Dh B4 Andrews Afb Logs-timelines Fdr- Mfr- Ang Input To Project Vulcan

9/11 Personal P r i v a c y

18 September 2001 MEMO FOR THE RECORD Air National Guard Jnput to Project Vulcan for Period 11-14 Sept 01

SUBJECT: Meeting With Colonel Allison Hickey (NGB/CFX) to Review the Circumstances and Documentation Regarding Terrorist Attacks on the United States on 1 1 September 2001 Met at the Air National Guard (ANG) Crisis Action Team (CAT) at Andrews AFB, Maryland. Much of the information below is from an interview with Col , Hickey and subsequent written inputs! 1, Recommended steps include First Air Force briefings and interviews. Call Colojjel . Dan Navin (Ret.). Special Assistant to First Air Force Commander. Cell phone! I 1 '••.. | Also contact Major General T airy Arnnldj Commander. First Air Force, al

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2. Must interview 113th Fighter Wing (FW), Major Dan "Raising" Caine and 113FW/CC Brig Gen Dave Wherle. Also interview Otis ANG Wing CC and pilots who launched from these sites on 1 1 Sep 01. Major Caine briefed the ANG CAT on the actions described below. These remarks are from Col Mickey's notes and the 113FW brief developed at the request of legislative leader requests. As the units Fulltime Weapons and Tactics Officer, He got word through media sources on the .World Trade Center_attacks in New York City between 0846-0902. Brcause of its] Vpro'xiiniryTo'DC and extensive previous~intefactions"with the White "House Secret Service detail in the past, He ja C requlfementjor air_defensc_Qf the nation' s capitar-A before^the_jentagon attado The X lT3tlrFW~had three F-16s returning from a training range mission launched at 0833EST. All three were armed only with training bullets. All three landed at Andrews AFB. At 0930, the Secret Service informed the 113* of a possible CAP over DC. At 093_5, the 119* Fighter Wing (NDANG) Alert Aircraft at Langley AFB were airborne with 3xF-16. At 0937, AA 77 Impacts the Pentagon. At 0945, theJJSFW bre_aks out AIM-9Ms from munitions. Arifl32Zlhe"NCA-(VPOTUS tfeougLJQC) •' launches one of the thTeFF-re's'^.had-previo^sly landed, with training bullets only) '^t__1042, same-cbanneis launched CAIlsn~and_.2;Joadedj^jv-tt-ainingjbullets..andj =-=-"---- ~- "••-•—- -'• '" ri2ejJl^U043JL^^^I3FW)n FAA weapons'contrpllers.— GAP-l-becomgs_qn While initial CAP flown from 113FW were rulitime staff, by afternoon traditional aircrew were_in the line-up with the entire evening CAP performed by traditional ^ V-T13FW F-16 loaded- with •2MM-9-(heat^eeking'missijejj^_^nmg_bullets. 'Tjiej 'N— ROE-is-changed.to "weapons^ free zone." By 1115, the CAP lead requests~tanker

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support and and assumes command of the CAP. Based on this time flow, the assumption is that the original aircraft launched at VPOTUS direction would have been in position to intercept the fourth hijacked airliner if it had not crushed in western Pennsylvania. In addition to the 113th FW, 7 other Air Defense units at 14 additional sites were immediately launched or ready to launch into established CAPs over major American cities. Within hours of this notification, 34 fighter units were generated and ready with 15 already flying. In the first day alone, 179 missions were flown in support of CAPs, Presidential Escort, and FEMA support. Units have since returned to an alert status in many sites across the country with two 24/7 combat air patrols (CAP) remaining supported by varied fighter wings. Vice President Richard Cheney announced on "Meet the Press" last Sunday that President Bush had given authority to shoot down the airliners if necessary, fighter guys taught T/CA controllers how to be weapons controllers in a few minutes. ANG F-16 units used Litening pods to illuminate moving aircraft for visual ID. Because of very limited supply in the ANG across the board, typically only the lead aircraft was fitted with the PODLesson learned: need one for one POD for every ANG F-16 to provide this critical capability for both weapons delivery in a AEF role, as well as CAP and air defense mission in an HLS role - dual missioned. At 0840, the FAA notified the North Eastern Air Defense Sector of the American Airlines assumed hijacking. First Air Force instantly established an AOC expanding from 38 to 153 personnel using First Air Force headquarters personnel for additional support requirements. |Air Force command and control was established immediately with Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold in charge as the COMAFFOR, JFACC, Area Air Defense Commander and Airspace * Control Commander. First Air Force sent the fighter scramble order to two F-15's from Otis Air National Guard Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts at 0846. The fighters were airborne 8 minutes later at 0852 - 8 minutes after the first aircraft hit the first World Trade Center tower. The FAA notified the NEADS of the second United Airlines Flight 175 hijacking at 0843. The same scramble order used for AA Flight 11 gave the 2F-15's authority for intercept. The second Airliner impacted the second World Trade Center Tower at 0902 after the launch of the F-15's but prior to the ability of the fighters to reach the airliner even at full speed. The F-15's, while launched far within the window of current requirements was still 8 minutes and 71 miles short of the intercept. 3. First Air Force didn't originally see the hijacked airlines on its radar screens because it has historically been focused by its mission directive to look "outward" for threats penetrating American airspace from outside our borders. Once the threat was redefined, 1AF immediately shifted its focus to internal airspace as well. When it shifted to an inward look on radar they lost a lot of low level coverage due to the nature of the current radar systems. In response to some gaps in visibility, they immediately deployed the Joint Base Expeditionary Control system developed by ANG for cruise missile defense. (See Colonel Navin.) 4. The Secret Service asked Vice President Cheney who asked President Bush for authority to shoot down hijacked commercial airliners. (See Major Raisen.)

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5. 18 ANG tanker wings (78 aircraft generated, ready and flying) involved with this operation within hours were flying Tanker missions in support of CAP operations all on volunteerism. Also, there were 24 ANG tankers supporting SIOP requirements within hours of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. 6. An ANG F-16 flew the FEMA Director back to Washington, DC from a meeting hi Montana on 11 September 2001. 7. ANG airlift support began slowly but increased over the next 2 days. They began moving FEMA and FBI people to the various sites nearly immediately. They also moved skin products, blood, Civil Support Teams and Combat Communications teams and equipment. New York ANG's 106th Rescue Whig was activated (state active duty) with hundreds of people and flew hundreds of missions. Over 200 New York ANG Civil Engineers were activated to State Active Duty. With increased threat assessments and conditions, the ANG began standing up more and more ANG security forces; most of them to protect ANG bases many located on civilian airports. Nine ANG Air Traffic Control units are now up - these are all of them. 8. Began talking about a possible "freeze of in-place forces" to keep necessary forces currently deployed hi AEF in-place. Lt Gen. Wald asked Maj. Gen. Paul A. Weaver Jr., the ANG Director, about the effects of holding people hi place on AEF deployments in theater on 11 September 2001. (Maj Gen Weaver, Director ANG and Brig. Gen. Paul Kimmel, ANG Chief Operating Officer and ANG Crisis Action Team Director can explain this.) The standing rules of engagement for ANG participation in the AEF have been to this point 15-day voluntary rotations in theater plus travel. Continued discussions on PRC from many MAJCOMs and Airstaff. ANG position throughout: "Keep it voluntary if possible. Give us the authority we need and the ceiling number and we will meet that with first—MPA day volunteers; then short mobilization (31 days); and as last resort Partial Mobilization (which mobilizes individual involuntary for 2 years) In all cases, the ANG position was to be a vital and relevant part of all three requirements: (1) maintain our air defense posture in the CONUS; (2) maintain our AEF commitments - and (3) if the U.S. executes a strike, then support that strike with a presentation of Forces which is being figured now. In all cases, give Unit Commanders the flexibility on status requirements needed for each with a focus on maximum volunteerism. Gen Weaver continued to press this issue with Air Force and MAJCOM leaders including a provision with SECAF to seek relief of the 2 year Partial Mob requirement to a 1 year option. New PRC authority includes 13,000 personnel for the Air Force. We still have 5 standing PRCs in place - one of which may be used to support critical AEF operations. ANG's intent is to continue as long as possible with its personnel doing CONUS missions remaining on duty hi volunteer status. Deploying oversees may be a different matter. The ANG is committed to providing the USAF with 25 percent of its force for 30 days as long as possible relying on volunteers. 9. On the evening of 16 September 2001, Gen. Robertson; AMC Commander, called Maj. Gen. Weaver who called Col. Mark Dougherty (NGB/DO) giving strategic

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warning on possible use of our ANG KC-135 fleet. ANG needed to determine how many of them were available. Had 220 in the ANG fleet with about 164 available. Pacer Crag modification program reduced KC-135 availability among other factors. Doing another look at that availability now. Also looked at C-130 availability including requirements to support 72-hour availability to support CST airlift at home. Intent is to rely on ANG volunteers to operate both ANG KC-135 and C-130s. Air Force is accepting this for now. 10. As soon as ANG flying units got permission to conduct 24/7 operations, went into War Readiness Spares Kits to help sustain flying operations. Readiness rates went up for all aircraft systems. Moving to a 24/7-maintenance schedule by relying on volunteerism of traditional Guard maintainers also increased the initial readiness rates of all aircraft systems substantially with immediate results. 11. The ANG Crisis Action Team (CAT) was stood up immediately at the Air National Guard Readiness Center (ANGRC) at Andrews AFB, Maryland by General Weaver after the Pentagon bombing on 11 September 2001. Secured trained people, mainly from the ANG headquarters staff to help staff it. Pulled in some ANG people from AETC who happened to be here on TDY and others who were "trapped" in the area. Maj. Gen. Sullivan was here from the Ohio ANG for normal duty and has remained to help lead the CAT along with Brig. Gen. Paul Kimmel. (See Col. Steve Snipes, ANG/DOX, about the CAT.) CAT personnel doing 12- hour shifts to start moving to 8 hours. 12. Other lessons learned: ANG had conducted a comprehensive look associated with the QDR effort on its role in HLS. A whitepaper developed by NGB/CFX and vetted through several leadership meetings including 1AF/CC, TAGs, NGB/CF, several DoD agencies, AF/QR, and other AF Agencies. This paper, for all extensive purposes played out during the week of 11 - 14 Sept and continues to do so. The major premise of the paper is that the ANG is dual-missioned for both wartime and HLS mission areas. The concept that we are capable of responding to HLS requirements as a result of our wartime tasking, training, experience and equipment was a critical objective of our focus. This became reality on 11 Sept 01. On that date at 0830 the ANG had 1204 people deployed on an AEF in a wide variety of weapon systems including F-15, F-16, A-10, KC-135, C-130, and Rescue (158 aircraft total) and over 2000 others deployed in support of CINC or Service support with over 4200 deployed for the month of September to date. By 0845, the Air National Guard became "dual-missioned" in support of Homeland Defense with the launching of the Attack on America. Just as the whitepaper suggested - we were capable of both and our unique community connections aided immeasurably with our ability to bring military support to civil authorities - not in lieu of our combat mission - but in addition to! 13. Other mission areas identified early as critical during this period: 88 ANG Flying Wing Command Posts across 54 States and Territories became the eyes and ears of Hometown America. They often had the only classified capability to receive and

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transmit vital and critical information. There are some lessons learned here that suggest a critical need for more SIPERNET and other command and control technologies to improve this capability. Dozens of highly trained Critical Incident Stress Management Chaplains were used or alerted. Hundreds of Civil Engineers were prepared for support. Security Forces were volunteering hi high numbers while still completing many of their local law enforcement responsibilities. In the long haul, we will need more SF forces to accomplish both requirements. Aeromedical crews were ready and on standby with some support to all three sites. Since the initial action, ANG medical forces have been tasked by AF/SG to build multiple teams of 25 bed Chem/Bio capability for HLS and operational support. Since 11 Sept 01 prior to the attack and 14 Sep 01, the ANG tripled its workday support (both faces and days) for non-AEF operations and increased by nearly one thousand its other support in the form of AT, ST, UTA, and ADSW. Augmentation to 1AF and ANG CATs became critical to sustained operations. Visual Information specialists were rapidly needed to capture the ANG story out for historical and media purposes. Public Affairs Officers (Traditional Guard) were needed to augment the fulltime Community Manager position who also serves as the Wing Executive Officer/CoS and oversight to Family Support and Employer Support. ANG units who were already in the process of hiring the new Family Readiness and Support Contract position were given authority from Gen Weaver to select from a list of options to shorten the cycle time of hire for immediate results. They were asked hi all cases to select an option that could revert hi 1 year to the original plan. ANG National and Local Judge Advocate Generals were immediately employed for both Commander and personnel support. Services units were feeding fulltime at 35 different installations and are still active at dozens today. Services and Civil Engineers were tapped early to identify short and long-term solutions to alert facilities requirements. MPFs reported extensive and extended services for support to increased personnel requirements. Medical support teams (clinics) were on duty for increased base requirements. Base Communications were tapped extensively to keep command and control communications, networks, arid computer equipment hi operation. 14. Public Affairs coordination at the Air Force and OSD levels with NGB-PA and the AF and ANG CAT was problematic. While OSD might release information to media sources and establish PAG guidance, it often came in conflict "in intent" with the other PAG releases. Since the ANG responds across the board with links to NGB, NORAD, MAJCOMs, SAF/LL, SAF/PA the ANG CAT often found itself in the predicament of not releasing information to Adjutants Generals of the 54 States and Territories because of OSD or AF guidance only to have the Governors of these same states find out through media releases or other sources that their units had been partially mobilized. Because staffs hi these PA environments don't understand the nuances of differences (but prove significant) between an PRC, Partial Mob, or use of MPA mandays hi volunteer status under the partial mob authority routine use of the terms as interchangeable created chaos and irate state leadership as well as a media nightmare for unit level PAOs. Education of our active components on this issue is a must. As a minimum, no release that references the activation, mobilization or use of

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