Dm B4 Gore Fdr- Capps-gore Questions And Withdrawal Notice Re Interview Outline 318

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: Folder Title: [Ai] Gore Document Date: 04-09-2004 Document Type: Briefing Paper From: To: Subject:

Outline: Interview of Vice President Albert Gore

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QUESTIONS FOR VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE Aviation security as a national security issue The Gore Commission's first recommendation in the aviation security chapter was "The federal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, and provide substantial funding for capital improvements." Question: What did the commission mean when it said aviation security should be treated as a national security issue? What are the specifics of that in terms of funding, policies, priorities, procedures etc? Intelligence and threat analysis Question: The Gore Commission report referenced the changing threat from terrorism to the U.S. homeland. How did you perceive the threat to civil aviation both domestically and internationally from the intelligence you received in the course of the Commission's work and, in general, as Vice President? Hij acking/Sabotage Question: The Gore Commission focused heavily on the sabotage threat to aviation. Little was said about hijacking. What was the Commission's view of the hijacking threat and given the known shortcomings of our checkpoint screening operations, why wasn't this more of a focus? Technology Question: Both the Pan Am Commission and the Gore Commission focused on the importance of maximizing the use of technology to promote security. What advice do you have for this commission about how to set an aviation security R&D agenda, to fund it and to deploy the technology? Passenger Profiling Question: Will you share with us your recollection of the commission's deliberations about the following key issues: • Aircraft as weapons; • The security consequences for passengers selected by the computer prescreening system that the commission so strongly endorsed; For instance, was it the commission's intent that prescreening be used only to identify those who may pose a sabotage threat, or did you have in mind identifying those who might pose a hijacking threat as well? • The civil liberties aspects of CAPS and CAPS consequences; • The use of government watch lists to stop suspected terrorists from flying.

Reinventing Government The Commission on Reinventing Government that you also chaired focused intently on raising barriers to the imposition of new federal rules. Question: How did the Reinvention of Government initiative relate to the Federal Aviation Administration? Given that aviation security was a regulatory process that depended on rulemaking to implement improved security measures, was there concern that the lessons from the Commission on Reinventing Government might unwittingly frustrate reforms contemplated in the report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security? A*~ > ,,_/ +» Genera. Assessments Question: What was your analysis of the civil aviation security system in place leading up to and on 9/11/01? Why were the attacks able to succeed? How and why did the system fail, in your view? In retrospect, is there anything that you believe either the Clinton or Bush Administrations could have done which would have prevented those disasters? Gore Commission: General Question: Commissioner Vict^ia CummockjBled a dissent to many of the ^ Commission's recommendations, argiiirig that in some cases they lacked specificity, responsibility, substance, accountability^apglicability and timelines and deadlines. Further, her dissent included what sjae thought^would address those perceived gaps. Could you comment on that dissejit in terms of its validity and how the commission^de with her views? Recommendations Question: What would you tell the Commission they should recommend to improve aviation and transportation security in particular and homeland security in general and what steps can we take to enhance the probability that our recommendations are duly considered and implemented? Question: Threats and vulnerabilities to the nation's transportation system are many and varied. They include not only aviation but maritime, rail, pipelines and other surface modes. How would you advise that priorities be determined? How should cost be allocated among stakeholders?

CAPS (computer assisted passenger screening) and CONSEQUENCES One of the Gore Commission's key recommendations was for the FAA and air carriers to administer a computerized profiling system to identify passengers who should receive additional security screening. The FAA's Baseline Working Group which helped inform the Commission's recommendation stated that the system should "identify selectees, whose persons and property (checked baggage and carry-on bags/items) will be subjected to security scrutiny beyond that required for regular passengers." However, when the FAA implemented the recommendation the consequence of selection was restricted to the following: either the selectee's checked bags would be screened for explosives or they would be loaded onto the plane only after their owner was aboard. Being a selectee did not mean you underwent any additional screening of your person or carry-on bags—despite the fact that the FAA knew checkpoints were notoriously porous. In fact, you could only be a CAPS selectee if you checked bags. Q: Was it the Commission's intent for profiling to focus solely on stopping explosives in checked baggage? Did the FAA's rules on CAPS' consequences adequately reflect the Gore Commission's recommendation? (Follow-up: The CAPS recommendation included the following provision: "FBI, CIA and BATF should evaluate and expand the research into known terrorists, hijackers and bombers needed to develop the best possible profiling system." Hijackers sneak things through on their person/carry-on not their checked bags, so why the focus of CAPS consequences on checked bags only? Q: It seems apparent that one of the reasons for focusing CAPS consequences solely on checked baggage was that by doing so the FAA/air carriers didn't have to "hassle" people at the checkpoint—which could have raised both civil liberty complaints and caused "efficiency" problems in getting people through screening and to their flights. How would you respond to that premise? Watchlisting Among the Gore Commission's recommendations was the following: "The FBI and CIA should develop a system that would allow important intelligence information on known or suspected terrorists to be used in passenger profiling without compromising the integrity of the intelligence or its sources." Q: Was this intended to be the means of developing a "no fly" list? How expansive did you intend this effort to be?

Q: As you know there were fewer than 15 people on FAA's no fly list as of 9-11. This seems like an area in which the Commission's recommendation never went anywhere. Do you recall hearing why this wasn't being done and did you take any steps to push it? Checkpoint Screener Certification The Gore Commission recommended that screening companies be certified by the federal government to help enforce better performance. The FAA initiated rule-making to implement the recommendation in 1997. As of September 11, 2001 the rule still hadn't been finalized. Q: Were you aware why it was taking so long to implement such a key rule? Did you take any steps to eliminate the bureaucratic delay? Q: The Gore Commission's first recommendation was to treat aviation security as a National Security issue. Would you agree that taking 5 years to implement a key aviation security measure was not consistent with that standard? Lobbying Q: We understand that the air carriers undertook a very aggressive lobbying campaign when the Commission was developing its recommendations and in the implementation phase. What's your recollection of this campaign by the air carriers?