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Proposed Work Plan for the Counterterrorism Policy Team Alexis Albion Scott Allan Warren Bass Daniel Byman Bonnie Jenkins Charles Hill Draft: April 25, 2003 Contents Project Overview Key Questions Proposed Division of Labor Initial Document Review List Appendix One: Summary of Joint Inquiry Staff Work on Policy Appendix Two: Suggested Readings Appendix Three: Notional Interview List Appendix Four: Proposed Briefings for the Commissioners

Project Overview: Counterterrorism Policy The policy team seeks to understand and assess the development of U.S. Counterterrorism policy before the September 11 attacks, the changes in the immediate aftermath, and the nature of the policy today. These tasks will require reviewing overall priorities, identifying and evaluating the different instruments used to fight terrorism (prosecutions, military strikes, extraditions/renditions, and so on), and determining how well senior policy makers understood the threat from al-Qa'ida. Another integral part of the policy team's effort is examining U.S. relationships with key foreign partners and .../view.php?thismailbox=rNBOX&index=312&id=2&actionID=113&mime=ec70aeOOe84f263aO(5/l/03

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adversaries with regard to counterterrorism. When appropriate, the team will distinguish between U.S. counterterrorism policy in general and U.S. efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in particular. The nature of terrorism during the Cold War shaped U.S. counterterrorism policy when al-Qa'ida began to emerge. These earlier terrorists, in the words of RAND's Brian Jenkins, wanted "a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead." Their goals were usually tied to Marxist or ethno-nationalist agendas. The most lethal terrorists during this era were those backed by states, not those operating independently. In general, terrorism during this period was viewed as an important but not overriding policy concern. As al-Qa'ida and affiliated Islamist groups emerged and grew in the 1990s, the focus slowly shifted. The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center marked a turning point. For the first time, Islamist radicals sought mass casualties on U.S. soil. In contrast to the terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, who had balked at destroying entire buildings, the new radicals wanted a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead. Several government counterterrorism officials recognized the danger al-Qa'ida posed, but U.S. policy changed unevenly at best. The 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania elevated the importance of terrorism in general and al-Qa'ida in particular, but policy still lagged behind the immensity of the threat. It took the September 11 attacks to dramatically change U.S. counterterrorism policy. Even today, counterterrorism policy is evolving, with important policy decisions being made almost daily. The policy team expects to follow a normal investigative regimen of document requests and review, briefings by key individuals both inside and outside government, and extensive interviews with those in a position to discuss the formulation and implementation of U.S. government policy in the counterterrorism arena. In addition, the team will draw on the work of the Congressional September 11 Joint Inquiry as appropriate. Key Questions At the Commission hearings held on March 31 in New York, witnesses described their views of the September 11 attackers, the intelligence capabilities of the government, and the quality of the USG's counterterrorism policy before September 11. They also suggested improvements in these areas in order to prevent another tragedy. Based upon their statements and our research so far, we have compiled a list of key questions and issues that we think need to be addressed by the Commission. The list is divided into three parts, corresponding to the overall statutory structure of the Commission's inquiry. Most of the questions focus on Part I (the pre-September 11 era), as this is essential for understanding Parts II and III, which cover the period after the attacks. Part One: Counterterrorism Policy before September 11, 2001 Background 1. What shaped counterterrorism policy before the 1993 World Trade Center attack? • What was the "old paradigm" regarding the threat posed by terrorist groups? • What instruments (law enforcement, diplomacy, military strikes, financial controls, and so on) were used for fighting terrorism? • How important was terrorism considered, in general?

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Strategy and Priorities 2. Did the USG possess a unified counterterrorism policy prior to September 11, or did policy vary between agencies? • Did our strategy employ all instruments of U.S. national power? • What were the gaps in the strategy? Were they obvious at the time? • Was there leadership and coordination? • Did any political concerns affect counterterrorism policy? 3. Was counterterrorism factored into the design of key foreign policy measures, including policy toward Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Middle East peace process, Pakistan, and Egypt? 4. Where was counterterrorism on the overall USG priority list?

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• What were the other priorities?

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• Did money follow the priority list? Did high-level time and attention follow the list? If not, why not? • Was there a system for managing priorities?

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Was there an integration of domestic policy and foreign policy on counterterrorism?

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• With the knowledge available at the time, should counterterrorism have been a higher priority? • Was the particular threat of al-Qa'ida recognized? 5. Were any "balls dropped" during the transition from the Clinton administration to the Bush ^^~ A~ administration? Were transition mechanisms effective? lN{r&Jt ' Understanding the Threat

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6. Did policy makers feel well-informed by the intelligence community on the nature of the threat, both at home and abroad? At what stage was al-Qa'ida considered a threat? At what point was al-

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7. Did the White House and Congress exercise effective oversight of the intelligence community and other bureaucracies fighting terrorism? Was U.S. policy realistic given the limitations of the key agencies?

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• In formulating counterterrorism policy, was sufficient attention given to the organization of the intelligence community and its ability to combat terrorism? • In formulating counterterrorism policy, did the USG focus sufficient attention on the FBI's organizational ability to counter foreign terrorists in the United States?

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Terrorism and Foreign Relations 8. To what extent did the United States emphasize and integrate counterterrorism into its foreign relations? What were the tradeoffs? 9. Did the USG fail to confront terrorist sanctuaries in the Sudan and Afghanistan? 10. Did the United States properly address the issue of state sponsors of terrorism? Was too much attention given to state-sponsored terrorist groups? _ ___ • •• ? — -

1 1 . How supportive were key countries in fighting al-Qa'ida? • How supportive were Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries where popular support f< Islamists was high and where the governments reportedly had links to al-Qa'ida? • How supportive were key European countries, such as Germany? • Who were our vital friends in the effort against al-Qa'ida? Counterterrorism Instruments 12. What were the primary instruments used in fighting terrorism? • What were their limitations? • Were these instruments effective? Were they used well? • Were certain options off the table? Should they have been? Part Two: The Immediate Aftermath of September 11 (through September 20) 13. What changes were made in the aftermath of September 11, and why? 14. Could these changes have been made before September 11? Why or why not? 15. What was the doctrine laid out by the President's September 20 speech and other key pronouncements made during this pivotal period? How did these emerge? Part Three: Counterterrorism Policy Today 16. Could the United States be better positioned to fight al-Qa'ida and other terrorists today? 17. Are the problems that hindered effective efforts against al-Qa'ida and terrorism before September 1 1 fixed? 18. What policy steps should be taken today? What bureaucratic and coordination changes are necessary? 19. Is counterterrorism properly integrated into U.S. foreign policy today? Does our current handling of such issues as "winning hearts and minds" abroad, using preemptive or retaliatory force, handling failed states, and formulating Middle East policy make sense from the perspective of the war against

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al-Qa'ida? Proposed Division of Labor (this will change as our team decides who has the best skills for which issue) Person

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Alexis Albion

CIA, DoD

Scott Allan

State, DoJ, CIA

Warren Bass

White House/NSC, State

Daniel Byman

White House/NSC

Bonnie Jenkins

DoD, State

Charles Hill*

State

Dana Leseman or other person who could do DOJ issues Kevin Scheid or other person with budget experience

DOJ OMB

[[Issues | Background (lead), oversight, transition, understanding the threat (lead) Post-9/1 1 changes, counterterrorism instruments (lead), foreign governments and sanctuaries Strategies/priorities (lead), foreign governments, transitions (lead), understanding the threat, post-9/11 changes Foreign governments (lead), strategies/priorities Post- 9/11 changes (lead), oversight (lead), counterterrorism instruments (but not law enforcement) Background, foreign governments Counterterrorism instruments (particularly law enforcement) Counterterrorism budgets

• Senior advisor. It may be best to use him to review the research plan and work as it progresses rather than assign a particular task. Byman may be used in a similar manner. All team members will work Part III - or at least we will split it up later. Proposed Briefings for the Commission We believe the Commissioners would benefit from briefings about general U.S. counterterrorism policy, U.S. policy toward al-Qa'ida before September 11, and the status of U.S. policy today. • Richard Clarke, the former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, would be the ideal briefer, given his pivotal role in counterterrorism in both administrations. • General John Gordon, who now holds Clarke's old job, should brief on the current counterterrorism policy. • Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism, would also be well-suited for helping Commissioners understand counterterrorism policy in context before September 11. • Dr. Bruce Hoffman of the RAND Corporation, perhaps the leading non-government authority .../view.php?thismailbox=INBOX&index=312&id=2&actionID=l 13&mime=ec70aeOOe84f263aO 5/1/03

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on terrorism, could provide an excellent analysis of how the threat of terrorism has changed over the years. • Dr. Paul Pillar, currently the National Intelligence Office for the Near East and South Asia, is perhaps the government's leading analyst of terrorism and could provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of different counterterrorism instruments. If necessary, staff member Daniel Byman could brief on the nature of al-Qa'ida and several aspects of the Joint Inquiry investigation (e.g. covert action, foreign liaison, the use of military force, and the overall counterterrorism strategy as it related to intelligence). However, in his view, these briefers would be preferred given their stature and experience. Mr. Clarke, Ambassador Sheehan, Dr. Pillar, and Dan Byman would probably prefer to brief in a classified or, at least, private venue in order to provide the maximum detail. Dr. Hoffman could brief in public. Generalized Document Review List It will be difficult to accurately predict what documents the team will want to review, although there are some obvious ones. Much, if not all, of the material we will be asking for will be classified. Since we will be requesting policy documents, the focus will be the Executive/NSC/OMB and probably the Departments of State and Justice as well. This list will grow and become more specific as the investigation proceeds. The documents we will be requesting include: • Presidential Decision Directives related to counterterrorism policy; • NSC Memoranda related to counterterrorism policy; • State Department records, from both Foggy Bottom and the field, related to counterterrorism policy; • Records of discussion of counterterrorism policy; • Deliberative information and factors considered before issuing policy; • Tasking directed to the intelligence community related to counterterrorism; ]

Tasking directed to the military related to counterterrorism; and

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Budget documents reflecting resources applied to counterterrorism.

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Many of the most interesting documents for the purposes of our effort will be predecisional. Such documents will provide insights into which options were chosen, which were rejected, and which were off the table. Because of the sensitivity of these documents, it may prove difficult to acquire them, which may necessitate high-level interventions. Appendix One: Congressional Joint Inquiry Activity in the Policy Area The Inquiry did some work on policy issues, but most of that focused on the intelligence-policy nexus rather than on the soundness of the overall policy. The Inquiry discussed intelligence priorities, the dissemination of information, and the quality of analysis with policy makers in some depth, but it did not venture far beyond this. The focus of its work was on the late Clinton-early Bush administrations, with the Inquiry having more success learning about the Clinton period. Policies toward foreign partners received at best incomplete attention. For example, the Inquiry looked at how the policy makers' desire for a strong bilateral relationship with Country X affected intelligence gathering on Country X or on neighboring countries. However, this was only done with a few countries, and even there it was not done systematically. Moreover, the Inquiry deliberately did not try to judge whether other equities in a bilateral relationship were more or less important than counterterrorism. The Inquiry did more extensive work on the use of military force and on covert action. On the former, however, it was hampered by a lack of interviews and access to many key individuals and documents outside the strict purview of intelligence. The Inquiry did not try to judge overall counterterrorism policy in any comprehensive way. Parts of the Inquiry's work looked at issues such as warning the public, working with state and local officials, and emphasizing law enforcement over disruption of terrorist groups. Many of these issues, however, involved the work of non-Intelligence Community agencies (e.g. the Department of Justice, the INS), which received less attention than they deserved. In addition, the Inquiry did not do basic policy analysis such as trying to evaluate the available instruments, the limits on those instruments, and political support in Congress. Suggested Readings for the Commissioners on Terrorism and U.S. Policy Readings on U.S. Policy 1. Jonathan Fredman, "Covert Action, Loss of Life, and the Prohibition on Assassination," Studies in Intelligence (1997), pp. 15-25. 2. Adam Roberts, "Counter-terrorism, Armed Force, and the Laws of War," Survival, Vol. 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 7-32. 3. Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings, 2001), pp. 73-129. 4. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 219-392. General Readings on Terrorism 1. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (McGraw Hill, 2002), pp. 55-66. 2. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 13-44. .../view.php?thismailbox=rNBOX&index=312&id=2&actionID=l 13&mime=ec70aeOOe84f263aO 5/1/03

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Readings on al-Qa'ida and Jihadist Groups 1. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes (Brassey's, 2002), entire. 2. Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, no. 25 (2002), pp. 303-316. 3. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 101-114. 4. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?" New Republic, June 24, 2002. 5. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 337. Notional List of People to Interview As a first cut, the team would divide people to be interviewed into several categories: those with responsibilities for U.S. foreign policy who can place counterterrorism in context; those with Counterterrorism responsibilities; those with valuable related responsibilities; foreign officials; and outside experts. The first list in particular includes the most prominent names in U.S. government. That may seem ambitious, but priorities and focus do begin at the top — and often end there. Once you go one or two levels down the food chain, the individuals have "accounts" and thus do not have a sense of where their responsibilities fit into the overall picture. So if we are to be comprehensive, we need to talk to these people. In several cases (e.g., at OMB), it may be more appropriate to talk to a deputy or someone who focused more on counterterrorism. Given the prominence of several of the people on this list, we favor interviewing the working-level individuals, particularly those involved in counterterrorism, and outside experts first whenever possible. Only when we know as much of the story as possible will we interview the most senior individuals. People Responsible for Overall Policy • President George W. Bush

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• President William J. Clinton • Vice President Richard Cheney • Vice President Al Gore • Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor • Samuel Berger, former National Security Advisor • Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor • Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor • Colin Powell, Secretary of State .../view.php?thismailbox=INBOX&index=312&id=2&actionID=l 13&mime=ec70aeOOe84f263aO 5/1/03

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• Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State • Attorney General John Ashcroft • Former Attorney General Janet Reno • Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld • Secretary of Defense William Cohen • Former Office of Management and Budget Director Jacob Lew • Office of Management and Budget Director Mitch Daniels • Former FBI Director Louis Freeh • Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet • Former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch • Former U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson

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• Any other participants in the "Small Group" • Deputies of various departments as appropriate Counterterrorism Specialists • Richard Clarke • Past and present participants in the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) • Ambassador Michael Sheehan (former S/CT at State) • Sheehan's predecessors at S/CT • General (ret.) Wayne Downing, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism • General John Gordon, Coordinator for Counterterrorism • Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), for both the Bush and Clinton administrations • SOLIC and CENTCOM officials with CT responsibilities • Other former NSC staff working with Clarke (Roger Cressey, Dan Benjamin, Steve Simon, and so on) • NSC staff working on intelligence • Cofer Black, both in his CTC and in his S/CT responsibilities yview.php?thismailbox=INBOX&index=312&id=2&actionID=l 13&mime=ec70aeOOe84f263aO 5/1/03

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• Dale Watson, former senior FBI official • Ambassador Robert Oakley, former S/CT Those with Related Responsibilities • Ambassador Karl Inderfurth (former Asst. Secretary, South Asia) • Ambassador Mark Parris (former Asst. Secretary, Near East) • Ambassador William Burns (Asst. Secretary, Near East) • Ambassador Martin Indyk (Asst. Secretary, Near East) • Bruce Reidel, former Senior NSC Director for the Middle East • Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Germany, Britain, Israel, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, and other countries before September 11 Foreign Government Officials • HRH Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi ambassador to the United States • Jean-Paul Brugiere, investigating magistrate, France • Selected other foreign officials Outside Experts • Bruce Hoffman, the RAND Corporation • Brian Jenkins, the RAND Corporation • Martha Crenshaw, Wesleyan University • Jessica Stern, Harvard University • Juliette Kayyem, Harvard University • Richard Betts, Columbia University 11 Draft -- Unclassified Draft ~ Unclassified

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