Dh B5 Staff Statement 17 Comments Fdr- Dod Comments On Staff Statement 17
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j UN— i o—
ir
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Inteltigence)
Warfighter Analysis and Integration 5000 Defense Pentagon, Rm 3C281 Washington, DC 20301-5000 Time:
Date:
Phone:
Fax: From:
Phone:703-695-1831 Unclassified Fax: 703-695-8215 Classified Fax: 703-614-7687
Subject:
T rel="nofollow">D
Number of pages including coversheet: Message:
r
<w
-#/*
T UNCLASSIFIED DoD Comments on Staff Statement No. 17 "Improvising A Homeland Defense" #
ORG/ REVIEWER JS
Pg#
Paratf
Line#
Comments Statement: "NORAD was, and is, responsible for the air defense of the continental United States." Recommendation: Change to reacL/TQORAD was, and is, responsible for the air defense of tHe continental United States. NORAD has the dual missioivof aerospace warning and aerospace control. On thexfay of 9/11, NORAD's focus was out ward-looking, addressing the threat of an external attack from a foreign military
NORAD
Rationale: As written, understates the NORAD mission, and is also misleading as it does not note the threat that NORAD was tasked to address. Statement: 'They assumed the fighter escort would be discreet, vectored to a position five miles direeuy behind the hijacked aircraft, where it could perfornufsrnission." Recommendation: Chap£e to read, ".. .where it could perform its mission to monitor tbe flight path of the aircraft." Rationale: Correctness. The statement as re-written more correctly defines the role of the fighter escort. 6/15/2004 4:3OPM
UNCLASSIFIED 1/11
UNCLASSIFIED Statement: 'The nine minutes notice..." >
NORAD
RecoiriknendatipHf^Add wording to clarify that notification was probablyVlpser to six minutes considering the phone was answecpdxaXp837 and the call completed at 0840. \: Completeness. NORAD
11
Statement: Tfae communication betweenJFAA and NEADS that followed is referenced as beginning al^21 (reference ID Op, Channel 7, at 09f21:10, NEADS^vSce data recording.) Recommendation: :harfge to read,/At 9:22JXEADS received a report from FA A."
NORAD
12
Rationale: curacy. >, ChanneL4, has this communication between FAA and NEAPS ^ginning/at 09:22:24. Statement: "The Mission Crew Commander (MCC) at NEADS issued an order at 9:22: Okay...sc/ambleLangley. Head them towards the Washington DC arc ecommendationNChange to read, "....issued the order at 9:23:.^ Then add the following statement: " That order was processed and transmitted fo Langley at 9:24, and the Langley fighters were airborne ar Rationale: Accuracy. The MCC statement was made at 09:22:32 according to MCC Op, Ch 2, NEADS voice data recording. 6/15/2004 4:30 PM
UNCLASSIFIED 2/11
UNCLASSIFIED
NORAD
13
Rounding to the nearest minute, as was done in the rest of the report, makes the time 9:23 vs. 9:22. The NEADS Air Surveillance Technician (AST) confirms the Langley scramble time as 9:24 on AST, Channel 15, at 09:24:33: "Scramble time 24, 24 LF1 [Three-letter identifier for Langley] 1324, did you get that?" Statement: "Boston Center called NEADS at 9:39 and identified Delta 1989, a 757 jet that departed Logan Airport destined for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack." Recommeni NEADS ai "—
NORAD
14
: Change to read, " Boston Center called j
Rationale: Consistency, accuracy. ID Op, Channel 4, documents the time as 09:41:08. Statement: ".. .NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked..." The footnote referenced, "MCC Op, Ch., at 13:42:08," is incorrect. JUeoinmendation: The correct reference is: ID 2, Channel 8, at 09:45:22 fromFAA. Rationale: Accuracy.
6/15/2004 4:30PM
UNCLASSIFIED 3/11
UNCLASSIFIED 8
NORAD
16
Statement: NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center, at 10:07." No footnote reference was cited. Recommendation: CJiaage^p read, "...the military liaison at Cleveland Center
NORAD
18
1-6
Rationale: Accuracy, consistency. Reference footnote should be ID 1, Channel 4, 10:06:28. Statement: "Yet this response to a phantom aircraft, American 11, is not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by FAA or DoD....to an actual hijacked aircraft." Recommendation: Reword paragraph to read, "Yet this response to a phantom aircraft, American 11, has not been widely disseminated by the FAA or NORAD. Early official timelines indicated the scramble of the Langley fighters was a response to the reported hijacking of American 77, or United 93, or some combination of the two. This inaccurate account created the appearance that the Langley scramble was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft." Rationale: Correctness. Original timelines incorrectly identified the notification of American 77 to coincide with the Langley fighter scramble. That information was not corrected until Commission interviews and NORAD review of tapes clearly indicated the inaccuracy. While NQRAD did not issue a public 6/15/2004 4:3OPM
UNCLASSIFIED 4/H
1
UNCLASSIFIED
announcement of corrected timeline, NORAD did freely share the corrections with Commission staff in 2003 and 2004.
10
OUSD(I)
19
Statement: Referencing NORAD's initial timeline inaccuracies: "They also had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain dmely and accurate information from its own resources." Recommendation: Delete quoted sentence above.
11
OUSD(I)
21
Rationale: The meaning of the sentence is not clear. As written, statement seems to imply that NORAD may have purposely misled the Commission to deflect other criticism concerning the military's handling of events. Based on the Commission's interviews with NORAD/NEADS personnel, Commission staff has acknowledged that the inaccuracies were not intentional. Statement: "As one witness described, "[It] was almost like there were parallel decisionmaking nrocesses going on; one was a voice conference orchestrated byfne NMCC.. .and then, there was the [White House video cWfcrence].. .in my mind they were competing venues for o>mjnand and control and decisionmaking." Recommendation": For accuracy, add a sentence after current final sentenceto clarify the point that "competition" between venues was for the time of participants rather than control of C2/decisionmakmg. 6/15/2004 4:30PM
UNCLASSIFIED 5/11
UNCLASSIFIED
12
JS
21
8
Rationale: Although this statement was made by an officer on duty in the NMCC on 9X11, as^uoted, the statement is misleading. It is more acWrate to say that the concurrent communication venuegxreated competition for the time of the participants and should nottmply that there were two command and control/decisionmaking venues. Statement: "Inside the National Milit Command Center, the director of operations... " Recommendation: Change Operations (DDO) . . . "
13
JS
22
Deputy Director for
Rationale: Correct duty title. Statement: "He recommended transitk ung the call into an Air Threat Conference call." Recommendation: Chan; Air Threat Conference call."
14
OUSD(l)
22
directed the transition to an
Rationale: More accurate Statement: "But the highest level Defense Department officials relied on the NMCGI's Air TJjieat Conference alone, in which FAA did not meaningftUlypaiticipate." *^^^^
w
m.
1.
Recommendation: Re-write sentence to read: "But the highest level Defense DepartmentNofficials, acting on established 6/15/20O4 4:30 PM
UNCLASSIFIED 6/11
UNCLASSIFIED
protocol, relied on the NMCC's Air Threat Conference alone, in which FAA did not meaningfully participate." Rationale: As written, this statement is technically correct. However, the conclusion derived is misleading because it is not fully explained. NORAD's commanders and staff followed internal DoD guidance per CJCSI6130.01 A, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction oft)erelict Airborne Objects" dated 1 June 2001, on the moniuSg/oi 9/11. This instruction directs that "The DDO, NMCC, is designated as the DOD coordinating authority between the^AAand operational commanders." DoD and Joint Staff directives, instructions, and policies are developed and adapted over years with careful consideration and measurement of best-odds options for the Wa^ighter and National Defense.
15
JS
22
Statement: "At 9:39, the NMCC s director, . . . Recommendation: Chan Director for Operations . .
16
NORAD
22
2-3
9:39, the NMCC's Deputy
Rationale: Correct duty title Statement: "[the commander of] NO defense emergency at this point.
is not declaring air
Recommendation: Add clarififcajj-on to explain the implications of NQRAD declaring "Air Defense Emergency." 6/15/2004 4:30PM
UNCLASSIFIED 7/11
UNCLASSIFIED
Rationale: Completeness and clarity. Air Defense Emergency is a DoD term that triggers national defense responses not suitable to the events of 9-11-01. 17
JS
22
Statement: Recommend for Operation
18
JS
23
'C director . . . Change to "the NMCC's Deputy Director
Rationale; Correct duty title Statement: "The NMCC direct Recommendation: Ch for Operations . . . "
19
JS
23
the NMCC's Deputy Director
Rationale; Correct duty title Statement: "At 9:52, NORAD suggested operations. . . "
he director of
Recommendation: Change to\"At^f52, NORAD suggested to the Deputy Director of Operati 20
JS
23
Rationale; Correct duty title Statement: " At 9:58, the director of operations stated that the Vice Chairman, General Richard Myers, was recommending evactuating the.Sears Tower in Chicago...." 6/15/2004 4:30 PM
UNCLASSIFIED 8/11
UNCLASSIFIED
Recommendation: Change to "At 9:58, the Deputy Director for Operations and the Vice Chairman, General Richard Myers, discussed the possibility of evacuating the Sears Tower
21
OUSD(I)
27-28
Rationale: Correct duty title\for DF9O. Also, Gen Myers was told by the DDO that other agencie\rex5ommended evacuating the Sears Tower. Gen Myers agreed with the recommendation but he did not initiate the recommendation as the statement currently implies. ' Beginn Statement: Draft quotes the Vice President and the Secretary of ing line Defense from the ATCC directly. 4 Recommendation: Textus classified. Permission to declassify or quote these passages direc^y from the ATCC resides with the White House. Statement: "The first of the Andrews fighters was airborne at 10:38." x
22
JS
28
S
J
Recommendation: Change to " .. airborne at 10:33."
23
AF/XOH/ NORAD
29
Rationale: NORAD's best timelines indicate a take-off time of 10:33 (unless the Commission staff has a better citation, but none is provided). / Statement: "There was only one set offigJHfersorbiting Washington....the Langley F-15s." \ 6/15/2004 4:30 PM
UNCLASSIFIED 9/11
UNCLASSIFIED
Recommendation: Change to read, "., .the LangJey F-16s."
24
NORAD
29
6-7
All
Rationale: Correctness. The alert fighters from Langley were FI6s permanently assigned to the 119FW at F Statement: "Once the target was known and identified, NEADS needed orders to pass to the pilots. Shoot down authority was first communicated to NEADS at 10:3 1 . Given the clear attack on the United States, it is also possible—though unlikely—that the NEADS commander could have ordered the shoot down without the Vice President's authorization. NORAD Officials have maintained in the past that they were tracking United 93 and would ha^e intercepted and shot down the aircraft. We are. not so sure." Recommendations Reword/to read: "Once the target was knowij and identified, NEADS needed orders to pass to the pilots/ Presidential shoot down authority was first communicateij to NEADS at 10:31. Given the clear attack on the United States, it is also possible that the NEADS, CONR, or NORAD Commanders could have ordered the shoot down without specific Presidential authority. Each commander would have first pursued authorization from the President, but without Presidential authorization in time, NORAD would have defended the Washington, D.C. area from attack. " 6/15/20O4 4:3OPM
UNCLASSIFIED 10/11
UNCLASSIFIED Rationale: NORAD leaders believe there would have been actions attempted to gain shoot down authority had UA93 continued in to Washington, DC.
I
T
ID
IS
6/15/2004 4:30 PM
UNCLASSIFIED 11/11
I\
M
ir
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Inteltigence)
Warfighter Analysis and Integration 5000 Defense Pentagon, Rm 3C281 Washington, DC 20301-5000 Time:
Date:
Phone:
Fax: From:
Phone:703-695-1831 Unclassified Fax: 703-695-8215 Classified Fax: 703-614-7687
Subject:
T rel="nofollow">D
Number of pages including coversheet: Message:
r
<w
-#/*
T UNCLASSIFIED DoD Comments on Staff Statement No. 17 "Improvising A Homeland Defense" #
ORG/ REVIEWER JS
Pg#
Paratf
Line#
Comments Statement: "NORAD was, and is, responsible for the air defense of the continental United States." Recommendation: Change to reacL/TQORAD was, and is, responsible for the air defense of tHe continental United States. NORAD has the dual missioivof aerospace warning and aerospace control. On thexfay of 9/11, NORAD's focus was out ward-looking, addressing the threat of an external attack from a foreign military
NORAD
Rationale: As written, understates the NORAD mission, and is also misleading as it does not note the threat that NORAD was tasked to address. Statement: 'They assumed the fighter escort would be discreet, vectored to a position five miles direeuy behind the hijacked aircraft, where it could perfornufsrnission." Recommendation: Chap£e to read, ".. .where it could perform its mission to monitor tbe flight path of the aircraft." Rationale: Correctness. The statement as re-written more correctly defines the role of the fighter escort. 6/15/2004 4:3OPM
UNCLASSIFIED 1/11
UNCLASSIFIED Statement: 'The nine minutes notice..." >
NORAD
RecoiriknendatipHf^Add wording to clarify that notification was probablyVlpser to six minutes considering the phone was answecpdxaXp837 and the call completed at 0840. \: Completeness. NORAD
11
Statement: Tfae communication betweenJFAA and NEADS that followed is referenced as beginning al^21 (reference ID Op, Channel 7, at 09f21:10, NEADS^vSce data recording.) Recommendation: :harfge to read,/At 9:22JXEADS received a report from FA A."
NORAD
12
Rationale: curacy. >, ChanneL4, has this communication between FAA and NEAPS ^ginning/at 09:22:24. Statement: "The Mission Crew Commander (MCC) at NEADS issued an order at 9:22: Okay...sc/ambleLangley. Head them towards the Washington DC arc ecommendationNChange to read, "....issued the order at 9:23:.^ Then add the following statement: " That order was processed and transmitted fo Langley at 9:24, and the Langley fighters were airborne ar Rationale: Accuracy. The MCC statement was made at 09:22:32 according to MCC Op, Ch 2, NEADS voice data recording. 6/15/2004 4:30 PM
UNCLASSIFIED 2/11
UNCLASSIFIED
NORAD
13
Rounding to the nearest minute, as was done in the rest of the report, makes the time 9:23 vs. 9:22. The NEADS Air Surveillance Technician (AST) confirms the Langley scramble time as 9:24 on AST, Channel 15, at 09:24:33: "Scramble time 24, 24 LF1 [Three-letter identifier for Langley] 1324, did you get that?" Statement: "Boston Center called NEADS at 9:39 and identified Delta 1989, a 757 jet that departed Logan Airport destined for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack." Recommeni NEADS ai "—
NORAD
14
: Change to read, " Boston Center called j
Rationale: Consistency, accuracy. ID Op, Channel 4, documents the time as 09:41:08. Statement: ".. .NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked..." The footnote referenced, "MCC Op, Ch., at 13:42:08," is incorrect. JUeoinmendation: The correct reference is: ID 2, Channel 8, at 09:45:22 fromFAA. Rationale: Accuracy.
6/15/2004 4:30PM
UNCLASSIFIED 3/11
UNCLASSIFIED 8
NORAD
16
Statement: NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center, at 10:07." No footnote reference was cited. Recommendation: CJiaage^p read, "...the military liaison at Cleveland Center
NORAD
18
1-6
Rationale: Accuracy, consistency. Reference footnote should be ID 1, Channel 4, 10:06:28. Statement: "Yet this response to a phantom aircraft, American 11, is not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by FAA or DoD....to an actual hijacked aircraft." Recommendation: Reword paragraph to read, "Yet this response to a phantom aircraft, American 11, has not been widely disseminated by the FAA or NORAD. Early official timelines indicated the scramble of the Langley fighters was a response to the reported hijacking of American 77, or United 93, or some combination of the two. This inaccurate account created the appearance that the Langley scramble was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft." Rationale: Correctness. Original timelines incorrectly identified the notification of American 77 to coincide with the Langley fighter scramble. That information was not corrected until Commission interviews and NORAD review of tapes clearly indicated the inaccuracy. While NQRAD did not issue a public 6/15/2004 4:3OPM
UNCLASSIFIED 4/H
1
UNCLASSIFIED
announcement of corrected timeline, NORAD did freely share the corrections with Commission staff in 2003 and 2004.
10
OUSD(I)
19
Statement: Referencing NORAD's initial timeline inaccuracies: "They also had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain dmely and accurate information from its own resources." Recommendation: Delete quoted sentence above.
11
OUSD(I)
21
Rationale: The meaning of the sentence is not clear. As written, statement seems to imply that NORAD may have purposely misled the Commission to deflect other criticism concerning the military's handling of events. Based on the Commission's interviews with NORAD/NEADS personnel, Commission staff has acknowledged that the inaccuracies were not intentional. Statement: "As one witness described, "[It] was almost like there were parallel decisionmaking nrocesses going on; one was a voice conference orchestrated byfne NMCC.. .and then, there was the [White House video cWfcrence].. .in my mind they were competing venues for o>mjnand and control and decisionmaking." Recommendation": For accuracy, add a sentence after current final sentenceto clarify the point that "competition" between venues was for the time of participants rather than control of C2/decisionmakmg. 6/15/2004 4:30PM
UNCLASSIFIED 5/11
UNCLASSIFIED
12
JS
21
8
Rationale: Although this statement was made by an officer on duty in the NMCC on 9X11, as^uoted, the statement is misleading. It is more acWrate to say that the concurrent communication venuegxreated competition for the time of the participants and should nottmply that there were two command and control/decisionmaking venues. Statement: "Inside the National Milit Command Center, the director of operations... " Recommendation: Change Operations (DDO) . . . "
13
JS
22
Deputy Director for
Rationale: Correct duty title. Statement: "He recommended transitk ung the call into an Air Threat Conference call." Recommendation: Chan; Air Threat Conference call."
14
OUSD(l)
22
directed the transition to an
Rationale: More accurate Statement: "But the highest level Defense Department officials relied on the NMCGI's Air TJjieat Conference alone, in which FAA did not meaningftUlypaiticipate." *^^^^
w
m.
1.
Recommendation: Re-write sentence to read: "But the highest level Defense DepartmentNofficials, acting on established 6/15/20O4 4:30 PM
UNCLASSIFIED 6/11
UNCLASSIFIED
protocol, relied on the NMCC's Air Threat Conference alone, in which FAA did not meaningfully participate." Rationale: As written, this statement is technically correct. However, the conclusion derived is misleading because it is not fully explained. NORAD's commanders and staff followed internal DoD guidance per CJCSI6130.01 A, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction oft)erelict Airborne Objects" dated 1 June 2001, on the moniuSg/oi 9/11. This instruction directs that "The DDO, NMCC, is designated as the DOD coordinating authority between the^AAand operational commanders." DoD and Joint Staff directives, instructions, and policies are developed and adapted over years with careful consideration and measurement of best-odds options for the Wa^ighter and National Defense.
15
JS
22
Statement: "At 9:39, the NMCC s director, . . . Recommendation: Chan Director for Operations . .
16
NORAD
22
2-3
9:39, the NMCC's Deputy
Rationale: Correct duty title Statement: "[the commander of] NO defense emergency at this point.
is not declaring air
Recommendation: Add clarififcajj-on to explain the implications of NQRAD declaring "Air Defense Emergency." 6/15/2004 4:30PM
UNCLASSIFIED 7/11
UNCLASSIFIED
Rationale: Completeness and clarity. Air Defense Emergency is a DoD term that triggers national defense responses not suitable to the events of 9-11-01. 17
JS
22
Statement: Recommend for Operation
18
JS
23
'C director . . . Change to "the NMCC's Deputy Director
Rationale; Correct duty title Statement: "The NMCC direct Recommendation: Ch for Operations . . . "
19
JS
23
the NMCC's Deputy Director
Rationale; Correct duty title Statement: "At 9:52, NORAD suggested operations. . . "
he director of
Recommendation: Change to\"At^f52, NORAD suggested to the Deputy Director of Operati 20
JS
23
Rationale; Correct duty title Statement: " At 9:58, the director of operations stated that the Vice Chairman, General Richard Myers, was recommending evactuating the.Sears Tower in Chicago...." 6/15/2004 4:30 PM
UNCLASSIFIED 8/11
UNCLASSIFIED
Recommendation: Change to "At 9:58, the Deputy Director for Operations and the Vice Chairman, General Richard Myers, discussed the possibility of evacuating the Sears Tower
21
OUSD(I)
27-28
Rationale: Correct duty title\for DF9O. Also, Gen Myers was told by the DDO that other agencie\rex5ommended evacuating the Sears Tower. Gen Myers agreed with the recommendation but he did not initiate the recommendation as the statement currently implies. ' Beginn Statement: Draft quotes the Vice President and the Secretary of ing line Defense from the ATCC directly. 4 Recommendation: Textus classified. Permission to declassify or quote these passages direc^y from the ATCC resides with the White House. Statement: "The first of the Andrews fighters was airborne at 10:38." x
22
JS
28
S
J
Recommendation: Change to " .. airborne at 10:33."
23
AF/XOH/ NORAD
29
Rationale: NORAD's best timelines indicate a take-off time of 10:33 (unless the Commission staff has a better citation, but none is provided). / Statement: "There was only one set offigJHfersorbiting Washington....the Langley F-15s." \ 6/15/2004 4:30 PM
UNCLASSIFIED 9/11
UNCLASSIFIED
Recommendation: Change to read, "., .the LangJey F-16s."
24
NORAD
29
6-7
All
Rationale: Correctness. The alert fighters from Langley were FI6s permanently assigned to the 119FW at F Statement: "Once the target was known and identified, NEADS needed orders to pass to the pilots. Shoot down authority was first communicated to NEADS at 10:3 1 . Given the clear attack on the United States, it is also possible—though unlikely—that the NEADS commander could have ordered the shoot down without the Vice President's authorization. NORAD Officials have maintained in the past that they were tracking United 93 and would ha^e intercepted and shot down the aircraft. We are. not so sure." Recommendations Reword/to read: "Once the target was knowij and identified, NEADS needed orders to pass to the pilots/ Presidential shoot down authority was first communicateij to NEADS at 10:31. Given the clear attack on the United States, it is also possible that the NEADS, CONR, or NORAD Commanders could have ordered the shoot down without specific Presidential authority. Each commander would have first pursued authorization from the President, but without Presidential authorization in time, NORAD would have defended the Washington, D.C. area from attack. " 6/15/20O4 4:3OPM
UNCLASSIFIED 10/11
UNCLASSIFIED Rationale: NORAD leaders believe there would have been actions attempted to gain shoot down authority had UA93 continued in to Washington, DC.
I
T
ID
IS
6/15/2004 4:30 PM
UNCLASSIFIED 11/11
I\
M
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