Custody Of Minors.docx

AM No. 03-04-04 –SC Rules on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in relation to Custody of Minors Manalo v. CA, GR No. 129242, Jan. 16, 2002 Facts: Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven children, who are all of legal age. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop. The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the respondent RTC of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) who were granted then 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion. Issue: Whether or not the motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made. Ruling: The petition was denied for lack of merit. petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant GR No. 112019. January 4, 1995 Facts: Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the marriage, the couple when quarreling over a number of things including the interference of Julia’s parents into their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the United States. Leouel was then unable to communicate with her for a period of five years and she had then virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should be appreciated. Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated and must be incurable. Mere abandonment cannot therefore qualify as psychological incapacity on the part of Julia.

Espiritu vs. CA GR 115640, March 15, 1995 Facts: Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children

and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children. Issue: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother. Held: In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter. Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.

DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents. G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children. The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.

In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. The RTC rendered justice in favor of Daisie, stating that the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David is hereby given to the natural mother. The CA reversed on appeal holding that Habeas Corpus was not proper and that the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a Habeas Corpus case contemplates a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated. Issue: Whether or not the remedy of Habeas Corpus proper Held: It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is. APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: Article 213 of the Family Code provides that “In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.” Also, the first sentence of Article 176 of the Family Code applies to this case, which provides that “Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.”

G.R. No. L-26953 March 28, 1969 ZENAIDA MEDINA, assisted by her husband, FELICIANO CASERO, petitionerappellant, vs. DRA. VENANCIA L. MAKABALI, respondent-appellee. Fausto D. Laquian for petitioner-appellant. Maximino Q. Canlas for respondent-appellee. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Facts: On February 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the Makabali Clinic in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali, single, who assisted at the delivery. The boy was Zenaida’s third, had with a married man, Feliciano Casero. The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her own son; had him treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he recovered his health; and sent him to school. From birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited her child, and never paid for his expenses. The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with her two other children apparently with the tolerance, if not the acquiescence, of Caseros lawful wife who resides elsewhere, albeit the offspring of both women are in good terms with each other; that Casero makes about P400.00 a month as a mechanic, and Zenaida herself earns from 4 to 5 pesos a day. Issue: Whether or Not the petition for rights and duties of parents and children should go to the petitioner (parent) Held: Upon extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to allow the minor a free choice with whom to live when he reaches the age of 14, the Court held that it was for the child’s best interest to be left with his foster mother and denied the writ prayed for. The real mother appealed, as already stated.

We see no reason to disturb the order appealed from. While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that “in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount” (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother (Do.) This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents, into a radically different institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Peña, now “there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.” As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356). As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most. It may well be doubted what advantage the child could derive from being coerced to abandon respondent’s care and love to be compelled to stay with his mother and witness her irregular menage a trois with Casero and the latter’s legitimate wife. It is hinted that respondent’s motivation in refusing to surrender the boy is to coerce petitioner to pay for the rearing of the child. This is not acceptable, for Dra. Makabali knew (at least at the trial) that any expectation on her part is illusory, given Zenaida’s meager resources, yet expressed willingness to care and educate him. No abuse of discretion being shown, but on the contrary, the appealed order being justified in fact and law, we hold that said order should be, and hereby is, affirmed. Costs against appellant.

Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575 Facts: Angelie Anne Cervantes, a minor, born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are Common-law husband and wife, was offered for adoption to Gina Carreons sister and brother in law, therein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes. Petitioners took care and custody of the child when she was barely two weeks old. An affidavit of Consent of adoption of the child by the petitioners was executed by respondent Gina Carreon on April 29, 1987 and filed before the RTC of Rizal. Sometime during March or April of 1987, the adoptive parents received from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,

000.00, otherwise, they would not get their child back. Petitioners refused. And as a result, while petitioners were out at work, Gina Carreon took the child from their yaya and brought her to her house in Paranaque and thereupon said that she had no desire to give up her child and that the affidavit consent was not fully explained to her and she will return the child only if she were paid the amount of P150, 000.00 Issue: Whether or not Adopting parents have the right to care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over child Held: YES. As an adopted child, the child will be freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as the legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate. Consequently, even though the child was below 7 years of age, the courts can still decide where it best suites the interest of the child and deprive Gina Carreon of custody on grounds that the child will not have a suitable environment with her, unlike with the adoptive parents who appear to be morally, physical, financially and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than that of her natural mother.