Labor Cases.docx

SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989) Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking. Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate. G. Capitol Medical Center vs NLRC GR No. 147080, Apr 26, 2005

[G.R. No. 147080. April 26, 2005] CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JAIME IBABAO, JOSE BALLESTEROS, RONALD CENTENO, NARCISO SARMIENTO, EDUARDO CANAVERAL, SHERLITO DELA CRUZ, SOFRONIO COMANDAO, MARIANO GALICIA, RAMON MOLOD, CARMENCITA SARMIENTO, HELEN MOLOD, ROSA COMANDAO, ANGELITO CUIZON, ALEX MARASIGAN, JESUS CEDRO, ENRICO ROQUE, JAY PERILLA, HELEN MENDOZA, MARY GLADYS GEMPEROSO, NINI BAUTISTA, ELENA MACARUBBO, MUSTIOLA SALVACION DAPITO, ALEXANDER MANABE, MICHAEL EUSTAQUIO, ROSE AZARES, FERNANDO MANZANO, HENRY VERA CRUZ, CHITO MENDOZA, FREDELITA TOMAYAO, ISABEL BRUCAL, MAHALKO LAYACAN, RAINIER MANACSA, KAREN VILLARENTE, FRANCES ACACIO, LAMBERTO CONTI, LORENA BEACH, JUDILAH RAVALO, DEBORAH NAVE, MARILEN CABALQUINTO, EMILIANA RIVERA, MA. ROSARIO URBANO, ROWENA ARILLA, CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW, GREGORIO DEL PRADO, ARIEL ARAJA, and JESUS STA. BARBARA, JR., respondents. CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: The Union filed a Notice of Strike with the (NCMB), The Union alleged as grounds for the projected strike the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on employees; and (c) interference/ restraint to self-organization.[7] A series of conferences was conducted before the NCMB but no agreement was reached. the petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board requesting that the notice of strike be dismissed;[8] the Union had apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of the NCMB with a copy of a notice of the meeting where the strike vote was conducted. On November 20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes[9] of the alleged strike vote purportedly held on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioner’s premises. It appears that 178 out of the 300 union members participated therein, and the results were as follows: 156 members voted to strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and eight votes were spoiled.[10] On November 28, 1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. Subsequently, the Union filed an ex parte motion with the DOLE, praying for its assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute. The SOLE assumed jurisdiction over the labor disputes, Consequently, all striking workers are directed to return to work within twentyfour (24) hours from the receipt of this Order and the management to resume normal operations and accept back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. In obedience to the order of the SOLE, the officers and members of the Union stopped their strike and returned to work. The Regional Director of the DOLE rendered a Decision denying the petition for the cancellation of the respondent Union’s certiftcate of registration. In a parallel development, Labor

Arbiter Leda rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner, and declared the strike staged by the respondents illegal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997; moreover, no notice of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least twentyfour (24) hours prior to the intended holding of the strike vote. According to the Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of the petitioner’s 17 employees who alleged that no strike vote was taken, and supported by the affidavit of the overseer of the parking lot and the security guards, must prevail as against the minutes of the strike vote presented by the respondents. The Labor Arbiter also held that in light of Article 263(9) of the Labor Code, the respondent Union should have filed a motion for a writ of execution of the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma which was affirmed by this Court instead of staging a strike. The respondents appealed the decision to the NLRC which granted their appeal and reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC also denied the petitioner’s petition to declare the strike illegal. In resolving the issue of whether the union members held a strike vote on November 10, 1997, the NLRC ruled as follows: We find untenable the Labor Arbiter’s finding that no actual strike voting took place on November 10, 1997, claiming that thi s is supported by the affidavit of Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the parking lot across the hospital, and the sworn statements of nineteen (19) (sic) union members. While it is true that no strike voting took place in the parking lot which he is overseeing, it does not mean that no strike voting ever took place at all because the same was conducted in the parking lot immediately/directly fronting, not across, the hospital building. Further, it is apparent that the nineteen (19) (sic) hospital employees, who recanted their participation in the strike voting, did so involuntarily for fear of loss of employment, considering that their Affidavits are uniform and pro forma. The NLRC ruled that under Section 7, Rule XXII of DOLE Order No. 9, Series of 1997, absent a showing that the NCMB decided to supervise the conduct of a secret balloting and informed the union of the said decision, or that any such request was made by any of the parties who would be affected by the secret balloting and to which the NCMB agreed, the respondents were not mandated to furnish the NCMB with such notice before the strike vote was conducted.

ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENTS COMPLIED WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STAGING THE SUBJECT STRIKE.

HELD: No. We agree with the petitioner that the respondent Union failed to comply with the second paragraph of Section 10, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC which reads: Section 10. Strike or lockout vote. – A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for the purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the Board of Directors of the employer, corporation or association or the partners obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. The regional branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or

the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Board and notice of meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours before such meetings as well as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period provided in this Rule. Although the second paragraph of Section 10 of the said Rule is not provided in the Labor Code of the Philippines, nevertheless, the same was incorporated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code and has the force and effect of law.[24] Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, a union intending to stage a strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of strike vote, at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place and time of the meeting of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be unable to supervise the holding of the same, if and when it decides to exercise its power of supervision. In National Federation of Labor v. NLRC,[25] the Court enumerated the notices required by Article 263 of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules, which include the 24-hour prior notice to the NCMB: 1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union; 2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice. However, in the case of union busting where the union’s existence is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed. … 4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.5)The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period. In this case, the respondent Union failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice requirement to the NCMB before it conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on November 10, 1997. As a result, the petitioner complained that no strike vote meeting ever took place and averred that the strike staged by the respondent union was illegal. Conformably to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines[30] and Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, [31] no labor organization shall declare a strike unless supported by a majority vote of the members of the union obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The requirement is mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. [32] The union is thus mandated to allege and prove compliance with the requirements of the law. In the present case, there is a divergence between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other, in that the Labor Arbiter found and declared in his decision that no secret voting ever took place in the parking lot fronting the hospital on November 10, 1997 by and among the 300 members of the respondent Union. Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the only parking lot fronting the hospital, and security guards Simon Tingzon and Reggie Barawid, declared in their respective affidavits that no secret voting ever took place on November 10, 1997; 17 employees of the petitioner also denied in their respective statements that they were not members of the respondent Union, and were asked to merely sign attendance papers and unnumbered votes. The NLRC and the CA declared in their respective decisions that the affidavits of the petitioner’s 17 employees had no probative weight because the said employees merely executed their affidavits out of fear of losing their jobs. The allegations in the affidavits belie the claim of the respondents and the finding of the NLRC that a secret balloting took

place on November 10, 1997 in front of the hospital at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City.

H. G.R. No. L-59743 May 31 1982 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW), petitioner, vs.ETHELWOLDO R. OVEJERA, CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE LA CARLOTA (CAC), COL. ROGELIO DEINLA, as Provincial Commander, 3311st P.C. Command, Negros Occidental, respondents. FACTS: In 1981, NFSW struck allegedly to compel the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers. The decision having become final and executory entry of judgment was made. After the Marcopper decision had become final, NFSW renewed its demand that CAC give the 13th month pay. CAC refused, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) Regional Office in Bacolod City a notice to strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck. ISSUE: Whether or not under Presidential Decree 851 (13th Month Pay Law), CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses, the aggregate of which admittedly exceeds by far the disputed 13th month pay? HELD: CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement amounting to more than a month's pay. When this agreement was forged on November 30,1981, the original decision dismissing the petition in the aforecited Marcopper case had already been promulgated by this Court. On the votes of only 7 Justices, including the distinguished Chief Justice, the petition of Marcopper Mining Corp. seeking to annul the decision of Labor Deputy Minister Amado Inciong granting a 13th month pay to Marcopper employees (in addition to mid- year and Christmas bonuses under a CBA) had been dismissed. But a motion for reconsideration filed by Marcopper was pending as of November 30, 1981. In December 1981, the original decision was affirmed when this Court finally denied the motion for reconsideration. But the resolution of denial was supported by the votes of only 5 Justices. The Marcopper decision is therefore a Court decision but without the necessary eight votes to be doctrinal. This being so, it cannot be said that the Marcopper decision "clearly held" that "the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given," within the meaning of the NFSW-CAC compromise agreement. At any rate, in view of the rulings made herein, NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its members are entitled to a 13th month pay in addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

I. Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc (INPORT) vs. NLRC GR No. 103560 July 6, 1995 Facts: Petitioner’s employees stopped working and gathered in a mass action to express their grievances regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. Said employees were all members of the Macajalar Labor Union — Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom petitioner had an existing collective bargaining agreement. Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the port of Cagayan de Oro. The strike paralyzed operations at said port. The strikers filed individual notices of strike (“Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-Welga”) with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment. With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction. The National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter, majority of the strikers returned to work, leaving herein private respondents who continued their protest. For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of the Labor Code, 3 the strike staged by petitioner’s workers on April 30, 1985 was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal. 4 The workers who participated in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their employment, since there was no evidence that they participated in illegal acts. After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held that the private respondents should similarly be allowed to return to work without having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their union (MLU-FFW). As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they could not have possibly been “duped or tricked” into signing the strike notice for they were active participants in the conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware of what was going on. Hence, said union officers should be accepted back to work after seeking reconsideration from herein petitioner. 5 The NLRC affirmed with modification 8 the Arbiter’s decision. It held that the concerted action by the workers was more of a “protest action” than a strike. Private respondents, including the six union officers, should also be allowed to work unconditionally to avoid discrimination. However, in view of the strained relations between the parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu of reinstatement. Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, public respondent modified the above resolution.

The Commission ruled that since private respondents were not actually terminated from service, there was no basis for reinstatement. However, it awarded six months’ salary as separation pay or financial assistance in the nature of “equitable relief.” The award for backwages was also deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. In lieu of backwages, compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given. Issue: Whether separation pay and backwages be awarded by public respondent NLRC to participants of an illegal strike? Held: Reinstatement and backwages or, if no longer feasible, separation pay, can only be granted if sufficient bases exist under the law, particularly after a showing of illegal dismissal. However, while the union members may thus be entitled under the law to be reinstated or to receive separation pay, their expulsion from the union in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement renders the same impossible. Ratio: A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, 13 is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. 14 A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. 15 Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute. The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263) paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code. 16 The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to the notice required by the law to be filed since they were represented by a union (MLU-FFW) which even had an existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT. Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting requirements. A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost their employment status. 20 An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike.

In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the striking workers, including union officers, back to work. Private respondents were left to continue with the strike after they refused to submit to the “screening” required by the company. Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from his employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost his employment status. Since there appears no proof that these union members committed illegal acts during the strike, they cannot be dismissed. The striking union members among private respondents are thus entitled to reinstatement, there being no just cause for their dismissal. However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from the time the disputed strike occurred, we find that to award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would be more practical and appropriate. No backwages will be awarded to private respondent-union members as a penalty for their participation in the illegal strike. Their continued participation in said strike, even after most of their co-workers had returned to work, can hardly be rewarded by such an award. The fate of private respondent-union officers is different. Their insistence on unconditional reinstatement or separation pay and backwages is unwarranted and unjustified. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union officer may be terminated from employment. 34 Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT previously accepted other union officers and that the screening required by it was uncalled for, still it cannot be gainsaid that it possessed the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. The law, in using the word may, grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. 35 Moreover, an illegal strike which, more often than not, brings about unnecessary economic disruption and chaos in the workplace should not be countenanced by a relaxation of the sanctions prescribed by law. The union officers are, therefore, not entitled to any relief. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, from the foregoing premises, the petition in G.R. No. 103560 (“Gold City Integrated Port Service Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.”) is GRANTED. One month salary for each year of service until 1985 is awarded to private respondents who were not union officers as separation pay. The petition in G.R. No. 103599 (“Adelo Ebuna, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.”) is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.