Dm B8 Team 5 Fdr- Feb 04 Memo- Team 5- Major Recommendations 475

MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS Team 5 Immigration, Non-Immigrant Visas and Border Control February 2004

I.

Recognize and attack travel as a major pillar of terrorism. "For these groups, passports are as important as weapons. " Judge Jean-Louis Brugeres The Commission found that the al Qaeda hijackers, as other terrorists, used trademark travel tactics that our intelligence community did not exploit. Al Qaeda built its organizations on four pillars: human resources, travel, material resources, and communications. They had to travel to recruit, train, and launch attacks. To travel and operate, they had to acquire resources and communicate. The need to communicate, acquire resources and material, and travel are universal requirements for terrorists. They create inter-related vulnerabilities. The U.S. developed signals intelligence to a high standard during the Cold War. But our intelligence community was organized to contain and defeat a foe that had a central stationary point — the Soviet Union. In the early 1990's, law enforcement and counterterrorism policy leaders developed anti-money laundering and terrorist finance tracing techniques to attack international organized crime, narco-traffickers, and terrorist groups. Some effort was made during the 1990's to develop systematic intelligence against alien smugglers and human traffickers. After September 11th, the intelligence community has stepped up efforts to deploy our intelligence and law enforcement capabilities to detect and disrupt terrorist travel. Exponential growth and restructuring must occur, however, to bring terrorist mobility intelligence activity up to the level we need to exploit terrorist group travel vulnerabilities. Some examples of specific proposals: • Incorporate terrorist travel in the national counterterrorism strategy: • Augment and perhaps restructure CIA terrorist mobility resources. • Establish a combined DHS-FBI international investigative unit to assist foreign countries in investigating terrorist-linked people smuggling, migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Establish a DOJ position in embassies to coordinate and assist overseas law enforcement policy and liaise with U.S. intelligence. Establish a penalty regime with lower standards and higher penalties for illegal travel facilitators (smugglers, forgers) who deal with terrorists. Advocate and assist in international adoption of augmented penalties for terrorist travel facilitation. • Pass a federal law requiring secure issuance of U.S. feeder/breeder documents and standards for acceptable identification. • Use diplomatic capital to propose and work toward consensus on a universal biometric for travel documents, address privacy concerns, and supply foreign assistance to help poor nations implement border controls. • Deepen cooperation with Canada and Mexico on cross-border terrorism issues.

II.

Incorporate border security into our national security strategy and fund it commensurate with its national security role. The Commission found that border crossings, outside the U.S. and at our own borders, created numerous opportunities to track and disrupt the September 11th plot. Ultimately, although U.S. border authorities prevented entry of a few of the conspirators, for reasons unrelated to their true purpose, sufficient numbers of al Qaeda operatives were able to enter the U.S. to carry its objectives on September 11th. Because transnational terrorists must travel to accomplish their ends, borders are of the highest strategic importance in national security and counterterrorism strategy. In an age of terrorism, border crossings represent both opportunity and risk. They offer a potent opportunity for the intelligence and law enforcement authorities to track, analyze, and disrupt terrorists. Border crossings also constitute risk to our nation - a line of vulnerability to terrorist entry that we must continually assess and address. We must make a substantial commitment to reshaping our border agencies to meet their new national security challenge. • Expand and better integrate the government's intelligence and forensic travel and identity document resources at CIA, DHS, FBI, USSS, and Consular Affairs. • Amend the National Security Act of 1947 to include the Secretary of DHS. • [consider eliminating HSC] • Travel is being periodically disrupted from countries in the visa waiver program, due to last minute intelligence. Address the security concerns associated with the visa waiver program by creating a meaningful preclearance screening mechanism or consider returning to a visa requirement. • Phase in a career-track Consular Corps with a migration policy role and dual reporting to DOS and DHS with real opportunity for advancement and mandatory career service in intelligence agencies, DOS • Move the Terrorist Screening Center to DHS. • Restructure and expand U.S. terrorist document fraud screening capabilities, at the visa, border and benefit stages. Leverage terrorist mobility intelligence through the nation's [15,000] border inspectors am agents and through international cooperation. • Greater controls at ports of entry mean more pressure on entry~cnannels across our coastal and land borders. Continue to expand border surveillance and response resources consistent with vulnerability analysis. • Legislatively require a comprehensive classified and unclassified review of every successful terrorist entry, similar to a military after-action review [formulate based on info from military re: hot wash] and establish an interagency advisory board to oversee such reviews.

III.

Shape migration policy in keeping with our character as a nation - to promote peace, prosperity, and justice. The Commission found that due to the U.S. government's neglect of migration and borders policy, including enforcement policy, we suffered two consequences from the September 11th attacks. First., a lack of established and effective border screening processes for use in a time of crisis caused us to virtually shut down the border in response to the attacks, causing a significant blow to our economy. Some travel delays are continuing, and legitimate travel is disrupted. Second, because of steps taken to enforce immigration laws after September 11, our enforcement policies were perceived as questionable or unfair. Several major enforcement initiatives after September 11th concentrated extraordinary resources on screening, arresting and detaining immigration violators from many, predominantly Arab or Moslem countries with the goal of preventing a second attack. These programs highlighted the lack of sufficient and consistent immigration enforcement before September 11, failed to link immigration enforcement to effective counterterrorism policy, and resulted in due process violations. The appropriate legal guidelines remain unresolved. Migration policy requires a national debate that recognizes the large number of foreigners who entered our country illegally and legally and who now form part of our economy. It requires we fully acknowledge the role of open borders in our economic prosperity. It equally requires that we acknowledge the role of constitutional rules in our system of laws, in national unity, and in the perception of the U.S. abroad, and therefore our ability to gain allies against the terrorist groups who are our enemy. • Establishing trusted traveler programs to facilitate legitimate travel. • Expand port and border infrastructure to keep pace with travel and commerce. • [Many specifics on the distinction between CT and immigration enforcement, constitutional due process and detainees etc] • [Reaffirm the centrality of foreign students and workers to our foreign policy and economy.] • [Discuss the impact of 9-11 on refugees and asylee programs.]

Background: The U.S. government's response to 9/11 ENFORCEMENT: Enhanced law enforcement concentrated on Arab-Moslem immigrants in the U.S. Extended detentions and due process issues. II. INTELLIGENCE: Improved terrorist mobility intelligence and watchlisting. III. TRAVELER SCREENING: Increased screening requirements on incoming travelers a. Condor namechecks b. Mandatory interviews for visa applicants (8/03) c. Entry biometrics and fingerprints for visa holders (1/04) (US VISIT) d. Machine readable passports from visa waiver countries (10/03 -delayed) e. Mandatory biometric data on visa waiver passports (10/04?) f. Student tracking g. Diplomacy and cooperation extending U.S. border screening outward ~ Canada and Mexico, Europe (?), cargo embarkation points IV. BORDER SECURITY: Increased sea (Coast Guard, Navy), and air (EPIC?, NORAD) protections. (Note: The Administration is proposing a cut for Border Patrol in the FY 2005 budget.) V. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION: HSC and DHS established unification of border inspection and enforcement agencies; separation of immigration services; framework for unified policy, intelligence and technology with priority focus on reducing vulnerability to terrorism. VI. IMMIGRATION POLICY: Tightened rules e.g length of stay for travelers; President's immigration policy reform proposal. I.

Issues raised by Commissioner Hamilton Threat Assessment. What are the weak spots in border security? Could the hijackers have gotten in today? Are the American people safer? Risk Management: Lee said the Team must explain the problem- how there are millions of people coming in and out of the country and thousands of miles of borders. The Team has to work in risk-management - what do managers on this problem confront, and where can they best apply resources? Cost is a big issue. Ports/Pushing Perimeter Back: Lee asked about pushing the perimeter back in general. The Team said there were good ideas applicable to cargo and people. For instance, the "trusted-shipper" program and "trusted-traveler" programs facilitate entry for legitimate cargo/travelers. Philosophically, you have to think about keeping bad things and bad people out of the country - not just slowing everything down. This demands prescreening in host-countries. DHS: Is it making us more secure? Visa process: Is the transfer of visa policy authority from State to DHS working? Are the post-9-11 interview standards a good idea? Is profiling effective? What is being done about disruptions in the visa process? LH said this is a problem for American foreign policy, and he has written to Secretary Powell about it.

US-VISIT: How does it help counterterrorism? Is it working? Timeline? Civil Liberties: Lee said the Team would have to evaluate steps taken since 9/11. How effective is the PATRIOT Act? He said the American people will have to be prepared for more intrusiveness and less privacy.