Deterrence Theory, Crime

Deterrence: Legal Perspecti
es Zimring F E, Hawkins G J 1973 Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control. University of Chicago, Chicago

D. S. Nagin

Deterrence Theory: Crime 1. Introduction The word deterrence has been linked to different topics, including nuclear deterrence (see Oxford English Dictionary), but the focus here is on theories about the effects of punishment on crime. Criminal deterrence pertains to the omission or curtailment of crime out of fear of legal punishment, and the first theory can be traced to the utilitarian philosophers Cesare Beccaria (1738–94) and Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) who believed that people are motivated fundamentally to obtain pleasure and avoid pain. To the extent that potential offenders anticipate pleasure from crime, they can be deterred by increasing the pain associated with it. In particular, potential offenders can be deterred by making legal punishment certain, celeritous, and se
ere, with certainty being the likelihood of being caught and punished for crime, celerity being the swiftness of punishment, and se
erity being the amount of punishment (von Hirsch et al. 1999, p. 6). Reduced to one fairly simple statement: ‘The rate for a particular type of crime varies inversely [negatively] with the celerity, certainty, and severity of punishments of that type of crime’ (Gibbs 1975, p. 5).

2. Complexities Although that statement is still the basis for contemporary deterrence theory, there are several complexities, one of which has to do with the distinction between specific and general deterrence (Stafford and Warr 1993). Whereas specific deterrence refers to the deterrent effects of directly experiencing a legal punishment, general deterrence refers to the deterrent effects of indirectly experiencing it. So when a person is imprisoned for committing a burglary and is then released, the imprisonment deters specifically to the extent that the released offender refrains completely from burglary, or at least curtails the amount of burglary that he or she commits, out of a fear of further imprisonment. To the extent that people other than the imprisoned offender learn about the imprisonment and refrain completely or in part from committing burglary out of fear of being imprisoned, those people have been generally deterred. The dis3550

tinction is important because a given punishment might deter only specifically or only generally instead of both. Another complexity is implied in the foregoing discussion of specific and general deterrence. Critics sometimes dismiss the possibility of deterrence by arguing that the commission of a crime itself is evidence against deterrence. For example, it sometimes is argued in reference to criminal justice policy to imprison drug traffickers that continued drug trafficking reveals that the threatened imprisonment did not deter potential offenders. However, the argument ignores the distinction between absolute and restricti
e deterrence (Gibbs 1975, pp. 32–4). To the extent that a person refrains completely from committing a crime out of fear of punishment, that person is deterred absolutely. However, a person may not be deterred absolutely but, instead, be deterred restricti
ely by curtailing or limiting his or her commission of a crime, as when a person limits the amount of drug trafficking in order to reduce the risk of punishment (perhaps out of a sense of cumulative risk). With restrictive deterrence, the key question is how much crime would occur if there were either no or less threatened punishment for it.

3. Premises of Deterrence Theory According to Gibbs (1975), there are three premises of deterrence theory: (a) The greater the actual certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment, the greater the perceived certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment. (b) The greater the perceived certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment, the less the crime. (c) The greater the actual certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment, the less the crime. Or stated diagrammatically: AP –
PP
– CR, where AP denotes actual punishments, PP denotes perceived punishments, CR denotes crime; the symbol –
denotes a positive relationship, and
– denotes a negative relationship. In contrast to the actual certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment in a given place and time for a given type of crime, perceived punishments pertain to people’s perceptions of the certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment (von Hirsch et al. 1999, p. 6). For example, if the actual certainty of arrest for burglary in a particular US state in a given year is 25 percent (law enforcement officials actually make 25 arrests for every 100 burglaries committed), people may perceive the certainty of arrest for burglary to be 25 percent or they may perceive it to be higher or lower than 25 percent. Deterrence theorists since Beccaria and Bentham have assumed that there is a strong positive relationship between actual punishments and perceived punishments (Premise 1), and that assumption is important

Deterrence Theory: Crime for two reasons. First, ‘to the extent that changes in actual penal policies do not alter potential offenders’ beliefs about the likelihood or severity [or celerity] of punishment, they cannot generate any … deterrence’ (von Hirsch et al. 1999, p. 6). Second, demonstration of a positive relationship between actual and perceived punishments is important to distinguish deterrence from other possible preventive consequences of punishment. To illustrate, suppose there was a strong negative relationship among US states between the actual certainty of imprisonment for auto theft and the auto theft rate. It may not be fear of legal punishment (deterrence) that accounts for the relatively low auto theft rates in states with a high certainty of imprisonment for auto theft; to the extent that imprisonment serves to limit the opportunities to commit auto theft (it is difficult to commit auto thefts in prison), the imprisonment of large numbers of auto thieves can cause a low auto theft rate through incapacitation and not fear of legal punishment. There would be evidence of deterrence only to the extent that (1) the people in states with a high actual certainty of imprisonment for auto theft perceived it to be high and (2) there were low auto theft rates in states with high actual and perceived certainty of imprisonment for auto theft.

4. Additional Complexities An additional complexity is that the deterrent effects of legal punishment may be contingent. To begin with, the deterrent effects of a particular property of punishment—say, certainty—may be contingent on the levels of the other punishment properties—say celerity, and severity. For example, Tittle (1969, p. 47) reported in a study of the relationship among US states between the actual certainty and severity of imprisonment and rates for seven crime types (e.g., homicide) that the actual severity of imprisonment acted ‘as a deterrent only when there was a high [actual] certainty of punishment.’ Similarly, Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) reported in a study of the relationship among individuals between the perceived certainty and severity of punishment and self-reported crime that perceived certainty has stronger effects at higher levels of perceived severity and that perceived severity has stronger effects at higher levels of perceived certainty. The deterrent effects of legal punishment also may be contingent on extralegal punishments, including self-imposed punishments (e.g., guilt, shame) and socially imposed punishments (e.g., divorce or employment loss). William and Hawkins (1986, p. 561) have indicated that extralegal punishment may result from legal punishment (e.g., an offender may experience loss of employment following imprisonment) and, thus, should be ‘part of the … deterrence pro-

cess.’ However, extralegal punishment also may be inflicted independent of legal punishment. For example, Grasmick and Bursik (1990, p. 840) have argued that offenders may experience guilt or shame from committing a crime regardless of whether they are caught and legally punished. Hence, the deterrent effects of legal punishment may vary by the likelihood of experiencing swift and severe extralegal punishment for committing crime. For example, the deterrent effects of legal punishment may be greater among those who have little to risk in the way of extralegal punishment for crime because fear of legal punishment may be their only barrier to law-violating behavior. In that connection, Burkett and Ward (1993, pp. 128–9) found that those who believed marijuana use to be sinful were unlikely to contemplate engaging in the behavior; and, hence, the threat of legal punishment for marijuana use was irrelevant for them. Only those who did not consider marijuana use sinful were deterred ‘because they appear[ed] to contemplate the act and, by reasonable inference, the probable consequences of their behavior.’ Policymakers need not worry that punishment does not deter all potential offenders as long as enough potential offenders are deterred. However, there is evidence that legal punishment sometimes is counterproductive by causing potential offenders to commit more crime. In relation to specific deterrence, Sherman and Smith (1992) reported that arrests for domestic assaults produced more subsequent assaults by unemployed offenders because they did not perceive police intervention as legitimate and ‘displaced [their anger about being arrested] onto their present or future romantic partners or other citizens’ (Sherman 1993, p. 465). According to Sherman (1993, p. 460), legal punishment provokes such ‘defiance’ (persistent or more serious law-violating behavior) to the extent that offenders (1) perceive the punishment as unfair, (2) are weakly bonded to other community members, (3) perceive the punishment as stigmatizing, and (4) deny the shame associated with it.

5. Links between Deterrence Theory and other Theories The connection between contemporary deterrence theory and the Beccaria-Bentham belief that people calculate the pleasure and pain associated with behavior means that deterrence theory can be linked to other, more general, theories of human behavior. Akers (1990) has argued that deterrence theory is subsumable under more general social learning or beha
ioral principles. ‘Threat of legal punishment is one source or indicator of aversive stimulus under the general concept of differential reinforcement (balance of rewarding and aversive stimuli)’ (Akers 1990, p. 658). Differential reinforcement refers to the overall 3551

Deterrence Theory: Crime balance of rewards and punishments for a behavior, including past, present, and future rewards and punishments. General deterrence is equivalent to observational\vicarious learning in social learning theory, which involves observations of other people and how their behavior is rewarded and punished; and specific deterrence is equivalent to experiential learning, which involves direct, personal experience with the rewards and punishments for a behavior (Stafford and Warr 1993). Both deterrence and social learning theory can be linked to rational choice theory in that both address the question of why people in certain situations decide or choose to engage in particular behaviors (Akers 1990). However, the meaning of ‘rational’ is ambiguous. To some deterrence researchers, rationality implies conscious and deliberate calculations about the rewards and punishments for crime (e.g., Bachman et al. 1992). In contrast, others deny that overt mental calculations of any kind are necessarily involved (e.g., Casey and Scholz 1991). Moreover, rational choices are sometimes conceived as willful rather than determined (e.g., Bachman et al. 1992), but Cornish and Clarke (1986, p. 13) have claimed that the ‘rational choice perspective is … neutral with respect to the free willdeterminism debate.’ Disagreement about the meaning of the word ‘rational’ stems from the existence of different versions of rational choice theory: old rational choice theory and new rational choice theory, each with different assumptions about rationality (Felson, 1993). Old rational choice theory, as set forth by such utilitarian philosophers as Beccaria and Bentham assumed that people engage in conscious and deliberate cost\benefit analysis in order to maximize the rewards and minimize the punishments for their behavior. The new version of rational choice theory entails weaker assumptions about rationality—that people intuit the rewards and punishments for a behavior and that they are imperfect processors of information and consequently must behave within the limits of their abilities to pursue what they perceive as most satisfying (e.g., Cornish and Clarke 1986). The assumption of ‘maximizing’ is rejected and replaced by alternative assumptions, such as ‘satisficing’ and ‘bounded’ or ‘situated rationality.’ As for the issue of free will versus determinism, new rational choice theory posits that ‘people make choices, but they cannot choose the choices available to them’ (Felson 1986, p. 119). Like new rational choice theory, deterrence theory does not require a strong assumption about rationality. In particular, crime need not be preconceived or carefully planned for legal punishments to deter, only that potential offenders choose between crime and conformity to the law on the basis of their estimates of the rewards and punishments involved. Also like new rational choice theory, deterrence theory does not require that people have free will. Indeed, a negative relationship between properties of legal punishment 3552

(e.g., the perceived certainty of punishment) and crime is as compatible with a strictly deterministic conception of human behavior as it is with free will (Gibbs 1975, p. 24). See also: Bentham, Jeremy (1748–1832); Crime: Sociological Aspects; Crime, Sociology of; Criminal Justice, Ethics of: Aspects of Human Dignity; Criminal Justice, Sociology of; Criminal Law and Crime Policy; Deterrence; Deterrence: Legal Perspectives; Imprisonment: Sociological Aspects; Law: Economics of its Public Enforcement; National Security Studies and War Potential of Nations; Prisons and Imprisonment; Punishment, Comparative Politics of; Punishment: Social and Legal Aspects; Rational Choice in Politics; War: Causes and Patterns; Warfare in History

Bibliography Akers R L 1990 Rational choice, deterrence, and social learning theory in criminology: The path not taken. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 81: 653–76 Bachman R, Paternoster R, Ward S 1992 The rationality of sexual offending: Testing a deterrence\rational choice conception of sexual assault. Law and Society Re
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erity: An Analysis of Recent Research. Hart Publishing, Oxford, UK Sherman L W 1993 Defiance, deterrence, and irrelevance: A theory of the criminal sanction. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency. 30: 445–73 Sherman L W, Smith D A 1992 Crime, punishment and stake in conformity: Legal and informal control of domestic violence. American Sociological Re
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Deutsch, Karl W (1912–92) Williams K R, Hawkins R 1986 Perceptual research on criminal deterrence: A critical review. Law and Society Re
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M. C. Stafford and S. D. Goodrum Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Deutsch, Karl W (1912–92) Karl Wolfgang Deutsch belongs to the cohort of the ‘brain drain’ which, by emigrating in the 1930s from Europe, contributed to the development of the social sciences in the United States. Born in Prague on July 21, 1912, Deutsch escaped from the imprisoned continent in 1939, after having received a law degree from Charles University. Son of the first woman parliamentarian in Czechoslovakia, he moved from one privileged social stratum to another, debarking with a fellowship at Harvard University. He worked for the Office of Strategic Studies during World War Two, began teaching at MIT in 1945, then at Yale University in 1957 and, from there, taught at Harvard University until retiring in 1985. At that time, he was appointed as one of the directors of the Wissenschaftzentrum in Berlin. As is often the case with those who learn a new language after puberty, Karl Deutsch kept his distinctive German accent. He died at the age of 80 in Cambridge, MA, on November 1, 1992. Karl Deutsch’s contributions to the advancement of social sciences can be summed up in five domains: (a) Building empirically grounded concepts and theories, such as nation-building, social mobilization, national and international integration, center–periphery, distribution of power, and understanding macrosocial processes. His definition of integration of a society is still in use in the literature: the capacity to receive and transmit information on wide ranges of different sectors with little delay. One of his writings appears retrospectively as predictive: ‘Cracks in the monolith, possibilities and patterns of disintegration in totalitarian systems’ (Deutsch 1954). (b) Pioneering, cross-national research. Deutsch remains a leading figure of the first post-War generation of comparativists. In the late 1950s and 1960s, he did comparative research, using aggregate data at a time when other great comparativists, such as Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, preferred the survey method for comparing countries. (c) Quantitative methodology. Karl Deutsch advanced the introduction of statistical analysis in political science. Such a vocation could be explained by the fact that, as the son of an optician, early in life, Deutsch considered the possibility of becoming one himself, and consequently studied mathematics. He did quantitative analysis on the size of government, growth of governments, foreign trade as a percentage of GDP, global modeling, two-way: channels of communication between e! lites and mass. Deutsch was

in the forefront of the so-called ‘data movement.’ His contribution to Quantitati
e Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences (Deutsch 1969) was considered as a research agenda. (d) Work on communication theory, particularly cybernetics. He developed Wiener and Neumann’s research, focusing on politics and society. The subtitle of The Ner
es of Go
ernment, ‘Political Communication and Control,’ (Deutsch 1963) paraphrases Wiener’s definition of cybernetics: ‘Control and Communication in the Animal and Machine.’ (e) Bridges between disciplines, by importing in political science concepts and theories from various disciplines (anthropology, social psychology, economics, and biology). Nationalism and Social Communication (Deutsch 1953) is an eminently interdisciplinary work, where Deutsch’s intimate knowledge of European history and geography appears in all chapters. Deutsch was a leading contributor to Ad
ances in the Social Sciences 1900–80 (Deutsch et al. 1986). Retrospectively, it can be said that Deutsch’s most eminent book is his first, Nationalism and Social Communication: an Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality (1953). This is his most cited work, and has been so since its publication. The subject of this book is related to his personal experience. Born to a Sudeten German family in the Austro-Hungarian empire, a multinational state, ‘Deutsch put his emotional and intellectual energy into scholarship focused upon nationalism and formation of large-scale political communities’ (Merritt and Russett 1981, p. 6). As a teenager, Deutsch witnessed the collapse of three empires and the emergence of many new independent nation-states in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The success of this book can be explained by Deutsch’s capacity to interpret statistical data with an intimate knowledge of the historical and social contexts. There are social scientists who write about countries they have only read about in books and who, in spite of their statistical virtuosity, too often offer superficial explanations. They should contemplate the following: ‘We will always need the clinician who knows the problem from having seen many cases, who knows the countries, the cultures, the areas where the problem takes place, and who knows the particular syndromes. It is by equipping the clinician with the work of the technicians, by having clinical judgement and technological and scientific evidence side by side, that we are likely to make the most progress’ (Deutsch 1980 p. 19). In a survey of the most commonly cited political scientists, Deutsch’s name ranked eighth between 1945 and 1960, fourth from 1960 to 1970, and tenth between 1970 and 1976. After 1980 his name still appears on the list of the three dozen most-cited political scientists. Between 1970 and 1979, his name was cited 1870 times. Between 1996 and 1999 he has been cited 60–90 times per year. Most of them concern the following three books: Political Community at the International 3553

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences

ISBN: 0-08-043076-7