (Garwin 246-248). Therefore, delegates should be careful in their consideration of appropriate solutions regarding this issue in their effort to formulate a comprehensive international solution on this issue.

- 22 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Anti-satellite Weaponry The development of ASAT was precipitated by US and Soviet escalation of space weaponry. ASAT therefore are generally not located in space itself, but are more typically missiles launched from Earth. Some types of ASAT are placed in space, however, because of the method in which they are meant to destroy satellites. There are several different forms of ASAT, but most still are designed with a missile or rocket as the main weapon designed to reach and destroy a satellite. Miniature homing vehicle (MHV) technology, for example, can easily reach an LEO satellite through placement within a missile or rocket. It can be launched from an aircraft or from the ground in order to reach the satellite. MHV technology is also typically incorporated into state missile defense programs or strategies (Garwin 246-250). Though ASATs are technically space weapons, there are some ASATs that are not designed to destroy satellites. Instead, these ASAT disrupt satellites’ normal activities and thus blur the line established by the OST and other related international documents because they are not actually destructive weapons. Therefore, the OST does not ban the use of ASATs. Commonly used disruptors deployed by ASATs include groundbased jamming weapons, encryption devices, and suborbital intercept missiles that are used for missile defense. These weapons essentially shut down communications from the satellite to its host, rendering the host unable to receive communication for a short period of time. In addition to non-destructive or passive weapons such as these, it is not uncommon for weapons to be deployed in space only for a short time period like a few days or weeks so to remain ambiguous and not be identified as actual weapons. Space mines, which detonate when a satellite comes into range are also a type of ASAT, which, as previously mentioned, are considered a type of ASAT even though they are physically in space (Park 882-883). These weapons are still, however, in development. Since there is no actual international legal definition of what a space weapon is, it is sometimes unclear to see how ASATs fit into the category of space weapons. ASATs are a type of space weapon because they are the only viable means of destroying satellites available. The lack of a legal definition and the exclusion of ASAT from the OST are glaring weaknesses in international law pertaining to the weaponization of space. Since ASATs in missile form are most effective at targeting LEO satellites, many of which are NTM, this makes them a significantly greater threat to international security. ASATs, unlike other types of space weapons, are the most readily available space weapons today, which makes them even more pertinent in the broader scope of the weaponization of space. Space weapons, or weapons physically located in outer space, present in many ways a much different threat to international security than ASAT. Space Weapons Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars program was the first significant international plan proposed to place weapons in space for any purpose, whether peaceful, defensive, or offensive. It marked the end of the continuous rhetoric about space weapons of the 1960s and 1970s, and the beginning of a realistic attempt to create weapons in outer space. Researchers focused most of their efforts during the Star Wars era on a laser weapons able to shoot down and missiles from space (Garwin 245). The space-based laser (SBL) could also be used to mount an attack on land, sea, or air from outer space via laser beam in LEO, constituting it as a futuristic threat not only to just advanced technology such as satellites, but also to the inhabitants of Earth as well as to forms of major international infrastructure, for example highways or medical systems. Laser weapons seem futuristic, and they are. Although many prototypes are in development, there is still yet to be developed a viable laser weapon that is capable of doing any of the above. There are speculations that states such as the United States are still developing SBL for use in space. The United States military has commonly reviewed the usefulness of an SBL for military purposes in replacing the need to risk human lives in military operations (Park 881). Much like the SBL, kinetic kill vehicles are another type of space-based weapon that have been proposed by the United States and Russia. Like SBL, kinetic kill vehicles would focus on targeting and destroying ballistic missiles upon their launch. Instead of the use of one laser beam, however, kinetic kill vehicles would accomplish their goal through the deployment of several small satellites around the Earth (Park 881). Outside of these two major types of space based weapons, other more simple weapons systems have been proposed. One such example is a rocket system that would remain in orbit with the ability to target satellites and missiles - 23 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

and to destroy them. Additionally, though banned by the OST and other major international documents, there is always the ever-looming threat of the inclusion of nuclear weapons or other non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction into the category of space weaponry (Garwin 245). The Threat of the W eaponization of Space Although current technology limits the ability to place highly advanced weapons in space that will be able to meet such demands, the rapid growth of new advanced technology today will surely supersede these limitations in the future. The dangerous possibility of space weapons being able to reach any type of satellite, no matter the height of its orbit, as well as to possibly reach Earth with a force such as a laser is what makes them such an important issue in the realm of international disarmament and security. It is important to realize that though the development of such advanced weapons would occur in the future, the international community must act now to ensure they will never leave the ground. The commercialization of space completely changed the entire economic, political, military, and social landscape of the international community, as have the continuous technological advances related to such commercialization. Included in this change was the move of communications infrastructures to satellite technology, as well as the use of satellites to manage and run national economies or international economic structures. In addition to these two critical areas, many states depend on NTM satellites in LEO for functioning government and military apparatuses. Although NTM are protected by the ABM and the SALT Agreements, the international community has not fully endorsed either of these treaties because of the bilateral nature of the agreements and the collapse of the Soviet Union shortly after the negotiations. The destruction of any of these types of infrastructural satellites could cripple a state because of the interconnectedness of digital data run through computers today via satellites. NTM satellites digitally run economies, government and military communications, and are used to transmit data vital to a state’s existence. Beyond even this, space warfare could also be used to directly cause damage to vital physical infrastructure on Earth, a completely separate security question altogether. Though futuristic, the reality stands that there is already technology existent, whether or not it is in place in outer space or on land, sea, or air, that is able to reach and effectively destroy satellites in space. The commercialization of space also brought forth another major international security issue: semiindependent or even independent actors can now influence the international security agenda in outer space (Park 880). When the OST and other international and UN documents of its kind were introduced, there were only two major actors in space, both with a substantial amount of control over the security agenda. In fact, most of the treaties drafted during the Cold War concerning outer space, most specifically the OST, were headed by the United States and the USSR (Henry 62). The myopia of all of the international documents concerning the weaponization of space to not recognize the ability of commercial enterprises to influence space dynamics has created a vacuum in the international legal regime’s ability to regulate these types of actors (Park 880). Continued proliferation of space technology makes future space warfare more realistic. Several key issues have been raised as to the capabilities of space weapons and their capability, as well as the weaknesses in the current legal space structure. The weaponization of space, while it presents several positive security possibilities for states, also presents several threats to international security. States such as the United States have taken firm stances to continue their development of space weapons for defensive and therefore semipeaceful purposes. More actors today such as India and China have taken steps to do the same, a trend that will more than likely continue to grow in the future. The positive uses for space weapons are quite clear: they are effective for monitoring and protecting national interests. The negative aspects of space weaponization are what must be dealt with; separating the positive uses from the negative uses of space weapons is what must be done in the international forum to effectively address the issue of the weaponization of space.

- 24 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

CURRENT STATUS Chinese Anti-Satellite Test On 11 January 2007, China performed an anti-satellite test against one of its own satellites, marking the first known successful Chinese ASAT test (Henry 62). The Chinese government tested their ASAT technology on a decrepit weather satellite using a rocket derived from a ballistic missile. This development shocked several countries, most notably the United States, which until this point had maintained monopolistic control over military operations in space, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Chinese had previously attempted to accomplish this same feat three different times between 2004 and 2007, finally finding success in 2007 (Henry 62). The motives behind the test were unclear from the outset, but what was immediately clear at the time was that the Chinese has emerged alongside the United States and the post-Soviet Russian Federation as a significant actor in outer space (Broad). Initially, it was assumed that the Chinese test was an attempt to signal their rise to power as a major military force in space. The test was the first true “escalation in the weaponization of space” since the last weapons test by the United States in 1984, and ended a span of restraint in the use of space weapons. In the days following the Chinese test, several inquiries were made, most at the behest of the United States, into the nature of the test. The Bush Administration, during the previous August, had authorized a new National Space Policy that rejected any international call for bans on space weapons tests. This policy guaranteed US deterrence against any state that impedes its ability to carry out such tests or to develop space weapons. In a more punitive manner, the policy guaranteed that the US would “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests” (Broad). The US harshly criticized China for the test, saying that its actions did not coincide with efforts to maintain international and even bi-lateral cooperation in space on the issue of the weaponization of space (Broad). Following the test, China maintained their stance that an arms race in outer space must not occur, pushing for negotiations to ban weapons in space. It has been speculated that because of this stance by the Chinese, the test was intended to send a different message for the United States. Some have suggested that the Chinese government performed the test in order to push the US into negotiations for a treaty banning space weapons, an agenda of which both China and Russia have been major advocates (Kahn). During UN negotiations on the subject in October 2007, the United States made it clear that it would not support any type of space arms ban treaty, which it deemed would be “superficially appealing” but in actuality would be severely flawed (United). Both China and Russia vigorously continued to press an agenda for such a treaty, co-sponsoring resolutions dealing with an outer space arms race. China, more importantly, reaffirmed its stance that a resolution banning an arms race in space must be passed, in addition to responding critically to United States criticism regarding the significant amount of space debris the US is responsible for (United). More than 40% of all space debris has been found to belong to the United States, a problem which extends beyond the issue of space weaponization (United). United States Response to Chinese Test Following several UN negotiations that did not amount to any significant international action to ban weapons in outer space, or prevent the occurrence of an arms race in space, the United States announced that it would perform a missile test to destroy a dead or non-functional satellite in LEO (Tellis). On 21 February 2008 the US successfully performed this ASAT test. Unlike China, the US announced the test to the international community, and voiced concerns for the toxic fuel leaking into the atmosphere from the satellite (Tellis). Two days prior to the US announcement of its intentions to destroy this satellite, China and Russia introduced a draft treaty aimed at banning the weaponization of space (Tellis). The US was sending a clear message to both China and Russia that it had no intentions of halting its space weapons development or testing, nor did it intend to support any type of treaty banning such development and testing (Po).

- 25 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

M ore Recent Actors in Space Most recently, India has emerged as a new international competitor in the race for space dominance. It announced in June 2008 that it planned to “boost its defense presence in space” – most likely due to increased space activity from its competitive neighbor, China (Sands). India previously had only a civilian satellite program, but because of China’s recent offensive and defensive expansion in space, India has moved to defend its national interests in space as well. India has openly admitted rising concern over China’s plan for outer space, making the newly announced development of an Indian space defense system a signal of a potential Asian space race (Sands). Japan has also recently made a move to bolster its defensive presence in space. The Japanese government most recently passed a bill ending the ban upon the use of space as a defensive frontier. Japan insists that there are no plans for the development of such a program. There is speculation, however, that this was truly their intent as nearby neighbor China has stepped up their military initiatives in space (Sands). Finally, the current French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, has proposed a massive expansion of the French space defense program. The proposed plan nearly doubles the current French budget for space defense and intelligence, with the new budget surpassing US$1 billion per annum. The plan includes not only space defense initiatives, but also the addition of more spy satellites for intelligence purposes (Sands). It is clear that these nations all have something in common: a desire to bolster their presence in space for the protection of their own national interests. It would seem, however, that it is China and not the US that has moved these nations into action. China’s 2007 missile test broke a long lasting period of no ASAT tests. This unannounced action has caused many nations not part of the space arms race, to join in an effort to protect their own interests. BLOC POSITIONS The United States of America The United States has the most space-based assets to protect, as their economy and defense systems heavily rely on space technology. For this reason, the US is committed to continuing its space program at all costs, as evidenced by the Bush Administration’s new space policy announced in 2006. The US plans to continue its uninhibited expansion of space technology for military purposes. Thus far, the US has blocked any international attempts at creating a treaty to ban the development, testing, and use of space weapons, or in other words to halt the possibility of an arms race in space. In particular, the negotiations on a new space arms-limitation treaty, which have been ongoing for several years, have been stalled by the US’ general unwillingness to agree with any form of restriction on the militarization of space, whether it be for offensive or defensive purposes. The most recent February 2008 proposition for a ban on all types of space weapons by China and Russia has also met a lack of cooperation from the United States. It is clear that the US has the most to lose when it comes to the possibility of space warfare, thus the source of US policy is understandable. The US is not completely opposed to the idea of a treaty that would place some restrictions on the weaponization of space, but what is clear is that it will not accept a widespread ban on military action in space (Henry 63). The US clearly wants a defined legal approach to international space weapons limitation, not a blanket ban of all weapons as proposed by Russia and China. The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation Perhaps the most mysterious of all current states active in space, China and Russia have formed an allied attempt to pass a treaty to completely ban the weaponization of space. China is actively developing its military space capabilities, both for offensive and defensive purposes. There is a possibility that both China and Russia have proposed this treaty in an attempt to distract the international community from any further developments in their own military space programs. China’s 2007 tests may suggest that they plan on challenging US space dominance. Though negative speculations may be made about their actions, it is obvious that both China and Russia form the vanguard of the effort to stop the weaponization of space, regardless of their motives. - 26 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

New Actors in Space Nations such as India, Japan, and France are all included in this category as they have all made recent efforts to bolster or pave the way for the expansion of their military programs in outer space. These efforts have most often been cited as reactions not to the US’ continuing military program for space, but to China’s continuous expansion in this area since its first successful ASAT test in 2007. Now that US dominance in space has been challenged, these newer actors seek to build up their defense programs in outer space, as they feel that an arms race in space could be inevitable. In part, this bloc shares the US view that they must protect their assets in outer space, yet still these nations also feel that a new treaty on the weaponization of space must be negotiated to ensure that neither space warfare nor a true arms race in space takes place. Beneficiaries and Unrepresented Actors The remainder of the international community not engaged in bolstering their space defense programs still must make the decision as to how their foreign policy dictates where they stand on the issue of the weaponization of space. For some, such as Britain and Israel, it is clear that as major allies of the United States they are benefactors of the expansion of US’ defense programs in space and attempts to protect its national interests in outer space. For those not represented, especially for developed nations, the question of protecting national interests in the future is still pertinent, even if there is no short term prospect of these nations gaining influence in outer space. Unrepresented actors must decide where they stand based on their own foreign policy, and from there decide the most effective way to limit the use of arms in space and additionally to prevent an arms race in space. COMMITTEE MISSION China’s ASAT test in 2007 has made the issue of the weaponization of space more important in recent years than ever before. The First Committee must decide how to deal with this issue, especially as more actors emerge and begin to increase their military-related activities in outer space. With new technology and a growing number of actors in space, the legal framework currently in place requires revision, if not an entirely new framework altogether. The OST in particular only bans the use of nuclear weapons in space, while other weapons such as missiles are left out of the document entirely. Which past documents should be discarded, and what aspects of others should be kept should be at the foremost of delegates’ minds. It would be foolish to create an entirely new legal framework without lifting passages from others; no body of law or legislation exists in a vacuum without influence from the past. There are clearly economic and military benefits from the usage of space. In many ways, the modern economy would not be able to operate without the communications benefits given by satellite technology. Satellites can also be used to military purposes, as seen in history, and the economic benefits must be weighed against the military dangers when making any decision. Additionally, the future ability of independent actors to expand military capabilities into space must be factored into such a legal framework. This framework should also be more specific on the term “peaceful uses for outer space” as much of the ambiguity around this term has inspired nations to continue defensive military operations in space. An overarching definition for this term would foremost be a solid guide for any new legal framework. The First Committee must resolve the issue of the weaponization of space before it becomes an even greater threat to international security. Solutions for this topic do not have to follow any specific formula and innovation and open-mindedness is highly encouraged to successfully implement a UNbolstered outer space weapons regulation regime.

- 27 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

RESEARCH AND PREPARATION QUESTIONS As mentioned in the Note on Research and Preparation, it is imperative that delegates answer each of these questions in their position papers. TOPIC A 1.

Is your state party to any of the major conventional weapons treaties or conventions? If so, which treaties? If not, what is your state’s reasoning?

2.

How does your state view the legal trade of conventional weapons as it is currently unregulated by international law?

3.

How does your state view the UN Register of Conventional Arms? Does it make regular submissions? Has it ever withheld information from this body?

4.

Has your state ever been implicated in the illicit transfer of conventional weapons internationally, or their misuse for political or militaristic means?

5.

In what ways has your state attempted to deal with the illicit transfer of conventional weapons internationally, regionally, and locally?

TOPIC B 1.

To what extent is your state involved in outer space? How does your state define the peaceful uses for outer space?

2.

Does your state’s foreign policy effect its involvement in outer space? If so, how? Does your state believe in military uses for space?

3.

To what extent does your state believe the commercialization of space should be limited? Does your state have any commercial or private interests in space?

4.

How does your state feel about anti-satellite weaponry? Does it see this technology as a positive or a negative in its own security agenda?

5.

How has your state been involved on the international level with the issue of the weaponization of space? Is it party to any of the major treaties concerning space?

- 28 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS The following documents have been hand-selected by Directors to further aid in delegate preparation. Please make a concerted effort to read and analyze these documents prior to the conference. TOPIC A Arms Without Borders: Why a Globalized Trade Needs Global Controls. Control Arms. 2007. This report provides a number of detailed examples of the illicit trade in conventional arms as well as deficiencies in the current legal system. Beyond providing such outstanding examples it also provides substantial solutions to the issue. Jaffer, Jamil. "Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime." Chi. J. Int'L L. 519 (2002): 519-526. Hein Online. This journal article provides a strong background of the Wassenaar Arrangement and its policies and functions. This article also makes several key suggestions about reforming the current regime to make it more comprehensive. Kaye, David, and Steven A. Solomon. "The Second Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons." The American Journal of International Law 96 (2002): 922-936. JSTOR. This article gives a detailed description of the origins of modern conventional arms legislation internationally. Specifically, this article gives good focus to the CCW, an instrumental document in leading the ways for controls over certain conventional weapons. Laurance, Edward J., Hendrik Wagenmakers, and Herbert Wulf. "Managing the Global Problems Created by the Conventional Arms Trade: an Assessment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms." Global Governance (2005): 225-246. Hein Online. This resource provides a very detailed description of the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the background information concerning its creation. Additionally, this article gives an in depth analysis of the problems facing the Register and how they must be addressed. UN Register of Conventional Arms: Information Booklet 2007. New York: Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, 2007. This UN document provides a direct summary of all the weapons types included under the jurisdiction of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. TOPIC B Freeland, Steven, Mist Maogoto, and Jackson Nyamuya. "Space Weaponization and the United Nations Charter Regime on Force: A Thick Legal Fog or a Receding Mist." International Law Journal (2007): 1091-120. This journal gives an outstanding background for the whole issue of the weaponization of space. Additionally, this journal provides a strong history of the United Nations’ involvement with the issue. Krepon, Michael. "Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive toward Antisatellite Weapons." Foreign Affairs Journal (2001): 2-8. This journal article provides a substantial background for the use and development of anti-satellite weaponry. Additionally it provides a detailed history of the space race between the US and USSR during the Cold War. Park, Andrew T. "Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space." Journal of International Law (2006): 871-911. This is an excellent journal article providing much background on the issue of weaponization of space, as well as a plethora of information concerning developments in the issue. Most notably this article describes the different types of space weapons, and also addresses the lack of international legislation concerning much of the advances in the issue which have been made over the past few decades. - 29 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Sands, David R. "China, India Hasten Arms Race in Space; U.S. Dominance Challenged." The Washington Times 25 June 2008. This article is critical to understanding the current status of this issue. The authors provide a detailed analysis of various states’ stances on space related security questions and the protection of their national interests in space. "UNITED STATES SAYS DISCUSSING MERITS OF TREATIES TO PREVENT WEAPONIZATION." General Assembly. 22 Oct. 2007. United Nations. . This article provides a different viewpoint than most others from the United States of what its agenda in space is. Additionally there is a wealth of information about the space policies of other states in the international community.

- 30 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

BIBLIOGRAPHY TOPIC A UN Sources UN Register of Conventional Arms: Information Booklet 2007. New York: Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, 2007. This UN document provides a direct summary of all the weapons types included under the jurisdiction of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Non-UN Sources Allen, David. "A Cluster of Fallacies." Foreign Policy in Focus (2008). 22 June 2008 . This article focuses on the threat posed to civilians through the use of cluster munitions. It provides a good argument as to why cluster munitions must be banned internationally. Arms Without Borders: Why a Globalized Trade Needs Global Controls. Control Arms. 2007. This report provides a number of detailed examples of the illicit trade in conventional arms as well as deficiencies in the current legal system. Beyond providing such outstanding examples it also provides substantial solutions to the issue. Caldwell, Dan, Robert E. Williams Jr. Seeking Security in an Insecure World. 2006. Rowman & Littlefield Inc. Lanham. This book provided several interesting facts and figures on conventional weapons and the destruction they have caused internationally. It substantiates much of the reasoning behind furthering controls on conventional arms. Dutra, Michael. "Strategic Myopia: the United States, Cruise Missiles, and the Missile Technology Control Regime." J. Transnat'L L. & Pol'Y (2005): 37-86. Hein Online. This journal article discusses the various types of missiles and their uses internationally and applications for military. This article also gives a detailed description of the MTCR. "East Timor: History, Geography, Government, and Culture." Infoplease. 17 June 2008 . This website gives a brief background of the history of East Timor, involving the war between East Timor and Indonesia over the rights to the land. Grimmett, Richard F. Conventional Arms Transfers To Developing Nations, 1998-2006. United States Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2007. This report gives a detailed description of conventional arms transfers worldwide over a span of 8 years. It provides in depth charts and analysis of trends in the legal international conventional arms trade. Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). Center for Nonproliferation Studies. This background report summarizes the inception and the functions of the HCOC, as well as its implications to the conventional arms trade internationally. This document is very concise and descriptive as to the abilities and purpose of the HCOC. "Hezbollah (a.K.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'Llah)." Council on Foreign Relations. 17 June 2008 . This website briefly describes the terrorist organization Hezbollah and details their history and background since being founded.

- 31 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Jaffer, Jamil. "Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime." Chi. J. Int'L L. 519 (2002): 519-526. Hein Online. This journal article provides a strong background of the Wassenaar Arrangement and its policies and functions. This article also makes several key suggestions about reforming the current regime to make it more comprehensive. Kaye, David, and Steven A. Solomon. "The Second Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons." The American Journal of International Law 96 (2002): 922-936. JSTOR. This article gives a detailed description of the origins of modern conventional arms legislation internationally. Specifically, this article gives good focus to the CCW, an instrumental document in leading the ways for controls over certain conventional weapons. Kitchen, Veronica. "From Rhetoric to Reality - Canada, the United States, and the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines." Int'L J. (2002): 37-56. Hein Online. This journal focuses on the Ottowa Landmine Treaty and the movement towards its acceptance internationally. This article gives good focus to the threats landmines pose to the international community. Kozyulin,Vadim. Conventional Arms Transfers - Illicit Arms Trade: An Overview and Implications for the Region. 2002. http://www.pircenter.org/data/news/kozulin091104lect.pdf This is a very descript article focused on the roots of the illict trade in conventional arms. Many strong examples are provided of the illict trade, as are some concrete initiatives that must be taken to combat this trade. Laurance, Edward J., Hendrik Wagenmakers, and Herbert Wulf. "Managing the Global Problems Created by the Conventional Arms Trade: an Assessment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms." Global Governance (2005): 225-246. Hein Online. This resource provides a very detailed description of the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the background information concerning its creation. Additionally, this article gives an in depth analysis of the problems facing the Register and how they must be addressed. "Lebanon /Israel: Hezbollah Hit Israel with Cluster Munitions During Conflict - First COnfirmed Use of Weapons Type." Human Rights News. Human Rights Watch. 17 June 2008 . This news article details the conflict during the summer of 2006 between Israel and Lebanon based around Hezbollah. Specifically it provides a concrete example of a terrorist organization using conventional weapons for destruction. Lloyd, Nathan T.H. “Rebuilding a Broken Regime: Restructuring the Export Administration Act” Vand. Journal of Transnational Law (2004). Hein Online. McClelland, J. "Conventional Weapons: a Cluster of Developments." International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2005): 755-767. General One File. Gale. This source discusses the Wassenaar Agreement in depth and provides many viewpoints on the viability of the regime. Also, this article pinpoints the weakness of the regime very well. Nagle, Luz E. "Prosecuting the Use of Anti-Personnel Mines by Illegal Armed Groups: the Colombian Situation." Or. Rev. Int'L L. (2006): 231-262. Hein Online. This article provides examples for rebel group attacks through the use of conventional weapons. Specifically, this article deals with Colombian rebels and the use of landmines in Colombia. Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security. Non Governmental Organization (NGO) Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security. 17 June 2008 . This NGO website provides short and descript overviews of each type of major conventional arms as defined by the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Additionally it provides links to more detailed descriptions of these weapons, most notably ballistic missiles. Phythian, Mark. “The Illicit Arms Trade: Cold War and Post-Cold War”. Under the Counter and Over the - 32 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Border: Aspect of the Contemporary Trade in Illicit Arms. 2000. Kluwer Academic Publishers. The Netherlands. This book gives concrete examples of how the black market for conventional arms works and spreads, with specific emphasis on the African continent. Several powerful examples of the illicit trade of these weapons are provided by this sources. Stoel, Jonathan T. "Codes of Conduct on Arms Transfers." Law & Pol'Y Int'L Bus (2000): 1285-1316. Hein Online. This article provides political and economic rationales for the legal international trade of conventional arms. This is a strong source for discovering the roots of the legal trade and the rationales behind national policy decisions concerning this trade. Vagts, Detlev F. "The Hague Conventions and Arms Control." The American Journal of International Law 94 (2000): 31-41. JSTOR. This journal addresses the oldest of international legal declarations concerning conventional weapons. It provides a good foundation for future international conventional weapons treaties and bans. TOPIC B UN Sources "UNITED STATES SAYS DISCUSSING MERITS OF TREATIES TO PREVENT WEAPONIZATION." General Assembly. 22 Oct. 2007. United Nations. . This article provides a different viewpoint than most others from the United States of what its agenda in space is. Additionally there is a wealth of information about the space policies of other states in the international community. Non-UN Sources Broad, William J. "Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite in Test." The New York Times 19 Jan. 2007. This news article provides a basis for the rationale that China destroyed its satellite to send a message to the international community, specifically the United States. Freeland, Steven, Mist Maogoto, and Jackson Nyamuya. "Space Weaponization and the United Nations Charter Regime on Force: A Thick Legal Fog or a Receding Mist." International Law Journal (2007): 1091-120. This journal gives an outstanding background for the whole issue of the weaponization of space. Additionally, this journal provides a strong history of the United Nations’ involvement with the issue. Henry, Phillipe. "The Militarization and Weaponization of Space: Towards a European Space Deterrent." Paris. 5 May 2008. The viewpoint expressed in this article describes the European attitude towards the weaponization of space, while maintaining a positive balance of information concerning major actors outside of Europe. Specifically it deals with Europe’s place amongst the US, China, and Russia and how it should respond to their current actions. Kahn, Joseph, and David Sanger. "U.S. Tries to Interpret China’s Silence Over Test." New York Times 22 Jan. 2007. This news article attempts to interpret the US and Chinese stances on the Chinese missile test of 2007. Furthermore, this article does a good job of staying unbiased and viewing the issue from both sides. Krepon, Michael. "Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive toward Antisatellite Weapons." Foreign Affairs Journal (2001): 2-8. This journal article provides a substantial background for the use and development of anti-satellite weaponry. Additionally it provides a detailed history of the space race between the US and USSR during the Cold War. - 33 -

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Moore, Mike. "An Arms Treaty Nears Orbit." The Washington Times 6 Mar. 2008. This news article looks at the space arms treaty proposed by China and Russia. The article is strong in that it goes in depth into the rationale behind the US position against the treaty. Park, Andrew T. "Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space." Journal of International Law (2006): 871-911. This is an excellent journal article providing much background on the issue of weaponization of space, as well as a plethora of information concerning developments in the issue. Most notably this article describes the different types of space weapons, and also addresses the lack of international legislation concerning much of the advances in the issue which have been made over the past few decades. Sands, David R. "China, India Hasten Arms Race in Space; U.S. Dominance Challenged." The Washington Times 25 June 2008. This article is critical to understanding the current status of this issue. The authors provide a detailed analysis of various states’ stances on space related security questions and the protection of their national interests in space. Tellis, Ashley J. "Don't Panic About Space Weapons." Wall Street Journal 22 Feb. 2008. This article seeks to put aside the idea that US space dominance can be challenged. Also this article directly focuses on the 2007 China anti-satellite test, and its implications for the US. Wei Po, Wen. "Hong Kong paper sees US Ambition in Outer Space Via Satellite Shootdown." BBC Monitoring Asian Pacific 23 Feb. 2008. This article analyzes the 2008 US response to the Chinese anti-satellite test the year previous. It is a strong article in that it provides a viewpoint that the US is attempting to weaponize space in the future.

- 34 -