Dh B4 Andrews Afb Logs-timelines Fdr- Memo For The Record- Air National Guard Input To Project Vulcan 9-11 To 9-14-01 098

9/11 Personal P r i v a c y

18 September 2001

MEMO FOR THE RECORD Air National Guard Jinput to Project Vulcan for Period 11-14 Sept 0 1

SUBJECT: Meeting with Colonel Allison Hickey (NGB/CFX) to Review the Circumstances and Documentation Regarding Terrorist Attacks on the United States on 1 1 September 2001 .{Met at the Air National Guard (ANG) Crisis Action Team (CAT) at Andrews AFB, Maryland. Much of the information below is from an interview with Col , Hickey and subsequent written inputs) . 1, Recommended steps include First Air Force briefings and interviews. Call Colojjel Dan Navin fRet.X Special Assistant to First Air Force Commander. Cell phonei I 1 . I Also contact Major General Larry Arnold. Commander. First Air Force, d I 2. Must interview 113th Fighter Wing (FW), Major Dan "Raising" Caine and 113FW/CC Brig Gen Dave Wherle. Also interview Otis ANG Wing CC and pilots who launched from these sites on 11 Sep 01. Major Caine briefed the ANG CAT on the actions described below. These remarks are from Col Rickey's notes and the 113FW brief developed at the request of legislative leader requests. As the units Fulltime Weapons and Tactics Officer, He got word through media sources on the .World Trade^Centerjtttacks in New York City between 0846-0902. B-Maase"onts] \proximiry~to~ DC and extensive previous~intefactions"with the Wrute"House~Secret ^Service detail in the past, He J||l^d_them_to_ask jf_they_had^cpnsidered-thejwl] \r air_defense_pf the riation'?japitel~7^before_theJPentagon attack:^ The lT3*"FW had three F-16s returning from a training range mission launched at 0833EST. All three were armed only with training bullets. All three landed at Andrews AFB. At 0930, the Secret Service informed the 1 1 3* of a possible CAP over DC. At 0935, the 1 19* Fighter Wing (NDANG) Alert Aircraft at Langley AFB were airborne with 3xF-16. At 0937, AA 77 Impacts the Pentagon. At 0945, theJJ3FW breaks out AJM-9Ms from

launches one.pfthe three F-16's thaXhad-previQUsly landed,with training bullets only) A lj42J.same-cbanngis launched CAPS. 1 and^^^loadediWitiv-ttaining bullets, and) «- i.-^-._--, _^ -.._. -'- " ;Aut^^ed.^A4lpJ3^AEl~(rijFW)^ FAA weaporis~conlroUers.— GAP-Lbecomes_qn s^he'^rnrnahjler ^control ^ ' ^(lT9j;WO_and2Fll5_(lFW)IinjCAP While initial CAP flown from 113FW were fulitime staff, by afternoon traditional aircrew werein the line-up with the entire evening CAP performed by traditional \-in3FW F-16 loaded- with ^AIM-g-Oiearseeking'missiles^and training buUets.jThe] -is. changed Jo^weap^ns^free^zone^." By 1115, the CAP lead requests~tanker

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support and and assumes command of the CAP. Based on this time flow, the assumption is that the original aircraft launched at VPOTUS direction would have been hi position to intercept the fourth hijacked airliner if it had not crushed in western Pennsylvania. In addition to the 113th FW, 7 other Air Defense units at 14 additional sites were immediately launched or ready to launch into established CAPs over major American cities. Within hours of this notification, 34 fighter units were generated and ready with 15 already flying. In the first day alone, 179 missions were flown hi support of CAPs, Presidential Escort, and FEMA support. Units have since returned to an alert status in many sites across the country with two 24/7 combat air patrols (CAP) remaining supported by varied fighter wings. Vice President Richard Cheney announced on "Meet the Press" last Sunday that President Bush had given authority to shoot down the airliners if necessary. Fighter guys taught FAA controllers how to be weapons controllers in a few minutes. ANG F-16 units used Litening pods to illuminate moving aircraft for visual ID. Because of very limited supply hi the ANG across the board, typically only the lead aircraft was fitted with the PODLesson learned: need one for one POD for every ANG F-16 to provide this critical capability for both weapons delivery in a AEF role, as well as CAP and air defense mission hi an HLS role - dual missioned. At 0840, the FAA notified the North Eastern Air Defense Sector of the American Airlines assumed hijacking. First Air Force instantly established an AOC expanding from 38 to 153 personnel using First Air Force headquarters personnel for additional support requirements. Air Force command and control was established immediately with Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold in charge as the COMAFFOR, JFACC, Area Air Defense Commander and Airspace Control Commander. First Air Force sent the fighter scramble order to two F-15's from Otis Air National Guard Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts at 0846. The fighters were airborne 8 minutes later at 0852 - 8 minutes after the first aircraft hit the first World Trade Center tower. The FAA notified the NEADS of the second United Airlines Flight 175 hijacking at 0843. The same scramble order used for AA Flight 11 gave the 2F-15's authority for intercept. The second Airliner impacted the second World Trade Center Tower at 0902 after the launch of the F-15's but prior to the ability of the fighters to reach the airliner even at full speed. The F-15's, while launched far within the window of current requirements was still 8 minutes and 71 miles short of the intercept. 3. First Air Force didn't originally see the hijacked airlines on its radar screens because it has historically been focused by its mission directive to look "outward" for threats penetrating American airspace from outside our borders. Once the threat was redefined, 1AF immediately shifted its focus to internal airspace as well. When it shifted to an inward look on radar they lost a lot of low level coverage due to the nature of the current radar systems. In response to some gaps in visibility, they immediately deployed the Joint Base Expeditionary Control system developed by ANG for cruise missile defense. (See Colonel Navin.) 4. The Secret Service asked Vice President Cheney who asked President Bush for authority to shoot down hijacked commercial airliners. (See Major Raisen.)

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5. 18 ANG tanker wings (78 aircraft generated, ready and flying) involved with this operation within hours were flying Tanker missions hi support of CAP operations all on volunteerism. Also, there were 24 ANG tankers supporting SIOP requirements within hours of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. 6. An ANG F-16 flew the FEMA Director back to Washington, DC from a meeting in Montana on 11 September 2001. 7. ANG airlift support began slowly but increased over the next 2 days. They began moving FEMA and FBI people to the various sites nearly immediately. They also moved skin products, blood, Civil Support Teams and Combat Communications teams and equipment. New York ANG's 106th Rescue Whig was activated (state active duty) with hundreds of people and flew hundreds of missions. Over 200 New York ANG Civil Engineers were activated to State Active Duty. With increased threat assessments and conditions, the ANG began standing up more and more ANG security forces; most of them to protect ANG bases many located on civilian airports. Nine ANG Air Traffic Control units are now up - these are all of them. 8. Began talking about a possible "freeze of in-place forces" to keep necessary forces currently deployed in AEF in-place. Lt Gen. Wald asked Maj. Gen. Paul A. Weaver Jr., the ANG Director, about the effects of holding people in place on AEF deployments in theater on 11 September 2001. (Maj Gen Weaver, Director ANG and Brig. Gen. Paul Kimmel, ANG Chief Operating Officer and ANG Crisis Action Team Director can explain this.) The standing rules of engagement for ANG participation in the AEF have been to this point 15-day voluntary rotations in theater plus travel. Continued discussions on PRC from many MAJCOMs and Airstaff. ANG position throughout: "Keep it voluntary if possible. Give us the authority we need and the ceiling number and we will meet that with first—MPA day volunteers; then short mobilization (31 days); and as last resort Partial Mobilization (which mobilizes individual involuntary for 2 years) In all cases, the ANG position was to be a vital and relevant part of all three requirements: (1) maintain our air defense posture in the CONUS; (2) maintain our AEF commitments - and (3) if the U.S. executes a strike, then support that strike with a presentation of Forces which is being figured now. In all cases, give Unit Commanders the flexibility on status requirements needed for each with a focus on maximum volunteerism. Gen Weaver continued to press this issue with Air Force and MAJCOM leaders including a provision with SECAF to seek relief of the 2 year Partial Mob requirement to a 1 year option. New PRC authority includes 13,000 personnel for the Air Force. We still have 5 standing PRCs in place - one of which may be used to support critical AEF operations. ANG's intent is to continue as long as possible with its personnel doing CONUS missions remaining on duty hi volunteer status. Deploying oversees may be a different matter. The ANG is committed to providing the USAF with 25 percent of its force for 30 days as long as possible relying on volunteers. 9. On the evening of 16 September 2001, Gen. Robertson; AMC Commander, called Maj. Gen. Weaver who called Col. Mark Dougherty (NGB/DO) giving strategic

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warning on possible use of our ANG KC-135 fleet. ANG needed to determine how many of them were available. Had 220 in the ANG fleet with about 164 available. Pacer Crag modification program reduced KC-135 availability among other factors. Doing another look at that availability now. Also looked at C-130 availability including requirements to support 72-hour availability to support CST airlift at home. Intent is to rely on ANG volunteers to operate both ANG KC-135 and C-130s. Air Force is accepting this for now. 10. As soon as ANG flying units got permission to conduct 24/7 operations, went into War Readiness Spares Kits to help sustain flying operations. Readiness rates went up for all aircraft systems. Moving to a 24/7-maintenance schedule by relying on volunteerism of traditional Guard maintainers also increased the initial readiness rates of all aircraft systems substantially with immediate results. 11. The ANG Crisis Action Team (CAT) was stood up immediately at the Air National Guard Readiness Center (ANGRC) at Andrews AFB, Maryland by General Weaver after the Pentagon bombing on 11 September 2001. Secured trained people, mainly from the ANG headquarters staff to help staff it. Pulled hi some ANG people from AETC who happened to be here on TDY and others who were "trapped" in the area. Maj. Gen. Sullivan was here from the Ohio ANG for normal duty and has remained to help lead the CAT along with Brig. Gen. Paul Kimmel. (See Col. Steve Snipes, ANG/DOX, about the CAT.) CAT personnel doing 12- hour shifts to start moving to 8 hours. 12. Other lessons learned: ANG had conducted a comprehensive look associated with the QDR effort on its role hi HLS. A whitepaper developed by NGB/CFX and vetted through several leadership meetings including 1AF/CC, TAGs, NGB/CF, several DoD agencies, AF/QR, and other AF Agencies. This paper, for all extensive purposes played out during the week of 11 - 14 Sept and continues to do so. The major premise of the paper is that the ANG is dual-missioned for both wartime and FILS mission areas. The concept that we are capable of responding to HLS requirements as a result of our wartime tasking, training, experience and equipment was a critical objective of our focus. This became reality on 11 Sept 01. On that date at 0830 the ANG had 1204 people deployed on an AEF in a wide variety of weapon systems including F-15, F-16, A-10, KC-135, C-130, and Rescue (158 aircraft total) and over 2000 others deployed in support of CINC or Service support with over 4200 deployed for the month of September to date. By 0845, the Air National Guard became "dual-missioned" in support of Homeland Defense with the launching of the Attack on America. Just as the whitepaper suggested — we were capable of both and our unique community connections aided immeasurably with our ability to bring military support to civil authorities - not in lieu of our combat mission - but in addition to! 13. Other mission areas identified early as critical during this period: 88 ANG Flying Wing Command Posts across 54 States and Territories became the eyes and ears of Hometown America. They often had the only classified capability to receive and

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