Dm B8 Team 1 Fdr- Workplan- Team 1- Final And Draft (least Redacted Versions) 436

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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES TEAM #1 WORKPLAN AL QAEDA & RELATED TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS

Team Members: Doug MacEachin Tom Dowling Dana Lesemann Yoel Tobin John Tamm Rajesh De Ernest May Matt Levitt

Item 1

Key Questions of the Investigation

Item 2

Suggested Readings

Item 3

Document Requests

Item 4

Interview Candidates

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TEAM #1 Item 1: Key Questions I.

Lines of Inquiry and Key Questons A. We propose to organize our initial research around three over-arching questions, which will be used as principal lines of inquiry: 1. What is the history of al Qaeda and its linkages to other terrorist entities prior to the 9/11 attacks? 2. What can we determine through a comprehensive examination of all evidence now available—synthesizing the information available earlier with that obtained post-9/11—regarding the planning, preparation, financing, and execution of the 9/11 attacks? 3. What is now known of the present composition of al Qaeda and its affiliated entities and what threat do they now pose? Each of these lines of inquiry is a building block that encompasses many specific component questions. We can identify some of these component questions at the outset of the research, and they are listed below as a means of focusing the initiation of our research. However, new component questions will emerge from our discoveries as our research progresses. Thus, one of the aims of the initial research is to identify additional key component questions for our research. One of the crosscutting issues to which we will pay close attention is al Qaeda's collaborative relationships and connections with various other entities because these factors will be critical in assessing al Qaeda's means and capabilities for future attacks. B. The following is a list of some of the key component questions that will be the focus of our initial research: 1.

What is the history of al Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attack? a) What are al Qaeda's origins, ideological roots, doctrines, and worldview, and how have they evolved over time? Who have been its key functionaries? How has it recruited personnel? b) What attacks before 9/11 can we now connect with al Qaeda, either operating alone or in collaboration with other terrorist groups? How were they carried out? c) With what other terrorist groups has al Qaeda been affiliated, either in collaborative operations or through funding and logistical support? FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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d) How has al Qaeda functioned organizationally and financially? e) What have been its relationships with governments or government components acting outside the purview of their own political leadership, including, but not limited to those governments or factions that provided al Qaeda with support and sanctuary? 2.

What can we determine through a comprehensive examination of all evidence now available—synthesizing the information available earlier with that obtained post-9/11—regarding the planning, preparation, financing, and execution of the 9/11 attacks? a) What can we now understand regarding the strategic objectives of the attack? b) How were the targets and means of attack chosen? By whom? How was intelligence collected and employed for this purpose? c) What do we know of the origins and details of the operational planning for the attack, e.g., the designation of operational command, the selection of the hijacking teams, the establishment of logistic and financial support? When was the plan finalized? Was it fixed or flexible? d) What were the key planning and decision variables? For example, is there any evidence of any variables that would have resulted in a decision to abort the plan? Who had the final authority to carry out the plan or abort it? e) What training, exercises, and/or rehearsals were carried out? f) What staging areas and support networks were employed in carrying out the plan? Did affiliated entities play any role in staging or supporting the attacks?

3.

What is now known of the present composition of al Qaeda and its affiliated entities and what threat do they now pose? a) How has al Qaeda sought to adapt and compensate for its losses? What changes have taken place since 9/11 in such areas as tactics, doctrine, personnel, and financial practices? b) What is the current status of al Qaeda's active membership and itc or»r»occ to tr\cweapons onH trcnnincr9 its access and training? FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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c) What has happened to the many thousands who passed through the training and vetting camps in Afghanistan? d) What role has al Qaeda played in terrorist attacks mounted since 9/11, whether thwarted or actually carried out? e) What has been the role, if any, of affiliated and collaborative entities in these attacks, and what is the status of the connections between al Qaeda and other terrorist groups? f) Is there any evidence that al Qaeda is currently receiving any support from any state actor? g) What is the status of al Qaeda's efforts to acquire WMD? II.

Outlining a Research Plan We will start our research on the first line of inquiry—in effect, the construction of the "base building block"—in the 1989-1990 time frame, when Usama bin Laden's "base" or "al Qaeda" was set up in Peshawar, Pakistan, and bin Laden himself returned to Saudi Arabia. After the deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in 1990, bin Laden began his tirades against the "apostate" regimes in the Muslim world and called for the expulsion of the American "infidels" from the land of the "sacred sites" of Islam. In 1991 bin Laden moved his base to Sudan. Some context: During this time frame several major terrorist operations took place in which bin Laden is known to have been involved, as well as additional attacks for which there is evidence of, at least, bin Laden's support. These attacks include the 1992 bombing of a hotel in Yemen where American troops on their way to Somalia were staying; the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC I); the "Day of Terror" plot, targeted at New York City landmarks, a plot that was broken up by law enforcement in June 1993; the 1995 "Bojinka Plot" in Manila, which included plans to blow up 12 airliners over the Pacific Ocean, assassinate the Pope and the U.S. president, and fly an airplane laden with explosives into the CIA's headquarters; and the 1995 bombing of the Saudi National Guard building in Riyadh that killed five U.S. soldiers. In addition, although the attacks on the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania did not take place until August 1998, the planning was already well underway while bin Laden was residing in Sudan and he reportedly reviewed the plans for the attacks and the reconnaissance photos used for those plans. The multiple connections between these operations offer insights into the evolving structure ofal Qaeda. For example, Wadih el-Hage served as FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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bin Laden's personal secretary while the al Qaeda leader was based in Sudan. Prior to that, from 1991 to 1992 El-Hage headed a so-called charitable organization in New York City that ostensibly raised funds for veterans of the Afghan jihad; the organization had previously raised funds to support those fighters during the jihad. While in New York City ElHage also had contact with at least one of the participants in WTCI and he was later convicted for his role in the 1998 Embassy bombings. Similarly, Ramzi Yousef, who managed WTC I, escaped after the attack and ended up in Manila, where he worked with future 9/11 commander Khalid Sheikh Mohammed on the 1995 Bojinka Plot. Our research will then follow bin Laden's move to Afghanistan in the spring of 1996 and the establishment of his infrastructure there. We will focus on one of the key developmental lines during this period, the further expansion of al Qaeda's global reach through recruitment, indoctrination, training and the dispersal of its cells, at least some of which played critical roles in the later 9/11 attacks. Some context: Al Qaeda's base and operational infrastructure expanded by a significant order of magnitude after bin Laden's move to Afghanistan in 1996, entrenching its "army" infrastructure of bases for training in weapons, tactics, and production of explosive devices. This infrastructure also provided centers for ideological indoctrination and for screening the ranks to spot and vet individuals for the inner cadre of terrorist cells. This was the source of a large portion of the individuals dispatched to form cells in cities around the globea process vividly demonstrated in what we now know about many of the 9/11 hijackers. The home base in Afghanistan also facilitated sequestered gatherings for strategic and operational planning, and for collaboration sessions with leaders of other terrorist groups. We now understand that a significant expansion of consortium arrangements with other terrorists took place from the Afghan bases. For example, there is evidence that al Qaeda collaborated with two Asian terrorist groups in attacks carried out in Manila and Jakarta in December 2000. This same connection was used to set up the January 2000 al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur, including individuals who would later be involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, the 9/11 attacks, and in the October 2002 Bali bombing. Similarly, a report released by the Singapore police reveals that the Southeast Asian terrorist organization Jema'ah Islamiyya planned to provide the foot soldiers for the aborted suicide strikes planned for Manila and Jakarta in early 2002; al Qaeda leaders made the strategic planning decisions at meetings in Afghanistan and provided the financing and much of the target reconnaissance.

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Research into Key Question/Line of Inquiry 2, dissecting and reconstructing the planning, preparation, financing and execution of the 9/11 attacks in rigorous detail from its origins to execution, will proceed in parallel, with part of the team merging newly developed intelligence (including findings emerging from the research on al Qaeda's origins and development) with information from existing sources. Our specific objectives include the identification of al Qaeda's links with other entities, including possible links with state sponsors. These links could be a major part of the threat al Qaeda poses in the future. Some context: Evidence now available indicates that the concept of using aircraft as weapons—crashing them into major sites—was raised with top al Qaeda leaders as far back as the mid-1990's, at the same time the Manila-based Bojinka Plot was underway. Some have also theorized that the concept of employing hijackers with pilot training evolved from the failed attempt of Algerian hijackers to force pilots to steer a hijacked aircraft into the Eiffel Tower in 1995. The process of selecting individuals for piloting the aircraft, bringing together the operational teams, moving the financial support for the training and maintenance of the teams, and, most notably, coordinating the actions of the diverse components of the attack—entering the United States from both sides of the continent, and coordinating the implementation of the plot with flights from three major airports—are prima facie indications of the linchpin role of the "central staff" ofal Qaeda's inner circle. The results of these research efforts will provide a base for honing specific areas of focus and identifying sources for pursuing the third line of inquiry: What has happened to al Qaeda in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the intensified worldwide coalition in a war against terrorism, and, of even greater importance, what this reveals about al Qaeda's present composition and its threat to the United States. The research on al Qaeda's earlier developments will naturally feed into the understanding of al Qaeda's current situation. However, we plan to step back at various intervals to examine what specific component questions and branches of inquiry have emerged from our research into al Qaeda's evolution and use these questions to sharpen our focus on the current threat.

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TEAM#1 Item 2: Suggested Readings On the origins and evolution of the al Qaeda global terrorist consortium, we suggest either Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., (Touchstone, 2002) or Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qa 'ida (Columbia University Press, 2002). Although both were published within a few months after the 9/11 attacks, both authors had begun their research into al Qaeda years earlier and both conducted extensive interviews with key actors in foreign settings. The differences are mainly in presentation. Bergen employs a more journalistic narrative style, while Gunaratna is somewhat more scholarly and offers substantial depth on key points. For insight into the Washington perspective and what was known of the terrorist threat presented by bin Laden and al Qaeda prior to 9/11, we suggest Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002). For a detailed, intimately informed layout of the complex interconnections of individuals and cells involved in the terrorist plots in New York and several individuals who later turned up in various al Qaeda operations, read John Miller and Michael Stone, The Cell (Hyperion Books, 2002). Bernard Lewis' book What Went Wrong? (HarperCollins 2002) provides a conceptual background introduction to the Middle Eastern and Islamic environment in which al Qaeda grew.

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TEAM #1 Item 3: Document Requests We propose to initiate our research by digging into key known lodes of information. This needs to be understood as a starting point, however, because one of the desired products of an in-depth research effort is the identification of new branches and potential sources for further research. We plan to look preliminarily to open sources, many of which have already been used to begin shaping our detailed timeline of al Qaeda's emergence and actions since its formation in the late 1980's. (Some of the most useful books are listed in the attached list of suggested reading materials.) We then propose to examine the following key sources: 1. The records compiled by the Joint Inquiry, both as substantive sources of information and as a means of identifying what else to look for and where to look. All of the documents that have been made available to the Joint Inquiry are maintained in specific storage areas by the agencies from which they originated. 2. The FBI's Penttbom file, which contains the details of what has been learned from the investigations of the 9/11 conspiracy, including a detailed timeline of what the FBI knows of the origins and movements of each of the plot's participants. 3. Records of statements of individuals interrogated in connection with several major terrorist prosecutions in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere. This is a critical lode of information for examining the evolving cell structure, transnational connections and key players in the evolution. The documents include records of investigations and interrogations from the first trial of participants in the WTC I attack, which concluded in March 1994; the trial of the conspirators in the New York City landmarks case, including the "Blind Sheikh," which concluded in October 1995; the two trials of Ramzi Yousef, first for his role in the Bojinka Plot, concluded in September 1996, and then for his role in WTC I, concluded in November 1997; the pre-empted "Millennium strike" on Los Angeles International Airport; and the prosecution of the perpetrators of the African Embassy bombings, which concluded in July 2001. In addition, the gunman in the 1990 assassination of Meir Kahane, the leader of the Jewish Defense League, was later convicted for his involvement in the 1993 plot to bomb New York City landmarks. We intend to review the records from the Kahane assassination and other related investigations to determine the origins of the New York terrorist cell. 4. Documentary reports of information relating to the 9/11 attacks and the history of al Qaeda that were obtained from individuals and material taken into custody since 9/11. The Intelligence Community has obtained a vast amount of information from the large number of operatives, documents, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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and equipment captured since 9/11. We will start with the Director of Central Intelligence's Review Group, which has been tasked with accumulating all information on bin Laden, al Qaeda, and terrorist plots against the United States worldwide. This information is critical to the task of examining al Qaeda's development, structure, key players and collaborative ties with other regional and transnational terrorist entities, which is particularly important in assessing the threat al Qaeda currently poses. Many key individuals and materials have been captured since the conclusion of the Joint Inquiry, including, according to media accounts, individuals who played key roles in the al Qaeda leadership circle, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaida, as well as key field operators such as Ramzi Binalshib, Umar Faruq and Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. The latter two are sources for information on al Qaeda's global reach because of their central roles in the collaboration of al Qaeda and Southeast Asian terrorist groups in the December 2000 attacks in Manila and Jakarta, the planned multiple attacks in Singapore and Malaysia that were thwarted by local authorities in December 2001, and the October 2002 Bali bombing. Other individuals currently in custody, such as Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, served as regional points of contact with al Qaeda in coordinating terrorist actions, and funneling money and materials to operatives. 5. Reporting from foreign intelligence and law enforcement entities. This body of information, in combination with the information from detainees, provides the largest amount of information about al Qaeda that has been obtained since the 9/11 attacks. In addition to what has been provided through more traditional allies, the reporting provided by Singaporean and Malaysian authorities is a rich lode, as exemplified by the January 7,2003, Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs report to Parliament detailing connections between al Qaeda and Jema'ah Islamiyya.

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TEAM#1 Item 4: Interview Candidates The following is a preliminary list of individuals and categories of individuals who are probable interviewees. We will prioritize initial interviews based on their potential for providing guidance and clues to mining known and potential sources of information. We will take up additional interviews as the research process proceeds, with the guiding principle that the effectiveness and productivity of factual interviews is directly related to the availability of relevant documents, and the time and effort given to preparatory research. In other words, the more informed the interviewer, the more effective the interview. U.S. Intelligence Community George Tenet (DCI) Gen. Michael Hayden (Director, NSA) Director, Arab Peninsula Group (NSA) Cofer Black (former head, Counter-terrorist Center, CIA) 9/11 Closed by Statute

Other CIA officers currently under official cover New York Criminal Cases and PENTTBOM Investigation Robert S. Mueller, III (FBI Director) Louis Freeh (former FBI Director) Dale Watson (former Deputy Executive Assistant Director, FBI) Patrick Fitzgerald (former Assistant U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y.) John Mullaly (New York Police Department) Louis Napoli (New York Joint Terrorism Task Force) 9/11 _Law Enforcement Privacy' New York) 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy\fg\ York) 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy NCW York)

Ken Karas (Assistant U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y.) Andrew McCarthy (Assistant U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y.) Mary Galligan (FBI Headquarters, lead agent on Penttbom investigation) 9/11 Law Enforcement

Michael Rolince (FBI Headquarters) PasQuale J. D'Amuro (Deputy Executive Assistant Director, FBI) 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacyf^evV York)

Scholars and Outside Experts Bruce Hoffman (RAND Corporation) Daniel Benjamin (CSIS)

Steven Simon (RAND) Rohan Gunaratna (Saint Andrews) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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Magnus Ramstrop (St. Andrews) Zachary Abouza Bernard Lewis U.S. Department of State/NSC l^/llLawEnforcementPrivacy

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9/11 Law Enforcement PrivacyT/NC)

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9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

Richard Clarke (former Chair, CSG, NSC) Barbara Bodine (former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen) Prudence Bushnell (former U.S. Ambassador to Kenya) Michael Shaheen (former Coordinator for Counterterrorism) Foreign Services Officiak from various foreign services, potentially including officials classified Inf0rmation

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Phillip/Chris The attached is intended to be a "start-up" work plan. I emphasize the concept of "start up," because our team sees this as a process that will be adjusted, refined and more sharply targeted as we proceed down the learning process. As an example, other than the open sources, we found a lot of diverse views around town as to existing data sources, their value, etc. So we decided to start with our "survey," in effect, reconnaissance to identify the lodes for mining - to plan our move from broad area coverage to high resolution targeting. You will note that the plan stresses identification of "connections." It seems to me that this is one area where our government at large has been a bit behind the curve on the al Qaeda network, and that - because of the major losses that al Qaeda's existing structure has taken - the connections could become the an avenue through which it tries to revitalize its attack capabilities. I would note in this regard that the biggest attack since 9/11 (Bali) was in fact through one of these collaborative entities. Re the text boxes, there was some concern of couple of team members that these might be seen as distracting detail. It seemed to me, however, as well as a couple of others, that sprinkling a little of the picture of the complicated tentacles we will need to trace would be of some use to the Commission members. I put this to Ernst May and he was definitely (in writing) in favor of keeping them; he said he thought the format of a box with a reduced font made it clear that the info was being offered as a "read or skip" option. Ernst fully endorsed the draft, and the concept of a "start up" to be refined as information is taken in. He suggested two sentences - one each for the list of "components" of key questions 1 and 2 - both of which have been nserted. And he suggested deletion of one phrase, not because he disagreed with it but because he feared it might give the wrong impression. I totally agreed with him on that pointm, and had only inserted it as a lesser evil to satisfy a request. It has now been deleted. The list of initial interviewees should be viewed as a work in progress - names that have been offered to us by various sources, including those served on the Joint Inquiry Staff.

MISSION STATEMENT/OBJECTIVE To construct a detailed examination of the 9/11 terrorism conspiracy and al Qaeda transnational terrorist consortium - incjudingtmalysis of leadership and personnel, organizational evolution, procedur<^finances"aati objectives, global connections and affiliations, and all known and suspected terrorist operations in which it has been involved- up to its present status. • One purpose of this would be to provide - with the acknowledged benefit of hindsight and the information now available post 9/11 - a picture that helps expose the observables in a way that could be employed in other studies and in efforts to design recommendations for future measures and practices within the U.S. security architecture. • Equally critical, it would seek to expose the nature and reach of the global tentacles of the al Qaeda terrorist consortium, much of which has only recently begun to be apparent, and which could be a central factor in the shape and magnitude of the evolving threat..

KEY QUESTIONS/LINES OF INQUIRY -

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We propose to organize our initial research around four over-arching questions, which will be used as principal "lines of inquiry." 1 . What is the history of al-Qaeda prior to the 9/1 1 attack? 2. What can we now determine, through a comprehensive examination of all evidence now available, (synthesizing the information available earlier with that obtained post-9/1 1) regarding the planning, preparation, fingncjrig) and execution of the 9/11 attacks? What has happened to al-Qaeda in the wake of 9/1 1 , with its expulsion from Afghanistan, the capture of some of its key leaders, and confrontation with an intensified worldwide coalition in the war against terrorism? 4. What now is known of the composition and level of threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliated entities? These lines of inquiry in effect constitutel&«/W/ng blocks. Each encompasses many specific component questions, which are in effect building blocks to the larger overarching questions. Some of these component questions can be identified at the outset of the research and are listed below as a means of focusing the initiation of our research, but new component questions will emerge from discoveries as the research progresses. One of the aims of the initial research will in fact be to identify the additional key questions on which to direct the research. One of the crosscutting issue that will be given especial attention are collaborative relationships and connections with various other entities, as these will be critical in assessing means and capabilities for future attacks. The following is a list some of the key subsets of component questions that will be engaged to focus the initial research:

1. What is the history of al-Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attack? a. What are its origins, ideological roots, doctrines, and worldview, and how have these evolved over time? Who have been its key functionaries? How has it recruited personnel? b. What attacks before 9/11 can we now connect with al-Qaeda, mounted on its own or in collaboration with other terrorist groups? How were they carried out? c. With what other terrorist groups has it been affiliated, whether in collaborative operations or funding and logistic support? r^C^jf:^ d. How has it functioned organizationally and how has cM^isagftl its finances?H e. How has it adapted in response to the Western countermeasures? To different operating locales and to changes in its own main base - from Sudan to Afghanistan, for example. _} f. What have been its relationships with governments, including but not limited to those that provided support and sanctuary, and other actors in the Muslim world?

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2. What can we now determine, through a comprehensive examination of all evidence now available, (synthesizing the information available earlier with that obtained post9/1 1) regarding the planning, preparation, financing, and execution of the 9/11 attacks? a. What gaps are left in the picture? For example, regarding timing of the planning and preparation process? Any role played by affiliated entities? b. Is there any evidence of state sponsorship or assistance? c. When was the plan conceived? By whom? How, when, where, and by what means did the planners collect their intelligence? .. prepare detailed plans? ... recruit and equip the attack teams? ... plan and handle logistics? d. What can we now understand regarding strategic objectives of the attack? 3. What has happened to al-Qaeda in the wake of 9/11. with its expulsion from Afghanistan, the capture of some of its key leaders, and confrontation with an intensified worldwide coalition in a war against terrorism? a. What additional terrorist attacks have been mounted post 9/11 - whether actually carried out or thwarted? X ('«M 7 <^ f>+M«M) ^U<^)^^i^ ' b. What affiliated and collaborative entities have played a role in these attacks, and what was their role? c. How has al-Qaeda sought to adapt and compensate for its losses? What changes have taken place since 9/11 in such areas as tactics, doctrine, personnel, and financial practices? d. What role have affiliations with other terrorist groups played in this adaptation? 4. What is known of the present composition and threat posed to the United States by alQaeda and its affiliated entities? a. Which affiliated groups are still operative? What is the nature of their connections with al-Qaeda? Are there any new connections or groups emerging? b. To what extent do al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups retain popular support and ideological appeal in the Muslim "street."

c. What is the current status of active membership, and its access to weapons and training? What has happened to the many thousands who passed through the training and vetting camps in Afghanistan? d. What if any is the evidence of links to radical states? e. What is the status of the efforts to acquire WMD? OUTLINING A RESEARCH PLAN Research tracking the first line of inquiry (Key Question 1) — in effect construction of the "base building block" - will start in the 1989-90 time frame, by which time bin Laden's "base," or "al Qaeda," was set up in Peshawar, Pakistan, and he returned to Saudi Arabia. After the deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in 1990, he began his tirades against the "apostate" regimes in the Muslim world and expulsion of the U.S. "infidels" from the land of the "sacred sites" of Islam. •

This research will track the developments accompanying his establishment of his headquarters in Sudan, and the linkages and affiliations that expanded the transnational terrorist consortium during this period. Some context. During this time frame several major terrorist operations took place in which bin Laden is known to have been involved, and some additional ones in which there is evidence of at least his connection and support. These include the bombing of a hotel in Yemen intended to kill U.S. servicemen enroute to Somalia, the 1993 WTC attack, the pre-empted plot to attack multiple landmark sites in the US, the 1994-95 Manila-centered plot for multiple aircraft hijackings and assassination of the Pope and US president, and the November 1995 bombing of the Saudi National Guard building in Riyadh that killed five US servicemen. And although the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania did not take place until August 1998, the planning was already well underway while bin-Laden was residing in Sudan and he was in fact personally reviewing the plans and reconnaissance photos. The multiple branches and connections revealed in what is now known of these operations offer insights into the evolving structure of al Qaeda. For example, the person who served as bin Laden's personal "secretary" while he was based in Sudan, and who has now been identified as a key player in the African embassy bombings, had previously (in 1991-92) headed a so-called charitable organization in New York City ostensibly raising funds for veterans of the Jihad in Afghanistan (earlier it had raised funds for fighters). At that time this person had contacts with at least one of the participants in the 1993 attack on the WTC. Ramzi Yousef, who managed the 1993 WTC attack, escaped and ended up in Manila, working with future 9/11 commander Kallid Sheikh Mohammed, on the aborted plot (1995) for multiple aircraft hijackings and the conjuring of plans for assassination attemots on the Pooe and U.S. President.

The research will then follow the trail of bin Laden's move to Afghanistan in the spring of 1996 and the establishment of his infrastructure there. One of the key developmental lines to be examined in this period will be the further expansion of global reach through recruitment, indoctrination, training and dispersal of cells, at least some of which played critical roles in the later 9/11 attacks.

Some context. Evidence now reveals a significant expansion of consortium arrangements with other terrorist took place from the Afghan bases. Examples include collaboration with two Asian terrorist groups in attacks carried out in Manila and Jakarta in December 2000, the thwarted multiple attacks in Singapore and Malaysia slated for early 2002. This same collaborative connection was used to set up the January 2000 al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur, which included individuals that would be involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 and the 9/11 attacks, and the Bali bombing in October 2002. .

Research into Key Question/Line of Inquiry 2, dissecting and reconstructing the planning, preparation, financing, and execution of the 9/11 attacks in excruciating detail, from its origins to execution, will proceed in parallel, with part of the team merging the inflow of newly developed information (including findings emerging from the parallel research on the al Qaeda origins and development) with that available from existing sources. Among the specific objectives, as noted above, will be identification of key gaps in the picture in relation to linkages with other entities, or to potential linkages with state sponsors. The results of these research efforts will provide a base for honing_the specific areas of focus and identification sources for pursuing the thirdOand fourthjiines of inquiry, on what has happened to al-Qaeda in the wake ofthey/11 attaclcsin. the face of the intensified worldwide coalition in a war against terrorism, and what all of this reveals of its present composition and the threat it and its affiliated entities pose to the US. > While the research on the earlier developments up through the 9/11 attacks will by itself feed into the understanding of the more current lines of inquiry, we plan to step back at various intervals to examine what specific component questions and "branches" of inquiry have emerged from the research on the evolution trail, and use these to sharpen the focus of the examination of the specific issues of current threat potentials. SOURCE SURVEY We propose to initiate our research by digging into key known "lodes" of information. This needs to be understood as a starting point, however, because one of the desired products of an in-depth research effort is the identification of new branches and potential sources for further research. In addition to the open sources, (some of the most seful books are listed in the attached reading materials) the key information lodes where we propose to initiate our research include: \j

1. As a starting point, the records of information obtained by the Joint Inquiry, both as substantive sources and as a means of identifying what else to look for and where to look. All of the documents that have been made available to the Joint Inquiry are maintained in specific "storage bins" by the agencies from which they originated - whether domestic security agencies or Intelligence Community components. These include documents complied by the DCI's "Review Group" created after the 9/1 1 attacks, which has pulled

together all information then available in CIA files on bin Laden, al Qaeda, and terrorist plotting against the U.S. 2. Records of statements of individuals interrogated in connection with several major terrorist prosecutions and trials in the New York Federal District. This is a critical lode Minformation for examining the evolving cell structure and transnational connections and key players in the evolution of the al Qaeda that carried out the 9/11 attacks. » This information lode includes trial records and interrogation statements from the first trial of participants in the 1993 WTC attack, which concluded in March 1994; the trial of participants, including the "blind Sheikh," in the thwarted plot to blow up several U.S. landmarks in the New York-New Jersey area, concluded in October 1995; the two trials of Ramzi Yousef, first for the "Manila plot," concluded in September 1996, and then for his role in the 1993 WTC attack, concluded in November 1997; and the prosecution and trial of perpetrators of the African embassy bombings, concluded in July 2001. » Also, subsequent information has revealed connections between the gunman in the Kahane assassination and at least one of the participants in the 1993 WTC attack and plot for multiple attacks on landmarks. The records and interrogation reports from this case need to be looked at again for implications of the possibility of a cell structure and network that goes back even further than is now apparent. 3. Reports of interrogations of detainees and information from captured materials. A vast amount of the information on al Qaeda's development, structure, key players and -of particular importance for looking at potential future actions - its collaborative ties with other regional and transnational terrorist entities has been obtained from the large number of operatives captured since 9/11, as well as documents and laptop computers. Many key individuals and materials have in fact been captured since the conclusion of the Joint Inquiry. • This includes [according to media accounts] individuals who played key roles in the al Qaeda leadership circle (e.g. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaida,) as well as some key field operators such as Bin al-Shib, Umar Faruq and Mohammed Monsour Jararah. The latter two are sources for information on the global reach, because of their central role in collaborative attacks such as took place in Manila and Jakarta in December 2000, the planned multiple attacks on western diplomatic, military and commercial facilities in Singapore and Malaysia thwarted by local authorities in December 2001, and the Bali bombing of October 2002. • Others, such as Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, served on the other side of the collaborative actions, as regional points of contact with al-Qaeda in coordinating the actions and in funneling support such as finances and materials. 4. Reporting received from foreign intelligence and law enforcement entities. This body of information, in combination with the detainee sources, provides the largest body of what has been learned of al Qaeda since the 9/11 attacks. In addition to what has been provided through more traditional allies, the report from the Singapore and Malaysian authorities is a rich lode, as is exemplified by the report submitted to the Singapore

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Parliament by its Ministry of Home Affairs on 7 January 2003 (now released to the public) The initial survey of these materials will then be employed to design the more detailed targeting of the research. An extensive list of individuals with whom interviews will be sought has also been started, and will continue to be unfolded as the process unfolds. These interviews will be aimed at obtaining both substantive information and guidance and clues to other potential information lodes to be mined. These cues will be especially important in resurfacing the record trails of some of the earlier terrorist actions. Some of those with whom we will be seeking early contact are listed below.

The New York District Trail Dale Watson FBI/CT (NY investigations) Patrick Fitzgerald DoJ/U.S. Att. (Multiple terrorist investigations NY District) John Mullally NYPD (Investigation, trial in Kahane assassination 1990-91) Law Enforcement privacy JTTF (1992-2000) (Investigation, prosecutions 1993 WTC) 9/11 Law Enforcement privacyTTF (Yousef investigations re 1993 WTC and Manila plots) Louis Napoli JTTF | | FBI/NY 9/11

Law Enforcement Privacy FBI/NY

I

I Dan Colenan Jack Cloonan

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

FBiyCT/NY FBI/CT/NY FBI/CTC/DCI FBI/GT/NY

Ken Karas Andrew McCarthy

DoJ (Prosecution - Landmark plots)

Foreign Intelligence Michael Sheuer Gofer Black ' Rudi Russo

CTC/DCI CTC/DCI DCI Review Team

9/11 Closed by Statute

Scholars, outside experts Bruce Hoffman RAND Corp. Daniel Benjamin tJ.5/? Rohan Gunaratna Saint Andrews

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BASELINE READING First tier - origins, evolution, transnational connections, record of terrorist operations of the al Qaeda global terrorist consortium:. Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, (New York: Random House, 2002) Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaida, Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Bin Laden, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2002) Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc., (New York: Touchtone, 2002) \Thfottgh-Qiir Epemy's Eyes, (Dulles, Vlr]|mia-:-Brassey's, 2002) Joint Inquiry Final Report