Documents About Issue Of Visas To 9/11 Hijackers In Jeddah From 9/11 Commission's Files

COMMISSION SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event!

Former Consular Officer, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

Type of event: Interview Date: 10-14-03

..

Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Tom Eldridge

/ 9 / 1 1 W o r k i n g - l e v e l Employee

Team Number: 5 Location: State Bureau of Near Asian Affairs, SCJJF Participants - Non-Commission:

9/11 Working-level Employee

Paula Pound

Asst. Le£al Counsel

202-647-

Participants - Commission: Tom Eldridge

// Counsel Team 5

Susan Ginsburg

/'/

Counsel Team 5

202-401-1686 202-401-1747

Documents/handouts received by the Commission: None Other contacts referred to: None TEXT: was a consular officer in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia from (?) 1998 until July 2000. Consulate environment [described and drew a picture of the consular section at the Jeddah post during his tenure there. It was a double-wide trailer. The consular section had been in the building along a perimeter wall, and this was perceived as unsafe by the RSO. The trailer was "fed" by a cattle chute that was covered but open on the sides. Applicants entered the trailer and were then in a group facing consular employees who were behind a wall with glass - three interview stations, a cashier and an MRV collection window. There were desks behind the stations, and at the back were offices for the consular section chief, NIV section, and American Citizen Services Section. Employees entered the trailer at the side away from the applicant entrance. Overall, the description and diagram shows a cramped environment with very close working quarters and no real crowd control for people entering or in the trailer. Once someone had entered the embassy, passing the security at the gate, there was no additional security for people in the consular section.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Saudi Visa Policy iescribed the visa applicants in Jeddah as falling into two, very distinct groups: Saudis and Third Country Nationals (TCNs). In Jeddah, approximately 50% of applicants were Saudi, and 50% were TCNs and foreign workers. Their socio-economic profiles were very different, and so too was their handling for visa purposes. In general, the policy for Saudis was interview by exception. There was an assumption that the vast majority of Saudis overcame their presumption of ineligibility under 214(b). It was accepted that travel by Saudis to the U.S. was a "rite of passage." Saudi applications were screened by FSNs for completeness and any red flags. Once an FSN screened an application, the applicant was called to the window and was either told to return or was interviewed on the spot. NOTE: This was in the era before Visa Express with Travel Agency document processing. Jsaid completeness in filling out the application was "always a problem for Saudis." He ; added that many Saudis could not understand English. For these reasons, the post had big signs describing what Saudis needed to do to fill out the applications, and the forms were translated into ArabicJ tinted that the signs said the Saudis had to "answer all questions" on the visa application/form] plso said that the FSNs were instructed to not receive applications that had not been filled out fully. For Saudis, the visa policy in Jeddah was slightly different than for Saudis in Riyadh. Jeddah interviewed more Saudis than did Riyadh. In JeddafyP land the other part-time consular officej [shared an office and interviewed, all first-time student visa applicants, not so in Riyadlj, according tol I They also interviewed returning students to see if they were makihg progress. Not infrequently, they would demand to see students' transcripts in order to satisify themselves that the student was working toward a degree, as opposed to lounging around at a/school in the/LJ.S. effectively on a vacation paid for by their family, a company, or the goy.ernment.1 fcaid that I-20s were not always a reliable proof of bona fides (not really a shock); | fcaid that Saudis would sometimes transfer multiple times to new schools, hipping around and avoiding doing any work. Some Saudis would sign up for English courses rtpedtedly.. There was also the/problem of schools that were not legitimate providing an 1-20 to j?611.ect Saudi cash with no real educational component...] taid student applicants had to provide a bank statement proving their ability to pay for the first year of study, and that this rule ; "hard and fast." / ., However

said that for a B1/B2 visa, NO DOCUMENTATION WAS REQUIRED.

said they interviewed 100% of first-time students, 80% of all students, and 5% of all .other Saudi applicants. ,.

9/11 Agency Internal Matters

9/11 Working-level Employee COMMISSION SENSITIVE

H XTOCT/"V\

9/11 Agency Internal Matters

Whenf first arrived, the process was that a CO would adjudicate the applicant's visa. The CO would then send the passport back to the FSN who had prepared the application for adjudication so the FSN could do the data entry. The file was then sent back to the CO for the nam6check in CLASS. Meanwhile, the applicant (if a Saudi) was told to go home and come back later in the day. When the applicant came back, if there were no flags, then they were issued a visa. If there was an issue at one of the stages - adjudication, data entry, or namecheck - then the applicant was told to return the next day to be interviewed. Interference by Ambassador Fowler | j-ecalled the incident involving Ambassador Fowler described in his memo to Carl [ Cockburn, in which Fowler stormed into the consular section and demanded that| ~|issue a I visa to the servant of a Saudi diplomat. He admitted to being embarrassed by the ambassador, ;: but said that this was the only example he could recall of this kind of front office meddling in the /affairs of the consular section. Validation Studies said they did visa validation surveys at post by selecting at random NIV recipients and calling them to see if they had returned (hardly scientific)^! (also said that they would receive "blue sheets," i.e. notices from the I>JS that an NTV recipient had applied to change their status in the U.S. NOTE: While this might indicate a bad NTV approval, it must be kept in mind that applying to change status is a perfectly .legal thing to do. I Isaid that in his two years in Jeddah, he received 2 blue sheets.. f6r NTVs he had approved. Like other consular officers we have spoken withf [remembered the facts..of both cases. [ 9/11 Closed by Statute

9/11 Working-level Employee

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

9/11 Working-level Employee

L.

o/\ o i i

4/vw

rv\

j

24

J-firf - L

0 \ To

-v*i

C—^

T"C

£OCJ\'o - €co
z/>

F.T/O -

7

\J &iA

-

5 /O

—

a

-P< 0 i-

CL

\-

)h

UrUxncf

u^^ # .

cL&

H^A.

o

;

u/^

; i

'OAXVVV^VI

^A.

°

k*^.

; fix? ^ .

-

Lgg(

u

oVXJT

a/)

fff

/rvvU Of CO He cA c^\

'-'

>/

*^-t,JLJUt

Co

-txv-i

, 01 fo 4_oAii fr<^> d^—t \r\

^—

2, \CJLV-1

£

|.T>

jo--

v-

,

Lo

w

,

\ -f»

if*-l / l&^-Olf

to

°f


. J s\AA4s> 0-T

• *»r«-i t£x3

Thomas H. Kcan CHAIR Lee H. Hamilton VICE CHAIR Richard Ben-Veniste Max Cleland Fred F, Fielding Jamie S. Gorelick

DOS INTERVIEW REQUEST NO. 9 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission") requests interviews with the following Department of State officials during the weeks of October 13, October 20, or October 27. Please provide a proposed date, time, and location for these interviews no later than October 9, 2003, if possible. The anticipated length of each interview is two hours.

Slade Gorton John Lehman Timothy J. Roemer James R. Thompson

Philip D. Zelikow EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

1. George Lannon 2. Catherine Barry 3. Travis Farris 4. Karl Wycoff 5. Charles H. Brayshaw 6. Albert A. Thibault, Jr. 7. Richard Baltimore 8. Arthur Mills 9. Carl Cockburn 10 11] _ 12. Thomas Krajeski 13. Michael Polt 14. Charisse Phillips The Commission anticipates that classified information may be discussed at these interviews. The Commission reserves the right to re-interview these individuals based on the results of the requested interviews and the needs of the Commission. September 30, 2003

Daniel Marcus General Counsel

9/11 Working-level Employee

TEL (202) 331-4060 FAX (202) 296-5545 www.9-11 comrnission.gov

,xp^

<-s?Ut?it«c03:

/O '/' l^j n
9/11 Working-level Employee

'I'lASf (jd\<J* '^9X^7 4*&~''p* .>• 4tl'

I* U' fern

a-j- f&^tf&M

G>

NJ O O

W);

9/11 Working-level Employee