Dh B2 Langley Mfrs Fdr- 12-1-03 Mfr- Dwayne Acoff And Robert Lugaro

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UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Langley Air Force Base Site Visit Type of event: Interviews Date: Monday, December 01, 2003 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Miles Kara Team Number: 8 Location: Base Flight Operations Building, Conference Room Participants - TSGT Dwayne Acoff and Airman First Class Robert Lugaro, separately. Participants - Commission: Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer Observer - Colonel Pam Jefferson, USAF, Base Legal Office Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details. Background: Acoff and Lugaro were added to the interview list and separately interviewed after it was determined that it was Lugaro who entered the flight plan for Quit 25,26, and 27, the 119th FW, Det 1, Air Defense Fighters scrambled from Langley AFB on September 11,2001. Scheduled interviewees informed staff that A1C Lugaro was sitting the FD (Flight Data) position as a trainee and that his monitor was TSGT Acoff. At the conclusion of the two separate interviews Staff consulted with the current Langley Tower Officer-in-Charge, CAPT Scherer for additional perspective. TSGT Acoff: On September 11, 2001 TSGT Acoff was assigned to the FD/CD (Flight Data/Clearance Delivery) position as the primary watchstander. That day, several trainees were in the tower to complete their training qualifications and A1C Lugaro was. actually sitting at the FD/CD position when the scramble order came in from the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS). Acoff was plugged in to the console so that he could monitor the conversations and activity of A1C Lugaro. Acoff recalled that both the Tower Supervisor, MSGT Griffith, and A1C Halford were also present. Acoff had been in the FD/CD position at Langley since his arrival there in November, 1999. He has been a certified Flight Data watchstander since 1992. The Flight Data/Clearance Delivery position issues clearances, enters flight data, records landing and takeoff times and coordinates with adjacent civil and military facilities. The position also updates weather information. Acoff recalled the active air scramble coming in on the alert line, a telephone line that automatically reaches about five entities/sites—Langley Base Ops, Langley Tower, and Norfolk Tower among them. Data transmitted usually includes a heading and COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED

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/ UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE altitude and target information. /Only a heading and altitude were transmitted on 9-11. By the time the scramble order; was received Acoff was aware from information obtained on a break that the first WTC tower had been hit. He also recalled that it was about 15 minutes later that the order cajne to put the Langley fighters on .Battle Stations. He recalled that it was a "long tirhe" before the scramble order was given. Acoff stated that he (toes not recall ever—both before and after 9-11-entering the actual heading and altitude .as contained in the scramble order. He was shown a transcription of the actual scramble order and pointed to the heading and altitude as information they were cognizant of but did not enter in the flight plan. Rather, they always defaulted! 9/11 classified information I He explained that their task wasf I I / \Staffobtainedacopyofthesampleentrysheetcurrentas of the date (j)f this interview. For scrambles that sheet contains the heading/bearing informatior Acoff characterized the clearance entered into the flight data system as a "ghost clearance." It was his experience that the fighters took off and then assumed whatever heading they needed under Norfolk Tower control. In fact, because of the speed of the fighters and the limited air space that the tower actually controls, the practice is to turn control of the fighters over to Norfolk while the fighters are rolling down the runway. When shown a track of the route the fighters actually flew Acoff could only characterize what he saw as, "that was useless." He further stated that NEADS doesn't know what we do to get the fighters off. He has never visited NEADS and he does not recall that anyone from NEADS has visited Langley, except just recently—in the last month. Acoff characterized 9-11 as "everything seemed slow that morning" before events transpired. He recalled those events as the first time in his experience that something really happened concerning scrambles. Acoff supported the actions of Lugaro and recalled that Lugaro turned to him as the flight data was being entered as 0900060 and he gave his approval. Airman First Class Lugaro Lugaro had been in training for one month and was just completing his qualifications. He recalled that Griffith and Halford were in the Tower together with Airmen Campbell, Clark, and Cubero. His situational awareness was that there had been a stop on all traffic in the New York area and that something had hit the WTC. The scramble call came in on the hot line—a dedicated phone line that includes the Base Command Post, NEADS, Norfolk Approach and Langley Tower. It may include Giant Killer. Lugaro recalled that he acknowledged receipt as requested by NEADS by using his initials, Lima October (LO). His procedure was to write the essential information in grease pencil on plexiglass—call sign, frequency, alternate frequency, flight level and heading. COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE He stated that it was often difficult to find a clearance to enter that the system would accept [Staff Note: We will pursue this issue at Norfolk Tower and elsewhere in FA A]. He used the terminology a "DME" [Distance Measurement Equipment] entry that the computer will accept in the FDIO (Flight Data Input Ouput) terminal. He does not recall trying that morning to try and find an acceptable heading and used the information available to him at the terminal—a known acceptable entry. He said that the supervisor (Acoff) said 090 for 60, it was a known good entry. If needed, he understood, Norfolk Approach would change it in the flight data system. Once planes reach 2500 feet altitude, Lugaro said, they could turn to any heading they wanted. In sum, the data that Langley tower enters is a clearance limit, according to Lugaro, that can be amended at any time. His understanding is that Norfolk would do the amendment, it would not be left up to the pilot. He appeared surprised when shown the actual route taken by the Langley fighters on 9-11. Additional information. Lugaro said that the flight altitude limits for Norfolk Tower Were I

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Capt Scherer. Staff consulted with the current tower commander, Capt Scherer, after the two interviews. He simply shook his head negatively and understood he had a training problem. He was reading from the 1994 scramble agreement, still current, and it was clear to him that Langley tower would entry the scramble data as transmitted by NEADS. Scherer will also arrange for staff to actually use the FDIO during a subsequent visit to test the hypothesis that it may be difficult to find a "DME" that the computer will accept. He also provided information on how to contact his predecessor who was the tower commander of record on 9-11.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED

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