Criminal-law-2-everyday-digest-edited-2.pdf

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Second Semester School Year 2017 -2018

Jennica Gyrl Delfin

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST TITLE ONE – CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW OF NATIONS November 24, 2017 - Article 114 - TREASON BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A. US v. ABAD G.R. No. L-976. October 22, 1902 LADD, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not the charge of “treason and sedition” was proper. FACTS: The offense with which the defendant was charged and of which he has been convicted is that defined in section 14 of Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission, which is as follows: "Any person who shall have taken any oath before any military officer under the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands, whether such official so administering the oath was specially authorized by law so to do or not, in which oath the affiant is substance engaged to recognize or accept the supreme authority of the United States of America in these Islands or to maintain true faith and allegiance thereto or to obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by its duly constituted authorities and who shall, after the passage of this act, violate the terms and provisions of such oath or any of such terms or provisions, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both." In the present case the act by which the defendant is found by the court below to have violated the oath was that of denying to an officer of the United States Army the existence of certain rifles, which had been concealed by his orders at the time of his surrender in April, 1901, and of the existence and whereabouts of which he was cognizant at the time of the denial. If this act was a violation of the oath, which upon the evidence in the case may be doubtful, it was probably also an act of treason, as being an act of adhering to the enemies of the United States, giving them aid and comfort, and if the element of breach of promise is to be regarded as merely an incidental circumstance forming no part of the essence of the crime of violation of oaths of allegiance, the offense in this particular case might, perhaps, be held to be covered by the amnesty as being, in substance, treason though prosecuted under another name. HELD: YES. Treason, in its more general sense, is the "violation by a subject of his allegiance to his sovereign or liege lord, or to the supreme authority of the state." Sedition, in its more general sense, is "the raising of commotion or disturbances in the state." Technical terms of the law when used in a statute are ordinarily to be given their technical signification. But in construing an executive act of the character of this proclamation, as in construing a remedial statute, a court is justified in applying a more liberal rule of construction in order to effectuate, if possible, the beneficient purpose intended. Certainly a limitation of the words in question to

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their literal and technical signification would utterly defeat the unmistakable general object of the amnesty. Upon such a construction treason, the highest of all political crimes, a crime which may be punished by death under section 1 of Act No. 292, would be included in the amnesty, while insurrection, which is a crime of precisely the same nature and differs from it solely in being inferior in degree and punishable by fine and imprisonment only, would be excluded. A construction leading to such manifest inconsistencies could be accepted only when the language admitted of no other. We think the construction suggested as the true one though somewhat less restricted that the precise legal signification of the terms "treason" and "sedition" might warrant, may be adopted without doing violence to the language of the proclamation, and there is no room for doubt in our minds that by adopting that construction we carry out the real intention of the President. The Court ruled that the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance, being one of the political offenses defined in Act No. 292, is included in the general words "treason and sedition," as used in the proclamation. The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the proclamation. LAUREL v. MISA G.R. No. L-409. January 30, 1947 ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be prosecuted for the crime of Treason penalized under Art. 114 of the RPC. FACTS: Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus which was based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended. HELD: YES. The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our Constitution. There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her husband. Because some external and insurmountable force precludes the husband from exercising his marital powers, functions, and duties and the wife is thereby deprived of the benefits of his protection, may the wife invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed with the assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the wife allege as defense for her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity? Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States,

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution. PEOPLE v. PEREZ G.R. No. L-856. April 18, 1949 TUASON, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not the charge of Treason was proper. FACTS: Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason and sentenced to death by electrocution. Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the court, were substantiated. Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other Filipinos forced numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of satisfying the immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini. Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That accused in company with some Japanese and Filipinos forcefully took some women to attend a banquet and a dance organized in honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet Governor and thereafter be used as sex slaves by the Colonel. Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, that two girls were taken from their homes by the accused and his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two, the accused Susano Perez and his companion Vicente Bullecer, raped the girls before delivering them to the Japanese Officer. Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said accused deceived two women on the pretext that they were to be taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the investigation of a case against a certain Chinese, but upon arriving at the Colonel’s office, through force and intimidation, the two women were raped by the accused and some Japanese Officials. Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino companion two nurses of the provincial hospital, for not having attended a dance and reception organized by the Puppet Governor in honor of Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers; that upon being brought the Puppet Governor, they were severely reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8, 1942, against said nurses were forced to attend another banquet and dance in order that the Jap

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officers Mini and Takibayas might make a selection which girls would suit best their fancy; that the real purpose behind those forcible invitations was to lure them to the residence of said Japanese Officer Mini for immoral purposes. HELD: NO, the charge was not proper. The SC ruled that the deeds committed by the accused do not constitute treason. If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because women's company kept up their morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining them at parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. For any act of hospitality without doubt produces the same general result, yet by common agreement those and similar manifestation of sympathy and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as treason. In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts between the invaders and the natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their nature degree and purpose. To draw a line between treasonable and untreasonable assistance is not always easy. As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities is to assist him as individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to lend or give him money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against the giver's country enhance his strength and by same count injures the interest of the government of the giver. That is treason. Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of error is correct. His "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United State. The acts herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple the defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect the defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission, may

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST be gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular case. November 25, 2017 – Article 115 – CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT TREASON UNAS, Nor-Aiza R. US VS. BAUTISTA, ET AL. 6 PHIL. 581 NOVEMBER 3, 1906 CARSON, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not there was conspiracy and proposal to commit treason. FACTS: During the latter part of 1903, a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos, resident in Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms and establishing in its stead a government to be known as the Republica Universal Democratica Filipina. Prim Ruiz was recognized as the titular head of this conspiracy and one Artemio Ricarte as chief of the military forces to the organized in the Philippines in the furtherance of the plans of the conspirators. The appellant Francisco Bautistam was an intimate friend of the said Ricarte; that Ricarte wrote and notified Bautista of his coming to Manila and that, to aid him in his journey, Bautista forwarded to him secretly 200 pesos; that after the arrival of Ricarte, Bautista was present, taking part in the meetings whereat the plans of the conspirators were discussed and perfected, and that at one of these meetings Bautista, in answer to a question of Ricarte, assured him that the necessary preparations had been made and that he "held the people in readiness." The appellant Tomas Puzon united with the conspirators through the agency of one Jose R. Muñoz, who was proven to have been a prime leader of the movement, in the intimate confidence of Ricarte, and by him authorized to distribute bonds and nominate and appoint certain officials, including a brigadier-general of the signal corps of the proposed revolutionary forces; that at the time when the conspiracy was being brought to a head in the city of Manila, Puzon held several conferences with the said Muñoz whereat plans were made for the coming insurrection; that at one of these conferences Muñoz offered Puzon a commission as brigadiergeneral of the signal corps and undertook to do his part in organizing the troops; and that at a later conference he assured the said Muñoz that he had things in readiness, meaning thereby that he had duly organized in accordance with the terms of his commission. HELD: Yes. It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an appointment as an officer of the military forces of the conspiracy should not be considered as evidence against him. But the case at bar is to be distinguished from these and like cases by the fact that the record clearly disclose that the accused actually and voluntarily accepted the appointment in question and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance, and that the charge in this

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case is that of conspiracy, and the fact that the accused accepted the appointment is taken into consideration merely as evidence of his criminal relations with the conspirators. It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might appoint a person in no wise connected with them to some high office in the conspiracy, in the hope that such person would afterwards accept the commission and thus unite himself with them, and it is even possible that such an appointment might be forwarded in the mail or otherwise, and thus come into the possession of the person thus nominated, and that such appointment might be found in his possession, and, notwithstanding all this, the person in whose possession the appointment was found might be entirely innocent of all intention to join the conspiracy, never having authorized the conspirators to use his name in this manner nor to send such a commission to him. Indeed, cases are not unknown in the annals of criminal prosecutions wherein it has been proven that such appointments have been concealed in the baggage or among the papers of the accused persons, so that when later discovered by the officers of the law they might be used as evidence against the accused. But where a genuine conspiracy is shown to have existed as in this case, and it is proven that the accused voluntarily accepted an appointment as an officer in that conspiracy, we think that this fact may properly be taken into consideration as evidence of his relations with the conspirators. JOSE JINGGOY E. ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 148965 FEBRUARY 26, 2002 PUNO, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, is proper. FACTS: In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman. The respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila. HELD: Yes, but only to those acts which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President Joseph Estrada. The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other coaccused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST second paragraph describes in general how plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item 2 of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item 1 in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former President. Subparagraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the Jose Velarde account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items 2 and 3 in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item 6 in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.

In the crime of plunder, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of illgotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.

From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in subparagraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.

As regards to accused Baculi, although he confessed to have assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he only did it because he was compelled by the murderers who called him, striking him with the butts of their guns and forced him to bury the corpses. It was corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime who was present when it was committed. The witness also stated that Baculi was not a member of the group who murdered the Americans.

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November 26, 2017 – Article 116 – MISPRISION OF TREASON FLORENTINO, Kimberly A. US VS CABALLEROS ET AL 4 Phil 350 (1905) ISSUE: Whether or not there was Misprision of Treason. FACTS: Two accused were sentenced to the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as accessories to the crime of assassination or murder of four American school- teachers. Without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as accomplices but they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims to conceal the crime. HELD: No, the Supreme Court did not justify the evidence.

As regards to the other accused Apolonio Caballeros, there was no proof that he took any part in the execution of the crime and did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses as to the testimonies of the witness and the other accused. The fact that the two accused did not report to the authorities about the perpetration of the crime, which seemed to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the lower court took into consideration in the judgment, is not punishable by the Penal Code and therefore

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST cannot render the two accused criminally liable under the law.

The Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy is still in force in the Philippines.

November 27, 2017– Article 117 – ESPIONAGE [NO CASE FOUND]

PEOPLE VS. CATANTAN G.R. No. 11807, September 5, 1997

November 27, 2017– Article 118 – INCITING TO WAR OR GIVING MOTIVES FOR REPRISALS [NO CASE FOUND]

ISSUE: Whether accused-appellant committed grave coercion or piracy under PD. No. 532.

November 27, 2017 – Article 119 – VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY [NO CASE FOUND]

FACTS: The Pilapil brothers, Eugene and Juan Jr., were fishing in the sea, 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. In the course of their fishing, accused Catantan and Ursal boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapil's at gun point.

November 27, 2017 – Article 120 – CORRESPONDENCE WITH HOSTILE COUNTRY [NO CASE FOUND] November 27, 2017 – Article 121 – FLIGHT TO ENEMY’S COUNTRY [NO CASE FOUND] November 27, 2017 – Article 122 – PIRACY SANTOALLA, Stephanie M. PEOPLE VS. LOL-LO & SARAW G.R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922 ISSUE: WON Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime of piracy alleged in this case. FACTS: Two boats left Matuta, the boat 1 is of a dutch possession and had one dutch subject, while boat 2 had 11 men, women and children, likewise from Holland. Boat 2 arrived in Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies, then suddenly they were surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 moros who first asked for food. They eventually entered the boat and took all the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two women. They also took the 2 women and left the ship to sink-- on board those who were left as they placed holes in it. Two moro marauders in Tawi Tawi were identified as Lol-lo and Saraw, and arrested for piracy. The accused-appellants questioned the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts to the case, but the court ruled that piracy is a crime against all mankind, so every court also has jurisdiction to try these cases. HELD: Yes. All the elements of the crime of piracy were present. Piracy is robbery in forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi (intention to steal), and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Philippine courts has jurisdiction to this case because pirates are in law hostes humani generis (enemy of mankind), a crime against all mankind. Therefore, it can be punished in any competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found.

The pumpboat of the Pilapil brothers broke down, as a result, they boarded another pumpboat operated by Juanito. Catantan ordered the latter to take them to Mungaz, Cebu. However, Juanito's pumpboat ran out of gas and the accused were apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the incident to the local authorities. HELD: Yes. The RTC convicted the accused of the crime of piracy under PD 532, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Hence, were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy. The Court does not agree on the contention of the appellant that the acts committed only constitute grave coercion defined in Article 286 of the RPC, and not piracy under PD No. 532. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. PP v. TULIN G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001 ISSUE: WON the Philippine courts is without jurisdiction to try the crime of piracy committed outside Philippine waters and territory. FACTS:

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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST A cargo vessel owned by PNOC named MT Tabangao was sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded with barrels of Kerosene, gasoline and diesel oil. Suddenly, the cargo vessel was boarded by seven (7) fully armed pirates named Tulin et. al., and took control over the vessel and painted the logo and ship with black, and then painted with the name Galilee. In Singapore, where the ship crew was forced to sail from Mindoro, a vessel called Navi Pride, anchored beside MT Tabangao. One of the accused Hiong, supervised the Navi's crew and received the cargo on board MT Tabangao. The said vessel went back to the Philippines and the pirates released the original crew members in batch after the transfer of goods were completed. The pirates then ordered the batch not to tell authorities what happened. A series of arrests were effected against the accused-appellants, charging them with qualified piracy or violation of PD. No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters), after the Chief Engineer of the crew reported the incident to the coast guard. However, one of the accused-appellant Hiong, argues that the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were executed outside the Philippine waters and territory, therefore stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial. HELD: Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try this case. Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law. Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

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As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters. November 28, 2017 – Art. 123 – QUALIFIED PIRACY; AND PD 532 CEBALLOS, Jesus C. PEOPLE V. SIYOH, KIRAM, INDANAN AND JAMAHALI G.R. NO. L-57292, February 18, 1986 ISSUE: Whether the guilty of Siyoh et al were proven beyond reasonable doubt granting that the body of Anastacio de Guzman was never found. FACTS: Antonio de Guzman together with his friends, Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman, who were also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan. The group were onboard a pumpboat operated by Kiram with Siyoh as his help. While on their way, 2 men armed with armantes onboard a pumpboat fired at them thereupon Kiram turned off the engine and threw a rope towards the other pumboat. While the group’s boat was towed towards Mataja Island, the armed men took their money and goods as well as their clothes. After which, Kiram uttered “It was good to kill all of you” then Siyoh hacked de Castro and Hiolen with his “barong.” Antonio de Guzman was able to jump out of the boat but Kiram’s group fired at him hitting him at the back. Antonio de Guzman was able to survive the attack and reported it to the Philippine Army. Antonio de Guzman was able to identify the men who boarded their boat as the men that his group saw talking with Kiram and Siyoh in BalukBaluk Island the previous night. The trial court found the defendants to be guilty qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder. It then imposed to Siyoh et al the death penalty. HELD: The Court upheld the decision of the trial court. Art.123. of the RPC states that: Qualified piracy. — The penalty of reclusion temporal to death shall be imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following circumstances:

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST 1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same; 2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves; or 3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape. In the case at bar, it was proven that Siyoh et al killed their victims, with the exception of Antonio, after they stole the personal belongings of their victims. The number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of victims. Thus, the recovery or non-recovery of the body of Anastacio is immaterial in the present case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ G.R. No. L-60100, L-60768 and L-61069 March 20, 1985 ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating their plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance. FACTS: Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y Medrano; Rico Lopez; Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa; and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were crew members of M/V Noria 767. While within the territorial waters of the Municipality of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, Province of Tawi-Tawi, armed with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms, the group robbed the said vessel. In the course of the robbing, several persons were killed and injured. Leopoldo Lao, Municipal Health Officer of the said municipality went aboard the vessel M/V Noria when it arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi and saw at the wharf ten dead bodies. Upon their arraignment the accused pleaded guilty of the crime of piracy. The trial court imposed the penalty of death upon the accused. HELD: The trial court was correct. Sec. 3 of PD 532 otherwise known as the AntiPiracy Law provides that Sec. 3 Penalties.—Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by: a) Piracy.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or no homocide is

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committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the crime of piracy where rape, murder or homicide is committed is mandatory death penalty. Thus, the lower court committed no error in not considering the plea of the three (3) defendants as a mitigating circumstance. In relation to the above, Art. 63 of the RPC was cited, to wit: ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.—In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. PEOPLE V. ANG CHO KIO G.R. NOS. L-6687 AND L-6688 JULY 29, 1954 ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in not finding the accused guilty of the complex crime of grave coercion with murder with the imposable penalty of death. FACTS: Ang Cho Kio was onboard PAL flight heading to Aparri from Laoag. Somewhere over the airspace of Mt. Province, he shot and killed the purser of the flight, Eduardo Diago. He then ordered the pilot, Pedro Perlas, to change route towards Amoy. The pilot refused, prompting Kio to shoot the pilot which caused his instantaneous death. For the first charge, he was sentenced to prision mayor in the minimum and reclusion temporal as maximum. For the second charge, the court found him guilty of murder and grave coercion and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. HELD: The trial court was correct. The accused committed two separate crimes, murder and grave coercion. The defendant could have deprived Pedro Perlas of his life without having to force him to change the direction of the airplane; Coercion to commit murder was not indispensable. Nor was it indispensable to assassinate to commit coercion, quite the contrary; for having murdered the pilot, the defendant did not get his wish to reach Amoy: he committed two acts that consisted of the crimes of coercion and murder. Complex crime is defined as a single act constituting two or more crimes or when one of them is necessary to commit the other. The penalty corresponding to the most serious crime shall be imposed, applying it to its maximum extent.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST TITLE TWO – CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE November 29, 2017 – Article 124 – ARBITRARY DETENTION ARANCES, Javy Ann G. RAMON MILO VS CFI JUDGE ANGELITO SALANGA G.R. NO. L-37007, July 20, 1987 JUSTICE GANCAYCO ISSUE: Whether or not Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, can be charged of arbitrary detention. FACTS: On April 21, 1973 at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines, the accused with the aid of some other private persons, conspiring, maltreated Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists. Immediately thereafter, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours. On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged against him do not constitute an offense of arbitrary detention and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Respondent judge quashed the motion on the ground that Tuvera Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with arbitrary detention. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition thereto. HELD: Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person.1 The elements of this crime are the following: 1. That the offender is a public officer or employee. 2. That he detains a person. 3. That the detention is without legal grounds. Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention. Thus, it was erroneously reasoned that captain did not detained Valdez, being merely a captain, no authority, and that barrio captain was not a public official, not considered persons in authority, only upon PD 299. From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention. FELICIANO GALVANTE VS HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO

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G.R. NO. 162808, April 22, 2008 JUSTICE AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents can be charged of arbitrary detention. FACTS: On May 14, 2001, private respondents, PO1 Romil Avenido, PO1 Valentino Rufano, PO1 Eddie Degran, PO1 Federico Balolot and Regional Mobile Group, PNP members of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live ammunitions. Consequently, information filed against the petitioner for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 3258. Petitioner filed against private respondents an administrative case and criminal case for Arbitrary Detention. Petitioner states that private respondents aimed their long firearms at him, arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him in detention. Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. filed a "Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss," which was granted by Officer-in-Charge Prosecutor II Victoriano Pag-ong, on the ground that "the action of the policemen who conducted the warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances justifying the same intruded into the privacy of the accused and the security of his property." HELD: The criminal complaint for arbitrary detention was properly dismissed by public respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be shown that (a) the offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender detained the complainant, and (c) the detention is without legal grounds. The second element was not alleged by petitioner in his AffidavitComplaint. As pointed out by private respondent Conde in his Comment and Memorandum, petitioner himself identified in his AffidavitComplaint that it was Police Chief Rocacorba who caused his detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did petitioner allege that private respondents effected his detention, or were in any other way involved in it. There was, therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain the criminal charge for arbitrary detention against private respondents. November 30, 2017 – Art. 125 – DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES. DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl LINO V. FUGOSA, ET. AL G.R. NO. L-1159 JANUARY 30, 1947 ISSUE: Whether or not Montaniel and Deoduco were detained illegally. FACTS:

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST A petition for habeas corpus was filed against Valeriano Fugoso, Lamberto Javaler and John Doe in their capacity as Mayor, police and officer in charge of the municipal jail of the City of Manila, respectively for unlawfully detaining twelve (12) persons. Ten of the petitioners were released. However, the other two remained and were confined for three days and four days respectively without warrants and charges formally filed in court. The papers of their cases were not transmitted to the City Fiscal’s office until late in the afternoon of November 11, 1946. Montaniel and Deoduco remained in custody because they were charged with unjust vexation and disobedience to an agent of a person in authority. The informations were filed the same day. However, no warrants of arrests or orders of commitment were issued by the municipal court. HELD: Yes. The detention of Deoduco and Montaniel was illegal upon the exploration of six hours without them having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. Their cases were referred to the City Fiscal four and three days, respectively, after they were arrested. The illegally of their detention was not cured by the filing of information against them, since no warrants of arrest or orders of commitment were issued by the municipal court. The two petitioners are charged with light offenses. The general rule is that when the offense charged is light the accused should not be arrested, except in particular instances when the court expressly orders. In the instant case, the municipal court has not yet acted on the informations. While an arrest may be made without warrant there are reasonable grounds the prisoner cannot be retained beyond the period provided by law, unless a warrant is procured from a competent court. The City Fiscal had no authority to issue warrants of arrest and was powerless to validate such illegal detention by merely filing informations or by any order of his own, either express or implied. It is not necessary to determine whether the City Fiscal is a judicial authority within the purview of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code since the petitioners’ case was referred to him long after the expiration of the six hours provided by law. These prisoners should have been out of prison long before the informations were filed with the municipal court, and they should not be retained therein merely because of the filing of such informations since that the offenses charged are light. Under such circumstances, only an order of commitment could legalize the prisoner’s continued confinement, and no such order has ever been issued. SORIA V DESIERTO G.R. NOS. 153524-25, JANUARY 31, 2005

respondents for alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. One police identified Bista to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of BP Blg. 6. From the time of Soria’s detention up to the time of his release, 22 hours had already elapsed and Bista was detained for 26 days. The crimes for which Soria was arrested without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. The crimes for which Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having been filed with the proper judicial authorities. Petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaintaffidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents. The office dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution. HELD: No. Respondents did not abuse their discretion in dismissing the case. Their disposition of petitioners' complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Regarding the complaint of Soria, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a 'no-office day. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. In the same vein, the complaint of Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.

ISSUE: Whether or not the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

December 1, 2017- Article 127- EXPULSION FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.

FACTS: Petitioners Rodolfo Soria and Edimar Bista were arrested on May 13, 2001, a Sunday and the day before May 14 elections, without a warrant by

ISSUE: Whether or not Mayor Lukban was authorized to send those women in transferring their residence from Manila to Davao

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VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. V. LUKBAN, ET AL. G.R. NO. L-14639, MARCH 25, 1919

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST FACTS: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. HELD: NO. Only the court by a final judgment can order a person to change his residence. This is illustrated in ejectment proceedings, expropriation proceedings and in the penalty of destierro. Hence, the Mayor and the Chief of Police of Manila cannot force the prostitutes residing in that City to go and live in Davao against their will, there being no law that authorizes them to do so. These women, despite their being in a sense, lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattels, but Philippine citizens, protected by the same constitutional guarantees as are other citizens. December 2, 2017 - Art. 128 - VIOLATION OF DOMICILE LAZO, Joseph Artfel T. EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE and GENEROSO MARFIL alias "TAPOL" vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014 ISSUE: WON the accused are guilty of violating art. 128? The crime of violation against domicile FACTS: On May 14, 1989 in the Evening. Acccused Gerochie, then Barangay Captain and 2 CAFGU members, hence persons in authority who feloniously and without judicial order entered the house of victim Mallo by breaking the door against the will of the occupants and injuring one of them During Trial, the Accused were named as barangay captain and Civilian Volunteer, which the accused later admitted and confirmed RTC: Found the accused guilty of slight Physical Injuries under Art. 265

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They also stated that accused should not be guilty of violating Art. 128 for lack of proving the essential requisite that the accused were Public Officials and that such admission is not enough to prove that they were public officers. It is required that clear and convincing evidence other than the the testimony of the witnesses that accused were in fact public officers. and when in doubt on whether the accused were public officers, then it should be ruled in favor of the accused Petitioners appealed to the CA to contest the decision on Slight Physical Injuries CA: Upon appeal the RTC decision, the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC on Slight Physical Injuries but ruled that accused were guilty of Violating of Domicile considering that the accused admitted to be the Barangay Captain and part of the Citizen Armed Forces HELD: YES, The Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony before the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche denied that he was a barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU members. In holding such positions, they are considered as public officers/employees. December 3, 2017 - Art. 129 - SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED, AND ABUSE IN THE SERVICE OF THOSE LEGALLY OBTAINED SALVERON, Jan Ione R. AURELIO S. ALVERO vs. ARSENIO P. DIZON, ET AL G.R. No. L-342 May 4, 1946 ISSUE: Is a search and seizure without warrant but an incident of a lawful arrest legal? FACTS: While the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the United States Army, accompanied by men of Filipino Guerrilla Forces arrested Aurelio Alvero for treason and seized and took certain papers from his house. He filed a petition, in which he protested against the procedure of the government in the seizure of said documents, and asked for the documents to be returned to him but was denied. Alvero asked for the reconsideration of said order but was gain denied. Herein petitioner now claims that the respondent judges, in denying the petition for the return of said documents, acted without jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse in the exercise of their discretion, alleging that even the seizure of documents by means of a search warrant legally issued which constitutes a violation of his rights under the Constitution. HELD: The court ruled YES and cited the ruling in Agnello vs United States: "The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is being committed or after its commission. The right to search includes in both instances that of searching the person of him who is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed." The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. But it does not prohibit the Federal Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made by a private person or under authority of state law. FELICIANO GALVANTE vs. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO G.R. No. 162808 April 22, 2008 ISSUE: Can the respondents be criminally liable under article 129 of the revised penal code? FACTS: Respondents pointed their firearms to petitioner; went near the owner type jeep owned by petitioner and conducted a search. Respondents saw a .38 pistol under the floormat of the jeep and asked petitioner of the MR of the firearm. Due to fear that respondents' long arms were still pointed to them, petitioner searched his wallet and gave the asked document. Immediately, the policemen (respondents) left them without saying anything bringing with them the firearm. The RTC found that "the action of the policemen who conducted the warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances justifying the same intruded into the privacy of the accused and the security of his property. Unaware of the RTC decision, Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for illegal search. It found that the allegations of the complainant failed to establish the factual basis of the complaint, it appearing that the incident stemmed from a valid warrantless arrest. HELD: NO. The conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches: Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained, and Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies; rather, he accused private respondents of conducting a search on his vehicle without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC. The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil, under

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Article 32, in relation to Article 2219 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code. Ombudsman properly dismissed the complaint for illegal search, although the reason for dismissing (valid warrantless arrest) the same is rather off the mark. The same should have been dismissed by the reason that it is not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal offense. December 4, 2017 - Article 130 - SEARCHING DOMICILE WITHOUT WITNESS OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P. PAPA VS MAGO G.R. NO. L-27360, FEBRUARY 28, 1968 ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of the goods were valid. FACTS: Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized. She hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence. She claims that the goods were seized without search warrant issued by a competent court. Further, the Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined and that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs. HELD: Yes. It is the settled rule that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. Petitioner his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." Hence, the seizure of the goods were valid. EDUARDO QUINTERO VS. NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION G.R. NO. L-35149 JUNE 23, 1988 ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence being seized were admissible. FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo Quintero disclosed that certain persons had distributed money to some delegates of the Con-Con to influence the delegates in the discharge of their functions. As an offshoot of this disclosure, Delegate Quintero delivered to the Con-Con the aggregate amount of the "payola" he himself had received the amount of P11, 150.00 in cash. Quintero, however, did not reveal the names of the persons who gave him the money; and he begged at that time not to be made to name names. However, pressure mounted on Delegate Quintero to reveal the identities of the people behind the "payola" scheme. Hence, Quintero released from his hospital bed in San Juan de Dios Hospital a sworn statement addressed to the Committee on Privileges of the Con-Con, mentioning the names of the persons who gave him the "payola." Also, In his privilege speech, he said that "in that same evening of January 6,1972, after the dinner was over, when we were still inside the Malacañang grounds on our way to our cars, one of the

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delegates made this announcement: "The envelopes are ready. They will be distributed in a couple of days." Hours after Delegate Quintero's statement was made public, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos went on the air as well as on TV to denounce Mr. Quintero, and he averred that he "shall not rest until I have unmasked this pretender, his master-minds and accomplices." In the evening of the same day that Mr. Marcos issued the afore-quoted statement, the agents of the respondent National Bureau of Investigation (NBI, for short) raided the house of Delegate Quintero, on the basis of Search Warrant No. 7 issued also on 31 May 1972 by respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Manila. NBI agents seized bundles of money amounting to P379, 000.00. On 1 June 1972, the NBI filed with the City Fiscal of Pasay a criminal complaint for direct bribery against Delegate Quintero. HELD: No. Disregarding for a moment the absence of "probable cause," the search itself that was conducted by the NBI agents who raided the house of petitioner, pursuant to the questioned search warrant, was highly irregular. The two (2) occupants of the house who witnessed the search conducted, Generoso Quintero and Pfc. Alvaro Valentin, were closeted in a room where a search was being made by a member of the raiding party, while the other NBI agents were left to themselves in the other parts of the house, where no members of the household were in a position to watch them, and thus they conducted a search on their own. Such a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the house, is held to be violative of both the spirit and the letter of the law, which provides that "no search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of at least one competent witness, resident of the neighborhood." Another irregularity committed by the agents of respondent NBI was their failure to comply with the requirement of Sec. 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides that "The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at least one-witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property." The receipt issued by the seizing party in the case at bar, showed that it was signed by a witness, Sgt. Ignacio Veracruz. This person was a policeman from the Manila Metropolitan Police (MMP), who accompanied the agents of respondent NBI during the conduct of the search, The requirement under the aforequoted Rule that a witness should attest to the making of the receipt, was not complied with. This requirement of the Rules was rendered nugatory, when the one who attested to the receipt from the raiding party was himself a member of the raiding party. The circumstances prevailing before the issuance of the questioned search warrant, and the actual manner in which the search was conducted in the house of the petitioner, all but

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST imperfectly, and yet, strongly suggest that the entire procedure, from beginning to end, was an orchestrated movement designed for just one purpose — to destroy petitioner Quintero's public image with "incriminating evidence," and, as a corollary to this, that the evidence allegedly seized from his residence was "planted" by the very raiding party that was commanded to "seize" such incriminating evidence. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. YOLANDA G.R. NO. 89373. MARCH 9, 1993. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence was properly obtained by the police. FACTS: A police raiding team armed with a search warrant went to the brgy. captain for them to be accompanied in serving the said warrant at the residence of the accused, Yolanda Gesmundo. The police was allowed to enter the house upon the strength of the warrant shown to the accused. The accused begged the police not to search and to leave the house. However, the police still searched the house and was led to the kitchen. She pointed a metal basin on top of a table as the hiding place of died marijuana flowering tops contained in a plastic bag marked ISETANN. The police also recovered from a native “uway” cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in 3 pieces of komiks paper. According to the accused, when the police arrived at her house, she saw Sgt. Yte and PFC Jose Luciano. She invited Sgt. Yte to enter her house while Luciano was left in the jeep that was parked near the house. While inside the house Yte showed the accused something he claimed as a search warrant, when someone coming from the kitchen uttered “eto na” They proceeded to the kitchen and saw Luciano holding a plastic bag with four other companions. They confronted the accused and insisted that the bags belonged to her. Accused denied the accusation and told them that she doesn’t know anything about it. She was made to sign a prepared document. She was brought to the police station and was detained. HELD: No. The claim that the marijuana was planted was strengthened as the police violated sec 7, rule 126 rules of the court provides no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code. The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was inadmissible to the court as the accused was not informed of her right not to sign the document neither was she informed that she has the right to the assistance of a counsel and the fact that it may be used as evidence against her. It was not proved that the marijuana belonged to her. Not only does the law require the presence of witnesses when the search is conducted, but it

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also imposes upon the person making the search the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. He is likewise required to deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory thereof duly verified under oath. Again, these duties are mandatory and are required to preclude substitution of the items seized by interested parties. Hence, the guilt of the accused was has not been established she is acquitted from the crimes charged. December 5, 2017 - Article 131 PROHIBITION, INTERRUPTION, AND DISSOLUTION OF PEACEFUL MEETINGS ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M. FERNANDO IGNACIO and SIMEON DE LA CRUZ, VS THE HONORABLE NORBERTO ELA [G.R. No. L-6858. May 31, 1956.] ISSUE: Whether or not respondent mayor violated Article 131 by not granting the petition to hold the public meeting in the part of the public plaza as was requested. FACTS: A permit to hold a public meeting at the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, together with the kiosk, was sought on behalf of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society (commonly known as Jehovah’s Witnesses). The respondent mayor gave them permission to use the northwestern part of the plaza, instead of the section of the plaza near the kiosk. It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part of the authorities regarding peace and order. This is especially so considering that the tenets of petitioners’ congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church. HELD: The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be “injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the right of the community or society,” and this power may be exercised under the “police power” of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Thus, the action taken by the respondent who refused to allow the use of the kiosk, part of the public plaza, by the members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to those professed by the Catholics, is not unconstitutional as an abridgement of the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship, considering that in view of the proximity of the kiosk to the Catholic church, such meeting, if allowed, might result in the happening of untoward incidents and disturbance of peace and order.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST NELSON NAVARRO VS. MAYOR ANTONIO VILLEGAS G.R. NO. L-31687 FEBRUARY 26, 1970 ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents act on denying the request of the petitioner violates the petitioners’ Right to peaceable assembly and right to the equal protection of the law in violation of Article 131 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: On February 24, 1970, the petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement of a Democratic Philippines, wrote a letter to the respondent, the Mayor of the city of Manila, applying to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda February 26, 1970, from 4-11pm.On the same day, the respondent wrote a reply, denying his request on the grounds that,the have temporarily adopted the policy of not issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstration during weekdays due to the events that happened from the past week. On the same letter, the respondent gave the petitioner an option to use the Sunken Garden near Intamuros for its rally, and for it to be held earlier for it to end before dark. The petitioner filed suit contesting the Mayor’s action on the ground that it violates the petitioner’s right to peaceable assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances (ART. 3, sec 1(8)) and of the petitioner’s right to the equal protection of the law (art. 3, sec. 1). HELD: The right of peaceable assemble is subject to regulation under the police power of the state. The right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly, though granted by the Constitution, is not absolute for it may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right of community and society, This power may be exercised under the police power of the state, which is the power of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, and good order, safety and general welfare of the people. While the privilege of the citizen to use streets and parks for communication may be regulated in the interest of all, said privilege is not absolute. It must be exercised insubordination to the general comfort and convenience and in consonance with peace and good order, but it must not guise of regulation be abridged or denied. PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO L-18000. JAN 27, 1948 ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor Violated Article 131 of the RPC in refusing to issue permit hence violating freedom of assembly. FACTS: This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947. The petitioner requested for a permit to hold a “peaceful public meeting”. However, the

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respondent refused to issue such permit because he found “that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public order.” Respondent based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Freeuse of Public Place. HELD: Yes. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are not absolute. They can be regulated under the state’s police power – that they should not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the community or society. The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila ;and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction since the first construction is tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of public places and not for the assembly itself. The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down. Any public officer or employee is in violation if Article 131 if the RPC if he or she shall prohibit or hinder any person from addressing, either alone or together with others, any petition to the authorities for the correction of abuses or redress of grievances. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state. PETITION IS GRANTED. BAYAN, ET AL., VS. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. NO. 169838, APRIL 25, 2006 ISSUE: Whether or not policemen violated Article 131 in relation to BP 880 by dispersing BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS in their rally. FACTS: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880. Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution, Article 131 of the RPC: Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005. HELD: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

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However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither the words “opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing” in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. December 6, 2017 - Article 132 INTERRUPTION OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M. US VS. BUENAVENTURA BALCORTA G.R. NO. 8722, September 10, 1913 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for "interruption of religious worship". FACTS: The accused entered a private house, uninvited, where services of the Methodist Episcopal Church were being conducted between ten and twenty persons, and threatened the group with a club, interrupting or the disturbing the divine service. The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija sentenced the defendant/appellant, to three years six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and a fine of 625 pesetas, together with other accessory penalties provided by law. HELD: YES. The Spanish Constitution provided for a state religion but also guaranteed the privilege of freely practicing, both in private and public. However, only those followers of the state religion are allowed to practice in public. It is under this constitution the Penal Code of Philippines of 1884 was promulgated, it provided consequences against the violation or crime against the state religion specifically disturbing,

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST by means of violence, threats, etc., their ceremonies when conducted in cemeteries or other places were such ceremonies may be lawfully authorized. (Art. 225.) The change of sovereignty and the enactment of the fourteenth paragraph of section 5 of the Philippine Bill caused the complete separation of church and state, and the abolition of all special privileges and all restrictions theretofore conferred or imposed upon any particular religious sect, looking equally to all religious sects. The articles of the Penal Code referring equally to all religious sects are of two, article 223 and 571. This article recognizes the freedom of religion and worship of all mankind however violations against this incur subsequent penalties. But like any other constitutions no penalty was attached in this article. It says that "the penalty . . . shall be imposed upon any person who . . . shall force some other person to perform an act of worship . . ." The offense falls within the provisions of article 223 and 571 of the Penal Code. However records failed to establish the intent of the accused in committing the act, it was not proven that religious hatred prompted the accused to act as he did. He simply threatened to assault them with a club if they will not stop the religious service. The offense appears to be simply that of disturbing the religious service, punishable under article 571. It is further alleged that the people thus dispersed by the defendant were not holding religious services, as they were simply reading some verses out of the Bible. We have been unable to find any provision of law which requires religious services to be conducted in approved orthodox style in order to merit its protection against interference and disturbances. As stated in Hull vs. State (120 Ind., 153): It makes no difference that the method of worship of those assembled was singular or uncommon. The protection of the statute is extended to all, irrespective of creed, opinion, or mode of worship. Persons who meet for the purpose of religious worship, by any method which is not indecent and unlawful, have a right to do so without being molested or disturbed. December 7, 2017 – Article 133 – OFFENDING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S. PEOPLE VS. PROCORPIO REYES, ET AL. GR No. L-40577, Aug 23 1934 ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants violated Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: In the Barrio of Macalang, Tarlac there is a chapel where it is customary to hold a Pabasa. While the pabasa was going between 11 and 12 o clock midnight, the defendants Procorpio Reyes and company started to construct a barbed wired

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fence in front of the chapel. The chairman of the committee in charge of the pabasa tried to persuade them to refrain from carrying out their plans, because it was already late at night and it was during the holy week. An altercation ensued thus, a complaint was filed against the defendants. HELD: NO. it is noted that Article 133 of the revised penal code punishes acts “notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful”. The construction of the fence, even though irritating and vexatious is not an act designated as “notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.” It is urged that the act of building a fence was innocent and was simply to protect the property rights of the owners. Therefore, appellants are acquitted of a violation of Article 133 but was found guilty of art 287 of the same code.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST TITLE THREE – CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER December 8, 2017 – Article134 – REBELLION OR INSURRECTION ALILIAN, Enna B. POMEROY V DIRECTOR OF PRISONS G.R. Nos. L-14284-14285, February 24, 1960 ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI erred in ordering the release of the petitioners. FACTS: William Pomeroy and Celia Mariano were convicted with the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and robbery committed in pursuance of the rebellion. They entered prison and began serving their sentence. Thereafter, said convicts filed a petition invoking subsequent cases wherein the Court declared that the acts of violence committed in pursuance of rebellion give rise only to simple rebellion. CFI Court ordered the release of the petitioners. HELD: Yes. The rule adopted by the Court is that judicial doctrines have only prospective operation and do not apply to cases previously decided. The sentence meted out was the one provided by law for rebellion which herein applicants were indicted, at the time of their conviction. It was only 4 years after petioners’ conviction that the Court declared that the acts of violence committed in pursuance of rebellion did not give rise to a complex crime in People v Hernandez, May 30 1964. CFI erred in ordering the release of the petitioners. December 8, 2017 – Article134-A – COUP D’ETAT ALILIAN, Enna B. TRILLANES IV V PIMENTEL, SR. G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008 ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in denying petitioner’s motion to be allowed to leave from imprisonment. FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code based on his acts of storming into the Oakwood Premier Apartments and publicly demanding the resignation of the President and key national officials. Subsequently, petitioner won a seat in the Senate causing him to file an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests" invoking that since he was not convicted yet, he must still be presumed to be innocent. Further, he pleaded for the same liberal treatment accorded other detention prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses. HELD: No. The court held that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.

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Also, since coup d’etat cases are punishable by reclusion perpetua, the rule that no person charged by crimes and offenses punishable by such shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong was applicable in this case. It is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release was denied. The determination that petitioner’s guilt was strong justified his detention as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. Moreover, leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. Petitioner failed to establish that the discretion was gravely abused. December 9, 2017 – Article 135 – PENALTY FOR REBELLION, INSURRECTION OR COUP D’ETAT BANUELOS, Kelvinn L. G.R. Nos. L-6025-26 July 18, 1956 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL. CONCEPCION, J. LEGAL ISSUE: W/N Rebellion should be complexed with other crimes committed on such occasion. FACTS: That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously thereafter until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the Philippines, HERNANDEZ, conspiring, confederating, and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31) Defendants charged in criminal cases and also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown. The HERNANDEZ and their co-conspirators, being then officers and/or members of, or otherwise associated with the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organization (CLO), an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other ‘mass organizations’ in different places in the Philippines, and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, fully cooperates in, and synchronizes its activities with the rebellious activities of the ‘Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of the armed rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines. ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ or ‘Hukbalahaps’ made armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose. The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment. However, the defense contends, among other things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. HELD: NO. It is true that treason and rebellion are distinct and different from each other. This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Besides there is more reason to apply said rule in the crime of rebellion than in that of treason, for the law punishing rebellion (Article 135, Revised Penal Code) specifically mentions the act of engaging in war and committing serious violence among its essential elements — thus clearly indicating that everything done in the prosecution of said war, as a means necessary therefor, is embraced therein — unlike the provision on treason (Article 114, Revised Penal Code) which is less explicit thereon. It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority may be committed with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil., 162), homicide (People vs. Lojo, 52 Phil., 390) and murder (U. S. vs. Ginosolongo, 23 Phil., 171; U. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385), and rape may be perpetrated with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya, 34 Phil., 690), then rebellion may, similarly, be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The conclusion does not follow, for engaging in war, serious violence, physical injuries and destruction of life and property are inherent in rebellion, but not in assault upon persons in authority or agents of persons in authority or in rape. The word “rebellion” evokes, not merely a challenge to the constituted authorities, but, also, civil war, on a bigger or lesser scale, with all the evils that go with it, whereas, neither rape nor assault upon persons in authority connotes necessarily, or even generally, either physical injuries, or murder. Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance “to the Government the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part thereof,” then said offense becomes stripped of its “common” complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FEDERICO GERONIMO alias Cmdr. OSCAR, ET AL. G.R. No. L-8936 October 23, 1956 REYES, J. B. L., J. LEGAL ISSUE: W/N accused Geronimo should only be guilty of simple rebellion only. FACTS: On or about January 31, 1953, at barrio of Santa Rita, Del Gallego, Camarines Sur a group of HMBS with Federico Geronimo alias Commander Oscar ambushed and fired upon an Army Patrol headed by Cpl. Bayrante, resulting in seriously wounding of Pfc. Paneracio Torrado and Eusebio Gruta a civilian. Also, on or about February 1954 at barrio Cotmo, San Fernando, Camarines Sur, a group of four HMBS led by accused Commander Oscar with evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed one Policarpio Tipay a barrio lieutenant. On October 18, 1954, the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings; and giving him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnify the heirs of the various persons killed, as listed in the information, in the sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the proportionate costs of the proceedings. From this judgment, accused Federico Geronimo appealed, raising the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, or simple rebellion. HELD: YES. As in treason, where both intent and overt act are necessary, the crime of rebellion is integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes expressed in article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence described in the first paragraph of article 135. That both purpose and overt acts are essential components of one crime, and that without either of them the crime of rebellion legally does not exist, is shown by the absence of any penalty attached to article 134. It follows, therefore that any or all of the acts described in article 135, when committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends described in article 134, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and cannot be regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in themselves. In law they are part and parcel of the rebellion itself, and cannot be considered as giving rise to a separate crime that, under article 48 of the Code, would constitute a complex one with that of rebellion. The majority of the Court found no cogent reason for limiting “commission of serious violence” in article 135 to hostilities against the Government’s armed forces exclusively; for in that case, the former expression would be

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST redundant and mere duplication of “engaging in combat” with loyal troops, also described in the same article. If the infliction of “serious violence” was separately expressed in the law, it is because the violence referred to is that inflicted upon civilians. Again, to restrict “serious violence” to acts short of homicide, is to unwarrantedly assume that the broad term “violencia grave” is used in the limited sense of “lesiones graves”, which in our Penal Code has a specialized signification. In truth, if physical injuries constitute grave violence, so would killing necessarily be, if not more. Additionally, it may be observed that rebellion is by nature a crime of masses or multitudes, involving crowd action that cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds. And we have already pointed out in the Hernandez resolution that to admit the complexing of the crime of rebellion with the felonies committed in furtherance thereof, would lead to these undesirable results: (1) to make the punishment for rebellion heavier than that of treason, since it has been repeatedly held that the latter admits no complexing with the overt acts committed in furtherance of the treasonous intent, and, in addition, requires two witnesses to every overt act which is not true in the case of rebellion; (2) to nullify the policy expressed in article 135 (R.P.C.) of imposing lesser penalty upon the rebel followers as compared to their leaders, because under the complexing theory every rebel, leader or follower, must suffer the heavier penalty in its maximum degree; (3) to violate the fundamental rule of criminal law that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused: “in dubiis reus est absolvendus”, “nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege.” Of course, not every act of violence is to be deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it happens to be committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion. But ever then, the individual misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other; the individual crime would not be a means necessary for committing the rebellion as it would not be done in preparation or in furtherance of the latter. This appears with utmost clarity in the case where an individual rebel should commit rape; certainly the latter felony could not be said to have been done in furtherance of the rebellion or facilitated its commission in any way. The ravisher would then be liable for two separate crimes, rebellion and rape, and the two could not be merged into a juridical whole. JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. HON. OMAR U. AMIN G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990 GUTIERREZ, JR., J. ISSUE: W/N the crime of Rebellion can be complexed with the special penal law

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FACTS: On or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house. On March 21, 1990, ENRILE filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that: (a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense; and (b) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829. The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829. Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law. HELD: NO. The doctrine of absorption is applicable in the case at bar. If a person cannot be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion. The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra: In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive: In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one cannot be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense whereas in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. December 11, 2017 – Article 136 – CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT COUP D'ETAT, REBELLION OR INSURRECTION VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B. THE UNITED STATES v. SIMEON FIGUERAS ET AL G.R. No. 1282. September 10, 1903. MAPA, J. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are guilty of the crime of conspiracy FACTS: The judgment of the Court of First Instance from which the defendants appealed finds them guilty of the crime of conspiracy under section 1 of Act No. 292. There were three witnesses: Paulino Legaspi, Laureano Martinez, and Petronilo Portugal. Petronilo Portugal’s testimony was disregarded. He testifies that he was invited by Paulino Legaspi to rebel against the Government, and that he was given to understand by Legaspi that there were many persons who intended to conspire, but the witness did not know whether the accused were implicated in this conspiracy.

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Paulino Legaspi testifies that various persons, some forty more or less in number, were conspiring to overthrow the constituted Government, and states that he knows that the defendants were engaged in this conspiracy because he heard them say so in their conversations. Called upon to repeat the words which he heard them say, he stated the following: "What a life this is, so full of misery, constantly increasing. When will our wretchedness end? When will the authorities remedy it? What shall we do?" He does not state that he heard anything beyond this, and it appears that he relies solely upon these words, used by the defendants, as a basis for his assertion that they were conspiring. As to other matters this witness testifies solely from hearsay. The second witness, Laurenao Martinez, the owner of the said house where the meeting was held, averred that it is improbable that the defendants should select his house, for the purpose of meeting together to conspire, to read and comment upon correspondence relating to the conspiracy, and to consider the matter of contributions and arms collected for the purposes thereof, as this witness testifies, doing all this in his presence, without the slightest caution or care, when it appears from the testimony of the witness himself that not only was he not a party to the conspiracy but that he had not even been requested to join it. From this it follows necessarily that the conspirators could not know whether they could count upon his consent and adhesion or not, and it is incredible that the defendants should discuss so grave and delicate a matter with such an absolute disregard of the most rudimentary precautions — precautions which the most ordinary prudence would counsel in such cases — as would appear to be the case from the testimony of the witness Martinez. Martinez further said that it is also improbable that Martinez, who had no interest in the conspiracy, he being, according to his own testimony, an entire outsider, would have permitted such criminal meetings to be held in his house, thus exposing himself to disagreeable consequences. A letter which Martinez states that he abstracted from the pocket of the defendant Bermudes, was attached to the record as evidence for the prosecution. HELD: No. The insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution it is unnecessary to consider the weight to be attributed to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense, which, however, tends to demonstrate the innocence of the defendants. The letter submitted might perhaps have some value as evidence if it were shown: (1)That the words and phrases used in the letter have a conventional meaning; and if so, then the ordinary meaning of the words and phrases employed; (2)The authenticity of this letter. Nothing in this connection has been proven, nor was any attempt made to introduce such evidence at the trial and in the absence of such

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST important data the value of this letter as evidence must depend exclusively upon the testimony of Laureano Martinez, whose credibility, as we have already stated, appears exceedingly doubtful. The terms of the letter itself are such that, given their natural and ordinary meaning, they do not even remotely show the existence of any conspiracy. The court finds that it is at least strange that Martinez, although he succeeded in getting possession of the letter on the night of Monday, March 9, did not deliver it to the governor of the province until the night of Wednesday, the 11th, if, as he testifies, his sole purpose in stealing it was to discover and denounce the conspiracy. There is nothing in the case, supposing that such was his purpose, to satisfactorily explain such a delay, and it is even more strange that it should not have occurred to the witness to read the letter. He had it in his possession for a considerable length of time, and it would have been natural for him to be interested in reading it, either for the purpose of assuring himself that it was the same letter he proposed to purloin and not some other, or else for the purpose of determining, by acquainting himself with its contents, of which he had no knowledge, whether or not it was sufficient to support the very grave charge which he proposed to lodge with the Government authorities of the province. Above all, the fact that the other witness for the prosecution, Paulino Legaspi, who, according to the testimony of Martinez, is the one who delivered this letter to the defendant Bermudes, not only fails to say a single word about it but testifies in such a way that it may reasonably be inferred from his testimony as a whole that he was wholly ignorant of the existence of the letter, his statements thus being an implicit denial of the assertions of Martinez in this regard. The court finds that the guilt of the defendants not having been established by the evidence, they are entitled to an acquittal. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL. G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964 ----------------------------THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BAYANI ESPIRITU, ET AL G.R. No. L-6026 May 30, 1964 ISSUE: Does his or anyone's membership in the Communist Party per se render Hernandez or any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion under the provisions of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code? FACTS: On or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously thereafter, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082, 14270, 14315 and 14344, the said accused and their other coconspirators, being then high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with

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the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thru act theretofore committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines, and of which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof as in fact that to attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose. The said accused conspiring among themselves and with several others as aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or maintained the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organizations (CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other "mass organizations" in different places in the Philippines, as an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and synchronize its activities — as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or maintained by the herein accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and synchronized its activities with the activities of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of the above-mentioned armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines. HELD: No. The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished, respectively, by prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos, and by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. Mere membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the same. On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising or rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force, and by such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by law. The leader of the CLO therefore, namely Hernandez, cannot be considered as a leader in actual rebellion or of the actual uprising subject of the accusation. Hernandez, as President of the CLO therefore, by his presidency and leadership of the CLO cannot be considered as having actually risen up in arms in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines, or taken part in the conspiracy to commit the rebellion as charged against him in the present case; he was merely a propagandist and indoctrinator of Communism, he was not a Communist conspiring to commit the actual rebellion by the mere fact of his presidency of the CLO. December 12, 2017 – Article 137 – DISLOYALTY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES [NO CASE FOUND] December 12, 2017 – Article 138 – INCITING TO REBELLION OR INSURRECTION [NO CASE FOUND] December 12, 2017 – Article 139 – SEDITION DUQUE, Francis Lester PEOPLE vs. GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL. G.R. No. 17748 - March 4, 1922

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ISSUE: WON it is necessary that the offender should be a private citizen in the crime of sedition. FACTS: Policemen of city Manila arrested a woman who was a member of the household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at Santa Lucia Barracks. The next day, Artemio Mojica, police officer posted in the street of Calle Real had an encounter with various Constabulary soldiers which resulted in the shooting of private Macasinag, constabulary who was mortally wounded and eventually died. The next day in, a rumor spread among the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks that policeman Mojica was allowed to continue on duty These incidents was considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage committed by the policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction between members of Manila police department and member of the Philippine Constabulary. Constabulary soldier endangered a deep feeling of resentment which was soon converted into a desire for revenge against the police force of the city of Manila. At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day, corporal Ingles approached private Nicolas Torio who was then the man in charge of quarters, and asked him to let the soldiers out through the window. Private Torio was easily was persuaded. Some 70 armed soldier went out. They divided into two groups. One platoon of Constabulary Soldier fired in the direction of the intersection of Calles Real where an American policeman Driskill was stationed with his friend Jacumin. A street car happened to stop. Without considering that the passengers in the car were innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad fired a volley into the car, killing one passenger wounding three civilian. Some minutes later, Captain William E. Wichman, assistant chief of police, riding in a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, arrived and a volley of shorts by Constabulary soldiers were fired resulted in the instantaneous death of Wichman and Saplala. About the same time, a police patrol came, the Constabulary soldiers fired at them which resulted in the death of patrolmen Trogue and Sison. Another platoon arranged themselves in a firing line on the east side of Calle General Luna and fired upon the motorcycle occupied by Sergeant Armada and driven by policeman Policarpio who were just passing. As a result the two policemen was mortally wounded. The same platoon fired several volleys indiscriminately into the Luneta police station, and the office of the secret service. The next day Colonel Lucien R. Sweet of the Constabulary officers, and the fiscals of the city of Manila, commenced an investigation. Sergeant Graciano L. Cabrera admitted to have participated in the shooting. The defendants were charged with the crime of sedition and found guilty by the court. Hence this petition. Counsel contend that it is necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public functionary, and that what really happened in this instance was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST HELD: No. Act No 292 - Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies when the wording of said law states that "it makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government."

Commander Torio and about 20 armed men. Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions leave.

PEOPLE vs. NARCISO UMALI, ET AL G.R. No. L-5803 - November 29, 1954

HELD: No. The crime committed was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government as defined in Article 134 of the RPC but rather, the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong punishable uder Article 139 of the RPC.

ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct in finding Narciso Umali guilty of complex crime of rebellion.

December 13, 2017 – Article 140 – PENALTY FOR SEDITION [NO CASE FOUND]

FACTS: Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old time friends belonged to the same political faction and even campaigning for each other. Umali was then a congressman while Punzalan was a Mayor. Narciso Umali regarded himself as the political head and leader in Tiaong, became jealous because of his (Punzalan's) fast growing popularity among the people of Tiaong who looked to him instead of Umali for political guidance, leadership, and favors.

December 13, 2017 – Article 140 CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT SEDITION DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna

On 1951 election, Punzalan ran for reelection. To oppose him, and to clip his political wings and definitely blast his ambition for continued power and influence in Tiaong, Umali picked Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader. Amado Mendoza, star witness for the prosecution, testified that on the eve of the election, at the house of Pasumbal's father, then being used as his electoral headquarters, he heard Umali instruct Pasumbal to contact the Huks through Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be killed, Pasumbal complying with the order of his Chief (Umali) went to the mountains and held a conference with Commander Abeng. It would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan was going to win in the elections the next day, and that his death was the surest way to eliminate him from the electoral fight. In the evening of the same day, Mendoza heard Pasumbal report to Umali about his conference with Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to the proposition and had even outlined the manner of attack. Day following the election, Punzalan win over Pasumbal. He was told by Umali to come with him, and Pasumbal and the three boarded a jeep toward the Tiaong Elementary School and once there he (Mendoza) was left at the school premises with instructions by Umali to wait for Commander Abeng and the Huks and point to them the house of Punzalan. After waiting for sometime, Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with garands and carbines, arrived and after explaining his identity and his mission to Abeng, Mendoza had led them Punzalan's house and then walked toward his home, leaving the Huks who proceeded to lie flat in a canal. Before reaching his house, he already heard shots, so, he evacuated his family. His wife Catalina incidentally saw Congressman Umali holding a revolver, in the company of Huk

FACTS: On the 1st day of September, 1910, an uprising in the Philippine Islands, and having for its object the overthrow of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and provincial and municipal governments of the Province of Nueva Vizcaya and other provinces in the Philippine Islands, took place in and about the township of Solano in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya.

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–

THE UNITED STATES vs. MAXIMINO PLANAS G.R. No. 6867 December 23, 1911 ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is liable for the crime of conspiracy to commit sedition.

Defendant, Maximino Planas, was the president of the town of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On the 3rd day of September, 1910, the said Maximino Planas called together the policemen of the said town of Bambang and said them, "The insurrectos have entered Solano and seized money from the treasury, burned the papers, and made prisoners of the padres. Now you must bring your arms to my house so that I can deliver them to the issurrectos when they reach here and you must all be ready to join the insurrectos when they bring because I am captain of insurrectos, and when they come we will kill the Americans Bennett and Scott and the Romanista padre, and burn the convent. Do not tell anything of this to the Americans or the insurrectos will kill you when they come," or words to that effect. On the 4th day of September, 1910, between 9 and 10 o'clock, the councilmen of Bambang assembled at the presedencia of said town in obedience to the call or bandillo which had been published the previous evening in said town by the defendant. At this meeting there were present the councilmen: Proceso Sierra, Martin Apno, Marcelino Alvarez, Angel Malonoy, Santiago Corales, and Francisco Pugayan, and President Planas, the accused. And that the accused then told the assembled councilmen that the insurrectos had entered Solano, seized the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST municipal funds, burned the papers, and made prisoners of the Romanista padres. "Prepare your people with arms, bolos, spears, and arrows, and when the insurrectos arrive in this town be ready to join them, then we will kill the Americans Bennett and Scott and the Romanista padre," or words to that effect. Also, in the house of the councilman Martin Apno, of the town of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, the accused had a conversation with the aforementioned Councilman Martin Apno in which the accused said "Do you know what has happened in Solano? The insurrectos have entered there and taken the money and burned the papers," and that said councilman Apno must prepare bolos, lances, and other arms and when the insurrectos entered be prepared to join them and that after they would kill Mr. Bennett and Mr. Scott and the Roman padre of the town of Bambang, Nueva Viscaya. HELD: Yes. Many witnesses were presented both by the government and the defendant. The facts in the present case bear a very close relation to the facts in the cases of U. S. vs. Mandac (No. 6763), and U.S. vs. Isidro Olaño (No. 6882). The Court found that the facts were conclusively and overwhelmingly proven by the testimony of the prosecution which consisted of the evidence of four policemen of the town of Bambang, Pantaleon Pugayan, Pedro Sierra, Santiago Angela, and Emeterio Marquez; three councilmen of said town whose names were Proceso Sierra, Martin Apno, and Angel Malanoy, and the municipal treasurer of Bambang, Ventura Bernal, and his clerk Martiniano Mirralles. The policemen testified that they assembled, four in number, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon in the presidencia of Bambang by order of the defendant on the 3d of September, 1910, and that the defendant then told them to deliver their arms to his house as he, the defendant, was a captain of the insurrectos and that he (the defendant) would deliver said arms to the insurrectos when they entered the town of Bambang. The defendant also told the four policemen that the insurrectos had already entered Solano, seized the municipal funds and burned the papers, and that when they (the insurrectos) reached Bambang to be ready to join them and that they would then kill the two Americans, Bennett and Scott, and the Romanpadre and burn the convent. On the next day, the 4th of September, when six councilmen assembled in thepresidencia of Bambang in obedience to his order the defendant repeated substantially the same conversation as he had with the policemen. He told the councilmen to prepare their people with arms of all kinds, bolos, lances, and arrows, and be ready to join the insurrectos when they reached Bambang, after which they (the insurrectos) would kill the Americans Scott and Bennett, and the Romanista padre, and burn the convent. He also told the councilmen that the insurrectos had already entered Solano, seized the municipal funds and burned the papers, and that when they (the insurrectos) entered Bambang, they, the councilmen and their people, would hear the

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salvos of the police at the presidencia and this would be the signal to join forces with the insurrectos. From the foregoing, the Court held that the findings of fact made by the lower court are in accordance with such evidence, and show that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged beyond peradventure of doubt, and that the sentence imposed by the lower court is in accordance with the law. December 14, 2017 - Article 142 – INCITING TO SEDITION PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D. PEOPLE vs. ISAAC PEREZ G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923 MALCOLM, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not Perez has uttered seditious words which tend to incite others. FACTS: Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and one Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, happened to meet in the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." HELD: Yes. In the words of law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government. Since, the Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States and holds in his office at the pleasure of the President, a seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty. PEOPLE VS. NABONG G. R. No. 36426, November 03, 1932 STREET, J. ISSUE: Whether or not Nabong’s speech tended to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes. FACTS: Antonio D. Ora, the head of the communists in the Philippine Islands, died and a necrological service in his memory was held. Nabong, an attorney, delivered a speech in such service criticizing the members of the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Constabulary, using words substantially to the following effect: "They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag. The members of the Constabulary are bad because they shoot even innocent women, as it happened in Tayug. In view of this, we ought to be united to suppress that abuse. Overthrow the present government and establish our own government, the government of the poor. Use your whip so that there may be marks on their sides." HELD: Yes. The language used by Nabong clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently intended to be understood. The word "overthrow" could not have been intended as referring to an ordinary change by the exercise of the elective franchise. It was the purpose of Nabong, beyond a doubt, to incite his hearers to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means. The words used by Nabong manifestly tended to induce the people to resist and use violence against the agents of the Constabulary and to instigate the poor to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes. They also suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, thereby tending to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the community. It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that the words used should in fact result in a rising of the people against the constituted authorities. The law is not aimed merely at actual disturbance, and its purpose is also to punish utterances which may endanger public order. ESPUELAS VS PEOPLE G.R. NO. L-2990, DECEMBER 17, 1951 BENGZON, J: ISSUE: Whether or not Espuelas was liable of scurrilous libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the Government of the Philippines. FACTS: In the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of the same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, stating his dismay in the administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis and for this reason he is ashamed that he cannot hold high brows to the world with such dirty government.

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HELD: Yes. A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government. The violent and provocative statements made by Espuelas against the state was neither constructive nor with reason. It, instead, went beyond the ambit of criticism legally permitted since it had the dangerous tendency of appealing to the common mind and suggesting or inciting rebellious conspiracies and riots against the duly constituted government. December 15, 2017 – Article 143 – ACTS TENDING TO PREVENT THE MEETING OF THE ASSEMBLY AND SIMILAR BODIES ALAMEDA, Manuel PEOPLE VS ALIPIT 55 Phil 170- August 22, 1922 ISSUE: Whether or not the chief of police and municipal president are liable under Article 143 for preventing the meeting of the municipal council. FACTS: The municipal council held an extraordinary meeting which was presided over by vicepresident Basa because the hour fixed had come without the president being present. While the meeting was being held, the accused Victorio Alemus, then the chief of police of that municipality, entered the room, saying that he had an order from the president to arrest vicepresident Basa. Basa answered that he had not committed any crime. Dominador Delfino, one of the councilors present, succeeded in persuading the chief of police to wait until the meeting was over. A few minutes thereafter president Alipit arrived at the municipal building and after taking one of the revolvers in the police office, fired a shot in the air, entered immediately the room where the meeting was being held and said in a loud voice to the chief of police who was there: "Arrest him, arrest him," pointing out the vice-president. The chief of police obeyed the order, holding the vice-president by the arm and taking him to the jail, president Alipit following them with the revolver in his hand. Shortly afterwards, councilor Delfino asked president Alipit if they could continue the meeting to the end, to which Alipit answered: "Whoever dare continue holding the meeting will be arrested." the councilors then dispersed, leaving the premises. HELD: Any stranger, even if he be the municipal president himself or the chief of the municipal police, must respect the meeting of the municipal council which for the time being, at least, raises the presumption that no defect exists to render it illegal. That meeting of the municipal council was entitled too this respect on the part of the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST defendants and the aforesaid presumption was effective as to them. December 16, 2017 – Article DISTURBANCE OF PROCEEDINGS RIVERA, Marynit P.

144

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LOPEZ V. DE LOS REYES G.R. No L-3436, November 5, 1930 ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Candido Lopez could be made the basis for contempt proceedings and for criminal prosecution FACTS: On October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez attacked and assaulted, without any justification, the Honorable Jose D. Dimayuga, who was then and is now a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippine Islands while said Representative was going to the hall of the House of Representative to attend to the sessions. As a result of the attack and assault, Representative Dimayuga was unable to attend the sessions on that day and those of the two days next following by reason of the threats which Mr. Candido Lopez made against the said Representative. HELD: Yes. The implied power to punish for contempt of the National Assembly is coercive in nature. The power to punish crime is punitive in character. Thus, the same act could be made the basis for contempt proceedings and for criminal prosecution. December 17, 2017 – Article 145 – VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY TADO, Diann Kathelline A. MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN vs. THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, and THE CITY WARDEN OF MANILA G.R. No. L-34022, March 24, 1972 ISSUE: Whether Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code applies in this case FACTS: Petitioner Martinez y Festin alleged that on June 10, 1971, an information against him for falsification a public document was filed. Its basis was his stating under oath in his certificate of candidacy for delegate to that Constitutional Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945, when in truth and in fact he knew that he was born on June 20, 1946. He was arrested by the City Sheriff in the afternoon of September 6, 1971. At the time of the filing of the petition he was confined at the City Jail in the custody of respondent City Warden of Manila. He was on his way to attend the plenary session of the Constitutional Convention. Such arrest was against his will and over his protest. As for petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr., 10 it was alleged that he is a duly elected and proclaimed delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Two criminal complaints was filed

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by a defeated delegate-aspirant for alleged violation of Section 51 of the Revised Penal Code in that they gave and distributed free of charge food, drinks and cigarettes at two public meetings, one held in Sablan and the other in Tuba, both towns being in Province of Benguet. Before a warrant of arrest in said criminal cases could be issued, petitioner in a motion of August 14, 1971 invoked the privilege of immunity from arrest and search, pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, in relation to Sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution and Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code. HELD: NO. Their reliance on the constitutional provision which for them should be supplemented by what was provided for in the Revised Penal Code is futile. There is no justification then for granting their respective pleas. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI, the immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Certainly then from the explicit language of the Constitution, even without its controlling interpretation as shown by the debates of the Constitutional Convention to be hereinafter discussed, petitioners cannot justify their claim to immunity. Nor does Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code come to their rescue. Such a provision that took effect in 1932 could not survive after the Constitution became operative on November 15, 1935. The repugnancy between such an expansion of the congressional immunity and the plain command of the Constitution is too great to be overcome, even on the assumption that the penalty to which a public officer will be subjected in the event that he did arrest one entitled thereto for an offense punishable by less than reclusion temporal suffices to widen its scope. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. DECEMBER 18, 2017 – Article 146 – ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P. MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO G.R. NO. L-62270 MAY 21, 1984 ISSUE:

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Whether Article 146 of the Revised Penal Code applies in this case FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the university. On the scheduled date, the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time and held it in a different place from that indicated in the permit. They expressed in a vehement language their opposition to the merger and as a result, classes and office work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. On appeal, they were found guilty of holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. HELD: NO. Petitioners only invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech which they are entitled to do so. Their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities who are devoid to deny such request. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of nonacademic personnel. However, in violation of terms, penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. December 19, 2017 – Article 147 – ILLEGAL ASSOCIATION NASH, Regina Mercado IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF SERAFIN G. CRUZ. SERAFIN G. CRUZ vs. GEN. ROMEO GATAN of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga G.R. No. L-44910 November 29, 1976 ISSUE: Whether or not the detention of Serafin Cruz was legal under Art. 147 RPC. FACTS: Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by PC agents on August 30, 1976, at the Baguio Checkpoint along Kennon Road, Baguio City, and brought to Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, under the command of respondent Gen. Romeo Gatan, for custodial interrogation. On October 22, 1976, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was filed in his behalf wherein it was claimed that the said Serafin Cruz is held incommunicado; that he is restrained of his liberty without due process of law and is in the custody of the respondent not by virtue of a judgment or court order; that he is not a member of any subversive organization covered by Proclamation No. 1081 and falls within the class of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not been suspended.

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The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus returnable to the Court on Friday, November 12, 1976 at 3:00 p.m. and required the respondent to make a return of the writ not later than Wednesday, November 10, 1976. Admitting that the petitioner has been arrested and detained, the respondent justifies such arrest and detention as having been legally ordered by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his powers under martial law claiming that Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by virtue of Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order No. 4122, dated August 28, 1976, issued by the Secretary of National Defense, for violation of Art. 147 of the Revised Penal Code (Illegal Associations), Serafin G. Cruz being the "Over-all Commander and Contractor General of the Bataan Defenders Command," an unregistered veterans outfit, at the time of his arrest. It is further claimed that his continued detention is the free will and volition of the petitioner who expressed fears that he might be harmed or injured by some members of the "Bataan Defenders Command" if he were free from custody while the mastermind and legal counsel of the association, one Atty. Cecilio Baylon Buenafe, has not yet been arrested. On November 17, 1976, counsel, who filed the petition in behalf of Serafin G. Cruz, filed a comment on the return saying, among others, that after November 12, 1976, he talked with Serafin G. Cruz and the latter avowed his preference to stay within the confines of Camp Olivas, notwithstanding the subsequent arrest of the said Atty. Cecilio Baylon Buenafe, thus rendering the issues raised in the petition unnecessary and/or irrelevant. Then, at the hearing of the case, Serafin G. Cruz manifested to the Court that he prefers to stay under protective custody. Under the circumstances, there is no other recourse but to dismiss the case. But, be that as it may, under General Order No. 2-A, as amended, the President of the Philippines, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, ordered the Secretary of National Defense "to arrest or cause the arrest and take into custody and to hold them until otherwise ordered released by me or by my duly designated representative: 1. Such persons as may have committed crimes and offenses in furtherance or on the occasion of or incident to or in connection with the crimes of insurrection or rebellion as defined in Articles 134 to 138 of the Revised Penal Code, and other crimes against public order as defined in Articles 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 154, 155, and 156 of the same Code; ... HELD: Yes it was legal when they arrested and detained Cruz by virtue of an Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order issued by the Secretary of National Defense for violation of Article 147 of the Revised Penal Code pursuant General Order No. 2-A, as amended. The declaration of martial law and the consequent suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons reasonably believed or charged to be engaged in the disorder.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST December 20, 2017 – Article 148 – DIRECT ASSAULT DAHIROC, Janice L. RIVERA v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 138553, JUN 30, 2005 ISSUE: Whether or Not Rivera is guilty of the crime of direct assault? FACTS: Police Inspector Edward M. Leygo and SPO1 Joseph Basquial were conducting patrols on board in Shilan, Benguet. They came upon a truck which was unloading sacks of chicken dung at the stall of Enrique Totoy Rivera along the highway since Municipal Ordinance No. I-91 prohibits the unloading of chicken dung along the highway, Inspector Leygo asked the driver to stop unloading the manure and return the truck from where it came. The driver complied. After a while, Enrique Rivera asked the driver to drive back to Shilan, Benguet and unload the sacks of chicken dung and not follow the police’s orders. The driver followed Rivera’s order and drove back to Shilan Benguet while Rivera was following closely behind in his own car. Inspector Leygo gave chase to the truck. Leygo was able to intercept the truck and force it to stop. Leygo inquired why they insisted on defying the ban on the loading and unloading of manure. Rivera then alighted from his vehicle and uttered insulting words such as: “babalian kita ng buto”, “Ilalampaso kita”, and “Pulis lang kayo”. Leygo then approached Rivera and said that he was going to arrest him for violating the Municipal Ordinance. Rivera then assumed fighting stance and punched Leygo in his lower lip. They grappled for a while and with the help of fellow police officers, Rivera was finally arrested. HELD: YES. Direct assault may be committed by two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. It is evident that this case falls under the second mode. It is evident that the assault happened when Leygo was engaged in the actual performance of his official duties. He was wearing the designated police uniform and was on board a police car conducting a routinary patrol when he first came upon the truck unloading chicken manure. Since the loading and unloading of chicken manure is prohibited by an ordinance, Leygo has every right to order the accused to stop. When accused defied such a lawful order, it is only natural that Leygo would stop them from doing so. Under the circumstances, it simply defies reason to argue that Leygo was not in the performance of his

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lawful duties as a police officer when the assault upon him was perpetrated by the petitioner. Aggravating circumstances 1. The assault is committed with a weapon 2. When the offender is a public officer or employee 3. When the offender lays hand upon a person in authority GELIG V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 173150/ JUL 28, 2010 ISSUE: Whether or Not Lydia C. Gelig is liable for the crime of Direct Assault. FACTS: Lydia C. Gelig and Gemma B. Micarsos were public school teachers at the Nailo Elementary School. Lydia’s son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma. Lydia confronted Gemma during class after learning that Gemma called Roseller "sissy". Gemma tried to calm Lydia down but failed to do so. As Gemma tried to go the Principal office, Lydia pushed Gemma causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. Gemma experienced abdominal pain and after 42 days she suffered incomplete abortion. Lydia was convicted in the RTC for the crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion. Lydia was then acquitted before the CA for the crime of direct assault but was held liable for slight physical injuries. Unsatisfied with the ruling, Lydia brought he case before the SC. HELD: Yes. This case falls under the second mode of Direct Assault which has the following elements: 1. that the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance. 2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent. 3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged i the actual performance of official duties, or (b) that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties. 4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties. 5. That there is no public uprising. Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the RPC. Since the assault happened while Gemma was overseeing the class, she is in the actual performance of her official duties. That being the case, all of the requisites of the crime of Direct Assault are present. As such, Lydia is guilty of Direct Assault. However, Lydia is not guilty of indirect abortion since the prosecution failed to prove that the act of pushing is the proximate cause of the abortion. The interval of time 42 days, is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. December 21, 2017 – Article 149 – INDIRECT ASSAULT [NO CASE FOUND]

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST December 21, 2017 – Article150 – DISOBEDIENCE TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P. UY KHEYTIN ET. AL., VS ANTONIO VILLAREAL GR NO. 16009, SEP 21, 1920 ISSUE: Whether the Books, Papers, and other properties seized may be returned. FACTS: Ramon Gayanilo, a constabulary, applied for a search warrant, stating in his application; “That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, under the writing desk in his store, there is kept a certain amount of opium.” Upon that application, a search warrant was issued. On April 30th, respondent and accompanied by some of his subordinates, searched the house of petitioner Uy and found 60 small cans of opium. They wanted to search the bodega but Uy denied that it was his. Wanting to be sure, Torralba placed a guard in the premises to ensure nothing was removed from the premises. Later, they found out thru one Segovia that Uy was renting the bodega. There, Torralba resumed the search and found and seized other articles such as opium pipes, containers, books and papers. Uy then filed a criminal complaint for violation of the Opium law and filed a petition in the Court of First Instance, for the return of the private papers, books and other property which the Constabulary seized illegally and in violation of the constitutional rights of the defendants. HELD: Yes. Although in the issuance of the search warrant, the Judge did not comply with the requirements of Sec. 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and its paraphernalia which was found under said warrant. However, the seizure of the petitioner’s books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no inherent relation with opium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was illegal and in violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights.

sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault. A Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created, composed of five members to be appointed by the President of the Senate to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the duty of the said Committee to determine whether the said purchase was honest, valid, and proper and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, and any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises. Said Committee shall have the power to conduct public hearings; issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents before it; and may require any official or employee of any bureau, office, branch, subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government to assist or otherwise cooperate with the Special Committee in the performance of its functions and duties. Said Committee shall submit its report of findings and recommendations within two weeks from the adoption of this Resolution. Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus HELD: When Arnault refused to divulge the identity of the person to whom he gave an amount of P440.000, whose identity the Senate investigating committee believed him to know, the Senate pronounced him guilty of contempt and ordered his imprisonment until he would be willing to identify such person.

JEAN ARNAULT VS. LEON NAZARENO G.R. NO. L-3820, JULY 18, 1950

It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty, but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness’ right to due process of law.

ISSUE: Whether the senate can impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.

December 22, 2017 – Article 151 DISOBEDIENCE TO THE PERSON IN AUTHORITY IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.

FACTS: The Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the

PEOPLE VS CHAN FOOK G.R. NO. 16968, OCTOBER 6, 1921

Hence, Art. 150 may not apply when the papers or documents may be used in evidence against the owner, because it would be equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself.

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ISSUE:

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Whether accused is guilty for the crime of resistance and disobedience to the public authority. FACTS: Accused is a Chinese subject and a passenger of a US military transport South Bend which arrived in Manila on April 6, 1920. The immigration authorities has allowed the appellant to land, he left the boat on the same day. Appellant then went back to the pier No. 1 to get his baggage the following day, Customs agent Cruz searched the baggage of the accused and found postcards of indecent characters. He later then tried to search the body of the accused, which the accused objected. A disputed took place, after showing the accused his police badge, the accused still resisted and struck the agent on the stomach. The agent then struck the accused on the neck and Agent Jacinto intervened and explained that the inspector was a custom agent searching for contraband, and appellant resisted no further and allowed him to be searched. Chan Fook was then prosecuted for the crime of resistance and disobedience to the public authority, and sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila to two months and one day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of 1,301 pesetas and the costs of the action, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. HELD: No, that the right to be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. It is urged that the object of searching the person of the accused was to find whether he had with him any contraband. It was too late to look for any contraband. He had already been searched when he left the boat. The accused had reached his destination, spending the night in the house where he had taken lodging. It is not, therefore, reasonable to believe that when he returned to pier No. 1 the next day, he had about his body any contraband. Thus the search made by the agent Cruz appears to be unreasonable. A person in authority, his agent or a public officer who exceeds his power cannot be said to be in the exercise of the functions of his office. The law that defines and establishes his powers does not protect him for anything that has not been provided for. "The scope of the respective powers of public officers and their agents is fixed. If they go beyond it and they violate any recognized rights of the citizens, then the latter may resist the invasion, specially when it is clear and manifest. The resistance must be coextensive with the excess, and should not be greater than what is necessary to repel the aggression. EDMUNDO SIONZON V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 202692, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 ISSUE: Whether petitioner violated Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code when he resisted the officer placing him under arrest. FACTS:

31 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

A checkpoint was established along Roxas Boulevard in Malate on June 11, 2006. P/Insp. Aguilar et. al., where manning the checkpoint when they saw a red Ford Ranger with plate number XAE 988 driven by petitioner Sydeco. They then proceeded to flagged the swerving pick up and asked the petitioner to alight from the vehicle. Petitioner, who the police claimed was smelling liquor, denied of being drunk, shouted and talked rudely to the Policemen. Petitioner blurted out “Putang Ina Mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli.” Respondents, proceed to subdue the petitioner and was arrested and brought to Manila Hospital to be examined for liquor. Petitioner on the other hand, claimed to be a victim of physical injuries, robbery and arbitrary detention against P/Insp. Aguilar. The MTC and the RTC, rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of violation of RA 4136 and violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code of resisting arrest. HELD: No. Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior as defined in Sec. 48 of RA 4136 – No person shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or without reasonable caution or so as to endanger the property or the safety or rights of any person or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway. Nothing in the records indicate that the area was a "no swerving or overtaking zone." Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are usually clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb and property to third persons is minimal. The men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during the period material appeared not to have performed their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of the norm expected of peace officers. They spotted the petitioner’s purported swerving vehicle. They then signaled him to stop which he obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of the driver’s license or issue any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as required under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of RA 4136, which specifically provides: SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License. – Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations x x x confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches to be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed. Moreover, there is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpointmanning policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk" action. December 23, 2017 – Article 152 – PERSONS IN AUTHORITY AND AGENTS OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P. PEOPLE VS FELIX BENITEZ G.R. NO. 48396, SEPTEMBER 11, 1942 ISSUE: Whether or not a division superintendent of schools is a person in authority. FACTS: Felix Benitez, a special agent in the office of the Provincial Governor punched D’Artagnan Williams, a Division Superintendent of School in Negros Occidental for his supposed acts or remarks that caused an outrage or offense to the Provincial Governor in connection with the appointment of teachers. On an indictment for assault upon a person in authority, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional and to pay a fine of P500 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. HELD: Under the law (section 917 of the Revised Administrative Code), a division superintendent of schools is given the power of general superintendence over schools and school interests in his division, with the right to appoint municipal school teachers and to fix their salaries, and further, since education is a state function and public policy demands an adequate protection of those engaged in the performance of this commission, we believe and so hold that a division superintendent of schools should be regarded as a person in authority. RUBEN DEL CASTILLO VS PEOPLE G.R. NO. 185128, JANUARY 30, 2012 ISSUE: Whether the search warrant issued to conduct search and the seizure of illegal drugs found by the barangay tanod in the nipa hut are admissible as evidence. FACTS: Operatives of the Cebu City Police conducted a surveillance at the house of the petitioner. After which, they secured a search warrant from the RTC and on September 13, 1997, the same police

32 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

went to Mabolo Cebu City to serve the search warrant. The residence were the petitioner resided was a two-storey house. The police officers went upstairs where they met the wife of the accused and told her that they will implement the search. But as soon as they can search the area, the accused fled the scene to a Nipa House. SP03 Masnayon then requested the aid of the Barangay Tanods to conduct a search. This time, they conducted the search at the residence of the petitioner and the nipa hut, where they found several articles of four (4) packs of crystalline substance which was later tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. And information was filed against the petitioner and the RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable charge of violating section 16, Article 3 of R.A. 6425 which the CA affirmed, hence the petition. HELD: No. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-91197-24] specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as: x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. The police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence. Wherefore, Petitioner is Acquitted.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST December 24, 2017 – Article 153 – TUMULTS AND OTHER DISTURBANCES OF PUBLIC ORDER IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P. PEOPLE VS BACOLOD G.R. No. L-2578, July 31, 1951 ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in granting the motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. FACTS: Ladislao Bacolod, then a member of the PC Patrol in the municipality of Santa Fe, Cebu, fired his sub-machine gun thereby hitting Consorcia Pasinio at the back of the right side of her body. That the same caused a serious disturbance in a public place by firing his sub-machine gun which wounded Pasinio, thereby causing panic among the people present in the town fiesta. Accused Bacolod was charged with two informations; one charging him of the crime of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and the other is serious disturbance in a public place by firing a sub-machine gun. His counsel de oficio moved to quash this second information, invoking double jeopardy by reason of the first information which the lower court granted prompting the People to appeal. HELD: Yes. It will be observed that both informations have one common element: defendant’s having fired a sub-machine gun, however the two informations do not describe the same offense. One is a crime against persons; but the other is an offense against public peace and order. The first is punished under article 263 of the Revised Penal Code and the latter under article 153 referring to individuals disturbing public gatherings or peaceful meetings. The proof establishing the first would not establish the second, it being necessary to show, besides the willful discharge of firearm, that there was a dance in the tennis court in connection with the town fiesta, and that the people in attendance became panicky and terrified. Therefore, the appealed resolution is reversed and the record is remanded for further proceedings. December 25, 2017 – Article 154 – UNLAWFUL USE OF MEANS OF PUBLICATION AND UNLAWFUL UTTERANCES [NO CASE FOUND] December 25, 2017 – Article 155 – ALARMS AND SCANDALS PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P. PEOPLE V. DORIQUEZ GR No. L-24444-45, July 29, 1968 ISSUE:

33 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

Whether or not accused Doriquez was placed in double jeopardy by charging the offense of discharge of firearm. FACTS: Accused Doriquez was charged with the offense of grave oral defamation before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Six days later, Doriquez was indicted before the same court for discharge of firearm. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the two indictments. Subsequently, he moved to dismiss both information. One of his contentions is that the institution of criminal action for discharge of firearm places him in double jeopardy for he had already been in jeopardy once in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo which dismissed, without his consent, the information charging him with the offense of alarm and scandal based on the same facts. The court denied the motion to dismiss. The motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this appeal. HELD: No. For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove, among other things, that there is "identity of offenses." It is altogether evident, however, that the offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal, nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony. Neither may it be asserted that every crime of discharge of firearm produces the offense of alarm and scandal. Nor could the reverse situation be true, for the less grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the offense of alarm and scandal which is a light felony. Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under Article 155 of the Revised Penal Code and the information for discharge of firearm instituted under article 258 of the same Code are closely related in fact (as the two apparently arose from the same factual setting, the firing of a revolver by the accused being a common element), they are definitely diverse in law. Firstly, the two indictments do not describe the same felony - alarm and scandal is an offense against public order while discharge of firearm is a crime against persons. Secondly, the indispensable element of the former crime is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger to the public, while the grava men of the latter is the discharge of a firearm against or at a certain person, without intent to kill. The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may appear to be connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offense. The instant appeal is premature, and the present appeal is dismissed. This case is hereby ordered remanded to the court of origin for immediate trial on the merits. December 26, 2017 – Article 156 – DELIVERY OF PRISONERS FROM JAIL DIZON, Roxan Danica G.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST ALBERTO AND INTIA VS HON. DELA CRUZ AND ORBITA G.R. No. L-31839, June 30, 1980 ISSUE: Whether or not Governor Cledera and Esmeralda can be held liable under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS: Respondent Judge Dela Cruz directed petitioners Provincial Fiscal and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur to amend the information filed in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the CFI of Camarines Sur entitled, People of the Philippines versus Eligio Orbita, so as to include as defendants Governor Armando Cledera and Assistant Provincial Warden Jose Esmeralda of Camarines Sur. In said case, Orbita, a provincial guard, was prosecuted for infidelity in the custody of a prisoner for the escape of detention prisoner, Pablo Denaque. In the course of the trial, the defense alleged that Esmeralda received a written note from Governor Cledera asking him to send in five prisoners which party included Denaque, who was then under the custody of Orbita, to his house in Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur to work in the construction which made Denaque's escape possible, and thus, Esmeralda and Gov. Cledera should be equally guilty of the offense with Orbita. HELD: No. The offense of delivering prisoners from jails as defined in Article 156 is usually committed by an outsider who: (1) removes from jail any person therein confined or (2) helps him escape. To remove means to take away a person from the place of his confinement, with or without the active compensation of the person released. To help in the escape of a person confined in any jail or penal institution means to furnish that person with the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his escape. If the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoners defined and penalized under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the jailer of the province and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code. December 27, 2017 – Article 157 – EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE ALAMEDA, Manuel F. TANEGA V MASAKAYAN GR No. L-27191, February 28, 1967 ISSUE: WON Prescription of sentence has commenced FACTS: Petitioner was convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City. She was found guilty once again by the Court of First Instance where she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City, on

34 | 1 YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay ST

January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This prompted the respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was never arrested. Petitioner moved to quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March 23, 1965. (Ground: Penalty has prescribed. On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served", rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest. Hence, the present petition. HELD: NO. Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty. By Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code, light penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year. The period of prescription of penalties — so the succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: the offender is a convict by final judgment; he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. Article 157: provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, ... " evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking" Petitioner was never placed in confinement and the prescription of penalty does not run in her favor. DEL CASTILLO VS. TORRECAMPO GR NO 13903, December 18, 2002 ISSUE: Whether the penalty imposed upon Del Castillo had prescribed FACTS: Del Castillo was charged for violation of Section 178(nn) of the 1978 Election Code. The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. During the execution of judgment on October 14, 1987, petitioner was not present. The presiding Judge issued an order of arrest and the confiscation of his bond. Petitioner was never apprehended. 10 years later, petitioner filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed upon him had already prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial court. HELD:

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST No. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor. PEOPLE VS ABILONG G.R. NO. L-1960, NOVEMBER 26, 1948 ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not cover evasion of service of "destierro." FACTS: That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947,in the City of Manila, Philippines, Florentino Abilong, the accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve destierro during which he should not enter any place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila for attempted robbery, evaded the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and commit vagrancy. HELD: It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. Under the case of People vs. Samonte, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area." US VS. LOO HOE G.R. NO. 12473, SEPTEMBER 18, 1917 ISSUE:

35 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

WON the penalties for jail breaking under Article 127 is applicable to sentence executed by deportation. FACTS: Loo Hoe was found guilty of a violation of the Opium Law and was sentenced to be deported. The sentence was executed. However, he returned to the Philippine Islands, in violation of the terms of said sentence. A complaint was filed by the deputy prosecuting attorney and Loo hoe was brought to trial, and upon arraignment plead guilty and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of four months, and at the termination of said sentence of imprisonment, to be again deported and to pay the costs. HELD: No. If the defendant who has been sentenced to imprisonment breaks jail, the executive departments of the Government may do two things: a. It may, in proper cases, proceed against him under article 127 and other provisions of the Penal Code; and b. it may simply arrest him and return him to jail. Whether the executive department of the Government will pursue one or the other of these statutory remedies lies within the discretion of that department of the Government. The violation of the judgment of deportation by the appellant is not punishable as contempt under section 232. The judgment of deportation was final. The sentence had been duly executed. The court had lost all jurisdiction over the defendant in that case. The judgment was executed by the executive department of the Government; and if the defendant has escaped the penalty imposed by the court, the executive department of the Government has its remedy by enforcing the terms of the sentence again. The SC is also of the opinion that none of the provisions of article 127 of the Penal Code is applicable to the present case. The penalties for jail breaking under said article (127) cannot be applied to the acts of the defendant. BASILONIA v. VILLARUZ GR Nos. 191370-71, Aug 10, 2015 ISSUE: WON the penalty of imprisonment already prescribed and the civil liability arising from the crime already extinguished. FACTS: On June 19, 1987, a decision was promulgated against Basilonia et al in a criminal case for murder of Atty. Isagani Roblete. Almost two decades passed from the entry of judgment, on May 11, 2009, Roblete, claiming to be the son of the deceased victim, Atty. Roblete, filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment alleging, among others, that despite his request

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST to the City Prosecutor to file a motion for execution, the judgment has not been enforced because said prosecutor has not acted upon his request. The trial court granted the motion for execution and ordered the bondsmen to surrender Basilonia et al. Due to petitioners' failure to appear in court after the expiration of the period granted to their bondsmen, the bail for their provisional liberty was ordered forfeited and the sheriff issued the writ of execution. Basilonia et al contended that trial court has no more jurisdiction to order the execution of judgment since the penalty has already prescribed. HELD: Evasion of service of sentence is an essential element of prescription of penalties. The culprit should escape during the term of imprisonment in order for prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run. The period of prescription of penalties as provided in Article 93 states - "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence." Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code explains the concept of evasion of service of sentence: ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period. Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: 1. the offender is a convict by final judgment; 2. he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty; and 3. he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. By the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution.." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."

36 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

Thus, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. "Escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. It applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty, and that the period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. This is not applicable in the case at bar. For the longest time, they were never brought to prison or placed in confinement despite being sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment. Prescription of penalty of imprisonment does not run in their favor. Thus, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the motion for execution and in eventually granting the same. PARULAN VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS G.R. NO. L-28519, FEBRUARY 17, 1968 ISSUE: WON the CFI of Manila with jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the sentence upon Parulan for evasion of service of sentence. FACTS: Parulan was serving life imprisonment (commuted to 20 years by the President) in Muntinlupa. In Oct 1964, he was transferred to Fort Bonifacio. He escaped in the same month, but was recaptured in Manila. He was prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Art. 157 of the RPC. The CFI in Manila found him guilty and sentenced him accordingly. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the Director of Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered “to release immediately and without delay the body of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement.” Parulan contended that his confinement illegal because the sentence of conviction imposed upon him for the crime of evasion of service of sentence was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with which he was charged. HELD: Yes. Transitory or continuing offenses are crimes where some acts material and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another. The court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has jurisdiction to try the case. There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the violation of the law is deemed to be continuing. When the prisoner in his attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be validly said that after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be found. The right of arrest without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime — evading the service of his sentence.

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty and the court forthwith ordered his recommitment for the unexpired portion of his former sentence. The accused appealed from this judgment and prays that he be acquitted or that the penalty be reduced.

December 28, 2017 – Article 158 – EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE ON THE OCCASION OF DISORDER, CONFLAGRATIONS, EARTHQUAKES, OR OTHER CALAMITIES. ALILIAN, Enna B.

HELD: Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the Penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original sentence."

LOSADA v ACENAS GR No. L-810, March 31, 1947

ISSUE: WON the said inmates were entitled to the deduction of their sentence provided in Art 98 in accordance with Art 158 RPC FACTS: The Justice of Peace ordered the release of the four (4) inmates who remained in the penal colony and did not try to escape during the war. HELD: No. The special allowance for loyalty authorized by articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code refers to those convicts who, having evaded the service of their sentences by leaving the penal institution, give themselves up within two days. As these petitioners were not in that class, because they had not escaped, they had no claim to that allowance. December 30, 2017 – Article 159 – OTHER CASES OF EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE Arances, Javy Ann G. PEOPLE VS SANARES G.R. NO. L-43499, January 11, 1936 Justice Recto ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be acquitted or that the penalty be reduced. FACTS: Isidoro Sanares y Caerne was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The accused was granted by His Excellency, the GovernorGeneral, a conditional pardon remitting the unexecuted portion of the sentence of imprisonment of six years and one imposed upon him for the crime of theft. Upon accepting the condition of such pardon, to wit: that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippine Islands, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violated the condition of such pardon by then and there committing the crime of estafa for which he was finally sentenced to suffer three months and eleven days of imprisonment.

37 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

The record shows that the conditional pardon whose conditions were violated by the accused referred to a penalty of six years and one day of prision, of which two years, five months and twenty-two days had been served by the accused. The penalty remitted by the pardon was, therefore, three years, seven months and eight days.

The second part of the article just quoted is inapplicable to the case at bar because the unexpired portion of the penalty remitted by reason of the condition pardon granted the accused does not exceed six years. The first part thereof, which imposes the penalty or prision correccional in its minimum period upon the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon, shall violated any of its conditions, is, therefore, applicable. The duration of this penalty is from six months and one day to two years and four months. Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstance of having pleaded guilty should be considered in favor of the accused, and there being no aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its minimum period which ranges from six months and one day to one year, one month and ten days of prision correccional. The benefits afforded by the Indeterminate Sentence Law are not applicable to the accused, by express provision thereof. TORRES VS GONZALES G.R. NO. 76872, July 23, 1987 Justice Feliciano

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. FACTS: In 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa and in 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again and that should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal. HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. Under article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed. In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. December 31, 2017 – Article 160 – COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERVICE OF PENALTY IMPOSED FOR ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE BANUELOS, Kelvinn L. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. ANTONIO YABUT G.R. No. 39085 September 27, 1933 BUTTE, J. LEGAL ISSUE: Whether or not Quasi-Recidivism of Article 160 is not applicable for YABUT. FACTS: On or about the 1st day of August, 1932, in the City of Manila, the accused Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, in said city, did then and there, with intent to kill, wilfully and treacherously, assault and use personal violence upon one Sabas Aseo, another prisoner also serving sentence in Bilibid, by then and there hitting the said Sabas Aseo suddenly and unexpectedly from behind with a wooden club, without any just cause, thereby fracturing the skull of said Sabas Aseo and inflicting upon him various other physical injuries on different parts of the body which caused the death of the latter about twenty-four (24) hours thereafter.

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At the time of the commission of this offense, the said Antonio Yabut was a recidivist, he having previously been convicted twice of the crime of homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final sentences rendered by competent tribunals. Upon arraignment, YABUT pleaded not guilty. We reject the testimony of Yabut that it was Prisoner Villafuerte, the squad leader of their brigade, not YABUT, who gave the fatal blow to the deceased Aseo. The testimonies of Santiago Estrada, resident physician of the Bureau of Prisons and Dr. Pablo Anzures of the Medico Legal Department of the University of the Philippines, clearly establish that the death of Aseo was caused by subdural and cerebral hemorrhages following the fracture of the skull resulting from the blow on the head of Aseo. They further confirm the testimony of the four eyewitnesses that the deceased was struck from behind. YABUT places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the English translation of the headnote of article 160 and would have us accept his deduction from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the new crime which is committed by a person already serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. Inasmuch as the appellant was serving sentence for the crime of homicide, the appellant contends the court below erred in applying article 160 in the present case which was a prosecution for murder (involving homicide). HELD: Yes, Article 160 still applies. The language is plain and unambiguous. There is not the slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that said article applies only in cases where the new offense is different in character from the former offense for which the defendant is serving the penalty. It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text, especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows. A mere glance at the titles to the articles of the Revised Penal code will reveal that they were not intended by the Legislature to be used as anything more than catchwords conveniently suggesting in a general way the subject matter of each article. Being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the articles of the Code, they cannot, in any event have the effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words of the text. Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create doubt. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BETH TEMPORADA. G.R. No. 173473 December 17, 2008 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. LEGAL ISSUE: Whether or not Article 160 should not be considered as an “attending circumstances” in

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST relation to the application of Indeterminate Sentence Law. FACTS: From September 2001 to January 2002, Rosemarie "Baby" Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan and Jojo Resco and Beth Temporada, all employees of the Alternative Travel and Tours Corporation (ATTC), recruited and promised overseas employment, for a fee, to complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. as technician in Singapore, and Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay, Evelyn Estacio and Dennis Dimaano as factory workers in Hongkong. The accused and appellant were then holding office at Dela Rosa Street, Makati City but eventually transferred business to Discovery Plaza, Ermita, Manila. After complainants had submitted all the requirements consisting of their respective application forms, passports, NBI clearances and medical certificates, the accused and appellant, on different dates, collected and received from them placement fees in various amounts, viz: a) from Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. – 57,600.00; b) from Dennis Dimaano – P66,520.00; c) from Evelyn Estacio – P88,520.00; d) from Soledad Atle – P69,520.00 and e) from Luz Minkay – P69,520.00. As none of them was able to leave nor recover the amounts they had paid, complainant lodged separate criminal complaints against accused and appellant before the City Prosecutor of Manila. On November 29, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Restituto Mangalindan, Jr. filed six (6) Informations against the accused and appellant, one for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under Article 38 (a) of the Labor Code as amended, and the rest for five (5) counts of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is an argument that the incremental penalty rule should not be considered as analogous to a modifying circumstance stems from the erroneous interpretation that the "attending circumstances" mentioned in Section 1 of the ISL are limited to those modifying circumstances falling within the scope of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. HELD: YES. While we affirm the conviction for the five (5) counts of estafa, we find, however, that the CA erroneously computed the indeterminate penalties therefor. The CA deviated from the doctrine laid down in People v. Gabres; hence its decision should be reversed with respect to the indeterminate penalties it imposed. The reversal of the appellate court’s Decision on this point does not, however, wholly reinstate the indeterminate penalties imposed by the trial court because the maximum terms, as determined by the latter, were erroneously computed and must necessarily be rectified. Section 1 of the ISL is again quoted below – SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which

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shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x The plain terms of the ISL show that the legislature did not intend to limit "attending circumstances" as referring to Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. If the legislature intended that the "attending circumstances" under the ISL be limited to Articles 13 and 14, then it could have simply so stated. The wording of the law clearly permits other modifying circumstances outside of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC to be treated as "attending circumstances" for purposes of the application of the ISL, such as quasi-recidivism under Article 16051 of the RPC. Under this provision, "any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony." This circumstance has been interpreted by the Court as a special aggravating circumstance where the penalty actually imposed is taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum period without regard to any generic mitigating circumstances. Since quasirecidivism is considered as merely a special aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree is computed based on the prescribed penalty without first considering said special aggravating circumstance as exemplified in People v. Manalo and People v. Balictar. The question whether the incremental penalty rule is covered within the letter and spirit of "attending circumstances" under the ISL was answered in the affirmative by the Court in Gabres when it ruled therein that the incremental penalty rule is analogous to a modifying circumstance. Article 315 of the RPC pertinently provides – ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: 1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be. x x x Under Gabres, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is the prescribed penalty55 for estafa when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00. An amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00 is effectively considered as a special aggravating circumstance in the sense that the penalty actually imposed shall be taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum period without regard to any generic mitigating circumstances. Consequently, the penalty next lower in degree is still based on the prescribed penalty without in the meantime considering the effect of the amount defrauded in excess of

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST P22,000.00. What is unique, however, with the afore-quoted provision is that when the amount defrauded is P32,000.00 or more, the prescribed penalty is not only imposed in its maximum period but there is imposed an incremental penalty of 1 year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. This incremental penalty rule is a special rule applicable to estafa and theft. In the case of estafa, the incremental penalty is added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years) at the discretion of the court, in order to arrive at the penalty actually imposed (i.e., the maximum term, within the context of the ISL). This unique characteristic of the incremental penalty rule does not pose any obstacle to interpreting it as analogous to a modifying circumstance, and, hence, falling within the letter and spirit of "attending circumstances" for purposes of the application of the ISL. Under the wording of the ISL, "attending circumstances" may be reasonably interpreted as referring to such circumstances that are applied in conjunction with certain rules in the Code in order to determine the penalty to be actually imposed based on the prescribed penalty of the Code for the offense. The incremental penalty rule substantially meets this standard. The circumstance is the amount defrauded in excess of P22,0000.00 and the incremental penalty rule is utilized to fix the penalty actually imposed. At its core, the incremental penalty rule is merely a mathematical formula for computing the penalty to be actually imposed using the prescribed penalty as starting point. Thus, it serves the same function of determining the penalty actually imposed as the modifying circumstances under Articles 13, 14, and 160 of the RPC, although the manner by which the former accomplishes this function differs with the latter. For this reason, the incremental penalty rule may be considered as merely analogous to modifying circumstances. Besides, in case of doubt as to whether the incremental penalty rule falls within the scope of "attending circumstances" under the ISL, the doubt should be resolved in favor of inclusion because this interpretation is more favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.56 Thus, even if the Dissenting Opinion’s interpretation is gratuitously conceded as plausible, as between Gabres and the dissent’s interpretation, Gabres should be sustained since it is the interpretation more favorable to the accused.

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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST TITLE FOUR – CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST January 1, 2018 – Article 161 – COUNTERFEITING THE GREAT SEAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, FORGING THE SIGNATURE OR STAMP OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A. GAMIDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. Nos. 111962-72 December 8, 1995 MENDOZA, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not the charge of violation of Art. 161 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was proper. FACTS: On March 25, 1985, then Executive Assistant Juan C. Tuvera issued Memorandum Circular No. 1281. Following the issuance of this memorandum, the Presidential Security Command and the Office of the President, through the Malacañang Complaints and Investigation Office (CIO), investigated petitioner. On September 27, 1985, upon the invitation of Atty. Quirino Sagario, CIO Hearing Officer, petitioner appeared and presented the 11 documents, claiming that President Ferdinand E. Marcos had signed them in his (petitioner's) presence. The lone witness for the prosecution, Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Presidential Staff Director of the Malacañang Records Office (MRO), testified that there were no copies of the documents on file in his office and that the signatures thereon did not appear to be those of the former President. For his part, petitioner said that he was the Executive Director of the Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services, or PRAMS, having been appointed by then President Marcos and that his appointment and the related documents, subject of the prosecution, had been signed by the former President in petitioner's presence. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila found him guilty and charged him with 11 counts of violation of Art. 161 of the RPC by forging the signature of the President of the Philippines on 11 different documents and making it appear that the documents were genuine official documents of the Republic of the Philippines. He was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each of these eleven (11) criminal cases, or a total of eighty (80) years up to one hundred fifty-four (154) years. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. HELD: YES, the petition has no merit. Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Director of the Malacañang Records Office, testified that his office did not have a record of the documents. For his part Executive Secretary Juan C. Tuvera declared the Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services as nonexistent and its alleged Executive Director, herein petitioner, as

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not in any capacity connected with the Office of the President. From these premises it is rational to conclude that the documents in question, which purport to have been signed by then President Marcos, are bogus documents. The trial court and Court of Appeals correctly found petitioner to be the author of the forgery. The presumption is that the possessor and user of a falsified document is the forger thereof. Petitioner also argues that he should have been charged under only one information because there was only one intent "to discharge the imagined functions of a non-existent office." The argument has no merit. The documents in this case were forged on different dates. One act was not done to commit another. There is therefore no basis for considering the various acts as constituting only one crime of forgery. January 2, 2018 – Article 162 – USING FORGED SIGNATURE OR COUNTERFEIT SEAL OR STAMP [NO CASE FOUND] January 2, 2018 – Article 163 – MAKING AND IMPORTING AND UTTERING FALSE COINS DAHIROC, Janice L. THE UNITED STATES VS. AGUSTIN BASCO G.R. NO. L-2747 APRIL 11, 1906 ISSUE: Whether or not the case constitutes the crime of counterfeiting money. FACTS: It was proved at the trial of this case that the defendant attempted to pay for a package of cigarettes which he bought at a certain store with what appeared to be silver coin, but which, as a matter of fact, was a Philippine copper cent. He insisted that the owner of the store should accept the same as a peseta, that is to say, a twenty cent piece. The latter refused to accept it upon noticing what the real value and denomination of the coin was. The defendant again insisted that the money be accepted and the owner of the store refused to do so. As a result of such refusal a quarrel ensued between them. A policeman then interfered, and upon being informed of what had happened, placed the defendant under arrest and took him to the police station, where several Mexican and Japanese coins were found in his possession together with a roll of Philippine copper cents, the latter being silver plated, and identical with the coin which he had attempted to pass at the store as a twenty-cent piece. Upon an examination of these plated coins it was found that they were genuine Philippine copper cents, which apparently and been whitened with quicksilver to give them the color and brightness of silver. The defendant having been asked as to where he had obtained the said coins, first answered that he had received them as change, but later admitted that he had silvered them himself. HELD: No. The Attorney-General, in his brief filed in this court, contends that these facts do not constitute the crime of counterfeiting money, but that of estafa, and for this reason asks that the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST defendant be acquitted of the crime charged in the complaint without prejudice to the filing of another complaint against him for estafa. There can be no counterfeiting of money when, as in this case, no spurious or clipped coin was used. The coins in question were genuine copper cents and bore their original designs and inscriptions. The defendant did not make or attempt to make any alteration in the designs and inscriptions of the said coins. All that he did was to give them the appearance of silver pieces for the purpose of passing them as twenty-cent coins. He did not, however, attempt to imitate the peculiar design of such coins. The acts committed by the defendant for the purpose of defrauding third persons by deceiving them us to the real value of the coins in question constitute the crime of estafa and not of counterfeiting money. There were not legal grounds upon which a charge for this latter offense could be based. The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant acquitted of the charge of counterfeiting money contained in the complaint, and the Attorney-General is directed to present another complaint against him for the crime of estafa. It is ordered that the Mexican and Japanese coins found in the possession of the defendant be returned to him. The costs of both instances are declared de oficio. After the expiration of ten days from the date of final judgment, let the case be remanded to the Court of First Instance from whence it came for proper procedure. January 3, 2018 – Article 164 – MUTILATION OF COINS - IMPORTATION AND UTTERANCE OF MUTILATED COINS DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J. PEOPLE V TIN CHING TING GR L-4620 JANUARY 30,1952 ISSUE: Whether or not the coins in this case are mutilated. HELD: Mutilation is to diminish by ingenuous means the metal in the coin. One who mutilates a coin does not do so for the sake of mutilating, but to take advantage of the metal abstracted; he appropriates a part of the metal of the coin. Hence, the coin diminishes in intrinsic value. One who utters said mutilated coin receives its legal value, much more than its intrinsic value. It is indispensable that the mutilated coin be of legal tender. (Note: The copy of the full text of the case cannot be found; only the ruling) January 4, 2018 – Article 165 – SELLING OF FALSE OR MUTILATED COIN, WITHOUT CONNIVANCE DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G. PEOPLE V GO PO GR. NO. 42697, VL.J. 393, AUGUST 1985 ISSUE: Whether or not the Chinaman may be convicted of illegal possession of false coin?

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FACTS: A Chinese merchant was paid by purchaser of goods in the former’s store a false 50-centavo coin. He placed it in his drawer. During a search by some constabulary officers, the false coin was found in the drawer. HELD: No. Article 165 requires three things as regards possession of false coins, namely: (1) possession ; (2) intent to utter; and (2) knowledge that the coin is false. The fact that the Chairman received it in payment of his goods and placed it in his drawer shows that he did not know that such coin was false. January 5, 2018 – Article 166 – FORGING TREASURY OR BANK NOTES OR OTHER DOCUMENTS PAYABLE TO BEARER; IMPORTING, AND UTTERING SUCH FALSE OR FORGED NOTES AND DOCUMENTS DIZON, Roxan Danica G. US VS GARDNER G.R. No. 1468, March 14, 1904 ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant can be held liable for falsification of notes or documents equivalent to current money payable to bearer FACTS: Gardner ordered Jameson to buy a bottle of mucilage and blue pencil. That night, while passing by a tailor shop, Gardner handed Jameson a bill asking him to change it for silver and promised to give him half its value. Jameson cashed the bill and received 25 pesos. Gardner also had another bill on which he had pasted a number "10". Gardner tried to pass Confederate $10 in a Filipino drug store. The Chinaman Ah Fun had given 25 pesos in exchange for an American bill upon which the number 10 had been pasted. He did not observe the defect in the bill at first, but observed it afterwards and immediately went to the people station to file a complaint. Some other night, Gardner through the witness Klip also attempted to pass a onedollar bill raised to a ten in a house of prostitution. It was shortly after returned to him saying that it was bad. HELD: Yes. The falsification of bank notes and of documents of credit payable to bearer and issued by the State, to which class the two certificates in question belong, is an act severely punished by the law as tending to bring such documents into discredit and because such offenses produce a lack of confidence on the part of the holders of said documents to the prejudice of the interest of society and of the State, and for this reason the law punishes this crime more severely than it does the counterfeiting of money, in consideration of the fact that it is easier to counterfeit such certificates, notes, and documents of credit payable to bearer than to make counterfeit coin, and that the profit which is derived therefrom by the forger of such documents is greater and the incentive for the commission of such a crime more powerful.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST DEL ROSARIO VS PEOPLE G.R. No. L-16806, December 22, 1961 ISSUE: Whether or not said act constitutes a violation of Article 166 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS: Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar were accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes. They have shown to Apolinario del Rosario Philippine one-peso and two-peso bills and induced him to believe that the same were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them, although in fact they were genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits of each of which had been altered and changed. They obtained P1,700.00 from said complainant for the purpose of financing the manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of the Philippines. HELD: Yes. It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial No. F-79692619, had been erased and changed so as to read 0 and that similar erasures and changes had been made in the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691, in the last digit in Serial No. D-716326, and in the last digit 9 of Serial No. D-716329. The possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words or signs contained" in which had been erased and or altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by petitioner herein and his codefendants in the manner adverted to above, is punishable under Article 168, in relation to Article 166 (1), of the Revised Penal Code. TECSON VS CA G.R. No. 113218, November 22, 2001 ISSUE: Whether or not Tecson can be held liable for the illegal possession and use of counterfeit US dollar notes FACTS: On April 26, 1990 a test-buy operation was ordered by Atty. Pio Chan, Jr., Chief of the Investigation Staff of the Central Bank, which resulted in the purchase from Tecson of one US dollar note for Two Hundred Pesos that was found to be counterfeit. Consequently, a team to conduct a buy-bust operation was formed. During such occasion, Tecson was introduced to Pedro Labita and Johnny Marqueta as persons interested in buying US dollar notes. Apparently convinced, the man drew ten pieces of US $100 dollar notes from his wallet. Upon such, the two introduced themselves as Central Bank operatives and apprehended Tecson. The trial court found Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense as defined in Art. 168 and penalized in Art. 166 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence this petition. HELD: Yes. The prosecution established, through the testimonies of Pedro Labita and Johnny

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Marqueta, that a buy-bust operation was conducted by the combined agents of the Central Bank of the Philippines and the US Secret Service, and that the petitioner was therein caught in flagrante delicto in the possession of and in the act of offering to sell counterfeit US dollar notes. The testimony of Pedro Labita which was corroborated by Johnny Marqueta and the presentation during the trial of the ten counterfeit US $100 dollar notes, which were confiscated from the petitioner when he was arrested, proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of illegal possession and use of fake US dollar notes under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. January 7, 2018 – Article 167 – COUNTERFEITING, IMPORTING, AND UTTERING INSTRUMENT NOT PAYABLE TO BEARER [NO CASE FOUND] January 7, 2018 – Article 168 – ILLEGAL POSSESION AND USE OF FALSE TREASURY OR BANK NOTES AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF CREDIT DUQUE, Francis Lester M THE UNITED STATES vs. JUAN DE LEON, ET AL. G.R. No. 1934, April 29, 1905 ISSUE: WON it is necessary to convict the accused that the latter know the bill was a counterfeit at the time it was uttered. FACTS: Juan de Leon and Albino de Leon, the accused in this case, were found guilty in the CFI of the crime of uttering a counterfeit bank note under Art 292 of the Penal Code. It appears that the accused were brothers, and that Juan de Leon having paid a debt with a counterfeit 50-peso note of the Spanish-Filipino Bank, and the creditor having expressed some doubt as to the genuineness of the note, the said Albino de Leon assured him that the said note was good, and promised that if it should prove to be counterfeit he himself would make good the loss. It was further shown that the note was in fact counterfeit and that the said Albino de Leon refused to make good the amount as he had promised. HELD: Yes. Under Article 292 of the Penal Code, to sustain a conviction of the crime of uttering a counterfeit bank note it must affirmatively appear that the accused knew that the note was counterfeit at the time it was uttered. Here, It was not proven that Albino was aware that the note in question was counterfeit when he aided his brother in uttering it, and guilty knowledge of this fact being an essential element of the crime, Albino should not have been convicted either as principal or accomplice. PEOPLE VS. NICASIO BARRAQUIA C.A. NO. 50, APRIL 13, 1946 ISSUE:

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST WON the evidence is sufficient to find accused convicted for the crime charged. FACTS: The witness for the prosecution Maximo Pascasio testified that: Nicasio went to his office to change a bank note of ten-peso denomination; he did not change it because he saw that it was not genuine; he ordered that a policeman be called; when he told accused that the bank note was a counterfeit, the accused kept silent; accused had occasion to go away before the arrival of the policeman, but he preferred to remain and waited for the policeman; accused admitted to the policeman that he is the owner of the bank note, and the policeman brought him for investigation to the municipal building without offering any resistance. Other witness Vicente C. Reventar, cashier of the provincial treasury of Laguna, testified that: he can distinguish a counterfeit from a genuine one; in his opinion, ten peso bill is a counterfeit because the printing is somewhat blurred and the paper is very oily. At the investigation, accused explained that the bank note was passed to him in a game of cara y cruz. Upon his own testimony accused appears to be an illiterate laborer, who does not know how to read or write. He testified that he happened to know that the bill a counterfeit only when the postmaster of Calamba informed him so, but for himself he cannot distinguish a counterfeit note from a genuine one. HELD: No. The only evidence presented by the prosecution to the effect that the bank note in question was a counterfeit is the testimony of Reventar who stated that the printing of the bill is somewhat blurred and the paper is very oily. The SC do not believe that these two circumstances may be considered as enough basis for declaring the bill in question as falsified. The fact that the printing is somewhat blurred may be attributed to the overuse of an old printed matter, or that the bank bill is oily is not an evidence of a counterfeit bill, because any bank note may become oily by impregnation with an oily liquid. According to the decision of the lower court, the subject bill bears No. D462691D. No evidence has been presented that this number does not check with the genuine one issued with the same number. Furthermore, even if the subject ten peso bill was counterfeited bank note, it was not prove that appellant had knowledge of the fact before the postmaster of Calamba called a policeman. PEOPLE VS. CAMOLO DIGORO ALIAS PANONDIONGAN. G.R. NO. L-22032, MARCH 4, 1966 ISSUE: WON the RTC is correct in finding accused guilty under Article 168 of the RPC. FACTS: On 1961, Camolo Digoro was charged with Article 168 of the RPC. The information was read as follows: That said accused, did then and there

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willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to possess, have in his possession, custody and control, 100-peso bill, 20-peso bill, 10-peso bill, 5-peso bill, 2-peso bill and 1-Peso bill denominations in resemblance or similitude to a genuine treasury or bank notes issued by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. A decision was rendered finding accused guilty by the trial court. The accused appealed his case., on the ground that the information does not charge an offense. HELD: No. Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. The subject law is clear: Under ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit.— …any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles. It follows that an information, as in this case, alleging possession of false treasury and bank notes without alleging intent to use the same but only "intent to possess" them, charges no offense. Wherefore, the case is remanded for new prosecution under an appropriate and valid information. January 8, 2018 – Article FORGERY IS COMMITTED FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.

169

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HOW

THE UNITED STATES VS ALONSO P. GARDNER G.R. NO. 1468, MARCH 14, 1904 ISSUE: Whether or not forgery was committed. FACTS: Accused was charged with falsification of silver certificates by pasting little pieces of paper, on each one of which the figure “10” appears, over the figure “1’, which showed the true value of the certificate and by obliterating with a pencil the number “1” whenever it appeared on the corners or sides of the certificates for the purpose appear that each one of them was worth $10 instead of $1, and by this means the sum of 25 Mexican pesos was fraudulently obtained in exchange for one of the said bills or certificates. HELD: Yes. Article 289 of the Penal Code provides that those who falsify bank notes or other instruments or documents payable to bearer, or coupons thereof, the issue of which has been authorized by law, or those who introduce such in the Philippine Islands, shall be punished. The silver certificates in the record are documents payable to bearer or documents of credit duly issued by virtue of the Federal laws in force in the United States, and are included as instruments payable to bearer.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

THE UNITED STATES vs MARIANO SOLITO GR. NO. L-12546 August 25, 1917 ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty of forging, uttering and passing an altered obligation of the Government of the Philippine Islands. FACTS: Accused was the correspondence clerk and acting chief clerk in the office of the division superintendent of schools in the municipality of Dumaguete. With that he was intrusted and authorized to open letters of an official character addressed to the office. It was the custom of the director of Education to forward to division superintendents of schools checks for the reimbursement for travel expenses and for the payment of the salary of employees. On April 19, 1915 a Treasury Warrant was issued to Alvah D. Riley for the sum of P657.53 from the Auditor of the Philippine Islands for payment. Accused then presented the said warrant to the municipal treasurer for payment, bearing the indorsement of Alvah D. Riley and received the amount stated therein. Alvah D. Riley contended that he never had in his possession the said warrant, nor had ever seen the same, that he did not indorse the same by writing his name at the back, that his signature which appears at the back of the said warrant was not his. HELD: Yes. The said warrant was a check issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands and, an obligation of the Government of the Philippine Islands. It was originally made payable to Alvah D. Riley, or to his order. When it was indorsed as above indicated, it became a check or warrant payable to “bearer”. The indorsement made a material alteration in said warrant. The indorsement changed said check from one payable to Alvah D. Riley, or to one to whom he ordered it paid, to one payable to bearer. The indorsement of the accused had the effect of erasing the phrase “or order” upon the face of the warrant. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RAFAEL BALMORES 85 Phil. 493 FEBRUARY 16, 1950 ISSUE: Whether or not accused committed forgery under Article 169 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: Accused was charged for attempted estafa through falsification of security by tearing off at the bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion of a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true and real unidentified number of same and substituting and writing in ink at the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or number 074000 thus making the said ticket bear the said number 074000, which is a prize-winning number in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw last June 29, 1947, and presenting the said ticket so falsified on said date, September 22,

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1947, in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for the purpose of exchanging the same for the corresponding cash that said number had won, fraudulently pretending in said Office that the said 1/8 unit of a Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket is genuine and that he is entitled to the corresponding amount of P359.55 so won by said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw on said date, June 29, 1947, but the said accused failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of estafa thru falsification of a security as a consequence by reason of some causes other than his spontaneous desistance. HELD: Yes. The alteration, or even destruction, of a losing sweepstakes ticket could cause no harm to anyone and would not constitute a crime were it not for the attempt to cash the ticket so altered as a prize-winning number. The penalty imposed by article 166 for the forging or falsification of "treasury or bank notes or certificates or other obligations arid securities" is reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed P10,000, if the document which has been falsified, counterfeited, or altered is an obligation or security of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. In this case the ticket in question was owned by the government of the Philippine Islands. January 9, 2018 – Article 170 – FALSIFICATION OF LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS [NO CASE FOUND] January 9, 2018 – Article 171 – FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BY A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE OR NOTARY OR ECCLESIASTIC MINISTER IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P. PEOPLE V. PO GIOK TO G.R. NO L-7236, April 30, 1955 ISSUE: Whether Defendant violated Article 171 by forging a public document. FACTS: Defendant forge a public document namely the residence certificate No. A-1618529 and misrepresenting to the said representative of the City Treasurer that his name is Antonio Perez along with his birth place and citizenship when in fact he is a Chinese national. The CFI of Cebu charged defendant with the crime of falsification of a public document. Accused then filed a motion to quash on the grounds that the information did not allege that the document allegedly falsified and that he had the wrongful intent to injure a third person. The lower court then dismissed the case on the grounds that the information filed did not alleged the intent and disclosure of the facts in the documents allegedly falsified. Defendant also contended that he cannot be charged with violation of Article 171 since the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST falsified document was committed by a public employee who wrote the untrue facts. HELD: Yes, although it is true that it was the employee who wrote the untrue facts, it was the defendant who induced him to do so by supplying the facts making him the principal of the crime by inducement. The court also held that the obligation on the part of the accused to disclose the truth as to the facts that should appear in a residence certificate to be issued to him, is inherent in the very nature and purpose of said document. Hence, defendants falsification of the information need not be alleged in the information for him to be convicted of the crime. Since under Commonwealth Act No. 465, for the purpose of establishing his true and correct identity, he thereby committed falsification as principal by induction in making false statement in the narration of fact. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. SPS. REVELO AND CORAZON VILLAMAR V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 178652, 12/8/10 ISSUE: Whether accused falsified a public document. FACTS: On April 20, 1967, Elena Mananton sold a parcel of land to her 9 children. On June 6, 1983, some of her children sold Land to Simplicio. However, Modesta and Felipe did not participate in the sale. Simplicio then sold the parcel of land to his daughter Corazon who is married to Petitioner Revelo. They registered the deed of sale in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Lingayen which was signed and notarized which was dated Nov. 23, 1989. In the deed it was made to appear that all of Elena’s children signed it. The signatures of Modesta and Felipe were forged. On Sept. 7, 2000, an information was filed charging petitioner with falsification of public documents. Petitioner maintained that they could not be guilty since it was not them who prepared the document. It was left in the assessors office which they were told to come back and once they came back it was already signed. They contended that they did not act with intent to falsify and that they acted in good faith. HELD: Yes. Petitioners were the authors and mastermind since falsification is presumed from the fact that they actually benefited from it. In Maliwat v. CA, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, the one found in possession of and who used a forged document and made use of it, taking advantage and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.

46 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

January 10, 2018 – Article 172 – FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL AND USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS LAZO, Joseph Artfel T. II THE UNITED STATES, v. DAMIAN OVERA (alias KIM CUAN), 11 Phil 596 ISSUE: WON a counterfeiting a ticket is considered a falsification of a private document. FACTS: Damian Orera (alias Kim Cuan) was convicted by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, of the crime of having falsified a Chinese theater ticket which entitled the bearer thereof to admission to a performance held in the theater by counterfeiting and simulating the signature and rubric of Eng Ning on the said ticket, The accused was sentenced to be imprisoned at the Insular Prison of Bilibid for the period of six months and one day, to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, Philippine currency, and the costs of the suit, from which judgment the accused appealed. HELD: YES That the court below did not err in qualifying such ticket as a document in order to prosecute and punish the crime of falsification, the subjectmatter of the complaint, because if, according to the authority cited by the appellant, a document is "a deed, instrument or other duly authorized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth," and a private document is, according to another authority cited by the same appellant, "every deed or instrument executed by a private person, without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which document some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth," it follows that the ticket in question, being an authorized document evidencing an agreement for the rent of a place in a theater to enable the possessor to witness a theatrical performance, is a private document. PEOPLE VS MANANSALA 105 Phil 1253 ISSUE: WON the person being in possession of the tvr is presumed to be the author of the falsification FACTS: Felix Manansala, Accused was apprehended by del Rosario of Manila Police Department (MPD) for driving outside of his authorized route. Upon presenting the Traffic Violations Report (TVR) del Rosario noticed that the TVR was altered.It was later found that the alterations consisted of erasing the number “III” and the word “three” after the word Pending cases and replacing the figures with “I” and “one”this changed the original meaning of the TVR which previously stated 3 pending cases to only 1 pending case.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST At the investigation, the accused admitted having made the alterations in question, in order to hide his previous pending traffic violation cases and thereby avoid immediate arrest should he be caught committing a fourth traffic violation HELD: YES. The falsified Traffic Violations Report(TVR) in question was issued to the accused and the records show that it was in his possession and had been used as a temporary drivers permit from its issuance to the time he was caught by del Rosario upon commission of his 4th violation. It is an established rule that when a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption is that such person is the forger. The accused also had sufficient motive to commit the falsification as MPD policy is to arrest a person upon the 4th traffic violation. Hence, he had the strongest temptation to make in his TVR appear that he had only committed 1 infraction. PEOPLE VS DOMINGO 49 PHIL 28 ISSUE: WON the acts of the accused constitute a falsification of public documents FACTS: Benita Domingo and company were accused of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents after they had defrauded a Moises Bunzon for an amount of P5,000. The property (fishpond) in question is under the administration of Josefa de Leon. Accused Benita Domingo approached the administrator (representing herself as a Realty broker) after learning that de Leon was looking for a buyer of the property. Domingo later stated that she had found a buyer and asked if she could have temporary possession of the Title deed and other related documents to the property.The documents were later handed to Domingo on the promise that it would be returned later in the afternoon. However, that promise was broken. Shortly, Sanchez learned his property was being mortgaged by accused Modesto and company (comrades of Domingo) but upon confrontation he was merely told that he did not have possession of the documents Modesto and Company later approached a certain Moises Bunzon and pretended to be Josefa de Leon and representing the owner of the property. They sold the subject property for P5000 to Bunzon with the option of buying back the property. This transaction criminally injured Moises Buzon

defrauded

and

HELD: YES The crime charged in the information and conclusively established by the evidence. The crime could hot have been committed if its perpetrators had not been in possession of the

47 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

certificate of title is obvious and it has been proven beyond a shadow of doubt that the appellant was the person who obtained the certificate from Sanchez. It is true that there is no direct evidence that she delivered it to the two women who signed the deed, but in view of the fact that she offered no explanation as to what she did with the certificate and even denied that she received it, there is no escape from the inference that she placed the certificate in the hands of her confederates. If she had not been a co-conspirator, she would have revealed the name of the party to whom the certificate was delivered. Her position is analogous to that of a person who immediately after a larceny has been committed is found in possession of the stolen goods and offers no explanation SIQUIAN VS PEOPLE 171 SCRA 223 ISSUE: WON Siquian was guilty of falsification of public documents FACTS: Jesusa Carreon went to the office of Manuel Siquian, the municipal mayor of Isabela, to apply for a job in the office of the mayor. Siquian later appointed her as a clerk in the office of the municipal secretary and even said that her salary would be included in the budget. Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds through a form issued by Siquian and addressed to the CSC, pursuant to the requirements of the latter. It should be noted that the Municipal council of Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-76. As such, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-75, was deemed re-enacted. No such position (that assigned to Carreon) existed then. Carreon worked for five months and was supposed to receive her salary of P120. She approached the municipal treasurer to ask for the money but the latter said that there was no money yet. She then sued Siquian for falsification of a public document. HELD: YES. He was found guilty under par 4 of art 171,“making untruthful statements in a narration of facts”; the elements of which are: (a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false. In this case, all the elements for falsification were met especially when Siquian stated that funds were available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality, the position itself did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated. It is further

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST bolstered by the fact that when the budget was deemed re-enacted, there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Carreon was appointed. And there is also no appropriation made in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-75 for such position, thus rendering Siquian's statement in his certification utterly false. Siquian also had the legal obligation to disclose the truth of such facts. He also took advantage of his official position in falsifying the document. Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document. In this case, Siquian was charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Carreon. Lastly, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified document is a public document. January 11, 2018 – Article 173 – FALSIFICATION OF WIRELESS, CABLE, TELEGRAPH, AND TELEPHONE MESSAGES, AND USE OF SAID FALSIFIED MESSAGES MERCADO-NASH, Regina US V. ROMERO 17 Phil. 76 ISSUE: Whether or not Romero was guilty of falsifying telegraph message. FACTS: On April 24, 1908, the accused Joaquin Romero who was a postmaster and telegraph operator send two telegrams for transmission. He reduced the words of the telegraph messages by twelve and eight words, respectively. He was not authorized to do so by the senders. Romero pocketed the differences in the prices charged in the sums of P0.72 and P.48, respectively. On August 24, 1908, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance in Tarlac, charging Romero with the crime of falsification of telegrams. This crime is punishable under Article 300 of the Penal Code (now Art. 173 of the Revised Penal Code). He was a government employee and engaged in the service of sending or receiving wireless, cable, telegraph or telephone messages. The defendant Joaquin Romero admitted that he changed the wording of the telegrams which he received by omitting several words in each of them; and the record of the cause shows no proof of his allegation that he made an error in recounting the amount received for each telegram, owing to the number of words they contained, and that he was obliged to diminish the number of words of each of them. HELD: Yes, Romero had violated the crime of falsification of telegrams. The crime is provided for and punished by Article 303 in connection with Article 300 of the Penal Code, which article 303 reads: “A public official in charge of the telegraph services who shall originate or falsify a

48 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

telegraphic message shall incur the penalty of prision correctional in its medium and maximum degrees.” January 13, 2018 – Article 174 – FALSE MEDICAL CERTIFICATES, FALSE CERTIFICATES OF MERITS OR SERVICE, ETC. OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P. UNITED STATES VS. JUAN ANGEL MICHELENA (4 Phil 492) ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of falsification of certification of merit was committed. FACTS: In an application to the Civil Service Board for examination, a document printed in accordance with the form prescribed by said Board, and in that part thereof which contains recommendations of the applicant. The certificate No. 3 appears to be subscribed by Frank N. West, the latter having neither subscribed it nor written the contents thereof, the same not being correct in some respects, as regards the age of the party certifying and the length of time which he knew the candidate recommended. The candidate, now the defendant, failed to present himself for examination, notwithstanding having in his possession the ticket of admission. HELD: YES. The crime was fully proven. The act done by the defendant is simply the falsification of a certificate of merit. The court sentenced Juan Angel Michelena to two months and one day of arresto mayor, crediting him with one-half of the time of his detention already suffered, and the costs in both instances. THE UNITED STATES vs. RUFINO DELOSO (11 Phil 180) ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of falsification of certification of merit was committed. FACTS: Rufino Deloso, in order to take part in the municipal elections that were to be held about the first (1st) of December, 1904. in the town of Jimenez, called at that municipal building and stated under oath to the municipal secretary, that he was a resident of the said town, and that at the date of the next municipal election, he would have resided therein for a period of six months; and that he was in every way entitled to vote. Subsequently, At the municipal elections held at the town of Oroquieta, in the same province, on the fifth (5th) of December 1905, the said Deloso was elected by a majority vote to the office of municipal president. The election was protested by several residents of the town on the ground that the successful candidate had no legal residence therein. In his defense, Deloso stated under oath on the 4th of January, 1906, before Vicente Fortich, notary public of Oroquieta, that he had been, and was at the time a resident of the said town, and that he had

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST resided therein from the month of April, 1902, until the above-mentioned date; that he was a candidate for the municipal presidency of Oroquieta at the elections of December, 1903, that, although he paid frequent visits to the pueblo of Jimenez, he always returned to Oroquieta, the place where he resided; that he never vote for municipal officers in the pueblo of Jimenez. A complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal charging Rufino Deloso with the crime of falsification of official documents. HELD: YES. The document offered in evidence issued by the municipal secretary of Jimenez is not, strictly speaking, a public document, but it belongs to the class of documents that the falsification of which is covered under the falsification of a certificate of merit. The said document or certificate was used with the knowledge that its contents were false, in that Deloso was not a resident of Jimenez. The falsity of the statement made by him to the municipal secretary of said pueblo, was proven by another notarial document executed by the said Deloso who also stated under oath, that he was a resident of Oroquieta both before and after the year 1904; it is therefore unquestionable that the accused was liable.

raised their defenses, Sapigao denied the accusations against him, maintaining that the blotter entries were true, as he personally witnessed their details whereas Acosta averred that she was merely performing her duties as Barangay Secretary when she certified as true copies the photocopies of the aforesaid blotter entries requested by the police authorities. The OPP dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. It found that the questioned blotter entries were all made in good faith and merely for recording purposes; done in the performance of respondents' official duties; and based on personal knowledge of what actually transpired. Cariaga filed a petition for review before the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) but affirmed the OPP's ruling. The ORSP pointed out that Acosta's mere authentication of the photocopies of the blotter entries cannot be equated to issuing a false certification so as to indict her of such crime. HELD: NO. The court affirmed the ORSP ruling that the mere act of authenticating photocopies of the blotter entries cannot be equated to committing the crime of False Certification under the law. Hence, the ORSP correctly found no probable cause to indict respondents of the said crimes.

DANILO CALIVO CARIAGA vs. EMMANUEL D. SAPIGAO and GINALYN C. ACOSTA G.R. No. 223844, June 28, 2017

January 14, 2018 – Article 175 – USING FALSE CERTIFICATES PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of falsification of certification of merit was committed.

NEGROS MERCHANTS ENTERPRISES INC. VS. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION GR NO. 150918 (AUGUST 17, 2007) ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed because of using a false and unauthorized certificate

FACTS: A Complaint Affidavit filed by Cariaga before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) accusing respondents Emmanuel D. Sapigao (Sapigao) and Ginalyn C. Acosta of the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents, False Certification, and Slander by Deed, defined and penalized under Articles 171, 174, and 359 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In the said complaint, Cariaga alleged that respondents, in their respective capacities as Barangay Chairman and Secretary of Brgy. Carosucan Sur, Asingan, Pangasinan, made two (2) spurious entries in the barangay blotter: (1) stating that an unnamed resident reported that someone was firing a gun inside Cariaga's compound, and that when Sapigao went thereat, he was able to confirm that the gunfire came from inside the compound and was directed towards the adjacent ricefields and (2) stating that a concerned but unnamed resident reported to Sapigao that Cariaga and his companions attended the funeral march of former Kagawad Rodrigo Calivo, Sr. (Calivo, Sr.) with firearms visibly tucked in their waists. Accordingly, the police authorities used the blotter entries to obtain a warrant for the search and seizure operation made inside Cariaga's residence and cattle farm which resulted in the confiscation of a firearm and several ammunitions, the criminal case for illegal possession of firearms consequently filed against him but was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court claiming that the statements in the blotter entries were completely false and were made to dishonor and discredit him. Sagipao and Acosta

49 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

FACTS: Petitioner NMEI, through its President and General Manager, Jacinto Tan Jr., applied for an P8 million Credit Accommodation with respondent CBC. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over its properties. Subsequently, NMEI, through Tan, applied for an additional Case-to-Case Loan. Both loans were respectively paid in 1996. Petitioner NMEI re-availed the P8M credit line and failed to settle the obligation. The latter, through its counsel Atty. Diaz, sent two letters to respondent requesting a detailed statement of account and to hold in abeyance any legal action. The latter replied that said statement could not be released without proper board resolution or authorization. The petitioner’s properties were extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public auction, with respondent as the highest bidder. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure Sale with Damages and Preliminary Injunction. Respondent CBC moved to dismiss the same on the ground that petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that it is entitled to the relief sought in the complaint. The RTC of Bacolod denied respondents Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner later filed an Amended Complaint impleading Tan and his spouse, Corazon Tan, as well as respondents Bacolod

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Branch Manager Ainalea Cortez. Respondent again sought to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state cause of action and for failure to comply with the rules on non-forum shopping. In the CA, it held that the Amended Complaint should have been dismissed because the accompanying certification against forum shopping which was signed by petitioner's corporate secretary, Amelito Lizares, was defective, for lack of authorization from the board of directors. HELD: Yes. In the instant case, Lizares was not authorized to file the complaint for and in behalf of petitioner corporation. Thus, the complaint is not deemed filed by the proper party in interest and should be dismissed. There was no allegation that petitioner NMEI, through a board resolution, authorized Lizares to execute the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Moreover, no such board resolution was appended to the complaint or amended complaint. In Tamondong v. CA, it was held that if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff. January 15, 2018 – Article 176 – MANUFACTURING AND POSSESSION OF INSTRUMENTS OR IMPLEMENTS FOR FALSIFICATION PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P. US VS. ANGELES 6 PHIL. 435 (SEPTEMBER 11, 1906) ISSUE: Whether or not Angeles is liable under Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS: The evidence is sufficient to show that the defendant Modesto Angeles, manufactured a seal in imitation of the seal of the municipality of Lipa, in the Province of Batangas, for the purpose of using it in the making of false certificates of the transfer by him of live stock. HELD: YES. A person who manufactured a seal in imitation of the seal of Lipa, Batangas, for making false certificates for the transfer of livestock, is guilty of making instrument for falsification of certificates. The falsification of one of these documents is punished, as we have just held in the case of the United States v. Florentino Sayson 1 (4 Off. Gaz., 572). PEOPLE VS. MAGPALE G.R. NO. L-46656 (JUNE 26, 1940) ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in applying article 176 of RPC

50 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

FACTS: A criminal complaint was lodged against Felipe Magpale in the justice of the peace court of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, charging him with a violation of Article 176. That, on or about the 25th day of March, 1938, in the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the abovenamed accused did then and there willfully, feloniously, knowingly and without lawful purpose, have in his possession, custody and control one brand of the municipal government of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, to wit: ,with the intent of using it for falsifying the official brand of the said municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, in public documents, to wit: Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle. All contrary to law. HELD: NO. Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows: ART. 176. Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for falsification. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not to exceed 10,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall make or introduce into the Philippine Islands any stamps, dies, marks, or other instruments or implemented intended to be used in the commission of the offenses of counterfeiting or falsification mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter. Appellant himself admits that the ordered the questioned iron brand to be made, wherefore, he is criminally liable for the making thereof. (Article 176, Revised Penal Code.) It also appears that the said brand is an exact imitation of that owned and used by the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, to brand its own large cattle and to counterbrand large cattle belonging to its inhabitants. January 16, 2018 – Article 177 – USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D. PEOPLE VS. HILVANO G.R. No. L-8583. July 31, 1956 BENGZON, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not Hilvano, a public officer, be held liable for the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: Francisco Hilvano, the councilor of the municipality of Villareal, Samar, acted in place of the Mayor of said municipality as he was designated by the latter when the latter departed for Manila on official business. Vice-Mayor Juan Latorre then served written notices to the Municipal Councilors, including Hilvano, that he was assuming the duties of the absent Mayor. When Hilvano refused invoking that he was designated by the Mayor, Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the Executive Secretary informing such controversy. The latter replied by letter, that under sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code it was the Vice-Mayor who

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST should discharge the duties of the Mayor during the latter’s temporary absence. Vice-Mayor also sought the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal who also had the same view with the Executive Secretary. Shown these official pronouncements, Hilvano still refused to surrender the position and held it for about a month; appointed some policemen, solemnized marriages, and received the salary for mayor. Hilvano was charged with usurpation of authority and official functions under Article 177 of the R.P.C. On his appeal, Hilvano contended that he committed no usurpation of authority because he was a public officer and that such crime may only be committed by private individuals. HELD: Yes, Hilvano, a public officer, was liable for the crime of usurpation of authority and official functions. There was actually no reason to restrict the operation of Article 177 to private individuals. For one thing it applies to “any person”; and where the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish. Furthermore, contrary to Hilvano’s assumption that Articles 238-241 of the Revised Penal Code penalize all kinds of usurpation of official functions by public officers, said articles merely punish interference by officers of one of the three departments of government (legislative, executive and judicial) with the functions of officials of another department. Said articles do not cover usurpation of one officer or employee of a given department of the powers of another officer in the same department. There was no excuse for Hilvano. In the beginning he might have pleaded good faith, invoking the designation by the Mayor; but after he had been shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the opinion of the provincial fiscal, he had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to the position. PEOPLE VS. LIDRES G.R. No. L-12495, July 26, 1960 BARRERA, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not Lidres was guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions under Republic Act No. 10. FACTS: Joseta Diotay and Dionisio Lidres filed an application as a substitute teacher of the second grade class of Biasong Elementary School when Echavez, the original teacher of said class, filed and granted a maternity leave. Diotay was appointed as a substitute teacher and began teaching. However, before the said appointment, Diotay was requested by the supervising teacher to sign an agreement to take over Echavez' position on a "50-50" basis, that is, the period from January to March, 1954 would be equally divided between her and Lidres.

51 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

On the strength of the agreement, Lidres, armed with a prepared letter of resignation for the signature of Diotay, appeared at the school and asked Diotay to sign it but the former refused. Despite the refusal of Diotay, Lidres took over her class. Accordingly, Lidres was charged with the crime of usurpation of official function with deliberate intent and without pretense of official position under Republic Act No. 10 HELD: No. Republic Act 10 was intended as an emergency measure, to cope with the abnormal situation created by the subversive activities of seditious organizations at the time of its passage in September, 1946. Hence, the elimination of the element of pretense of official position required under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, and the elevation of the penalty from prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods to not less 2 years nor more than 10 years. And since it was neither alleged in the information nor proved during the trial that Lidres was a member of said seditious organizations engaged in subversive activities, he could not be held liable or found guilty under Republic Act. No. 10. Granting, arguendo, that Republic Act No. 10 was an amendment to Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and not merely an implementation thereof or an emergency measure as stated, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 379 effective June 14, 1949, would constitute an amendment thereof by restoring the element of pretense of official position in the offense of usurpation of official functions, originally required by Article 177 prior to its amendment by the latter Act. Under Republic Act No. 379 then, the law in force at the time of the commission of the alleged offense by Lidres, pretense of official position was an essential element of the crime of usurpation of official functions. But the information specifically charges that Lidres committed the offense "without pretense of official position". Under circumstances, the facts alleged in the information failed to constitute an offense. Neither can defendant be convicted of usurpation of authority, as distinguished from usurpation of official functions, under the first paragraph of Article 177, as amended by said Republic Act No. 379, namely, that of representing to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, inasmuch as the information does not charged the same. RUZOL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013 VELASCO, JR., J.: ISSUE: Whether Ruzol was guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions. FACTS: Leovegildo R. Ruzol, the Municipal Mayor of General Nakar, Quezon, was accused of

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST usurpation of official functions for issuing 221 Permits to Transport salvaged forest products under the alleged “pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so”, since such authority, as ruled by the Sandiganbayan, belonged solely to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. HELD: No. The DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The records were likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR. January 17, 2018 – Article 178 – USING FICTITIOUS NAME AND CONCEALING TRUE NAME RIVERA, Marynit P. US v. TO LEE PIU G.R. No. 11522, September 26, 1916 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be convicted of the crime of using a false name FACTS: The appellant To Lee Piu was charged with using a false name. He came to the Philippine Islands in 1911 and presented a section six certificate wherein his name appears to be To Lee Piu. Thereafter, he attached to an application for a passport the name Toribio Jalijali. Said application was accompanied by the affidavits of two witnesses and by a baptismal certificate showing that a person by that name was born in the Philippine Islands in 1878. On the trial there was no denial of the fact that appellant signed the name Toribio Jalijali to the application for a passport. According to the defendant, he was born in the Philippine Islands as Toribio Jalijali. He went to China at an early age. Feeling doubtful as to his ability to prove his right to reenter, he applied to the American consul at Canton for a section six certificate. On such application, he stated that his name was Toribio Jalijali. Upon being told by the clerk of the consulate that it was not necessary to put his surname in such application, he wrote therein the Christian name Toribio alone. The charge is prosecuted on the theory that To Lee Piu is the appellant's correct name and that the name Toribio Jalijali is false. HELD: Yes. It is established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant used the name of another person for the purpose of deceiving Government

52 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

and, by that deception, to obtain a passport. He came to the Philippine Islands as a Chinese person traveling for curiosity and pleasure. He so represented himself to the American consul at Canton and, by that representation, obtained a section six certificate. In his application for that certificate he stated that he was a Chinese person, and that his name was To Lee Piu .He came to the Philippine Islands upon those representations; and, by virtue of the certificate obtained thereby, was permitted to enter the country. Desiring to return to China, or travel in other parts of the world and, at the same time, be permitted to return to the Philippine Islands at will, he sought to obtain a passport as a citizen of the Philippine Islands under the sovereignty of the United States. In order to accomplish his purpose it was necessary for him to show to the authorities of the Philippine Islands issuing passport that he was in fact a citizen of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to a passport. He thereupon took unto himself a Filipino name, one not his own, and made his application for a passport attaching to his application the name Toribio Jalijali. ONG HOCK LIAN alias JULIAN ONG v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-21197, May 19, 1966 ISSUE: Whether or not Ong Hock Lian is guilty of violating the Anti-Alias Law FACTS: Ong Hock Lian alias Julian Ong, a citizen of the Republic of China filed a petition for naturalization pursuant to the Naturalization Law. The Solicitor General appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of which it granted the petition for naturalization. Moreover, appellant contends that the lower court erred in in not holding that appellee uses an alias without court authority and in violation of the Anti-Alias Law. HELD: Yes. Under the law, except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court (Section 1, Commonwealth Act 142). Aside from the name "Ong Hock Lian," appellee is using the alias "Julian Ong." There is no evidence that appellee has been baptized with the latter name or that he has been known by it since childhood, or that the court has authorized the use thereof. Appellee has therefore committed a violation of the Anti-Alias Law. January 18, 2017 – Article 179 – ILLEGAL USE OF UNIFORMS OR INSIGNIA [NO CASE FOUND] January 18, 2018 – Article 180 – FALSE TESTIMONY AGAINST A DEFENDANT SALVERON, Jan Ione R.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIONISIO MANEJA G.R. NO. L-47684, JUNE 10, 1941 ISSUE: From what date should the period of prescription be computed for the crime of false testimony under article 180 of the Revised Penal Code? FACTS: This case was an appeal by Dionisio Maneja who was accused of giving a false testimony in a criminal case no. 1872 on December 16, 1933 as the lower court held, or from the time the decision of the Court of Appeals in the aforesaid case became final in December 1938. HELD: The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which final judgment is served in the principal case. Considering that the penalties provided therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in every case, made to depend upon the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act of testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an actionable offense until the principal case is finally decided. And before an act becomes a punishable offense, it cannot possibly be discovered as such by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.

ISSUE: Whether or not Soliman is guilty of violating Article 181 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: Soliman, testifying in his own behalf in the course of another criminal case in which he, with several others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain material allegations of fact. He testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in evidence in support of the charge of estafa, which was in effect an extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been executed voluntarily, and that its execution had not been procured by the police by the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture. HELD: It must not be forgotten that the right of an accused person to testify in his own behalf is secured to him, not that he may be enabled to introduce false testimony into the record, but to enable him to spread upon the record the truth as to any matter within his knowledge which will tend to establish his innocence. January 21, 2018 – Article 182 – GIVING FALSE TESTIMONY IN CIVIL CASES TADO, Diann Kathelline A. THE UNITED STATES vs. ISIDORO ARAGON G.R. No. L-2709 December 28, 1905

January 19, 2018 – Article 181 – FALSE TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.

ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of giving false testimony in a civil case

PEOPLE V. REYES (C.A., 48 O.G. 1837)

FACTS: This was an action for the crime of giving false testimony. Isidoro Aragon is accused of the crime of false testimony in a civil case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the false testimony in favor of defendant need not directly influence the decision of acquittal. FACTS: The accused was the star witness in a prosecution for robbery against Jemenia. Before the trial, the accused executed an affidavit in which he manifested that he was not interested in the prosecution of the case and that he wanted to give the accused “a chance to earn his living wisely and in the honest way.” The fiscal refused to ask for the dismissal of the case. When the case was called for trial, the accused who was asked to identify Jemenia, testified that he could not remember anymore the face of Jemenia. After further questions failed to elicit other data, the case against Jemenia was dismissed by the court, resulting in his acquittal. HELD: The contention of the defense that the acquittal of Jemenia was due to the failure if the fiscal to call other witnesses who could have properly identified Jemenia, is irrelevant. It is not necessary that the testimony given by the witness should directly influence the decision of acquittal, it being sufficient that it was given with the intent to favor the accused. U.S. V. SOLIMAN 36 PHIL. 5

53 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

On February 23 1904, E.H Warner filed a complaint for forcible entry and unlawful detainer against the tenants of his estate. The accused was summoned as witness to appear before the justice of the peace court of manila, and after having been duly sworn, testified that he does not remember or have no recollection of forcible entry or detainer suits on the Pasay or Pineda Estate prior to the four last years. It was alleged that all his statements are absolutely false, and are essential to the case at issue as they were made. He well knew that at that time there were brought in the justice of the peace court at Pineda when he was filing that office many actions for forcible entry and detainer, instituted by Agustin J. Montilla against tenants of the estate.He received an order from the CFI asking for a list of forcible entry and detainer actions and the accused himself signed three lists which was forwarded to the CFI, among other orders of the CFI to the accused. HELD: During the examination of the defendant as a witness in the cause in which it is alleged he gave false testimony he was asked certain questions with reference to the existence of certain facts. His answers invariably were that he did not remember, or that he had no recollection concerning those facts. His answers invariably

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST were that he did not remember, or that he had no recollection concerning those facts. The prosecuting attorney proved the existence of the facts with reference to which the defendant was questioned, but failed to prove that the statements of the defendant with reference to those facts were false. The mere fact that the defendant had had to do in the year 1896 with certain facts and relations was not sufficient to prove that he stated a falsehood when he stated in December, 1904, that he had "no recollection with reference to such facts or relations." The evidence adduced during the trial fails, in our judgment, to show that the defendant testified falsely or gave false testimony as was charged in the complaint. In order that a defendant may be convicted under article 321 of the Penal Code for giving false testimony, the following facts must be shown: First. The testimony must be given in a civil cause. Second. The testimony must relate to the issues presented in said cause. Third. The testimony must be false. Fourth. The false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false. Fifth. Such testimony must be malicious and given with an intent to affect the issues presented in said cause. The evidence adduced during the trial of this case is not sufficient to show that the defendant committed the crime charged in the complaint. The judgment of the inferior court is therefore reversed and the said cause is hereby ordered to be dismissed. ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS, INC. vs. The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 150, HON. ZEUS ABROGAR, VIOLETA BAGUIO and LORELEI IRA [G.R. No. 137010. August 29, 2003] ISSUE: Whether Article 182 is violated FACTS: Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Travel for brevity) filed with the City Prosecutor of Makati a criminal complaint for False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira. It was alleged that on or about the 19th day of February, 1996, the accused gave false testimony upon a material fact in Civil Case No. 95-1542, relative to a complaint for Collection of sum of money, torts and damages filed by Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Inc. for short) against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMA, Inc. for short). During the trial of said civil case, the accused testified under oath that the claims of ARK, Inc. supported by a statements of accounts (Exhibit E to GG) sent to and received by defendant-corporation NFMA, Inc. is baseless and/or been paid, which testimony as accused very well knew and ought to know, by reason of accused's position as cashier, was false

54 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

inasmuch as the claim based on the statement of accounts of ARK, Inc. are, in truth and in fact, valid, legal and unpaid accounts of NFMA, Inc. with ARK Travel Inc., herein represented by private complainant MA. PAZ ALBERTO, to the damage and prejudice of the latter. HELD: To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must concur: 1. The testimony must be given in a civil case; 2. The testimony must relate to the issues presented in the case; 3. The testimony is false; 4. The false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false; and 5. Such testimony must be malicious and given with and intent to affect the issues presented in the case. There is no doubt that the first two requisites are extant in this case. The records show that Ark Travel filed a complaint for collection of sum of money, torts and damages against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMAI) and Angelina T. Rivera with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 137). In said civil case, private respondents were presented by NFMAI as witnesses. They executed their respective sworn statements and testified before the trial court that NFMAI has no outstanding obligation with Ark Travel as the same had been paid in full. The existence of the last three requisites is quite dubious. The falsity of the subject testimonies of private respondents is yet to be established. It is noted that at the time of the filing of the criminal complaints, the civil case filed by Ark Travel is still pending decision. Ark Travel has yet to prove the validity of its monetary claims and damages against NFMAI. It is only after trial that the RTC can assess the veracity or falsity of the testimony and correspondingly render a decision. Thus, the civil case is so intimately connected with the subject crime that it is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondents in the criminal cases. In other words, whether or not the testimonies of private respondents in the civil cases are false is a prejudicial question. January 22, 2018 – Article 183 – FALSE TESTIMONY IN OTHER CASES AND PERJURY IN SOLEMN AFFIRMATION UNAS, Nor-Aiza R. US V. JURADO (31 Phil 491) ISSUE: Whether or not Jurado committed the crime of perjury. FACTS: On July 9, 1913, the acting provincial fiscal of Cebu, Dionisio Jacosalem, proceeded to investigate the matter of the robbery of some tins of opium, committed in the house of Francisco Jurado by Alejandro Albao, a municipal policeman, through threats and intimidation and by availing himself of his office. This opium belonged to Vicente Lizarraga who had taken it

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST to the said house to sell it to some residents of the town. Lizarraga, the owner of the drug, stated that Francisco Jurado was present, among others, at the time of the robbery; but when Jurado was called to testify as an eyewitness to the crime he denied that he was at home on the night of the robbery, as he was then in a cinematograph with his family. He further testified that he did not know either Vicente Lizarraga or Alejandro Albao. Such was his testimony given under oath before the provincial fiscal Jacosalem, but in the proceedings brought against Ciriaco Singson for robbery, commenced on September 24,1913, Jurado, testifying as a witness for the defense, stated under oath that he had known Vicente Lizarraga since the month of June, 1913, and that he was already acquainted with Alejandro Albao on the date of the crime. In order that a witness, in testifying under oath before a public official authorized to administer same commit the crime of perjury and incur the penalty prescribed by section 3 of Act No. 1697, it is necessary and indispensable that he testify to and.declare under oath with regard to some material matter which he does not believe to be true, or that such false testimony tend to establish something which conflicts with the truth of an essential or important fact which has been proven by the evidence; because, if the false testimony of the witness is not important, essential, or material to the principal matter under investigation, it can not properly be held that the crime of perjury has been committed. RULING: No. The principal object of the investigation was to find out whether Alejandro Albao had actually been in Jurado's house where Lizarraga was that night with several tins of opium for sale, and whether on that occasion Albao, availing himself of his office of municipal policeman, by intimidation with a revolver, succeeded in compelling Lizarraga to deliver to him the tins of opium which Lizarraga was carrying and which Albao seized, took away with him and appropriated to himself, and which have not yet been recovered. Jurado, the owner of the house where the robbery was committed, testified that he learned from Isabelo Alburo that Lizarraga had in fact been in the house with tins of opium for sale, but that witness did not see them because he was that night in the cinematograph with his family. This testimony is not contradicted by any evidence in the record. For lack of sufficient proof of the falsity of that statement by the owner of the house, the defendant Jurado, for it was not proven that it was false and, as he certainly was in his own house on the said night of the robbery, it cannot be held that, in testifying as he did, he perjured himself. January 23, 2018 – Article 184 – OFFERING FALSE TESTIMONY IN EVIDENCE VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M. SORIANO VS. CABAIS ( GR NO. 157175, June 21, 2007) ISSUE:

55 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

Whether or not perjury was committed under article 184? FACTS: Hilario P. Soriano, petitioner, is the President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. (RBSM). On the other hand, Zenaida A. Cabais, respondent, is the comptroller designated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to oversee the bank’s operations. Eventually, the RBSM was closed and placed under receivership by the BSP. Thereupon, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. In the course of the proceedings, respondent executed two affidavits stating that: 13. About a week before RBSM declared a "bank holiday" on January 4, 2000, RBSM on December 27, 1999 and December 29, 1999, paid Forcecollect Professional Solution, Inc. and Surecollect Professional Solution, Inc., entities owned/controlled by Mr. Soriano and other RBSM officers (Annexes "14" and "15") P5.300 million and P5.750 million (Annexes "16" and "17"), respectively, without any supporting documents, as payment of 25% collection fee;2 x x x (Affidavit dated February 17, 2000) 8. RBSM paid Manager Check Nos. 0000040071 and 0000040079 in cash on December 27 and 29, 1999, respectively, as evidenced by the attached Debit Advances of even dates (Annexes "1-B" and "2-B" respectively).3 x x x (Affidavit dated March 22, 2000) On April 6, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a complaint for perjury defined and penalized by Articles 183 and 184 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent. Petitioner alleged that respondent committed perjury by narrating false statements in her affidavits. HELD: The petition lacks merit. The fact of issuance and payment by RBSM of said checks to Forcecollect and Surecollect is furthermore bolstered by the Certifications issued by RBSM Accountant, Narciso Adriano (p. 39), RBSM Branch Accountant for Plaridel, Carmina Capule (p. 40), and PDIC’s Assisting Deputy Receiver, Mauricia Manzanares (p. 41). It can be gleaned from the foregoing that the averments of respondent in her subject Affidavits are true. Nevertheless, granting for the sake of argument that the statements of respondent in her Affidavits are false, still, there exists no reasonable ground to indict her under Articles 183 and 184 of the Revised Penal Code. It bears stressing that one element of perjury is a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. Such element is absent in the instant case. Respondent’s contention that said Manager’s Checks were issued and paid by RBSM to Forcecollect and Surecollect, are duly supported by RBSM records which she has perused and examined in her capacity as duly designated BSP Comptroller for RBSM. Thus, respondent believes in good faith that what she mentioned in her Affidavits are true. It must be noted that good

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST faith is a defense in perjury (People of the Philippines v. Abaya, 74 Phil. 59). For the same reasons, respondent cannot likewise be prosecuted under Article 184 of the Revised Penal Code. January 24, 2018 – Article 185 MACHINATION IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S.

–

VICENTE DIAZ VS. RUPERTO KAPUNAN DECEMBER 8, 1923 ISSUE: Whether or not attorney Kapunan Violate Article 542 of the Penal Code(Now Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code). FACTS: Vicente Diaz and Secundino de Mendezona formed a partnership and entered into extensive business transactions in the Province of Leyte. The capital of the partnership was P380,000. Unfortunately, however, the business failed to prosper, with the result that on liquidation, it was found to have suffered a loss of P67,000. When Diaz and Mendezona came to settle up their affairs, they eventually formulated a document of sale and mortgage in which Mendezona recognized a debt in favor of Diaz in the sum of P80,000 and an additional sum of P10,000 owing to Diaz, laid upon the hacienda "Mapuyo," and to be paid within the term of one year. When the year had expired Mendezona was not to be found and his family was unable to meet the payment. There followed the usual proceedings for foreclosure and sale, which, after considerable delay, resulted in the hacienda's being offered for sale at public auction. At the time fixed for the sale, December 23, 1922, there appeared Vicente Diaz, accompanied by his lawyer Emilio Benitez, and Attorney Ruperto Kapunan. Luis Velarde, the deputy sheriff of Leyte, is authority for the statement that Kapunan told him that he, Kapunan, was ready to bid on the property up to P16,000 in order to assist the Mendezona family which was in financial straits. At any rate, the bidding was opened by Kapunan offering P12,000 for the property and with Diaz and Kapunan raising the bids until finally Diaz offered P12,500. There the bids stopped on account of Diaz and Kapunan entering into the agreement, of decisive importance, which we next quote in full: We, Vicente Diaz and Ruperto Kapunan, both being the bidders at the auction held for the sale of the properties of Secundino Mendezona, do hereby agreed that Don Ruperto Kapunan should withdraw his bid and refrain from bidding at the said auction as he does hereby withdraw his bid, and in consideration thereof, the said Mr. Diaz offers him a premium of one thousand pesos (P1,000) which, out of consideration to said Don Vicente Diaz, Mr. Kapunan accepts and has, for this reason, refrained from bidding in competition with said Mr. Diaz. Following the termination of the sheriff's sale, Diaz on December 26, 1922, gave Kapunan P500 of the P1,000 mentioned in the above quoted document. Diaz further followed the usual procedure to take over the property of Mendezona pursuant to his bid of P12,500,

56 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

which covered the amount of the mortgage with its accumulated interest and with the judicial expenses. RULING: YES. Article 542 punishes "any person who shall solicit any gift or promise as a consideration for agreeing to refrain from taking part in any public auction." The crime is consummated by the mere act of soliciting a gift or promise for the purpose of abstaining from taking part in the auction. Not permitting our minds to be confused by the varied explanations of Diaz and Kapunan, the document formulated by them and hereinbefore quoted, demonstrates that Kapunan, on the promise of Diaz to pay P1,000, refrained from further participation in the sale of the property of Mendezona, which is exactly the situation covered by article 542 of the Penal Code. Public policy discountenances combinations or agreements on the part of bidders at execution sales, the objects and effects of which are to stifle competition. The courts will consider an agreement between a judgment creditor and one claiming an interest in the thing about to be sold under an execution, that neither shall bid against the other, as void, unless all parties concerned know of the arrangement and consent thereto. Execution sales should be open to free and full competition, in order to secure the maximum benefit for the debtor. Article 542 of the Penal Code is, therefore, a wise provision even though rarely invoked, and should be used to discourage the stifling of bids at judicial sales. PATERNO OUANO VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND FRANCISCO ECHAVEZ GR No. L-40203 August 21, 1990 ISSUE: Whether Ouano committed machinations in public auction punishable under the Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of land registered under RFC (DBP). Said property was offered for bidding for the second time because the first bidding was nullified due to Ouano’s protest. It appears that prior to the second bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To ensure success of their enterprise, they also agreed to induce the only other party known to be interested in the property-a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from presenting a bid. They broached the matter to Mrs. Bonsucan's group. The latter agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw from the sale; and Ouano's wife paid it P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses. RULING: YES. These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez had promised to share in the property in question as a consideration for Ouano's refraining from taking part in the public auction, and they had

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST attempted to cause and in fact succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away from the auction. in order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned In so doing, they committed the felony of machinations in public auctions defined and penalized in Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code

January 26, 2018 – Article 187– IMPORTATION AND DISPOSITION OF FALSELY MARKED ARTICLES OR MECHANDISE MADE OF GOLD, SILVER, OTHER PRECIOUS METALS OR THEIR ALLOYS DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P.

That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter of record, as is the fact that thereby only one bid that of Echavez was entered for the 'land in consequence of which Echavez eventually acquired it. The agreement therefore being criminal in character, the parties not only have no action against each other but are both liable to prosecution and the things and price of their agreement subject to disposal according to the provisions of the criminal code. This, in accordance with the so-called pari delicto principle set out in the Civil Code.

[NO CASE FOUND]

January 25, 2018 – Article 186 – MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B. THE UNITED STATES v. CANDIDO FULGUERAS G.R. No. 2176 April 18, 1905 ISSUE: Whether or not Fulgueras committed the acts as mentioned under article 186 of the revised penal code on monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade FACTS: In the months of March to July, 1904, Fulgueras attributed to himself a supernatural power pretending to hold a commission from a powerful chief in Manila. He went about distributing papers and proclamations to the people of Oroquieta, Province of Cagayan de Misamis, spreading subversive and fanatical ideas, and with orders from his alleged chief to lower the prices of needful commodities and to reform the customs otherwise they would be under the penalty of being visited with flood and calamities. By these machinations and deceits the defendant succeeded in deceiving ignorant people and causing them to provide themselves with instruments of measure larger than they formerly had and different from the regular size and also succeeded in making them lower the prices of commodities of everyday life, all with violation of law. HELD: Yes. The court held in this case that this spreading of false rumors or making use of any other artifice to restrain free competition in the market constitutes the acts as mentioned under Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code. The court found all these charges well proven and sentenced the defendant to the penalty of six months’ arresto mayor and to pay a fine of 5,000 pesetas, in accordance with the provisions of article 544 of the Penal Code (now Article 186 of the RPC).

January 26, 2018 – Article 188 – INFRINGEMENT - RA 8293 (SUBSTITUTED FOR ART. 188 OF THE RPC) CEBALLOS, Jesus C. GSELL v. YAP-JUE G.R. No. 4720, Jan. 19, 1909 ISSUE: Whether or not Yap-Jue infringed on the patent of Gsell. FACTS: Gsell obtained a patent for manufacturing canes and umbrellas with a curved handle by means of a lamp or blowpipe fed with mineral oil or petroleum. Yap-Jue made similar products using the same process but instead of using “a lamp or blowpipe fed with mineral oil or petroleum,” he used a lamp fed with alcohol. HELD: Yes, he did. The Court held that alcohol is an equivalent or substitute for mineral oil or petroleum, in connection with blast lamps or blowpipes. It is a well-known fact at the time when the patent was issued to Gsell. The use of a blast lamp or blowpipe fed with petroleum or mineral oil, rather than one fed with alcohol, is an unessential part of the patented process the use of which was prohibited by the court in a prior proceeding. The Doctrine of “Mechanical Equivalents” provides that the inventor of an ordinary machine is protected against all mere formal alterations and against the substitution of mere mechanical equivalents. It protects the patentee from colorable invasions of his patent under the guise of substitution of some part of his invention by some well-known mechanical equivalent. Human ingenuity would be taxed beyond its powers in preparing a grant of a patent so comprehensive in its terms, "as to include within the express terms of its detailed description every possible alternative of form, size, shape, material, location, color, weight, etc., of every wheel, rod, bolt, nut, screw, plate, and other component parts of an invention." ASIA BREWERY, INC. V. CA AND SAN MIGUEL CORP GR NO. 104533 JULY 5, 1993 FIRST ISSUE: Does ABI's BEER PALE PILSEN label or "design" infringe upon SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN WITH RECTANGULAR MALT AND HOPS DESIGN? HELD:

57 | 1 YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay ST

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST NO. On the other hand, the dominant feature of ABI's trademark is the name: BEER PALE PILSEN, with the word "Beer" written in large amber letters, larger than any of the letters found in the SMC label. The trial court perceptively observed that the word "BEER" does not appear in SMC's trademark, just as the words "SAN MIGUEL" do not appear in ABI's trademark. Hence, there is absolutely no similarity in the dominant features of both trademarks. Neither in sound, spelling or appearance can BEER PALE PILSEN be said to be confusingly similar to SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. No one who purchases BEER PALE PILSEN can possibly be deceived that it is SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. No evidence whatsoever was presented by SMC proving otherwise Besides the dissimilarity in their names, the following other dissimilarities in the trade dress or appearance of the competing products abound: (1) The SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle has a slender tapered neck. The BEER PALE PILSEN bottle has a fat, bulging neck. (2) The words "pale pilsen" on SMC's label are printed in bold and laced letters along a diagonal band, whereas the words "pale pilsen" on ABI's bottle are half the size and printed in slender block letters on a straight horizontal band. (See Exhibit "8-a".). (3) The names of the manufacturers are prominently printed on their respective bottles. SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN is "Bottled by the San Miguel Brewery, Philippines," whereas BEER PALE PILSEN is "Especially brewed and bottled by Asia Brewery Incorporated, Philippines." (4) The SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle cap is stamped with a coat of arms and the words "San Miguel Brewery Philippines" encircling the same. The BEER PALE PILSEN bottle cap is stamped with the name "BEER" in the center, surrounded by the words "Asia Brewery Incorporated Philippines." (5) On the back of ABI's bottle is printed in big, bold letters, under a row of flower buds and leaves, its copyrighted slogan: "BEER NA BEER!" Whereas SMC's bottle carries no slogan. (6) The back of the SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle carries the SMC logo, whereas the BEER PALE PILSEN bottle has no logo. (7) Finally, there is a substantial price difference between BEER PALE PILSEN (currently at P4.25 per bottle) and SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN (currently at P7.00 per bottle). One who pays only P4.25 for a bottle of beer cannot expect to receive San Miguel Pale Pilsen from the storekeeper or bartender. Second Issue: whether ABI is passing off its BEER PALE PILSEN as SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN.

58 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

HELD: NO. The amber color is a functional feature of the beer bottle. As pointed out by ABI, all bottled beer produced in the Philippines is contained and sold in amber-colored bottles because amber is the most effective color in preventing transmission of light and provides the maximum protection to beer. As was ruled in California Crushed Fruit Corporation vs. Taylor B. and Candy Co., 38 F2d 885, a merchant cannot be enjoined from using a type or color of bottle where the same has the useful purpose of protecting the contents from the deleterious effects of light rays. That the ABI bottle has a 320 ml. capacity is not due to a desire to imitate SMC's bottle because that bottle capacity is the standard prescribed under Metrication Circular No. 778, dated 4 December 1979, of the Department of Trade, Metric System Board. With regard to the white label of both beer bottles, ABI explained that it used the color white for its label because white presents the strongest contrast to the amber color of ABI's bottle; it is also the most economical to use on labels, and the easiest to "bake" in the furnace. No one can have a monopoly of the color amber for bottles, nor of white for labels, nor of the rectangular shape which is the usual configuration of labels. Needless to say, the shape of the bottle and of the label is unimportant. What is all important is the name of the product written on the label of the bottle for that is how one beer may be distinguished form the others. BIRKENSTOCK ORTHOPEADIE GMBH AND CO. KG V. PHILIPPINE SHOE EXPO MARKETING CORP. GR. NO. 194307 NOV. 20, 2013 ISSUE: Whether or not the subject marks should be allowed registration in the name of Birkenstock. FACTS: Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corp. (PSEMC) was the registered owner of the trademark “Birkenstock and Device” since October 21, 1993 in the Philippines. Birkenstock Orthopeadie GMBH and Co. KG(Birkenstock), a German company, and has been using “Birkenstock” since 1774 by its inventor, Johan Birkenstock. In 1994, Birkenstock applied for trademark registration of “Birkenstock” before the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) in the Philippines. This was opposed by PSEMC. During the pendency of the registration proceedings, PSEMC failed to file the required 10th Year Declaration of Actual Use (10th Year DAU) for “Birkenstock and Device” on or before October 21, 2004. Failure to file the 10th Year DAU constitutes abandonment of the trademark and will result in the automatic cancellation of the certificate of registration. The Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) found that the mark, “Birkenstock”, of Birkenstock was not popular in the Philippines and that PSEMC did not lose their right over the mark for non-filing of

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST the 10th Year DAU due to their continued use of the product. The decision of the BLA was reversed by the Director General of the IPO (DGIPO) citing that PSEMC’s failure to file the DAU. The CA reversed the decision of the DG-IPO and adopted the BLA’s ruling. HELD: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. It affirmed the decision of DG-IPO that non-filing of the DAU is an automatic cancellation of the registration and constitutes abandonment of the mark. The SC also appreciated the evidence provided by Birkenstock, though photocopies , that “Birkenstock” is a popular mark in the world and thus entitled to protection under Philippine Laws. It emphasized that registration of a trademark, by itself, is not a mode of acquiring ownership.1âwphi1 If the applicant is not the owner of the trademark, he has no right to apply for its registration. Registration merely creates a prima facie presumption of the validity of the registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the trademark, and of the exclusive right to the use thereof. Such presumptionis rebuttable and must give way to evidence to the contrary. It is not the application or registration of a trademark that vests ownership, but it is the ownership of a trademark that confers the right to register the same. A trademark is an industrial property over which its owner is entitled to property rights which cannot be appropriated by unscrupulous entities that, in one way or another, happen to register such trademark ahead of its true and lawful owner. The presumption of ownership accorded to a registrant must then necessarily yield to superior evidence of actual and real ownership of a trademark. The Court also finds that the registration of PSEMC of the mark was in bad faith since it is very remote that two persons did coin the same or identical marks. To come up with a highly distinct and uncommon mark previously appropriated by another, for use in the same line of business, and without any plausible explanation, is incredible. The field from which a person may select a trademark is practically unlimited. As in all other cases of colorable imitations, the unanswered riddle is why, of the millions of terms and combinations of letters and designs available, [respondent] had to come up with a mark identical or so closely similar to the [petitioner’s] if there was no intent to take advantage of the goodwill generated by the Birkenstock mark. Being on the same line of business, it is highly probable that the PSEMC knew of the existence of “BIRKENSTOCK” and its use by the Birkenstock, before PSEMC appropriated the same mark and had it registered in its name. January 27, 2018 – Article 189 – INFRINGEMENT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, FRAUDULENT DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN, FALSE DESCRIPTION, FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION. FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z. COFFEE PARTNERS, INC. V. SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE ROASTERY, INC.

59 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

G.R. NO. 169504 MARCH 3, 2010 ISSUE: Whether petitioners use of the trademark SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE constitutes infringement of respondent’s trade name SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE & ROASTERY, INC. FACTS: Respondent San Francisco Coffee Roastery, Inc. is a local corporation engaged in wholesale and retail sale of coffee. It registered its business name SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE & ROASTERY, INC. with the Department of Trade and Industry in June 1995. On the other hand, petitioner Coffee Partners, Inc. is a local corporation engaged in the business of establishing and maintaining coffee shops in the country. It registered its name on January 2001 under a franchise agreement with Coffee Partners Ltd., a business entity established under British Virgin Islands to use CPL’s designed trademarks like SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE. In 1998, respondent formed a joint venture agreement with Boyd Coffee USA and later on embarked in setting up coffee shops in malls and commercial establishments around Metro Manila. In June 2001, respondent discovered that petitioner was about to open a coffee shop under the name SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE in Libis, Quezon City. According to respondent, petitioners shop caused confusion in the minds of the public as it bore a similar name and it also engaged in the business of selling coffee. Respondent sent a letter to petitioner demanding that the latter stop using the name SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE. Respondent also filed a complaint with the Bureau of Legal Affairs-Intellectual Property Office (BLA-IPO) for infringement and/or unfair competition with claims for damages. HELD: Yes. Petitioners SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE trademark is clear infringement of respondent’s SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE & ROASTERY, INC. trade name. The descriptive words San Francisco Coffee are precisely the dominant features of respondent’s trade name. Petitioner and respondent are engaged in the same business of selling coffee. Whether wholesale or retail. The likelihood of confusion is higher in cases where the business of one corporation is the same or substantially the same as that of another corporation. In this case, the consuming public will likely be confused as to the source of the coffee being sold at petitioner’s coffee shops. Respondent has acquired an exclusive right to use of the trade name SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE & ROASTERY, INC. since the registration of the business name with the DTI in 1995. Thus, respondent’s use of its trade name from then on must be free from any infringement by similarity. Of course, this does not mean that respondent has exclusive use of the geographic word SAN FRANCISCO or generic word COFFEE. Geographic or generic words are not, per se, subject to exclusive appropriation. It is only the combination of the words SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE, which is respondent’s trade name in its coffee business, that is protected against infringement on matters related to the coffee business to avoid confusing or deceiving the public.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST DIAZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LEVI STRAUSS INC. G.R. NO. 180677 FEBRUARY 18, 2013 ISSUE: WON there was infringement of trademarks committed by Diaz in this case. FACTS: Levi Strauss and Company (Levi’s), a foreign corporation had been engaged in the apparel business. It is the owner of trademarks and designs of Levi’s jeans like LEVI’S 501, the arcuate design, the two-horse brand, the twohorse patch, the two-horse patch with pattern arcuate, and the composite tab arcuate. After receiving information that Diaz was selling counterfeit LEVI’S 501 jeans in his tailoring shops in Almanza and Talon, Las Piñas City, Levi’s Philippines hired a private investigation group to verify the information. Surveillance and the purchase of jeans from the tailoring shops of Diaz established that the jeans bought from the tailoring shops of Diaz were counterfeit or imitations of LEVI’S 501. Levi’s Philippines then sought the assistance of the NBI for purposes of applying for a search warrant against Diaz to be served at his tailoring shops. NBI agents searched the tailoring shops of Diaz and seized several fake LEVI’S 501 jeans from them. Levi’s Philippines claimed that it did not authorize the making and selling of the seized jeans; that each of the jeans were mere imitations of genuine LEVI’S 501 jeans by each of them bearing the registered trademarks, like the arcuate design, the tab, and the leather patch; and that the seized jeans could be mistaken for original LEVI’S 501 jeans due to the placement of the arcuate, tab, and two-horse leather patch. In his defense, the accused interposed that he did not manufacture Levi’s jeans, and that he used the label "LS Jeans Tailoring" in the jeans that he made and sold; that the label "LS Jeans Tailoring" was registered with the Intellectual Property Office; that his shops received clothes for sewing or repair; that his shops offered madeto-order jeans, whose styles or designs were done in accordance with instructions of the customers; that since the time his shops began operating in 1992, he had received no notice or warning regarding his operations; that the jeans he produced were easily recognizable because the label "LS Jeans Tailoring," and the names of the customers were placed inside the pockets, and each of the jeans had an "LSJT" red tab; that "LS" stood for "Latest Style;" and that the leather patch on his jeans had two buffaloes, not two horses. The RTC found him guilty of the said crime. HELD: No. Diaz used the trademark "LS JEANS TAILORING" for the jeans he produced and sold in his tailoring shops. His trademark was visually and aurally different from the trademark "LEVI STRAUSS & CO" appearing on the patch of original jeans under the trademark LEVI’S 501. The word "LS" could not be confused as a derivative from "LEVI STRAUSS" by virtue of the "LS" being connected to the word "TAILORING", thereby openly suggesting that the jeans bearing the trademark "LS JEANS TAILORING" came or

60 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

were bought from the tailoring shops of Diaz, not from the malls or boutiques selling original LEVI’S 501 jeans to the consuming public. The prosecution also alleged that the accused copied the "two horse design" of the petitionerprivate complainant but the evidence will show that there was no such design in the seized jeans. Instead, what is shown is "buffalo design." Again, a horse and a buffalo are two different animals which an ordinary customer can easily distinguish. The prosecution further alleged that the red tab was copied by the accused. However, evidence will show that the red tab used by the private complainant indicates the word "LEVI’S" while that of the accused indicates the letters "LSJT" which means LS JEANS TAILORING. Again, even an ordinary customer can distinguish the word LEVI’S from the letters LSJT. DY V. PHILIPS ELECTRONICS G.R. NO. 186088 MARCH 22, 2017 ISSUE: Whether the registration of the trademark of PHILITES will defraud and cause unfair competition and infringement of trademark to PHILIPS. FACTS: On 12 April 2000, petitioner PHILITES filed a trademark application covering its fluorescent bulb, incandescent light, starter and ballast. After publication, respondent Philips Electronics filed a Verified Notice of Opposition alleging that the registration of such will cause to mislead the public as to the origin, nature, quality, and characteristic of the goods on which it is affixed and it is tantamount to fraud as it seeks to register and obtain legal protection for an identical or confusingly similar mark that clearly infringes upon the established rights of PHILIPS over its registered and internationally wellknown mark. HELD: Yes. Applying the dominancy test in the instant case, it shows the uncanny resemblance or confusing similarity between the trademark applied for by respondent with that of petitioner's registered trademark. An examination of the trademarks shows that their dominant or prevalent feature is the five-letter "PHILI", "PHILIPS" for petitioner, and "PHILITES" for respondent. The marks are confusingly similar with each other such that an ordinary purchaser can conclude an association or relation between the marks. The consuming public does not have the luxury of time to ruminate the phonetic sounds of the trademarks, to find out which one has a short or long vowel sound. At bottom, the letters "PHILI'' visually catch the attention of the consuming public and the use of respondent's trademark will likely deceive or cause confusion. Most importantly, both trademarks are used in the sale of the same goods, which are light bulbs. Applying the holistic test, entails a consideration of the entirety of the marks as applied to the products, including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing similarity. A comparison

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST between petitioner's registered trademark "PHILIPS'' as used in the wrapper or packaging of its light bulbs and that of respondent's applied for trademark "PHILITES" as depicted in the container or actual wrapper/packaging of the latter's light bulbs will readily show that there is a strong similitude and likeness between the two trademarks that will likely cause deception or confusion to the purchasing public. The fact that the parties' wrapper or packaging reflects negligible differences considering the use of a slightly different font and hue of the yellow is of no moment because taken in their entirety, respondent's trademark "PHILITES" will likely cause confusion or deception to the ordinary purchaser with a modicum of intelligence.

61 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST TITLE FIVE – CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS January 28, 2018 – RA 6425 – CRIMES RELATED TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P. US VS AH SING 36 PHIL 978 ISSUE: Whether or not accused Ah Sing is liable to illegal importation of Opium. FACTS: Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel which arrived in the port of Cebu from Saigon. He bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board and had them in his possession during the said trip. The 8 cans of opium were found in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine by authorities who made a search upon anchoring on the port of Cebu. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He dis not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug. RULING: Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person who unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise. note: Possession of Opium on board a vessel is punishable when Philippine port is its destination. When a foreign steamer anchored in any of our ports after arriving direct from a foreign country, mere possession of Opium therein is punishable. PEOPLE VS. MARTIN SIMON ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of accused Simon for the violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 was proper. FACTS: Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a total of 3.8 grams, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana. Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the day of question, he was picked up by the police at their house while

62 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the marked money or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the marked money came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body. Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement RULING: No. To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established. To sell means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration. It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills. After careful review, the Court held that there were 2 tea bags of marijuana that was sold and there were 2 other tea bags of marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon should be charged of selling for the 2 tea bags of marijuana only. However, there is an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, the court hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused. The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, the court have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, the court applied first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.” Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional. JULIUS CACAO Y PRIETO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. NO. 180870, 610 SCRA 636, JANUARY 22, 2010] ISSUE: Whether or not there was a proper chain of custody in the instant case. FACTS: On October 14, 2004, at around 7:45 in the evening, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Celso Pang-ag of the Intelligence and Operation Section of the Laoag City Police Station received a telephone call from an informant about a drug session being held inside Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City. Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 Jonel Mangapit, went immediately to the Starlight Hotel to determine the veracity of the report. Upon arrival at the target area, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit approached the lady clerk manning the information counter of Starlight Hotel and inquired about the alleged drug session at Room 5 of the hotel. The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit that the roomboy of the hotel was about to deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and they could follow him if they [so wish]. Thus, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy knocked at the door and a woman, later identified as Mylene, opened the door wide enough to enable the police officers to look inside. PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated on top of the bed sniffing shabu while Joseph Canlas was on the floor assisting petitioner sniffing shabu. At this juncture, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit arrested petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them the drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters and plastic sachets. PO2 Mangapit frisked

63 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

petitioner and recovered from him one plastic sachet containing shabu. After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit brought them to the Laoag City Police Station and turned them over to the police officer on duty while the confiscated items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta. The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory conducted an examination on the specimen recovered from appellant and his companion which tested positive for shabu. On October 15, 2004, two separate informations were filed against Joseph Canlas y Naguit and Cacao indicting them for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 before the RTC of Laoag City. Both RTC and CA convicted petitioner. RULING: No. As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, if there is any indication that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case, the Supreme Court will not hesitate to review the same. In this case, the Court finds it imperative to review the factual findings of the trial court because of certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on material points. A. The testimonies of the prosecutions principal witnesses are inconsistent as to who delivered the prohibited drug to the evidence custodian. In this case, PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2 Jonel Mangapit (Mangapit) both testified that it was the latter who brought the item confiscated from petitioner to the evidence custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta (Ancheta). However, the foregoing assertions are totally at odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the evidence custodian. The latter denied that it was Mangapit who delivered the item allegedly recovered from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and categorically declared that it was SP03 Balolong (Balolong) from whom he received the plastic sachet of shabu. Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, The Court is of the considered view that this contradiction is not so inconsequential or minor but a discrepancy touching on substantial and significant matter which could well affect the credibility of the witnesses. B. The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the item presented in court was the same item confiscated from Cacao. The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one hand, and the testimony of Ancheta on the other hand, necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the same item that was allegedly seized and confiscated from petitioner. If the version of Mangapit is to be believed, then the most lamentable aspect pertains to his failure to

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST identify the seized item with certainty. For sure Mangapit, who is the most competent person to make the proper identification being the officer who confiscated the item from Cacao, never actually identified the same. The only other person who could have identified the subject drug is Pang-ag. However, the Court cannot lend credence to his supposed identification, the same not being also positive, certain and unequivocal. Besides, there is no showing that this witness actually saw the shabu at the time it was allegedly seized from petitioner. In fact, Pang-ag is even incompetent to make the identification since from all indications, he has never been in possession of it. Moreover, considering the testimony of Ancheta, it was Balolong who forwarded the seized item. It must be noted that Balolong was never presented to testify in this case. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that what was turned over to the evidence custodian by Balolong and later presented in court was the same substance recovered from petitioner. The failure to establish the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s case. Note: Essential in a drug-related case is that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt Since the dangerous drug constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction, it behooves upon the prosecution to establish and prove with certainty that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same item recovered from his possession. The failure to establish the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s case. There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself override the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence. PEOPLE VS PAGADUAN (GR NO 179029, 12 AUGUST 2010) ISSUE: Whether or not the integrity of the evidence was preserved. FACTS: Buy-bust operation was conducted by PO3 Almarez, SPO1 Balido and Captain de Vera. Ruper Pagaduan was arrested and plastic sachet of what appears to be shabu was marked, request for laboratory examination was done the same day. The plastic sachet was turned over to PNP Crime Laboratory two days after. He was found guilty by the court and the same was affirmed by CA Pagaduan contents among others that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of

64 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

custody in the handling of the seized drug. He claims that there was no evidence to show when the marking were done. RULING: No. The Supreme Court acquitted Pagaduan. The prosecution failed to show that the illegal drug presented in the court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the Pagaduan. Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drug’s unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Resolution: We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence. For this reason, the last sentence of the implementing rules provides that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] Thus, noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case; police procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to justify the failure of the police to conduct the required physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs. The apprehending team failed to show why an inventory and photograph of the seized evidence had not been made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police station (as required by the Implementing Rules in case of warrantless arrests). We emphasize that for the saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had been preserved. In other words, the justifiable ground for noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from the apprehending team to the police station. PO3 Almarez testified that the appellant was brought to the Diadi Police Station after his arrest. However, he failed to identify the person who had control and possession of the seized drug at the time of its transportation to the police station. In the absence of clear evidence, we cannot presume that PO3 Almarez, as the poseur buyer, handled the seized sachet to the exclusion of others – during its transfer from the place of arrest and confiscation to the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST police station. The prosecution likewise failed to present evidence pertaining to the identity of the duty desk officer who received the plastic sachet containing shabu from the buy-bust team. This is particularly significant since the seized specimen was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory only after two days. It was not, therefore, clear who had temporary custody of the seized items during this significant intervening period of time. Although the records show that the request for laboratory examination of the seized plastic sachet was prepared by Captain de Vera, the evidence does not show that he was the official who received the marked plastic sachet from the buy-bust team. As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the seized specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to the PNP Crime Laboratory on December 29, 2003, where it was received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined by PSI Quintero. However, the person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory was not identified. As earlier discussed, the identity of the duty desk officer who received the shabu, as well as the person who had temporary custody of the seized items for two days, had not been established. The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in the chain of custody, creating a reasonable doubt whether the drugs confiscated from the appellant were the same drugs that were brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and eventually offered in court as evidence. In the absence of concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold, the body of the crime the corpus delicti has not been adequately proven. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating reasonable doubt on the appellants criminal liability.

65 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST TITLE SIX – CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS January 30, 2018 – Article 195 – ACTS PUNISHABLE IN GAMBLING AND BETTING ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M U.S. v. JAIME FILART AND HILARIO SINGSON G.R. No. L-10263 March 13, 1915 Moreland, J. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants conducted lottery FACTS: Filart and Singson took part in a lottery or raffle of an automobile, which was the property of Filart. The winner was determined in the following manner: The numbers composing the 450, each written on a separate piece of paper, were placed together in a box and thoroughly mixed. A boy was selected who placed his hand in the box and drew out a number. This he delivered to a person who unfolded the paper and read the number in a loud voice while Filart, with a list of the 450 numbers referred to, struck from the list the number corresponding to that drawn from the box. This was repeated until all of the numbers were drawn from the box and stricken from the list. It was agreed that the last number drawn from the box should be the winning number and that the owner of that number should win the automobile. Both defendants were charged for violating the following provisions of the law: Section 7 of Act No. 1757 provides, as follows: The playing at and the conducting of any game of monte, jueteng, or any form of lottery or policy . . . is hereby prohibited, and any person taking any part therein . . . shall be punished as provided in section 3 hereof. . . . . This section also provides that: It shall be no defense to any criminal action under this section that the defendant acted as the agent of another or that he had no interest in the result. HELD: Yes. The facts of record place this case within the definition generally given of a lottery. A lottery is said to be “a species of gaming, which may be defined as a scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance among persons who have paid, or agreed to pay, a valuable consideration for the chance to obtain a prize.” It was held in the case of Equitable Loan Co. vs. Waring, 117 Ga., 599, that three elements enter into a lottery scheme: (1) A consideration; (2) chance: (3) a prize, or some advantage or inequality in amount or value which is in the nature of prize. Doctrine: A lottery is defined as a scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance among persons who have paid, or agreed to pay, a valuable consideration for the chance to obtain a prize. Its elements are: (1) a consideration; (2) chance: (3)

66 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

a prize, or some advantage or inequality in amount or value which is in the nature of prize. MARTIN VILLAMOR and VICTOR BONAOBRA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 200396 MARCH 22, 2017 ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ conviction for violation of RA 9287 as collector or agent under Section 3(c) for Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d) for Bonaobra, should be upheld. FACTS: Villamor was charged as a collectior with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng” and possessing a list of various numbers, a calculator, a cellphone, and cash.Another Information was filed in the same court charging Bonaobra as an operator or manager with violation of the same law on the same day and place. The prosecution testified that PD Penaflor received a call from an informant regarding an ongoing illegal numbers game at Barangay Francia, Virac, Catanduanes, specifically at the residence of Bonaobra. They proceeded to the latter's residence and upon arrival, they saw petitioners in the act of counting bets, described by the Bicol term “revisar,” which means collating and examining numbers placed in “papelitos,” which are slips of paper containing bet numbers, and counting money bets.When they entered the gate of fee compound, they introduced themselves as police officers and confiscated the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting to P1,500.00 in different denominations, the “papelitos,” a calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen. Petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco Camacho where they were investigated for illegal gambling. Subsequently, a case was filed against the petitioners before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The version of the defense asserted that the evidence were inadmissible because the police officers had no search warrant when they barged into Barnoabra's compound and therefore the conviction should not be upheld.The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the arresting officers and held that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto committing an illegal numbers game locally known as “lotteng” a variant of Last Two. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. RULING: No. The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra’s compound without a valid warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said right.After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid warrantless arrest on petitioners. It was not properly established that petitioners had just committed, or were actually

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in the presence of the arresting officers. In this case, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the acts that constitute the offense of illegal gambling as a collector or an agent.The prosecution merely relied on the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia found and confiscated inside the house of Bonaobra and not on the specific overt acts that constitute the offense.All told, the evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound is inadmissible in evidence since it was obtained in violation of Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, Since the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court acquits petitioners. "EL DEBATE," INC., VS JOSE TOPACIO, Director of Posts G.R. No. L-19982 December 29, 1922 ISSUE: Whether or not the guessing contest of El Debate a "lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance" within the meaning of the law. FACTS: El Debate, a newspaper of the City of Manila, published a full page announcement regarding two contests.The first contest is for the award of prizes for the nearest approximate guesses as to the total number of votes that will be cast for any of the winning candidates for Carnival Queen either in the provinces or in Manila. The second contest is for the award for the nearest approximate guesses as to the total number of votes that the Queen elect will receive for the Carnival queenship. Any subscriber to El Debate may participate in these two contests by paying in advance at least the amount of the subscription of a quarter.But payment is to be strictly in advance and the estimate or guess must be explained.The Director of Posts, following the advice of the Attorney-General, refused to admit the issues of El Debate, containing the advertisement, to the mails, for the reason that it fell within the provisions of the Administrative Code concerning non-mailable matter. Not satisfied with the ruling of the Director of Posts, the publishers of El Debate have had recourse to these original proceedings in mandamus to settle the controversy between the newspaper and the Government. El Debate argued that it was a guessing game and not lottery thus Director of Posts must grant the issues containing such advertisements. RULING: Yes. It is similar. "Neither of these contests is a "legitimate business enterprise." In each thousands invest small sums in the hope and expectation that luck will enable them to win large returns. A comparatively small percentage of the participants will realize their expectations, and thousands will get nothing. They are, in effect, lotteries, under the guise of 'guessing contests'. The Meeting, therefore, the issues in the case, we rule that the Director of Posts acted advisedly in refusing the use of the mails for the issue of El Debate which contained the announcement of its guessing contest, and that

67 | 1 YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay ST

said contests is a lottery, or gift enterprise depending in part upon lot or chance, within the meaning of the Postal Law.The general rule is that guessing competitions or contests are lotteries within the statutes prohibiting lotteries. Indeed, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the most ingenious and subtle mind to devise any scheme or plan short of a gratuitous distribution of property, which will not be held to be in violation of the Gambling Law, and repugnant to the Postal law. It is for the courts to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and the pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent.The purpose of El Debate in devising its advertising scheme was to augment its circulation and thus to increase the number of newspaper readers in the Philippines — which is commendable. But the advertisement carries along with it a lottery scheme — which is not commendable.Open the door of chance but a little, for one scheme, however ingeniously and meritoriously conceived, to pass through, and soon the whole country will be flooded with lotteries. January 31, 2018 – Article 196 – IMPORTATION, SALE AND POSSESSION OF LOTTERY TICKETS OR ADVERTISEMENTS ALAMEDA, Manuel F. THE UNITED STATES vs. EMILIO SANTOS REYES, ET AL., G.R. No. L-7260 August 21, 1912 ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant violated Sec.3, Act No. 1523. FACTS: These defendants were charged with a violation of an Section 3, Act No. 1523, to prohibit the importation, sale, giving away, use and possession of lottery tickets and lottery advertising matter. The defendant, Emilio S. Reyes, was by occupation a printer; that during the months of March, April, May and June, 1911, he printed a large number of lottery tickets, alleged to be lottery tickets of the Royal Lottery of Colombo; that a number of said lottery tickets were found in his private residence and others in his place of business; that the tickets which the defendant Reyes had delivered to the defendant Dominga Trinidad were later found in the possession of the said Dominga Trinidad and the other codefendant, Teodoro Fidel. The attorney for the appellant maintains in his brief that said Act No. 1523 did not provide a punishment for the possession of lottery tickets of the Philippine Islands or of lottery tickets made in the Philippine Islands. He further argues that the tickets were printed by the defendant Reyes for one Miguel Soler and that he had nothing to do with said lottery tickets, except to print them under his contract with Soler. Soler was not called as a witness during the trial of the cause. The defendant Reyes admitted that he had printed the tickets; that he was in possession of the same; that a part of them were found hidden in his house and that he had given to his codefendant, Dominga Trinidad, a number of said tickets for a certain sum of money. HELD:

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST In view of the fact that the defendant, Emilio Santos Reyes, gave to his co-defendant, Dominga Trinidad, certain of said lottery tickets, and in view of the fact that he had hidden away in his private residence certain of said lottery tickets, we are of the opinion that his possession of the same has not been satisfactorily explained, and that his possession of said lottery tickets is in violation of said section 3. U.S. VS MARCELO JOSE GR NO. 11566 AUG 10, 1916 ISSUE: Did the defendants violate Section 3 of Act No. 1523? FACTS: The mercantile firm of Marcelo Jose & Co., composed of Marcelo Jose and Tan Bo, was located at No. 200 Calle Harris, Olongapo. Both members of this firm were arrested on the night of May 16, 1915, and placed in confinement. About 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the following day, May the 17th, the store was searched by the authorities and a one-tenth part of a Macao lottery ticket was found therein. At the time this search was made neither of the owners of the store was present. Tan Bo, the managing partner, testified that this lottery ticket was sent to him by a friend in Amoy and that when he received it he put it in an envelope and placed it in the drawer and that his partner, Marcelo Jose, had never seen it. The appellant, Marcelo Jose, testified that, although he is a member of the mercantile firm of Marcelo Jose & Co., he knew nothing of the existence of the lottery ticket until he saw it in the court of the justice of the peace, and that he lived in Manila and went to Olongapo only when the business required his presence. Section 3 of Act No. 1523 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, give away, use or have possession of, with intent to sell, give away or use, any lottery ticket. HELD: If the defendant can establish that he did not know of the existence of the lottery ticket within his premises, the presumption is destroyed and the defendant must be acquitted.It is a general rule that, when ay of the prohibited drugs, enumerated in section 31 of the Opium Law, are found upon the premises occupied by a person accused of using the same, there can be no conviction under said section unless it affirmatively appears that he knowingly had the prohibited article on the premises, or that the animus possidendi in fact existed together with his alleged apparent possession or control of such article. But direct proof of facts of this nature, in a criminal proceeding, is rarely forthcoming, except in cases of confession, and their existence may and usually must be inferred from the varying circumstances in each particular case. When a full, satisfactory, and sufficient explanation of the presence of a prohibited drug on the premises at the time of the seizure is given, which is entirely consistent with the allegation of the defendant to the effect that he did not have the same in his possession, there can be no conviction and the accused must be acquitted. The testimony of both this appellant and Tan Bo

68 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

stands uncontradicted and the Government did not attempt to impeach the credibility of these witnesses. February 1, 2018 – Article 197 – BETTING IN SPORTS CONTESTS ALILIAN, Enna B. [NO CASES FOUND] February 1, 2018 – Article 198 – ILLEGAL BETTING ON HORSE RACES ARANCES, Javy Ann G. [NO CASES FOUND] February 2, 2018 – Article 199 – ILLEGAL COCKFIGHTING BANUELOS, Kelvinn L. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARIANO AYOSO, TEODORICO VALENZUELA, ALFONSO DESOYO and FELIPE DE LA CRUZ. G.R. No. L-18762 April 27, 1967 Ponente: MAKALINTAL, J. ISSUE: Whether or not the cockfighting is valid.

ordinance

regarding

FACTS: On July 21, 1960, accused-appellants MARIANO AYOSO, ET AL., were charged with the crime of ILLEGAL COCKFIGHTING before the Municipal Court of Bogo. That on or about 2:45 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less of July 21, 1960 at the cockpit of Tan Sim, Poblacion Bogo, Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, feloniously, unlawfully and knowingly with unlawful purpose, indulge themselves in illegal cockfighting commonly known as "Tari-Tari", wherein money P25 is used as bet on a day, Thursday, which is not permitted by law though the place is a licensed cockpit. This act is a gross violation of Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, Section 1. The accused filed a motion to quash, claiming that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute an offense because cockfighting is authorized in Bogo on Thursdays under the provisions of Ordinance No. 18, Series of 1960, enacted and approved by the Municipal Council of Bogo. HELD: NO. The municipal ordinance is invalid. Thus, the issue boils down to whether Republic Act No. 938, as amended, gives local government, blanket authority to permit cockfighting at any time and for as long as said governments may wish it. Upon mature deliberation, we hold that the answer must be in the negative. To begin with, repeals and even amendments be implication are not favored, whereas an affirmative answer would entail a vital amendment, amounting for all practical purposes, to a repeal, of sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Secondly, grants of power to local governments are to be constructed strictly, and doubts in the interpretation thereof should be resolved in favor of the national government and against the political subdivisions concerned. Thirdly, it is a matter of common knowledge that cockfighting is one of the most wide-spread vices of our population, and that the government has always shown a grave concern over the need of effectively curbing its evil effects. The theory of petitioner herein presupposes that the Republic of the Philippines has completely reversed its position and chosen instead, to place the matter entirely at the discretion of local governments. We should not, and cannot adopt, such promise except upon a clear and unequivocal expression of the will of Congress, which insofar as said premise is concerned is not manifest from the language used in Republic Act No. 938, as amended. Lastly, "cockpits" and "cockfighting" are regulated separately be our laws. Thus, Section 2243 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers municipal councils "to regulate cockpits". Yet, the authority of said councils over cockfighting, is found in sections 2285 and 2286 of said Code, not in said section 2243 (i). Similarly, Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code punishes, not illegal "cockpits" but "illegal cockfighting." What is more, participation in cockfights "on a day other than those permitted by law" is dealt with in said article separately from participation in cockfights "at a place other than a licensed cockpit". So too, the authority of local governments, under Republic Act No. 938, as amended, "to regulate ... the establishment, maintenance, and operation of ... cockpits" does not necessarily connote the power to regulate "cockfighting", except insofar as the same must take place in a duly licensed "cockpit". Again, the first and second proviso in Section 1 of said Act, regulating the distance of cockpits and places of amusements therein mentioned from 'any public building, schools, hospitals and churches' and the third proviso of the same section, prohibiting the admission of minors to some of those places of amusement, suggest that the authority conferred in said provision may include the power to determine the location of cockpits, conditions to be observed for the protection of persons therein, the number of cockpits that may be established in each municipality and or by each operator, the minimum age of the individual who may be admitted therein, and other matters of similar nature — as distinguished from the days on which cockfighting shall be held and the frequency thereof. In short, we are of the opinion that the city ordinances relied upon by petitioner herein authorizing cockfighting on Thursdays, are invalid. February 3, 2018 – Article 200 – GRAVE SCANDAL BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.

69 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

US vs. SAMANIEGO G.R. No. 5115. November 29, 1909. MORELAND, J. : ISSUE: Whether or not the accused committed Grave Scandal. FACTS: That on and for many weeks prior to the 27th day of November, 1907, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Juana Benedicto de Perez was a married woman, and that said Manuel Samaniego knew that she was married and united in the bonds of matrimony with and was the legitimate consort of Jose Perez Siguenza; that during the period of time above expressed the said Manuel Samaniego and Juana Benedicto de Perez, willfully, illegally, and criminally and scandalously, without having any matrimonial tie between them, habitually appeared together in public places and frequented together places of recreation, suspicious places, vacant houses, and houses of bad repute, in the daytime as well as in the nighttime; and lewdly and indecently went to bed together in the house of the husband of the said Juana Benedicto de Perez during the late hours of the night, dressed only in their night clothes, and indecorously, indecently, and immodestly embraced each other and caressed each other in the presence of the family, children, and servants of the said husband of Juana Benedicto de Perez; all with public scandal and with scandal to the community, and with shame and humiliation to the husband and family of the said Juana Benedicto de Perez. RULING: NO. The acts complained of lack many of the elements essential to bring them within the purview of the article of the Penal Code invoked by the prosecution. Every act that was in anywise public fails entirely of those qualities which offend modesty and good morals by "grievous scandal or enormity." The occurrence at the residence on the night of the 6th of November did not have that publicity which is required by the article of the Penal Code referred to. (U.S. v. Catajay, 6 Phil. Rep., 398; supreme court of Spain, April 13, 1885, December 14, 1903, and January 27, 1908; Viada, vol. 3, p. 130.) The evidence introduced on the reopening adds nothing to the case already made by the prosecution. The case was reopened for a particular purpose and the evidence to be introduced, if any, was restricted to a particular condition, viz, the "publicity or nonpublicity of the acts charged in the complaint." On the reopening, evidence was presented by the prosecution in relation to the alleged occurrence between the defendants in Plaza Palacio. Concerning this incident testimony had already been given on the trial by the witness Rafael Perez. Testimony was also given on the reopening by the same witness as to an occurrence between the defendants one morning in the Botanical Garden. In relation to this same event he had already given his testimony on the trial. His evidence as to these two events given on the reopening of the case is wholly inconsistent with,

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST if not absolutely contradictory of, his testimony in relation to the same events given on the trial. Such testimony can have no weight. The other testimony given on the reopening by this witness and the testimony of the witness Amadeo Pacheco can have no bearing or weight in the decision of this case because such testimony relates to acts and relations between the defendants which are not "charged in the complaint" and concerning which no evidence whatever had been offered on the trial. In the judgment of this court the evidence fails to show the defendants guilty of the crime charged. US vs. CATAJAY G.R. No. 2785. August 23, 1906. CARSON, J. : ISSUE: WON the accused committed Grave Scandal. FACTS: The trial court found be accused guilty of the crime of public scandal in violation of the provisions of article 441 of Penal Code. PUBLIC SANDAL. — Article 441 of the Penal Code construed. Held, That it is an essential element of the crime defined and penalized therein that the acts complained of resulted in a grave public scandal. It appears, however, that the acts complained of were committed at night, in a private house, and at a time when no one was present except the accused, the mistress of the house, and one servant, and we are of opinion that these circumstances do not constitute that degree of publicity which is an essential element of the crime defined and penalized in article 441 of the Penal Code. The correct construction of this article well stated by Viada in his commentary on article 457 of the Penal Code of Spain, which exactly corresponds with the article in question: "Constitute the crime provided all those acts contrary to decency and good manners that, for their publicity, have been subject to public scandal for people who have accidentally witnessed. Although the article does not say it, it is evident that it is a precise condition for this crime to exist that offense to modesty and good habits is public: if the offense did not have this character, it is clear that it would not produce the serious scandal nor the transcendence required by the article, and therefore, no longer subject to the sanction of the same, but the most benign of No. 2 of Article 586, which punishes as inmates a simple offense against public order, with the arrest penalty of one to ten days and a fine of 5 to 50 pesetas, to those who with any kind of acts offended the moral and good custom without committing a crime. When the act, then, offensive to modesty is publicly committed, should be assessed as a crime, since this same publicity is what produces the serious scandal that is punished: in another case, the provision cited Article 586 is the one that should apply." (Viada comments to the Penal Code of 1870, fourth edition, volume 3, page 130.) *translated via translate.google.com RULING:

70 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

YES. There can be no doubt that the accused committed the offense defined and penalized in No. 2 of the article 571 of the Penal Code, which corresponds with the above-mentioned number 2 of article 586 of the Penal Code of Spain, and provides that a penalty of from one of ten days’ arrest and a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas shall be imposed upon those who, by exhibiting prints or engravings, or by means of other acts, shall offend against good morals and custom without committing a crime. Since this is a lesser offense that the one charged in the complaint, and is included therein, we find him guilt of a violation of the provisions of the said article and, reversing the sentence of the trial court, we impose upon the accused, Jose Catajay, the penalty of the ten days’ imprisonment (arresto), and the payment of a fine of 125 pesetas, and the costs of the trial in both instances. After the expiration of ten days from the date of final judgment let the cause be remanded to the lower court for proper procedure. So ordered. February 4, 2018 – Article 201 – IMMORAL DOCTRINES, OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND EXHIBITIONS, AND INDECENT SHOWS CEBALLOS, Jesus C. FERNANDO V. CA G.R. NO. 159751 DEC. 6, 2006 ISSUE: Whether or not Fernando was guilty of selling and distributing obscene materials. FACTS: Gaudencio E. Fernando owned Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair and Rudy Estorninos was its attendant. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region (PNP-CIDG NCR), acting on reports that the store sold and distributed pornographic materials, raided the store by virtue of a search warrant. The raid yielded twenty five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines. Fernando contends that his Mayor’s permit was expired and thus not the lawful owner of the store. HELD: Yes, he is guilty of Art. 201. In order to be liable under Art. 201, it must be proven that (a) the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials. Necessarily, that the confiscated materials are obscene must be proved. The following guidelines as to what is obscene was adopted by the Court: (1) whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST (3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The Supreme Court noted the reasoning of the trial court as to the obscene nature of one of the VHS tapes confiscated: “The tape exhibited indecent and immoral scenes and acts. Her dancing movements excited the sexual instinct of her male audience. The motive may be innocent, but the performance was revolting and shocking to good minds.” Furthermore, Art. 201 does not require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the public. PEOPLE V. KOTTINGER G.R. NO. L-20569 OCTOBER 29, 1923 ISSUE: Whether or not the photos of naked native women in the post cards were obscene. FACTS: Kottinger was manager of Camera Supply Co where several post cards were confiscated due to their alleged obscenity. The post cards showed photos of naked native women from nonChristian areas in the Philippines. HELD: No, they do not. The tests used by the Court as to whether a material is considered obscene were the following: 1) whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall; and 2) Whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men. The Court ruled that the pictures merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. That pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are not obscene or indecent. Dr. Beyer, a professor from University of the Philippines also testified that that none of the pictures represented poses which he had not observed on various occasions, and that the costumes worn by the people in the pictures are the true costumes regularly worn by them. February 5, 2018 – Article 202 – VAGRANCY AND PROSTITUTES DAHIROC, Janice L. PEOPLE VS. SITON, ET AL., GR 169364, 18 SEPT. 2009 ISSUE: Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy violate the equal protection clause? FACTS: Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Art. 202 (2) of the RPC in two separate Informations. Accused were found wandering

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and loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets of Davao City, without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose. Respondents filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Art. 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overboard. The municipal trial court denied the motions, directed respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits, and declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power (or the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property) and justified by the Latin maxim “salus populi est suprema lex” (which calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number). Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law and claiming that Art 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause. The RTC granted the petition of the herein respondents and declared Art. 202 (2) unconstitutional. HELD: No. Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct. U.S. VS HART, ET AL., G.R. NO. 8848 NOVEMBER 21, 1913 ISSUE: Whether or not Hart, Miller and Natividad have committed the act of Vagrancy. FACTS: Hart, Miller and Natividad were accused of Gambling and Vagrancy where they all appealed. Hart had ran gambling games in his saloon ever night one in Angeles and one in the Bario of Tacondo. He also operated a hotel Angeles in which he did a business. He was also a proprietor He raised hogs which he sold to the Army garrison at Camp Stotsenberg. He was also authorized to sell several hundered hectarcs of land owned by one Carrillo in Tacondo. With the power of an attorney, he furnished the same property and paid for the 1st public school in Tacondo. Miller had the reputation of being a gambler and that he was fined for gambling and was seen in houses of prostitution. Miller was discharged from the Army last year. He had the position of Sergeant and received a rating as "excellent" on being discharged. He had a partnership with one Buckered and invested P1000. The business netted him P300 per month. Natividad was also a gambler. During his visits to saloons, he sometimes acted as a banker. His occupancy is that of a tailor which was sufficient enough to support his family.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST HELD: Defendants are AQUITTED Act No. 519 states that: "(1) Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who had the physical ability to work, and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling; (2) every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling housed, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support; (3) every person known to be a pickpocket, thief, burglar, ladrone, either by his own confession or by his having been convicted of either said offenses, and having no visible or lawful means of support when found loitering about any gambling house, cockpit, or in any outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every idle or dissolute person of associate of known thieves or ladrones who wanders about the country at unusual hours of the night; (5) every idle person who lodges in any barn, shed, outhouse, vessel, or place other than such as is kept for lodging purposed, without the permission of the owner or a person entitled to the possession thereof; (6) every lewd or dissolute person who lives in and about houses of ill fame; every common prostitute and common drunkard, is a vagrant." It is insisted by the Attorney General (AG) that visible means of support, which are evident in the occupations of the accused, would not be a bar to the conviction under any one of the last four (4) clauses of the said act. The AG contends that "visible means of support" only applies to those "staying through the country". The courts decided that the mere missing of the punctuation cannot hold bar the argument of the AG, since the intention of the legislators was to prevent "loitering". It was stated that loitering was idling or wasting one's time. The time spent in saloons drum shops, and gambling houses is anything but that. The three defendants were earning a living by legitimate means in a degree of comfort higher than the average. Their sole offense was gambling, which the legislature has yet to make a subject of penal law. DISPOSITIVE PORTION: For these reasons, the defendants ACQUITTED, with the costs de oficio.

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are

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST TITLE SEVEN – CRIMES COMMITTED BY A PUBLIC OFFICERS February 6, 2018 – Article 203 – WHO ARE PUBLIC OFFICERS DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J FELICIANO MANIEGO y CATU, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R. No. L-2971 April 20, 1951 ISSUE: Whether or not Maniego is considered a public officer. FACTS: Feliciano Maniego was employed as a laborer to work as the person in charge of delivering summons and subpoenas in the Municipal Court of Manila. Nevertheless, Maniego was permitted to write motions for dismissal of prescribed traffic cases against offenders without counsel, and to submit them to the court for action, without passing through the regular clerk. Sometime in 1947, a certain Felix Rabia was subpoenaed in connection with a traffic violation. The said crime has prescribed without Rabia being prosecuted but then Maniego informed Rabia that he is penalized with a P15 fine; that Maniego can fix this if Rabia can pay him P10. Maniego pocketed the P10.00 and for this he was later charged for violating Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code which provides in part: Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and fine of not less than the value to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon if the same shall have been committed. Maniego assails the charge. He avers, among others, that he is not a public officer as he was merely hired as an ordinary government employee. HELD: Yes. Maniego is considered a public officer under Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code which includes all persons “who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Philippine Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class.” That definition is quite comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public servant from the highest to the lowest. For the purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the standard distinction in the law of public officers between “officer” and “employee”. Further, even assuming that Article 203 can’t be applied, although Maniego was originally engaged as a laborer, he was temporarily performing public functions when he was permitted to draft motions. And as in the performance thereof he

73 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

accepted, even solicited, monetary reward, he certainly guilty as charged. The receipt of bribe money is just as pernicious when committed by temporary employees as when committed by permanent officials. AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO ZOLETA, Petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [FOURTH DIVISION] and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. G.R. No. 185224 July 29, 2015 ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners, as public officers, were correctly charged with the crime of malversation. FACTS: The case stemmed from an anonymous complaint filed against the petitioner, Mary Ann Gadian, and Sheryll Desiree Tangan before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman) for participating in the scheme of questionable grants and donations to fictitious entities using provincial funds. As a result of this complaint, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit in Sarangani Province. Among the irregularities discovered by the Special Audit Team was a ₱20,000.00 financial assistance given to Women in Progress (WIP), a cooperative whose members were mostly government personnel or relatives of the officials of Sarangani Province. The COA Special Audit Team submitted its report to the Ombudsman which, in turn, conducted a preliminary investigation. Thereafter, the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charged the petitioner, ViceGovernor Felipe Constantino, Violeta Bahilidad, Maria Camanay, and Teodorico Diaz with malversation of public funds by falsification of public documents defined and penalized under Article 217 in relation to Article 171(2) and Article48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Sandiganbayan in an Information which reads: That on January 24, 2002 or prior or subsequent thereto in Sarangani, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Felipe Katu Constantino, a high-ranking public officer, being the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sarangani, Maria D. Camanay, Provincial Accountant, Teodorico F. Diaz, Provincial Board Member, Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta, Executive Assistant III, all accountable public officials of the Provincial Government of Sarangani, by reason of the duties of their office, conspiring and confederating with Violita Bahilidad, private individual, the public officers, while committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of their respective positions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, convert and misappropriate the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in public funds under their custody, and for which they are accountable, by falsifying or causing to be falsified the corresponding Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822 and its supporting documents, making it appear

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST that financial assistance had been sought by Women In Progress, Malungon, Sarangani, represented by its President, Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta, when in truth and in fact, the accused knew fully well that no financial assistance had been requested by the said group and her association, nor did Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta and her association receive the aforementioned amount, thereby facilitating the release of the above-mentioned public funds in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00)through encashment by the accused at Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 36481 dated January 24, 2002 issued in the name of the Violeta Bahilidad, which amount they subsequently misappropriated to their personal use and benefit and despite demand, the said accused failed to return the said amount to the damage and prejudice of the government and the public interest of the aforesaid sum. HELD: Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property; by taking or misappropriating the same; by consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any other person to take such public funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property. The elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are the following: (a) that the offender be a public officer; (b) that he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. All these elements have been established by the prosecution. First, it is undisputed that all the accused, except Bahilidad, are all public officers. A public officer is defined in the Revised Penal Code as "any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class. Constantino was the Vice-Governor of Sarangani Province, while the petitioner, Camanay, and Diaz were occupying the positions of Executive Assistant (at the Office of the Vice-Governor), Provincial Accountant, and Provincial Board Member, respectively. Second, the funds misappropriated are public in character, as they were funds belonging to the Province of Sarangani. Third, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay were accountable public officers. Under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, an accountable public officer is a public officer who, by reason of his office, is accountable for public funds or property. The Local Government Code expanded this definition with regard to local government officials.

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Finally, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take the public funds when they signed Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822. The term voucher, when used in connection with disbursement of money, implies some instrument that shows on what account or by what authority a particular payment has been made, or that services have been performed which entitle the party to whom it is issued to payment. Corollarily, when an authorized person approves a disbursement voucher, he certifies to the correctness of the entries therein, among others: that the expenses incurred were necessary and lawful, the supporting documents are complete, and the availability of cash therefor. He also attests that the person who performed the services or delivered the supplies, materials, or equipment is entitled to payment. February 7, 2018 – Article 204 – KNOWINGLY RENDERING UNJUST JUDGMENT DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G. QUINTIN STA. MARIA vs. HON. ALBERTO UBAY A.M. No. 595-CFI December 11, 1978 ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge may be held liable under Art 204 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: Quintin R. Sta Maria, attorney-in-fact of Valeriana Sta Maria, filed with the Supreme Court a letter-complaint against Judge Q. Ubay for violating the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code when he knowingly rendered an unjust judgment by promulgating a decision contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court in previous related proceedings, violating section 11 of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, falsifying his decision in order to make it appear that he rendered the same within the statutory threemonth period and putting ever obstacle to the approval of their Record on appeal in spite of lack of opposition duly filed on time. The lettercomplaints were indorsed by the Assistant to the Judicial Consultant to the respondent Judge for comment. In another letter complaint, Atty. Paz Palanca, branch clerk of Clerk of respondent judge in his sala, was also charged with infidelity in the custody of judicial records and, with putting all obstacles to the approval of their Record on Appeal. Sta. Maria states that the respondent Judge in awarding to the plaintiffs (in Civil Case C-2052) in toto what they prayed for in their complaint and amended complaint did so in bad faith and with full knowledge that said plaintiffs are not entitled thereto. HELD: No. the Court reiterates the ruled that in order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust in the sense that it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. The rule requires that the judgment

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST should be unjust for being contrary to law and for not being supported by the evidence. In the case at bar, to determine whether or not the decision of the respondent Judge in Civil Case C2052 constitutes an unjust judgment would involve more than a mere cursory reading of the decision itself or its comparison with this Court's decisions invoked by the complainant. To delve into the different factors bearing on the issues raised in Civil Case C-2052 considered by the respondent Judge in arriving at his conclusions set forth in the decision in question for purposes of ascertaining the factual, legal and jurisprudential bases of the said decision, would be tantamount to pre-empting the Court of Appeals of its appellate jurisdiction over the case, considering that the same is pending before it. Indeed, this Court stated in Gahol vs. Hon. Riodique that "only after the appellate court holds in a final judgment that a trial judge's alleged errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be levelled against a trial judge." For, through an appeal, an aggrieved party can always point out, for rectification by the appellate court, the errors in the alleged unjust judgment affecting him. The rule also requires that the judgment should be rendered by the judge with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. In the case at bar, the complainant failed to show any unmistakable indication that bad faith motivated the alleged unjust actuations of the respondent judge in Civil Case C-2052. Absent, thus, any positive evidence on record that the respondent Judge rendered the judgment in question with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice, the compliant must fall. BAN HUA U. FLORES V OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND ATTY. ENRIQUE L. FLORES, JR. GR NO. 136769, SEPT. 17, 2002 ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against private respondent for violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. FACTS: A complaint against the Ban Hua Flores for accounting and turnover of corporate funds of UBS Marketing was instituted by Johnny K. H. Uy with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction which was denied. Likewise denied was the appeal filed with the SEC en banc. A judgment was rendered in favor of the complainant. Petitioner Flores and company then appealed to the SEC en banc which reversed the decision except the order of accounting. A criminal complaint was then filed by the petitioner alleging that Hearing Officer Enrique Flores rendered an unjust judgment under Art. 204 of the RPC and violating Sec. 3 of RA 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act) which was dismissed by the Office of Ombudsman for insufficiency of evidence ratiocinating that there

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was no showing that the decision was rendered maliciously and deliberately to do an injustice to the complainant and that the error was committed in good faith pursuant to the principle of regularity in the performance of official functions. It was well settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion is not criminally liable for any error which he commits provided he acts in good faith. Even though the complainant had been inconvenienced because of the decision of the respondent, such inconvenience did not amount to causing undue injury under Sec. 3 of RA 3019, not only because there is no showing of evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence but because the decision appealed to the SEC en banc was immediately corrected, hence said decision did not become final and executory. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration which was likewise denied. Hence this petition where petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint, alleging that the decision was not made in good faith since the case did not involve a complex question of law but was a plain violation of simple rules of procedure and that petitioner and her family suffered undue injury as result of the decision, making respondent liable under Sec. 3 of RA 3019. HELD: No. There is grave abuse of discretion where the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment,13 as when the assailed order is bereft of any factual and legal justifications. In this case, the Court found that the assailed resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing the complaint against private respondent was legally justified. This is so because before one can be held liable under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the person subject of the complaint must be shown to have committed the act in bad faith. It was held in Guerrero vs. Villamor, 296 SCRA 88, 98 (1998), that a judge will be held liable for rendering an unjust judgment where he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive. In Ingco vs. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563, 574 (1997), the Court clearly indicated, as one of the elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, that the public officer complained of should have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. In this case, the Office of the Ombudsman did not find private respondent in bad faith, hence, the important element for the above offenses is wanting. Notice should also be made of the fact that under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender must be a judge. In this case, the alleged offender is a hearing officer of the SEC. Neither does the assailed resolution lack factual justification because petitioner failed to overcome the burden of proof to show private respondent’s bad faith. February 8, 2018 – Article 205 – JUDGMENT RENDERED THROUGH NEGLIGENCE DIZON, Roxan Danica G. EVANGELISTA VS BAES 61 SCRA 475 DECEMBER 26, 1974

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST ISSUE: Whether or not a judge may be held liable for abuse of discretion FACTS: Judge Baes is charged with knowingly, or by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, rendering unjust orders. In CAR Case No. 959 Judge De Guzman authorized landholder Jose Tan Kapoe to eject his tenant Silvestre Masa. On May 8, 1963 Masa's counsel moved to reconsider; Judge Macalino, then the presiding judge, ordered the clerk of court to furnish a copy of the motion to Tan Kapoe's counsel. As no opposition to the motion was interposed, Judge Macalino reconsidered Judge De Guzman's decision, and rendered on February 20, 1964 a decision denying the petition for ejectment of Masa and adjudging a leasehold system of tenancy between Tan Kapoe and Masa. Three and a half years later, Judge Macalino, on petition of Masa, rendered a supplemental decision fixing the rental on the holding. On April 2, 1968 Tan Kapoe moved for reconsideration of not only the supplemental decision but also the decision of February 20, 1964. Judge Baes granted Tan Kapoe's motion for reconsideration, with the justification that Judge De Guzman's prior decision had become final and executory allegedly because the motion for its reconsideration that was granted by Judge Macalino was fatally defective for lack of proof of service. Judge Baes' justification for his orders of June 11, 1968 and October 8, 1969 was rejected in Masa vs. Baes, et al., L-29784, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 263, where this Court held, inter alia, that the alleged non-service upon Tan Kapoe of a copy of Masa's motion to reconsider Judge De Guzman's decision "is belied by the record" and that Tan Kapoe was in estoppel to deny his receipt of a copy of the motion for reconsideration. HELD: While Judge Baes acted in abuse of discretion in issuing the orders complained of, it does not necessarily follow that he acted in bad faith or that his abuse of discretion signifies ignorance of the law in his part. Abuse of discretion signifies ignorance of the law on his part. Abuse of discretion by a trial court does not necessarily mean ulterior motive, arbitrary conduct or willful disregard of a litigant's rights. YARANON VS JUDGE RUBIO 66 SCRA 67 August 7, 1975 ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Rubio can be held liable for an error in judgment FACTS: This is an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Antonio Rubio of the Municipality of Inopacan Leyte for alleged (1) incompetence and/or ignorance of the law and (2) delaying justice. Complainant, Atty. Yaranon filed a charge of estafa with respondent's court against the spouses Puzon, his tenants or

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overseers who had earlier filed a case against him and his wife for reinstatement, which said complainant eventually lost. Complainant accused said tenants with having failed to account for agricultural items given to them in trust. After due trial wherein the only witness of complainant was himself, respondent acquitted the accused. Complainant charges that said decision of acquittal constitutes knowingly rendering an unjust and/or unfair decision. HELD: The Court was satisfied that absent any evidence of ill-motive or improper consideration, the same cannot by itself prove the charge laid against respondent. The decision discusses creditably the evidence of the parties and the Court see no indication therein of any untoward factor that could have induced respondent to be unfair to complainant. The latter may have a different view of his case, but mere error of judgment, assuming its existence, and the Court hold that here there was none, cannot serve as basis for a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, there being no proof or even allegation of bad faith. TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC. vs COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO NATIVIDAD G.R. No. 152568 February 16, 2004 ISSUE: Whether the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it modified the decision of the NLRC and ordered the petitioner to pay backwages to the private respondent. FACTS: Private respondent Pedro Natividad was working with petitioner Tomas Claudio Memorial College (TCMC) as "Liason Officer" of the school. On June 10, 1996, the private respondent was arrested by the Morong police authorities, without any warrant therefore, for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. A criminal complaint was later filed against him. A preliminary investigation was conducted which found probable cause to hold him for trial. The court, on the said date, issued a warrant for the private respondent’s arrest. The records were elevated to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. In the interim, the petitioner sent a Memorandum to the private respondent informing him that his employment was already terminated. On July 5, 1996, the private respondent posted a bail bond. He did not, however, file any complaint against the petitioner with the NLRC on account of his dismissal. On October 2, 1996, the State Prosecutor issued a Resolution dismissing the criminal complaint filed against the private respondent for lack of merit. On November 21, 1996, the private respondent was arrested anew by police authorities. The Morong Chief of Police filed a criminal complaint for violation of Section 27, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425. On February 17, 1997, an Information therefore was filed with the RTC. On said date, the private respondent posted a bail bond and

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST was released from detention. On June 11, 1997, the private respondent filed a complaint with the NLRC against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. On November 10, 1998, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Ramos, rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of legal basis. The private respondent appealed the decision to the NLRC which affirmed the same. However, on certiorari with the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed, with modification, the decision of the NLRC, holding that although there was a valid cause for the private respondent’s dismissal, the petitioner did not follow the procedure for the termination of his employment. The CA ordered the petitioner to pay backwages to the private respondent from June 13, 1996 up to the finality of the said decision. The petitioner assails the decision of the CA in this Court. Among his contentions was that: The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion and authority when it knowingly rendered a decision which is bias, unfair & unjust, a violation of Art. 205 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Sec (2) (e) of RA 3019 (anti-graft law), hence the decision is void. HELD: No. The public respondent acts without jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case. There is excess of jurisdiction when the public respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law. There is a grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In Santos v. NLRC, the Court explained that: The normal consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed are, firstly, that the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and secondly, the payment of backwages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The statutory intent on this matter is clearly discernible. Reinstatement restores the employee who was unjustly dismissed to the position from which he was removed, that is, to his status quo ante dismissal, while the grant of backwages allows the same employee to recover from the employer that which he had lost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal. The two forms of relief are distinct and separate, one from the other. The payment of backwages is generally granted on the ground of equity. It is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of the unlawful dismissal; the grant thereof is intended to restore the earnings that would have accrued to the dismissed employee during the period of dismissal until it is determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause. The award of backwages is not conditioned on the employee’s ability or inability to, in the interim, earn any income. While it may be true that on June 11, 1996, the private respondent was detained , the State Prosecutor found no

77 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

probable cause for the detention of the private respondent and resolved to dismiss the case. The private respondent has not yet been convicted by final judgment. Indeed, he is presumed innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. In fine, the Court found and held that the Decision of the CA is in accord with law. February 9, 2018 – Article 207 – MALICIOUS DELAY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE Duque, Francis Lester M RENATO ALVARO RUPERTO vs. JUDGE TIRSO F. BANQUERIGO, respondent. A.M. No. MTJ-98-1154. August 26, 1998 ISSUE: WON Judge Banquerigo can be held liable under Art 207. FACTS: Complainant alleges that this administrative case stems from respondent Judge ruling in a case he filed against the spouses Anselmo and Pacita Mojillo, for ejectment with damages, The Mojillo spouses failed to file their answer to the complaint within the reglementary period. Since the case falls under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, herein complainant filed a motion with the trial court to summarily decide the case in accordance with the aforesaid Rule. Respondent judge, however, failed to act on the motion and, worse, he further granted therein defendant spouses an additional ten days within which to file their answer. The case was set for hearing on December 14, 1995, and, thereafter, it was again reset to March 14, 1996. Respondent Judge in his comment stressed that he was only an acting judge of the MCTC which had jurisdiction over the cases in question and that he was reporting to that court which had 226 pending cases, only twice a week. The subject ejectment case was filed in August, 1995. Considering that there were several cases filed with said MCTC, the case was set for hearing on March 14, 1996 allegedly as agreed upon by the parties and their counsel. He claims that his failure to act on the motion of complainant to decide the case in accordance with Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was because, in the interest of justice and equity, he believed that said motion should be set for hearing. HELD: No. The Court held that although Judge Banquerigo failed to comply with what is specifically required as a judicial duty. The ejectment case filed by complainant against the defendant spouses therein clearly falls under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. SEC. 6. (Effect of failure to answer) hereof provides-Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein...

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST The court however, believe that respondent judge should be merely reprimanded, in view of the fact that he was not only detailed to the court where the cases herein involved were pending, but also to other courts. Such multiple assignments, in one way or another, affected his efficient handling of cases. In addition, there was no showing of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations on the part of respondent judge which would justify the imposition of a more severe penalty, or that he has heretofore been found guilty of any administrative offense. RAFAEL SALCEDO vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE DAVID ALFECHE, JR., respondent. A.M. No. 267-MJ June 30, 1975 ISSUE: WON Respondent Judge can be held liable as charged. FACTS: An administrative complaint of malicious delay in the administration of justice filed by Rafael Salcedo against Judge Alfeche, Jr. due to his absence from his official position on March 5, 1971, as a consequence of which a cash bond posted by complainant, then accused in a pending criminal case, could not be accepted, with the result that he was detained overnight. Respondent in his answer claim that his absence on March 5, 1971 was due to his having taken a vacation leave and he did not have to report until March 6, 1971. HELD: No. The matter was referred to the then Executive Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, who in his report and recommendation stated the following: "Respondent judge had noted in his daily time record his absence from his station. In the absence of the municipal judge, it is a provision in the rules of Court that the accused may put up his bond before the municipal mayor who is authorized to order his release in case of such bond, reporting to the municipal judge on his return to the office the release made. It is clear though that immediately after he took cognizance of the fact that the accused was apprehended and ready to put up his bail, he immediately ordered his release on March 6 when he reported to the office the next day. In other words, after he had knowledge of the apprehension of the accused or his being detained, on the first opportunity he immediately released him. There was no motive why respondent Judge could be accused of having wantonly prejudiced the right of the complainant, he recommended the dismissal of the charges. JOHAN L.H. WINGARTS and OFELIA A. WINGARTS vs. JUDGE SERVILLANO M. MEJIA A.M. No. MTJ-94-1012 March 20, 1995 ISSUE: WON respondent judge can be held liable for Article 207 of the RPC "Malicious Delay in the Administration of Justice FACTS:

78 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

Complainant Johan L.H. Wingarts was the accused in MTC for malicious mischief. Respondent judge is charged with malicious delay in the administration of justice because the case Malicious Mischief allegedly dragged for one year and four months. HELD: No. A perusal of the records reveal that while there was a delay in hearing the case, such a delay does not appear to be malicious nor deliberate. Firstly, while the case appears to have been filed only on February 1, 1993, it was remanded back to respondent's sala sometime in June 1993 and was set for hearing on July 9, 1993. Secondly, the postponements were all on account of the absence or unavailability of the fiscal and/or the defense counsel and not of the Judge's own making. While Judges should not allow the parties to control the proceedings in their Court, in the case of respondent, he had no alternative but to grant the postponements if only to better serve the ends of justice. On January 10, 1994, he had to reset the hearing as the assigned fiscal was still in the USA. On April 21, 1994, respondent Judge issued an Order giving the prosecution fifteen days within which to file its position paper and thereafter, the case is deemed submitted for decision. Counting fifteen (15) days from April 21, 1994, the case was deemed submitted for decision last May 6, 1994. It was decided on June 8, 1994 or barely a month after it was deemed submitted for decision. Obviously, therefore there was no delay in deciding the case. If at all, the delay was in the hearing of the case and for apparently excusable grounds. February 10, 2018 – Article 207 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; NEGLIGENCE AND TOLERANCE FLORENTINO, Kimberly A. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS NICOLAS L. MINA G.R. NO. L-45312 JUNE 13, 1938 ISSUE: Whether accused violated Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: Accused was the chief of police in Asingan, municipality of Pangasinan. He was charged in breached of his official duty by maliciously defaulted in the prosecution and punishment of the violators of law prohibiting and penalizing the game of chance called “jueting” in that he failed to file the corresponding criminal actions against Juan Lazo as Jueting collector. HELD: Yes. Under Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code, any public officers or officer of the law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the punishment of the violators of law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses shall be punished. In this case, the accused being the chief of police was proven to have failed to prosecute the jueting collector who was caught possessing jueting lists, was held liable.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST BEATRIZ RAMOS VDA DE BAGATUA, ET AL. VS PEDRO A. REVILLA AND LEONIAS S. LOMBOS G. R. NO. L- 12247 AUGUST 26, 1958 ISSUE: Whether the City Attorney and Assistant City Attorney are liable under Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: Upon the death of her husband, Ramos donated a parcel of land to her children. When her children decided to subdivide the lot among themselves they engaged the services of a real estate broker. However, Rodrigo Bagatua accused Pangilinan real estate broker of estafa before the City Attorney of Quezon city for allegedly inducing them to sign papers supposedly necessary for the subdivision of the lot that turned out to be a deed of sale. Upon receipt of said complaint, the Assistant City Attorney, acting for the City Attorney, conducted a preliminary investigation, during that time both parties were duly represented by counsel. After the presentation of testimonies and documentary evidence the Assistant City Attorney recommended for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. Accordingly the complaint was dismissed. Complainants filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the City Attorney and the Assistant City Attorney to file an information against Pangilinan for estafa contending that in dismissing the complaint, respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: No. The court held that the fiscal as a prosecuting officer, is under no compulsion to file information based upon complaint, where he is not convinced that the evidence gathered or presented would warrant the filing of an action in court. Respondents are not liable. HILARIO SORIANO VS OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELINO ET. AL G.R. NO. 163178 JANUARY 30, 2009 ISSUE: Whether Garcia violated Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila an affidavit of complaint against Mely Palad a bank examiner of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for falsification of public document and use of falsified document. Assistant City Prosecutor recommended that Palad be charged in court for falsification of Public document. First Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the approval of the resolution. However, upon the motion of Palad to reconsider, First Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the reopening of the case. Respondent approved the recommendation to re open the case. However, in an Indorsement, Garcia forwarded the complete records of the case to the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. In September 2002, petitioner filed an Affidavit- Compalint

79 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

against Garcia for violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code. HELD: No, The court held in citing the case of US vs Mendoza, 23 PHIL 194 that “ The crime committed by the law violator must be proved first. If the guilt of the law violator is not proved, the person charged with dereliction of duty under Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code is not liable”. In taking into the account of the aforementioned jurisprudence and elements of the offense charged, it is clear that the filing of the instant suit is still premature considering the questioned controversy against Palad is still pending. Even the element of malice and deliberate intent to favor the violator of law cannot be entrenched without Palad’s guilt for the alleged defiance having been pronounced first. February 12, 2018 – Article 209 – BETRAYAL OF TRUST BY AN ATTORNEY OR SOLICITORREVELATION OF SECRETS FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z. MA. LUISA HADJULA V. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA A.C. NO. 6711 (JULY 3,2007) ISSUE: WON there was a violation of Article 209 (2) Revealing any of the secrets of his client learned by his in this professional capacity. FACTS: Hadjula and Atty. Madianda were used to be friends as they were colleagues at Bureau of Fire Protection where Atty. Madianda was the Chief Legal Officer and Hadjula was the Chief Nurse. Sometime in 1998, Hadjula approached respondent for some legal advice. She alleged that in their discourse, it was supposed to be kept confidential as she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later that respondent will refer the case to her another lawyer friend. Hadjula alleged that was malicious because after respondent heard her case and her secrets to she refused to take the case. Eventually, Hadjula filed for administrative and criminal complaint against Atty. Madianda for violation of Article 209 of the RPC because those secrets and information were later on used against her in a administrative case at the Office of the Ombudsman. HELD: Yes. However, the Supreme Court did not upheld the case as punishable under the Revised Penal Code even though Atty. Madianda was found indeed to have breached his duties of preserving the confidence of a client. The SC reiterated in this manner: The seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the error of respondent’s ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality. Thus, Atty. Madianda was only REPRIMANDED by the SC in this case. February 12, 2018 – Article 210 – DIRECT BRIBERY IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P. PEOPLE V. JOSELITO C. BARROZO A.C. NO. 10207 (JULY 21, 2015) ISSUE: Whether the act of the accused constitute direct bribery. FACTS: Disbarment Case against former Assistant Public Pros., Joselito C. Barrozo. Jen Valeriano, was a respondent in several cases of estafa and was assigned to respondent. According to Valeriano, Respondent would resolve her cases in her favor in exchange for P20,000.00. Hence, Valeriano went to the Office of the State Prosecutor to report the matter. NBI then conducted an entrapment operation where respondent was caught red handed receiving the P20,000.00. Sandiganbayan sentenced respondent to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 9 years, 4 months and 1 day prision mayor and a fine of P60,000.00 In October 2013 the Office of the Bar Confidant received a letter from Wat & Co. of Hongkong that their office received a letter from respondent asking for long service payment. Wat & Co. found out about respondent’s conviction on the internet and asked the OBC if respondent is qualified to practice law. Prompted by this letter, OBC recommended the disbarment of respondent. HELD: Yes. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. And with the finality of respondent's conviction for direct bribery, the next question that needs to be answered is whether direct bribery is a crime that involves moral turpitude. The elements of Direct Bribery: 1. the offender is a public officer; 2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another; 3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be

80 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and 4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties. To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act constituting the same must have been "done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [It must involve] an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. UNITED STATES V. RUFINO SANCHEZ G.R. NO. 9102 (NOVEMBER 5, 1913) ISSUE: Whether the crime committed in this case is direct bribery. FACTS: A municipal policeman pretended to arrest a person who had in his possession a substance which he had purchased as opium but proved to be only molasses. The policeman knew the character of this substance and, with this knowledge, threatened to have the said person prosecuted for a violation of the Opium Law unless he paid him P500. P150 was finally agreed upon as the price which the policeman would accept to turn him loose. Sometimes afterward Lua discovered that what he had purchased and had been deprived of by the two policemen was not opium at all, and the present case is a consequence of his complaint to the authorities. The appellant, Rufino Sanchez contends that the crime established by the above facts is not robbery, but bribery. In United States v. Gimenea (24 Phil. Rep., 464), this court said: "Viada, vol. 2, p. 642, in discussing article 381, says that to constitute the crime of bribery as provided in this article, four things are necessary: (1) That the defendant be a public officer according to the meaning of this term in article 401; (2) that he has received either personally or through another gifts or presents or accepted offers or promises; (3) that such reception of gifts or presents or acceptance of offers or promises has been for the purpose of executing a crime; and (4) that the act constituting the crime relates to the exercise of the office which the public officer discharges.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST HELD: No. The money was not delivered to the two policemen for the purpose of executing a crime. Had Lua been allowed to retain possession of the molasses no law would have been violated, nor would the two policemen have been guilty or a noncompliance with their official duties. Several reasons are advanced as to why the acts of the policemen did not constitute robbery all based upon the misconception of the injured person as to the nature of the substance which he had purchased as opium. It is quite true that had the latter been aware of the true state of affairs he would not have permitted the appellant and his companion to force him to pay them the P150. But the guilt of the appellant is not contingent upon the conception or misconception of Lua as to the true state of affairs. In the case of United States v. Flores (19 Phil. Rep., 178), the court laid down the following doctrine: "A policeman who, knowing that a person has committed no crime for which he could be lawfully arrested and tried, nevertheless arrests such person, falsely accusing him of a crime, and then by means of threats of presentation and imprisonment, thus playing upon his ignorance and fear, obtains money from the said person, secures such money by force and intimidation and commits the crime of robbery as defined by the Penal Code. FEBUARY 13, 2018 – ARTICLE 211 – INDIRECT BRIBERY LAZO, Joseph Artfel T. LEONOR FORMILLEZA, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of indirect bribery under article 211 FACTS: Petitioner Formilleza has been with government service for around 20 years as the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the National Irrigation Administration. (NIA) On the other hand, Mrs. Mutia was an employee of NIA for 7 years. Sometime in December 1983, her appointment was terminated. Taking steps to either obtain permanency or at least a renewed appointment she was told to approach the petitioner who determined if an employee is to be appointed or promoted. However, petitioner refused to attend to her papers unless she was given some money. Mrs. Mutia reported the problem with the Philippine Constabulary, Who later took steps for an entrapment. The entrapment was a success after Mrs. Mutia handed the marked money under the table to which petitioner accepted the money. Petitioner was found positive of ultra-violet powder. Powder used in the marked money. HELD: No, The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. There

81 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or other property. Moral certainty, not absolute certainty, is needed to support a judgment of conviction, Moral certainty is a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon a given matter. 14 Without this standard of certainty, it may not be said that the guilt of the accused in a criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. GREGORY JAMES POZAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. ISSUE: WON the money given was a bribe to corrupt the city probation officer FACTS: Petitioner Pozar, is an American Citizen and Permanent resident of the Philippines, Charged with the crime of corruption of a public official. After he feloniously gave to the city probation officer 100pesos upon his application for probation. RULING: The court deduce that the procedure for processing petitioner's application for probation in the Probation Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear cut And since the accused petitioner is a foreigner and quite unfamiliar with probation rules and procedures, there is reason to conclude that petitioner was befuddled, if not confused so that his act of providing and advancing the expenses for whatever documentation was needed further to complete and thus hasten his probation application, was understandably innocent and not criminal. The facts and circumstances on record amply justify and support the claim of the defense as against the conjectures, speculation and supposition recited in the decision of the trial court and quoted with approval in the appealed decision under review. The Government's own evidence as indicated in the Post-Sentence Investigation Report that the giving of the one hundred pesos ( P100.00) was done in good faith, is vital for it belies petitioner's criminal intent. There being no criminal intent to corrupt the Probation Officer, the accused petitioner is entitled to acquittal of the crime charged. We hold and rule that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. ATTY. ENRICO M. CABRERA vs. JUDGE JAMES B. PAJARES

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST ISSUE: WON respondent judge accepted the money on account of his office. FACTS: On Jan, 1985,Petitioner Enrico Cabrera denounced Respondent Judge Pajares for having allegedly asked money from him in connection with his case. Petitioner was advised by his counsel to accommodate any request for money from the respondent so that he would not be unduly hard on the complainant. And during the course of the case, The Respondent Judge, told petitioner needed money. To which, petitioner gave P1000 the next day. However, after two months the Respondent Judge told him once again that he needed money. It was then when the petitioner decided to report to the authorities. Acting on the report, NBI staged an entrapment and used marked money. The entrapment succeeded when the judge took the marked money from the complainant. RULING: There is reason to believe that the respondent judge accepted the money and that he knew it was being given to him by reason of his office. The evidence shows that after receiving the envelope with the money, the respondent judge did not really try to return it to Cabrera, as he claims he did, but that instead he placed it between the pages of his diary Second, the plan to entrap the respondent appears to have been cleared with the Executive Judge, Hon. Juan B. Llaguno, before whom the complainant swore to his statement and It is not likely that Judge Llaguno would approve the 'frame-up' of a colleague Investigating Justice Mendoza's above statement and analysis of the evidence and a review of the records fully support the finding that "respondent Judge accepted the money and that he knew it was being given to him by reason of his office." The Court has time and again stressed that members of the judiciary should display not only the highest integrity but must at all times conduct themselves in such manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion. But the Court is constrained to disapprove his recommendation as to the first charge of indirect bribery which is fully supported by the evidence that respondent Judge "be suspended from office for 2 years and 4 months, taking into consideration the penalty prescribed in art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code." The penalty of 2 years and 4 months imprisonment provided for the criminal offense of indirect bribery may not be equated with the penalty of separation from the judicial service which is the proper applicable administrative penalty by virtue of respondent Judge's serious misconduct prejudicial to the judiciary and the public interest. ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge is hereby dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. FEBUARY 14, 2018 – ARTICLE 212 CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

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–

NASH, Regina M. MORFE V MUTUC, 22 SCRA 424 January 31, 1968 Fernando, J. Plaintiff-appellee: Jesus P. Morfe (Judge of CFI) Defendants-appellants: Amelito R. Mutuc (Executive Secretary) et al. ISSUE/S: Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is: 1. An oppressive exercise of police power; 2. Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the right to privacy implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination; 3. An insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials. FACTS: • The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019) • Every public officer within 30 days after its approval or after his assumption of office “and within the month of January of every year thereafter”, as well as upon termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, “a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year”. • Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission “within the month of January of every other year thereafter” of their sworn statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy implicit on the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. • Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec: • Acceptance of public position = voluntary assumption of obligation • Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest of general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of police power. • CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause RULING: Decision reversed. RATIO: 1. Presumption of validity • Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a reasonable requirement for employment so a public officer can make of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST not present evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. • “If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.” (ErmitaMalate Hotel v. Mayor of Manila) 1. Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process Clause • “inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society” (Justice Malcolm) • The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain (Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights) • Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the protection of due process. • It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore he could also use due process to strike down what he considers as an infringement of his liberty. • Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process is observed. • The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. • “It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office…There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.” 1. Right to privacy • Right to be let alone • “It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and

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liabilities, including the statement of the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.” 1. Unreasonable Search and Seizure • The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give freedom from testimonial compulsion. 1. Right against self-incrimination • We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice. 1. Insult to personal integrity and official dignity • Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, mey be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. Rainier Espina GR No. 213500, Mar 15, 2017 ISSUE: Whether or not Espina should be held administratively liable for the charges imputed against him? Was he guilty of graft and corruption due to gross negligence in signing procurement documents without proper inspection. FACTS: On July 11 and 17, 2012, petitioner the FactFinding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) filed before the Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint and a supplemental complaint, respectively, charging Espina and several other PNP officers and private individuals for: (a) violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080 Anti - Graft and Corruption Practices Act, RA 3019, RA 9184 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents under Article 217 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (b) Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty; arising from alleged anomalies that attended the Philippine National Police's (PNP) procurement of 40 tires, and repair, refurbishment, repowering, and maintenance services of a total of 28 units of V150 Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), and the related transportation and delivery expenses of 18 units of LAYs between August and December 2007.It averred that the PNP did not comply with the bidding procedure prescribed under RA 9184 and its IRR, in that: (a) copies of the bid documents were not furnished to possible bidders; (b) no pre-procurement and pre-bid conferences were held; (c) the invitation to bid was not published in a newspaper of general circulation; (d) the procuring agency did not require the submission of eligibility requirements as well as the technical and financial documents from the bidders; and (e) no post qualification was conducted. Further, it claimed that there

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST were "ghost deliveries," i.e., the tires were never delivered to the PNP and no repair and refurbishment works were actually performed on the LAVs. In a Joint Resolution dated December 19, 2012, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Espina and several other PNP officers for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Section 65 (b) (4) of RA 9184, and for Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification under Article 217 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC. The Ombudsman also found them guilty of Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty and, accordingly, recommended their dismissal from government services. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior and to constitute an administrative offense, the misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. RULED: Rainier A. Espina is GUILTY of GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY. Accordingly, he is DISMISSED from government service with all the accessory penalties. FEBUARY 15, 2018 – ARTICLE 213 – FRAUDS AGAINST THE PUBLIC TREASURY AND SIMILAR OFFENSES OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P. SOLEDAD V. GANADEN VS. GREGORIO N. BOLASCO Adm. Matter No. P-124, May 16, 1975 ISSUE: Whether or not the Bolasco is liable under Article 213 of the RPC. FACTS: Gregorio N. Bolasco, who was Deputy Provincial Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Zambales is charged by complainant, Soledad V. Ganaden, a stenographer of the same court, with dishonesty by demanding P13.00 as sheriff's fee in civil case, entitled "Carmen Flores vs. Leonardo Frondarina," but issuing therefor a receipt for a lesser amount and by issuing a private receipt for P50.00 to plaintiff Paulino Padua in a civil case for the service of a writ of execution but failed to make a return of said writ. Bolasco was also charged with misconduct by delaying the service of summons upon Paulita Esteban and entrusting its service to her nephew, Atty. Eduardo Balaoing, Jr.. HELD: YES. Bolasco committed illegal exaction penalized by paragraph 2(b) of Article 213 of the RPC for failure to issue receipts for money collected by him officially. In this case, on two occasions, Bolasco received certain amounts in connection with the performance of his duties as deputy sheriff without issuing the corresponding official

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receipts. First, was on February 3, 1971, counsel for plaintiff in a civil case gave respondent P12.60 for sheriff’s fee for service of the complaint and summons thereof upon the defendants. Bolasco received said amount before the summons to be served were delivered to him for service, in spite of the standing instruction from the clerk of court and the provincial sheriff not to accept any payment if no official receipts are available. Bolasco did not issue the official receipt even after he had received the booklet of official receipts February 5 or 6, 1971. Lastly, respondent also received, again without issuing the corresponding official receipt, P50.00 from plaintiff for service of a writ of execution issued in connection in another civil case. Proof of receipt of said amount is respondent's private receipt. Hence, a collecting officer should issue official receipts and not mere private receipts. ARIEL C. VALLEJO vs HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 156413 April 14, 2004 ISSUE: Whether or not Vallejo is liable FACTS: Ariel Vallejo is a lawyer in the Register of Deeds of the province of Isabela. Franklin M. Javier, a National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent, filed a sworn application for search warrant before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan which briefly requests that a Search Warrant be issued on the Office of the Registry of Deeds, Provincial Capitol, Alibaga, Iligan for the purpose of seizing the following documents: 01. Undetermined number of FAKE LAND TITLES, Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Our Primary Entry Book under no. 496 and other pertinent documents related therewith; 02. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the Registry of Deeds; 03. Undetermined number of Land Transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of Documentary Stamps and Capital Gains Tax. That all of the said documents are being used or intended to be used in the commission of a felony that is FALSIFICATION OF LAND TITLES under Article 171 RPC, Article 213 RPC and R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft) and are hidden or being kept in the said office. HELD: NO. The charged imputed upon Vallejo should be dismissed and the seized items be returned. The questioned warrant in this case is a scattershot warrant for having been issued for more than one offense - Falsification of Land Titles under Article 171 and Article 213 of the RPC, and violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A warrant must be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. In fact, a careful perusal of the application for the warrant shows that the applicant did not allege any specific act performed by the petitioner

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST constituting a violation of any of the aforementioned offenses. Thus, the questioned warrant must be struck down for having been issued in contravention of the 1987 Constitution, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and existing jurisprudence consequently the charged against Vallejo must be dismissed. FEBUARY 16, 2018 – ARTICLE 214 – OTHER FRAUDS PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P. FRANCISCO AND LENLIE LECAROZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE G.R. NO. 130872 (MARCH 25, 1999) ISSUE: Whether or not accused Francisco and Lenlie Lecaroz are guilty of Estafa through falsification of public documents, and thereby convicting them also under Article 214 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS: Francisco Lecaroz is the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque. Lenlie Lecaroz, the former’s son, was the outgoing chairman of Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Santa Cruz and member of Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing the federation of KBs. Jowil Red won as Chairman of Barangay Santa Cruz in the 1985 KB elections. Lenlie did not run as candidate as he was no longer qualified, having passed the age limit. Jowil Red was appointed by President Marcos as member of SB of Santa Cruz, representing the federation of KBs. He received his appointment powers when President Aquino was already in power. However, he was not allowed by Mayor Lecaroz to sit as sectoral representative in the SB. Subsequently, Mayor Lecaroz prepared and approved on different dates the payment to Lenlie Lecaroz of payrolls covering period of January 1987 to January 1987. Red assumed position of KB presidency upon expiration of term of Lenlie Lecaroz. It was alleged that Lenlie continued to receive salary even after his term has expired. The Sandiganbayan convicted the accused, on 13 Information for Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and perpetual special disqualification from public office in accordance with Article 214 of the Revised Penal Code. HELD No. The offenses of which petitioners were convicted under Article 171, paragraph 4, of The Revised Penal Code, are intentional felonies for which liability attaches only when it is shown that the malefactors acted with criminal intent or malice. If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to him. There was no criminal intent demonstrated to justify petitioner’s conviction. Moreover, the decision of the Sandiganbayan of the accused’s perpetual special disqualification from public office in accordance with Article 214 of the Revised Penal Code, does not stand. Petitioners have been convicted for falsification of public documents through an untruthful narration of facts under Article 171, paragraph 4, of The Revised Penal Code. For the offense to

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be established, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and, (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. The first and third elements of the offense have not been established in this case. UNITED STATES V. FLORENCIO TORRIDA G.R. NO. 7450, 7451 AND 7452 (SEPTEMBER 18, 1912) ISSUE Whether or not the penalty under Article 214 is applicable to accused Torrida. FACTS Torrida, as part of his councilman duties in the town of Aparri, Cagayan Province, gave directions to his subordinates that the death of all large animals must be reported by the owners to him as councilman. These orders were conveyed to the people as directed. Several individuals lost their carabaos. Upon the receipt of this information, appellant Torrida informed these owners that they must pay a fine of P5 for each animal, these fees to be turned into the municipality by him. The owners, believing that the municipality had provided for the payment of such fines, turned over to the appellant five pesos for each animal that died. There was no provision whatever made by the municipality or any other entity for the imposition of such fines. These facts clearly constitute the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized in paragraph 1, article 535, in relation with paragraphs 1, article 534, Penal Code. Torrida was charged with three separates crimes of Estafa in three separate actions, tried and found guilty in each case. HELD Yes. When the councilor, Torrida in this case, takes advantage of his official position in committing Estafa, the disqualification mentioned in Article 399 (now Article 214 of the Revised Penal Code) is a part of the penalty to be imposed. The fact that the appellant was councilman at the time placed him in a position to commit these crimes. If he had not been councilman, he could not have induced the injured parties to pay these alleged fines. It was on account of his being councilman that the parties believed that he had the right to collect fines and it was for this reason that they made the payments. It is true that he had no right to either impose or collect any fines whatsoever. It is also true that a municipal councilman is not an official designated by law to collect public fines. But these facts do not destroy or disprove the important fact that the accused did by taking advantage of his public position, deceive and defraud the injured parties out of the money which they paid him. UNITED STATES V. JUSTO DACUYCUY G.R. NO. L-3873 (OCTOBER 18, 1907) ISSUE Whether or not accused Dacuycuy is liable under Article 214 of the Revised Penal Code.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST FACTS On December 1906, the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of said province accusing Justo Dacuycuy of the crime of Estafa, stating that the said accused, being a public official and taking advantage of his office of councilor for the municipality of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, received the sum of P39 from the residents of his district, for the purpose of investing the money in cedulas, and failed to invest said sum in cedulas or return the same to the owners thereof, and misapplied it and converted it to his own use to the prejudice of the several residents. The court sentenced Dacuycuy to the penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor, to suffer the accessory penalties, to indemnify the individuals residing in the barrio of Oangagan, town of Bacarra of said province. From this sentence the accused has appealed. In his testimony, the accused Dacuycuy confessed to having received from several residents of the barrio, the said sum of P39 to purchase an equal number of cedulas, but denied that he had gone over to the said barrio in order to collect taxes, and further stated that he was there enjoying a vacation when the residents handed him the money for the purchase of their respective cedulas, but that he was unable to get the cedulas because at the municipal treasury one person was not permitted to take out a cedula for another. HELD No. Since the councilor committed the crime of Estafa as a private individual, it is not proper to impose on him the penalty provided by Article 399 (now Article 214) of the Revised Penal Code for public officers, because he received the money not on the exercise of his functions as a councilor. When a public officer commits a common crime independent of his official functions and does acts that are not connected with the duties of his office, he should be punished with the penalty which the law imposes on the private individual who violates its provisions, without taking into account the official character with which the guilty party is invested. February 17, 2018 – Article 215 – PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS [NO CASE FOUND] February 17, 2018 – Article 216 – POSSESSION OF PROHIBITED INTEREST BY A PUBLIC OFFICER PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D. THE UNITED STATES v. CLEMENTE UDARBE G.R. No. 9945. November 12, 1914 ARAULLO, J. ISSUE: Whether or not Municipal President Urdabe became interested in any business in which it was his official duty to intervene. FACTS: Urdabe was appointed as the Municipal President of the Municipality of Magsingal and while on duty as said president, the Municipal Council on and under his presidency, approved

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and passed Regulation No. 7 for the leasing of fishponds in the said municipality. When the auction for the different sections of said fishponds was held in the town hall of the municipality, it was recorded that Urdabe, who presided over the auction, took part in the bidding for one particular section of the fishponds and that section was adjudicated to him as the highest bidder for the sum of two pesos a year. HELD: Yes. Municipal President Urdabe became interested and took direct part in the leasing of property of the Municipality of Magsingal, wherein he had to intervene by reason of his office as president of said Municipality, and he has therefore openly violated the provisions of Section 28 of the Municipal Code which states that: "No municipal officer shall be directly or indirectly interested in any contract work, or cockpits, or any other permitted games and amusements, or business of the municipality, or in the purchase of any real estate or any other property belonging to the corporation.” MACARIOLA v. ASUNCION Adm. Case No. 133-J. May 31, 1982 MAKASIAR, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Asuncion intervened in his official capacity in the transactions of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. FACTS: Judge Asuncion rendered a decision pertaining to a partition of the estate of Francisco Diaz. One of the lots of the said estate was sold to the spouses Galapon. A year after, spouses Galapon sold such lot to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein, at the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion was the stockholder’s president of the corporation. Consequently, Bernardita Macariola, one of the heirs of Diaz and who was against of the partition of the estate, contended that Judge Asuncion intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. when he rendered the decision concerning the partition of the estate. HELD: No. There was no showing that Judge Asuncion participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. The business of the corporation in which Judge Asuncion participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where Judge Asuncion intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which is a prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene," (I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime: it is

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime." February 18, 2018 – Article 217 – MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY PRESUMPTION OF MALVERSATION RIVERA, Marynit P. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LICERION P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON AND ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT G.R. NO. L-33254 JANUARY 20, 1978 ISSUE: Whether or not Samson is guilty of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS: In 1969, Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Samson, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, used 6 forged provincial vouchers to evidence fictitious sales of construction materials in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23. Samson hand-carried the vouchers and followed-up their processing in the offices of the provincial government and received the cash payments. HELD: Yes. Samson is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the provincial treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation. CECILIA U. LEGRAMA v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 178626, June 13, 2012 ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cecilia Legrama is guilty of the crime of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS: The Office of the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) for the Province of Zambales issued PAO Office No. 96-09 directing an Audit to conduct an examination of the cash and account of petitioner Cecilia Legrama, the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales. After the audit, the COA prepared a Special Cash Examination Report on the Cash and Accounts of Ms. Cecilia U. Legrama. The report contained the findings that petitioners cash accountability was short of P289,022.75 and that there was an unaccounted Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) in the amount of P863,878.00, thereby showing a total shortage in the amount of P1,152,900.75. Included in the shortage is the amount of P709,462.80, representing the total amount of various sales invoices, chits, vales, and disbursement vouchers, which were disallowed in the audit for lack of supporting documents. From the total amount of the shortage, petitioner was able to

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restitute the initial amount of P60,000.00. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan failed to consider the testimonial and documentary exhibits presented to support her claim that she did not appropriate or misappropriate for her use and benefit the subject fund nor did she allow her co-accused to use the said fund without the proper acknowledgment such as receipts, vales or sign chits. Petitioner maintains that she has satisfactorily explained the shortage on the basis of the documentary evidence submitted. HELD: Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property; by taking or misappropriating the same; by consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any other person to take such public funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property. The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are: (a) That the offender be a public officer; (b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. In the case at bar, after the government auditors discovered the shortage and informed petitioner of the same, petitioner failed to properly explain or justify the shortage that was subject to her accountability. Petitioner denied that she put the amount involved to personal use and presented various sales invoice, chits, vale forms, and disbursement voucher to prove her claim. Petitioner even went further by testifying that the total amount of P681,000.00 appearing in a disbursement voucher were cash advances given to the mayor during the height of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. However, the date when the eruption occurred was way before the period subject of the audit. Undoubtedly, all the elements of the crime are present in the case at bar. Hence, the petitioner is guilty of the crime of malversation under Article 217 of the RPC. February 21, 2018 – Article 218 – FAILURE OF ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER TO RENDER ACCOUNTS ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M. FLORENCIO B. CAMPOMANES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES DECEMBER 19,2006 ISSUE: Whether or not Campomanes is guilty of failure to render accounts as defined in Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: During the period material to the Information of this case, accused Cecilio G. Hechanova was the Chairman of the Philippine Sports Commission

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST (PSC) and Florencio B. Campomanes was the President of the Federation International Des Echecs (FIDE), a private international organization with offices at Lausanne, Switzerland. On 6 March 1991,the Philippine Sports Commission submitted to FIDE a bid offer to host the 30th Chess Olympiad of 1992 in Manila.The PSC’s bid offer was accepted by FIDE, and accordingly the Philippine government thru the PSC was granted the right to organize and host the 30th World Chess Olympiad in Manila from June 6-25, 1992. From October 1990 to June 1992 the PSC, also complying with its obligations under the bid offer, remitted to FIDE – received in FIDE’s behalf by its President, Florencio Campomanes – the total amount of P12,876,008.00 in connection with the 30th World Chess Olympiad in Manila. The amount of P12,876,008.00 was acknowledged as having been received by FIDE as shown by a letter dated December 22, 1995 of Willy Iclicki, FIDE Treasurer. The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an audit of the PSC’s transactions from March 1990 up to June 1992. The COA team noticed irregularities in the claims payable to the FIDE. The irregularities consisted of the lack of acknowledgment receipts and of accounting liquidation attached to the disbursement vouchers. The COA defined an acknowledgment receipt as an official receipt evidencing that the FIDE received the funds from the PSC. The COA invited the PSC officials to an exit conference on 27 October 1993. During the conference, the COA submitted its team’s findings to the PSC and requested for the PSC’s comment on the matter. In the absence of the PSC’s comment, the COA prepared SAO Report No. 93-27. The report stated that the FIDE, through Campomanes, received P12,876,008 without acknowledgment and without liquidation. Hechanova and Campomanes were charged as of fail to render account on the disbursement thereof, within the period provided for by law and the rules and regulations of the Commission on Audit. The Sandiganbayan acquitted Hechanova on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt while convicted Campomanes of the crime of failure to render accounts as defined in Article 218 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code. RULING: NO. There are four elements of the crime under Article 218. First, the offender is a public officer. Second, he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property. Third, the offender is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA, or to a provincial auditor. Fourth, he fails to render an account for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered. Campomanes is clearly not a public officer. He is the president of the FIDE, a private foreign corporation with whom the PSC, through Hechanova, negotiated to conduct the 1992 Chess Olympiad and Congress in Manila. The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Campomanes is not a public officer. So the Sandiganbayan applied Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 218. The Sandiganbayan’s decision, however, failed to specify any law or regulation requiring Campomanes to render accounts to the COA. Therefore Campomanes was acquitted because

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of the failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of Article 218, in relation to Article 222, of the Revised Penal Code. Because of this failure, The Supreme Court deem it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by both parties. ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 166680, July 7, 2014, 729 SCRA 191 ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the acquittal under RA 3019(Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) is a bar to his conviction under Art. 218 of Revised Penal Code. (2) Whether prior demand is a requisite for conviction under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: In 1994, Mayor Lumauig of Alfonso Lista obtained a cash advance of P101,736.00 intended for the payment of freight and insurance coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the City of Manila. However, instead of motorcycles, he was able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. It never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount advanced since the vehicles were already turned over to the municipality. He claimed that he was neither informed or did he receive any demand from COA to liquidate his cash advances. It was in 2001 while he was claiming for separation pay when he came to know he still has an unliquidated cash advance. And so as not to prolong the issue, he paid the amount of P101,736.00 to the municipal treasurer, for which reason, the incumbent Mayor Prudenciano executed an Affidavit of Desistance. The Sandiganbayan acquitted Lumauig for the violation of RA 3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) but convicted him for the felony of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under Art. 218 of the Revised Penal Code. HELD: (1) NO, acquittal from violation of RA 3019 is not a bar against conviction for Article 218 of the RPC. It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident. However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the same act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct charges. The elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a public officer whether in the service or separated therefrom. (2) that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property. (3) that he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and (4) that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such account should be rendered. (2) NO, demand is not element of the offense and that it is sufficient that there is a law or regulation requiring the public officer to render an account.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Since Lumauig received the subject cash advance sometime in 1994, he was, thus, required to liquidate the same on or before January 20, 1995. Further, to avoid liability under Article 218, he should have liquidated the cash advance two months from the time it was due, or on before March 20, 1995. In the case at bar, Lumauig liquidated the subject cash advance only on June 4, 2001. Hence, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, he was liable for violation of Article 218 because it took him over six years before settling his accounts. Considering the two mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and return or full restitution of the funds, Lumauig is sentenced to a straight penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor. HERMES E. FRIAS, SR. VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 171437 OCTOBER 4, 2007 ISSUE: Whether or not Frias is guilty with violation of Art.218 of the Revised Penal Code despite the fact that he did not benefited from the disallowed cash advances. FACTS: Frias, on behalf of the Municipality of Capas, made cash advances amounting to P50,000 and P950,000 (or a total of P1,000,000). These cash advances were allocated for the maintenance of economic enterprises and the augmentation of the general fund. The Commission on Audit found these purposes too vague. Thus, they disallowed the cash advances due to petitioner's failure to indicate a specific legal purpose. COA notified Frias, municipal treasurer Panganiban and municipal accountant Domingo of the disallowance of the municipality's cash advances and directed them to settle the P1,000,000. Neither Panganiban nor Domingo returned the amount. Hence, Abesamis requested petitioner to settle the disallowed cash advances. Petitioner, however, refused for the reason that he gave the proceeds of the cash advances to Panganiban. COA, mindful of petitioner's predicament, pointed out that the cash advances were made under his authority. Moreover, the checks were payable to him (as payee) and he admitted receipt thereof. For this reason, even if he gave the proceeds to Panganiban, he was still required to return the P1,000,000. Notwithstanding COA's demand, petitioner did not account for the cash advance. Thus, COA recommended the filing of this criminal complaint against petitioner.In his defense, petitioner argued that he was not liable for the cash advances because he did not derive any benefit from them. Panganiban alone benefited from the cash advances as she used the P1,000,000 to settle her existing deficiencies with the Commission on Audit (COA). Petitioner pointed out that the COA, upon Abesamis' recommendation, also filed a criminal complaint against Panganiban. RULING:

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YES. The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty as charged due to the concurrence of the following elements: 1. petitioner was a public officer; 2. he was an officer accountable for public funds or property; 3. he was required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or provincial auditor and 4. he failed to render an account for the period of two months after such accounts should have been rendered. According to the Sandiganbayan, in spite of the fact that Panganiban alone benefited from the disallowed cash advances, petitioner, as municipal mayor, was responsible and accountable for it.Moreover, petitioner was liable to return the proceeds to the Government in view of his failure to account for the cash advances. Therefore Hermes E. Frias Sr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. February 22, 2018 – Article 219 – FAILURE OF A RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC OFFICER TO RENDER ACCOUNTS BEFORE LEAVING THE COUNTRY [NO CASE FOUND] February 22, 2018 – Article 220 – ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY SANTOALLA, Stephanie M. PEOPLE VS MONTEMAYOR 5 SCRA 929, AUGUST 30, 1962 ISSUE: WON there is a diversion of the funds from the purpose for which they had been originally appropriated by law or ordinance. FACTS: Zosimo Montemayor then, and until now, President of the Mindanao Agricultural College, a government institution established and existing under the provisions of law, order the accused Ciriaco Ducusin to use the students' property deposits for the purchase of supplies and materials needed by the college, and the latter, then the property custodian of said college and who had been keeping said fund under his administration, by virtue of said instruction and order, spend and apply the amount of P1,911.64 out of said fund for the purchase of 9991.8 gallons of gasoline, 965.1 gallons of crude oil and 131.5 gallons of SAE 30 for the use of said college, thereby applying said amount to a public use other than that for which it was appropriated by Resolution No. 18 of the Board of Trustees of said college namely, for the payment of the losses and breakages of college instrument and equipment incurred by students. HELD: No crime committed if amounts received are applied to a public use. To constitute the crime of illegal use of public funds, there must be a diversion of the funds from the purpose for which they had been

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST originally appropriated by law or ordinance (Revised Penal Code, Article 220). In the case at bar the students' payments had not been so appropriated, because the resolution of the college authorities that the amounts paid by the students should be later refunded nowhere implied that the repayment was to be made precisely out of the moneys received, and as the refund could be made out of any available funds of the College, there was no appropriation for a particular purpose that was violated by the accused. PARUNGAO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, 197 SCRA 173, May 15, 1991 Considering that the evidence presented in the malversation case is the same evidence that will be presented in the event that a technical malversation charge is later filed, the Court deems it best to pass upon the issue of whether or not petitioner is indeed guilty of illegal use of public funds. ISSUE: Is Parungao guilty of Illegal use of public funds? FACTS: OSCAR PARUNGAO, Municipal Treasurer of Porac, was charged with malversation for appropriating and converting to his own personal use and benefit the amount of P185,250.00. Parungao entered a plea of not guilty. During the pretrial conference, he admitted that he received from the Ministry of Public Works and Highways the amount of P185,250 known as the fund for construction, rehabilitation, betterment and improvement (CRBI) for the concreting of Barangay Jalung Road located in Porac, Pampanga. In his defense, he accounted for the P185,250 fund, and after hearing, the respondent Sandiganbayan rendered a decision acquitting the petitioner of the crime of malversation of public funds but convicting him of the crime of illegal use of public funds. But while the accused could be deemed to have fully accounted for the amount in question, the fact sticks out from the evidence that he allowed the use of part of the funds for a purpose other than what it was intended. The said amount of P185,250.00 was specifically allotted for the concreting of the barangay Jalung road in Porac, Pampanga. Instead of applying it fully to that particular project, he gave P59,154.41 of it to the municipal mayor of Porac to pay the labor payrolls of the different barangays of the municipality, resulting in the non-completion of the project. He thereby violated the following provision of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. HELD: A comparison of the two articles reveals that their elements are entirely distinct and different from the other. In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the latter’s personal use. In technical malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or another’s personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance. Technical

90 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily include the crime of malversation of public funds charged in the information. Since the acts constituting the crime of technical malversation were not alleged in the information, and since technical malversation does not include, or is not included in the crime of malversation of public funds, he cannot resultantly be convicted of technical malversation. The Court has unequivocably ruled that in the absence of law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road, the petitioner cannot be declared guilty of the crime of illegal use of public funds.— the use thereof for another public purpose (there, for the payment of wages of laborers working on projects other than the Barangay Jalung Road) will not make Parungao guilty of violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. ABDULLA vs. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 150129, April 6, 2005 ISSUE: Is there a presumption of criminal intent in illegal use of funds or property cases? FACTS: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of illegal use of public funds, Abdulla is before the Court on petition for review under Rule 45. Appellant’s co-accused, Aguil and Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended Abdulla’s sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged. RULING: No. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by competent evidence that appellant’s act of paying the terminal leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State College was done with criminal intent rests upon the prosecution. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST YSIDORO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 192330, November 14, 2012 ISSUE: Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a public purpose different from their originally intended purpose FACTS: This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for those suffering from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconsideration projects affecting the homes of victims of calamities. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries. Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP. She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local Government Units governed the distribution of SFP goods. Thus, Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries. The evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001. This appropriation was based on the executive budget which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services which covers the CSAP housing projects. The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a pubic purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance. RULING : The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunian’s intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual budget. Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be used for SFP’s needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs. The target clientele of the SFP according to its manual are: 1) the moderately and severely underweight preschool children aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2) the families of six members whose total monthly income is P3,675.00 and below.

91 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If Ysidoro could not legally distribute the construction materials appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food intended for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries. February 24, 2018 – Article 221 – FAILURE TO MAKE DELIVERY OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY [NO CASE FOUND] February 24, 2018 – Article 222 – OFFICERS INCLUDED IN THE PRECEDING PROVISIONS UNAS, Nor-Aiza R. ALFREDO L. AZARCON v. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. BATAUSA G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997 ISSUE: Whether or not Azarcon is considered a public officer by reason of his designation by the BIR as a depositary of distrained property. FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling "dirt and ore." His services were contracted by the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP). Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former's premises. From this set of circumstances arose the present controversy. It appears that on May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) addressed to the Regional Director (Jose Batausa) or his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, Petitioner Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code. HELD: No. The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting constructive distraint over the truck allegedly owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring the petitioner Alfredo Azarcon who was in possession thereof to sign a pro forma receipt for it, effectively designated petitioner a depositary and, hence, citing U.S. vs. Rastrollo, a public officer. This is based on the theory that (t)he power to designate a private person who has actual possession of a distrained property as a depository of distrained property is necessarily

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST implied in the BIRs power to place the property of a delinquent tax payer (sic) in distraint as provided for under Sections 206, 207 and 208 (formerly Sections 303, 304 and 305) of the National Internal Revenue Code, (NIRC) x x x. We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case before us simply because the facts therein are not identical, similar or analogous to those obtaining here. While the cited case involved a judicial deposit of the proceeds of the sale of attached property in the hands of the debtor, the case at bench dealt with the BIRs administrative act of effecting constructive distraint over alleged property of taxpayer Ancla in relation to his back taxes, property which was received by petitioner Azarcon. In the cited case, it was clearly within the scope of that courts jurisdiction and judicial power to constitute the judicial deposit and give the depositary a character equivalent to that of a public official. However, in the instant case, while the BIR had authority to require petitioner Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. FLORENCIO B. CAMPOMANES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 161950 December 19, 2006 ISSUE: Whether or not Campomanes is guilty of failure to render accounts as defined in Article 218 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: Florencio B. Campomanes was the President of the Federation International Des Echecs (FIDE), a private international organization with offices at Lausanne, Switzerland. The Philippine Sports Commission submitted to FIDE a bid offer to host the 30th Chess Olympiad of 1992 in Manila. The PSC’s bid offer was accepted by FIDE. The PSC, also complying with its obligations under the bid offer, remitted to FIDE – received in FIDE’s behalf by its President, Florencio Campomanes – the total amount of P12,876,008.00 in connection with the 30th World Chess Olympiad in Manila. The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an audit of the PSC’s transactions from March 1990 up to June 1992. During the audit, the COA team requested for the journal and checks and disbursements issued by the PSC pertaining to the P12 million appropriated to defray the organization, administration, and hosting of the Chess Olympiad and Congress. The COA team noticed irregularities in the claims payable to the FIDE. The irregularities consisted of the lack of acknowledgment receipts and of accounting liquidation attached to the disbursement vouchers. HELD: No. Campomanes is clearly not a public officer. He is the president of the FIDE, a private foreign corporation with whom the PSC, through Hechanova, negotiated to conduct the 1992 Chess Olympiad and Congress in Manila. The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Campomanes is not a public officer and applied Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 218. The Sandiganbayan enumerated

92 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

the elements of the crime as applied to Campomanes thus: 1. That the offender is [a] private individual. 2. That he has charge of any insular (now national), provincial, or municipal funds, revenues, or property or [is an] administrator or depository of funds, property attached, seized, or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private individual. 3. That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the Commission on Audit, or to a provincial auditor. 4. That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered. Campomanes admitted that he received funds from the PSC, through Hechanova. The exhibits show Campomanes’ signatures in the respective disbursement vouchers issued by the PSC and FIDE’s letters to PSC acknowledging receipt of the funds. Moreover, Campomanes has not rendered an accounting of the funds even after he received a letter dated 19 January 1994 from COA Chairman Pascasio S. Banaria demanding that Campomanes refund or submit a detailed accounting to the COA covering the liquidation of the funds that the FIDE received. The Sandiganbayan’s decision, however, failed to specify any law or regulation requiring Campomanes to render accounts to the COA. The COA has the authority to demand an accounting from the FIDE if there is a law which requires the PSC to ask the FIDE to render an accounting, or if the PSC expressly required the FIDE to render an accounting as a condition for funding the Chess Olympiad and Congress. Absent such law or contractual obligation, the COA does not have the authority to audit the accounts of non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity from the government, like the FIDE. In the same manner, non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity from the government, like the FIDE, are not obliged to render an accounting to the COA if no law or contract requires them to do so. In the present case, the absence of the conditions contained in Section 2(1)(d) of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution prevents the creation of an obligation on the FIDE’s part to render an accounting to the PSC or the COA. Consequently, Campomanes, as representative of the FIDE which has no legal obligation to render an accounting, cannot be liable under Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code. February 26, 2018 – Article 223 – CONNIVING WITH OR CONSENTING TO EVASION VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M. US vs. LEON BANDINO G.R. No. L-9964 February 11, 1915 ISSUE: Whether or not Accused Leon Bandino was guilty of 'connivance or consenting to evasion'? FACTS: On December 4, 1912, the municipal president of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, filed a written

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST complaint in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, charging Leon Bandino with the crime of faithlessness in the custody of prisoners committed with reckless negligence. Said Leon Bandino, accused, a municipal policeman having under his care and guard one Juan Lescano, who was serving a sentence in the municipal jail of the said pueblo, did, with great carelessness and unjustified negligence, grant him permission to go and buy some cigarettes near the place where he was held in custody. The prisoner, taking advantage of the confusion in the crowd there, fled from the custody of the accused. HELD: Article 358 of the Penal Code prescribes that "any public officer guilty of connivance in the escape of a prisoner in his custody shall be punished," etc. In the existence and commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of prisoners, it is essential that there should have been, on the part of the custodian, connivance in the escape of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with guarding the fugitive did not connive with him, then he did not violate the law and is not guilty of the crime of faithlessness in the discharge of his duty to guard the prisoner. It may perhaps be true that the accused had no knowledge that the prisoner Lescano would escape, and that he did not permit him to do so, but it is unquestionable that he did permit him to go out of the municipal jail, thus affording him an opportunity to get away with ease. Therefore the prisoner's escape was effected through the tolerance of his custodian, and is deemed also to have been by connivance with the latter. According to the rules established by the courts, there is real and actual evasion of service of a sentence when the custodian, failing intentionally or maliciously to perform the duties of his office, and conniving with the prisoners, permits him to obtain a relaxation of his imprisonment and to escape the punishment of being deprived of his liberty, thus making the penalty ineffectual, although the convict may not have fled, and where the prisoner's leaving the jail and his evasion of service of the sentence were effected with the consent and tolerance of the custodian, or rather in agreement and connivance with him. Even though the accused committed the crime of faithlessness with carelessness, in violation of regulations or with culpable negligence, the case should not be dismissed nor should the crime go unpunished. March 8, 2018 – Article 226 – REMOVAL, CONCEALMENT OR DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS ALILIAN, Enna B. ZAPANTA V PEOPLE G.R. NOS. 192698-99 APRIL 22, 2015 ISSUE: WoN accused was guilty of violating Art 226 RPC FACTS: Accused, as employees of Registry of deeds, caused the disappearance and re-issuance of TCT NO. T-285369, and deleting the encumbrance annotated in TCT No. T-256662, thereby affording unwarranted benefits to one

93 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

First Oriental Ventures, Inc., the owner of TCT No. T-285369, to the damage and prejudice of Manuel Ang, Sr., the mortgagee in TCT No. 256662. RULING: Yes. An accused may be held criminally liable of Infidelity in the Custody of Documents under Article 226 of the RPC, provided that the following elements are present: 1. The offender must be a public officer 2. There must be a document abstracted, destroyed or concealed 3. Such documents are entrusted to the public officer by reason of his office 4. There was a damage to public interest or a third person Said elements are present in the case at bar. The act of the said public officers of the Registry of deeds caused damage to Dr. Ang and eroded public trust and confidence in the Register of Deeds. Further, citing the case of Kataniag v. People,25 the Sandiganbayan wrote that damage under Art. 226 of the RPC may also consist in mere alarm to the public or in the alienation of its confidence in any government agency. The Sandiganbayan added that Atty. Gadia's act of concealing TCT No. T-256662 constituted a breach of trust in the official care of the said certificate of title. ATTY MANZANARIS V PEOPLE G.R. NO. L-64750 JANUARY 30, 1984 ISSUE: WoN Sandiganbayan was right in finding accused guilty even though the latter did not act in bad faith FACTS: Atty Manzanaris as the Clerk of Court was found by the Sandiganbayan to be guilty of Violation of Art 226 of RPC for giving the certificate of title to one accused in the Court where he was working. Atty Manzanaris argued that he did it with a lawful and commendable motive. RULING: No. To warrant a finding of guilt of the crime of infidelity in the custody of documents, the act of removal as a mode of committing the offense, should be coupled with criminal intent or illicit purpose. This calls to mind the oft-repeated maxim "Actus non facit, nisi mens sit rea”. February 28, 2018 – Article 231 – OPEN DISOBEDIENCE VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B. THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA AND ASEOCHE, REPRESENTED BY ITS FOUNDING PARTNER, FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, vs. ATTY. JOSEJINA C. FRIA G.R. No. 183014 August 7, 2013 ISSUE:

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Whether or not Atty. Fria is guilty of acts violating article 231 Open Disobedience of the RPC. FACTS: Atty. Josejina C. Fria (Atty. Fria), Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, was charged for the crime of Open Disobedience under Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Law Firm was engaged as counsel by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 03-110 instituted before Branch 203. On July 29, 2005, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff (July 29, 2005 judgment), prompting the defendant in the same case to appeal. However, Branch 203 disallowed the appeal and consequently ordered that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the foregoing judgment. Due to the denial of the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, the July 29, 2005 judgment became final and executory. In its Complaint-Affidavit dated February 12, 2006, The Law Firm alleged that as early as April 4, 2006, it had been following up on the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the July 29, 2005 judgment. However, Atty. Fria vehemently refused to perform her ministerial duty of issuing said writ. In her Counter-Affidavit dated June 13, 2006, Atty. Fria posited that the draft writ of execution (draft writ) was not addressed to her but to Branch Sheriff Jaime Felicen (Felicen), who was then on leave. Neither did she know who the presiding judge would appoint as special sheriff on Felicen’s behalf. Nevertheless, she maintained that she need not sign the draft writ since on April 18, 2006, the presiding judge issued an Order stating that he himself shall sign and issue the same. On July 31, 2006, the prosecutor issued a Memorandum recommending, inter alia, that Atty. Fria be indicted for the crime of Open Disobedience. The corresponding Information was thereafter filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 80 (MTC. The MTC ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of probable cause. It found that aside from the fact that Atty. Fria is a judicial officer, The Law Firm failed to prove the existence of the other elements of the crime of Open Disobedience. In particular, the second element of the crime, i.e., that there is a judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities, unlikely existed since the Court already declared as null and void the entire proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 due to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, the MTC opined that such nullification worked retroactively to warrant the dismissal of the case and/or acquittal of the accused at any stage of the proceedings. HELD: No. The criminal case is dismissed for lack of probable cause. Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court judge may immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause, viz: Sec. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10)

94 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information. It must, however, be observed that the judge’s power to immediately dismiss a criminal case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear. In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor’s authority, it must be stressed that the judge’s dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause – that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence. Applying these principles to the case at bar would lead to the conclusion that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of probable cause. The dismissal ought to be sustained since the records clearly disclose the unmistakable absence of the integral elements of the crime of Open Disobedience. While the first element, i.e., that the offender is a judicial or executive officer, concurs in view of Atty. Fria’s position as Branch Clerk of Court, the second and third elements of the crime evidently remain wanting. March 2, 2018 – Article 234 – REFUSAL TO DISCHARGE ELECTIVE OFFICE [NO CASE FOUND] March 4, 2018 – Article 238 – ABANDONMENT OF OFFICE OR POSITION ALAMEDA, Manuel SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES v CA GR No. 118883 January 16, 1998 ISSUE 1. Whether Antonio’s resignation was complete. 2. W/N respondent abandoned his membership in the SB. FACTS: Antonio, priate respondent, was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay Catanduanes

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST on March 1989. He was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Council(ABC) for the Municiplity of San Andres Catanduanes. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the President as Member of the Sanguniang Bayan of the sid municipality. Meanwhile, DILG Sec. declared the election for the president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Council(FABC) void for lack of quorum. As a result, the provincial council was reorganized. DILG Sec then designated private respondent as a temporary member of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes effective on 15 June 1990. Because of his designation, private respondent tendered his resignation as a member of the Sanguniang Bayan dated 14 June 1990 to the Mayor of San Andres Catanduanes. Copies of his letters were also forwarded to the provincial governor, DILG and the municipal treasurer. Subsequently, Aquino then the Vice President of ABC was appointed by the provincial governor as member of the Sanguniang Bayan in place of private respondent. Aquino assumed office on 18 July 1980 after taking his oath. Subsequently, the ruling of the DILG annulling the election of the FABC president was reversed by the Supreme Court and declared the appointment of private respondent void for lacking the essential qualification of being the president of FABC. On 31 March 1992, private respondent wrote to the Sanguniang Bayan(SB) of San Andres regarding his re-assumption of his original position. SB refused. HELD The resignation was not complete for lack of acceptance thereof of the proper authority however, an office may still be deemed relinquished through voluntary abandonment which needs no acceptance. In Ortiz vs Comelec, resignation is defined as the “act of giving up of an ifficer by which he declines his office andrenounces the further right to use it”. It can be express or implied. To constitute a complete and operative resignation the folloving must be present. (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. In the case at bar, there was no evidence that the private respondent’s resignation was accepted by the proper authority. Although the Local Government Code of 1983 was silent as to who specifically should accept the resignation it provides that the position shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance of resignation and should be acted upon by the Sangunian concerned. The resignation letter was tendered to the mayor and copies were sent to the governor, DILG and the municipal treasurer but none of them expressly acted on it. Furthermore, under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions as to whom it should be submitted, should be submitted to the appointing power. Therefore, the resignation should have been submitted to the president or to the DILG as the president’s alter ego. Tackling the second issue, abandonment has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and contro thereof. It is a species of resignation. While resignation is the formal relinquishment,

95 | 1 YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay ST

abandonment is the voluntary relinquishment by non-user. There are 2 essential elements of abandonment : (1) an intention to abandon and (2) an overt act by which intention is carried on. In the case at bar, the first element was manifested on the following instances: (1) private respondent’s failure to perform his function as SB; (2) his failure to collect the corresponding renumeration for the position, (3)his failure to object to the appointment of Aquino as his replacement to SB and (4) his prolonged failure to initiate any act to reassume his post in the SB after SC had nullified his designation as member of Sanguniang Panlalawigan. The second element was demonstrated by the following: (1) his letter of resignation, (2) his assumption of office as member of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful discharge of his duties and functions of SP and (4) his recept of renumeration for such post. JOSON III VS SANTOS G.R. NO. 91548 JULY 13, 1990 ISSUE: Whether or not the office of Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija was rendered vacant by the voluntary resignation. FACTS: The controversy originated from the indefinite sick leave that the incumbent Governor of Nueva Ecija, Eduardo L. Joson, had to take on December 7, 1989, thus creating a temporary vacancy in his Office. As Vice Governor, Nario took over as Acting Governor pursuant to the Local Government Code l. 1 But as fate would have it, Nario himself fell ill shortly afterwards, and so executed a "waiver" of his "right" to the office of Governor. Joson forthwith took his oath as Acting Governor, on December 19, 1989. Four (4) days later, apparently feeling that his illness had worsened, Nario sent a letter to the Secretary of local Governments tendering his resignation as Vice- Governor of Nueva Ecija RULING: The decided weight of authority is that "apart from legal provision, . . . mere presentation of resignation does not work a vacancy, and a resignation is not complete until accepted by proper authority;" Clearly, a public officer cannot abandon his office or position before his resignation is accepted, but the incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he has been duly notified therefor. This is not to say that a public officer may not resign. Mechem says that he "'may certainly resign, but without acceptance his resignation is nothing, and he remains in office.' He is, therefore, so far as the rights of third persons are concerned, not only still clothed with authority, but is subject to the burdens of the office, and he may be compelled to perform the duties, and is liable for their nonperformance, as before. In our jurisprudence," this Court has held, "acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code REPUBLIC vs. WINSTON T. SINGUN

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST G.R. No. 149356 March 14, 2008 ISSUE: WON Singuin is considered as resigned in his post. FACTS: Singuin was the former Chief Trade and Industry Development Specialist of DTI-RO2, Cagayan Province. In a letter dated 20 October 1999, he wrote Regional Director Hipolito signifying his intention to apply for an 8 month leave of absence starting 16 November 1999 until 31 July 2000 and to retire from the service on 1 August 2000. On 4 November 1999, respondent filed his application for leave of absence and early retirement. Director Hipolito denied the request. Director Hipolito endorsed the application to Assistant Secretary Maglaya for comment. But without waiting for Assistant Secretary Maglaya’s comment, he again filed an application for leave of absence but for a shorter period (16 November 1999 to 14 January 2000) and signified his intention to resign effective at the close of office hours on 14 January 2000. According to Director Hipolito, he immediately approved respondents application for leave of absence and resignation and he reiterated said approval in a memorandum dated the same day. Director Hipolito also notified Regional Director Soria of the CSC of his acceptance of respondents resignation. Undersecretary Ordoez detailed respondent to the Office of the Undersecretary for Regional Operations effective 17 January 2000. On January 14, 2000, respondent informed Director Hipolito that he was reconsidering his earlier letter of resignation and that he decided to wait until he could qualify for early retirement. But according to Atty. Soria, respondent was considered resigned effective 14 January 2000 because (1) of respondents voluntary written notice informing Director Hipolito that he was relinquishing his position and the effectivity date of said resignation and (2) Director Hipolitos acceptance of respondents resignation in writing which indicated the date of effectivityof the resignation. His letter withdrawing his resignation did not automatically restore him to his position because Director Hipolito should first approve the withdrawal before it becomes effective. Singuin informed Undersecretary Ordoez that his application for resignation was made under duress because it was imposed by Director Hipolito as a condition for the approval of his application for leave of absence. His original intention was to resign on 1 August 2000 after completing 15 years of service in the government it was also ineffective because he was not notified of its acceptance for he did not receive a copy of his approved resignation letter and Director Hipolitos memorandum accepting his application for resignation. Singuin demanded from Director Hipolito the payment of his salaries and other benefits from 1 December 1999 to 31 March 2000. Director Hipolito answered that he was considered resigned as of 14 January 2000 because the detail order made no mention that its issuance meant that the acceptance of the resignation was revoked.

96 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

HELD: To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.[29] In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office.[30] Resignation to be effective must be accepted by competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the appointment of the successor.[31] A public officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238[32] of the Revised Penal Code.[33] The final or conclusive act of a resignations acceptance is the notice of acceptance.[34] The incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he had been duly notified therefor. In this case, the Court of Appeals and the CSC declared that there was nothing in the records to show that respondent was duly informed of the acceptance of his resignation. There was no indication that respondent received a copy of his 12 November 1999 application for leave of absence and resignation as accepted by Director Hipolito. Neither was there any indication that respondent received Director Hipolitos 12 November 1999 Memorandum informing him of the acceptance of his resignation. Therefore, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondents resignation was incomplete and inoperative because respondent was not notified of the acceptance of his resignation. Until the resignation is accepted, the tender or offer to resign is revocable.[36] And the resignation is not effective where it was withdrawn before it was accepted.[37] In this case, since respondents resignation was not finally and conclusively accepted as he was not duly notified of its acceptance, respondent could validly withdraw his resignation. There was no need for Director Hipolito to accept the withdrawal of resignation since there was no valid acceptance of the application of resignation in the first place. Undersecretary Ordoez also validly issued the detail order as respondent had not effectively resigned from DTI-RO2. March 4, 2018 – Article 240 – USURPATION OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS ARANCES, Javy Ann G. PEOPLE VS HILVANO GR NO. L-8583, JUL 31, 1956 PONENTE: JUSTICE BENGZON ISSUE: Whether or not defendant Francisco Hilvano, can be charged of usurpation of executive functions. FACTS: On September 22, 1952, When Mayor Fidencio Latorre of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila on official business, designated the herein defendant Francisco Hilvano, councilor, to discharge the duties of his office. Later, ViceMayor Juan Latorre found Hilvano acting in the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST place of the Mayor; he served written notices to the corresponding municipal officers, including Hilvano, that he (Juan Latorre) as Vice-Mayor was assuming the duties of the absent mayor. However, Hilvano refused to yield, arguing that the Mayor had designated him. Whereupon the Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the Executive Secretary informing the latter of the controversy. Also, sought the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, who by letter (Exhibit D), replied that the ViceMayor had the right to the office. Wherefore Francisco Hilvano was prosecuted and after trial was convicted of usurpation of public authority under Republic Act No. 10. He appealed in due time. HELD: Article 240 of the Revised Penal Code to read as follows: “Usurpation of executive functions. — Any judge who shall assume any power pertaining to the executive authorities, or shall obstruct the latter in the lawful exercise of their powers, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period.” Thus, a councilor who assumes a power pertaining to the mayor or obstructs him in the lawful exercise of his power is not liable under Article 240, because only a judge can commit usurpation of executive functions. The councilor is liable under Article 177 of the Code, if he assumes the power of the mayor. March 5 2018 – Article 241 – USURPATION OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS BANUELOS, Kelvinn L. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO HILVANO G.R. No. L-8583 JULY 31, 1956 ISSUE: Whether or not Francisco Hilvano is guilty of usurpation. FACTS: On September 22, 1952, When Mayor Fidencio Latorre of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila on official business, designated the herein defendant Francisco Hilvano, councilor, to discharge the duties of his office. Later, ViceMayor Juan Latorre found Hilvano acting in the place of the Mayor; he served written notices to the corresponding municipal officers, including Hilvano, that he (Juan Latorre) as Vice-Mayor was assuming the duties of the absent mayor. However, Hilvano refused to yield, arguing that the Mayor had designated him. Whereupon the Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the Executive Secretary informing the latter of the controversy. Also, sought the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, who by letter (Exhibit D), replied that the ViceMayor had the right to the office. Wherefore Francisco Hilvano was prosecuted and after trial was convicted of usurpation of public authority under Republic Act No. 10. He appealed in due time. Hilvano contented that Articles 238-241 of the Revised Penal Code penalize all kinds of usurpation of official functions by public officers. HELD:

97 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

Yes. But in violation of Article 177 not Article 238 to 241. Hilvano’s contention is untenable. Said articles (Article 238-241) merely punish interference by officers of one of the three departments of government (legislative, executive and judicial) with the functions of officials of another department Said articles (Articles 238241) do not cover usurpation of one officer or employee of a given department of the powers of another officer in the same department. For instance, the exercise by a bureau employee of the powers of his director. There is no excuse for Defendant-Appellant. In the beginning he might have pleaded good faith, invoking the designation by the Mayor; but after he had been shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the opinion of the provincial fiscal, he had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to the position. He was rightfully convicted. JOSE REYES y VACIO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. Nos. 177105-06 August 12, 2010 ISSUE: Whether or not Reyes is guilty of usurping the judicial functions as provided by Art. 241. FACTS: On February 20, 1986, the IAC promulgated its decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883, granting Belen’s appeal: declaring as null and void and without any effect whatsoever the deed of sale executed by and between appellant Belen Lopez vda. De Guia and defendant Carlos de Guia. On November 8, 1988, Belen, through her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Melba G. Valenzuela (Melba), filed in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for ejectment and collection of rents against the tenants, entitled Belen Lopez Vda. De Guia thru her Attorney-in-Fact, Melba G. Valenzuela vs. Paulino Sacdalan, Romeo Garcia, Numeriano Bautista, Leonardo Sacdalan and Santiago Sacdalan and docketed as DARAB Case No. 034-BUL’88. On March 16, 1993, the JOSE REYES, as Provincial Adjudicator, rendered a decision in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL’88 entitled Belen Lopez vda. De Guia thru her Attorney-in-Fact, Melba G. Valenzuela v. Paulino Sacdalan, Romeo Garcia, Numeriano Bautista, Leonardo Sacdalan and Santiago Sacdalan,11 dismissing Belen’s complaint for ejectment and collection of rents and affirming the respective TCTs of the tenants. On May 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations in the Sandiganbayan, one charging the petitioner with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, and the other with usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code. Criminal Case No. 24656 That on or about 16 March 1993, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in Malolos, Bulacan, Philippines, above-named accused Jose V. Reyes, a public officer being then employed as Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Malolos, Bulacan, while in the performance of his official function as such and taking advantage thereof, with full knowledge of a Decision in ACGR CV-02883 of the Court of Appeals, which declared Belen de Guia as the true owner of the lands litigated in said case, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously disregard, obstruct and ignore the said final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals, by rendering a decision in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 thereby favoring and emboldening the tenantsrespondents in said DARAB case to unlawfully continue occupying the lands of Belen de Guia, the complainant, to her damage and prejudice, as well as to the public interest. Arraigned on August 8, 2000, the petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to each information. After trial, on January 15, 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision,22 finding the petitioner guilty of both charges; and sentencing him to suffer: (a) in Criminal Case No. 24655 (for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019), an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment from six years and one month, as minimum, to 10 years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 24656 (for usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code), imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor. The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on March 15, 2007. On appeal, the petitioner insists that his rendition of the decision did not amount to the felony of usurpation of judicial functions. HELD: NO. Reyes did not commit any usurpation. Hence, not guilty. Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code states: xxx The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correcional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any officer of the executive branch of the government who shall assume judicial powers or shall obstruct the execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction. In usurpation of judicial function, the accused, who is not a judge, attempts to perform an act the authority for which the law has vested only in a judge.44 However, the petitioner’s task as Provincial Adjudicator when he rendered judgment in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88 was to adjudicate the claims of the opposing parties. As such, he performed a quasi-judicial function, closely akin to the function of a judge of a court of law. He could not be held liable under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore, considering that the acts constitutive of usurpation of judicial function were lacking herein. March 6, 2018 – Article 243 – ORDERS OR REQUEST BY EXECUTIVE OFFICERS TO ANY JUDICIAL AUTHORITY CEBALLOS, Jesus C. BORRROMEO V. MARIANO G.R. NO. 16808 JANUARY 3, 1921 ISSUE: WON the transfer of Judge Borromeo by the Governor-General was valid.

98 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

FACTS: Andres Borromeo was appointed as judge of the 24th Judicial District (JD) on July 1, 1914. Said appointment was accepted by Borromeo on the same date. On February 25, 1920, he was transferred to the 21st JD without his consent. Under the Administrative Code, Judges of First Instance are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years. HELD: No, it was not. Under the Administrative Code, ”a Judge of First Instance can be removed from office by the Governor-General only if in the judgment of the Supreme Court sufficient cause shall exist involving serious misconduct or inefficiency in office..” Relatedly, Art. 243 of the Revised Penal Code states that “Orders or request by executive officers to any judicial authority. – Any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.” It was noted that although the appointment of a judge lies with the Executive Department (by the Governor-General with the consent of the Senate), the power to remove, transfer or discipline the judges lies with the Judiciary. The power of the Executive ceases upon the consent of the judge to the position, to allow such action by the Executive could be used to discipline the judge or as an indirect means of removal thus would violate the separation of powers between a coordinate and equal branch of the government. March 7, 2018 – Article 245 – ABUSES AGAINST CHASTITY DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J G.R. NO. L-9768 FEBRUARY 20, 1915 THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE, VS. EULALIO MORELOS, DEFENDANTAPPELLANT ISSUE: Whether or not proof of solicitation is necessary when the illicit relations were consummated. FACTS: The appellant, as acting warden, was in charge of the prisoners in the Tondo police station. Among them was a woman named Tomasa Clemente. On the night of 18th of September 1913, he entered the cell of the woman and had illicit relations with her. The appellant argues that the proof fails to show that he solicited a woman in his custody. It was proven, however, that his illicit relations were consummated. HELD: No. It would be a strange interpretation to place upon said law, that a failure in the proof to show a "solicitation" was sufficient to relieve the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST defendant from responsibility, when the act solicited was consummated. G.R. No. L-28144 August 26, 1927 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE MARIANO, defendants-appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of abuse against chastity is included in those cases in which criminal liability is extinguished by the marriage of the accused with the offended party. FACTS: The accused was charged with the crime of abuse against chastity, and after trial the Court of First Instance of Manila convicted him of said crime, sentencing him to three years, six months and twenty-one days prision correccional with the accessories of the law and the costs of the action. The accused appealed to this court from said judgment. On August 3, 1927, he filed a motion praying for the dismissal of the case as he had married the offended party, according to the marriage certificate attached to said motion. HELD: Yes. The intention of our Legistature in enacting said Act No. 1773 was that the married of the accused or convict with the offended party should extinguish the criminal liability in the cases of seduction, abduction and rape and those involving offenses included in said crimes, such as frustrated or attempted seduction, abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the liability for a crime is extinguished in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, and for a stronger reason, in the lesser crimes. Now then, if the crime of abuse against chastity is not denominated rape, it is only for lack of the intention to lie, both crimes being identical in every other respect, though of different degrees of gravity. For this reason, in regard to the kind of crimes for which the Legislature wished to provide extinction liability by reason of marriage, abuse against chastity cannot but be held included to the crime of rape without misinterpreting the intention of the law, or thwarting its lofty and wholesome purposes. We therefore conclude that the crime of abuse against chastity is included in the crime of rape mentioned in section 2 of Act No. 1773 and, consequently, to marriage of the accused with the offended party in the present case has extinguished his criminal liability.

99 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST TITLE EIGHT – CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS March 8, 2018 – Article 246 – PARRICIDE DELFIN, JENNICA GYRL G. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PILUS SUBANO GR. NO L-48143, SEPTEMBER 30, 1942 ISSUE: Whether or not Pilus Subano is guilty of parricide. FACTS: Pilus Subano had a quarrel with his wife, Bankalot, when the latter refused to work in their kaingin. Their quarrel resumed the following day when Bankalot refused to accompany Pilus to Macasin River to catch fish. Bankalot’s father, Ebol and father of Pilus’ other wife, Biwang, noticed that he went home alone that day and that there were bloodstains on his bolo and on its scabbard. Pilus explained that the bloodstains were from the fish he had just cut. Ebol asked Pilus where his daughter was but the latter disclaimed any knowledge of her. Four days later, Bankalot’s body was found in the middle of Macasin River. The incident was reported to Lieutenant Olivares to whom the case was reported. During trial, Pilus denied killing his wife. HELD: No. The facts duly established that Pilus is the author of the crime but what he committed was homicide and not parricide. From the testimony of Ebol, father of the deceased, it appears that the defendant has three wives and that the deceased was the last in point of time. Although the practice of polygamy is approved by custom among these non-Christians, polygamy, however, is not sactioned by the Marriage Law which merely recognizes tribal marriage rituals. The deceased, under our law, is not thus the lawful wife of the defendant and this precludes conviction for the crime of parricide. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANUEL MACAL Y BOLASCO G.R. NO. 211062, JANUARY 13, 2016 ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of parricide. 2. Whether or not the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. FACTS: Manuel and Auria Macal are married and begot 2 children. Auria’s mother, Angeles, claimed that they were all living together in Tacloban. Angeles testified that she was walking home with her children, including Auria after playing bingo at a local peryahan. Along the way, with some of their friends, their group met Manuel who joined them in walking back in their house. When they arrived, the group proceeded to the living room except for Auria and Manuel who went straight to their bedroom. Shortly thereafter, Angeles heard her daughter screaming for help. They immediately tried opening the locked door. When it was opened, they saw a bloodied Auria on one

100 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

side of the room. Next to her was Manuel, who was trying to stab himself with the use of an improvised weapon. Auria was immediately taken to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. On the other hand, Manuel, managed to escape before the police could reach the crime scene. In his defense, Manuel claimed that he did stabbed his wife but it was not intentional. He only did that out of anger because he saw his wife conversing with a man inside their bedroom. The Regional Trial Court convicted Manuel of the crime of Parricide and held that they were not convinced that the stabbing incident was purely accidental. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. HELD: 1. No. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Among the three requisites, the relationship between the offender and the victim is the most crucial. This relationship is what actually distinguishes the crime of parricide from homicide. In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship between the offender and victim is their marriage certificate. Oral evidence may also be considered in proving the relationship between the two as long as such proof is not contested. In this case, the spousal relationship between Auria and the accused-appellant is beyond dispute. As previously stated, the defense already admitted that Auria was the legitimate wife of the accused-appellant during the pre-trial conference. Such admission was even reiterated by the accused-appellant in the course of trial of the case. Nevertheless, the prosecution produced a copy of the couple's marriage certificate which the defense admitted to be a genuine and faithful reproduction of the original. 2. Yes. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the imposable penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346), the imposition of the penalty of death is prohibited. Likewise significant is the provision found in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code stating that in the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Applying these to the case at bar and considering that there are no mitigating and aggravating circumstances present, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the RTC and CA. March 9, 2018 – Article 247 – DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES DIZON, Roxan Danica G. PEOPLE VS BITUANAN G.R. No. 34510 August 31, 1931 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is entitled to the privilege under Art 423 of of the Penal Code (source of Art . 247 of the RPC)

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST FACTS: Moro Bituanan and Mora Sabay were married by Datu Alon according to Moro customs and usages. According to the same customs and usages, the Datu divorced the couple. Twenty days afterwards, Bituanan caught Sabay and Ali Sabpa sleeping on the same bed. Thereupon, Bituanan attacked Ali Sabpa and Sabay, killing the former and wounding the latter. In the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Judge Natividad found Bituanan guilty of the crime of murder. It is the sole contention of counsel for the accused, on appeal, that the decision of the lower court should be modified by applying article 423 of the Penal Code to the admitted facts. Said article provides that "Any husband who, having surprised his wife in the act of adultery, shall kill her or her paramour in the act, or shall inflict any serious physical injuries upon either, shall suffer the penalty of destierro." HELD: The marriage of Bituanan and Sabay, performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion, was valid. Granting, without necessarily having to decide, that Bituanan and Sabay were, accordingly, not legally divorced, it only need be said that there is no evidence in the record showing that Bituanan surprised Sabay and Ali Sabpa in the act of adultery when he killed the latter. The privilege given in article 423 of the Penal Code extends solely to the case of a husband who surprises his wife in the act of actual adultery, that is, actual carnal knowledge with her paramour. The article does not apply to a husband who catches his wife sleeping with another man on the same bed. PEOPLE VS GONZALES G.R. No. 46310 October 31, 1939 ISSUE: Whether or not Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable in this case FACTS: Marciano Gonzales , on returning to his house from the woods, surprised his wife, Sixta Quilason, and Isabelo Evangelio in the act, told her that the man was the very one who used to ask rice and food from them, and counseled her not to repeat the same faithlessness. His wife, promised him not to do the act again. The accused left the house and went to see his carabaos. Upon returning to his house in the afternoon, and not finding his wife there, he looked for her and found her with Isabelo near the toilet of his house in a place covered with underbush, who was standing and buttoning his drawers, immediately took to his heels. The accused went after him, but unable to overtake him, he returned to where his wife was and, completely obfuscated, attacked her with a knife without intending to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity on her and took her dead body to his house. The accused contends that he was entitled to the privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. HELD: The accused cannot avail himself of the aforesaid

101 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

article, because the privilege there granted is conditioned on the requirement that the spouse surprise the husband or the wife in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; the accused did not surprise his wife in the very act or carnal intercourse, but after the act, if any such there was, because from the fact that she was rising up and the man was buttoning his drawers, it does not necessarily follow that a man and a woman had committed the carnal act. PEOPLE VS ABARCA G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987 ISSUE: Whether or not Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS: One day in 1984, Francisco Abarca, through a peephole, caught his wife having sexual intercourse with one Khingsley Paul Koh inside the Abarca residence. The two also caught Abarca looking at them and so Koh grabbed his pistol and thereafter Abarca fled. One hour later, Abarca, armed with an armalite, went to the gambling place where Koh usually stays and then and there shot Koh multiple times. Koh died instantaneously. However, two more persons were shot in the adjacent room. These two other persons survived due to timely medical intervention. Eventually after trial, Abarca was convicted of the complex crime of murder with frustrated double murder. HELD: Yes. Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. Even though one hour had already lapsed from the time Abarca caught his wife with Koh and the time he killed Koh, the killing was still the direct by-product of Abarca’s rage. Therefore, Abarca is not liable for the death of Koh. However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he caused to the two other persons he shot in the adjacent room but his liability shall not be for frustrated murder. In the first place, Abarca has no intent to kill the other two persons injured. He was not also committing a crime when he was firing his gun at Koh – it being under Art. 247. Abarca was however negligent because he did not exercise all precaution to make sure no one else will be hurt. As such, he shall be liable for less serious physical injuries through simple

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST negligence for the injuries suffered by the two other persons who were in the adjacent room when the incident happened. PEOPLE VS OYANIB G.R. Nos. 130634-35 March 12, 2001 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is entitled to the privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS: Manolito and Tita were married and had two children. Due to marital differences, they separated with Manolito keeping custody of their children. Tita lived nearby, renting a room at the second floor of Edgardo Lladas' house. Manolito exerted efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of their children, but to no avail. Tita was very reluctant to reconcile instead, she was open about her relationship with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One instance, Manolito chanced upon Tita and Jesus in a very intimate situation by a hanging bridge. He confronted them and reminded Tita that she was still his wife. They ignored him and threatened to kill him. On September 4, 1995, Manolito went to the house where Tita was staying to inform the latter of the meeting at the school about the failing grades of their child. Upon reaching the house, he heard "sounds of romance" (kissing) coming from the inside. He opened the door lock using a hunting knife and caught Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse, Jesus on top of Tita, with his pants on his knees. Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek but the latter immediately stabbed the former. Lladas, upon hearing a commotion on the second floor of his house, went to check and found Manolito stabbing Jesus while sitting on the latter's stomach. Tita was sprawled on the floor with her duster smeared with blood.She died on the way to the hospital. Jesus and Tita died of multiple stab wounds. Accused surrendered and admitted killing his wife and her paramour but invoked the exceptional circumstance under Article 247 of RPC. The trial court convicted him of homicide and parricide with 2 mitigating circumstances: passion/obfuscation and voluntary surrender. HELD: Yes. He invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as an absolutory and an exempting cause. "An absolutory cause is present 'where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.” Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. The Court found the accused to have acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.

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To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the police when a call for him to surrender was made. March 9, 2018 – Article 248 – MURDER DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P. G.R. No. L-4116 February 25, 1982 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EPIFANIO O. VALERIO, JR., and DOMINGO ELEPAÑO FACTS: The case revolves around a plot of murder of an eight-year old boy for insurance. The persistence in the criminal design was evident from the fact that when the insured eight-year-old waif disappeared, another hapless substitute, whose name is unknown to this day, was taken... to replace the first intended victim. Sometime in August 1972, Amador Castro brought home a boy whom he met in a Pantranco bus during a flood. "I will live with you to take care of the cows" said the boy. On November 8, 1972, accused VALERIO, one Celestino de la Cruz and Amador Castro, while at the latter's yard at Bo. Tamayo, San Carlos City, conferred about obtaining life insurance on the boy living with Castro, who would be subsequently killed so that the policy proceeds could be "divided 50-50" In accordance with the aforementioned plan, and upon instructions of VALERIO, Castro had the boy baptized as "Amador Castro, Jr." at the San Carlos City Roman Catholic Church with Celestino de la Cruz as "ninong". VALERIO waited outside the church during the ceremony. On January 16, 1973, the insured boy left the Castro household after losing money, through gambling, given to him by Castro's wife to buy something. Castro then informed De la Cruz and VALERIO about the departure of the boy but the latter told him "easy ka lang, steady... ka lang, we will substitute a boy for him". VALERIO then gave Amador Castro a boy, who began staying with the Castros beginning March 6, 1973. Thereafter, VALERIO, Castro and De la Cruz planned the killing of the new boy at Lido Beach, Cavite. VALERIO and de la Cruz told Castro that if the plan were to be executed in Pangasinan, they would be "mabubuko". On March 13, 1973, Castro, his wife, their three children, the new boy, VALERIO, De la Cruz and accused Domingo ELEPAÑO, as driver of the jeep, went to Lido Beach in Cavite. According to Castro's testimony on the witness stand, he, VALERIO, and De la Cruz together with the... new boy went swimming. When they reached a depth of four feet, Celestino de la Cruz who was at the back of the boy hit the latter's head with a piece of iron. Castro was at the left side of the boy while VALERIO was at the boy's right side. De la Cruz then held the boy by the... neck and

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST submerged him in water. VALERIO and Castro left De la Cruz and the boy in the water. Upon instructions of De la Cruz, Castro reported the new boy's "loss" to the life saver in Lido Beach. Later, the life saver found the new boy, who was brought to the Bautista Hospital... at Cavite City. The boy was pronounced lifeless and was not examined anymore. The cadaver was thereafter brought to Funeraria Popular, Manila, where it was examined by NBI agents. Thereafter, Castro filed a death claim on the insurance of "Amador Castro, Jr.", which was denied because the fingerprints of the boy insured were different from the boy who was killed.

with the Cardinal Life Insurance Corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused Valerio and Elepano are liable for murder.

FACTS: Timoteo Penesa and Rosario Aguillon lived, as husband and wife, Their daughter and five children of Rosario by her late husband lived with them. Due to continuous wrangles between Timoteo and Rosario’s children by her late husband, both agreed to part. Timoteo left the house. The following day, Timoteo returned to the house and asked Rosario to live with him in another place. The request was refused. Santiago Cerrado, a cousin of Rosario, came to the house and, upon seeing Timoteo, asked the latter why he was there after they had agreed to live apart. Angered by this remark, Timoteo unsheated his bolo and assaulted Santiago. Crescencio Doro, the eldest son of Rosario, who tried to prevent another blow upon Santiago and had made a remark similar to that of Santiago before the latter came to the house, was also assaulted by Timoteo. At this juncture, Rosario went down through the stairway, preceded by Santiago. Crescencio and Timoteo grappled for the possession of the bolo and both fell to the floor. A brother of Rosario appeared upon the scene and snatched the bolo and a dagger from the hands of Timoteo. As a result of the assault upon Santiago Cerrado, three wounds were inflicted upon him, one on the left forearm and another under the left axilla. They were not serious but the one in the left palm was serious and, if the hemorrhage was not stopped, it would have resulted in Crescencio’s death. Trial court found Timoteo Penesa guilty of frustrated homicide.

RULING: Yes, both are liable. From inception to execution, Valerio’s active participation was evident. He authored the idea of securing insurance on the boy's life, killing him and thereafter collecting the insurance proceeds. VALERIO was with Castro and the boy when the latter was taken swimming to deeper waters. Those were the categorical testimonies of Castro and ELEPAÑO. According to ELEPAÑO, VALERIO also assisted in funeral arrangements. VALERIO was at the vigil of the boy until the latter was... buried. VALERIO contributed P100.00 for burial expenses. But in so far as ELEPAÑO is concerned, we find the evidence of the prosecution insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The only evidence linking him to the crime is found in Castro's Statement given to the NBI on April 25, 1973, Exhibit "1". Castro,... however, repudiated under oath and in open Court his said Statement in so far as ELEPAÑO is concerned and stressed that ELEPAÑO had nothing to do with the killing. Treachery, as alleged in the Information, must be considered qualifying and must be appreciated against the accused. The killing of a child is murder even if the manner of attack was not shown.[63] The qualifying circumstances of treachery or "alevosia" exists in the commission of the crime of murder when an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death. Evident premeditation is satisfactorily established if it is proved that the accused had deliberately planned to commit the crime and had persistently and... continuously followed it notwithstanding that he had ample and sufficient time to allow his conscience to overcome the determination of his will, if he had desired it, after meditation and reflection. It contemplates cold and deep meditation and tenacious persistence in the... accomplishment of the criminal act.[65] In the case at bar, from the time the insurance was taken in November, 1972, and even after the boy insured got lost, the culprits did not relent in the pursuit of their scheme for money culminating in the... killing of the substitute boy and the filing of a death claim

In deciding every criminal case, the civil responsibility incurred by the accused, consequent upon his criminal liability, must be declared because every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. March 9, 2018 – Article 249 – HOMICIDE DUQUE, Francis Lester M [G.R. No. CA-263. August 19, 1948.] People v. TIMOTEO PENESA, DefendantAppellant.

ISSUE: WON Timoteo has intent to kill HELD: No. The SC ruled that when Timoteo went to the house of Rosario, it was not with the intention to kill anybody, for he went there to entreat Rosario Aguillon to live with him in another house. The bolo with which the appellant inflicted was one ordinarily used by farm laborers. The dagger was carried for self-defense. The wounds inflicted upon the offended parties by the appellant were caused indiscriminately and not deliberately. Appellant’s purpose in going to the house, and not the kind of weapons he carried, nor the parts of the victims’ bodies on which the wounds were inflicted indiscriminately, is indicative and determinative of his intent. The accused was convicted only of slight physical injuries. G.R. No. L-17666 June 30, 1966 ISIDORO MONDRAGON vs. PEOPLE FACTS:

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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST While complainant Serapion Nacionales was opening the dike of his ricefield, he heard a shout from afar telling him not to open the dike, Nacionales continued opening the dike, and the same voice shouted again, "Don't you dare open the dike." When he looked up, he saw Isidoro Mondragon coming towards him. Nacionales informed appellant that he was opening the dike because he would plant the next morning. Without much ado appellant punched the compalinant but the latter was able to dodge. Petitioner then drew his bolo and struck complainant on different parts of his body. Complainant backed out, unsheathed his own bolo, and hacked appellant on the head and forearm and between the middle and ring fingers in order to defend himself. Trial court found the petitioner guilty of attempted homicide ISSUE: WON the facts established do not show that petitioner has the intent to kill HELD: Yes. SC finds that the intention of the petitioner to kill the offended party has not been conclusively shown. It may be assumed that the petitioner drew his bolo and hit the offended party with it only when the offended party had shown a defiant attitude, considering that the complainant himself had a bolo, as in fact the offended party had also drawn his bolo and hit the petitioner with it. Pertinent testimony is as follows (Petitioner was asked): QUESTION: In other words you want to tell us that you will do everything you could to stop Nacionales digging the canal, because you need water? ANSWER - Yes, sir, because I need the water. The answer of the petitioner is not a categorical statement of an intention on his part to kill the offended party. The term "will do everything" has a broad meaning and it should be construed in a manner as to give the petitioner the benefit of the doubt as to what he really meant to do. 1Petitioner was guilty only of less serious physical injuries. The intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. That element must be proved with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488). G.R. No. 1509 February 16, 1904 THE UNITED STATES vs. NICOLAS GLORIA, defendant-appellant. Intent to kill is a conclusive presumption when death resulted. FACTS: Nicolas Gloria had a quarrel with Tiburcio de la Cruz which was followed by a fight. In the course of the struggle, Gloria inflicted upon Cruz with a pocketknife he was carrying, a wound in the left side of the trunk above the abdomen, from which

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wound the said Dela Cruz died. Romualdo Asuncion testified that the deceased himself told him that the wound had been inflicted by Nicolas Gloria. In view of the evidence for the prosecution, the judge decided that the facts constituted the crime of assault (lesiones) or physical injuries. ISSUE: WON the judge is correct finding the accused guilty of lesiones since there be no clear showing of intent to kill. HELD: No. The crime must be classified as homicide and not as assault (lesiones), notwithstanding the opinion of the trial judge. All acts punished by the law are presumed to be voluntarily in the absence of proof to the contrary. With respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. G.R. No. L-2095 , January 28, 1950 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FAUSTO CLAMANIA FACTS: Apolinario Inciso and Modesto Delantar, two witnesses for the prosecution, testified in substance that on the night of September 26, 1942, in barrio Lawaan, Balangiga, Samar, they were forced by the accused at the point of a revolver to accompany him to the beach. At the beach they saw Juan Grafil and Apolinario Gahoy in a boat with their hands tied behind their backs. With Apolinario Inciso at helm, Delantar and the accused rowed the boat with the victims on board to Can-usod Island. There, Grafil and Gahoy were taken ashore and beaten to death by Fausto Clamania with an oar. After Grafil and Gahoy were killed the accused ripped their abdomens to let out the bowels, attached stones as weights to the bodies, tied the bodies to the craft, and then hauled them to deep water where they were released. As above stated, the defendant admitted the above testimony, except that which says he had a firearm and coerced the prosecution witnesses into following him. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the accused is liable for murder. 2. Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited place and ensañamiento found by the trial court were erroneously appreciated. RULING: Yes, accused Clamania is liable for murder. The Court agree with the Solicitor General that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited place and ensañamiento found by the trial court, have been erroneously appreciated. Nocturnity is absorbed by treachery by which the killing is qualified; there is no proof that Can-usod Island was uninhabited, and the disemboweling of the deceased was not an unnecessary mutilation or deliberate and wanton augmentation of the suffering of the offended parties. For when the disemboweling

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST was affected, the victims were already dead, and the operation was conceived solely for the purpose of facilitating the sinking of the cadavers and preventing their discovery. G.R. No. 121828, June 27, 2003 PEOPLE vs, PILOLA FACTS: On February 5, 1988 11:30 pm: Elisa Rolan was inside their store waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Although already drunk, Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba joined them. Edmar had a heated argument with Julian. Elisa pacified Edmar and advised them to go home as she was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left then returned to block Joselito and Julian. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face. Elisa shouted: “Tama na. Tama na” but she was ignored as they continued until they reached the end of the street. Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches. As Joselito tried to stop the fight, Odilon pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselito’s neck, and stabbed him. Ronnie and Rene Gayot Pilola, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. Ronnie took a knife from the kitchen of Teresita and rushed together with Pilola to the scene and stabbed Joselito. As Joeslito was stabbed 11 times (6 fatal stab wounds), he fell in the canal. Odilon and Pilola fled while Ronnie went after Julian who ran dear life. When Julian noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, he looked back and saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and bashed Joselito’s head. Then, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more before fleing from the scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselito’s house and informed his wife and brother of the incident. Agripina Gloria, a female security guard, saw Ronnie repeatedly stabbed Joselito and fled towards the direction of the mental hospital. She did not see Odilon. Elisa cross-examination had an inconsistency, she stated that it was Edmar who struck the victim (before it was Ronnie) RTC: Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder qualified by treachery and sentenced to reclusion perpetua ISSUE: Whether or not Pilola is guilty of murder. HELD: YES. Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de minimis importance. Elisa’s testimony is corroborated by the autopsy report of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz. No showing of any improper motive on the part of a witness to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the commission of the crime. The trial court gave credence and full

105 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

probative

weight

to

Elisa’s

testimony.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders, and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his coconspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others. The mere presence of an accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim. Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred: o 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Art. 18. Accomplices. – Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. o To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: 1. the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; 2. the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice. Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the Pilola before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim. Since the victim is not yet dead, the crime is not yet consummated so Pilola is a principal by direct participation. Alibi is a weak, if not the weakest of defenses in a criminal prosecution, because it is easy to concoct but hard to disprove. To serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. For it to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was absent from the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been present then. Pilola knew that he was charged for the stabbing but instead of surrendering to the police authorities, he evaded arrest and this flight is evidence of his guilt. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part - attack on the unarmed victim was sudden. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery. March 10, 2018 – Article 250 – PENALTY FOR FRUSTRATED PARRICIDE, MURDER OR HOMICIDE. FLORENTINO, Kimberly A. UNITED STATES VS CANDIDO POBLETE GR NO. L-4354. MARCH 25, 1908 ISSUE: Whether the court can imposed penalty lower than what was being prescribed by law? FACTS: On the morning of May 19, 1907, a 19 year old woman together with her two companions were walking in the direction of the church. Unexpectedly they met the accused when they are nearing the parish house who immediately seized the victim and attacked her chest, back, sides, arms and thighs.Although she fell to the ground senseless the accused continued attacking her. The victim's companions attempted to help but they were also attacked by the accused. The victim sustained sixteen

106 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

wounds but through the assistance of a military surgeon in the hospital she was able to survived. The wounds healed in about three weeks. HELD: Yes. After taking into consideration the circumstances of the deed, and in the present case the trivial nature of the wounds inflicted upon the injuref party, which were cured in less than one month, Article 407 of the Penal Code (Article 250 RPC) authorizes courts to punish, within their rational discretion, the crime of frustrated murder with a penalty lower by one degree, imposing in its medium grade the penalty of presidio correccional in its maximum degree to presidio mayor in its medium grade, which is the penalty next lower to that imposed by Article 65 of the Penal Code ( Article 50 RPC). March 10, 2018 – Article 251 – DEATH CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z. [NO CASE FOUND] March 10, 2018 – Article 252 – PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P. [NO CASE FOUND] March 10, 2018 – Article 253 – GIVING ASSISTANCE TO SUICIDE LAZO, Joseph Artfel T. [NO CASE FOUND] March 15, 2018 – Article 254 – DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS NASH, Regina Mercado GERONIMO DADO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 131421) November 18, 2002 ISSUE: Whether accused is guilty of homicide instead of illegal discharge of firearm only. FACTS: The present case is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kudarat finding the Geronimo Dado and Francisc o Eraso guilty of the crime of homicide. The information charged both Dado and Eraso with murder allegedly committed by said the accused armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, and shot Silvestre Balinas thereby in flicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused his instant death.The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga wereas follows: On the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams to intercept some cattle rustlers. The Team composed of the petitioner SPO4Geronimo Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, AflredoBalinas and Rufo Alga waitedbehind a

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST large dike. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga, who were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, were positioned between the petitioner, who was armed with a caliber .45 pistol, andaccused Francisco Eraso, who was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. At around 11:00 of that sameevening, the team saw somebody approaching at a distance of 50 meters. When he was about 5 meters away from the team, Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso was making some movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his flashlight, Eraso firedhis M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately thereafter, petitioner fired a singleshot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim turned out to be Silvestre ―Butsoy‖ Balinas, thenephew of Alfredo Balinas. Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas to show his repentance for his deed. HELD: In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that conspirac yattended the commission of the crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner Dado and accused Eraso conspired in killing the deceased, thus, it is no longer necessary to establish who caused the fatal wound in as much as conspiracy makes the act of one conspirator the act of all. Although the agreement need not be directly proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement must nonetheless be convincingly shown. In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Eraso’s seemingly concerted and almost simultaneous acts were more of a spontaneous reaction rather than the result of a common plan to ki ll the victim. Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of the victim were particles of a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner. Hence, the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide and acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. A new decision was entered finding petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum penalty. March 11, 2018 – Article 255 – INFANTICIDE OLACO, Jan- Lawrence P. PEOPLE VS. JOSEFINA BANDIAN G.R. NO. 45186 SEPTEMBER 30, 1936 FACTS: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to respond to the call of nature. Few minutes later, Bandian emerged from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. Rushing to her aid, he brought her to her house and placed her on the bed. He called on Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before. She

107 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno declared that the appellant gave birth in her own house and three her child into the thicket to kill it. The trial court gave credit to this opinion. ISSUE: Whether or not Bandian is guilty of infanticide HELD: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. The evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her child’s death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol—she considers him her husband as he considers him his wife— began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew of the pregnancy and that it was his and that they’ve been eagerly awaiting the birth of the child. The appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol. Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which cause may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance, to take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life. If by going into the thicket to pee, she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she could not be blamed because it all happened by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (Art. 12(4), RPC). Thus, having the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted of the crime that she had been accused of. PEOPLE VS SEVERA JACA AND PROCESO RASALAN G.R. NO. L-34866 AUGUST 18, 1931 FACTS: On November 1930, the above-named accused, Severa Jaca and Proceso Rasalan, aiding and abetting each other for the purpose of concealing the dishonor of said Severa Jaca, did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously put to death the child which she had given birth to, before it was 3 days old. Having heard the case, the Court of First Instance (CFI) acquitted Severa Jaca, but convicted Proceso Rasalan of the crime charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Proceso Rasalan appealed from this sentence. ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty imputed upon Rasalan was correct.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST HELD: YES. There is no dispute about the fact that Severa Jaca's new-born baby die a violent death; this has been sufficiently proved. The evidence for the prosecution points to Proceso Rasalan as the offender, that two eyewitnesses, both of them related to the appellant, the first by consaguinity and the second by affinity, testified that Rasalan wrapped up the baby in a cloth which asphyxiated it — resulting in its death. Tomas Jaca, the appellant's father-in-law, testified that when the latter handed to him the corpse of the newly-born child in order that he might secretly throw it into the river, the accused revealed to him that he, Rasalan, had killed it in order to conceal the dishonor of Severa Jaca. The defendant questions the veracity of these three witnesses, alleging that they had a grievance against him and his family. The grievance mentioned was not sufficient to make the witnesses tell a falsehood in accusing their own relative of so serious crime. Moreover, as it has been established in the record that the crime charged was committed, and that the defendant committed it; that, inasmuch as he is not an ascendant of the dead child, he has incurred, according to the law the penalty for murder and is guilty of this crime. Hence, the penalty imputed is correct as against to Rasalan. March 12, 2018 – Article 256 – INTENTIONAL ABORTION PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P. UNITED STATES V. MARIANO BOSTON G.R. NO. L-4795 (NOVEMBER 23, 1908) ISSUE: Whether or not accused Boston should be liable of Intentional Abortion FACTS: In this case, the child was born three months in advance of the full period of gestation. The accused Boston, believing that the child in the womb of the woman was a sort of a fish-demon (which he called a balat), gave to her a portion composed of herbs, for the purpose of relieving her of this alleged fish-demon. Two hours after, she gave premature birth to a child. After the birth of the child, Boston, with the permission and aid of the husband and the brother of the infant child, destroyed it by fire in order to prevent its doing, which the Boston believed it was capable of doing. HELD: Yes. The guilt of appellant is conclusively established by the evidence of record, the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution leaving no room for reasonable doubt. These facts constitute, in our opinion, prima facie proof of the intent of the accused in giving the herb potion to the mother of the child, and also of the further fact that the herb potion so administered to her was the cause of its premature birth. The defense wholly failed to rebut this testimony of this prosecution and we are of opinion, therefore,

that the trial court with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt. PEOPLE V. FILOMENO SALUFRANIA G.R. NO. L-50884 (MARCH 30, 1988) ISSUE Whether or not Salufrania should be liable with the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion FACTS The accused Salufrania was found guilty by the trial court of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion. Several witnesses were presented by the prosecution and the defense throughout the trial. Pedro Salufrania, son of the accused, was one of the witnesses of the prosecution which stated that he saw his father box his pregnant mother on the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her to death; that he saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot where she fell. HELD No. The accused Salufrania should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows: 1. That there is a pregnant woman. 2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion. 3. That the violence is intentionally exerted. 4. That as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion. The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. March 12, 2018 – Article UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P.

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–

U.S VS. JEFFREY 15 PHIL 394 MARCH 5, 1910 ISSUE: W/N Jeffrey was liable under Art. 257 of the RPC FACTS:

ST

257

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST On the evening of March 1, 1909, while Teodorica Saguinsin was in a Chinese shop situated in Guadalupe, municipality of San Pedro Macati, Rizal Province, a man named D. B. Jeffrey appeared therein, and, without any apparent reason whatever, struck the woman three times on the hip with a bottle that he was carrying, in consequence of which the woman fell to the ground with an abundant hemorrhage from the womb; she was immediately taken to her home in a carretela, and being three months pregnant she had a miscarriage on the following day, according to the examination made by the president of the municipal board of health. The woman was ill and unable to attend to her usual duties for forty-five days. HELD: Yes. Even though it was not the criminal intent of the defendant to cause the abortion, the fact that, without any apparent reason whatever, he maltreated Teodorica Saguinsin, presumably not knowing that she was pregnant, as author of the abuse which caused the miscarriage, he is liable not only for such maltreatment but also for the consequences thereof, to wit, for the abortion; and it was also proven that on the said occasion the defendant was drunk, which circumstance explains how he came to strike the woman with a bottle without any known motive. It does not appear that he is a habitual drunkard. The penalty of prision correccional as fixed by the aforesaid article should be imposed upon him in the minimum degree, there being no aggravating circumstance to counteract its effect. PEOPLE VS. GENOVES G.R. NO. L-42819, APRIL 15, 1935 ISSUE: W/N there can be a complex crime of homicide with abortion FACTS: In the morning of the 28th of May, 1934, appellant and deceased Soledad Rivera were laborers in adjoining cane fields. Soledad claimed that the yoke of the plow which appellant was repairing belonged to her and tried to take it by force. Appellant struck her with his fist, causing her to fall to the ground. She got up and returned to the fray, whereupon she received another blow with the fist on the left cheek which caused her again to fall to the ground. Immediately after the incident deceased proceeded to the municipal building, a distance of about four kilometers, and complained to the chief of police about the maltreatment. At the time Soledad was heavy with child, and as she complained to the chief of police of pain in the abdomen, she was seen by the president of the sanitary district. According to testimony deceased was in good health the day before. From the time of the incident there was hemorrhage and pain which were symptoms of premature delivery. Deceased remained in this condition until June 10, 1934. On that date the condition culminated in the painful and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she way carrying, but the other baby could be delivered. Both babies were dead.

109 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

HELD: Yes. Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros of the complex crime of homicide with abortion. The first assignment of error is the contention of appellant that the death of the offended party was not the direct result of the assault upon her by the defendant. It is generally known that a fall is liable to cause premature delivery, and the evidence shows a complete sequel of events from the assault to her death. The accused must be held responsible for the natural consequences of his act. The other defense is that the accused did not strike the deceased, but this fact is clearly established by the prosecution. We find the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that inflicted and provocation, as the offended party by force induced the appellant to use force on his part. The abortion in this case is unintentional abortion denounced by article 257 of the Revised Penal Code. On the whole case, the period of confinement is fixed at twelve years and one day to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal. GELIG VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 173150, JULY 28, 2010 ISSUE: W/N the petitioner can Unintentional Abortion.

be

convicted

of

FACTS: On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a sissy while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydias violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her maxillary area, as shown by a medical certificate issued by a doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly, a medical certificate was issued. HELD: No. The prosecutions success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct assault does not necessarily mean that the same physical force she employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of unintentional abortion. There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the abortion. While the medical certificate of Gemmas attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was presented to the court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that her medical condition was a direct consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident. It was therefore vital for the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydias assault and Gemmas abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the assault on Gemmas abortion. It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the said incident were not substantiated by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion may have been the result of other factors. March 12, 2018 – Article 258 – ABORTION PRACTICED BY THE WOMAN HERSELF OR BY HER PARENTS. PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D [NO CASE FOUND] March 13, 2018 – Article 259 – ABORTION PRACTICED BY A PHYSICIAN OR MIDWIFE AND DISPENSING OF ABORTIVES RIVERA, Marynit P. [NO CASE FOUND] March 14, 2018 – Article 260 – RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTICIPANTS IN A DUEL ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M [NO CASE FOUND] March 13, 2018 – Article 261 – CHALLENGING TO A DUEL SALVERON, Jan Ione R. PEOPLE VS RAMY VALLES G.R. NO. 110564. JANUARY 28, 1997 ISSUE: Is the crime of challenging to a duel committed? FACTS: The victim, Elmer Porcullo, [4]who was a worker of Sta. Monica Canning Corporation went there to collect his salary with two of his co-employees, Rizza Pelegrino and Paulita Palencia. Upon reaching the gate of Sta. Monica. Rizza and Paulita were allowed by the security guards to enter the compound of the company, but not Porcullo who was prohibited by the accused Ramy Valles, a security guard of the company, since the former was only wearing "sando" and pants and had no identification card to present which was in violation of the company rules requiring employees to enter the company's premises in proper uniform. Porcullo then approached Valles not only once but four times insisting to get inside the compound of the company, it was at the third and fourth time that Porcullo got mad and started insulting Valles. Porcullo berated Valles and challenged him to go out of the compound and have a fist fight with him. Porcullo then pointed his finger at Valles and said “Putang ina mo, akala mo sino ka, hindi mo ba alam na ex-army ako?”

110 | 1 YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay ST

When Porcullo turned and walked away from Valles, the latter without warning shot Porcullo. He turned sideways to look at his wound but, again, he was shot by the accused. The victim sustained two (2) gunshot wounds, one on the left buttock and the other was below the right armpit. HELD: NO. The act of berating and challenging Valles to a fistfight apparently incited the fury of the accused-appellant, and, at this instance, Porcullo should naturally expect and anticipate the possible consequences of his rebellious acts like the consequent retaliation by the accusedappellant against his life. He courted obvious danger, and when it came, it can not be defined as sudden, unexpected and unforeseen. It entitled Valles to the mitigating circumstance of obfuscation. March 14, 2018 – Article 262 – MUTILATION SANTOALLA, Stephanie M. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAMUEL BORCE G.R. No. 124131 April 22, 1998 FACTS: Samuel Borce was convicted for Rape and Frustrated Murder. For Rape: That on April 29, 1994, at around 8:30 o'clock in the morning, at the hill of the western part of Bariquir, Barangay San Antonio, Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines with lewd design and with the use of deadly weapon, raped REGINA BAGA against her will and consent and this was repeated for the second time around, to the great damage and prejudice. For Frustrated Murder: That on April 29, 1994, at around 8:30 o'clock in the morning, at the hill of the western part of Barangay San Antonio, Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines SAMUEL BORCE, hack the face of one REGINA BAGA, inflicting multiple hack wounds on her face, by reason of the timely medical attendance rendered to said victim which prevented her death. ISSUE: WON the crime of Mutilation under Article 262 is committed? HELD: No. Crime of Rape was committed. In fine, relevant to the case at bar, when the crime of rape is committed "with the use of a deadly weapon," the penalty prescribed is reclusion perpetua to death. The death penalty is imposed when by reason or on the occasion of rape, the victim has suffered "permanent physical mutilation." Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 reads: Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. —

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death. The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.The imposition of the death penalty on accused-appellant by the trial court on each count of rape has been premised on the infliction of three scars on the victim's face. The phrase "permanent physical mutilation" has not been defined in the law. Neither Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as so amended by Republic Act No. 7659, nor any of the chapters in Title Eleven, entitled "Crimes against Chastity," provides any further clue on the meaning that should be given to the term. In Title Eight on "Crimes against Persons,"14 the Code simply states in Article 262 thereof that — Art. 262. Mutilation. — The penalty of from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction. Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods. No specific ascription having been given by the law to the word, "mutilation" must perforce be understood in its generic sense and ordinary usage. Webster15 defines mutilation as cutting off or permanently destroying a limb or an essential part thereof. Black16 defines the term, in its criminal law concept, as one that would deprive a person of the use of any of those limbs which may be useful to him in fight, the loss of which amounts to mayhem. A thorough reading of the records of the case would fail to disclose that accused-appellant inflicted the wounds on the victim deliberately to maim her. It would, in fact, appear that the victim sustained the wounds only as a result of a clear attempt by appellant to kill her and coverup his misdeeds. The injury thus borne by private complainant should not be taken as a circumstance which would raise the penalty to death for the crime of rape but should instead rightly be taken up and absorbed in the crime of frustrated murder. March 14, 2018 – Article 263 – SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES TADO, Diann Kathelline A. US VS ANDRES VILLANUEVA GR. NO. 10606, SEP 11, 1915. 31 PHIL. 412 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty FACTS:

111 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

Villanueva is charged "while quarreling with his opponent, Isidoro Benter, with having suddenly snatched the bolo which the latter was carrying at his belt and with it inflicting upon him a wound in the palm of the right hand that incapacitated the aggrieved party from performing work for more than thirty days and which rendered the said principal member entirely useless." But it turns out that Villanueva was not Benter's opponent nor was there any quarrel between the two. Neither did Villanueva inflict any wound upon Benter. The latter injured himself by an accident arising out of his own act. Benter testified that he agreed to take Villanueva to the town of Pola in his boat. At the landing, Villanueva took hold of the bolo which complainant carried at his belt. The complainant tried to retain it and that in doing so he caught it by the blade and cut himself in the palm of the right hand; that without a word being said the complainant left. Benter was able to testify that the wound delayed in healing for more than forty days. The trial court opined that the act constitutes lesiones graves by reckless negligence under Article 568 of the Penal Code. RULING: NO. The law speaks of a person who by reckless imprudence commits an act which, if maliciously performed, would constitute a grave felony. (Art. 568, Penal Code.) But the act of the accused in the case at bar does not constitute a felony, grave, or menos grave, nor is it a misdemeanor. The only act which he performed was to take, or attempt to take, from its sheath the bolo which Benter was carrying at his belt, and that was an act which is not defined in any law as being a crime ov misdemeanor. The defendant did not wound Benter. It was the latter who, by his own act in catching hold of the edge of the blade of the bolo, wounded himself, or as is said in the judgment appealed from, the bolo, by its edge or by its own weight, in slipping from Benteu's hand into the scabbard because he did not grasp it firmly, wounded Benter; the bolo did this, not the defendant. The crime of lesiones graves (physical injuries) which the trial court understands to be committed without malice or with reckless imprudence is thus classified in article 416 of the Penal Code: "Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another * * * shall suffer: 1. * * *. 2. The penalty of prision etc., if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted the injured person shall have lost an eye or any principal member, etc." The defendant did not wound, beat, or assault Benter; consequently he cannot be guilty of the crime of inflicting serious physical injuries, not even by reckless imprudence. S/SGT. CORNELIO PAMAN, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. G.R. NO. 210129, JULY 05, 2017

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST ISSUE: Whether or not Paman is guilty FACTS: On October 14, 2004, at about 1:20 p.m., Ursicio Arambala (Arambala) was on board a motorcycle traversing Roxas Street, Pagadian City towards the direction of the Southern Mindanao Colleges Main Campus. When he was nearing the intersection of Roxas and Broca Streets in Pagadian City, a multicab driven by S/Sgt. Cornelio Paman (Paman), a military personnel, crossed his path and collided with his motorcycle. Arambala was thrown from his motorcycle thus hitting his head on the road pavement. Emilda Salabit, who was then standing beside the road, saw Arambala being thrown away after the collision; she went to Arambala and hailed a tricycle and rushed him to the hospital. A Computed Tomography Scan report shows that Arambala suffered hematoma at the cerebral portion of his brain. After his confinement at the Mercy Community Hospital on October 15, 2004, Arambala was again admitted on October 24, 2004 at the Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Hospital due to erratic blood pressure and slurring speech caused by the hematoma. On February 21, 2005, an Information for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries was filed. The MTCC found Paman guilty. The RTC reversed MTCC decision. RTC pointed out that Arambala was the cause of the collision since he already saw the multicab driven by Paman ahead of time; that he had the opportunity to take precaution to avoid the accident, but he failed to do so. The CA reversed RTC decision. RULING: YES. A perusal of the records of this case clearly shows that it was Paman who was at fault since he was driving at the wrong side of the road when the collision happened. The CA observed that the evidence indubitably shows that before the collision, Arambala's motorcycle was cruising along its rightful lane when S/Sgt. Paman's multicab suddenly crossed his (Arambala) path coming from his left side using the wrong lane to cross the said intersection. The accident would not have happened had S/Sgt. Paman, the multicab driver, stayed on his lane and did not overtake the vehicle of the private complainant Ararnbala. Paman's act of driving on the wrong side of the road, in an attempt to overtake the motorcycle driven by Arambala, and suddenly crossing the path which is being traversed by the latter, is sheer negligence. It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. If, after attempting to pass, the

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driver of the overtaking vehicle finds that he cannot make the passage in safety, the latter must slacken his speed so as to avoid the danger of a collision, even bringing his car to a stop if necessary.20 This rule is consistent with Section 4l(a) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Here, Paman was violating a traffic regulation, i.e., driving on the wrong side of the road, at the time of the collision. He is thus presumed to be negligent at the time of the incident, which presumption he failed to overcome. For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane, Paman, as correctly held by the CA, must be held liable. Nevertheless, there is a need to modify the penalty imposed by the CA. Under Article 263(4) of the RPC, the penalty for serious physical injuries, when the injuries inflicted caused incapacity for more than 30 days, is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; the maximum period of the foregoing penalty prision correccional in its minimum period - is merely a correctional penalty and, thus, should be considered a less grave felony. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 365 of the RPC, Paman should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods or from one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Since the maximum term of imprisonment in this case, i.e., four (4) months, does not exceed one (1) year, the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law find no application and Paman should be meted a straight penalty taken from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. In view of the lack of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances in this case, Paman should be made to suffer the straight penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor. March 14, 2018 – Article 264 – ADMINISTERING INJURIOUS SUBSTANCES OR BEVERAGES UNAS, Nor-Aiza R. US V. CHIONG SONGCO G.R. NO. L-6503 FEBRUARY 27, 1911 ISSUE: Whether or not Songco is guilty of administering injurious substance or beverage as contemplated in Article 264 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: The defendant and appellant threw the contents of a bottle of sulphuric acid into the face and on the body of the complaining witness, inflicting wounds which resulted in the illness of the injured man for more than thirty days. It was further proven that the attack was made treacherously, as that circumstance is defined in article 10 of the Penal Code, it having been made at night, from behind the shelter of a sheet of zinc, and at a time when the victim was wholly unprepared to make any defense, he not having any reason to anticipate an assault so unexpected and unusual.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST HELD: No. The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime of lesiones defined in subsection 4 of article 416 read together with article 417 of the Penal Code, marked with the aggravating circumstance of the nocturnity, and sentenced him to imprisonment for 1 year and 1 day. But the commission of the crime having been marked with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the special penalty prescribed in the last paragraph of article 416 should have been inflicted, that is to say, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium degree. The penalty should have been imposed in its medium degree, the commission of the offense not having been marked by aggravating or extenuating circumstances, the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity as found by the trial court being taken into consideration in the finding of the existence of the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. We should add that the crime as committed is not in any wise related to the offices defined and penalized in article 417 of the code, as found by the trial court, the provisions of which clearly relate to the use of poisons and the like in an entirely different manner. The sentence imposed by the trial court is therefore reversed, and instead thereof, we sentence the defendant and appellant to two years of prision correccional, together with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to the payment of the cost of both instances. March 14, 2018 – Article 265 – LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M. CARLITO PENTECOSTES, JR. VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 167766 APRIL 7, 2010 ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of “Less Serious Physical Injuries” was committed in this case FACTS: On September 2, 1998, Rudy Baclig was drinking with his brother-in-law. After consuming ½ bottle of gin, he left and went to the house of a certain Siababa to buy coffee and sugar. He was accompanied by his four- year-old son. On their way there, a gray automobile coming from the opposite direction passed by them. After a while, he noticed that the vehicle was moving backward towards them. When the car was about two arms’ length from where they were, it stopped and he heard the driver of the vehicle call him by his nickname Parrod. Rudy came closer, but after taking one step, the driver, which he identified as the petitioner, opened the door and while still in the car drew a gun and shot him once, hitting him just below the left armpit. Rudy immediately ran at the back of the car, while petitioner sped away. After petitioner left, Rudy and his son headed to the seashore. Rudy later went back to the place where he was shot and shouted for help. The people who assisted him initially brought him to the Municipal Hall of Gonzaga, Cagayan, where he was interrogated by a policeman who asked him to identify his assailant. He informed the policeman that

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petitioner was the one who shot him. After he was interrogated, he was later brought to the Don Alfonso Ponce Memorial Hospital at Gonzaga, Cagayan. The following day, he was discharged from the hospital. On June 1, 1999, an Information was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Aparri, Cagayan, charging the petitioner of frustrated murder. Duly arraigned, petitioner pleaded Not Guilty to the crime as charged. The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Attempted Murder. The CA found him only guilty of less serious physical injuries. HELD: This Court also concurs with the conclusion of the CA that petitioner is guilty of the crime of less serious physical injuries, not attempted murder. The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder is the intent on the part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor. In the present case, intent to kill the victim could not be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latter’s body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. Favorably to petitioner, the inference that intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10) days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following day, the crime committed is less serious physical injuries only. The less serious physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "Any person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not described as serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor. March 15, 2018 – Article 266 – SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES AND MALTREATMENT VILLARIN, Paulo Jose GEORGE BONGALON vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013 FACTS: May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor,

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face; that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital; that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered contusions. On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters. To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and protective father. ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner is guilty of Child Abuse or Slight Physical Injuries. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner is guilty of Slight Physical Injuries under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court disagreed that the petitioner in striking the back of Jayson with his hands constituted child abuse. he records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RUSTICO TILOS FACTS: Geralyn Narciso, the 12-year old daughter of the victim, was on her way to a neighbors house to watch a betamax movie when she came upon accused-appellant inflicting fist blows on her father. From a distance of about 15 meters, she saw accused-appellant holding the victim by the nape with his right hand, and boxing him on the abdomen with his left hand. Geralyn called to her mother, Florida Narciso, for help and the latter arrived and pulled the victim away from accusedappellant. While Florida was hugging the victim, accused-at-large Mateo Mahinay came from behind them and struck the victim three times: on the left eye, the right eye, and the nape. The victim fell to the ground. Florida sought the help of two bystanders, Mercy Siquijod and Paniong Agustino, in bringing the victim home. Teotimo Narciso died two days later. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of conspiracy to murder. RULING: The Supreme Court held that accused-appellant is guilty of slight physical injuries only. In People vs. Laurio, 200 SCRA 465 (1991), the Court held that where conspiracy to murder is not proved, and the gravity or duration of the physical injury resulting from the fistblows by the accused on the victim was not established by the evidence, the accused is presumed, and is held, liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code ARTICLE 266-A TO 266-D AS AMENDED BY RA 8353 Republic Act No. 8353 (ANTI-RAPE LAW) - AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE, RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES PEOPLE VS ORITA GR no. 88724, April 3, 1990 FACTS: March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house after her classmates brought her home from a party. She knocked at the door of her boarding house when a frequent visitor of another boarder held her and poked a knife to her neck. Despite pleading for her release, he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the 1st floor was locked from the inside, they used the back door to the second floor. With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, he dragged her up the stairs. When they reached the second floor, he commanded herwith the knife poked at her neck, to look for a room. They entered Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her head on the wall. With one hand holding the knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as told but since she kept moving, only a portion of his penis entered her. He then laid down on his back and commanded her to mount him. Still only a small part of his penis was inserted into her vagina. When he had both his hands flat on the floor. She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. When he pursued her and climbed the partition, she ran to another room then another then she jumped out through a window. Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the boarding house and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building and knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door, they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house where they heard and saw somebody running away but failed to apprehend him due to darkness. She was taken to Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined. Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges. • RTC: frustrated rape ISSUE: Whether or not there was frustrated rape. HELD: NO. RTC MODIFIED. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000 • Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply to the crime of rape. • Requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will • attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform o If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. • in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen

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or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ • The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the victim. PEOPLE VS BENJIE RESURRECCION GR no. 185389 FACTS: On 20 June 2001, BENJIE was charged before the RTC with Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. He allegedly raped AAA, an 11 year-old girl. Dr. Marlyn Valdez-Agbayani examined AAA and found that the victim had no laceration in her external organ or her hymen. The former also testified that there were no spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina. Despite these findings, Dr. Valdez-Agbayani clarified that if the hymen of a woman is elastic and so thin, as in AAA’s case, laceration may not be present. As to the absence of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina, Dr. ValdezAgbayani said that it was possible that the victim washed her genitalia, especially since she was examined only after two days following the alleged rape incident. BENJIE was convicted by the RTC, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA. Upon appeal to the SC, BENJIE points out that 1) the testimony of AAA on how he allegedly raped her was highly improbable, and 2) the negative findings of spermatozoa and laceration must acquit him. ISSUE: Whether or not BENJIE guilty of rape? HELD: Yes. This Court itself, in its desire to unveil the truth as borne out by the records, has painstakingly pored over the transcripts of stenographic notes of this case, and like the RTC, finds the victim’s testimony of the incident candid and straightforward, indicative of an untainted and realistic narration of what transpired on that fateful day. BENJIE tries to discredit the victim's testimony by questioning the odd position at which the rape was done. While BENJIE’s position, i.e., covering AAA’s mouth with his left hand and pinning her down with the right hand, may be considered difficult, such does not exclude the possibility that rape can be consummated under said situation. Depraved individuals stop at nothing in order to accomplish their purpose. Perverts are not used to the easy way of satisfying their wicked cravings. It should be noted that the victim was a very young and fragile 11-year-old, who was easy to be subdued by an abuser who was used to manual labor and was already 18 or 19 years old. In his last-ditch effort to be exculpated, BENJIE calls this Court’s attention to the medical findings that no sperm cells were present in the victim’s vagina just two days following the rape.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST He intimates that no rape occurred because of the absence of the sperm cells. This contention is not well-taken. The absence of spermatozoa in the victim’s genitalia does not negate rape, the slightest penetration even without emission being sufficient to constitute and consummate the offense. The mere touching of the labia of the woman’s pudendum or lips of the female organ by the male sexual organ consummates the act. PEOPLE VS. GACUSAN G.R. NO. 207776, APRIL 26, 2017 FACTS: An information for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43 of Dagupan City against Gacusan. The information provided: That at around 11 [0]’clock in the evening of October 14, 2009 in Brgy. [Inmalog], San Fabian, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of AAA], a 15 year old minor, by having sexual intercourse with her, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. CONTRARY to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by [Republic Act No.] 8353. Upon arraignment, Gacusan pleaded not guilty to the charge. Gacusan is the common-law partner of the mother of the victim. The mother of the victim moved in with Gacusan, however, the victim’s mother died within 8 months of their common-law relationship. When BBB was still alive, AAA slept in a separate room in Gacusan’s house. When BBB died, AAA began sleeping beside Gacusan because of her fear of ghosts. At around 10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. of October 14, 2009, “AAA was trying to sleep beside [Gacusan] when” she felt Gacusan’s hand touching her private parts inside her shorts. DDD, Gacusan’s 19-year old son, was sleeping on a folding bed in the same room. AAA said that she did not attempt to remove Gacusan’s hand because she was already used to it.1 Gacusan “brought out his penis and inserted it through the leg opening of [AAA]’s shorts. During this time, AAA was on her back while [Gacusan] was on his side, facing her and trying to lift her leg. Gacusan was able to penetrate AAA’s vagina then proceeded to do a ‘“push and pull’ movement”. When AAA felt Gacusan’s penis inside her, she got up to go to the bathroom to urinate. Thereafter, “AAA went back to sleep beside [Gacusan]. According to AAA, although she felt pain when Gacusan raped her, “she did not shout [because] she was . . . afraid of him . . . [S]he was afraid to lose [a] family and she depended on [Gacusan for] support[.] She also claimed that she “was already 15 years old [on the date of the alleged rape] and had been living with [Gacusan] for five years. AAA confessed that Gacusan was already molesting her two (2) years after BBB’s death.

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The Regional Trial Court convicted Gacusan of simple rape. The trial court also ruled that in rape committed by a father to his daughter, it is the father’s moral ascendancy that replaces violation and intimidation. Thus, this principle “applies in the case of a sexual abuse of a stepdaughter by her stepfather and of a goddaughter by a godfather in the sacrament of confirmation.” Furthermore, the medico-legal findings were consistent with AAA’s testimony that she was raped. Hence, there is a sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established. The Court of Appeals ruled that “in incestuous rape or those committed by the common law spouse of the victim’s parent, evidence of force and intimidation is not necessary to secure a conviction.” “[I]n rape committed by an ascendant, close kin, a step parent or a common law spouse of a parent, moral ascendancy takes the place of force and intimidation.”Furthermore, AAA’s testimony and positive identification of Gacusan as the person who raped her, as well as the medical findings confirming the rape, prevail over the bare denials of Gacusan. Gacusan filed an appeal alleging failure of the prosecution to prove that he employed force, threat, or intimidation in raping AAA. ISSUE: Whether or not Gacusan is guilty of rape HELD: Yes. Sections 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, provide that: Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. – Rape is Committed1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: Through force, threat, or intimidation; … Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied) AAA admitted that despite the pain she felt, she neither protested nor shouted at the time of the rape incident The testimony of AAA reveals that the reason she did not shout during the alleged rape was that she was afraid of losing a family. It is reasonable to assume that she was terrified of losing someone who provided her support after losing her biological mother. She testified that she could not find comfort from her grandmother. “[D]ifferent people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.” One person may react aggressively, while another may show cold indifference. Also, it is improper to judge the actions of children who are victims of traumatic experiences “by the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST norms of behavior expected under the circumstances from mature people.” From AAA’s view, it appeared that the danger of losing a family was more excruciating than physical pain. Furthermore, a victim should never be blemished for her lack of resistance to any crime especially as heinous as rape. Neither the failure to shout nor the failure to resist the act equate to a victim’s voluntary submission to the appellant’s lust. Recent cases reiterating that moral ascendancy replaces violence or intimidation in rape committed by a close-kin cited People v. Corpuz. In Corpuz, the accused was the live-in partner of the victim’s mother. The victim, AAA, was 13 years old when accused Corpuz started raping her. The repeated rape incidents made AAA pregnant. In People v. Fraga, accused Fraga raped the daughters of his common-law partner. Fraga tried evading his conviction by shifting from his defense of alibi to lack of force or intimidation. While this Court affirmed Fraga’s conviction since force and intimidation was sufficiently proven, it also emphasized that: [A]ccused-appellant started cohabiting with complainants’ mother in 1987. As the commonlaw husband of their mother, he gained such moral ascendancy over complainants that any more resistance than had been shown by complainants cannot reasonably be expected. (Emphasis provided) In People v. Robles,accused Robles raped his common-law wife’s daughter. This Court affirmed his conviction and likened Robles’ moral ascendancy over the victim to that of a biological father; thus: Moral ascendancy and influence by the accused, stepfather of the 12 year-old complainant, and threat of bodily harm rendered complainant subservient to appellant’s lustful desires… Actual force or intimidation need not even be employed for rape to be committed where the over powering influence of a father over his daughter suffices. (Emphasis provided, citation omitted) Gacusan had moral ascendancy over AAA.

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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST TITLE NINE – CRIME AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY March 15, 2018 – Article 267 – SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RUBEN ABLAZA G.R. NO. L-27352 OCTOBER 31, 1969 ISSUE: a. Whether or not Ablaza committed kidnapping with serious illegal detention. b. Whether or not there was an error of considering motor vehicle as aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime. FACTS: Accused Ruben Ablaza forcibly took her from her aunt's place in Caloocan City and brought her to a house in a barrio in Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she was criminally abused by her abductor. After her rescue by the Philippine Constabulary men, a criminal case for forcible abduction with rape was filed against Ablaza. While that case in Bulacan was still pending, Annabelle Huggins, who was sweeping the front of her aunt's house in Makati, Rizal, was again grabbed by two men and forcibly taken to a taxicab where a third man, who turned out to be Ablaza, was waiting. Then the vehicle sped away before anybody could come to the aid of the struggling girl. Inside the cab, Annabelle was seated at the rear between Ablaza and a companion; her head was pressed down to the floor of the taxi, with Ablaza covering her mouth with his hand to prevent her from crying out for help. She was first brought to the house of Ablaza's compadre in Caloocan, but then, informed that the police were already in their pursuit, she was moved to the house of another compadre, where she was kept for a week. Later, at the instance of Ablaza, Annabelle was taken to Bulacan to ask for the complaint against him be dropped. This did not materialize, because when they were inside the Malolos municipal building Annabelle's uncle, in company of Constabulary men, came and took her. She also testified that for the duration of her detention the accused and his compadres were always guarding her to prevent her escape. The CFI of Rizal, in its decision dated March 7, 1967, found the accused guilty of kidnapping with serious illegal detention, attended by the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle, and was sentenced to death. Hence, this automatic review of the decision of the CFI of Rizal. HELD: a. Yes. Ablaza’s contention that he should be adjudged of abduction with rape rather than kidnapping with serious illegal detention bears no merit. He stood trial for kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and the deprivation of the complainant’s liberty, which is the essential element of the offense was duly proved and other crimes committed in the course of the victim’s

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confinement is immaterial to the case. The kidnapping became consummated when the victim as actually deprived of her freedom which makes it proper to prosecute the accused under Article 267 of the RPC. The surrounding circumstance make it clear that the main purpose of Ablaza in detaining Huggins was to coerce her to withdraw her previous charges against him. The Court also finds no reason not to believe the judgment of the trial judge giving credence to Huggins’ declaration. The records of the case are convincing that the complainant’s testimony on the facts of the kidnapping rang of truth. Not only that her narration was coherent, plausible and unshattered by the defense counsel’s cross examination, but also no motive has been adduced by Huggins, who, since the first incident in 1962, had got married and, therefore, would have wanted least public exposure of her harrowing experiences, would come out and undergo another legal scrutiny of her unfortunate encounters with the accused, other than her desire to tell the truth. b. No. The said contention is untenable. Contrary to the protestation of the accused, the fact of use of motor vehicle which facilitated the taking away of the complainant and her consequent detention was established not only by her declaration in court but also by the accused’s own admission that he took away Huggins from her Aunt’s residence in Makati by taxi cab. Considering the extant evidence on record, the Court fully agree with the decision of the trial court’s decision that the accused Reuben Ablaza committed the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention attended by aggravating circumstance of the use of motor vehicle. The Court thus confirms the death penalty imposed by the lower court. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIMA MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA AND EDUARDO CHUA G.R. NO. 187534 APRIL 4, 2011 ISSUE: Whether or not herein appellants are guilty for violating Article 267 on Serious Illegal Detention. FACTS: Josie Herrera, Robert Uy, Alicia a.k.a. Alice Buenaflor, together with appellants Ronald Norva and Eduardo Chua, concocted a plan to kidnap Rafael Mendoza, and after several days of conducting surveillance on their intended victim, on January 5, 1998, they decided to kidnap Rafael in Ali Mall, Cubao, Quezon City. However, the intended kidnapping failed, because Rafael did not show up at the said place. On February 5, 1998, a second attempt was made, but they encountered an accident before they could even execute their original plan. Around 5:30 a.m. of February 17, 1998, Alicia called up Rosalina Reyes, a partner of Rafael, to tell her that she wanted to meet her and Rafael at Jollibee, BBB, Valenzuela City to settle the former's loan of P350,000.00. She requested

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Rosalina to bring the land title which she was given as collateral for the said loan. Rosalina and Rafael arrived at Jollibee ahead of Alicia. Eventually, around 9:15 a.m. of the same date, Alicia showed up outside the store aboard a car. She was with appellant Ronald Norva. Alicia motioned Rosalina and Rafael to approach the car, which the two did as requested. While inside the vehicle, Alicia introduced appellant Ronald as her cousin. Later on, Alicia informed Rosalina and Rafael that she would pay them at her place. When the car passed by the street where Alicia's house was located, Rosalina asked the former where they were going. Alicia answered that they had to drop by the house of her financier who agreed to redeem her title and substitute as her creditor. Trusting Alicia, Rosalina and Rafael did not protest. They finally reached a house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City. Thereafter, appellant Ronald alighted from the vehicle and talked to a man inside a store, later identified as Jonard Mangelin. The gate of the house was then opened by appellant Dima. The car proceeded to the garage and Rosalina and Rafael were asked to go inside the house. Rosalina followed Alicia, while Rafael trailed Rosalina as they entered through a kitchen door. They passed by a man (Jessie Doe) who was washing his hands in the sink. While Rosalina was walking behind Alicia, she suddenly heard a dull moan coupled with the sound of stomping feet. She looked back at the direction where the sounds came from and saw Rafael being forcibly dragged inside a room. She decided to look for Rafael and on her way, she saw Jessie Doe place his hand on Rafael's mouth and poke a gun at him. Rafael struggled to get free. Rosalina pleaded with Jessie Doe to have pity on Rafael because of his existing heart ailment. Appellant Ronald rushed towards her, poked a gun at her mouth, tied her to a bed and warned her not to make any noise. He told her that all they want is her money, upon which, Rosalina said that if they really wanted money, they should untie Rafael, who then appeared to be on the verge of having a heart attack. Rosalina was untied and she immediately rushed to Rafael and began pumping his chest. She asked Jonard, who had just entered the room, to help her pump Rafael's chest while she applied CPR on the latter. Jonard did as told. While CPR was being administered, appellant Dima started removing all of Rafael's personal belongings, which include his ring, wallet, watch and other items inside his pocket, and passed them on to appellant Ronald. Afterwards, appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to take Rosalina to another room. While inside the room where she was brought, Rosalina begged Jonard to help her escape. Jonard was moved by Rosalina's plea and agreed to help her. During their conversation, Jonard told Rosalina that two women had tipped them off as the kidnap victims. When asked who they were, Jonard refused to reveal their identities. Rosalina was transferred to the master's bedroom around 12:00 noon because certain

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female visitors arrived. After the visitors left, Rosalina was returned to the room where she was previously taken. Rosalina asked Jonard about Rafael's condition, to which he replied that Rafael would be brought to the hospital. A little later, at around 1 p.m., Jonard went to check on Rafael and confirmed that he was still alive. Around 2:00 p.m., Rosalina heard the sound of someone being pummelled. Feeling nervous, she asked Jonard the whereabouts of Rafael and was told that he was brought to the hospital. But unknown to Rosalina, Rafael had just died and his body was placed inside the trunk of a car. Around 6:30 p.m., Rosalina was informed that she will be brought to another safe house. She was taken to a car and placed at the back seat, together with Jonard and three other men, later identified as Larry, Jack and Boy. The driver of the car was appellant Ronald. Appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to cover Rosalina's head with a jacket which Jonard did. As they were about to leave, the man seated beside Ronald started to talk. Rosalina recognized the voice of Robert. She then lifted the jacket covering her head and was able to confirm that the one talking was Robert. Rosalina cried, Robert, Robert, why did you do this, we did not do anything to you and Robert responded, Pasensiyahan na lang tayo. By 10:00 p.m., they arrived at a certain house in Pandi, Bulacan where there was no electricity. Thus, they lit candles for illumination. Rosalina found the house familiar and concluded that it was Alicia's. Rosalina was brought to a room on the second floor and while inside the room, she was told by one of the men guarding her that one of the leaders wanted to talk to her. Per the leader's instruction, the guard put out the candle light. The man then seated himself beside Rosalina and warned her against escaping as they were a large and armed group. Rosalina recognized the voice as that of Robert's. Before he left the room, Robert gave instructions to Jonard and the other men inside. Meanwhile, the group started digging a pit at the back of the same house near the swimming pool. Around 3:00 a.m. of the following day (February 18), the group buried Rafael's body in the pit. Thereafter, Robert instructed appellant Ronald to tell Jonard that the latter should kill Rosalina, which Jonard refused to do. Nonetheless, Robert instructed Jonard and the others to guard Rosalina well, as he himself would deal with her upon his return. Rosalina heard the car leave around 5:00 a.m. of the same day. Sensing that Jonard was sympathetic to her, Rosalina begged him again to help her escape for the sake of her children. When electricity was restored around 8 p.m., one of the men guarding Rosalina turned off the light inside the room. The room was only illuminated by a light coming from the hallway. Rosalina saw a person wearing a wig and sunglasses enter the room. Rosalina recognized him as Robert. Trying to mimic a woman by modulating his voice, Robert told her that Rafael was in the hospital and that he could still sign a check. He asked Rosalina the whereabouts of the other land titles

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST and the identities of the other financiers whom she knew. Rosalina replied in the negative. Robert angrily poked a gun at her and shouted, That's impossible, and then left the room. He gave instructions to his members and left.

his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

At 9:00 p.m., Jonard went to Rosalina and told her about Robert's order to kill her, which caused the latter to panic and cry. She then implored the help of Jonard for her escape. Afterwards, Jonard went to his companions Larry, Jack and Boy and told them that he would help Rosalina escape. His companions immediately cocked their guns and an argument ensued. Rosalina talked to them and begged them all to spare her life. One of Jonard's companions told Rosalina that if they would allow her to escape, they too would get into trouble. Taking advantage of the situation, Rosalina suggested that all of them should escape. They all agreed to escape in the early morning. Around 5:00 a.m., Rosalina, Jonard, Larry, Jack and Boy left the safe house. They walked through a rice field for about 30 minutes and then boarded a jeepney bound for Balagtas, Bulacan. From Balagtas, they took a bus going to Cubao and arrived at 7:30 a.m. Rosalina pawned her pieces of jewelry for P1,500.00 and gave the P1,000.00 to Larry, Jack and Boy. The three told Jonard to stay with Rosalina so that she would have a witness and, in case Rosalina would further need their help, left their address with Jonard.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

When the three left, Rosalina immediately called Rafael's brother Tito, and related what happened to her and his brother. When Tito asked Jonard which hospital Rafael was brought to, Jonard revealed to Rosalina that Rafael died at the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City. Rosalina called her lawyer, Atty. Teresita Agbi and asked her to meet them at Farmer's, Cubao. When Atty. Agbi arrived, she accompanied them to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) where an investigation was conducted. The following day, at 4:00 a.m., two groups from the DILG were formed to arrest Alicia, Josie, the appellants, and Robert. Alicia and Josie were not at their homes, while appellants Ronald and Dima were arrested at the residence of Robert. While at the DILG office, Rosalina positively identified appellants Ronald and Dima as her kidnappers. Meanwhile, Jonard accompanied the police authorities to the safe house in Pandi, Bulacan and showed them where the body of Rafael was buried. The remains of Rafael was later on exhumed. HELD: Yes. First of all, it must be emphasized that the crime committed by the appellants, as ruled by the trial court and affirmed by the CA, is the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide. Republic Act No. 7659, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, now provides: Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of

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1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made. 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer; In People v. Ramos, the court held that Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar, it specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped "on the occasion and in connection" with her detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof. "Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape. It appearing from the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there is a "direct relation, and intimate connection" between the kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy, rape cannot be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a component offense forming part of the herein special complex crime. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS FELIPE MIRANDILLA JR. G.R. NO. 186417 JULY 27, 2011 ISSUE: Whether or not Mirandilla is guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with rape. FACTS: AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making her way back through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders, with a knifes point thrust at her right side. She will come to know

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST the mans name at the police station, after her escape, to be Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. He told her not to move or ask for help. Another man joined and went beside her, while two others stayed at her back, one of whom had a gun. They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd, walked farther as the deafening music faded into soft sounds. After a four-hour walk through the grassy fields, they reached the Mayon International Hotel, where they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon passing the Albay Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone with Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from a companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into the darkness. Minutes later, they reached the Gallera de Legazpi in Rawis. Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside a concrete house. At gunpoint he ordered her to remove her pants.[6] When she defied him, he slapped her and hit her arms with a gun, forced his hands inside her pants, into her panty, and reaching her vagina, slipped his three fingers and rotated them inside. The pain weakened her. He forcibly pulled her pants down and lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis inside.[7] Sayang ka, she heard him whisper at her,[8] as she succumbed to pain and exhaustion. When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried for help, shouting until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue came. At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he ordered her to open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his penis inside her mouth, pulling through her hair with his left hand and slapping her with his right. After satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the roads side, Mirandilla pushed her against a reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth, punched her arm, thigh, and lap, and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her underwear was gone. Then she felt Mirandillas penis inside her vagina. A little while, a companion warned Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away. They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside. Her mouth was again covered with cloth. Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at her point blank, grabbed her shirt, forced her legs open, and again inserted his penis into her vagina. The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she suffered the same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime, moved her back and forth from one place to another on the following nights, first to Bonga, then back to Guinobatan, where she was locked up in a cell-type house and was raped repeatedly on the grassy field right outside her cell, then to Camalig, where they caged her in a small house in the middle of a rice field. She was allegedly raped 27 times. One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing that Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed outside and ran,

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crossed a river, got drenched, and continued running. She rested for awhile, hiding behind a rock; she walked through the fields and stayed out of peoples sight for two nights. Finally, she found a road and followed its path, leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who brought her to the police station. It was 11 January 2001. AAA was in foul smell, starving and sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the police gave her food. When the police presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized the mans face she was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her. HELD: Yes. Mirandilla is guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with rape. Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual intercourse with AAA, which happened almost nightly during their cohabitation. He contended that they were live-in partners, entangled in a whirlwind romance, which intimacy they expressed in countless passionate sex, which headed ironically to separation mainly because of AAAs intentional abortion of their first child to be a betrayal in its gravest form which he found hard to forgive. In stark contrast to Mirandillas tale of a love affair, is AAAs claim of her horrific ordeal and her flight to freedom after 39 days in captivity during which Mirandilla raped her 27 times. The accused bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers. The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape. Love, is not a license for lust. This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; after the prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual. A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation. Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favour or to overthrow one when created against him. AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge of her; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation. She was also able to prove each element of rape by sexual assault

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his penis into her mouth; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation. Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code: Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. xxx Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM AND MARON LAJIM VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 179570 FEBRUARY 4, 2010 ISSUE: Whether or not herein appellants committed acts constituting serious illegal detention as enshrined in Article 267 of the RPC FACTS: On July 1, 1994, around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt Inon Dama were fetching water in a cave in Barangay (Brgy.) Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan. Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards them and carrying a badong (bolo). They tried to run away, but Sajiron overtook them. He held the hair of AAA and told her, Sara, you go with me. If you will not go with me, I will kill you. Inon Dama came to AAA's rescue, but Sajiron tried to hack her. Luckily, she was able to shield herself with a plastic container. AAA was crying while she held her aunt's hand. Sajiron then drew his gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it at Inon Dama and said, If you will not go, I will shoot you. Inon Dama went home and reported the incident to AAA's mother. When Inon Dama left the place, Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA to come with them. When AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the forest. There, AAA was untied and undressed, leaving only her bra on. While Sajiron was undressing AAA, she pleaded with him not to abuse her, but Sajiron told her that if she would submit to his desire, her life would be spared. Sajiron held her breast, touched her private parts and inserted his sex organ inside her vagina. AAA resisted, but to no avail. She felt pain and she noticed blood on her private parts. She was sexually abused three

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times on the ground, where she was made to lie down on a bed of leaves. During the entire time that AAA was being abused by Sajiron, Maron stood guard and watched them. They left the forest at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day and brought AAA to the house of Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard AAA and to shoot her if she would attempt to escape. On July 2, 1994, AAAs mother came to get AAA, but Egap refused and threatened to kill her daughter if she would report the matter to the authorities. Out of fear of losing her daughter, she went home and did not report the incident to the police authorities.[6] Egap asked AAA if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but she refused. AAA was then forced to sign an unknown document, which she was not able to read. Nine days after the abduction, or on July 11, 1994, upon instruction of Egap, AAA and Sajiron were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. The marriage was solemnized against AAA's will and without the presence of her parents. After the marriage, AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap, together with the latter's wife, children and mother-in-law. AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While detained, AAA did not try to escape, because her house was very far from the place where she was held captive, and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt to escape. During her detention, Sajiron abused her twice every night. She was free to roam within the vicinity of the house but she was usually accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her guard. She was also guarded and threatened by Egap's sons. She got pregnant after some time. HELD: Yes. Herein appellants are guilty of violating Article 267 pertaining to serious illegal detention. In the case at bar, the trial court found AAA's testimony credible. The trial court held that AAA's testimony was clear, categorical and consistent. She remained steadfast in her assertions and unfaltering in her testimony given in court on the unfortunate incident. The trial court found that AAA positively identified Sajiron and Maron as her abductors and narrated how she was taken and thrice raped by Sajiron in the forest. Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats does not affect the credibility of the complainant, nor can it be taken against her. The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. BBB explained that she did not immediately report the abduction, rape and detention of her daughter to the authorities, because Egap threatened to kill AAA, who was then in his custody. Further, BBB testified that, on another occasion, Egap threatened to kill her if she dared to report the matter to the authorities. True enough, when Egap learned that she did what he forbade her to do, he made good his threat and shot her at the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST back.Thus, BBB's delay in reporting the incident for five months should not be taken against her. It is highly improbable that a young girl, such as AAA, would concoct a horrid story and impute to the accused a crime so grave and subject herself and her family to the humiliation and invasive ordeal of a public trial just to avenge the alleged non-payment of the dowry, unless she be impelled by a genuine desire to expose the truth, vindicate her honor and seek justice she so greatly deserves. Neither is the Court convinced of the sweetheart theory, the defense of the accused, by alleging that AAA and Sajiron were engaged for three years prior to their elopement and marriage. If there were indeed romantic relationship between AAA and Sajiron, as the latter claims, her normal reaction would have been to cover up for the man she supposedly loved. On the contrary, AAA lost no time in reporting the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation, right after she was rescued by the authorities. The accusatory portion of the information alleges that AAA was taken and carried away by Sajiron and Maron against her will and brought to the forest; and, on the occasion thereof, Sajiron -- by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation -- had carnal knowledge of AAA. The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a)the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b)it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c)any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d)the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are private individuals, forcibly took and dragged AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her captive against her will. The crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.

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In the present case, although AAA was not actually confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her to the forest away from her home. March 15, 2018 – Article 268 – SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION ALAMEDA Jr., Manuel F. PEOPLE VS SALIENTE, ET AL. G.R. NO. L-2427 JUNE 28, 1949 FACTS: at about 9 o'clock in the evening , the defendants came to the house of Telesfora Alentejo where Telesfora's niece, Juana Briones, was then staying. Telling Juana that they had come for by her by order of their "chief," they asked her to go along with them and when she refused she was threatened by defendant Montilla with a bolo and by defendant Saliente with a pistol and then taken against her will to the latter's house in the barrio of Tambis, about two kilometers away. It would appear that the defendants were accompanied by some soldiers, although these were neither named nor identified. Once in Saliente's house, defendants let Juana know that what they had told her in private so that he could persuade her into marrying him. Juana retorted that she did not want to marry anybody. Juana was kept in Saliente's house for two nights and one day. On the third day, Juana was able to persuade the defendants to take her to the house of her brother, Brigido Enclona, so that they could talk the matter over with him. There they were joined by Montilla's father who, in behalf of his son, asked for Juana's hand in marriage. As Juana turned a deaf ear to the proposal, the trio took their departure, leaving her in the house of her brother.c In the evening of that same day, however, the defendants came back and, complaining that Juana had fooled them, they forcibly took her downstairs. Montilla then led her away, while Saliente stayed behind to wait for Enclona, who, was then absent. Meeting Enclona on the road, Juana warned him that Saliente was lying in wait for him with the intention of doing him harm. On hearing this, Enclona ran away, while Montilla, on his part, left Juana to herself and went back to rejoin Saliente. The defendants Montilla admitted having taken Juana from the house of her aunt, but put up the defense that this was done with her consent, since they had long been sweethearts and had, on the day in question, exchanged notes regarding their elopement. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of slight illegal detention is tenable in the case at bar. HELD: Yes. The crime committed is that of slight illegal detention under the third paragraph of article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18, approved on September 25, 1946, it appearing that the defendants voluntarily released Juana Briones within three days from the commencement of her detention without having attained the purpose intended

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST and before the institution of the criminal action against them. The penalty prescribed is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding P700. As the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and dwelling, not compensated by any mitigating circumstances, the said penalty should be imposed in its maximum period.

Thus, the last paragraph of article 268 applies to slight illegal detention only not to Article 267. Articles 267 and 268 are independent of each other.

LUIS ASISTIO v. LOURDES P. SAN Diego GR No. L-21991 Mar 31, 1964

G.R. NO. 138859-60 FEBRUARY 22, 2001 ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: That on or about the 26th day of December, 1962, Luisito Asistio et, al., being private individuals with the exception of the accused VICTORINO ARANDA and LORENZO MENESES who are public officers, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping and aiding one another, with threats to kill the person of CHUA PAO alias "SO NA", and for the purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) from the said CHUA PAO alias "SO NA" or from his wife did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, detain and deprive the person of the said CHUA PAO alias "SO NA" of his liberty, to his damage and prejudice.Petitioners applied for bail on the ground that the record of the ex parte investigation conducted by the fiscal showed, from the testimony of the offended party himself, Chua Pao alias So Na, that the latter was (a) voluntarily released by his captors (b) within 24 hours from seizure and (c) without any ransom being, in fact, paid. But the respondent judge denied the application for bail. ISSUE: whether or not the last paragraph of Article 268 applies not only to slight illegal detention but also to kidnapping and serious illegal detention penalized by Article 267. HELD: That kidnapping under Article 267 depended solely on the circumstances in which the kidnapping took place, irrespective of the end sought by the kidnapper; That the third paragraph of Article 268 already existed in the original version, and plainly was not intended to apply to crimes under Article 267; Article 268 then described two variants of dig illegal detention; (a) Slight detention where none of the circumstances specified in Article 267 was present (Article 268, par. 142), penalized by prision mayor; (b) Slight detention where, in addition to the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267, there were, besides three other circumstances, the voluntary release of the kidnappee within 3 days from seizure, plus the fact that the purpose intended (whatever it should be, ransom, marriage, disclosure of secrets, etc.) was not attained, plus the third fact that the release was effected before the institution of criminal proceedings against the culprit or culprits. Clearly, therefore, Articles 267 and 268 were originally mutually exclusive.

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March 16, 2018 – Article 269 – UNLAWFUL ARREST ALILIAN, Enna B.

FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the cases against him - violation of RA 3019, and unlawful arrest of the RPC, grounded on the lack of preliminary investigation. Ombudsman denied the motion. ISSUE: WoN preliminary injunction was required in cases of unlawful arrests HELD: No. A preliminary investigation was not required because unlawful arrest under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code was punishable by arresto mayor - imprisonment of one month and one day to six months. The Rules of Court requires only such investigation before an information for an offense punishable by at least four years, two months and one day may be filed in court. G.R. No. L-44335 July 30, 1936 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. KAGUI MALASUGUI FACTS: The accused was charged with the crime of robbery and homicide after the victim, while still sprawled on the ground with blood all around, dying, said the name of the accused as the one who attacked him, thus prompting the officials to immediately search the accused. With the accused was found the victim’s identification card and pocketbook containing P92 in bills. The accused was thereafter arrested. ISSUE: WoN the arresting officer violated Art 269 RPC unlawful arrest HELD: No. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. The appellant was then charged with the crime, imputed to him by Tan Why before the latter's death, of having assaulted the "deceased; that he was then also known to be carrying much money; and that a few moments before he was brought to Lieutenant Jacaria, and shortly after the assault on Tan Why, he was able to redeem two pairs of bracelets from two persons to whom he had pledge them several months before. These are circumstances which undoubtedly warranted his arrest without a previous judicial warrant. This is so because under the law, members of Insular Police or Constabulary as well as those of the municipal police and of

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST chartered cities like Manila and Baguio, and even of townships (secs. 848, 2463, 2564, 2165 and 2383 of the Revised Administrative Code) may make arrests without judicial warrant, not only when a crime is committed or about to be committed in their presence but also when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to suspect that one has been committed and that it was committed by the person arrested by them. An arrest made under said circumstances is not unlawful but perfectly justified; and the agent of authority who makes the arrest does not violate the provisions of article 269 of the Revised Penal Code which defines and punishes unlawful arrest. March 16, 2018 – Article 270 – KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR ARANCES, Javy Ann PEOPLE VS AIDA MARQUEZ GR NO. 181440, APRIL 13, 2011 PONENTE: JUSTICE LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ISSUE: Whether or not defendant Aida Marquez should be charged of Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. FACTS: According to the complainant, Carolina Cunanan Merano (Merano), she met Marquez at the beauty parlor where she was working as a beautician, whom she easily trusted because Marquez was close to her employers and was nice to her and her co-employees. On September 6, 1998, after a trip to a beach in Laguna, Marquez allegedly borrowed Meranos then three-month old daughter Justine Bernadette C. Merano (Justine) to buy her some clothes, milk and food. Merano said she agreed because it was not unusual for Marquez to bring Justine some things whenever she came to the parlor. When Marquez failed to return Justine in the afternoon as promised, Merano went to her employer’s house to ask them for Marquez’s address. However, Merano said that her employers just assured her that Justine will be returned to her soon. But a few months have passed and Merano discovered through Modesto Castillos that Marquez sold Justine to him and his wife and that they gave Marquez Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) supposedly for Merano who was asking for money. Castillo even gave Merano a photocopy of the handwritten Kasunduan dated May 17, 1998, wherein Merano purportedly gave Justine to the Castillo spouses. HELD: A reading of the charge in the information shows that the act imputed to Marquez was not the illegal detention of a person, but involves her deliberate failure to restore a minor baby girl to her parent after being entrusted with said baby’s custody. Contrary to Marquez’s assertions, therefore, she was charged with violation of Article 270, and not Article 267, of the Revised Penal Code. The Revised Penal Code considers it a crime when a person who has been entrusted with the custody of a minor later on deliberately

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fails to return said minor to his parent or guardian. This may be found in Article 270, which reads: Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor person, shall deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. This crime has two essential elements: 1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and 2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. This Court, in elucidating on the elements of Article 270, stated that while one of the essential elements of this crime is that the offender was entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to his parents or guardians. As the penalty for such an offense is so severe, the Court further explained what deliberate as used in Article 270 means: “Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.” (Emphasis ours.) PEOPLE VS GENEROSO JO, ET AL. GR NO. L-69236, AUGUST 19, 1986 PONENTE: JUSTICE MELENCIO-HERRERA ISSUE: Whether the court erred in charging Roca, one of the defendants, with Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code but convicted him of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 (4) [supra] of the same Code. FACTS: Complainant Elisa Casal Jo was married to accused Generoso Jo on July 27, 1969. They begot three children, namely, Eligen, Allan and Riza, whose ages at the time of the subject incident were 9 years old, 7 years old and 6 years old, respectively. Sometime in December 1975, the couple separated. On July 27, 1980, Elisa met Felipe Lapitan, a witch-doctor. Lapitan told Elisa that Generoso had hired him to kill her, that he had already set in motion the evil spirit which would put an end to her life in a few days; and that the effect of the evil spirit would be averted if she would submit herself for treatment. Helpless and not knowing what to do, Elisa believed the witchdoctor and consented to submit for treatment. Lapitan conducted an 'oracion' or strange prayer on her and then let her drink a glass of water concoction. Accused Felipe Lapitan and Virgilio Roca took her three children on a jeep to the Tacloban Wharf. Lapitan made them board a motorboat with him while Virgilio Roca sent them off. The boat left for Samar before noon.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST On August 9, 1980, Capt. Angelo Marcos, Station Commander of the La Paz Police Station filed a criminal complaint for kidnapping of minors against Felipe Lapitan, Virgilio Roca and Ceferino Lopez. HELD: The offense as charged, which is Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, is necessarily included in the offense proved, which is Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention of a minor under Article 267 (4) of the same code, inasmuch as the essential ingredients of the offense charged constitute or form a part of those constituting the offense proved. Thus, deliberate failure to restore a minor under one's custody and kidnapping of a minor who is not in custody both constitute deprivation of liberty. Consequently, ROCA can be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged. Besides, there is authority to the effect that paragraph 1 of Article 270 might have been superseded by Article 267, as amended, which punishes as serious illegal detention the kidnapping of a minor, regardless of the purpose of the detention. PEOPLE VS BERNARDO GR NO. 144316, MARCH 11, 2002 PONENTE: JUSTICE MELO ISSUE: Whether defendant Bernardo should be charged of Article 270 - Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. FACTS: On May 13, 1999, 12-year old Maria Roselle Tolibas y Aguada and her 15-day old sister, Rosalyn Tolibas, were with their mother, Rosita Tolibas y Aguada, at the Fabella Memorial Hospital for medical check up. While Rosita was undergoing medical checkup inside the hospital, her two daughters waited at the lobby. Roselle was seating on a bench with her 15-day old sister on her lap when the appellant sat beside her. Appellant befriended Roselle. After a while, the appellant gave P3.00 to Roselle and asked her to buy ice water. The appellant took the 15-day old baby from Roselle and assured her that she (accused) would take care of her (Roselles) sister, while she was buying ice water. Roselle was not able to find ice water for sale and on her way back to the hospital, she saw the accused running away with her baby sister. She chased the appellant and when she caught up with her, the appellant told her that she was running after her (Roselle’s) mother. Roselle did not believe the appellant and she held and pulled the appellants skirt to prevent her from getting away with her (Roselles) baby sister, but the appellant persisted in running with Roselle holding on to the appellants skirt. Roselle shouted for help, thereby attracting the attention of Emerento Torres, a Barangay Kagawad. Appellant contends that there was no deliberate failure on her part to restore the minor Rosalyn Tolibas to her parents or guardians, stating that the charge filed against her was a mere overreaction on the part of the prosecution witnesses to her act of going out of the hospital to look for the mother of the child.

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HELD: Yes. The essential element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. When Roselle entrusted Roselyn to appellant before setting out on an errand for appellant to look for ice water, the first element was accomplished and when appellant refused to return the baby to Roselle despite her continuous pleas, the crime was effectively accomplished. In fine, we agree with the trial courts finding that appellant is guilty of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor. March 17, 2018 – Article 272 – SLAVERY BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A. US VS. CABANAG G.R. NO. 3241 MARCH 16, 1907 TRACEY, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not Cabanag committed slavery. FACTS: An Igorot orphan girl called Gamaya, 13 years of age was taken from the possession of her grandmother by one Buyag, also an Igorot; whether this was done with or against the will of the grandmother is not altogether clear in the evidence. It was testified by a witness that Buyag came to the house and took her away, although the grandmother objected, saying "Do not take off that little girl," but not speaking when she went away. The man brought her to his house, about a half mile distant, where she was not confined, but on the contrary was allowed to go back alone to her grandmother, with whom she would spend a little while, returning the same day. She testified that on last evening, the grandmother was angry and did not wish her to go, but did not prevent her. According to her recollection she remained with Buyag, in the vicinity of her grandmother's residence, some two or three months. Buyag testified that more than two years before, in order to help the family after the father's death and for the purpose of keeping the child at home, he had bought her for three pigs, twenty-five hens, two measures of rice, and a cloak worth two pigs, from her mother, with whom she remained until the third year, when (her mother presumably having died) she was brought away by one Eusebio, at the instance of himself and another Igorot named YogYog, who had furnished part of the purchase price. Together they instructed Eusebio to sell her for a carabao and 50 pesos. Eusebio, in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and sold her to the accused, Tomas Cabanag, for 100 pesos. Cabanag had previously been instructed to buy a girl by one Mariano Lopez to whom after a few

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST days Gamaya was delivered in return for the price, which appears to have been 200 pesos. In his hands she remained for about two months until she was taken away by an officer of Constabulary. Afterwards this prosecution was instituted. Although Gamaya made objection to leaving the house of Cabanag she appears to have gone without actual constraint and at no time in any of these places was she physically restrained of her liberty; she was not under lock or key or guard, went into the street to play, returned at will, and was not punished or ill used in any way, but was employed about the household tasks; in short, she appears to have been treated by Mariano Lopez as a household servant and to have been well earned for while in the custody of the accused. It is proved in the case that it is an Igorot custom to dispose of children to pay the debts of their fathers, the transaction in the native language being termed a sale, and the defendant appears to have engaged in the business of buying in Nueva Vizcaya children to sell in the lowlands of Isabela. RULING: No. The judge below quotes the Bill of Rights of the Philippines contained in the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, declaring that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in said Islands." This constitutional provision is selfacting whenever the nature of a case permits and any law or contract providing for servitude of a person against his will is forbidden and is void. For two obvious reasons, however, it fails to reach the facts before us: First. The employment or custody of a minor with the consent or sufferance of the parents or guardian, although against the child's own will, cannot be considered involuntary servitude. Second. We are dealing not with a civil remedy but with a criminal charge, in relation to which the Bill of Rights defines no crime and provides no punishment. Its effects cannot be carried into the realm of criminal law without an act of the legislature. To sum up this case, there is no proof of slaver or even of involuntary servitude, inasmuch as it has not been clearly shown that the child has been disposed of against the will of her grandmother or has been taken altogether out of her control. If the facts in this respect be interpreted otherwise, there is no law applicable here, either of the United States or of the Archipelago, punishing slavery as a crime. The child was not physically confined or restrained so as to sustain a conviction for illegal detention, nor are the acts of the accused brought within any of the provisions of the law for the punishment of offenses against minors; consequently the conviction in this case must be reversed, in accordance with the recommendation of the Attorney-General, with costs de oficio, and the prisoner is acquitted. REYES VS. ALOJADO G.R. NO. L-5671 AUGUST 24, 1910 TORRES, J.:

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ISSUE: Whether or not slavery was committed by Reyes. FACTS: On or about January 22, 1905, Veronica Alojado received, as a loan, from Benito de los Reyes that the sum P67 .60, for the purpose of paying a debt she owed to Olimpia Zaballa. It was agreed between Alojado and Reyes that the debtor should remain as a servant in the house and in the service of her creditor, without any renumeration whatever, until she should find some one who would furnish her with the said sum where with to repeat the loan. The defendant, Veronica Alojado, afterwards left the house of the plaintiff, on March 12, 1906, without having paid him her debt, nor did she do so at any subsequent date, notwithstanding his demands. The plaintiff, therefore, on the 15th of march, 1906, filed suit in the court of the justice of the peace of Santa Rosa, La Laguna, against Veronica Alojado to recover the said sum or, in a contrary case, to compel her to return to his service. The trial having been had, the justice of the peace, on April 14, 1906, rendered judgment whereby he sentenced the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum claimed and declared that, in case the debtor should be insolvent, she should be obliged to fulfill the agreement between her and the plaintiff. The costs of the trial were assessed against the defendant. The defendant appealed from the said judgment. The defendant, in her written answer of August 15, 1906, to the aforesaid complaint, denied the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint and alleged that, although she had left the plaintiff's service, it was because the latter had paid her no sum whatever for the services she had rendered in his house. The defendant likewise denied the conditions expressed in paragraph 4 of the complaint, averring that the effects purchased, to the amount of P11.97, were in the possession of the plaintiff, who refused to deliver them to her. She therefore asked that she be absolved from the complaint and that the plaintiff be absolved from the complaint the wages due her for the services she had rendered. RULING: YES. The duty to pay the said sum, as well as that of P11.97 delivered to the defendant in small amounts during the time that she was in the plaintiff's house, is unquestionable, inasmuch as it is a positive debt demandable of the defendant by her creditor. (Arts. 1754, 1170, Civil Code.) However, the reason alleged by the plaintiff as a basis for the loan is untenable, to wit, that the defendant was obliged to render service in his house as a servant without remuneration whatever and to remain therein so long as she had not paid her debt, inasmuch as this condition is contrary to law and morality. (Art. 1255, Civil Code.) Domestic services are always to be remunerated, and no agreement may subsist in law in which it is stipulated that any domestic service shall be absolutely gratuitous, unless it be admitted that slavery may be established in this country

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST through a covenant entered into between the interested parties.

arraigned for violation of Article 365. He entered a plea of not guilty.

When legal regulations prohibit even a usurious contract and all abuses prejudicial to subordinates and servant, in connection with their salaries and wages, it will be understood at once that the compact whereby service rendered by a domestic servant in the house of any inhabitant of this country is to be gratuitous, is in all respects reprehensible and censurable; and consequently, the contention of the plaintiff, that until the defendant shall have paid him her debt she must serve him in his house gratuitously is absolutely inadmissible.

He filed a petition for review in the CA but which was denied. He raised before the SC that that he cannot be penalized twice for an “accident” and another for “recklessness.” He maintained that since he is facing a criminal charge for reckless imprudence, which offense carries heavier penalties under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be charged under Article 275, par. 2, for abandonment for failing to render to the persons whom he has accidentally injured.

March 17, 2018 – Article 273 – EXPLOITATION OF CHILD LABOR CEBALLOS, Jesus C. [NO CASE FOUND] March 18, 2018 – Article 274 – SERVICES RENDERED UNDER COMPULSION IN PAYMENT OF DEBT DAHIROC, Janice L. [NO CASE FOUND] March 18, 2018 – Article 275 – ABANDONMENT OF PERSONS IN DANGER AND ABANDONMENT OF ONE'S OWN VICTIM DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J G.R. NO. 93475 JUNE 5, 1991 ANTONIO A. LAMERA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. ISSUE: Whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code. FACTS: At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal. The petitioner abandoned them and failed to help or render assistance to them, without justifiable reason. As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article 365 and; b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim. On June 1987 the MTC of Pasig rendered its decision in finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the RTC of Pasig. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was

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HELD: No, because said Articles penalize different and distinct offenses. The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple act may be an offense against two different provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Since the informations were for separate offenses — the first against a person and the second against public peace and order — one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy. The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore, apply pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. March 18, 2018 – Article 276 – ABANDONING A MINOR DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G. PEOPLE VS. BANDIAN G.R. NO. 45186, SEPTEMBER 30, 1936 FACTS: One morning, Josefina Bandian went to a thicket to respond to the call of nature. After a while, Bandian went out of the thicket with her clothes stained with blood. She showed signs of not being able to support herself. She was seen by her neighbor Valentin Aguilar who asked the help of Adriano Comcom to bring her to her house. When Comcom rushed to aid Bandian, he saw a newborn baby near a path adjoining the thicket where Bandian was seen moments before. When asked if the baby was hers, she responded in the affirmative. Dr. Emilio Nepomoceno testified that Bandian gave birth in her house and thereafter threw the baby to kill it. The Solicitor-General maintains that Bandian may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under Article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned. The trial court gave credit to the opinion of Dr. Nepomoceno. ISSUE: Was the crime infanticide or abandonment of minor? HELD: No crime was committed since the fourth and seventh exempting circumstance are present in this case. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST the wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by the hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable. In this case, she had no cause to kill or abandon it, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident. Kirol testified at the trial that he knew that Bandian was pregnant, he believed from the beginning that the child carried by Bandian in her womb was his, and that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. Therefore, Bandian had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol. March 18, 2018 – Article 277 – ABANDONMENT OF MINOR BY PERSON ENTRUSTED WITH HIS CUSTODY; INDIFFERENCE OF PARENTS DIZON, Roxan Danica G. DE GUZMAN VS PEREZ G.R. NO. 156013 JULY 25, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner Roberto De Guzman and private respondent Shirley Aberde became sweethearts while studying law in the University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when Shirley became pregnant. She gave birth to Robby Aberde de Guzman. Shirley and Roberto never got married. In 1991, Roberto married another woman with whom he begot two children. Roberto sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice — the first in 1992 and the second in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, Roberto gave Shirley P7,000. Other than these instances, Roberto never provided any other financial support for his son. Shirley worked in Taiwan for two years. However, she reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide for her and Robby’s needs. The child’s continued education thus became uncertain. Despite his fabulous wealth, however, Roberto failed to provide support to Robby. On June 15, 2000, Shirley filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and neglect of child under Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603 . ISSUE: Whether or not Roberto alone may be charged for abandonment and neglect of child under Article 59 (2) and (4) of PD 603 HELD: Yes. Article 59(4) of PD 603 provides that:

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Art. 59 .Crimes. – Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who: (4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the family’s station in life and financial conditions permit. The crime has the following elements: (1) the offender is a parent; (2) he or she neglects his or her own child; (3) the neglect consists in not giving education to the child and (4 the offender’s station in life and financial condition permit him to give an appropriate education to the child. There is a prima facie showing from the evidence that Roberto is in fact financially capable of supporting Robby’s education. The notarized GIS of the RNCD Development Corporation indicates that petitioner owns P750,000 worth of paid-up shares in the company. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the family’s station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent’s faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties. The "neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as "indifference of parents") penalized under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code. March 19, 2018 – Article 278 – EXPLOITATION OF MINORS/ REPUBLIC ACT 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P. G.R. No. 203114, June 28, 2017 VIRGILIO LABANDRIA AWAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: AAA, a Grade III pupil declared that [petitioner] is the boyfriend of her sister. Sometime in January 2010, [petitioner] was in their house in Valenzuela City. [Petitioner] called her and brought her inside the room. [Petitioner] touched her vagina. [Petitioner] made her lie down beside him and again touched her vagina. Thereafter, [petitioner] put on his shoes and warned her not to tell her mother and father about the incident. AAA was wearing leggings and panty at the time of the incident. Petitioner never removed anything from her when he touched her. At the time of the incident, they were the only person (sic) inside the room. Her father and other siblings were then asleep in another room while his brother was downstairs. AAA's brother came to know about the incident when he saw her crying in a corner of their house. Her brother told her mother about the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST incident. Her mother called a police and petitioner was later apprehended. Her mother gave her statements at the police station. On January 25, 2010, Ortiz, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, received a request for Physical/Genital Examination on the person of AAA. His examination states: "anogenital examination reveals essentially normal gross findings." He observed that AAA's hymen was annular, thin with central orifice and no abnormality noted. There was no evidence of any sexual abuse because of his findings that AAA's genital organ is normal. As mentioned, the RTC found the petitioner guilty of acts of lasciviousness as defined in Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized pursuant to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. ISSUE: Whether or not the acts committed by the accused are considered as an lascivious acts which is penalized under section 5, Republic Act 7610. RULING: YES. The acts committed by the petitioner against AAA constituted acts of lasciviousness. The elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code are, to wit: (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) the act is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) the offended party is another person of either sex. Such acts are punished as sexual abuse under Republic Act No. No. 7 610, whose elements under Section 5 of the law are namely: (1) the accused commits the acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with· a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. No. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as: The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. G.R. NO. 198732 , JUNE 10, 2013 CHRISTIAN CABALLO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old, in her uncle’s place in Surigao City. Her uncle was a choreographer and Caballo was

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one of his dancers. During that time, AAA was a sophomore college student at the University of San Carlos and resided at a boarding house in Cebu City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went to Cebu City to attend the Sinulog Festival and there, visited AAA. After spending time together, they eventually became sweethearts. Sometime during the third week of March 1998, AAA went home to Surigao City and stayed with her uncle. In the last week of March of the same year, Caballo persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. This was followed by several more of the same in April 1998, in the first and second weeks of May 1998, on August 31, 1998 and in November 1998, all of which happened in Surigao City, except the one in August which occurred in Cebu. In June 1998, AAA became pregnant and later gave birth on March 8, 1999. During the trial, the prosecution asserted that Caballo was only able to induce AAA to lose her virginity due to promises of marriage and his assurance that he would not get her pregnant due to the use of the "withdrawal method." Moreover, it claimed that Caballo was shocked upon hearing the news of AAA’s pregnancy and consequently, advised her to have an abortion. She heeded Caballo’s advice; however, her efforts were unsuccessful. Further, the prosecution averred that when AAA’s mother confronted Caballo to find out what his plans were for AAA, he assured her that he would marry her daughter. Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during their first sexual intercourse, AAA was no longer a virgin as he found it easy to penetrate her and that there was no bleeding. He also maintained that AAA had (3) three boyfriends prior to him. Further, he posited that he and AAA were sweethearts who lived-in together, for one (1) week in a certain Litang Hotel and another week in the residence of AAA’s uncle. Eventually, they broke up due to the intervention of AAA’s parents. At a certain time, AAA’s mother even told Caballo that he was not deserving of AAA because he was poor. Lastly, he alleged that he repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but was always rejected because she was still studying. In a Decision dated April 1, 2003, the RTC found Caballo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, in relation to Section 2 of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases. On January 28, 2011, the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification the RTC’s ruling, finding Caballo guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. Caballo filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on September 26, 2011. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. RULING: Yes. As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any lascivious conduct due

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST to the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial as they are to their development.

can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.

In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s free will. Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as: The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another’s objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it." In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo’s actuations may be classified as "coercion" and "influence" within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610: First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is undisputed that AAA was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime and is hence, considered a child under the law. In this respect, AAA was not capable of fully understanding or knowing the import of her actions and in consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults, as in this case. Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA and Caballo were sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely instructive on this point:

The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. Second, coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s seniority. Records indicate that Caballo was 23 years old at the time of the commission of the offense and therefore, 6 years older than AAA, more or less. The age disparity between an adult and a minor placed Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to enable him to force his will upon the latter. Third, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and influence.1âwphi1 Records reveal that Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that she would not get pregnant since he would be using the "withdrawal method" for safety. Irrefragably, these were meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with him, with which he succeeded. Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first sexual encounter, it is observed that the brash and unexpected manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room and pressed on her to have sex with him, effectively placed her in, to a certain extent, a position of duress .. An important factor is that AAA refused Caballo's incipient advances and in fact, asked him to leave. However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she was put in a situation deprived of the benefit of clear thought and choice. In any case, the Court observes that any other choice would, nonetheless, remain tarnished due to AAA's minority as abovediscussed.

For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person. The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish "those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse." Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed. A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she

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Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute "coercion" and "influence" within the context of the law, and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the same, she is deemed as a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse"; as such, the second element of the subject offense exists. In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court hereby sustains Caballo's conviction for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST G.R. NO. 173988, OCTOBER 8, 2014 FELINA ROSALDES VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried. After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan, accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying and told his mother about the incident. His mother and his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryan’s aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police Station. The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador reads, in part: 1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.; 2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3L4; 3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.; 4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head. The petitioner was criminally charged with child abuse in the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City (RTC), and the case was assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The information alleged as follows: The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and Directive of the Deputy OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses FELINA ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD ABUSE LAW (Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a public school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan Elementary School, with a Salary Grade below 26, under the DECS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a seven year old child, by pinching him on different parts of his body, and thereafter slumping him

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to the ground, thereby causing Michael Ryan Gonzales to lose his consciousness and has suffered injuries on different parts of his body. CONTRARY TO LAW. On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child abuse. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner through its assailed decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, with a modification of the penalty. ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,] and not under the Revised Penal Code. RULING: YES. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly: (b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death. In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deedsor by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor." On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again. Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being. It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her first or only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross examination that she had also experienced the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST petitioner’s cruelty.The petitioner was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of another child named Dariel Legayada. Such previous incidents manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity for violence," as the trial judge stated in her decision of June 26, 2003. Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was insufficient in form and substance, in that the essential elements of the crime charged were not properly alleged therein; and that her constitutional and statutory right to due process of law was consequently violated. The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, viz: Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. – (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Atiicle 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. “The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the offense was aggravated by the petitioner being a public schoolteacher. It cited Section 3 l(e) of Republic Act No. 7610, which commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer or employee." Her being a public schoolteacher was alleged in the information and established by evidence as well as admitted by her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however, because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the crime committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum period, whose three periods are six years and one day to six years and eight months, for the minimum period; six years, eight months and one day to seven years and four months, for the medium period; and seven years, four months and one day to eight years, for the maximum period. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence should come from the maximum period, therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence should come from prision correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its minimum period, whose range is from four years, two months and one day to six years.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is four years, nine months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor.” G.R. NO. 193854 ; 24 SEPTEMBER 2012 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DINA DULAY

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FACTS: On 3 July 2005, AAA was introduced to the accused during the wake of a relative of AAA. Thereafter, the accused convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Paranaque City. However, before they went to the wake, they went to look for the boyfriend of the accused. They went to Bulungan Fish Port were they found the boyfriend of the accused. They proceeded to the kubuhan, located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. Upon arrival, the accused suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known only as “Speed” was waiting. AAA saw “Speed” give the accused some money, then the latter left. “Speed” wielded a knife and tied AAA’s hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant’s help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape, “Speed” and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her. AAA, accompanied by her sister and mother filed a complaint for Rape. The RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation for the crime of Rape. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be held liable as a co-principal for the crime of Rape HELD: No, in order to be considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. The Supreme Court held that the accused did not participate in the criminal resolution of the crime of Rape but merely delivered AAA to “Speed”. However, the accused is still liable for violation of Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610 or a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute. MALTO V. PEOPLE GR 16473 , SEPTEMBER 21, 2007 FACTS: Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto seduced his student, AAA, a minor, to indulge in sexual intercourse several times with him. Prior to the incident, petitioner and AAA had a “mutual understanding” and became sweethearts. Pressured and afraid of the petitioner’s threat to end their relationship, AAA succumbed and both had sexual intercourse. Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, AAA’s mother lodged a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. Assistant City Prosecutor charged the petitioner in an Information a violation of Section 5(a), Article III, RA 7610. During the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge. The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section 5(a), par. 3 of RA 7610, as amended and sentenced him to reclusion temporal. In a decision, the appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his acts were not covered by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; and thereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty prision mayor. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining petitioner’s conviction on the grounds that there was no rape committed since their sexual intercourse was consensual by reason of their “sweetheart” relationship RULING: NEGATIVE. Petitioner is wrong. Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended. The first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts committed by the accused. The second element refers to the state or condition of the offended party. The third element corresponds to the minority or age of the offended party. Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of petitioner was proper. Consent of the child is immaterial in criminal cases involving violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of RA 7610. Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and consented to have sexual intercourse with him. They engaged in these acts out of mutual love and affection. The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or without the consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual relations. For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person. A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection. The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should

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not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. To provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination. As well as to intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation, and discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same. The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principles of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life. March 19, 2018 – Article 279 – ADDITIONAL PENALTIES FOR OTHER OFFENSES DUQUE, Francis Lester M. G.R. NO. 179090 JUNE 5, 2009 LEONILO SANCHEZ ALIAS NILO VS. PEOPLE FACTS: Private complainant is VVV, a minor. FFF, VVV's father, was leasing a portion of the fishpond owned by Escolastico. Appellant, one of the heirs of escolastico went to FFF’s house to inquire about the whereabouts of the latter’s, MMM, FFF's wife told appellant that FFF was not around. Right then and there, appellant told them to leave the place and started destroying the house. MMM got angry and told appellant that he could not just drive them away since the contract for the use of the fishpond was not yet terminated. VVV left to fetch a barangay tanod but failed to do so. On her way back to their house, she saw appellant with a gallon of gasoline, headed to their house. Appellant warned VVV then to better pack up her family’s things because he would burn their house. Upon reaching their house, VVV saw her brother, BBB, get a piece of wood to defend themselves and their house from appellant. However, appellant approached BBB, grabbed the piece of wood and started beating him with it. At the sight, VVV approached appellant and pushed him. Irked by what she did, appellant turned to her and struck her with the piece of wood three (3) times. As a result, the wood broke into several

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST pieces. MMM restrained BBB, telling him not to fight back. After which, appellant left, bringing with him the gallon of gasoline. The RTC finds the accused guilty of R.A. 7610. ISSUE: WON appellant can be charged with additional penalties for other offenses violated which is PD 603. HELD: Yes. Here, the applicable laws are Par 09, Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 (Inflicts cruel and unusual punishment upon the child or deliberately subjects him to indignation and other excessive chastisement that embarrass or humiliate him) and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 which provides: SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. — (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603... In the case of Araneta v. People, SC held that the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts. Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" in Section 10 of R.a 7610 is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. March 19, 2018 – Article 280 – QUALIFIED TRESPASS TO DWELLING FLORENTINO, Kimberly A. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS AURELIO LAMAHANG G.R. NO. L-43530 AUGUST 3, 1935 ISSUE: What was the crime committed by the accused? FACTS: At early dawn of March 2, 1935,a policeman was patrolling along the streets of the city of Iloilo caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods. At the time the owner of the store was sleeping inside. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody. HELD: The court was of the opinion and held that under consideration the crime committed was attempted trespass to dwelling. Under Article

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280 of the Revised Penal Code, this offense is committed when a private person shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's will. The accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall of the said store by breaking a board and unfastening another for the purpose of entering the store and the accused did not succeed due to the presence of the policeman. Under the circumstances of this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is presumed. SALVADOR MARZALADO VS PEOPLE G.R. NO. 152997, NOVEMBER 10,2004 ISSUE: Whether the accused violated article 280 of the Revised Penal Code? FACTS: Accused was charged with violation of article 280 of the Revised Penal Code when he forcibly entered the leased unit of Cristina Albano. Accused claimed that when he was on his way home he saw water in a continuous stream flowing out of Albano's unit. He searched for Albano but he did not find her so he asked for the assistance of the Barangay Tanods and went inside the unit and found an open faucet, with water flooding on the floor. HELD: No. The Court ruled that as certified by Barangay Lupon secretary, the unit rented by Albano was forcibly opened by the owner because of the strong water pressure coming out of the faucet. Since Albano and her children already left, nobody was left to attend the unit. Clearly accused acted for the justified purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to his mother's property. No criminal intent could be clearly imputed to accused for the remedial action he had taken. There was an exigency that had to be addressed to avoid damage to the leased unit. March 20, 2018 – Article 281 – OTHER FORMS OF TRESPASS. FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z. [NO CASES FOUND] March 20, 2018 – Article 282 – GRAVE THREATS IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P. RONNIE CALUAG V. PEOPLE G.R. NO.: 171511, MARCH 4, 2009 ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s action constitutes to grave threats. FACTS: Complainants Nestor and his wife Julia Denido inquired to Caluag and Sentillas why their guests were mauled during their earlier drinking spree. Caluag butted in and said, “bakit kasama ka ba doon?” And boxed and mauled Nestor. The victims quickly went back to their house. Julia, on her way to the baranggay hall to report the incident, was confronted by Caluag and poked and threatened her with a gun to her forehead and said, “saan ka pupunta? Gusto mo ito?”

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Despite the threats, she was able to report the crime. Soon after, 2 informations was filed against petitioner; 1) for grave threats, and 2) for light physical injuries. The MTC, RTC found the petitioner guilty of the crime grave threats and slight physical injuries. Hence the appeal. HELD: Yes, the SC uniformly found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of grave threats and slight physical injury. Under article 282 of the Revised Penal Code – any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer; (2) the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos if the threat shall not have been made under subject to a condition. In this case, the act of pointing a gun to her forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill. Thus, action speaks louder than words considering it be taken in to context the earlier surrounding circumstances. March 23, 2018 – Article 284 – BOND FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR NASH, Regina Mercado [NO CASE FOUND] March 23, 2018 – Article 285 – OTHER LIGHT THREATS OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P. US V. ANDRES V. ESTRADA GR NO. 4418, MAR 26, 1908 FACTS: Cecilia went inside a billiard room, seeing this, Anastasio Delgado, who was also present inside the billiard room said to his friend, who was by his side " Are women allowed to come into billiard rooms? Cecilia took offense on the remark made and hot words passed between her and the said Delgado. Thereafter, Andres V. Estrada, the woman's husband, took part in the quarrel and notwithstanding the fact that Delgado had left the place, hiding himself in the next house, the accused also went out and returned shortly thereafter provided with a revolver and commenced to look for Delgado who, fearing injury, returned to his home. Moreover, his friends told him to stay hidden because the accused was looking for him in order to kill him. The court sentenced Estrada for a higher penalty and he appealed for a lower one. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused Estrada liable for other light threats and be awarded with a lower penalty. HELD: YES. The court stated that the act complained do not constitute a crime but simply a misdemeanor for uttering threats. A person who, in the heat of anger, threatened to kill another without persisting in the idea involved in his threat is liable only under the paragraph 2 of Article 285 of the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore,

136 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

Flaviano Delgado, testifies that the accused and his wife, after the information had been filed, called at the house of the witness to implore pardon, Estrada alleging that the threat was uttered without premeditation, and that it was done unintentionally. Hence, the accused Estrada is only liable for other light threats and consequently his penalty must be lowered. RONNIE CALUAG VS PEOPLE G.R. NO. 171511, MARCH 4, 2009 FACTS: Nestor learned that two of his guests from an earlier drinking spree were mauled. At that time, Caluag and Sentillas were drinking at the store owned by the son of Sentillas. When Nestor inquired from several people what happened, Caluag butted in and replied “Bakit kasama ka ba roon?”and immediately boxed him without warning. Nestor retaliated but he was overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia, wife of Nestor, saw Caluag and Sentillas box her husband. Although she tried to pacify them, they did not listen to her. To avoid his assailants, Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. In the evening, same day, Nestor told his wife to report the boxing incident to the barangay authorities. Thereafter, Julia and her son Rotsen were on their way to their barangay hall, she encountered Caluag, who blocked her way at the alley near her house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun, poked it at her forehead, and said “Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?” Despite this fearful encounter, she was still able to proceed to the barangay hall where she reported the gunpoking incident to the barangay authorities. ISSUE: Whether or not Caluag is liable for other light threats under Article 285 of the RPC. HELD: NO. The court stated that Under the Revised Penal Code, there are three kinds of threats: grave threats (Article 282), light threats (Article 283) and other light threats (Article 285). In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no condition. In the instant case, Julia Denido left her house to go to the barangay hall to report the mauling of her husband which she witnessed earlier in the afternoon. On her way there, Caluag confronted her and pointed a gun to her forehead, while at the same time saying “Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?” Considering what transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia’s husband, Caluag’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s forehead clearly announces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her person. Taken in the context of the surrounding circumstances, the uttered words do not go against the threat to kill or to inflict serious injury evinced by petitioners accompanying act. Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable since it presupposes that the threat to commit a wrong will not constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a wrong will constitute or not constitute

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST a crime is the distinguishing factor between grave threats on one hand, and light and other light threats on the other. Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone amounts to a crime, and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a condition. March 21, 2018 – Article 286 – GRAVE COERCIONS PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P. ALEJANDRO V. BERNAS GR NO. 179243 (SEPTEMBER 7, 2011) ISSUE Whether or not grave coercion can be committed through intimidation alone without violence FACTS Petitioner Alejandro is a lessee-purchaser of a condominium unit in Pasig City, under the Contract of Lease with Option to purchase with lessor-seller Oakridge Properties, Inc. (OPI). Alejandro sub-leased the unit to other petitioners (Firdausi, Abbas and Francisco) to be used as a law office. However, a defect in the airconditioning unit prompted petitioners to suspend payments until the problem is fixed by the management. Instead of addressing the defect, OPI instituted an action for ejectment before the MTC. During the pendency of the case, respondent Atty. Bernas ordered the unit to be padlock. Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for grave coercion against respondents Atty. Bernas, Atty SIa-Bernas, Amor and Aguilar. Petitioners claimed that the padlocking of the unit was illegal, felonious and unlawful which prevented them from entering the premises. Petitioners also alleged that said padlocking and the cutting off of facilities had unduly prejudiced them and thus constituted grave coercion. Moreover, there was sufficient intimidation by the mere presence of the security guards. HELD No. The second element of grave coercion is absent in this case. For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present: 1. That a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2. That the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and 3. That the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right. In this case, the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause intimidation to the petitioners.

137 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. Material violence is not indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient. In the crime of grave coercion, violence through material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party is an essential ingredient. Moreover, it was not alleged that the security guards committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of petitioners. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. Here, the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who presumably know their rights. In this case, the crime of unjust vexation is the proper complaint filed instead of the grave coercion against respondents. UNITED STATES V. MENA GR NO. 4812 (OCTOBER 30, 1908) ISSUE Whether or not defendant Mena is liable for grave coercion FACTS Three carabaos of defendant Mena trespassed upon the rice paddies of complainant Flora, doing considerable damage thereto. The latter took possession of the animals and refused to return them to Mena without compensation for the damage done. Mena was still unable to pay. Flora and his son set out to take the carabaos to the justice of the peace, for the purpose of depositing them in his care until the question of damages could be settled in his court. On the road to the justice of the peace, they met defendant Mena in company with some other persons. By refusal to surrender them to the defendant or his friends, defendant Mena drew his bolo, rushed at Flora’s, cut the mecate by which the son was leading the carabao, and with threats of bodily injury, compelled him to turn the other loose; and then with further threats of bodily injury, compelled Flora himself to turn loose the carabao which he was riding. HELD Yes. The acts committed by the defendant clearly fall within the foregoing definition of the crime of grave coercion. With violence he compelled the complaining witness to do that which he did not desire to do — that is to say, to turn over the possession of the carabaos. It is a maxim of the law that no man is authorized to take the law into his own hands and enforce his rights with threats of violence, except in certain well-defined cases, where one acts in the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST necessary defense of one’s life, liberty, or property, against unlawful aggression, and manifestly the defendant can not successfully maintain that his action was taken in defense of life, liberty, or property. The defendant was guilty of the crime of grave coercion unless he was lawfully authorized to enforce his demand when the complaining witness refused compliance therewith. March 22, 2018 – Article 287 – LIGHT COERCIONS PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P. ONG CHIU KWAN VS. PEOPLE GR NO. 113006 November 23, 2000 ISSUE: W/N the court was proper in finding petitioner guilty for violating Art. 287 par. 2 or unjust vexation of the RPC FACTS: Assistant City Prosecutor Andres M. Bayona of Bacolod filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bacolod City an information charging petitioner with unjust vexation for cutting the electric wires, water pipes and telephone lines of "Crazy Feet," a business establishment owned and operated by Mildred Ong. That on April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the morning, Ong Chiu Kwan ordered Wilfredo Infante to "relocate" the telephone, electric and water lines of "Crazy Feet," because said lines posed as a disturbance. However, Ong Chiu Kwan failed to present a permit from appropriate authorities allowing him to cut the electric wires, water pipe and telephone lines of the business establishment. After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the Municipal Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation, and sentenced him to "imprisonment for twenty days." On appeal, both the RTC and CA affirmed such decision by the MTC. Hence, this petition. HELD: Yes. Unjust Vexation is any conduct which annoys, vexes, disturbs or irritates another, provided there was no force, threat, violence or intimidation. In the present case, petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines of complainant’s business establishment because these lines crossed his property line. He failed, however, to show evidence that he had the necessary permit or authorization to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water and telephone services during peak hours of the operation of business of the complainant. Thus, petitioner’s act unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation. MADERAZO VS. PEOPLE GR NO. 165065 SEPTEMBER 26, 2006

138 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

ISSUE: W/N Maderazo is guilty of unjust vexation under art. 287 of the RPC FACTS: Verutiao (offended party) had been the lessee of a stall in the Biliran public market and paid a monthly rental of P200.00. She was allowed to finish the construction of the market stall with the permission of the Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer. She spent P24, 267.00 for the construction of the market stall but was not reimbursed by the Municipality of her expenses. Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a oneyear lease contract, renewable every year with a monthly rental of P400.00. It is also provided that, any violation of the conditions therein agreed shall be sufficient cause for its cancellation, notwithstanding the fact that the contract has not yet expired. The Municipality partially paid her P10, 000.00 of her total expenses in the construction of the market stall. However, considering that she had not been fully reimbursed of her expenses for the construction of the stall, she did not pay her rent. Verutiao closed her stall and proceeded to Mindanao where she spent the Christmas holidays and returned a month after. She and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo, directing her to vacate the stall within twenty-four (24) hours because of her failure to pay the rentals for the stall and the cancellation of the lease contract. Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased premises. The locks were opened on the authority of the Mayor. The contents of the market stall were inventoried by Victor Maderazo and taken to the police station for safekeeping HELD: Yes. In unjust vexation, being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a good defense to a charge for unjust vexation because good faith negates malice. The paramount question to be considered is whether the offender’s act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. The main purpose of the law penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is precisely to enforce the principle that no person may take the law into his hands and that our government is one of law, not of men. It is unlawful for any person to take into his own hands the administration of justice. In the present case, the overt acts of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr., on January 27, 1997, annoyed, irritated and caused embarrassment to her. It was petitioner Melchor Maderazo who ordered petitioner Victor Maderazo, Jr. to have the stall reopened, to conduct an inventory of the contents thereof, and to effect the transportation of the goods to the police station. Petitioner Victor Maderazo, who was a Sangguniang Bayan member, obeyed the order of the Mayor.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the stall and brought to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall and prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the business. March 22, 2018 – Article 288 – OTHER SIMILAR COERCIONS PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D [NO CASE FOUND] March 22, 2018 – Article 289 – FORMATION, MAINTENANCE, AND PROHIBITION OF COMBINATION OF CAPITAL OR LABOR THROUGH VIOLENCE OR THREATS RIVERA, Marynit P. G.R. No. L-1340 October 13, 1947 HERMOGENES MORTERA and CANLUBANG WORKERS' UNION (CLO) vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE and BISIG NG CANLUBANG (NLU) ISSUE: Whether or not peaceful picketing is prohibited FACTS: The Bisig ng Canlubang Union (BCU) demanded from the Canlubang Sugar Estate (CSE) the salary increase of its employees and other benefits. CSE refused and so BCU staged a strike. A case was filed which the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ordered the striking union to return to work and that any employee who shall fail to return to their post shall be substituted by CSE with a new employee. The CIR also prohibited any form of picketing while the case is pending. CSE was ordered to accept the returning employees and to maintain status quo. Both parties complied. RULING: NO. Peaceful picketing is part of freedom of speech and, therefore, cannot be prohibited. Picketing in a peaceful and and orderly manner is absolutely legal. It cannot be prohibited for it is part and parcel of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. March 23, 2018 – Article 290 – DISCOVERING SECRETS THROUGH SEIZURE OF CORRESPONDENCE ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M. [NO CASE FOUND] March 23, 2018 – Article 291 – REVEALING SECRETS WITH ABUSE OF OFFICE SALVERON, Jan Ione R.

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[NO CASE FOUND] March 24, 2018 – Article 292 – REVELATION OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS SANTOALLA, Stephanie M. AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, PENNSWELL, G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007

Vs. INC.

FACTS: Pennswell sold and delivered to Air Philippines Corporation industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants amounting to P450,000.00. When Air Philippines refused to pay the obligation, Pensswell filed a collection case before RTC Makati. In its Answer, Air Philippines alleged that: it refused to pay because it was defrauded in the amount of P600,000.00 by Pennswell for its previous sale of 4 items; said items were misrepresented by Pennswell as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with products it had previously purchased from Pennswell; and, Pennswell merely altered the names and labels of such goods. During the trial, Air Philippines filed a motion to compel Pennswell to give a detailed list of the chemical components and the ingredients used for the products that were sold. Pennswell opposed the motion for production, contending that the requested information was a trade secret that it could not be forced to disclose. ISSUE: Whether the court of appeals ruled in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it upheld the ruling of the trial court that the chemical components or ingredients of respondents products are trade secrets or industrial secrets that are not subject to compulsory disclosure. HELD: Yes A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends to a secret formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some article of trade having a commercial value. A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information that: (1) is used in one's business; and (2) gives the employer an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not possess the information. Generally, a trade secret is a process or device intended for continuous use in the operation of the business, for example, a machine or formula, but can be a price list or catalogue or specialized customer list. It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation has rights therein which may be treated as

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST property, and ordinarily an injunction will be granted to prevent the disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the information "in confidence" or through a "confidential relationship." American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors to determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer's business; (2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and (6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent source. The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondents special lubricants are trade secrets within the contemplation of the law. That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction affords to trade secrets is evident in our laws. The Securities Regulation Code, expressly provides that the court may issue an order to protect trade secrets or other confidential research, development, or commercial information belonging to the debtor. Moreover, the Securities Regulation Code is explicit that the Securities and Exchange Commission is not required or authorized to require the revelation of trade secrets or processes in any application, report or document filed with the Commission. This confidentiality is made paramount as a limitation to the right of any member of the general public, upon request, to have access to all information filed with the Commission. Revised Penal Code endows a cloak of protection to trade secrets under the following articles: Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal or master and shall reveal such secrets. art. 292. revelation of industrial secrets. the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon the person in charge, employee or workman of any manufacturing or industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the industry of the latter. Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the private character of trade secrets. There is a

140 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

privilege not to disclose ones trade secrets. Foremost, this Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in the Constitution. We said that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from compulsory disclosure. Significantly, our cases on labor are replete with examples of a protectionist stance towards the trade secrets of employers. For instance, this Court upheld the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company, on the rationalization that the company has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors. Notably, it was in a labor-related case that this Court made a stark ruling on the proper determination of trade secrets. In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 77 of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the Philippines, in order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is true that all consumer products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall indicate their general make or active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to respondent. Respondents specialized lubricants -- namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, DiElectric Strength Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound -- are not consumer products. Consumer products, as it is defined in Article 4(q),[ refers to goods, services and credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not be limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. This is not the nature of respondents products. Its products are not intended for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes. Rather, they are for industrial use, specifically for the use of aircraft propellers and engines. What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical formulation of respondents products is not known to the general public and is unique only to it. Both courts uniformly ruled that these ingredients are not within the knowledge of the public.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST

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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST TITLE TEN – CRIME AGAINST PROPERTY March 25, 2018 – Article 293 – WHO ARE GUILTY OF ROBBERY TADO, Diann Kathelline A. G.R. No. L-12453 July 15, 1918 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO LAHOYLAHOY and MARCOS MADANLOG, defendants-appellants. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused committed Robbery with Multiple Homicide FACTS: In 1912, the complaint the two children were staying with Juana, their grandmother, in a house some distance removed from that occupied by Roman and Rosa and located farther back from the shore. The grandfather, Francisco, had gone to the beach. After the grandmother and the children had gone to rest on a mat where they slept together, the two accused appeared and demanded money of Juana. She gave them P100 in money in response to this demand, and the accused then required the three to leave the house and go in the direction of the sea. A further demand was made upon the old woman for money, which demand she was unable to comply with. Lahoylahoy then struck her with a bolo just below her breast, killing her instantly. The two children, being greatly frightened, they ran away separately for some distance and remained hidden during the night in the bushes. The next morning the children made their way to the house where the old couple had lived, which was vacant. Going in that direction they stopped at the house of their sister, the wife of the defendant Madanlog. When they went a little later to the house where their parents had lived, the fact was revealed that Francisco, Roman, and Rosa had also been killed. All the bodies were collected and buried early in the morning by the two accused, assisted by Eugenio Tenedero, sonin-law of Lahoylahoy. The two children Miguela and Bartolome say that they were threatened with death if they should make complaint. At the trial the two children gave a very consistent account of the robbery and of the murder of their grandmother. They were charged crime of robbery with multiple homicide HELD: No. An important question arises upon the matter of the complaint in connection with the proof as to the ownership of the property which was taken by the accused. The part of the complaint here material to be considered reads as follows: Xxx According to the proof the person robbed was Juana; while the complaint charges that the property taken belong to Roman Estriba. Subsection 5 of section 6 of General Orders No. 58 declares that a complaint or information shall show, among others things, the names of the persons against whom, or against whose property, the offense was committed, if known. The complaint in this case therefore properly

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contained an averment as to the ownership of the property; and upon principle, in charging the crime of robbery committed upon the person, the allegation of the owner's name is essential. It is elementary that in crimes against property, ownership must be alleged as matter essential to the proper description of the offense. To constitute larceny, robbery, embezzlement, obtaining money by false pretenses, malicious mischief, etc., the property obtained must be that of another, and indictments for such offenses must name the owner; and a variance in this respect between the indictment and the proof will be fatal. It is also necessary in order to identify the offense. Xxx Now a complaint charging the commission of the complex offense of robbery with homicide must necessarily charge each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. To permit a defendant to be convicted upon a charge of robbing one person when the proof shows that he robbed an entirely different person, when the first was not present, is violative of the rudimentary principles of pleading; and in addition, is subject to the criticism that the defendant is thereby placed in a position where he could not be protected from a future prosecution by a plea of former conviction or acquittal. If we should convict or acquit these defendants today of the robbery which is alleged to have been committed upon the property of Roman Estriba, it is perfectly clear that they could be prosecuted tomorrow for robbery committed upon the property of Juana; and the plea of former jeopardy would be of no avail. It is evident that, by reason of the lack of conformity between the allegation and the proof respecting the ownership of the property, it is impossible to convict the two accused of the offense of robbery committed by them in this case; and therefore they cannot be convicted of the complex offense of robbery with homicide, penalized in subsection (1) of article 503 of the Penal Code. No such difficulty exists, however, with respect to the quadruple homicide committed upon the persons named in the complaint; and in conformity with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code, the penalties corresponding to all these crimes must be severely imposed. This court has already held in United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil. Rep., 260), that where more than one offense (not complex offenses) are charged in the complaint, and the accused fails to demur or ask for a severance, the penalties corresponding to all of the offenses which are charged and proved may be imposed. The doctrine announced in that case applies with even greater propriety offenses in one complaint. (See sec. 11, General Orders No. 58.) The acts causing the violent death of the four deceased must be qualified as homicide, as the record does not satisfactorily show how and in what manner they were executed.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST G.R. NO. 200922 JULY 18, 2012 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. CESAR CONCEPCION Y BULANIO, APPELLANT, ISSUE: Whether the crime committed was Theft or Robbery FACTS: The crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Cesar Concepcion y Bulanio (Concepcion). At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of May 25, 2004, while private complainant Jennifer Acampado was at the corner of Mother Ignacia Street, Quezon City and at another street which she could not remember and seemed to be deserted at that time, a male person riding at the back of the driver of a motorcycle whom she later identified in open court as accused Cesar Concepcion, snatched her brown Avon bag with black strap which at that time, was placed on her left shoulder. The black motorcycle with white covering at the back side and with plate number which is not visible to the eye, came from behind her. As the motorcycle sped away, the accused even raised and waved the bag that he snatched from Jennifer who was unable to do anything but just cry and look at the snatcher so much so that she recognized him in the process. Meanwhile, while prosecution witness Joemar de Felipe was driving his R & E Taxi, in the same vicinity, he witnessed the subject snatching incident. As the accused was waving the bag at Jennifer, he blew his horn. Ogardo drove faster so that de Felipe gave a chase and kept on blowing his horn. Eventually, Ogardo lost control of the motorcycle and it crashed in front of his taxi, sending its two occupants to the pavement. De Felipe immediately alighted from the taxi with the intention to arrest the snatchers. At that juncture, some policemen from the Kamuning Police Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, arrived. HELD: Theft Article 293 of the RPC defines robbery as a crime committed by "any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything." Theft, on the other hand, is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without the latter’s consent. By definition in the RPC, robbery can be committed in three ways, by using: (a) violence against any person; (b) intimidation of any person; and/or (c) force upon anything. Robbery by use of force upon things is provided under Articles 299 to 305 of the RPC. The prosecution failed to establish that Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in snatching Acampado’s shoulder bag.

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Acampado herself merely testified that Concepcion snatched her shoulder bag which was hanging on her left shoulder. Acampado did not say that Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in snatching her shoulder bag. Given the facts, Concepcion’s snatching of Acampado’s shoulder bag constitutes the crime of theft, not robbery. Concepcion’s crime of theft was aggravated by his use of a motorcycle in committing the crime. March 24, 2018 – Article 294 – ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF PERSONS – PENALTIES UNAS, Nor-Aiza R. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CESAR CONCEPCION Y BULANIO G.R. NO. 200922 JULY 18, 2012 ISSUES: Whether or not the snatching of the shoulder bag in this case is robbery as contemplated in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Whether or not Concepcion employ violence or intimidation upon persons, or force upon things, as contemplated under Article 294, when he snatched Acampado’s shoulder bag. FACTS: At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of May 25, 2004, while Jennifer Acampado was at the corner of Mother Ignacia Street, Quezon City and at another street which she could not remember and seemed to be deserted at that time, a male person riding at the back of the driver of a motorcycle whom she later identified in open court as accused Cesar Concepcion, snatched her brown Avon bag with black strap which at that time, was placed on her left shoulder. The black motorcycle with white covering at the back side and with plate number which is not visible to the eye, came from behind her. As the motorcycle sped away, the Concepcion even raised and waved the bag that he snatched from Jennifer who was unable to do anything but just cry and look at the snatcher so much so that she recognized him in the process. HELD: NO. The prosecution failed to establish that Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in snatching Acampado’s shoulder bag. Acampado herself merely testified that Concepcion snatched her shoulder bag which was hanging on her left shoulder. Acampado did not say that Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in snatching her shoulder bag. Given the facts, Concepcion’s snatching of Acampado’s shoulder bag constitutes the crime of theft, not robbery. Concepcion’s crime of theft was aggravated by his use of a motorcycle in committing the crime. Under Article 14(20) of the RPC, the use of a motor vehicle as a means of committing a crime is a generic aggravating circumstance. Thus, the maximum period of the penalty for the crime of theft shall be imposed upon Concepcion due to the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance and the absence of any mitigating circumstance.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO REGALA G.R. NO. 130508 APRIL 5, 2000 ISSUE: Whether or not Regala committed the crime of robbery with rape as contemplated in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 oclock in the evening at Barangay Bangon, Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother (Consuelo Arevalo) were sleeping, when appellant Armando Regala and his two other companions entered the formers house. Regala and his companions entered the house through the kitchen by removing the pieces of wood under the stove. Regala went to the room of Nerissa and her grandmother and poked an 8-inch gun on them, one after the other. Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by Regala and his companions. Thereafter, Nerissa was raped by Regala in bed while her grandmother was on the floor. After the rape, Regala and his two companions counted the money which they took from the "aparador." HELD: YES. There was sufficient evidence to establish the identity of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Nerissa positively recounted the incident on the witness stand. She was sleeping with her grandmother in the latters house when Regala, together with the unidentified companions entered the house. Regala pointed a gun, about 8 inches long, at her grandmother, and then at her, and hogtied both of them. Regala took off her panty and her shorts, and removed his own "porontong" pants, and made sexual intercourse ("itot") with her while she was hogtied in bed. Her grandmother was at the floor. She saw the aparador of her grandmother being opened. She could not shout because the gun was pointed at her, and she was afraid. Two companions of Regala entered the room as she was being raped. Two rings and money was taken by Regala and his companions. After raping her in bed, Nerissa saw Regala counting the money taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to the kitchen, still hogtied, and raped again. On crossexamination, Nerissa stated that although there was no electricity, and the light in the house was already off, she was able to see the face of Regala because at the time Regala was counting the money, one of his companions was holding the flashlight "beamed to the money" and there was "some reflection" on the face of Regala. She remembered the face of Regala because of an earring on his left ear which he was wearing when presented at the police line-up. Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the testimony of her granddaughter. On crossexamination, Consuelo Arevalo declared that she was able to see Regala because he used her flashlight, and he took off the mask he was wearing; she recognized Regala because of his earring and his flat top hair cut.

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The Court gives its approbation to the finding of the trial court that the evidence was sufficient to clearly establish the identity of Armando Regala as the person who, with two companions, committed the crime of robbery accompanied by rape on the night of September 11, 1995. Nerissa Tagala positively identified Armando Regala because at the time he was counting the money on her bed, the other companion of the accused beamed the flashlight towards the money and there was a reflection on the face of Regala. Although the three intruders were wearing masks when they entered the house, they removed their masks later. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NORBERTO VILLAGRACIA, ELMER PAGLINAWAN, ALFONSO PASTORAL, NELSON LEDESMA, NIXON LEDESMA, AND WILFREDO GAMPA G.R. NO. 94311 SEPTEMBER 14, 1993 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused committed robbery with rape as contemplated in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: On the 23rd day of September 1987, at Barangay Pamampangin, Municipality of Lopez, Province of Quezon, Philippines, the accused, armed with short firearms of unknown caliber and a fan knife and forming a band, with intent to gain and with force upon things, by means of force, intimidation and violence and taking advantage of nighttime, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of spouses Thelma Villasanta and Cenon Villasanta, and once inside, take, steal and carry away therefrom the latter’s personal properties. On the occasion thereof said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, by means of force, threats, violence and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take turn in having carnal knowledge of said Thelma Villasanta, against the latter's will. HELD: YES. The law uses the phrase "when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape" which means that the offender must have the intent to take the personal property belonging to another with intent to gain, and such intent must precede the rape. In this case, appellants employed violence against and intimidation of persons when they divested the Villasanta spouses of cash and other valuables. Three of the appellants were armed with short firearms and the other three carried fan knives. April 3, 2018 – Article 295 – ROBBERY WITH PHYSICAL INJURIES, COMMITTED IN AN UNINHABITED PLACE AND BY A BAND, OR WITH THE USE OF FIREARM ON A STREET, ROAD OR ALLEY VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST PEOPLE vs. APDUHAN JR. ET.AL. G.R. No. L-19491 August 30, 1968 ISSUE: Whether or not the penalties under Article 295 is applicable in this case. FACTS: On the 23rd day of May, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, in the Municipality of Mabini, Bohol, the accused and five (5) other persons,all of them armed with different unlicensed firearms, daggers, and other deadly weapons by means of violence, the dwelling house of the spouses Honorato Miano and Antonia Miano, which was also the dwelling house of their children, the spouses Geronimo Miano and Herminigilda de Miano. Once inside the said dwelling house, the above-named accused with their five (5) other companions, did attack, hack and shoot Geronimo Miano and another person by the name of Norberto Aton, who happened to be also in the said dwelling house, thereby inflicting upon the said two (2) persons physical injuries which caused their death; they took and carried away from said dwelling house cash money amounting to Three Hundred Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00). Act committed was contrary to the provisions of Art. 294, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code with the special aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms (Art. 296, Rev. Penal Code), and other aggravating circumstances – committed in the dwelling, at nighttime and with abuse of superior strength. RULING: The disposition of the question at hand necessitates a discussion of the interrelation among articles 294, 295 and 296 of the Revised Penal Code. As previously stated, art. 295 provides that if any of the classes of robbery described in subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294 is committed by a band, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the proper penalty. Correspondingly, the immediately following provisions of art. 296 define the term "band", prescribe the collective liability of the members of the band, and state that "when any of the arms used in the commission of the offense be in unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided by law." Viewed from the contextual relation of articles 295 and 296, the word "offense" mentioned in the above-quoted portion of the latter article logically means the crime of robbery committed by a band, as the phrase "all the malefactors" indubitably refers to the members of the band and the phrase "the corresponding penalty provided by law" relates to the offenses of robbery described in the last three subdivisions of art. 294 which are all encompassed within the ambit of art. 295. Evidently, therefore, art. 296 in its entirety is designed to amplify and modify the provision on robbery in band which is nowhere to be found but in art. 295 in relation to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Verily, in order that the aforesaid special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm may be appreciated to

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justify the imposition of the maximum period of the proper penalty it is a condition sine qua non that the offense charged be robbery committed by a band within the contemplation of art. 295. To reiterate, since art. 295, does not apply to subdivision 1 and 2 of art. 294, then the special aggravating factor in question, which is solely applicable to robbery in band under art. 295, cannot be considered in fixing the penalty imposable for robbery with homicide under art. 294(1), even if the said crime was committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms. March 26, 2018 – Article 296 – DEFINITION OF A BAND AND PENALTY INCURRED BY THE MEMBERS THEREOF VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S. PEOPLE VS PANCHO PELAGIO ET AL. G.R. No. L-16177 May 24 1967 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are liable under Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: Pancho Pelagio came to visit the spouses Jose Guico and Evelyn Villanueva asking to borrow money for the hospital expenses for his wife who has just delivered a child. Upon hearing the conversation between Pelagio and Guico Armando Manalang took advantage of the situation informed Pelagio of a robbery he was planning with some other friends who were later revealed as Jose Guico, Oscar Caymo and Arcadio Balmeo. Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo, Armando Manalang and Arcadio Balmeo set out for the execution of their plan. They all walked together towards Aling Nena's residence although before reaching the place, Caymo ordered Manalang to hail and hold a taxi which the latter did. Then, too, only Balmeo and Caymo actually entered the victim's premises because, as was earlier agreed upon, Pancho Pelagio acted as the lookout for the two and he simply posted himself by the gate of the said house. Caymo and Balmeo gained entrance to the house through its back kitchen door which they found to be open. Once inside, Caymo drew his gun and sought out its occupants. Only an old woman, Mrs. Severina de Gloria, however, was in at the time. Caymo then pointed the gun at the old lady and intimidated her into producing all the money and jewelry she could. All in all, the pair got about P437 in cash, three pieces of jewelry worth about P205.00 and a watch worth about P300.00. After they had taken the above items, Caymo ordered Mrs. de Gloria to lie face downward, covered her with a blanket, and cautioned her against moving or otherwise sounding out an alarm. The two then went down the house and out into the street. At the gate, however, they failed to find Pancho Pelagio. From G. Villanueva Street where the victim's house was located, Caymo and Balmeo walked till they got to the corner of F. Fernando street where they found Armando Manalang waiting for them in a taxi. Caymo and Balmeo then rode on it. As the taxi was about to leave, however, a jeep

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST from the opposite direction blocked its way and as the two vehicles were thus stopped, a man alighted from the jeep and started to walk towards the taxi. When the stranger was very near the taxi already, Manalang instructed Caymo to shoot at the man as the latter was a police officer. Whereupon, Caymo leveled several shots at the latter, about six in all; and the man, who was later identified as Patrolman Francisco Trinidad of the Pasay Police Department, fell dead. From the scene of the shooting, Manalang, Caymo and Balmeo went direct to a house in Buendia Street owned by Manalang's sister where they changed clothes and hid the death weapon and the money and jewelry they had robbed. Shortly thereafter, Caymo and Balmeo proceeded to a house in Blumentritt where they met Pancho Pelagio whom they called to account for his absence at the gate during the robbery. The latter explained that he had to scamper away before Caymo and Balmeo had gone down because he, Pelagio, saw someone slip out of the house apparently to summon the police. RULING: NO. When Arcadio Balmeo and Oscar Caymo hurried out of the victim's house after the robbery, Pancho Pelagio had evidently fled from his lookout post because the pair, Balmeo and Caymo, failed to locate him at the gate where he was supposed to have stationed himself. To be sure, the said decision itself renders the account that it was only Balmeo and Caymo who walked together from the said house to the corner of Villanueva and F. Fernando Streets where then they saw Armando Manalang waiting for them in a taxi and that it was only when these three had taken to the said taxi, and the cab was about to leave, that the shooting of Pat. Trinidad happened. When the homicide was committed, therefore, Pancho Pelagio could not have had the least intervention or participation as might justify penalizing him likewise for the said killing. So far as the records disclose, the conspirators were agreed only on the commission of robbery; there is no evidence that homicide besides was determined by them when they plotted the crime. All these warrant the exclusion of Pancho Pelagio from any responsibility for the said killing. (People vs. Basisten, et al., 47 Phil. 493) Considering that those who actually participated in the robbery were only three, Pancho Pelagio included, and only one of them was armed, the same evidently was not "in band." (Art. 296, Revise Penal Code) This being the case, then it would indeed be irregular or questionable to hold Pancho Pelagio similarly responsible as Caymo and Balmeo for the killing of Pat. Trinidad. Under the code, it is only when the robbery is in band that all those present in the commission of the robbery may be punished, for any of the assaults which its members might commit. Thus, in People v. Pascual, G.R. No. L-4801, June 30, 1953 (unreported), we held that where three persons committed robbery and two of them committed rape upstairs on its occasion, while the third guarded the owner of the house downstairs, only the two who committed the assault should be punished for robbery with rape while the third was liable for robbery only.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ALFONSO HAMIANA ET AL. G.R. NO. L-3491-93 MAY 30 1951 MAY 30, 1951 ISSUE: Whether or not the other members of the band are also guilty of robbery with rape. FACTS: About ten o’clock in the evening of April 9, 1947, Rosita Colantro, residing at the crossing of Atipuluan, Bago, Negros Occidental, heard one of the appellants call for "uncle, uncle." Rosita Colantro did not make any reply, whereupon the appellants hammered at the walls of her house which caused Rosita Colantro to ask what they wanted. The appellants ordered her to light her lamp and not to move. Rosita Colantro saw rifles aimed at her, her house being low. The appellants asked palay, and Rosita Colantro answered that she had a few seedlings. Rosita Colantro was then ordered to go down. With lamp in one hand and her small child in the other, Rosita Colantro met Alfonso Hamiana (her neighbor) with a bolo, Emiliano de la Cruz and Ceferino de la Cruz, armed with rifles, and Silvino Jabin, armed with a bolo. Undaunted by the presence of appellants, she attempted to flee but was caught in the arm by Anastacio Blancada. The latter ordered Rosita Colantro, at the point of his gun, to put her child down. She was taken by Anastacio Blancada to a place away from the house and, throwing her down, Anastacio Blancada, also at the point of his gun, raped her. After Anastacio Blancada had raped Rosita Colantro, the latter proceeded to the house of Federico Nava wherein she stayed during the night. Accompanied by Federico Nava, Rosita Colantro returned to her house the next morning where she found that the appellants carried away her palay worth P35. RULING: NO. The evidence shows that appellant Anastacio Blancada caught Rosita Colantro while the latter was trying to get away and that the rape was committed in a place away from her house, in which the robbery was committed. There is no positive proof in the record that the other appellants were aware of, much less abated, the criminal act committed by appellant Anastacio Blancada against the person of Rosita Colantro. Therefore, only Anastacio Blancada is guilty of robbery with rape while the other members of the band are only liable for simple robbery by a band. March 25, 2018 – Article 297 – ATTEMPTED AND FRUSTRATED ROBBERY COMMITTED UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JOSEPH BARRA G.R. NO. 198020 JULY 10, 2013 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide FACTS:

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST That on or about 11:00 P.M. of October 9, 2003, the accused, while armed with a firearm, after gaining entrance into the residence of his victim, with intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and steal money from Elmer Lagdaan y Azur; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take and steal the money, the herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and there feloniously shoot said Elmer Lagdaan, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound which caused his death, to the prejudice of his heirs. Dr. Villanueva testified that the victim sustained a gunshot wound due to the circular and inverted edges of the point of entry. She concluded that since there was no point of exit, the victim was shot at close range. Ricardo de la Peña testified that he knew appellant for a long time. He stated that he was on his way home to the neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m. on October 9, 2003, in the light of a bright moon, he saw appellant enter the house of Lagdaan, which was lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to the victim’s right forehead and demanded money. De la Peña hid behind a tree ten meters away. When the victim stated that the money was not in his possession, appellant shot him. He went home and reported the incident the following morning. Ely Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the victim’s house to collect his daily wage when he saw appellant in the yard of the victim’s house. He inquired from appellant if the victim was around. Appellant responded that the victim was not around. Asor went home. It was while Asor was in his house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following morning that he learned that the victim died. Asor then proceeded to report the incident. In his defense, appellant denied the charges against him. Appellant claimed that he was in Batangas City, with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was arrested and brought to Camarines Sur and charged with the crime of "robbery with murder." The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. The Court of Appeals only found appellant guilty of attempted robbery with homicide. HELD: Yes. The accused is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide In People v. Quemeggen, this Court gave the requisites to be proven by the prosecution for appellant to be convicted of robbery with homicide, to wit: 1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; 2. The property taken belongs to another; 3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and

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4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. In the case before us, appellant’s intention was to extort money from the victim. By reason of the victim’s refusal to give up his personal property his money - to appellant, the victim was shot in the head, causing his death. We, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the element of taking was not complete, making the crime one of attempted robbery with homicide as opposed to the crime appellant was convicted in the RTC. Appellant is, therefore, liable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code, not under Article 294 as originally held by the RTC. Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code states: Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances. — When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code. The elements to be convicted under Article 297 were discussed in People v. Macabales, to wit: The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1)There is an attempted or frustrated robbery. (2)A homicide is committed. In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Appellant can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide, thus punishable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the RTC and the Court of Appeals found appellant's crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FRANCISCO HAMTIG, ET AL., FRANCISCO HAMTIG, EUTIQUIO HAMTIG and MARIANO alias ALEJANDRO OSORIO, G.R. No. L-27431 August 22, 1969 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused committed Robbery with frustrated homicide FACTS: Hilaria Vda. de Hondolero, a widow, lived with her son, Mastito, in Barrio Manloy, Carigara, Leyte. Sometime after 8 o'clock in the evening of June 14, 1966 they went to sleep: Hilaria and her grandson Antonio Dandan — who decided to stay with them that evening — occupying the only room of the house, while Mastito lay down on a table found in the "sala" where they had a vigil lamp.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST At about three o'clock the following morning, they were suddenly awakened by noise coming from the kitchen. Mastito sat down on the table, took hold of his flashlight and focused its light towards the door leading to the kitchen from which emerged four armed persons whom he recognized as his brother-in-law, Francisco Hamtig, Eutiquio Hamtig, Mariano Osorio and Francisco Gaston. As the four intruders were advancing towards him, his mother came out of the room where she had been sleeping and upon seeing Francisco Hamtig she exclaimed: "It is you Kikoy." Thereupon Francisco, who was Hilaria's son-in-law, fired at her with a rifle hitting her in the abdominal region. Mastito immediately went to the aid of his mother and pulled her inside the room where the four armed persons followed them. As they continued firing they hit Hilaria again on the right and left arms. Mastito then decided to counter attack, and arming himself with a bolo he found in the room, he hacked the hand of Francisco Gaston with it, forcing the latter to go back to the sala. The other intruders, however, continued firing and hit Mastito on the right forearm. During all this time, Antonio Dandan was in hiding among the buri bags of rice in the room. On the other hand, in spite of their wounds, Hilaria and Mastito succeeded in escaping through the window, and went towards the house of Gonzalo Dandan — Antonio's father and son-in-law of Hilaria — located around thirty meters away. As Gonzalo Dandan was also awakened by successive gunshots coming from the direction of the house of his mother-in-law, he went down his house with a flashlight. Nearby he met his mother-in-law and Mastito — both wounded — and helped them go upstairs. Thereafter, he went down again to look for his son. Near the house of his mother-in-law he focused his flashlight towards it and was thereby able to recognize Francisco and Eutiquio Hamtig, Mariano, alias Alejandro Osorio and Francisco Gaston who were then going down the house. As stated heretofore, Antonio Dandan hid himself behind several buri bags of rice found in the room where he and his grandmother had slept. From that place he later saw the four intruders drag a trunk into the middle of the room where they forced it open and from which Francisco Hamtig got a bag full of money while the rest stood by, and afterwards they went downstairs together. Antonio then jumped out of the window and ran to his house. Hilaria and her son were brought to the Rural Health Officer of Capoocan, Leyte, upon whose advice they were taken to the Leyte Provincial Hospital in Tacloban City where the Senior Resident Physician operated upon Hilaria. The latter, however, died on June 24, 1966 as a result of Generalized Peritonitis due to her wounds, and secondary infection, while Mastito was able to return home the next day. HELD: Yes. The accused were guilty of the crime charged. It was found by the court that the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another and all armed with guns and

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pointed bolos with intent of gain and by means of violence against and intimidation upon persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of one HILARIA VDA. DE HONDOLERO and MASTITO HONDOLERO and once inside rob, steal, take and carry away against their will and content the amount of P1,400.00 Philippine Currency to their damage and prejudice in the said mentioned sum and that by reason and on the occasion of the said robbery the abovementioned accused in conspiracy did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot Hilaria Vda. de Hondolero and Mastito Hondolero with the weapons which the accused have provided themselves for the purpose. Thus the accused performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence thereof with respect to said Mastito Hondolero but nevertheless did not produce it by reason or causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Mastito Hondolero which prevented his death. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ADRIANO DAGUNDONG, FEDERICO BULAON, MELCHOR LAO and RICARDO SERRANO, ADRIANO DAGUNDONG, FEDERICO BULAON and RICARDO SERRANO, G.R. No. L-10398 June 30, 1960 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused were guilty of violating Article 297 on Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances. FACTS: On October 7, 1950, Alice Lake, more popularly known as movie actress Anita Linda, lived at No. 13 Pasong Tamo, Makati, Rizal, together with her son, her sister Mrs. Mamey Lake Hewell, and the latter's children, Josephine, Patricia, Johnny and Helen. At about 7 p.m. of said date, Alice, who was then in her bedroom, requested her niece Josephine, then 12 years old, to get her a glass of milk from the kitchen. As Josephine entered the kitchen, she suddenly came face to face with a man holding a gun. This gunman was small in stature, fairly built and was wearing a checkered shirt with long sleeves, dark colored pants, gloves and army shoes. On his head had a balangot hat, and over his face a black mask with two holes for the eyes. Instinctively, Josephine screamed. The gunman told her to keep silent and to return to sala. With the gun held against her back, the gunman followed her into the sala, where they found Patricia. The gunman motioned Patricia to come nearer to Josephine. At this time, Alice and her sister, Mrs. Hewell, startled by Josephine's scream, rushed out of the their respective bedrooms. When they reached the sala they came upon Josephine and Patricia, and the gunman who had his gun stuck at Josephine's back. As Mrs. Hewell knelt before the gunman and pleaded for her daughters, saying: "Maawa po kayo, huwag po", Patricia and Josephine ran to their aunt Alice. Without

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST compunction, the gunman levelled his gun straight at Mrs. Hewell's face. Meanwhile, Alice, together with her nieces, had fled into her bedroom. Shortly thereafter, several shots, not less than five, were heard coming from the sala. Alice and the children screamed. Alice wanted to go out to help her sister, but the two girls prevented her by locking the bedroom door. A moment later, they heard someone knock on and then kick the door to Alice's bedroom. Then complete silence. After some minutes, Alice heard the noise of a jeep moving away and going towards Sta. Ana. Feeling certain that the malefactors had left for good, Alice shouted for help. Her outcries were heard by the driver of a passing taxicab, who lost no time in bringing the Makati police to the scene. Upon entering the sala, the police came upon Mrs. Hewell's bullet—ridden body lying on the floor. In the course of their investigation, the policemen come across three .45 caliber empty shells about a meter from where Mrs. Hewell lay, and four other empty shells outside the premises. They also discovered five slugs, three of which were extracted from the wall leading to Alice's bedroom, and about two meters from Mrs. Hewell's feet, and the remaining two from the wooden cabinet which stood between the doors leading to the sala and the kitchen. On entering Mrs. Hewell's bedroom, the police found that it had been ransacked. After the removal of Mrs. Hewell's corpse, Alice went into her sister's bedroom and found it in the same condition as the policemen had found it, but she did not notice anything missing therefrom. The prosecution established by means of the testimony of Joseph Ebrada, one of the original accused but who was discharged in order to be a prosecution witness, that: On October 5, 1950, Melchor Lao went to see Ebrada in his place in Cavite, in order to borrow the jeep which Ebrada had in turn borrowed from a certain Terio Manimbao of Malagasang, Imus, Cavite. The jeep bore a PI plate number. At Lao's invitation, Ebrada went with him. They were then joined by appellants Dagundong and Serrano in going to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinglupa, Rizal. There, Lao and appellants Serrano and Dagundong visited Pablo Rabaton, an inmate. After thirty minutes they left and proceeded to Makati, Rizal. Along the way, appellant Dagundong stated that they must raise money with which to bail out Rabaton, and if necessary to commit robbery in order to do so. Ebrada, Lao and appellant Serrano agreed to this proposal. HELD: Yes. The accused are guilty of the crime charged. The court ruled that appellants Bulaon and Serrano are guilty of the crime of frustrated robbery with homicide, under Article 297, Revised Penal Code, in relation with Article 296, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 12 inasmuch as it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that they actually took part in the commission thereof, appellant Serrano by standing guard outside the victim's house while appellant Dagundong inside the house and helped him ransack the victim's room.

The Court believes, however, that the lower court erred in finding appellant Dagundong guilty of murder. It was established that it was he who had fired the fatal shots at Mrs. Hewell. But though that slaying was attended by treachery, his crime was not murder. The term "homicide" in paragraph 1, Article 294, Revised Penal Code, is used in its generic sense and the offense defined therein comprehends not only robbery with homicide in its limited sense, but also robbery with murder. So, an offense is not taken out of the purview of this article merely because the homicide "rises to the atrocity of murder" (People vs. Manuel, et al., 44 Phil., 333). And the same definition must be given to the term as it is used in Article 297, Revised Penal Code, which penalizes frustrated robbery with homicide. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. SILVERIO MORADOS, ET AL., G.R. No. L-46973 November 19, 1940 ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Mendoza is guilty only of attempted theft and not under Article 297 of the RPC FACTS: On the night of March 15, 1939, while Ceferino Ricasata, Rufino Aro and Lucio Enriquez were sleeping in the latter's hut in the sitio of Pasong Tabla, barrio of Bagbag, municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, a place where they had been treshing palay, several malefactors suddenly assaulted them. Ricasata who was awakened by the blows being inflicted upon his companions, tried to flee from the hut, but his dash for salvage was frustrated when hardly had he gone out the hut one of the ruffians shot him hitting him in the right thigh as a result of which he fell at a certain distance from the hut. His companions were beaten to unconsciousness. The evidence shows that through an agreement made between them, Felipe Moral who had a paltik (a homemade gun) and a flashlight, together with Silverio Morados, were to go to the hut to watch the inmate, while Benjamin Mendoza - who had also a paltik - and Florentino de los Reyes were to take away the carabaos. They all did their part of agreement: Morados and Moral effected their entrance into the hut, inflicting injuries upon Aro and killing Enriquez. While De los Reyes and Mendoza were untying the carabaos, the firmer heard the scream: "Naku agawin and buhay ko!" (Oh! save my life!), which interrupted by a pistol shot. Fearing that the might summon help, the malefactors escape without taking the carabaos, although one of them had already been untitled. The motive for killing was robbery of the carabaos which were tied near the hut, three of which belonged to the deceased (Lucio Enriquez), and the fourth, to one Turi. It is argued that Benjamin Mendoza did not enter the hut and did not take part in the assault, and he should only have been found guilty of attempted theft of large cattle. HELD:

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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST No. This contention is without merit. In U.S. vs. Landasan et al. (35 Phil., 359, 369), we observed that "neither the divisibility of this crime (robbery with homicide) into two crimes, nor the divisibility of the liability of the criminals who took part is allowable."

and robbing the passengers, Limosnero started the engine and sped away from the place despite the shouts of the men on both sides of the road for him to stop. Those men immediately commenced firing at the bus which was riddled with bullets.

And in U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil., 1, and People vs. Bautista 49 Phil., 389, 396, we held that "whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the complex crime of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide." It has not been shown that Mendoza endeavored to prevent the homicide.

One of the shots grazed the head of Limosnero. Another shot hit the passenger Maria Argame on the back, the slug penetrating the abdominal wall and entering the abdominal cavity. Still another shot struck passenger Elena Loyola on the shoulder, fracturing her right clavicle. When the bus was out of range of the guns of the eight men on the road and they had ceased firing, passenger Inobio on rising from his prone position in the bus, saw driver Limosnero's wound on the head, which was bleeding profusely, the blood dimming his vision, and so he took over the wheel. On reaching Zapote, an inspector of the Laguna Transportation Company took over the wheel from Inobio and drove the bus straight to the Las Pinas Municipal Building where the incident and shooting was reported to the police. Thereafter, the same bus, with a police officer, drove straight to Manila and to the Philippine General Hospital. Maria Argame was pronounced dead on arrival. The fracture of the right clavicle of Elena Loyola necessitated an operation, which was performed, and she was confined in the hospital for about twenty days, after which she was discharged, though she was not completely recovered, to continue treatment at home. The expert testimony on her condition is that if she had not been given prompt medical attention, she would have died from her wound. Driver Limosnero was treated at the same hospital for his head would and was released, but treatment was continued by the bus company for about a month.

The Solicitor-General recommends the imposition of the death penalty in view ;of the fact that the killing of Lucio Enriquez was qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and dwelling. For lack of humanity, however, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all respects, with costs. Article 297 of the Revised Penal code provides that "When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed the person guilty is such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period of reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code." THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EUGENIO OLAES, G.R. No. L-11166 April 17, 1959 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused committed the crime charged in Article 297 of the RPC FACTS: Between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m. of November 9, 1954, Bus No. 64 of the Laguna Transportation Company, driven by one Feliciano Limosnero, with one conductor, left the town plaza of Binan Laguna, bound for Manila. Among the passengers were Mariano Inobio, a resident of Bo. Almanza, Las Pinas, Rizal, Maria Argame and Elena Loyola. When the bus reached the curve in Bo. Almanza, Las Pinas, a man later identified by passenger Inobio as Cosme Isip, holding a rifle or carbine, suddenly appeared on the right side of the road and signalled the bus to stop. Limosnero, taking him for a prospective passenger, applied his brakes and slowed down, but before the vehicle could come to a complete stop, seven other men, also carrying guns, such as, garands or carbines, emerged from the left side of the road. Isip shouted, "Para, pasok!" The appearance of these armed men on both sides of the road must have affected the equanimity of Limosnero on the wheel, and he must have forgotten to press the clutch with his foot, resulting in the engine stalling or stopping. Probably convinced that the eight men were not passengers but were bent on holding-up the bus

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HELD: Yes. The accused is guilty of the committing the crime provided for in Article 297 of the RPC. After a careful study of the case, the court fully agrees with the trial court that defendant Eugenio Olaes is guilty. However, it will be remembered that the charge against him was for attempted robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide. Under this charge, as the Solicitor General well said, he may not convicted of consummated robbery with homicide as the trial court did. Moreover, we agree with the prosecution that inasmuch as no overt acts pointing to robbery or even an attempt thereof have been established, the killing of one passenger and the wounding of two others should be considered as plain murder, frustrated murder, and physical injuries respectively. The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and in band, there being more than three armed men in the group of malefactors, attended the commission of the crimes. The aggravating circumstance of in band may be considered to qualify the act of killing of Maria as murder, and the wounding of Elena as frustrated murder. The evidence for the defense was to the effect that appellant surrendered to the authorities when he found out that he was wanted by the constabulary. This was not refuted by the prosecution and so, it can be

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST regarded as a fact. This mitigating circumstance will compensate the other aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. The penalty for murder which is reclusion temporal in its maximum degree to death, should therefore be imposed in its medium period, namely reclusion perpetua, so that in the result, we agree with the trial court as to the penalty imposed by it. March 25, 2018 – Article 298 – EXECUTION OF DEEDS BY MEANS OF VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION ALAMEDA Jr , Manuel F. G.R. NO. L-28547 FEBRUARY 22, 1974 PEOPLE V. JARANILLA FACTS: Heman Gorriceta had just come from Ford San Pedro in Iloilo City and was driving a Ford pickup truck belonging to his sister. In front of the Elizalde Building on J.M. Basa Street, he saw defendants Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes. They asked Gorriceta to bring them to Mandurriao, a district in the city, as Jaranilla told Gorriceta that he had to get something from his uncle’s place. Gorriceta initially demurred but the appellants eventually prevailed. Upon reaching Mandurriao, they parked the pickup truck at a distance 50 – 70 meters away from the provincial hospital and Gorriceta was instructed to wait for the defendants as they alighted. After twenty minutes, the three accused arrived carrying two roosters each. They ran to the truck and instructed Gorriceta to drive immediately as they were being chased. Gorriceta then drove the truck to Jaro, another city district. The four of them were on the front seat of the truck. Gorriceta, as the driver, was on the extreme left and to his right was Suyo. Next to Suyo was Brillantes and on the extreme right was Jaranilla. In the middle of the road, they were intercepted by Policemen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin Castro. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policemn after Jabatan fired a warning shot. Jabatan went to the right side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all of them to step out which they did not heed. Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it while Suyo did nothing. Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened Gorriceta who immediately started the truck and drove straight home while Jaranilla kept on firing towards Jabatan. Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted in front of Gorriceta’s house where the latter was instructed not to tell anybody about the inicident. Gorriceta went to his room and after a while, he heard policemen calling his name asking him to come down. He initially hid in the ceiling of his house and it wasn’t until 8am the following day that he decided to come down and was brought to police headquarters. ISSUE:. Whether or not defendants Suyo and Brillantes are liable as co principal in the crime of Homicide. Was there violence and intimidation in the taking of roosters?

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HELD: The killing of the peace officer is characterized as homicide because the act was made during the spur of the moment and the treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or deliberately adopted by the offender. In addition, only persons who perpetrated the killing is responsible for such action. Furthermore, mere presence in the crime scene does not necessarily make a person co-principal thereof. Hence, only the accused, Elias Jaranilla, who perpetrated the killing is responsible and liable for robbery and homicide. The co-accused, Suyo and Brillantes, are convicted of theft.Therefore, the decision of the lower court is reversed and sentenced the accused, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes, as co-principals in the crime of theft. The crime was theft and not robbery.There was no evidence that violence or intimidation was employed in the taking of the roosters hence, Art. 298 of the RPC (Robbery with violence against or intimidation) could not be invoked. It also could not fall under Art. 299 (which penalizes robbery in an inhabited house, public building or edifice devoted to worship) as the chicken coop was outside Baylon’s house. Nor was it a dependency thereof as contemplated under Art. 301. March 27, 2018 – Article 299 – ROBBERY IN AN INHABITED HOUSE OR PUBLIC BUILDING OR EDIFICE DEVOTED TO WORSHIP ALILIAN, Enna B. G.R. No. L-2725 February 27, 1950 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ESTEBAN SEBASTIAN Y PANGILINAN (alias ERNING) and MAURO PANGILINAN Y SALTA, MAURO PANGILINAN Y SALTA (appellant) FACTS: The appellant allegedly entered the house no. 179 Simon street, City of Manila, and by means of threat and intimidation took, stole, and carried away cash money, and other personal things of the inhabitants. The appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted by the lower court of robbery under article 299 of the RPC. ISSUE: WoN the lower court correctly convicted the appellant for robbery under Art 299 RPC HELD: No. The fact that the information to which appellant pleaded guilty does not allege that the robbery was committed under any of the circumstances enumerated in said article, such as entering the house through an opening not intended for entrance or egress, the breaking of doors, etc., it is now settled that were robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is characterized by intimidation, this factor "supplies the controlling qualification", so that the law to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory that "robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence and intimidation against the person is present there

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST is a greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the individual." G.R. No. 181138 December 3, 2012 RICKY "TOTSIE" MARQUEZ, ROY BERNARDO, and JOMER MAGALONG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: The appellant was found guilty of robbery under Art 299 RPC for destroying the door lock of the stall of one SONIA VALDEROSA and passing/entering thru the same, once inside, took, robbed and carried away the items inside the store. ISSUE: WoN the Trial Court and CA correctly convicted the appellants for robbery under Art 299 RPC HELD: No. The records show that the store alleged to have been robbed by petitioners is not an inhabited house, public building or building dedicated to religious worship and their dependencies under Article 299 and as defined under Article 301. From Valderosa’s testimony, it can be deduced that the establishment allegedly robbed was a store not used as a dwelling. In fact, after the robbery took place, there was a need to inform Valderosa of the same as she was obviously not residing in the store.58 "If the store was not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and was not used as a dwelling, since the owner lived in a separate house, the robbery committed therein is punished under Article 302, not 299.

simple robbery, but found against all the defendants the generic aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and a gang, and a moreover against Juan Morada, Isidro Babano, and Librado Sugcay that of previous conviction, and against Gil Revilla that of vagrancy. Isidro Babano and Gil Revilla appealed from this judgment, while Morada and Sugcay submitted to it. Later, Babano withdrew his appeal to this court. HELD: Under the Penal Code of the Philippines, robbery with force upon things, in order to be qualified, must be committed in an uninhabited place and in a gang. It did not think applicable to article 300, because, according to its interpretation, the robbery is qualified when it is committed in an uninhabited place and in a gang, these two qualifications concurring, which does not happen in the present case, for it does not appear that the house wherein the robbery was perpetrated was located in an uninhabited place. March 26, 2018 – Article 301 – WHAT IS AN INHABITED HOUSE, PUBLIC BUILDING OR BUILDING DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS WORSHIP AND THEIR DEPENDENCIES BANUELOS, Kelvinn L. [NO CASE FOUND] March 27, 2018 – Article 302 – ROBBERY IN AN UNINHABITED PLACE OR IN A PRIVATE BUILDING BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.

March 26, 2018 – Article 300 – ROBBERY IN AN UNINHABITED PLACE AND BY A BAND ARANCES, Javy Ann G.

MARQUEZ VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 181138 DECEMBER 3, 2012 DEL CASTILLO, J.:

THE UNITED STATES VS JUAN MORADA, ET AL. G.R. NO. L-8183, NOVEMBER 19, 1912 PONENTE: JUSTICE ARELLANO

ISSUE: Whether or not all of the accused are guilty of the crime of robbery with force upon things.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents should be charged of Robbery in an uninhabited place and by a band. FACTS: On December 24, 1911, Juan Morada entered the shop to get, as he did, coin amounting to P20 and various articles such as cans of salmon and sardines, rice, penknives, a razor and comb, all together worth P31.80 and not recovered, excepting some worth P1.17. The owner of the shop, the Chinese Iyong, awoke and caught up a stick, but as he did, so some things fell and made a noise, so Morada fled. The next day a penknife, a can of sardines, and another of salmon were found in the possession of Librado Sugcay, who voluntarily confessed to the municipal police sergeant of Mambajao, the scene of the occurrence, and through him, the other defendants were soon discovered. Evidence of alibi having been rejected and proof of conviction being well established, the Court of First Instance of Misamis classified the crime as

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FACTS: At around 2:30 a.m. of April 6, 2002, Marlon Mallari (Mallari) was with petitioners and Benzon in front of the University of the East (U.E.), Caloocan City. Marquez suggested that the group rob the Rice-in-a-Box store located at the corner of U.E. Marquez then got a lead pipe and handed it to Magalong, which he and Bernardo used to destroy the padlock of the store. Mallari was designated as the look-out while petitioners and Benzon entered the store and carried away all the items inside it which consisted of rice cookers, a blender and food items.13 They then brought the stolen items to the house of Benzon’s uncle. Apprehensive that Mallari might squeal, the group promised to give him a share if they could sell the stolen items. At 9:30 a.m. of the same day, Valderosa received information from the daughter of the owner of the premises where her Rice-in-a- Box franchise store was located, that her store had been forcibly opened and its padlock destroyed. Upon her arrival thereat, she discovered that the contents of her freezer were missing along with other items inside the store. he total value of

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST these stolen items was approximately P42,000.00. She reported the robbery to the police. Meanwhile, on April 7, 2002, Mallari informed his older brother of his involvement in the said robbery. At around 4:00 p.m. of the next day, he again confessed but this time to Valderosa. Both the RTC and CA found them guilty of the crime of robbery with force upon things. Hence, this petition. RULING: Yes, the petition of the accused has no merit. ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building. - Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than those mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 299, if the value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, provided that any of the following circumstances is present: 1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for entrance or egress; 2. If any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window has been broken; 3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks, or other similar tools; 4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle has been broken; 5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be broken open elsewhere. When the value of the property taken does not exceed 250 pesos, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed. Under Article 293 of the RPC, robbery is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another by using force upon anything. When committed in an uninhabited place or a private building with the circumstance, among others, that any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window has been broken, the same is penalized under Article 302. Article 302 of the RPC provides that when the robbery is committed in an uninhabited place or in a private building and the value of the property exceeds P250.00, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods provided that, among other circumstances, any wall, roof, floor, or the outside door or window has been broken. Considering that petitioners burglarized the store of Valderosa which was not used as a dwelling by breaking its door and stealing property therein with a total value of P42,000.00, the penalty that must be imposed is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. PEOPLE VS. JARANILLA G.R. NO. L-28547 FEBRUARY 22, 1974 AQUINO, J.:

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ISSUE: Whether the taking of the six roosters is covered by article 302 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS: On January 9, 1966, Gorriceta was driving a pickup truck and while going home he saw Jaranilla, Suyo, and Brillantes. They hailed Gorriceta who stopped the truck. Jaranilla requested to bring them to Mandurriao, a district in another part of the city. Gorriceta demurred. He told Jaranilla that he (Gorriceta) was on his way home. Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta to take them to Mandurriao because Jaranilla ostensibly had to get something from his uncle's place. So, Jaranilla, Brillantes and Suyo boarded the pickup truck which Gorriceta drove to Mandurriao. Upon reaching Mandurriao, the three passengers alighted from the truck and instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. 20 minutes had passed when they reappeared. Each of them was carrying two fighting cocks. Jaranilla directed Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being chased. While traversing the detour road, they saw the Patrolmen Jabatan and Castro running towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after Patrolman Jabatan had fired a warning shot and was signalling with his flashlight that the truck should stop. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policeman. Jabatan approached the right side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of the truck to go down. They did not heed the injunction of the policeman. Jaranilla shot Patrolman Jabatan. He immediately started the motor of the truck and drove straight home. Jaranilla kept on firing towards Jabatan. After reaching Gorriceta’s home, Jaranilla warned Gorriceta not to tell anybody about the incident. The next morning, all of them were arrested. RULING: No, one essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under Articles 299 and 302 is that the malefactor should enter the building or dependency, where the object to be taken is found. Articles 299 and 302 clearly contemplate that the malefactor should enter the building (casa habitada o lugar no habitado o edificio). If the culprit did not enter the building, there would be no robbery with force upon things. The term "building" in article 302, formerly 512 of the old Penal Code, was construed as embracing any structure not mentioned in article 299 (meaning not an "inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship" or any dependency thereof) used for storage and safekeeping of personal property. As thus construed, a freight car used for the shipment of sugar was considered a private building. The unnailing of a strip of cloth nailed over the door, the customary manner of sealing a freight car, was held to constitute breaking by force within the meaning of article 512, now article 302. Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the accused were animated by single criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is punishable as a single offense of theft.

shall be punished by presidio correccional in its medium and maximum degrees, etc.

PEOPLE VS. TUBOG G.R. NO. L-26284 NOVEMBER 17, 1926

For such reasons, the penalty of the lower court is modified and reduced.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of robbery in an uninhabited place.

March 27, 2018 – Article 303 – ROBBERY OF CEREALS, FRUITS, OR FIREWOOD IN AN UNINHABITED PLACE OR PRIVATE BUILDING CEBALLOS, Jesus C

FACTS: That on or about June 22, 1926, in the muncilipality of Jagna, Province of Bohol, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named defendants did willingly and criminally, with intent of gain and through force upon things, conspiring and armed with weapons, did take, steal and carry away the iron safe "Safe Thomas Perry & Son, Bilston" containing the sum of P1,930 and other articles in the store, said defendants having broken the lock of one of the doors of the store and a part of the safe for the purpose of opening the same, and the defendant Juan Tubog as accessory after the fact. Upon arraignment, all accused pleaded guilty and as to the defendant Santiago Rubi (alias Santiago Lucero) and the appellant, as principal, each was sentenced to ten years and one day of presidio mayor, with the accessory penalties, and to pay one-fourth of the costs. The defendant Juan Tubog was sentenced to five months and ten days of arresto mayor. From this judgment the defendant Florencio Postrero appeals without assigning any error. The Attorney-General then says that in the instant case, the information does not allege that the store in which the robbery was committed was inhabited at the time of the commission of the crime, and that for want of which, the penalty should be imposed under article 512 (Article 302 of the RPC) of the Penal Code. RULING: Yes. In the instant case, the appellant is not specifically charged with a violation of article 508, and the information alleges that the entrance was made by breaking "the lock of one of the doors of the store." The fact that entrance was made in that manner clearly implies and carries with it the further fact that there was no person inside the store at the time the lock was broken, and that the defendants had to break the lock to get into the store. For failure of the information to allege that the store was used occupied as "an unhabitted place" at the time of the commission of the crime, the contention of the Attorney-General must be sustained. As the law now exists, the penalty for the commission of robbery committed in "an inhabited place" comes under article 508, and the penalty for the commission of that crime in a store, standing alone and within itself comes under the provisions of article 512 which provides: Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in any building other than those mentioned in paragraph one of article five hundred and eight

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PEOPLE V. RADA GR NO. L-16988 DEC. 30, 1991 ISSUE: WoN they were properly charged in court. FACTS: Rada, Bahenting and Canas were charged with the crime of robbery in an uninhabited house, under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The accused allegedly entered a bodega owned by Bastida and stole nine (9) sacks of palay. On arraignment, they pleaded not guilty because the crime was supposedly under Art. 303 of the RPC. Thereupon, they filed a motion to quash which the court granted. HELD: No, they were not. The Court held that the term rice does not only mean hulled rice but also includes palay, as the seed is locally known, as well as the plant itself. If the word rice includes the grain in its original state without the hull being taken away, then the conclusion is inevitable that “rice” is included under the term “semilla alimenticia” or cereal seeds. March 27, 2018 – Article 304 – POSSESSION OF PICKLOCKS OR SIMILAR TOOLS DAHIROC, Janice L. PEOPLE VS. RAMON LOPEZ GR No. L-18766, May 20, 1965 ISSUE: Whether or not the possession of 7 false keys constitute the crime in article 304 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: At 10:00 A.M. of December 21, 1960, the Chief of Police of Bacuag, Surigao del Norte, apprehended three suspicious-looking strangers who were loitering in Pagao, a sitio of Bacuag. A bag which they were carrying was confiscated with the following contents: three carbines, caliber .30 M1; one revolver, caliber .22; three flashlights with batteries; two carbine ammunition magazines, fully loaded; twelve rounds of carbine ammunition; one balisong; a screw driver; seven false keys, one of which was a master key; trousers; shirts; and a pair of shoes. After an investigation the aforesaid persons Ramon Lopez, Manuel Buico and Arturo Caniete were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Bacuag with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and, in a separate complaint, the crime of illegal possession of false keys. They pleaded

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST guilty to illegal possession of firearms, not guilty to illegal, possession of false keys. HELD: Article 304 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "Art. 304. Possession of picklocks or similar tools. Any person who shall without lawful cause have in his possession picklocks or similar tools specially adapted to the commission of the crime of robbery, shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correctional in its minimum period." Such crime of illegal possession of picklocks or similar tools has, accordingly, two elements: (1) possession of picklocks or similar tools specially adapted to the commission of the crime of robbery; (2) such possession is without lawful cause. The information alleged that the accused possessed, "without lawful cause seven (7) false keys, one of which is a picklock or master key". A picklock a tool used in picking locks is in itself specially adapted to the commission of robbery of the kind provided for in Articles 299 (a) 3 and 302, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code: ART. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or Office devoted to worship. Any armed person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished by reclusion temporal, if the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if the malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery was committed, by using false keys, picklocks or similar tools." Art. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building. - Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than those mentioned in the first paragraph of article 299, if the value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos, shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods provided that any of the following circumstances is present: "3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of keys, picklocks or other similar tools." Since picking of locks is one way to gain entrance to commit robbery, a picklock is per se specially adapted to the commission of robbery. The description in the information of a picklock as "specially adapted to the commission of robbery" is therefore unnecessary for its sufficiency. Notwithstanding the omission of such superfluous description, therefore, the charge of the offense of illegal possession of a picklock is .valid. We find both elements of the crime clearly alleged in the information in question. It follows that the term "false keys" appearing in the information sufficiently describes such tools. Wherefore, the order quashing the information is hereby set aside and the case is remanded for further trial, without costs. March 28, 2018 – Article 305 – FALSE KEYS DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J

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G.R. No. L-4429 December 24, 1908 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIXTO GALURAN, ET AL., defendants. SYTOC, appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of robbery with the use false keys was committed? FACTS: Galuran was a porter in the warehouse of the firm of Smith, Bell and Co. The appellant, SyYoc, quite frequently went to the said firm in order to arrange for the sale of certain boxes that the manufactured. On one of these visits he proposed to Galuran that he, Galuran, should get some of the cases of whiskey that were stored in the warehouse and take them over to the appellant's house, and that he would pay P16 for each case. Sy-Yoc suggested that he take an impression of the key of the warehouse in soap paste and have another key made by a locksmith. Galuran duly obtained an impression of the key and took it to Sy-Yoc; the latter sent for a locksmith, whom he paid for a key as soon as it was made according to the mold. Galuran was able to open the warehouse, from which, assisted by Dizon, he took two cases of whisky. These cases they at once took in a carromata to the store or establishment of Sy-Yoc, where they were surprised, while in the act of depositing the cases in question inside, and arrested by a secret-service agent who had been watching them from the street and had followed them. HELD: Yes. These facts, which we hold to have been proven, clearly show the guilt of the appellant, Sy-Yoc, as the instigator of the crime herein prosecuted. From him came the initiative in the robbery; he was the first to conceive the idea of its commission, and, being unable unwilling to carry it out himself, he employed Galuran, impelling him to the material execution of the crime by a promise to pay him P16 for each case of whisky that he was able to steal. The better to induce him to commit the offense, he cleverly demonstrated how easily he could be accomplished, instructed him as to the best means of carrying it out, and offered him money to pay for the false key. He thus removed all the difficulties in the way of determination to execute, and the actual execution of the robbery in question. These acts constitute a real inducement made directly for the commission of the said robbery, and place the appellant, SyYoc, in the position of principal in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code. March 28, 2018 – Article 306 – WHO ARE BRIGANDS; PENALTY DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G. PEOPLE V. LAURANTE, GR NO. 116734, MARCH 29, 1996 FACTS: Larry Laurente together with Melvin Dagudog and Richard Disipulo, who are still at large, robbed Herminiano Artana of his earnings in an undetermined amount along F. Concepcion St.,

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Bgy. San Joaquin, Pasig, Metro Manila, which is a Philippine Highway. For insuring success of their criminal act, said accused strangled the victim with a leather belt and hit him with a blunt instrument, causing him to sustain physical injuries which directly caused his death. SPO1 Crsipin Pio received a case assignment relative to Herminiano Artana and went to the place of incident. He saw inside the taxicab a dead man. He then conducted a crime scene search inside the taxicab and within the vicinity, he found a brown wallet containing a Social Security System (SSS) ID of Larry Laurente and a leather belt supposedly used in strangling the dead man. He requested the SSS to secure the complete record of Laurente. From the SSS records, the police authorities learned that Laurente lived somewhere in Pasig; accordingly, a follow-up team was formed to arrest him. Several witnesses were presented by the prosecution. On the other hand, Laurente interposed the defense of alibi. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed was brigandage. HELD: No. Presidential Decree No. 532 is a modification of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of highway robbery invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymous with brigandage, that is, as highway robbery/brigandage. This is but in line with previous rulings that highway robbers and brigands are synonymous. The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in Art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of Art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by Art. 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. Therefore, the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision precisely defines highway robbery/brigandage and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage. In the instant case, there is not a shred of evidence that Laurente and his coaccused, or their acts, fall within the purview of P.D. No. 532Thus, Laurente cannot be validly

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convicted for highway robbery with homicide under P.D. No 532. March 28, 2018 – Article 307 – AIDING AND ABETTING A BAND OF BRIGANDS (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 532) DIZON, Roxan Danica G. VIERNES VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 161970 June 30, 2006 FACTS: On November 15, 1992, at around 7:00 in the evening, while Josefina and her husband Ronaldo Lopango were on board a passenger jeepney, four of eight co-passengers declared a hold-up. Ronaldo resisted the attempt to hold him up by one of the four by kicking him, but another stabbed him three times causing him to fall from the jeepney. Josefina also fell from the jeepney upon which she brought Ronaldo to the hospital where he died after a few minutes. Josefina reported the incident to the police station. The trial court found the accused guilty of highway robbery under P.D. No. 532. It was modified on appeal by the Court of Appeals to simple robbery. ISSUE: WON the accused are guilty for a violation of PD No. 532 (The Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) HELD: In crimes of robbery, the offender must be proven to have unlawfully taken personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything. While the general rule is that contradictions and discrepancies between the testimony of a witness and his sworn statement do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte statements are generally incomplete, the rule is not without exception as, e.g., when the omission in the sworn statement refers to a very important detail of the incident which the one relating the incident as an eyewitness would not be expected to fail to mention, or when the narration in the sworn statement substantially contradicts the testimony in court. Josefina's assertion that the taking of her bag slipped from her mind because of her husband taxes credulity as the hold-up occurred only three hours earlier. To forget to mention the loss of the bag maybe excusable, but to categorically state that nothing was taken from them when she was asked, infirms Josefina's overall credibility. Josefina's uncorroborated testimony is tainted with inconsistencies on material points to thus lead the Court to discredit it and uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused. Accused-petitioner Viernes is, on reasonable doubt, acquitted of the charge of violation of P.D. No. 532.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPPINES VS AGOMO-O ET AL GR NO. 131829 JUNE 23,2000 FACTS: On September 22, 1993, at around 7:30 in the evening, a passenger jeepney driven by Rodito Lasap was stopped by three men-Eddy Paneza and Oscar Servando, and Ronnie Agomo-o, who, armed with a gun,and bladed weapons announced a hold-up and ordered the driver to turn off the engine. Ronnie Agomo-o shot the driver Rodito Lasap. He died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. They had stolen a wrist watch and cash money for a total value of three thousand three eighty pesos from the driver and passengers. Freddie Agrabio was also stabbed with a bladed weapon during such event. ISSUE: WON the accused are guilty of highway robbery under PD No. 532 HELD: Accused-appellants assert that they cannot be convicted of highway robbery as the crime was not committed by at least four persons, as required in Article 306 of the Revised Penal Code. However, highway robbery is now governed by P.D. No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. This law provides: Sec. 2. (e).Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway. In the case of People v. Puno,it was held that P.D. No. 532 amended Art. 306 of the Revised Penal Code and that it is no longer required that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers. The number of offenders is no longer an essential element of the crime of highway robbery. Hence, the fact that there were only three identified perpetrators is of no moment. P.D. No. 532 only requires proof that persons were organized for the purpose of committing highway robbery indiscriminately. The robbery must be directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims. In this case, the accused, intending to commit robbery, waited at the Barangay Mapili crossing for any vehicle that would happen to travel along that road. The driver Rodito Lasap and his passengers were not predetermined targets. Rather, they became the accused's victims because they happened to be traveling at the time when the accused were there. There was, thus, randomness in the selection of the victims, or the act of committing robbery indiscriminately, which differentiates this case from that of a simple robbery with homicide. The accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the provisions of

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Section 3, Paragraph (b) of Presidential Decree No. 532. March 29, 2018 – Article 308 – THEFT DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P. G.R. No. L-16961, September 19, 1921 THE UNITED STATES vs. NIEVES DE VERA Y GAYTE FACTS: on the 20th of February, 1920, three Igorots named Jose II, Balatan, and Pepe were on the Escolta, of this city, trying to dispose of a bar of gold when an Ilocano invited them to go to his house, stating that there was a woman there who would buy the precious metal. they accompanied the Ilocano to the house indicated by him where they met a woman, the accused herein, who apparently, was desirous of buying the gold and requested them to hand it to her so that she might take it to a silversmith and have it examined, stating that she would return within a short time to report the result. The Igorot Pepe, who was the owner of the bar of gold, thereupon handed it to her, together with P200 in bank notes which her requested to her to have changed into silver coins were more desirable in the Mountain Province. The woman then left the house at about 12 o'clock on that day, asking the Igorots to wait there. But the woman did not return. They waited in vain for hours for her and at nightfall they agreed that one of them should remain on watch while the other two went to the Meisic police station to report the matter. The police acted promptly and effectively. The policeman Jose Gonzales, assigned to take charge of the case, soon identified the woman who had taken away the bar of gold, by the description which the Igorots had given him, and at a few minutes after 11 o'clock he already was in a house on Calle Barcelona, examining the accused as to the whereabout of the bar of gold and the bank notes of the Igorots. As the woman gave evasive answers, it became necessary to ask for assistance from the office of the police, and shortly thereafter, two other policemen, Mr. Abbot and one Ronas, arrived, who took the woman to the house at No. 541 Calle Regidor, followed by Gonzales and the three Igorots. There the bar of gold divided into three pieces was found wrapped in a handkerchief and placed inside the water tank of a water-closet. The accused requested one Mamerta de la Rosa to let her have P150 which she in turn handed to the policeman. According to Exhibit B, which is a certificate issued by the Bureau of Science, the bar of gold delivered to the accused weighed 559.7 grammes and was worth P587.68 at the rate of P1.05 per gramme; whereas, the three bars found by the police weighed only 416 grammes, and were therefore, 143.7 grammes short. Of the P200 bank notes delivered to the accused, she returned only P150. In view of the above stated facts, which appear in the cause to have been duly proven, the accused was sentenced by the court a quo to the penalty already mentioned.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence does not establish the essential elements of theft. HELD: No. The argument advanced in support of the contention of the defense is that the goods misappropriated were not taken by the accused without the consent of the owner who had delivered them to her voluntarily, and this element being lacking, it cannot be the crime of theft. It is well to remember the essential elements of the crime of theft, as expounded in the textbooks, which are as follows: First, the taking of personal property, second, that the property belongs to another; third, that the taking away be done with intent of gain; fourth, that the taking away be done without consent of the owner; and fifth, that the taking away be accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. The commentators on the Spanish Penal Code, from which ours was adopted, lay great stress on the first element which is the taking away, that is, getting possession, laying hold of the thing, so that, as Viada says if, the things is not taken away, but received and then appropriated or converted without the consent of the owner, it may be any other crime, that of estafa for instance, but in no way that of theft, which consists in the taking away of the thing, that is, in removing it from the place where it is kept by the legal owner, without the latter's consent, of the legitimate owner. The American decisions an textbooks on "larceny," a crime which has the same characteristics as those oaf theft under our Penal Code, contain abundant illustrations of the question raised in the present case. The intention of the owner to part with his property is the gist and essence of the offense of theft (larceny), and the vital point on which the crime hinges and is to be determined. A felonious taking necessary in the crime of larceny, and generally speaking, a taking which is done with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious. But is the owner parts with the possession thereof for a particular purpose, and the person who receives the possession avowedly for that purpose has the fraudulent intention to make use of it as the means of converting it to his own use, and does so convert it, this is larceny, for in such case, the fraud supplies the place of the trespass in the taking, or, as otherwise stated, the subsequent felonious conversion of the property by the alleged thief will relate back and make the taking and conversion larceny. And it has been said that the act goes farther than the consent, and may be fairly said to be against it. If money is given to a person to be applied to a particular purpose, it is larceny for the receiver to appropriate it to his own use which was not the purpose contemplated by the owner. Obtaining money under the false pretense that it is to be bet on a horse race, and with the intent at the time to

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convert it to the bailee's own use, the race being a mere sham to aid this purpose, is larceny. The rule has been applied also to cases in which a person takes a piece of money from another to change, and keeps it with the unlawful intent to convert it and refuses to deliver the money given to him or the change therefore, on demand; and the fact that the taking was open and from the owner is of no consequence, if the intent to steal existed. This is so for the reason that the delivery of money to another for the sole purpose of getting it changed is a parting with the custody only and not the amount does not relieve him from liability for the larceny of the entire amount given him. Where the parties are engaged in a cash sale the whole transaction is incomplete until the payment is completed; and the possession of the goods remains in the seller and that of the money in the buyer, until they are simultaneously exchanged. If, in such case, the buyer gets control of the goods and makes off with them without paying for them, he is guilty of larceny. And conversely if the seller gets the money and refuses to give up the goods, it is larceny. Thus, where one surrenders up his watch with the understanding that he is immediately to receive 50 dollars for it, the keeping of the watch without payment of money is larceny. And where a tradesman handed good to a customer to examine and the latter ran away with them, he was held guilty of larceny. Similarly, where one unloaded onions which he owned on the premises of a prospective buyer, who thereupon refused to pay for the onions or to allow the seller to remove them, it was held larceny, as the owner never intended to part with the possession of the onions until he received his money therefor. One, waiting in crowd to purchase a railway ticket, requested another nearer the ticket office to buy a ticket for her, handing him the money to pay for it. He made off with money and was held guilty of larceny. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the crime proven in the cause to have been committed by the appellant by appropriating the gold bar delivered to her for examination, and by converting to her own use, without the consent of the owner, the bank notes which had been handed her to be exchanged for silver coins, is that of theft, defined and punished in article 518, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code. And the appealed judgment being in accordance with law, it must be, as is hereby, affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered. G.R. No. 210760 , January 26, 2015 KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution tends to establish that Zabala is a jeepney driver who earns Two Hundred Pesos (₱200) to Four Hundred Pesos (₱400) per day on an alternate day basis. Complainant Alas, meanwhile, works at the Manila City Hall. It is through this job that he was able to save the Sixty-Eight Thousand Pesos (₱68,000) stolen by Zabala. Piñon, on the other hand, had been the girlfriend of Zabalafor

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST about five months when the incident pertinent to this case occurred. Alas testified that he and Zabalawere neighbors in San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan. As neighbors,he had treated Zabala as his kumpare and would often invite the latter to drinking sessions inside his house. At times, he would also call Zabala to repair his vehicle, because Zabala is also a mechanic. He would allow Zabala to follow him to his bedroom to get cash whenever spare parts are to be bought for the repair of his vehicle. Alas further testified that on June 18, 2007, at about 4:00 in the morning, he left his house to go to work. When he returned from work, at around 11:00 in the evening, he discovered that his money amounting to Sixty Eight Thousand Pesos (₱68,000), which he kept in an envelope inside his closet, was missing. During that time, there were only five (5) persons living in their house: Alas, his parents, his nine (9) year-old son, and his aunt. He asked his parents and aunt if they knew where he kept his money, but they did not know. Witness Piñon, on the other hand, testified that in the early morning of June 18, 2007, she and Zabala, her boyfriend at the time, were together at a store owned by the latter, which was six to seven steps away from the complainant’s house. She then saw Zabala climb the fence and scale the tree in front of the complainant’s house, and enter the house. When he returned, she noticed that he had a bulge in his pocket, which she later found to be a plentiful sum of money. Zabala then brought her home, and agreed to meet her again at about 10:00 in the morning. They then went to Greenhills, where Zabala bought two Nokia mobile phones, which cost about Eight Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱8,500). On July 7, 2011, the RTC rendered its Judgment convicting petitioner of the offense charged. Aggrieved by the Judgment, petitioner appealed to the CA, attributing to the lower court the following errors: (1) there was a grave error in not giving credence to petitioner’s version; (2) petitioner was convicted of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) petitioner cannot be convicted based on circumstantial evidence. In its presently assailed Decision promulgated on July 15, 2013, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court, but with modification as to the penalty to be imposed upon petitioner. The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant through circumstantial evidence. The CA then found that the series of circumstances present in this case supports a conviction, and constitutes the basis for a reasonable inference of the existence of the facts thereby sought to be proved. Rejecting the defense of petitioner, the CA ruled that he offered no evidence other than an alibi to exculpate him from the crime charged. It then

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cited the rule that alibi is a weakdefense, and cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a truthful witness. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty for theft. HELD: No. The prosecution failed to establish, by circumstantial evidence, that petitioner is guilty of theft. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this Court finds that the prosecution failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the petitioner of the offense charged. We find that the pieces of evidence presented before the trial court fail to provide a sufficient combination of circumstances, as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To recall, the evidence of the prosecution purports to establish the following narrative: first, that the complaining witness Alas hides ₱68,000 in cash in his closet inside their house; second, that petitioner is aware that Alas hides money in his bedroom closet; third, that on the night of the incident, petitioner was with his then girlfriend, witness Piñon; fourth, that petitioner climbed through the fence of Alas’s house, and was able to successfully gain entrance to his house; fifth, that petitioner later went out of the house with a bulge in his pockets; and sixth, that later that day, petitioner and Piñon went shopping for a cellphone. The foregoing narration––based on the testimonies of the two witnesses of the prosecution, even if given full faith and credit and considered as established facts––failsto establish that petitioner committed the crime of theft. If at all, it may possibly constitute evidence that petitioner committed an offense, but not necessarily theft. In the case before the Court,the evidence presented by the prosecution fails to establish the corpus delicti of theft. In Tan v. People, this Court said: Corpus delicti means the "body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed." The "essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things." In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. First, nobody saw Zabala enter the bedroom of Alas, where the money amounting to ₱68,000 was allegedly kept and hidden. It is interesting to note that while Alas testified that there were other persons living in that house, i.e. his family members, the prosecution failed to put any of them on the witness stand, to testify that they saw or heard something out of the ordinary at the time the incident allegedly took place, or to explain why nobody else was able to notice that the theft took place while Alas was absent. Witness Piñon, meanwhile, merely testified that

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST she saw Zabala scale the fence of Alas’ house and enter it. She did not actually see Zabala enter the room of Alas, where the money was hidden. Second, the evidence presented below is insufficient to determine without a reasonable doubt that the ₱68,000 in cash was lost due to felonious taking, and, more importantly, that it was petitioner who committed the felonious taking. Even if believed in its entirety, the testimony of witness Piñon does not show that when petitioner left the house of Alas, he was carrying the ₱68,000 incash which was supposedly lost. All that Piñon saw was the bulge in petitioner’s pockets. Piñon’s testimony can considered as evidence to prove that when petitioner entered the house of Alas, he did so because of his intent to commit asportation. Third, Piñon' s testimony fails to establish that Alas' pocket indeed contained the stolen money, as she never actually saw what was inside the pocket of Zabala. While she testified that later that day, they went to buy 2 cellphones amounting to ₱8,500, she failed to testify whether the money that Zabala used in paying for the cellphone was retrieved from the very same bulging pocket which she saw earlier in the day, which would have led to the conclusion that Zabala's pocket contained money. Failing this, what is left is the fact that Pifion saw a bulge in Zabala's pocket, and there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that his pocket in fact was used to hide the money that he allegedly stole. The trial and appellate courts committed error in accepting as fact that Zabala's pocket contained money, when there is a dearth of evidence to support such allegation. And fourth, the rule in circumstantial evidence cases is that the evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person committed the crime.21 In the case here, however, the prosecution failed to prove, or even allege, that it was impossible for some other person to have committed the crime of theft against Alas. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence that at the time the theft was committed, there was no other person inside the house of Alas, or that no other person could have taken the money from the closet of Alas. Alas himself admitted that there were other residents in the house, but these persons were never presented to prove their whereabouts at the time the incident took place. This failure of the prosecution leads the Court to no other conclusion but that they failed to establish that culpability could only belong to Zabala, and not to some other person. Given the foregoing discussion, We find that petit10ner was wrongfully convicted of theft.1âwphi1 In the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence must be upheld, and thus, petitioner should be acquitted. G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013 RYAN VIRAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Private complainant Vedua maintains seventyfive (75) dogs at her compound in Caridad, Cavite

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City. To assist her in feeding the dogs and cleaning their cages, private complainant employed the accused who would report for work from 6:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On October 19, 2006, at around 6:30 in the morning, accused arrived for work. Half an hour later or at 7 o’clock, private complainant left for Batangas. Before leaving, she locked the doors of her house, and left the accused to attend to her dogs. Later, at around 7:00 in the evening, private complainant arrived home, entering through the back door of her house. As private complainant was about to remove her earrings, she noticed that her other earrings worth PhP 25,000 were missing. She then searched for the missing earrings but could not find them. Thereafter, private complainant also discovered that her jacket inside her closet and her other pieces of jewelry (rositas) worth PhP 250,000 were also missing. A Gameboy (portable videogame console), a compact disc player, a Nokia cellular phone and a Nike Air Cap were likewise missing. The total value of the missing items supposedly amounted to PhP 297,800. Private complainant immediately checked her premises and discovered that the main doors of her house were destroyed. A plastic bag was also found on top of her stereo, which was located near the bedroom. The plastic bag contained a tshirt and a pair of shorts later found to belong to accused. Witness Nimfa Sarad, the laundrywoman of Vedua’s neighbor, testified seeing Viray at Vedua’s house at 6:00 a.m. By 11:00 a.m., she went out on an errand and saw Viray with an unidentified male companion leaving Vedua’s house with a big sack. Another witness, Leon Young, who prepares official/business letters for Vedua, testified that he went to Vedua’s house between 10:00 and 11:00 am of October 19, 2006 to retrieve a diskette and saw petitioner with a male companion descending the stairs of Vedua’s house. He alleged that since he knew Viray as an employee of private complainant, he simply asked where Vedua was. When he was told that Vedua was in Batangas, he left and went back three days after, only to be told about the robbery. Prosecution witness Beverly Calagos, Vedua’s stay-out laundrywoman, testified that on October 19, 2006, she reported for work at 5:00 a.m. Her employer left for Batangas at 7:00 am leaving her and petitioner Viray to go about their chores. She went home around 8:30 a.m. leaving petitioner alone in Vedua’s house. Meanwhile, petitioner never reported for work after that day. For his defense, Viray averred that he did not report for work on the alleged date of the incident as he was then down with the flu. His mother even called up Vedua at 5:30 a.m. to inform his employer of his intended absence. Around midnight of October 20, 2006, Vedua called Viray’s mother to report the loss of some valuables in her house and alleged that Viray is responsible for it. Petitioner’s sister and aunt corroborated his version as regards the fact that he did not go to work on October 19, 2006 and stayed home sick.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST After the parties rested their respective cases, the trial court rendered a Decision dated December 5, 2009, holding that the offense charged should have been robbery and not qualified theft as there was an actual breaking of the screen door and the main door to gain entry into the house. Similarly, Viray cannot be properly charged with qualified theft since he was not a domestic servant but more of a laborer paid on a daily basis for feeding the dogs of the complainant. The trial court found that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude that Viray was the one responsible for the taking of valuables belonging to Vedua. Hence, the RTC found petitioner Viray guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery and sentenced him. In the present controversy, while the CA modified the decision of the trial court by convicting petitioner of qualified theft rather than robbery, the facts as found by the court a quo were the same facts used by the CA in holding that all the elements of qualified theft through grave abuse of confidence were present. It is not, therefore, incumbent upon this Court to recalibrate the evidence presented by the parties during trial. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable only for simple theft, not robbery nor qualified theft. HELD: YES. Art. 308 in relation to Art. 310 of the RPC describes the felony of qualified theft: Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent. xxxx Art. 310. Qualified Theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. The crime charged against petitioner is theft qualified by grave abuse of confidence. In this mode of qualified theft, this Court has stated that the following elements must be satisfied before the accused may be convicted of the crime charged: 1. Taking of personal property; 2. That the said property belongs to another; 3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be done without the owner’s consent; 5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and 6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

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As pointed out by both the RTC and the CA, the prosecution had proved the existence of the first four elements enumerated above beyond reasonable doubt. First, it was proved that the subjects of the offense were all personal or movable properties, consisting as they were of jewelry, clothing, cellular phone, a media player and a gaming device. Second, these properties belong to private complainant Vedua. Third, circumstantial evidence places petitioner in the scene of the crime during the day of the incident, as numerous witnesses saw him in Vedua’s house and his clothes were found inside the house. He was thereafter seen carrying a heavy-looking sack as he was leaving private complainant’s house. All these circumstances portray a chain of events that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner took the personal properties with intent to gain, especially considering that, fourth, Vedua had not consented to the removal and/or taking of these properties. With regard to the fifth and sixths elements, however, the RTC and the CA diverge in their respective Decisions. The RTC found that the taking committed by petitioner was not qualified by grave abuse of confidence, rather it was qualified by the use of force upon things. The trial court held that there was no confidence reposed by the private complainant on Viray that the latter could have abused. In fact, Vedua made sure that she locked the door before leaving. Hence, Viray was compelled to use force to gain entry into Vedua’s house thereby committing the crime of robbery, not theft. The CA, on the other hand, opined that the breaking of the screen and the door could not be appreciated to qualify petitioner’s crime to robbery as such use of force was not alleged in the Information. Rather, this breaking of the door, the CA added, is an indication of petitioner’s abuse of the confidence given by private complainant. The CA held that "[Viray] enjoyed the confidence of the private complainant, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets. He was given access to the outside premises of private complainant’s house which he gravely abused when he forced open the doors of the same house and stole the latter’s belongings." Committing grave abuse of confidence in the taking of the properties, petitioner was found by the CA to be liable for qualified theft. This Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the taking committed by petitioner cannot be qualified by the breaking of the door, as it was not alleged in the Information. However, we disagree from its finding that the same breaking of the door constitutes the qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence to sentence petitioner Viray to suffer the penalty for qualified theft. Instead, We are one with the RTC that private complainant did not repose on Viray "confidence" that the latter could have abused to commit qualified theft. The very fact that petitioner "forced open" the main door and screen because he was denied access to private complainant’s house negates the presence of such confidence in him by private

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST complainant. Without ready access to the interior of the house and the properties that were the subject of the taking, it cannot be said that private complaint had a "firm trust" on petitioner or that she "relied on his discretion" and that the same trust reposed on him facilitated Viray’s taking of the personal properties justifying his conviction of qualified theft. To warrant the conviction and, hence, imposition of the penalty for qualified theft, there must be an allegation in the information and proof that there existed between the offended party and the accused such high degree of confidence or that the stolen goods have been entrusted to the custody or vigilance of the accused. In other words, where the accused had never been vested physical access to,or material possession of, the stolen goods, it may not be said that he or she exploited such access or material possession thereby committing such grave abuse of confidence in taking the property. Thus, in People v. Maglaya, this Court refused to impose the penalty prescribed for qualified theft when the accused was not given material possession or access to the property: Although appellant had taken advantage of his position in committing the crime aforementioned, We do not believe he had acted with grave abuse of confidence and can be convicted of qualified theft, because his employer had never given him the possession of the machines involved in the present case or allowed him to take hold of them, and it does not appear that the former had any special confidence in him. Indeed, the delivery of the machines to the prospective customers was entrusted, not to appellant, but to another employee. Inasmuch as the aggregate value of the machines stolen by appellant herein is ₱13,390.00, the crime committed falls under Art. 308, in relation to the first subdivision of Art.309 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods.1âwphi1 No modifying circumstance having attended the commission of the offense, said penalty should be meted out in its medium period, or from 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months of prisión mayor. The penalty imposed in the decision appealed from is below this range. The allegation in the information that the offender is a laborer of the offended party does not by itself, without more, create the relation of confidence and intimacy required by law for the imposition of the penalty prescribed for qualified theft. Hence, the conclusion reached by the appellate court that petitioner committed qualified theft because he "enjoyed the confidence of the private complainant, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets" is without legal basis. The offended party’s very own admission that the accused was never allowed to enter the house where the stolen properties were kept refutes the existence of the high degree of confidence that the offender could have allegedly abused by "forcing open the doors of the same house." Without the circumstance of a grave abuse of confidence and considering that the use of force

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in breaking the door was not alleged in the Information, petitioner can only be held accountable for the crime of simple theft under Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309 of the RPC. As for the penalty, We note with approval the observation made by the appellate court that the amount of the property taken was not established by an independent and reliable estimate. Thus, the Court may fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case or impose the minimum penalty under Art. 309 of the RPC. In this case, We agree with the observation made by the appellate court in accordance with the rule that "if there is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of ₱5.00." Accordingly, We impose the prescribed penalty under Art. 309(6) of the RPC, which is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. The circumstance of the breaking of the door, even if proven during trial, cannot be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance as it was not alleged in the Information. Thus, the Court finds that the penalty prescribed should be imposed in its medium period, that is to say, from two (2) months and one (1) day to three (3) months of arresto mayor. Lastly, We delete the order for the reparation of the stolen property. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code is clear that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him, as he has duly proved. Since, as aforesaid, the testimony of the private complainant is not sufficient to establish the value of the property taken, nor may the courts take judicial notice of such testimony, We cannot award the reparation of the stolen goods. WHEREFORE, the C Decision of August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33076 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Ryan Viray is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of SIMPLE THEFT and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to three (3) months of arresto mayor. Further, for want of convincing proof as to the value of the property stolen, the order for reparation is hereby DELETED. March 29, 2018 – Article 309 – PENALTIES FOR THEFT DUQUE, Francis Lester M G.R. NO. L-30859 NOVEMBER 25, 1929 PEOPLE VS. JUAN CARPIO FACTS: Raymundo Silos hired automobile No. 376 known as "Star," and was driven by the chauffeur Resurreccion Ledesma. In one restaturant, Silos invited Ledesma to come in with him to eat something and while they were thus engaged, Ledesma's car No. 376 was stolen and was not to be found when Silos and Ledesma emerged from the restaurant. The next day the stolen car was found, stripped of three tires with the rims. A few days thereafter, the three tires

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST taken from car No. 376 were found on the "Star" car which was being driven by Juan Carpio. When the owner of the car No. 376 asked Carpio how his three tires came to be on Carpio's car, the latter admitted that said three tires belonged to the owner of the car No. 376; and they were in fact readily identified by their numbers. ISSUE: WON Carpio should be guilty of theft with respect to the tires only and not to the automobile. HELD: No. The gist of the offense of larceny consists in the furtive taking and asportation of property, animo lucrandi, and with intent to deprive the true owner of the possession thereof. The act of asportation in this case was undoubtedly committed with intent on the part of the thief to profit by the act, and since he effectively deprived the true owner of the possession of the entire automobile, the offense of larceny comprised the whole car. The fact that the accused stripped the car of its tires and abandoned the machine in a distant part of the city did not make the appellant any less liable for the larceny of that automobile. The deprivation of the owner and the trespass upon his right of possession were complete as to the entire car; and the fact that the thieves thought it wise promptly to abandon the machine in no wise limits their criminal responsibility to the particular parts of the car that were appropriated and subsequently used by the appellant upon his own car. Since subject car was less than 1 year after being bought by the owner, it was practically new. Upon taking judicial notice, the car valued at 250. This put the penalty under par 3 of Art 309 with the penalty of prision correcional in its medium and minimum period since the value of the property is more than 200 but does not exceed 6,000 which runs from one year, eight months and twenty-one days to two years, eleven months and ten days. G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008 SESINANDO MERIDA vs. PEOPLE FACTS: Petitioner was charged in RTC for cutting, gathering, collecting and removing a narra tree inside a Mayod Property over which Tansiongco claims ownership. Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the DENR forester Hernandez who ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber. Later, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra trunk into lumber. Hernandez went to the Mayod Property and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the lumber,9 and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A complaint was filed for violation for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 known as Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Merida appealed before SC contending that the penalty imposed was excessive.

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ISSUE: WON the penalty imposed by the RTC is correct. HELD: No. RTC is not Correct. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705 is punishable as Qualified Theft. Under Art. 309. Penalties. - 1.) The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period... 6.) Arresto Mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed five pesos. The Information alleged that the lumber valued in the amount of P20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the prosecution relied on Hernandez's testimony that these amounts, are his "estimates" based on "prevailing local price." This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the RPC, the prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case. In the case of People v. Dator with the same set of facts, SC imposed the minimum penalty under Article 309 (6)45 of the RPC. Applying penalty for qualfied theft (imposed penalty higher by two degrees) and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the SC imposed penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum. March 29, 2018 – Article 310 – QUALIFIED THEFT FLORENTINO, Kimberly A. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SYOU HU G.R. NO. L- 45765, JANUARY 29, 1938 ISSUE: Whether accused violated article 310 of the Revised Penal Code? FACTS: Accused was living in the house of the victim, who had sheltered him out of charity. In August of 1937, the sum of P435 in cash was taken from the offended party without his consent. HELD: Yes, article 310 of the Revised Penal Code provides that qualified theft is committed when "grave abuse of confidence is present," making it understood thereby that the relation of cause and effect must exist between the abuse of confidence and the crime. The grave abuse of confidence does not produce the crime of theft as effect. It is the asportation, with intent of gain, of personal property belonging to another without the owner's knowledge and consent, which

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST produces it. The relation of cause and effect, therefore does not exist between the two concepts.The grave abuse of confidence is a mere circumstance which aggravates and qualifies the commission of the crime of theft. It is not necessary for said circumstance to be premeditated in order to be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance qualifying said crime. Its presence in the commission of the crime is sufficient. The fact that the accused was living in the house of the ofended party, who had sheltered him out of charity, when he took the money belonging to his protector, aggravates the crime committed by him, inasmuch as he gravely abused the confidence which the owner of the house reposed inhim upon permitting him, out of charity, to live therein, stiffling the sentiment of gratitude awakended in his bosom by his benefactor's charitable act. This abuse of confidence was all the more grave because it happened between fellow countrymen. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EDGARDO T. CRUZ G.R. NO. 200081, JUNE 08, 2016 ISSUE: Whether the accused violated Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code? FACTS: Complainant Eduardo S. Carlos put up a business engaged in the sale of tires, batteries and services for wheel alignment, wheel balancing and vulcanizing. During the infancy of the business,complainant sought the help of the accused to tend the needs of the business including the financial aspect. When the business started to gain recognition and despite the the rise of the number of clients they were serving, its financial capital remained unimpressive. Thus, by suspicion complainant discovered through the accused's sister that he was stealing from the company. When complainant checked the daily sales report containing the list of payments and balances of customers he found out that the remaining balances of their customers and accused's advances totaled to P97, 984.00. At the bottom of the balance sheet was an acknowledgement of the accused that the amounts declared lost were actually used by him for his personal use. Complainant also discovered other irregularities in the business dealings of the accused. HELD: Yes. When theft as defined in article 308 of the Revised Penal Code is committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime appreciates into qualified theft punishable under article 310 of the same code. All the elements of Qualified Theft are present in this case such as; 1.) Taking of personal property 2.) That the said property belongs to another 3.) That the said taking be done with intent to gain 4.) That it be done without thebowner's consent 5.) That it be done without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things

164 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

6.) That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. The accused was found guilty and was sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua and was ordered to pay the amount of the value of the property stolen which is P97,984.00. ONG VS PEOPLE G.R. NO. 190475, APRIL 10, 2013 ISSUE: Whether accused is guilty of violating P.D. 1612 (Anti- Fencing Law)? FACTS: Private complainant was the owner of 44 firestone truck tires of which 6 were sold and 38 remained inside the warehouse. Complainant, marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse. The following day all the 38 tires were stolen, the gate was forcibly opened. Together with his caretaker they reported the incident to the police. While investigation was still pending complainant upon chance happened to inquire in a store if they have tires that has same specifications with the ones stolen. Accused answered in affirmative and showed it to him. Complainant happened to notice the marking he made during inventory. Complainant left the store and reported the matter to the police. A buy bust team was formed and the accused was arrested and the total of 13 tires were confiscated. HELD: Yes. Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another. March 31, 2018 – Article 311 – THEFT OF THE PROPERTY OF THE NATIONAL LIBRARY AND NATIONAL MUSEUM FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z. [NO CASE FOUND] March 31, 2018 – Article 312 – OCCUPATION OF REAL PROPERTY OR USURPATION OF REAL RIGHTS IN PROPERTY IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST US V. FUSTER G.R. NO. 1366, NOVEMBER 18, 1903

their ascendants and while there, they gathered coconuts and made them copra.

ISSUE: Whether accused violated article 312 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accused testified that they are the grandchildren of Lorenzo Cases, and during his lifetime, he acquired the real property in question and declared the same in his name. RTC rendered judgement finding accused guilty of violation of article 312 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused are further sentenced not to enter or intrude upon this property rightfully adjudged to belong to Francisco Delmonte, private complainant herein and they are ordered under pain of imprisonment for Contempt of Court, to Cease and Desist forever from disturbing or molesting the peaceful and quiet possession and ownership of the herein private offended party over the property subject of litigation, hence the appeal.

FACTS: Accused forcibly entered and usurped the land in questioned which was in possession of Dofia Carolina Gomez de la Serna. Dofia Carolina herself says that this land "does not belong to anybody," and that, although she is occupying it, it is only because she is in possession of it. There is, therefore, no evidence that the land is the property of those alleged to have been injured by the offense charged. The defendant offered to prove, by authentic documents, that he was the lawful owner of the land in question. This evidence was rejected in the court below. In this the court erred, for it unquestionably is an error to exclude proof of the ownership of property in litigation when, as in the case of usurpation, this ownership constitutes a necessary and indispensable element for the determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. If the defendant herein had shown that he was the owner of the land in question, there would have been no ground on which he could have been convicted of the offense charged, because no one can, in a legal sense, be guilty of the usurpation of his own property. HELD: The law requires that the real property or the real right seized be the property of another, in order that the crime of usurpation may exist. The error of law into which the court fell in refusing to admit the evidence of ownership offered by the defendant, and against which ruling the defendant duly excepted, would be a sufficient ground for remanding the case for a new trial. We do not, however, consider it necessary to do this, in view of the fact that the prosecution has not proven that the land alleged to have been usurped was not the property of the defendant. The burden lay with the prosecution to prove this fact, and, having failed to do so, we must acquit the defendant, even in the absence of any evidence in his behalf, because of the presumption of innocence to which every defendant is entitled until proven guilty. We therefore reverse the judgment appealed and acquit the defendant, with the costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered. QUINAO V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 139603, JULY 14, 2000 ISSUE: Whether petitioners are guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Property. FACTS: On February 2, 1993 at around 9am in the morning, accused together with their relatives, suddenly appeared in the land in questioned owned by Francisco Del Monte and used force, violence and intimidation and took possession of the land claiming that it is their inheritance from

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HELD: The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of anothers real property or usurped real rights in anothers property; that the possession or usurpation was committed with violence or intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for "usurpacion de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property occupied or usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and that the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or violence done to the person ousted of possession of the property. More explicitly, in Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense are (1) occupation of anothers real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to another person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or in usurping the real right, and (3) the accused should be animated by the intent to gain. In the present case, based on the above findings and the sketch maps submitted, it is clear that the disputed land which is the red shaded area (Exh. "B-2") is within the boundary of the land awarded to the complainant in Civil Case No. 3516 [should be 3561]. The issue of ownership over the land in question having been decided in Civil Case No. 3516 [should be 3561] in favor of the complainant in 1949, the same will not be disturbed. The accused has to respect the findings of the court., it is indeed very clear that the area claimed by the accused encroached the area of the plaintiffs. March 31, 2018 – Article 313 – ALTERING BOUNDERIES OR LANDMARKS LAZO II, Joseph Artfel T. [NO CASES FOUND] March 31, 2018 – Article 314 – FRAUDULENT INSOLVENCY NASH, Regina Mercado G.R. No. 38618 September 15, 1933 PEOPLE VS. SY GESIONG ISSUE:

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Whether or not Sy Gesiong is guilty of fraudulent insolvency? FACTS: Sy Gesiong, was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Bohol of the crime of estafa for having concealed or otherwise disposed of certain personal property belonging to him for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, and sentenced to one year of presidio correccional, to indemnify Ignacio Molina and Vicente Gaviola in the sum of P2,997.76 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. From this judgment the present appeal was taken. Appellant has assigned five errors as having been committed by the trial court. The first error assigned raises the question of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the information filed against the appellant.The theory of the prosecution is that the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of estafa defined in article 523 of the old Penal Code and in article 314 of the Revised Penal Code. It will be noticed that one of the essential elements of the crime thus defined is that the absconding of the property by the defendant must result in prejudice to his creditors. The information filed in this case contains no such allegation. It is true that it alleges that the defendant fraudulently concealed his property mentioned in the information, but such allegation is not sufficient to fulfill the requirement of the law. A person may fraudulently dispose of some of his property, and yet such act may not necessarily result in prejudice to his creditors; for he may have some other property with which to satisfy his obligations. It is too well-settled to require the citation of authorities that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved. The second assignment of error attacks the findings of fact of the trial court. On this point, the evidence for the prosecution shows that the goods alleged to have been concealed and otherwise disposed of by the appellant were shipped from Bohol to Cebu under suspicious circumstances. Appellant admitted having shipped the goods to Cebu, but claimed that he did so as a commission or purchasing agent for a firm in that city. Appellant further claimed that he had no knowledge of the order of the court of July 31, 1931, which was notified to him by his attorney only on August 15, 1931; and that, besides the goods alleged to have been fraudulently disposed of or concealed by him, he still had in his possession property valued at P4,600. HELD: No, Sy Giong was not guilty of fraudulent insolvency. Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, the court believe that the guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. In view of the above conclusions, we do not deem it necessary to discuss the other errors assigned by the appellant. The judgment appealed from was reversed, and the defendant was acquitted with costs de oficio. G.R. No. L-39177 February 21, 1934 PEOPLE vs. TAN DIONG (alias TANGO), PASTORA PADLA, and EUSTAQUIO BARANDA

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ISSUE: Whether or not Tan DIong, Pastora Padla and Eustaquio Baranda are guilty of fraudulent insolvency? FACTS: As appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, finding the three appellants, Tan Diong (alias Tango), Pastora Padla, and Eustaquio Baranda, guilty of the offense of making way with the property in fraud of creditors, in violation of article 523 of the old Penal Code (article 314, R.P.C.), and sentencing them as follows: Tan Diong to imprisonment for six years and one day, presidio mayor, and Pastora Padla and Eustaquio Baranda to imprisonment for four years, two months and one day, presidio correccional, and requiring them to pay proportional costs. Prior to the acts with which we are here concerned the appellant Tan Diong was a merchant in good standing in the municipality of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Pastora Padla is his wife and Eustaquio Baranda is the husband of the latter's niece. Prior to June, 1931, Tan Diong had become indebted to various merchants of Cebu, and a judgment against him had been rendered in favor of Lim Tian Ting & Co. for more than five thousand pesos. Upon this judgment an execution had been issued, but it realized only the sum of P198.23 from certain personal property levied upon in Tan Diong's, store. Tan Diong and his wife had previously owned various parcels of real property in the municipality, but investigation showed that prior to the events mentioned they had transferred all to their co-defendant Eustaquio Baranda. The proof amply shows that these conveyances were made for the purpose of putting the property beyond the reach of Tan Diong's creditor's, and that the consideration mentioned in the deeds of conveyance from Tan Diong and wife to Baranda was fictitious. No error, in our opinion, was committed in finding the appellant Tan Diong guilty of the offense charged. As to Eustaquio Baranda, we note that the conveyances by which these properties were conveyed to him were unilateral character. Baranda did not participate in the conveyances, and his alleged participation in the fraud consisted only of the fact that he has asserted ownership in the property conveyed. In our opinion, this does not justify his conviction as a participant in the fraud. His resolution to accept the benefit of the fraudulent conveyances may have been formed only after the act. His guilt as a co-conspirator in the fraud is therefore not proved. HELD: The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed as to Pastora Padla and Eustaquio Baranda, without prejudice to the right of the creditors, or any creditor, of Tan Diong to bring a civil action against Baranda. So ordered, with costs de oficio against said appellants. As to Tan Diong, the judgment appealed from is modified by sentencing him to an indeterminate period of

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST from one year, prision correccional, to eight years and one day, prision mayor; and as thus modified, the judgment as to him is affirmed, with costs. March 31, 2018 – Article 315 – ESTAFA (SWINDLING) OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P. LITO CORPUZ VS PEOPLE G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014 ISSUE: Whether or not Corpuz is guilty of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 of the RPC. FACTS: Lito Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days.The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy. When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail. Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz. However, Corpuz argued as follows – that the proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy and the fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved. HELD: YES. The court agreed that the admissibility of evidence, which was only a mere photocopy was valid, stating that the established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. In the instant, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. Moreover, the court pointed out that no specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money, in this case, property, would be tantamount to a demand. The court cited the case of Tubb vs. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, the query was tantamount to a demand. Hence, Lito Corpuz is liable for the crime of Estafa. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA G.R. NO. 163662, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 ISSUE: Whether or not Villanueva commit Estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(d), of the RPC. FACTS: The complainant Madarang went to Villanueva's residence and was able to sell to Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth P 1,010,000.00. Villanueva

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made out nine checks drawn against Philippine National Bank (PNB), eight of which were postdated for the payment of such jewelries. Madarang received the checks because of Villanueva's assurance that they would all be honored upon presentment. However, the draweee bank paid only one of the eight postdated checks since the remaining checks were dishonored by reason of Account Closed or Drawn Against Insufficient Funds. Villanueva denies the crime and insists on the absence of fraud when she drew the postdated checks. She claims that (a) the checks were issued as replacement; (b) the checks could only be deposited or encashed after Madarang was notified of the sufficiency of funds; and (c) the receipt presented by the Prosecution failed to embody the real intention of the parties. She further contends that the checks were not executed prior to or simultaneous with the alleged fraud and that Madarang had instigated her to issue the checks, hence, she cannot be held liable for estafa. HELD: YES. The estafa charged under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) may be committed when: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. The deceit should be the efficient cause of the defraudation, and should either be prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of the fraud. In the present case, all the elements of estafa were present. In the instant case, the first element was admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the assurance of Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. The second element was also established because the checks were dishonored upon presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the account was already closed. The third element was also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from Villanueva the balance of P995, 000.00. In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with Madarang whereby the latter would deposit or encash the checks only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds in Villanueva's account. This defense, however, was bereft of merit because she did not present proof of the supposed agreement. Hence, Villanueva is guilty of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) of the RPC. March 31, 2018 – Article 316 – OTHER FORMS OF SWINDLING PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P. ESTRELLADO-MAINAR V PEOPLE GR NO. 184320 ( JULY 29, 2015) ISSUE Whether or not accused Mainar is liable under

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS Petitioner Mainar offered for sale to Eric Naval, portions of land located in Matina Aplaya, Davao City. During the negotiations for this sale, the petitioner told Naval that the title to the land she was selling had no problems. The petitioner also informed Naval that the area subject of the proposed sale would "still be segregated from the mother title.” Subsequently, representatives from JS Francisco & Sons, Inc. (JS Francisco) demolished Naval's house. It was only then that Naval discovered that the lot sold to him had been the subject of a dispute between the petitioner's family and JS Francisco. Naval demanded from the petitioner the return of the amount he paid for the land, as well as to pay the value of the house demolished, but the latter refused to heed these demands. The prosecution charged petitioner with the crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The MTCC found petitioner guilty of Article 316, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which the RTC affirmed. The petitioner Mainar challenged the RTC ruling in the CA, but the latter denied it. HELD No. The information in the present case, expressly indicated in its caption that it is charging the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. We reiterate that the Information in the present case did not allege that the petitioner made an express representation that the property sold is free from any encumbrance. This Information was crafted in such a way that only one particular crime was charged did not constitute ground for conviction under paragraph 2, which may be committed even by the owner of the property. Moreover, the petitioner cannot be charged under Article 316 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The presented pieces of evidence do not also warrant a conviction for the crime for which the petitioner had been charged, that is, Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. PEOPLE V. GALSIM GR NO. L-14577 ( FEBRUARY 29, 1960) ISSUE Whether or not accused Galsim is liable under Article 316 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS Accused Galsim obtained a loan from Mauro Magno in the amount of P2,500.00 payable within a period of five years, and to secure its payment the former executed in favor of the latter a deed of chattel mortgage assigning and conveying by way of first mortgage a two-story house located in the City of Manila. Magno subsequently found out that the house in question had already been previously mortgaged by its owner to a certain Dela Torre. As a result, the deed of mortgage executed by the accused in favor of Magno was refused registration by the

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register of deeds. Magno demanded the return of his money from the accused but the latter failed to do so. HELD Yes. It is evident that the appellant obtained the loan from complainant through false representation or deceit which is one of the elements constituting the crime of estafa. It is apparent that the complainant had granted the loan to appellant in the belief that the security offered was good and sufficient to guarantee his investment because it was free from any lien or encumbrance. Had he known that it was already encumbered, the likelihood was that he would not have granted the loan, which proves the fraud of which he was a victim. April 01, 2018 – Article 317 – SWINDLING A MINOR PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P. [NO CASE FOUND] April 01, 2018 - Article 318 – OTHER DECEITS PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D. PEOPLE VS. GANASI C.A., 61 O.G 3603 ISSUE: Whether or not Ganasi was guilty of other deceits under Article 318 and not under paragraph 1(a) of Article 315. FACTS: Ganasi incurred a debt from Dacanay in the amount of P3,500. As security for the debt, Ganasi offered to mortgage Lot No. 1 to Dacanay. Ganasi then showed to Dacanay a plan to the lot, and accompanied him for an ocular inspection of the premises. Finding the land suitable for a carpentry shop he intended to build, Dacanay consented to the execution of a deed of mortgage. When said obligation became due, Ganasi, being unable to raise the amount, decided to sell the mortgage property to Dacanay, the same to answer for everything he owed to the latter. Thereafter, Dacanay went to the Register of Deeds of Benguet to have his ownership over Lot No. 1 registered. Much to his surprise, he was informed that what Ganasi sold to him was not Lot No. 1 but Lot No. 2 composed mostly of uneven and hilly terrain and which was worthless for what he intended to use it. HELD: Yes, Ganasi was guilty of other deceits under Article 318 and not under paragraph 1(a) of Article 315. The Solicitor General erred in stating that the offense comes within the purview of paragraph 1(a) of Article 315. Under such provision, the obligation to deliver already exists, and the offender on making delivery has altered the substance, quantity or quality of the thing delivered. The facts of this case were not foursquare with such provision of law. Here, Ganasi deceitfully pointed to Dacanay one parcel of land, offering it as security, on the strength of which deceit, Dacanay parted with his money. The deceit practiced by Ganasi preceded the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST alienation of substance, quantity or quality in the sense intended by paragraph 1(a) of Article 315 in Ganasi’s execution of the mortgage and later of the sale. Thus, the offense committed by Ganasi must perforce come within the meaning and intendment of the blanket provisions of Article 318 since it was not covered by Article 315, 316 and 317.

of the crime as charged. Since, the other elements of the crime under Art. 315, paragraph 2(d) were proved which included those of deceit and damage, it was correct to convict Sales of the crime under Article 318 (Other deceits) of the Revised Penal Code. GUINHAWA VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 162822, AUGUST 25, 2005 CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

JOVITA SALES v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-47817. August 29, 1988 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

ISSUE: Whether or not Guinhawa was guilty of other deceits under Article 318.

ISSUE: Did the act of Sales in causing the "stop payment" order of the checks in questions constitute the deceit referred to in Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code?

FACTS: Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new motor vehicles under the business name of Guinrox Motor Sales in Naga City.

FACTS: Jovita Sales issued two checks, one, for the sum of P2 000.00 and another one, for the sum of P6,000.00, both dated January 30, 1971. The said checks were issued in favor of Renato Magdaluyo. When both checks were presented for encashment or deposited for clearance with Magdaluyo’s bank, they were dishonored because Sales made a communication to her bank to issue a "stop payment" order regarding the same.

On March 17, 1995, Guinhawa purchased a brand new Mitsubishi L-300 Versa Van. When said van was transported from Manila to Naga City it suffered an accident. Guinhawa then repaired the van and later offered it for sale in his showroom.

Magdaluyo then looked for Sales and the latter promised him the payment of the amount of the dishonored checks in cash. However, the promise was never fulfilled. A formal demand was subsequently made, and when no compliance was still made, the charge of estafa was filed. After trial, instead of convicting Sales of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the City Court of Pasay found her guilty of the crime "Other deceits" under Art. 318 of the same Code.

On October 1995, spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo went to Guinhawa’s office to buy a new van and were shown the L-300 Versa Van which was on display. Unaware that the van had been damaged and repaired on account of the accident, the couple decided to purchase the van. When the spouses noticed the defects of the van and were informed that it had been involved in an accident before, they filed a criminal complaint for violation of paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against Guinhawa.

HELD: Yes, the act of Sales in causing the "stop payment" order of the checks in questions did constitute the deceit referred to in Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD: YES. The false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he offers for sale is brand new (when, in fact, it is not) is one of those deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. For one to be liable for other deceits under the law, it is required that the prosecution must prove the following essential elements:

In estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d), the elements are:

(a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the preceding articles;

1) Postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued;

(b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and

(2) Lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) Damage to the payee thereof (People v. Sabio, 86 SCRA 568). Sales’ act of causing the "stop payment" order of the checks in question undoubtedly makes her liable for the crime of estafa. It was only the failure on the part of the prosecution to show that Sales had insufficient funds in the bank to cover the checks in question at the time she postdated them that prevented Sales’ conviction

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(c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice. It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant to part with her property. The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST intended as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope and intendment.

the terrace where the fire started, but appellant ran away when he saw her and Dorecyll.

April 1, 2018 – Article 316 – REMOVAL, SALE OR PLEDGE OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY RIVERA, Marynit P.

Appellants neighbor, Felicitas Sarzona,also saw appellant near Celerinas house after it caught fire, following which, appellant fled on seeing Jovelyn and Dorecyll stepping out of the house, as other neighbors repaired to the scene to help contain the flames. Felicitas also saw Celerina, who was at a neighbors house before the fire started, enter the burning house and resurface with her grandsons Alvin and Joshua.Celerina and Alvin sustained third degree burns which led to their death. Joshua sustained second degree burns.

G.R. No. L-9892 April 15, 1957 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO BASALO ISSUE: What is the proper penalty for the accused? FACTS: Francisco Basalo was charged with having unlawfully and fraudulently sold and disposed of eighty cavans of palay, he had mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, without the knowledge and consent of the mortgagee, to the damage and prejudice of the said bank in the sum of at least P280. Upon arraignment, the accused interposed the defense of prescription on the ground that more than five years had elapsed from the time the offense was allegedly committed to the filing of the information on June 5, 1953. Answering the defense of prescription, the prosecution claimed that the Bank discovered the offense only in the year 1953. HELD: Under Article 319, the penalty for the offense is arresto mayor or a fine double the value of the property involved. In other words, the fine is an alternative penalty. In conclusion, to determine the prescriptibility of an offense penalized with a fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, such fine should not be reduced or converted into a prison term, but rather it should be considered as such fine under Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code; and that for purposes of prescription of the offense, defined and penalized in Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, the fine imposable therein if correctional or afflictive under the terms of Article 26, same Code, should be made the basis rather than that of arresto mayor, also imposable in said Article 319.

RULING: No. Apellant is only guilty of arson.In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder and arson. The Court finds that there is no showing that appellants main objective was to kill Celerina and her housemates and that the fire was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal. As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson. PEOPLE VS. CEDENIO G.R. NO. 93485 JUNE 27, 1994

April 3, 2018 – Article 320 AMENDED BY PD NO 1613 ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant should be charged by a complex crime of arson with murder.

PEOPLE VS BALUNTONG G.R. No. 182061 MARCH 15, 2010

FACTS: On November 26, 1986, Dorio residence was gutted with fire. Five members of the family, then occupying the house were burned to death. The five bodies retrieved were those of Mario Hilario Dorio, with wounds on the head and chest, Flora Dorio with a wound on the leg and head almost severed, Mario Dorio with wounds on the leg and left nipple, Nicanora Tabanao with a wound in the stomach and infant Dioscora with no wounds at all but charred to the bone.

ISSUE: Whether or not Baluntong is guilty of Double murder with frustrated murder or the crime of arson. FACTS: At around 10:30 p.m. while then 12-year old Jovelyn Santos was sleeping in the house of her grandmother,she was awakened by heat emanating from the walls of the house. She thus roused her cousin Dorecyll and together they went out of the house.Jovelyn saw appellant putting dry hay (dayami) around the house near

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Two witnesses testified that the three appellants namely, Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe Antipolo were seen running out of the burning house, holding bolos stained with blood.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Another witness testified that Pedro Cedenio borrowed from him a bolo on the night of November 26, and the following morning, the bolo was returned to him with a bloodstain on the handle. The accused Pedro Cedinio, also told him “do not worry, if this incident reaches the court, I will answer (for) everything” The trial court found the accused-appelants guilty of Arson with Multiple Murder as defined and penalized under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613. RULINGS: No. The late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites Groizard…when the fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in the house and that the objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take life. In other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is the burning of a building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson. From the evidence adduced, it is evident that after the victims were hacked and stabbed to death, appellants set the house afire to hide their gruesome act. Thus, the appellant are guilty of a separate crime of four counts of murder and arson. And not the complex crime of arson with murder. April 2, 2018 – Article 321 – OTHER FORMS OF ARSON SALVERON, Jan Ione R. G.R. No. L-10849 April 30, 1958 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTORIANO BUENO, alias VICTOR ISSUE: Whether article 321 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable in this case? FACTS: Victoriano Bueno was the owner of a parcel of agricultural land covered with rice hays set fire to the rice hays on his land in a careless and imprudent manner without taking the necessary precautions to prevent its spread to the neighbouring properties. Pedro Tanap’s hut which was situated on the adjoining land owned by Victoriano was burned, including all the farming implements and properties kept in it and surrounding trees belonging to Pedro. The entire loss of said hut and properties in it in the value of five hundred pesos (P500). Victoriano was subsequently convicted with the crime of arson through reckless imprudence. HELD: YES. Paragraph 5 of article 321 of the Revised Penal Code which states: When the arson consists in the burning of other property and under the circurmstances given hereunder, the offender shall be punished:

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xxxxxxxxx By prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period, when the damage caused is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000 pesos, and any of the property referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the next preceding subdivision is set on fire; but when the value of such property does not exceed 200 pesos, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in this subdivision shall be imposed when the property burned is a building used as a dwelling in an uninhabited place, and the penalty of arresto menor and a fine ranging from fifty to one hundred per centum of the damage caused shall be imposed, when the property burned consists of grain fields, pasture lands, forests or plantations shall be applied and must be read in relation to article 365 of the same code. The issue hinges on the penalty for the crime of Arson through Reckless Imprudence which has resulted only in damage to the property of another. The applicability of the third paragraph of said Article 365 was not considered in said case. In any event, the first paragraph of Article 365, pursuant to which "any person who, by reckless imprudence shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony," shall suffer the penalty of "arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods," merely establishes a general rule. The same is subject to the exception found in the third paragraph of the same article, namely, when the execution of said act shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos." The present case is precisely the one contemplated in said exception. Inasmuch as the reckless and imprudent act of herein accused has "only resulted in damage to property," worth, according to the complaint and the information, P500, the maximum penalty imposable is, therefore, a fine of P1,500, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court. As a consequence, neither was the Court of First Instance, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, competent to hear and decide this case on its merits over defendant's objection. The decision appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is dismissed. April 2, 2018 – Article 322 – CASES OF ARSON NOT INCLUDED IN THE PRECEDING ARTICLES SANTOALLA, Stephanie M. [NO CASE FOUND] April 3, 2018 – Article 323 – ARSON OF PROPERTY OF SMALL VALUE TADO, Diann Kathelline A. [NO CASE FOUND] April 3, 2018 – Article 324 INVOLVING DESTRUCTION UNAS, Nor-Aiza R.

–

CRIMES

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST [NO CASE FOUND] April 3, 2018 – Article 325 – BURNING ONE'S OWN PROPERTY AS MEANS TO COMMIT ARSON VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M. [NO CASE FOUND] April 3, 2018 – Article 326 – SETTING FIRE TO PROPERTY EXCLUSIVELY OWNED BY THE OFFENDER VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S. [NO CASE FOUND] April 4, 2018 – Article 327 – WHO ARE LIABLE FOR MALICIOUS MISCHIEF VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B. THE UNITED STATES v. CATALINO GERALE, ET AL. G.R. No. 1768 February 17, 1905 ISSUE: Whether or not Catalino and Bartolome are guilty of the crime of Malicious Mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: In the early hours of the morning of July 23, 1903, the defendants, Catalino and Bartolome Gerale, father and son, proceeded to the property in question, situated in the barrio of Tanque, town of Talisay, Province of Cebu. The defendants climbed some coconut trees which were growing upon said property and immediately proceeded to cut about eighty shoots and forty small trees that were producing tuba; that when Eugenia Bacho saw them she scolded them and asked how and why they cut the coconut shoots on her property and warned them not to continue damaging her property. The defendants then becoming angry, came down out of the trees and advanced toward her, raising their bolos and saying, "Here we shall all die;" that as the woman started to run, crying for help in order to bring the neighbors to her assistance, the defendants followed her as far as the road; that each one of the shoots was of the value of 5 pesos and that said shoots produced tuba to the value of 2 reales per day; that the coconut trees which were planted on the land had been planted about twelve years previously by said Eugenia Bacho and her husband, Luis Abarques; that the land was part of the hacienda of Santo Niño, the property of the friars; that this hacienda was then transferred to the Compania Agricola de Ultramar; that Abarques and Bacho, after leasing the land from the manager of said hacienda, planted therein some coconut trees some twelve years ago, by their laborers called mananguetes, cleaned off the land and cultivated the same and obtained tuba from the trees thereon, without any opposition whatever for about four months prior to September of said year. HELD:

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Yes. The crime of damage to property is not determined solely by the mere act of inflicting injury upon the property of a third person, but it must be shown that the act had for its object the injury of the property merely for the sake of damaging it. Without this circumstance the essential element of the crime is lacking and the criminal intention of the culprit cannot be established. The facts clearly proven in this case is that the two defendants cut eighty cocoanut shoots, which were producing tuba, without having any right so to do; that they occasioned thereby serious damage to the interests of those who planted the trees; that the damage caused amounted to 400 pesos. The defendants executed this act, prompted, doubtless, by grievance, hate, or revenge, because the injured party and her husband had leased the land from the manager of the hacienda after Catalino Gerale, one of the defendants and the father of the other defendant, had been expelled from said land by the attorney of the owners. When the injured party tried to stop the damage they were causing to the property, defendants threatened her and followed her as far as the road. It is clearly proven that the defendants knew very well that they were not the owners of the property; they had consented to the injured party herein profiting by said trees, extracting the tuba by means of her laborers, mananguetes, and therefore, when the defendants cut said shoots, they acted with malicious intention of injuring the property of the offended party. Therefore,, taking into consideration the provisions of articles 83 and 92 of the Penal Code, the court sentenced Catalino Gerale and Bartolome Gerale to pay a fine of 400 pesos. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RESTITUTO FALLER (alias R. Aguilar) G.R. No. L-45964 April 25, 1939 ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of malicious mischief may be committed through reckless imprudence FACTS: Restituto Faller was charged with the crime of damage caused to another's property maliciously and willfully. After hearing the evidence, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found that the damage was not cause maliciously of and willfully, but through reckless imprudence, and sentenced Restituto Faller, under paragraph 3 of article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as principal in the crime of damage through reckless imprudence, to pay a fine of P38 and to indemnify the offended party Ramon Diokno in the same amount, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. HELD: Yes. There is a crime of malicious mischief through reckless imprudence Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST The information alleges that the appellant acted willfully, maliciously, unlawfully and criminally. To this information no objection was interposed. Negligence being a punishable criminal act when it results in a crime, the allegation in the information that the appellant also committed the acts charged unlawfully and criminally includes the charge that he acted with negligence. SEPARATE OPINION: If malicious mischief (art. 327, Revised Penal Code) is an offense distinct from damage to property by reckless imprudence (art. 365, Revised Penal Code) and the latter is not necessarily included in the former or the situation does not call for the application of other exceptions laid down by this court, the conviction of the accused under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, notwithstanding his prosecution under article 327 thereof, was erroneous. An accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him (par. 17, sec. 1, Art. III, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to section 15, par. 2, and section 6, par. 3, of General Orders, No. 58), and for this purpose the law requires that a complaint or information must charge but one offense, subject to a single exception (sec. II, General Orders, No. 58). There are two reasons, however, why the decision of the lower court should be affirmed. First, because the constitutional and legal purpose has been amply served in this case, it appearing that the accused himself, in the course of the trial, put up the defense that he was at most responsible for the offense of damage to property by reckless imprudence. Secondly, assuming that the two offenses here are dinstinct, I think that they are at least akin to each other so as to justify the application of the rule laid down in United States vs. Solis MARIO VALEROSO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 149718 September 29, 2003 ISSUE: Whether or not Valeroso is guilty of the crime of malicious mischief under article 327 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: Valeroso was a former barangay captain of Balon Anito, Balanga, Bataan. On August 21, 1996, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) hired him as caretaker of its lot situated in Porto del Sol Subdivision, Balon Anito, Balanga, Bataan. Consequently, the petitioner put up on the said lot a sign which reads “No Trespassing, PNB Property” to ward off squatters. Sometime in April 1997, despite the sign, Mrs. Julita Castillo, believing that the said lot was owned by her grandparents, constructed a nipa hut thereon. She spent P12,350 for the huts construction. On June 5, 1997, the petitioner, together with Jorge Valeroso, Fernando Operario, Peter Morales and Rolando de Guzman, tore down and demolished Mrs. Castillos hut.

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She thus filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bataan a criminal complaint for malicious mischief against the petitioner. Valeroso admitted in his counter-affidavit and during his oral testimony that he indeed demolished the structure of complainant Julita Castillo in his capacity as caretaker of the owner, PNB, Republic Bank, after he warned her and all illegal occupants to vacate the premises even posting NO TRESPASSING signs to indicate that the place is privately owned; he also absolved all his co-defendants from any liability alleging that he acted alone during the demolition of said structure. Valeroso admits that he deliberately demolished Mrs. Castillos nipa hut. He, however, contends that the third element of the crime of malicious mischief, i.e., that the act of damaging anothers property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it, is not present in this case. He maintains that he demolished Mrs. Castillos nipa hut to safeguard the interest of his employer, the PNB, and for no other reason. His motive was lawful and that there was no malice in causing the damage to the private complainants property. In other words, he did not act out of hatred, revenge or other evil motive. HELD: Yes. All the elements of the crime of Malicious Mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are present. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are: 1. That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another; 2. That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction; 3. That the act of damaging anothers property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it. Contrary to the petitioners contention, all the foregoing elements are present in this case. First, he admits that he deliberately demolished the nipa hut of Mrs. Castillo. Second, the demolition does not constitute arson or any other crime involving destruction. Neither can the petitioner rightfully invoke paragraph 5, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code which states: Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability: 5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. The requisites of circumstance are:

the

foregoing

justifying

(1)that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (2)that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, Valeroso deliberately demolished the property of Mrs. Castillo without any lawful

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST authority. Thus, while the first requisite is present, the second is unavailing. Valeroso was not acting in the fulfillment of his duty when he took the law into his own hands and summarily demolished Mrs. Castillos hut. ROBERT TAGUINOD, -versusPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185833 October 12, 2011 ISSUE: Whether or not Taguinod is guilty of the crime of Malicious Mischief under article 327 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS: Pedro Ang (private complainant) was driving his Honda CRV (CRV) from the 3rd basement parking, while Robert Taguinod (petitioner) was driving his Suzuki Vitara (Vitara) from the 2nd basement parking. When they were about to queue at the corner to pay the parking fees, the respective vehicles were edging each other. The CRV was ahead of the queue, but the Vitara tried to overtake, which resulted the touching of their side view mirrors. The side view mirror of the Vitara was pushed backward and naturally, the side view mirror of the CRV was pushed forward. This prompted the private complainant's wife and daughter, namely, Susan and Mary Ann, respectively, to alight from the CRV and confront the petitioner. Taguinod appeared to be hostile, hence, the private complainant Ang instructed his wife and daughter to go back to the CRV. While they were returning to the car, petitioner accelerated the Vitara and moved backward as if to hit them. The CRV, having been overtaken by the Vitara, took another lane. Private complainant was able to pay the parking fee at the booth ahead of petitioner. When the CRV was at the upward ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the CRV's rear portion and pushed the CRV until it hit the stainless steel railing located at the exit portion of the ramp. As a result of the collision, the CRV sustained damage at the back bumper spare tires and the front bumper, the repair of which amounted to P57,464.66. HELD: Yes. Taguinod is proven beyond reasonable doubt to have committed the crime of Malicious Mischief. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another; (2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction; (3)That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it. The incident involving the collision of the two side view mirrors is proof enough to establish the existence of the element of hate, revenge and other evil motive. Here, the accused entertained hate, revenge and other evil motive because to his mind, he was wronged by the complainant

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when the CRV overtook his Vitara while proceeding toward the booth to pay their parking fee, as a consequence of which, their side view mirrors collided. On the same occasion, the hood of his Vitara was also pounded, and he was badmouthed by the complainant's wife and daughter when they alighted from the CRV to confront him for the collision of the side view mirrors. These circumstances motivated the accused to push upward the ramp complainant's CRV until it reached the steel railing of the exit ramp. First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner was clearly deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The version of the private complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara pushed the CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more believable than the petitioner's version that it was private complainant's CRV which moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara considering the steepness or angle of the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and dangerous for the private complainant and his family to move the CRV backward when it would be hard for him to see his direction as well as to control his speed in view of the gravitational pull. Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him and the private complainant. April 4, 2018 – Article 328 – SPECIAL CASES OF MALICIOUS MISCHIEF ALAMEDA, Manuel [NO CASE FOUND] April 5, 2018 – Article 330 – DAMAGE AND OBSTRUCTION TO MEANS OF COMMUNICATION ARANCES, Javy Ann G. [NO CASE FOUND] April 5, 2018 – Article 331 – DESTROYING OR DAMAGING STATUES, PUBLIC MONUMENTS OR PAINTINGS BANUELOS, Kelvinn L. [NO CASE FOUND] April 5, 2018 – Article 332 – PERSONS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A. INTESTATE ESTATE OF DE CARUNGCONG VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 181409. FEBRUARY 11, 2010 CORONA, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can apply for the benefits under article 322 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS:

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST On November 24, 1992, William Sato induced Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City. Mediatrix Carungcong, the duly appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, filed a complaint for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato. William Sato filed a motion to quash the information alleging that he is exempt from criminal liability under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In an order dated April 17, 2006, the trial court granted Satos motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case. Dissatisfied with the trial courts rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, however, in a decision dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. Hence, this petition. RULING: No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable. However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification. In this case, The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense. A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor. DOLORES G. GOMEZ VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

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G.R. NO. L-63202 APRIL 9, 1985 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is exempt from criminal liability under Article 322 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: On November 20, 1973, Rodrigo Gomez, husband of accused, went to the residence of his sister Belen, in Angeles City because there was somebody in Manila interested in buying some pieces of jewelry. Belen, together with Lourdes Balajadia and Rodrigo, went to the residence of accused. At the house of Rodrigo and Dolores Gomez and in the presence of Rodrigo and Lourdes, Belen delivered to Dolores three pieces of jewelry. On November 21, 1973, Milagros Gomez, sister-in-law of Dolores, accompanied by Belen Tiotuico, brought to her residence a pair of dangling earrings. The four pieces of jewelry were left with Dolores without any acknowledgment receipt as they were relatives, under the condition that, if after two or three days, the jewelry would be sold, Milagros would give Dolores and Rodolfo Punongbayan P2,000.00 except for the dominic ring in which she would give them P200.00; and if they could sell the jewelry for more than her price, the difference would belong to them (Dolores and Rodolfo) but should they fail to sell the same, they would return the same. A few days after the consignation, Belen kept on reminding Dolores about the jewelries but Dolores always answered that the jewelries were not yet sold. Sensing something was wrong after she again talked with Rodolfo in the evening of the same day, Belen reported the matter to the Philippine Constabulary in San Fernando, Pampanga, and asked them to look for Dolores, Rodrigo, and Wilson. Only the dominic ring was returned to Belen. The remaining two were pledged to Jose Lontok. When Belen tried to redeem the 7 Karat pink ring, Lontok declined her because the receipt she handed was not the original receipt. The next day, Belen returned to Jose to redeem the jewelry and told him she had merely asked Dolores to sell it for her. Jose promised to give her the jewelry if Willie would come with her and bring the original receipt. The next day when Willie and Belen came, she was able to recover the ring after paying Jose the amount of P25,000.00. After Wilson had given Belen the receipt of Antonio Tambunting's Pawnshop, as to the jewelry Dolores pledged to guarantee payment of P6,000.00, and after she (Belen) executed an affidavit that she was the real owner of the jewelry pledged, Belen was able to redeem it after paying the amount of P6,00000. As to the pair of dangling earrings, Belen was not able to recover the same and so she had to pay on installments, the value thereof to Belen Tiotuico from whom she had received the jewelry. On February 24, 1977, the Court of First Instance of Manila convicted Dolores Gomez of the crime of estafa or swindling under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. A motion for reconsideration filed by Dolores Gomez was denied by the respondent court in a resolution dated October 19, 1982.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST RULING: Yes. Both Rodrigo and Wilson were exempt from criminal liability since they were the brothers of Belen. In Dolores’ case, the Supreme Court ruled to acquit her criminal charges. There are other circumstances in the records strongly suggesting that the transactions were between Belen and her two brothers and that the petitioner came into the picture only because she was the wife of one of the brothers. In the case at bar, the evidence presented by the people to establish the presence of conspiracy is even murkier than the proof on the commission of the crime itself. The factual findings of the respondent Court of Appeals and the trial court do not show the participation of the petitioner in the events that followed after the pieces of jewelry were delivered to her and her husband, Rodrigo. The records show that the only participation of the petitioner in the transaction was when she and her husband received the pieces of jewelry from Belen Gomez Espiritu on November 10 and 21, 1973 at their residence. After the same were received, Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez took possession of the said pieces of jewelry and disposed of them without the knowledge of the petitioner. Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez alone absconded with the pieces of jewelry. As a matter of fact, the petitioner did not even know the whereabouts of Rodrigo and Wilson who were then in possession of the said pieces of jewelry. The participation of petitioner Dolores in the attempts to locate the missing brothers and to compel them to return the jewelry to their sister is not proof of conspiracy in a crime. It was understandable why she was involved in looking for her own husband at the behest of her sisterin-law. To establish conspiracy, there must be evidence of intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose (People v. Agda, 111 SCRA 330). There is no evidence of such kind of participation. Without conspiracy, the petitioner cannot be held liable as she had no direct participation in the commission of the crime charged. The presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner has not been successfully overcome by evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST TITLE ELEVEN – CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY April 6, 2018 – Article 333 – WHO ARE GUILTY OF ADULTERY CEBALLOS, Jesus C. PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA GR NO. 80116 JUNE 30, 1989 ISSUE: WoN Pilapil can be charged by Geiling with adultery. FACTS: Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Erich Geiling, a German citizen, were married in Germany. Subsequently, Geiling filed a divorce against Pilapil in Germany, which the Schoneberg Court granted on January 15, 1986. Geiling then filed a case of adultery against Pilapil at the RTC of Manila on June of 1986. He alleged that in 1982, Pilapil had an affair with William Chia and Jesus Chua in 1983. HELD: No, she cannot be charged. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In the present case, the fact that Geiling obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as Geiling is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Thus, Geiling ceased to be the lawful spouse of Pilapil at the time he initiated the criminal complaint against Pilapil. April 6, 2018 – Article 334 – CONCUBINAGE DAHIROC, Janice PEOPLE VS. PEDRO PITOC AND MARCIANA DEL BASCO G.R. NO. 18513 SEPTEMBER 18, 1922 ISSUE: Whether or not Pedro Pitoc and Marciana del Basco cohabition constitutes the crime of concubinage. FACTS: February 21, 1921, the defendant, Pedro Pitoc, was legally married to Petronila Roque in the city of Manila. For several years prior to their marriage, the defendant, Pedro Pitoc, had sustained illicit relations with Marciana del

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Basco. In a short time after the marriage, the defendant, Pedro Pitoc, and his wife left the city of Manila and went to Calumpit, Bulacan, to reside. Later Pedro Pitoc returned to Manila, leaving his wife at Calumpit, promising to return March 15, 1921. For his failure to return on March 17, 1921, his wife came to Manila to look for him. March 17, his wife came to Manila where she found the defendant living in the same house and under the same roof with his former paramour, staying around her store and keeping company with her, under circumstances which strongly tend to show that they had resumed their former relations. HELD: Yes. The word cohabit has many different meanings, each depending upon the sense in which it is used. Here, we have a law intended to prohibit a married man from keeping a mistress in his dwelling or anywhere else under "scandalous circumstances." Hence, the meaning of the word cohabit here must relate and he confined to the subject matter of the law itself. When used in that sense, it should be construed to mean "to dwell or live together as husband and wife; to live together as husband and wife although not legally married; to live together in the same house, claiming to be married; to live together at bed and board." (Corpus Juris, vol., 11, p. 950.) Applying the facts to such definition, it is undisputed that before his marriage to Petronila Roque, the defendant and his coaccused were living together for a number of years in illicit relations. The defendants, Pedro Pitoc, legally married Petronila Roque in the city of Manila on February 21, 1921, and together they went to Calumpit, Bulacan, to live. In a short time he left his wife there and came to Manila, promising to return on March 15, twenty-three days after their marriage. He never did return. March 17, his wife came to Manila where she found the defendant living in the same house and under the same roof with his former paramour, staying around her store and keeping company with her, under circumstances which strongly tend to show that they had resumed their former relations. It is, indeed, significant that the defendant Pitoc would leave his wife whom he married on February 21, and return to Manila and go direct to, and obtain a room in, the same house where his former paramour was living, and violate his promise to return tho his newly wedded wife on March 15. Petronila Roque testified that she asked her husband if that woman, meaning his coaccused, was his paramour, and that he answered yes, and that she asked him what would be her situation and "he answered me that he could not abandon that woman, referring to Marciana del Basco, and that I could do anything I pleased." This evidence was not denied by the defendant, Pedro Pitoc. When this is considered with the defendant's conduct and all the other evidence, surrounding facts and circumstances, the proof is conclusive that the defendant, Pedro Pitoc, did cohabit "with a woman who is not his wife," and that he is guilty of the crime charged.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST They were both found guilty as charged. BUSUEGO VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN MINDANAO AND ROSA BUSUEGO G.R. NO. 196842 OCTOBER 9, 2013 ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to indict Alfredo and Sia for Concubinage. FACTS: Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a complaint for: (1) Concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children); and (3) Grave Threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the Ombudsman against her husband, Alfredo. Alfredo is the Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional Hospital. They have 2 children. However, their marriage turned sour. Rosa went to the US and was eventually joined by her 2 children, Alfred and Robert. Robert eventually returned to Davao City to study medicine. Sometime in 1997, Rosa learned that a certain Emy Sia (Sia) was living at their conjugal home. When Rosa asked Alfredo, he said that Sia, nurse at the Regional Hospital, was just in a sorry plight and was allegedly raped by Rosa's brother-in-law so he allowed her to sleep at the maids' quarters. In October 2005, Rosa finally learned of Alfredo's extra-marital relationships. Robert and the housekeepers executed a joint affidavit to support Rosa's allegations. Rosa and the other son Alfred flew to Davao without informing Alfredo. She gathererd and consolidated information of her husband's sexual affairs. She also averred that during the course of the marriage, Alfredo physically and verbally abused her and her family. Alfredo denied all accusations. In their subsequent exchange of responsive pleadings, Rosa maintained Alfredo's culpability, and naturally, Alfredo claimed innocence. In the course thereof, the procedural issue of Rosa's failure to implead Sia and de Leon as respondents cropped up. Alfredo insisted that Rosa's complaint ought to be dismissed for failure to implead his alleged concubines as respondents. HELD: No. The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation. This is the reason why judicial review of the resolution of the Ombudsman in the exercise of its power and duty to investigate and prosecute felonies and/or offenses of public officers is limited to a determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the Ombudsman. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

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tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. In this regard, petitioner failed to demonstrate the Ombudsman's abuse, much less grave abuse, of discretion. The Ombudsman merely followed the provisions of its Rules of Procedure. No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or approval of the ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbyan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases. Notably, Rosa's complaint contained not just the Concubinage charge, but other charges: violation of Republic Act No. 9262 and Grave Threats. Upon the Ombudsman's perusal, the complaint was supported by affidavits corroborating Rosa's accusations. Thus, at that stage, the Ombudsman properly referred the complaint to Alfredo for comment. Nonetheless, while the Ombudsman found no reason for outright dismissal, it deemed it fit to hold a clarificatory hearing to discuss the applicability of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the issue having been insisted upon by Alfredo. Surely the procedural sequence of referral of the complaint to respondent for comment and thereafter the holding of a clarificatory hearing is provided for in paragraph b, Section 2 and paragraphs d and f, Section 4 of Rule II, which the Court have at the outset underscored. The Ombudsman merely facilitated the amendment of the complaint to cure the defect pointed out by Alfredo. The Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes involving public officers, without regard to its commission in relation to office, had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ. The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective heads of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the conduct of their investigations. WHEREFORE the petition is DISMISSED. April 7, 2018 – Article 335 WHEN AND HOW RAPE IS COMMITTED DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J Note: Art. 335 has been repealed by Rep. Act. No. 8353, other- wise known as the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997" which took effect on October 22, 1997. See page 523 of this Book II. (Article 266-A) April 7, 2018 – Article LASCIVIOUSNESS DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G

336

ISSUE: Whether or not the case for Lasciviousness can be sustained.

ACTS

Acts

OF

of

FACTS: Tiburcio Balbar allegedly entered the room where public schoolteacher Ester Gonzales was conducting her classes. Without warning and right after complainant had finished writing on the blackboard, Balbar placed his arms around her and kissed her on the eye. Shocked, complainant instinctively pushed Balbar away and tried to flee. Balbar brought out his "daga" (a local dagger) and pursued her, catching up with her before she was able to get out of the room. Balbar embraced her again, at the same time holding on to his "daga". They both fell to the floor, as a result of which complainant sustained slight physical injuries. Gonzales injured her right arm which required 3 to 4 days to heal. Two informations, one for Direct Assault Upon a Person in Authority and another for Acts of Lasciviousness were filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal against defendant before the CFI Batangas. Balbar filed separate motions to quash, contending that with respect to Criminal Case for Acts of Lasciviousness, the accused would be placed in double jeopardy and that the complaint charges two offenses. HELD: NO. Upon examination of the events which gave rise to the filing of the 2 informations, the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness does not appear to have been committed at all. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. In the instant case, considering the manner, place and time under which the acts complained of were done, even as alleged in the information itself, lewd designs can hardly be attributed to accused. The factual setting, i.e., a schoolroom in the presence of complainant's students and within hearing distance of her coteachers, rules out a conclusion that the accused was actuated by a lustful design or purpose or that his conduct was lewd or lascivious. It may be that he did embrace the girl and kiss her but, this of itself would not necessarily bring the case

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within the provision of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. April 7, 2018 – Article 337 – QUALIFIED SEDUCTION DIZON, Roxan Danica G. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIANO FONTANILLA G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is criminally liable under Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS: On September 1960, Fe Castro, a fifteen-year old virgin, was brought by her mother to the house of Mariano Fontanilla and his second wife, Magdalena Copio, a sister of Fe's mother, to serve as a helper. Fe Castro testified that during her stay in the house of Fontanilla for about three months, the accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her repeatedly, the total number of times she could not recall. Prior to this incident, the accused had made amorous overtures and advances toward her. Fe Castro further testified that she subsequently repeatedly yielded to the carnal desires of the accused, as she was induced by his promises of marriage and frightened by his acts of intimidation. The accused made love to her during the day when his wife was away and at night when the latter was already asleep. Their intimacies lasted for almost three months until her aunt, the wife of the accused, caught them in flagrante on the kitchen floor. The following day she returned to her parents, and revealed everything to her mother two days later. HELD: Yes. It is nevertheless settled that deceit, although an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, does not need to be proved or established in a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. When the offender is a public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic, tutor, teacher, or under any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the offended woman, as in the present case, the act is punishable although fraud or deceit may not have been used or, if employed, has not been proved. The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any of the persons enumerated in art. 337 "is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction ... even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for granted the existence of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than it does the simple seduction ... taking into account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an abuse of confidence which implies deceit or fraud." There is no evidence on record that Fe Castro, then a 15-year old single girl, was unchaste prior to her living with the Fontanilla spouses. Such being the case, her virginity before she was seduced by the appellant must be presumed.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Presumption of a woman's virginity arises whenever it is shown that she is single, and continues until overthrown by proof to the contrary. G.R. Nos. 104942-43 November 25, 1993 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NAPOLEON SUBINGSUBING ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty under Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code FACTS: Accused Napoleon was charged with the crime of rape in three separate informations. The complainant Mary Jane in all of these actions is sixteen years old and unmarried. She was living with her grandmother and the accused Napoleon who was her uncle. On November 25 and 28, 1989, the accused poked his garand rifle and then boxed the belly of Mary Jane, which rendered her unconscious. He proceeded having carnal knowledge with her against her will and without her consent. On November 30, 1989, the accused put over the nose of the victim handkerchief soaked with chemical which rendered her unconscious. He then proceeded having carnal knowledge with her. Mary Jane did not reveal to anybody the things that happened to her for fear that the accused might really kill her as the accused had threatened to do. Months later, Mary Jane finally divulged everything to her mother. They reported the incidents to the police station.Thereafter, she had herself physically examined and was found pregnant. At the trial, the accused Napoleon denied the charge of rape as narrated above and proferred a different story. He interposed consent on the part of the complainant as a defense. Three other witnesses for the defense were presented who corroborated the story of the accused and testified that indeed, the complainant and the accused were seen going out together and sharing happy moments months after November 1989. HELD: The evidence for the prosecution cannot, on its own, stand and suffice to establish the guilt of the accused for the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt. A perusal of the records and the testimony of the complainant discloses contradictions and inconsistencies on vital details which lead one to seriously doubt the veracity of her story. The complainant admitted that she still went out with the accused to watch betamax movies or get food for the pigs in the ricefields. Such behaviour directly contradicts the normal or expected behaviour of a rape victim. Appellant's exculpation from the offense of rape does not mean, however, that his responsibility is merely moral and not penal in character. He was found guilty of qualified seduction in one of the informations. Qualified seduction is the act of having carnal knowledge of a virgin over 12 years to 18 years of

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age and committed by any of the persons enumerated in Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code. Abuse of confidence is the qualifying circumstance in the offense. Notably, among the persons who can commit qualified seduction is a "domestic". And a "domestic," for purposes of said legal provision, has been interpreted judicially as — . . . Upon the word domestic being employed in said legal provision segregating it from that of a servant, the term is applied to persons usually living under the same roof, pertaining to the same house, and constituting, in the sense, a part thereof, distinguishing it from the term servant whereby a person serving another on a salary is designated; in this manner, it has been properly used. The verified complaint for rape contains allegations, sans averment on the use of force, which impute the crime of qualified seduction. Any deficiency in the complaint is supplied by the supporting affidavit, where complainant averred that the accused Napoleon Subingsubing, her uncle, who was living in the same house as the complainant, had sexual intercourse with her. The accused took advantage of his moral ascendancy if not dominance over the complainant. She was presumably a virgin. As already stated, the accused was a domestic in relation to the complainant within the meaning of Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code. April 8, 2018 – Article 340 - CORRUPTION OF MINORS FLORENTINO, Kimberly A. FRANCISCA ALIMAGNO & JOVITA MELO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. L-36458, FEBRUARY 21, 1983 ISSUE: Whether Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code was violated by the accused? FACTS: Victim was employed as a domestic helper when she came to know the accused who was then bringing money to her employer. One time, accused tried to convince her to leave the house of her employer promising her a better job. Accused succeeded in pursuing the victim to leave. Upon leaving the house of her employer a note was left saying " Ako ho ay nagtanan kasama ko ay lalake. Your utusan" which was admitted to have been written by the accused. After abandoning the house of her employer, victim was brought by the two accused to a hut and there allowed her to be ravished by a man whom she saw for the first time. RULING: Yes. Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code provides that any person who shall promote or facilitate or corruption of persons under age to satisfy the lust of another shall be punished. The Court clearly found through evidence and witnesses presented that the accused violated this article. The accused Alimagno was found guilty as principal to the crime and accused Melo was found guilty as an accomplice in the the consumated crime.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SIMPLICIO DELANTAR G.R. NO. 169143, FEBRUARY 2, 2007 ISSUE: Was the accused guilty for violation of R.A. No. 7610 in relation to Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code? FACTS: The victim was a minor below 12 years old and through her testimony showed that accused procured her as a child prostitute for at least two clients: the first, an Arab national named Mr. Hammond and the second, then Congressman Romeo Jalosjos.Victim testified that she was brought to the first client at least eleven (11) times. Once left alone with the victim, the client would perform lascivious acts, the recurrent salient points of her harrowing experience revolved around the client's kissing her, touching her breasts, embracing her, and inserting his finger in her private parts. After their first visit to the client, victim told accused that she did not want to go back because the client was "bastos." Accused promised her that they would no longer go back but the promise was broken as they went back a few more times. As with the first client, accused would tell the victim that they had to go to the second client because they had obligations to pay. During each of these visits, the client would give the victim money ranging from P2,000.00 to P10,000.00. The details of what transpired when victim was left alone with the second client were vividly recounted in People v. Jalosjos, where the second client was convicted of two (2) counts of rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness, all committed against the victim on various dates. HELD: Yes. There is no doubt, drawing from the evidence, that the victim was a child who was exploited in prostitution as defined in Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The law punishes not only the person who commits the acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with the child but also those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution. Accused is one such person. Accused in his brief, does not deny that he brought the victim to the clients. He, however, attempts to exculpate himself by stating that he did not coerce or influence the victim to go to the two clients to be exploited in prostitution. Verily, it was against the victim's will and consent to see the two clients. But even if the victim had in fact consented, appellant may still be prosecuted for child prostitution under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 because the child's consent or lack of it is not an element of the offense. April 8, 2018 – Article 341 – WHITE SLAVE TRADE FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z. PEOPLE V. NUEVAS ISSUE: WON accused Nuevas is guilty for violating Article 341 of the RPC FACTS:

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Jesus Nuevas contracted the services of 4 women of ill repute whom he brought and maintained in a house he rented in Batangas to engage in prostitution. He provided them food and lodging and in return he would receive ½ of the prostitutes’ earnings in their illicit traffic with soldiers. It was established that the prostitutes would charge the soldiers for 10 pesos each sexual intercourse. The accused now contended that under article 341 of the Revised Penal Code the prosecution (a) must identify the alleged house of ill fame, (b) must proved it to be really a house of ill fame, and (c) must further proved that the accused is either the owner or the lessee of the house. Held: Yes. The accused is guilty of the said felony. Under Article 341 penalizes three acts: (a) engaging in the business of prostitution, (b) profiting by prostitution, or (c) enlisting the service of women for the purpose of prostitution. Any person committing any one of these acts comes within the purview of said article. The proofs show beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant (a) enlisted the services of the women for the purpose of prostitution and (b) profited thereby. Even if the appellant were not the lessee of particular house, he could not escape the penalty imposed by the law for the immoral and illicit trade in which he engaged. As a matter of law, once it was proved that the accused had enlisted the services of women for the purpose of prostitution, he was criminally liable even if there were no proof that he had shared in the profit. And even if there were no proof that he had enlisted the services of women for the purpose of prostitution, he would still be criminally liable because there is indubitable proof in this case that he had share in the income of the prostitutes. April 10, 2018 – Article 342 – FORCIBLE ABDUCTION IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P. G.R. NO. 131914 APRIL 30, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. JAIME ABLANEDA FACTS: On February 18, 1993, at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning, 6-year old Magdalena Salas, a Grade I pupil at the Baldovino Elementary School, Camambugan, Daet, Camarines Norte, was walking to school. Along the way, accusedappellant Jaime Ablaneda, also known as Joey Capistrano, approached her and asked if he could share her umbrella, because it was raining. Suddenly, Ablaneda boarded a tricycle with Magdalena and brought her to a small hut. While inside, Ablaneda removed his underwear and the Magdalena’s panties. He applied cooking oil, which he had bought earlier, on his organ and on’s. Then, he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with the little girl. Magdalena felt pain but was too terrified to speak or cry out. After satisfying his lust, Ablaneda ordered Magdalena to go home. When Magdalena arrived at their house, Ailene Villaflores, her uncle’s sister-in-law, noticed that she looked pale and weak, and found traces of blood on her dress. Ailene asked her what happened, but Magdalena merely said that her classmate had pushed her.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Ailene did not believe this, so she brought her to a quack doctor. The latter told her that Magdalena had been raped. Ailene then brought Magdalena to the Daet Police Station and, later, to the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital to have her medically examined. When Ailene saw Magdalena’s bloodied panties, she again asked her what happened. This time, Magdalena confessed that she was raped by a man who had a scar on the stomach. The lower court found that the Ablaneda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. ISSUE: Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to convict Ablaneda. All elements of the crime of forcible abduction were proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman, was taken against her will, as shown by the fact that she was intentionally directed by accusedappellant to a vacant hut. At her young age, Magdalena could not be expected to physically resist considering that the lewd designs of Ablaneda could not have been apparent to her at that time. Physical resistance need not be demonstrated to show that the taking was against her will. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering that it was raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as probably the purpose was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. Finally, the evidence shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was effected in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim In the case at bar, Magdalena testified in open court that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her private parts. The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical findings wherein it was found that the victim suffered from complete hymenal laceration. Whether or not she consented to the sexual contact is immaterial considering that at the time thereof, she was below twelve years of age. Sex with a girl below twelve years, regardless of whether she consented thereto or not, constitutes statutory rape. G.R. NO. 199100 JULY 18, 2014 PEOPLE V. ROSENDO AMARO FACTS: 26th day of March, 1998, at 5pm in the afternoon, in front of Boots and Maya, AAA a 7 year old girl was forcibly abducted by appellant Rosendo Amaro. AAA testified that on her way home from school, she met appellant and asked her to buy him some cigarettes. Appellant offered her food. As she was finished eating the food, she felt dizzy and was unconscious. She later awoke

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in the house of appellant and saw the appellant naked and was rape. Victim was raped 5 times and was detained for 6 days. The RTC rendered judgement finding the accused guilty of violating Art. 342 of Forcible Abduction with Rape. In his appeal, appellant contends that there were no sufficient evidence to convict him. According to him, he did not rape AAA because she was not in his custody at the time said incident allegedly happened. Appellant adds that he entrusted AAA to the custody of Florante Magay’s sister because he was working. Appellant also insists that AAA voluntarily went with him to his house. ISSUE: Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused? HELD: The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape under Article 266-A is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by: (1) force or intimidation, or (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or (3) when she is under twelve years of age. The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in this case. The victim, AAA was a seven (7) year-old girl who was taken against her will by appellant who told her that he knew her mother and that he would bring her home. At her tender age, AAA could have easily been deceived by appellant. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. The presence of lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim. In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants are witnesses to their occurrences. The issue therefore boils down to credibility. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, saysthat she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show thatrape has in fact been committed. Wherefore, the decision was affirmed finding the accused guilty of Forcible Abduction with Rape. April 10, 2018 – Article 343 – CONSENTED ABDUCTION LAZO, Joseph Artfel T. The following cases could not be found: PEOPLE VS CRISOSTOMO, 46 PHIL 775 PEOPLE VS AMANTE, 49 PHIL 679

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST April 12, 2018 – Article 344 – PROSECUTION OF THE CRIME OF ADULTERY, CONCUBINAGE, SEDUCTION, ABDUCTION, RAPE, AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS. NASH, Regina Mercado

prosecution officer. The complaint contemplated by the law and the rules is necessarily that one filed in court. The "salaysay" was filed with the Fiscal and not with the court; it did not start the criminal proceedings

G.R. No. L-8520. June 29, 1957 PEOPLE v. ENGRACIO SANTOS, ET AL.

"In front of these provisions of law, it cannot be certainly pretended that the aforementioned ‘salaysay’ or written statement of the offended party, Exhibit 1, could be considered as the complaint required by law for the proper initiation of the present case of rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not the “salaysay’ or written statement of Policarpia Bansuelo, the offended party filed with the Fiscal and not in court is the complaint contemplated by Art. 344 of RPC? FACTS: Respondent Engracio Santos was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal with the crime of rape. After trial, said respondent was convicted a pd sentenced to the maximum period of reclusion temporal, from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years, and to pay the costs. Appealing to the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to quash and for discharge, on the ground that the trial court was without jurisdiction, there having been no valid complaint subscribed and sworn to by the offended party as required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Said motion was granted. Hence this appeal by the petitioners. It is contended that the "salaysay" executed and signed by petitioner Policarpia Bansuelo on January 12, 1954, before and in the presence of Fiscal Nicanor P. Nicolas of Rizal and Capt. Hermogenes Marco of the PCAC, is sufficient in form and substance to serve as the complaint required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. That the law requiring that the crime of rape, among others, shall be commenced by a complaint filed by the offended party is merely "designed for the protection of the offended party and her family who may prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial" (Samilin v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298, 304); that when petitioner Bansuelo executed said "Salaysay", she had manifested her desire to prosecute the maniacal abuse committed against her; that said "salaysay" has conformed substantially to the requisites of a, valid complaint; that it cannot be considered as her testimony during the preliminary investigation because, if it were so, the other witnesses should have also signed it. After a thorough examination of the "salaysay" in question, we agree with the appealed decision that it is a narration of how the crime of rape was committed against petitioner Bansuelo. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his comment on the motion for reconsideration, such sworn statement "salaysay" is not the complaint contemplated in and required by sections 1, 2 and 5 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court and Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. "The complaint is the process which begins the criminal action, and no other pleading on the part of the government is necessary. So, if a criminal action, had been commenced by complaint in appropriate cases, it would be error for the court to dismiss it, because it was not presented through the mediation of the

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"It is argued, however, that said Exhibit 1 should be considered as the complaint required by law, for on the basis thereof the provincial fiscal of Rizal conducted the preliminary investigation and then filed the information at bar. It is further argued that since under Republic Act No. 732, provincial fiscals have now the same authority as the Justice of the Peace to conduct preliminary investigation, said Exhibit 1 should be considered as the complaint contemplated in the Rules of Court and the Revised Penal Code. We cannot concur to this theory, for according to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 732, after the provincial fiscal has conducted an investigation of a case, he has the duty to have prepared an information or complaint. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 732 provides: ‘A provincial fiscal shall have authority to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against persons charged with the commission of the same.’ And the complaint mentioned in this provision of law is precisely what is defined and mentioned in the Rules of Court and the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, we hold the view that in the case at bar, after the fiscal has investigated the case, he should have procured the filing of a complaint by the offended party to properly initiate this case and not file by himself an information as he did." It is also argued that in affixing her signature and swearing to the allegations of the information together with the fiscal, petitioner Bansuelo had complied with the requirement of a valid complaint. Respondent Santos has answered this argument by saying that such fact is not borne out by the records; that such assertion has never been made before the Court of Appeals; that the opening paragraph of the information clearly and unmistakably shows that the fiscal alone accuses respondent Santos of the crime of rape; that the offended party has never been referred to in the body of the information as having requested its filing. We cannot consider the information, although signed by petitioner Bansuelo together with the fiscal, as equivalent to the complaint required by law, because said information lacks the oath of the complainant; the jurat contained therein is the subscribed and sworn certification of the fiscal that he had conducted the preliminary investigation in which obviously the offended party had taken no participation whatsoever; in very unequivocal terms, the information commences with the statement that "the

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST undersigned fiscal accuse Engracio Santos of the crime of rape", the offended party not having been mentioned at all as one of the accusers. It is not altogether true that to require the offended party to draft the complaint in legal form and terminology, — otherwise the complaint will be insufficient, — would impose a penalty on ignorance, and that a person with no legal training will not be able to institute a criminal action for private crimes; because, as may be gathered from the provisions of Section 2 of Republic Act 732, it is the duty of the Provincial Fiscal to prepare the necessary complaint after having taken down the testimony of the offended party and his witnesses during the preliminary investigation. Indeed, the law required this, since the victims of crimes which cannot be prosecuted except upon their complaint may be ignorant of the law. This Court has invariably maintained strict compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of a complaint by the offered party, as defined in Section 2 of Rule 106 and Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. In the case of People v. Palabao (L-8027, August 31, 1954), we considered insufficient an information filed with the Provincial Fiscal, wherein the offended party signed at the bottom thereof and above the signature of the prosecuting officer, the information even reciting that the Provincial Fiscal charged defendant with the crime of seduction at the "instance of the offended party." In the case of People v. Martinez, (76 Phil. 559), this Court motu proprio dismissed the case for failure of the aggrieved party to file the proper complaint for the offense of oral defamation, although the accused never raised the question on appeal, thereby showing the necessity of strict compliance with the legal requirement even at the cost of nullifying all the proceedings already had in the lower court. HELD: The decision appealed from was affirmed without costs. April 11, 2018 – Article 345 – CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P. EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM AND MARON LAJIM VS PEOPLE G.R. NO. 179570 FEBRUARY 4, 2010 FACTS: Fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt Inon Dama were fetching water in a cave in Barangay (Brgy.) Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan. Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards them and carrying a badong (bolo). They tried to run away, but Sajiron overtook them. Sajiron then drew his gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it at Inon Dama and said, “If you will not go, I will shoot you”. Inon Dama went home and reported the incident to AAA's mother. When Inon Dama left the place, Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA to come with them. When AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the forest. There, while Sajiron was undressing AAA,

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she pleaded with him not to abuse her, but Sajiron told her that if she would submit to his desire, her life would be spared. Sajiron had carnal knowledge with AAA against the latter’s will. During the entire time that AAA was being abused by Sajiron, Maron stood guard and watched them. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard AAA and to shoot her if she would attempt to escape. Nine days after the abduction, upon instruction of Egap, AAA and Sajiron were married by an Imam. The marriage was solemnized against AAA's will and without the presence of her parents. After the marriage, AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap, together with the latter's wife, children and mother-inlaw. AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While detained, AAA did not try to escape, because her house was very far from the place where she was held captive, and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt to escape. During her detention, Sajiron abused her twice every night. She was free to roam within the vicinity of the house but she was usually accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her guard. She was also guarded and threatened by Egap's sons. She got pregnant after some time. A crime of abduction with rape was charged against the appellants. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime imputed and the corresponding civil liability under ART. 345 was correct. HELD: YES. The court held that Sajiron and Maron, who are private individuals, forcibly took and dragged AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her captive against her will. The crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty.For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. In the present case, although AAA was not actually confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her to the forest away from her home. The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force and intimidation. For fear of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give in to Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault. Consequently, the court further stated that, AAA was sexually abused and gave birth. There was no showing that AAA had previously been sexually abused or had sexual relations with other men. Therefore, it can be logically deduced that Sajiron is the father of the child. Under Art. 345 of the Revised Penal Code, he is civilly liable for the support of his offspring. Hence, he is directed to provide support to the victim's child born out of the rape, subject to the amount and conditions to be determined by the trial court, after due notice and hearing, in accordance with Art. 201 of the Family Code.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST PEOPLE VS. SGT. MORENO BAYANI G.R. NO. 120894. OCTOBER 3, 1996 FACTS: Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), seeks the reversal of finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto. On the other hand, the People, through the Appellees Brief filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, refuted the accuseds arguments, and in closing, recommended that apart from the FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.000) PESOS as indemnity, appellant should be made to support his illegitimate child with Maria Elena, in conformity with Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: Whether or not Bayani is accountable under ART. 345 of the RPC. HELD: No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction, shall be sentenced to: (a) indemnify the offended woman; (b) acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing; and (c) in every case, to support the offspring. While under Article 283 of the Civil Code, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, and seduction when the period of the offense coincides, more or less, with the period of the conception. It has been held, however, that acknowledgment is disallowed if the offender is a married man, with only support for the offspring as part of the sentence. Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on the mother, and likewise provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the Family Code. As such, there is no further need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the offspring by an offender who is married which would vest parental authority in him. Therefore, under article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any. In the instant case, the accused should also be ordered to support his illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto,with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light of Article 201 of the Family Code, the amount and terms thereof to be determined by the trial court only after due notice and hearing. April 10, 2018 – Article 346 – LIABILITY OF ASCENDANTS, GUARDIANS, TEACHERS, OR OTHER PERSONS ENTRUSTED WITH THE CUSTODY OF THE OFFENDED PARTY. PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P. [NO CASE FOUND]

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CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST TITLE TWELVE – CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS April 11, 2018 – Article 347 – SIMULATION OF BIRTHS, SUBSTITUTION OF ONE CHILD FOR ANOTHER, AND CONCEALMENT OR ABANDONMENT OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P G.R. NO. 9279 MARCH 25, 1915 U.S. VS. CAPILLO, ET AL. ISSUE: Whether or not Capillo is guilty of concealment or abandonment of a legitimate child FACTS: That on or about the 12th day of August, 1913, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said defendants Saturnino Capillo and Petrona Paduga, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously expose a child, 1 month old, the legitimate son of the accused Saturnino Capillo and his wife Vicenta Umanbang to lose his civil status in the following manner to wit: That the defendant Saturnino Capillo, with intent to cause his legitimate child to lose his civil status and in cooperation with the defendant Petrona Paduga, took the said child without the permission of his mother Vicenta Umanbang or the authority of the courts of this city and agreed with one Chua Pue Tee to deliver to him the said child and never to claim it again, asking the said Chua Pue Tee at the same time to lend them the sum of P150 to defray the expenses incurred by the defendant Saturnino Capillo during the last sickness and death of his wife Vicenta Umanbang, and received from said Chua Pue Tee the sum of P106 of which P50 corresponded to the defendant Saturnino Capillo and P56 to defendant Petrona Paduga. That the living of said child under such circumstances in the possession of said Chua Pue Tee and his wife Sio Suat King exposes said child to lose his civil status, to wit, that of the legitimate son of the said defendant Saturnino Capillo and his wife Vicenta Umanbang to that of an unknown and nameless child or at the most to that of the child of one Chua Pue Tee and his wife. HELD: Yes. The exposition which is caused by abandoning a new-born child in a place where it cannot be easily assisted, intending that it should perish and save the honor of the mother, is a crime against life. The exposition of a child and the abandonment thereof in a place where it may not be in danger may be a crime against the safety of persons. Only that which has for its purpose the deprivation of the new-born child’s civil status is what constitutes the present crime. In order that it may be so, it is necessary therefore that the acts committed by the guilty party plainly show his intent. The fact that one abandons, in the midst of a lonely forest, an unfortunate child that needs all kinds of assistance during the first moments of coming into the world cannot be admitted as intent to destroy its civil status, but as an attempt against its life. On the contrary, he who places at the

186 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

door of a charitable person, a new-born child which is in condition to stand the first inclemencies of the weather, is supposed to do it in order that it may be taken up and protected, and therefore the legal presumption must be that he does not act with any other purpose than to cause the loss of any trace as to the filiation of the child. Finally, the same penalty is imposed upon anyone who conceals or exposes a legitimate child with the intention of making him lose his civil status. It must be remembered that by the word child must be understood a fully developed and living being, as the child born not capable of living has no status, nor can he transmit any rights whatever. It is, therefore, an essential condition of this crime, that the child who has been exposed or concealed shall have been born alive. April 11, 2018 – Article 348 – USURPATION OF CIVIL STATUS PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D [NO CASE FOUND] April 11, 2018 – Article 349 – BIGAMY RIVERA, Marynit P. G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015 LEONILA G. SANTIAGO vs. PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC FACTS: The prosecution adduced evidence that Nicanor Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-inlaw that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without responsibility." Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos. HELD: Yes. In Montanez v. Cipriano, this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows: The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. For the second spouse to be indicted as a coaccused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice. In the present case, there was a clear showing that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos. Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, the petitioner was validly charged with bigamy. G.R. No. 188775 August 24, 2011 CENON R. TEVES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DANILO R. BONGALON ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC FACTS: On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma). After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to the Philippines for vacations. While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon (Edita). To verify the information, she went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage indicating that her husband and Edita contracted marriage on 10 December 2001. On 13 February 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed a complaint accusing petitioner of committing bigamy. Petitioner was charged on 8 June 2006 with bigamy defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision dated 4 May 2006 declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Refusing to accept such verdict,

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petitioner appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal action or liability had already been extinguished. Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, "there is in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of." HELD: Yes. The elements of this crime are as follows: 1. That the offender has been legally married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Petitioner was legally married to Thelma. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage. Thus, it is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. April 12, 2018 – Article 350 – MARRIAGE CONTRACTED AGAINST PROVISIONS OF LAWS ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M. [NO CASE FOUND] April 12, 2018 – Article 351 – PREMATURE MARRIAGES SALVERON, Jan Ione R. REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10655 on March 13, 2015 and DECRIMINILIZED the crime of PREMATURE MARRIAGES April 12, 2018 – Article 352 – PERFORMANCE OF ILLEGAL MARRIAGE CEREMONY SANTOALLA, Stephanie M. RENE RONULO, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014 FACTS: The presented evidence showed that Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents,

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate. The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests. An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony. The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment. The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document. She heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey. Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple. The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law. The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC. The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. ISSUE: WON Ronulo is guilty of violation of Art, 352 of the RPC HELD: Yes The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the prosecution Article 352 of the RPC, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony.

188 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the RONULO admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 55 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 6 of the Family Code provides that "no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife." Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that: Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that: Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court. From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law. The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case. As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.

189 | 1ST YR – BLK 4 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW Atty. Dimpna Bermejo-Dulay

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST TITLE THIRTEEN – CRIMES AGAINST HONOR April 13, 2018 – Article 353 – DEFINITION OF LIBEL TADO, Diann Kathelline A. G.R. No. L-47971 October 31, 1990 LOPE O. DAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of libel under Article 353 FACTS: Appellant Lope Daez was the chairman of the Liberal Party in Meycauayan, Bulacan, and in that capacity helped the complainant Celso Legaspi campaign for the position of Mayor of that town. When Legaspi was already serving as Mayor of Meycauayan, he often received recommendations from appellant regarding the employment of certain persons in the police or other departments of the municipality. In 1972, appellant recommended a certain Villareal for the position of policeman and a certain Rubio for that of performance officer. However, Legaspi failed to appoint these persons. This omission of Legaspi as well as the prejudice which his subsequent renovation of the public market caused appellant's relatives resulted in appellant's resentment of him. On April 19,1972, while Legaspi was on leave as mayor, appellant wrote the then acting mayor, Vicente Barazon stating: "Sala-ula at bulok ang iyong pangasiwaan, ang iyong polisia ay tinuruan mong maging collector mo ng tong, ang daan libong pisong buwis ay ayaw mong ipakolekta sa Ingat Yaman Bayan, ang tanong ng bayan, kangino napupunta ang daan libong buwis na ito? At mabuti na lamang kung hindi mahalungkat sa fael ng army ang Salaysay laban sa iyo nuong ikaw ay hulihin ng 7th BCT. Kaya mag-ingat ka Alkalde sapagkat hindi mabilang ang iyong atraso. Ang bahay mo ay nakatayo sa buhangin, mabuay at sa bahagyang ihip ng hangin ay babagsak." Thus causing to the complaining witness Celso R. Legaspi dishonor, discredit and contempt to his damage and prejudice. Trial Court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty. Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision. RULING: Yes. The elements of libel are: 1) The imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; 2) publication of the imputation; 3) Identity of the person defamed; and 4) existence of malice. There is no doubt as to the presence of the first three elements in the instant case. A simple perusal of the letter will show the injurious nature of the imputations made to the complainant mayor. The charges in the disputed letter against the mayor that the latter was guilty

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of misconduct in public office, bribery, malversation of public funds, graft and corruption, if true, would constitute actual crimes punishable under the Penal Code or special laws. The gravity of the imputations are sufficient to impeach the complainant's honesty, virtue, integrity and reputation as a public official. The matter of publication was also proven on the basis of evidence on record as found both by the appellate court and the trial court. As indicated in the letter, copies thereof were distributed in the municipal court and municipal council of Meycauayan, Bulacan and chief of police in that place. Several witnesses testified as to having read the libelous letter. Further, evidence shows that petitioner even read the questioned letter before a gathering at a local party meeting wherein the complainant was present. Anent the last element of malice, the law presumes that every defamatory imputation is malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in cases concerning privileged communications (Article 354, Revised Penal Code). Hence, the burden of proving justifiable motive is upon the author of the libel. As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct on the part of public officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged with supervision over them. Such a communication is qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty of libel. The rule on privilege, however, imposes an additional requirement. Such complaints should be addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or power to redress the grievance or has some duty to perform or interest in connection therewith (US v. Galeza, 31 Phil. 365). In the instant case, none of the persons to whom the letter was sent, was vested with the power of supervision over the mayor or the authority to investigate the charges made against the latter. OGIE DIAZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 159787, MAY 25, 2007 ISSUE: Whether the subject article is libelous. FACTS: On or about December 28, 1991, the accused being then the Managing Editor and writer, respectively of Bandera, a newspaper of general circulation written, published or caused to be published in the movie section of said newspaper an article. In which words and phrases, which were used by many people, the said accused meant and intended to convey as in fact, they meant and conveyed false and malicious imputations that the said Florinda Bagay is a sexual pervert and possesses lascivious and immoral habits, the accused well knowing that said imputations are devoid of truth and without foundation in fact whatsoever, highly libelous and offensive to the good name, character, and reputation of the said Florinda Bagay. Florinda Bagay, complaining witness, testified that she is a graduate of medical secretarial

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST course. She tried her luck in the movies under the guidance of her godmother, Mila Parawan, a writer covering the entertainment industry. Florinda adopted and used "Patricia Santillan" as her screen name. Florinda claimed she was the "Miss S" alluded to in petitioner’s column "Pakurot" considering that her screen name is "Patricia Santillan." Mila Parawan also took the witness stand and corroborated Florinda’s testimony. She further testified that after Philip and Florinda parted ways, her former press relations officer, who used the nom de plume "Isko Peta," wrote an item entitled "Ibinulgar namin ang babaeng inanakan ni Philip Henson" which appeared in the December 2, 1991 issue of Artista Magazine. Philip believed that Florinda released their story to the press. He then caused the publication of the libelous article against her. Mila Parawan added that Florinda came from a well respected family in their community. Thus, she could not have done the acts being imputed to her. On cross-examination, Mila Parawan stated she was certain the "Miss S" referred to in the article is Florinda because petitioner and Pichel, her good friends, told her that "Miss S" is her "alaga" (ward). Petitioner Ogie Diaz admitted that while he wrote the column "Pakurot" where the alleged libelous statements appeared, however, he did not know the complaining witness or "Miss S." The source of his article was Philip Henson. RULING: NO. For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. Absent one of these elements, a case for libel will not prosper. We find the first element present. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by the persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. In the instant case, the article in question details the sexual activities of a certain "Miss S" and one "Philip Henson" who had a romantic liaison. In their ordinary sense, the words used cast aspersion upon the character, integrity, and reputation of "Miss S." The words convey that "Miss S" is a sexual libertine with unusually wanton proclivities in the bedroom. In a society such as ours, where modesty is still highly prized among young ladies, the behavior attributed to "Miss S" by the article in question had besmirched both her character and reputation. As to the element of malice, we find that since on its face the article is defamatory, there is a presumption that the offender acted with malice. In Article 354 of the same Code, every

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defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed. (Alonzo v. Court of Appeals, supra.). We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was neither good reason nor motive why the subject article was written except to embarrass "Miss S" and injure her reputation. On the element of publication, there can be no question that the article appeared in the December 28, 1991 issue ofBandera, a local tabloid. The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to. Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons laid the rule that this requirement is complied with where a third person recognized or could identify the party vilified in the article. The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does not give a sufficient description or other indications which identify "Miss S." In short, the article fails to show that "Miss S" and Florinda Bagay are one and the same person. Although the article is libelous, we find that Florinda Bagay could not have been the person defamed therein. In Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen,7 we held that where the requirement for an identified or identifiable victim has not been complied with, the case for libel must be dismissed. April 13, 2018 – Article 355 – LIBEL MEANS BY WRITINGS OR SIMILAR MEANS VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M. G.R. No. 159787 MAY 25, 2007 OGIE DIAZ VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISSUE: Whether or not the subject article is libelous. FACTS: Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz, Managing Editor and writer, respectively for Bandera, were accused of conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, with the malicious purpose of impeaching the integrity, honor and reputation of one Florinda Bagay. The accused were alleged to feloniously wrote and published an article about the sexual activities of certain “Miss S” and Philip Henson, in which through the words and phrases used in the article meant and conveyed malicious

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST imputation that this “Miss S” is a sexual pervert and possesses lascivious and immoral habits. Florinda Bagay, who happened to use “Patricia Santillan” as her screen name, claims that she was this “Miss S” being referred to in the said article. HELD: For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; © it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. 2 Absent one of these elements, a case for libel will not prosper. In the case at bar, it may be find that the first element present. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by the persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. In the instant case, the article in question details the sexual activities of a certain “Miss S” and one “Philip Henson” who had a romantic liaison. In their ordinary sense, the words used cast aspersion upon the character, integrity, and reputation of “Miss S.” The words convey that “Miss S” is a sexual libertine with unusually wanton proclivities in the bedroom. In a society such as ours, where modesty is still highly prized among young ladies, the behavior attributed to “Miss S” by the article in question had besmirched both her character and reputation. As to the element of malice, since on its face the article is defamatory, there is a presumption that the offender acted with malice. In Article 354 of the same Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed. There was neither good reason nor motive why the subject article was written except to embarrass “Miss S” and injure her reputation. The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to. The libelous article, while referring to “Miss S,” does not give a sufficient description or other indications which identify “Miss S.” In short, the article fails to show that “Miss S” and Florinda Bagay are one and the same person. Although the article is libelous, Florinda Bagay could not have been the person defamed therein.

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In Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen, where the requirement for an identified or identifiable victim has not been complied with, the case for libel must be dismissed. April 14, 2018 – Article 356 – THREATENING TO PUBLISH AND OFFER TO PRESENT SUCH PUBLICATION FOR A COMPENSATION VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S. UNITED STATES VS EGUIA 38 PHIL 857 FACTS: Salvador A. Eguia and Sebastian Lozano, conspiring and confederating with each other, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally threatened one Maria S. Tuason to publish in The Independent, a weekly newspaper edited and published in the said city of Manila, a libel consisting of certain letters which, according to the said defendants, would expose the name of said Maria S. Tuason to public contempt, the said defendants promising at the same time, moved by a desire to gain, to prevent the publication of said letters in the abovementioned newspaper, should the aforementioned Maria S. Tuason agree to pay them the sum of P4,000, Philippine currency. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of threats to publish libel. RULING: YES. Section 10 of the Libel Law (Act No. 277) is as follows: "Every person who threatens another to publish a libel concerning him, or any parent, husband, wife, or child of such person, or any member of his family, and every person who offers to prevent the publication of any libel upon another person, with intent to extort any money or other valuable consideration from any person, shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not exceeding six months, or both." In common parlance, blackmail and extortion are synonimous, although the latter term may have the wider signification. Blackmail, in its metaphorical sense, may be defined as any unlawful extortion of money by an appeal to the fears of the victim, especially extortion of money by threats of accusation or exposure. Two words are expressive of the crime hush money. The gravamen of the offense is the intent to extort money or other thing of value. The extortion is committed by obtaining property from another without his consent, induced by wrongful use of fear. The end is the same as in crimes against property, but the means employed are different. Indeed, certain classes of threatening letters have been held in the United States when followed by extortion to constitute robbery. The circumstances of this case are such that they lead to the irresistible conclusion that Eguia was the prime mover in this nefarious scheme. The only reasonable deduction is that he took the letters from the post office box of Mrs. Tuason. He was the only person who had possession of the key to the box. He knew that Mrs. Tuason was writing to Dr. Harmer. Not all the letters

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST found in the possession of Lozano were from Mrs. Tuason but all had been addressed to Dr. Harmer. The post office box used by Mrs. Tuason was in the name of Dr. Harmer and so if any mail was returned to Manila with his name on it, it would be put in this box. The night on which the letters were delivered, Lozano went in the direction of Eguia's house to get the letters. Eguia composed the note that fixed the price for the letters at P8,000. He entered into and agreed to the plot made up by Villaba. He introduced Villaba to Lozano. Though Eguia never appeared in the open he was always lurking in the background. Defendants attack the evidence from two directions. They contend, in the first place, that the court erred in taking into consideration against each appellant evidence presented at the trial of the other defendant. While the court rendered but one judgment, it is nevertheless true that practically the same facts were adduced in the two trials. Each defendant, moreover, endeavors to shield himself behind the acts of his codefendant. Of course, such a contention cannot be permitted to avail for a moment, where the proof shows that both defendants are inculpated. We hold that Salvador A. Eguia and Sebastian Lozano have been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt April 14, 2018 – Article 357– PROHIBITED PUBLICATION OF ACTS REFERRED TO IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B. [NO CASE FOUND] April 14, 2018 – Article 358 – SLANDER Alameda Jr., Manuel F. VILLANUEVA VS PEOPLE APRIL 10, 2006 G.R. NO. 160351 FACTS: The Councilor and Vice-Mayor of a town, both holders of exalted government positions, became slaves to their human limitations and engaged in a verbal scuffle at the municipal hall as if they were ordinary men in the streets. A moment of unguarded emotional outburst lead to the longdrawn out twists and turns of this case, which should have been avoided if only they have imbedded in their complex emotions, habits and convictions that consciousness to regulate these deflecting forces and not to let them loose, either to their own detriment or to that of the public they serve. This is the high price they have to pay as occupants of their exalted positions. On September 12, 1994 around four thirty (4:30 P.M.) in the afternoon, more or less, at the Municipal Building of Concepcion, Tarlac, where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, and in the presence of several persons, the accused Noel L. Villanueva while in the process of hurling verbal insults at the complainant, then and there unlawfully, feloniously and contemptuously gave the complainant what is commonly known as "dirty finger" by poking his hand at complainant's face with the middle finger extended and the rest of

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his fingers half-closed, an act tending to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt on the complainant and causing her mental anguish, wounded feelings and moral suffering for which she is entitled to moral and exemplary damages in an amount to be determined by the honorable court. Contrary to law. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners act of poking a dirty finger at complainant constitutes grave slander by deed HELD: Yes, but only simple slander by deed. Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is committed by performing any act, which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person. The elements are (1) that the offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor, (2) that such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons, and (3) that such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended party. Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a serious nature or not, depends on the social standing of the offended party, the circumstances under which the act was committed, the occasion, etc.[32] It is libel committed by actions rather than words. The most common examples are slapping someone or spitting on his/her face in front of the public market, in full view of a crowd, thus casting dishonor, discredit, and contempt upon the person of another. Pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase Fuck You, which is similar to the expression Puta or Putang Ina mo, in local parlance. Such expression was not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People,[38] where the Court said that: This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. Following Reyes, and in light of the fact that there was a perceived provocation coming from complainant, petitioners act of pointing a dirty finger at complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of the case that the act complained of was employed by petitioner "to express anger or displeasure" at complainant for procrastinating the approval of his leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature, thus, the penalty shall be arresto menor meaning, imprisonment from one day to 30 days or a fine not exceeding P200.00. PEOPLE VS PADER G.R. NO. 139157 8 FEBRUARY 2000 FACTS: Atty. Benjamin Escolango (ESCOLANGO) was a candidate for vice mayor of Morong, Bataan in the 8 May 1995 Elections. Escolango and Pader were neighbors. On the evening of 20 Apr 1995, Pader was drunk. Pader was angry at Escolango because of something that Escolango had done when Pader’s father had died. On 20 Apr 1995,

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST Escolango was conversing with his political leaders at the terrace of his house. Rogelio Pader (PADER) a political opponent of Escolango suddenly appeared at the gate and shouted “putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo!” ISSUE: Was Pader guilty of slight oral defamation, or of serious oral defamation. HELD: The defamatory words only amounted to SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION. DOCTRINE: Defamatory words will fall under slight or serious oral defamation, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. “Putang ina mo” is a common enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one’s expression of profanity. DE LEON VS PEOPLE JAN 11, 2016 GR NO. 212623 FACTS: The said accused, with the deliberate intent to besmirch the honor and reputation of one SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, did and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously publicly proffer against the latter slanderous words and expressions such as "WALANGHIYA KANG MANGONGOTONG NA PULIS KA, ANG YABANG YABANG MO NOON. PATAY KA SA AKIN MAMAYA [,]" and other words and expressions of similar import, thereby bringing the said SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO into public contempt, discredit and ridicule. Version of the Prosecution: The first hearing was scheduled on April 17, 2006 at the PLEB office on the 5th Floor of the Manila City Hall; At around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, while waiting outside the PLEB office on the 5th floor of the Manila City Hall, SPO3 Leonardo noticed De Leon and several of his companions approaching. Before entering the PLEB office, De Leon uttered these words to SPO3 Leonardo, "Walanghiya kang mangongotong na pulis ka, ang yabang yabang mo noon. Patay ka sa akin ngayon." The words uttered by De Leon caused SPO3 Leonardo embarrassment because there were several persons present at the PLEB premises. He could have arrested De Leon but he did not want to make a scene. Afterwards, De Leon's wife, Concepcion, emerged from the said office and apologized to Leonardo for her husband's actuations. SPO3 Leonardo calmly proceeded to the Special Operations Group of the Philippine National Police (PNP) located at the Manila City Hall to have the incident entered in its blotter. On the same day, SPO3 Leonardo filed his

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complaint at the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) together with Principe. Version of the Defense Prior incident,when De Leon, with his son John, while having breakfast with their fellow joggers at the Philippine National Railroad-Tutuban Station, were approached by SPO3 Leonardo who arrived on his scooter. With his gun drawn, SPO3 Leonardo walked fast towards the group and at a distance of two meters, more or less, he said, "Putang ina mo, tapos ka na Ricky Boy, referring to De Leon." He pressed the trigger but the gun did not fire, when he was to strike again, De Leon was able to escape with the help of John. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of slander tenable in this case. HELD: The crime committed is only Slight Oral Defamation. Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. It is defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood."[35] The elements of oral defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature.An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words used in the statement must be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. In this case, the Court agrees that the words uttered by De Leon were defamatory in nature. It is, however, of the view that the same only constituted simple oral defamation. Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the case, like the social standing or the advanced age of the offended party. "The gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST the accused and the offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony." VICTORIO V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NOS. L-32836-37 MAY 3, 1989 FACTS: Appellant-petitioner called Atty. Ruiz, "estapador", which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. Appellant-petitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer onetime Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association. ISSUE: whether or not the defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation or simply slight oral defamation. HELD: The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39). Article 358, Revised Penal Code, spells out the demarcation line, between serious and slight oral defamations, as follows: " Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if it is of a serious and insulting nature, otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." (Balite v. People, 18 SCRA 280 [1966]). The scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime estafa. The language of the indictment strikes deep into the character of the victim; He 'has sold the union; he 'has swindled the money of the vendees; he 'received bribe money in the amount of P10,000.00 ... and another P6,000.00'; He 'is engaged in racketeering and enriching himself with the capitalists'; He 'has spent the funds of the union for his personal use.' In the instant case, appellant-petitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer one-time Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association. As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into the character of the victim, no special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words uttered to be considered grave oral defamation US vs. TOLOSA G.R. No. L-12696 November 19, 1917 FACTS: The two families were living in houses about 15 meters apart. They had several altercations. The

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defendant was described as having the natural temperament, vehemence of expression, and other peculiar characteristics which indicates the kind of a woman that would stir up disturbances with the least provocation or whenever she feels offended. As a result, the defendant hurled at the complainant offensive and scurrilous epithets, including words imputing unchastity to the mother and tending to injure the characters of her daughters. ISSUE: WON the oral words imputing unchastity to a woman were actionable without proof of special damage. HELD: Yes. The words of the defendant were uttered with evident intent to injure complainant, to ruin her reputation, and to hold her in public contempt, for the sake of revenge. One who will thus seek to impute vice or immorality to another, the consequences of which might gravely prejudice the reputation of the person insulted, in this instance, apparently an honorable and respectable lady and her young daughters, all prominent in social circles, deserves little judicial sympathy. Certainly, it is time for the courts to put the stamp of their disapproval on this practice of the vile and loud slander, which so debauches and degrades womanhood. Shrews must be tamed in the modern Philippines. PEOPLE VS ATIENZA OCTOBER 26, 1968 G.R. NO. L-19857 FACTS: Damaso Atienza, was charged with grave oral defamation in the said Court upon a sworn complaint signed by the offended party, Pilar Lee. The defamatory word allegedly uttered by the defendant were: "Pauli na, puta ka. Oo, puta ka puta kat bilaw." The translation given in the complaint itself is: "Go home, you prostitute. Yes, you are a prostitute, really a prostitute." Damaso Atienza, was charged with grave oral defamation in the said Court upon a sworn complaint signed by the offended party, Pilar Lee. The defamatory word allegedly uttered by the defendant were: "Pauli na, puta ka. Oo, puta ka puta kat bilaw." The translation given in the complaint itself is: "Go home, you prostitute. Yes, you are a prostitute, really a prostitute." ISSUE: Whether or not the word "puta" connotes prostitution thus defamatory. HELD: The word "puta" alleged to have been uttered by the defendant in referring to the offended party does not necessarily connote the crime of prostitution as defined in Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code. REYES VS PEOPLE G.R. NOS. L-21528 & L- 21529 MARCH 28, 1969

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST FACTS: Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval station and the civilian population of Cavite City. The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.

Subsequently, Balite met with the Marine Officers Guild and engaged in conversation with Marine Officer Canlas, while the latter’s companions gathered around and within hearing distance of the two. Balite then uttered the words, as already translated –

ISSUE: Whether or not the words "putang ina mo constitute oral defamation.

ISSUE: WON there is slight oral defamation.

HELD: The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave oral defamation, respectively BALITE VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. L-21475 SEPTEMBER 30, 1966 FACTS: The Democratic Labor Association declared a strike against the Cebu Stevedoring Company. A copra exporter affected by the strike offered the union president Mercader P10,000 as aid to the union and presumably to pave the way for the amicable settlement. At first, it was decided that the amount be distributed amongst all the members. However, at a subsequent meeting Balite proposed that the amount should be given solely to the officers. Passions seemed to have run so high that Balite walked out of the meeting, threatened to destroy the union and to expose president and pursued a smear campaign against Mercader.

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"Mr. Mercader sold the Union. The money of the Union was swindled in the strike staged by the Democratic Labor Association against the Cebu Stevedoring Company. Atty. Mercader received bribe money in the sum of P10,000.00 from the copra exporter Richard Corominas & Co. and another P6,000.00 from the Cebu Stevedoring Company/ Atty. Mercader is engaged in racketeering and that he is enriching himself with the capitalists. The money of the Union was spent by him to his own personal benefit". At the time of the incident, Mercader was legal counsel of the Marine Officers Guild. The imputation apparently affected the guild's feeling and attitude towards Atty. Mercader. For, subsequently, he was eased out as the guild's legal counsel. Mercader filed a complaint for grave oral defamation against Balite. Balite pleads prescription as it was merely one for slight oral defamation which lapses in two months.

HELD: No. Rather there is grave oral defamation. The scurrilous words impute to the offended party the crime of estafa. The language of the indictment strikes deep into the character of the victim: • He "has sold the union" • He "has swindled the money of the members" • He "received bribe money in the amount of P10,000.00 . . . and another P6,000.00" • He "is engaged in racketeering and enriching himself with the capitalists" • He "has spent the funds of the union for his personal use." No amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation. They are serious and insulting. No circumstances need be shown to upgrade the slander. And, no circumstances were alleged in the complaint. Balite wanted the union officers to pocket the amount. He was frustrated in his wish. Then he conducted a smear campaign against the union president. For these, he was expelled from the union. Long after, came the meeting with the officers of the Marine Officers Guild. There, in cool and forceful deliberation, he let go the slanderous statements— in the absence of Mercader. This time, he had his way. Mercader was eased out as legal counsel of the Marine Officers Guild. The People has thus clinched a case for grave oral defamation.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST CRUZ VS CA G.R. NOS. L-56224-26 NOVEMBER 25, 1982 FACTS: Purisima Gestoso Cruz, and Santiago Gayomali were next-door neighbors, being residents of houses standing on adjacent lots at Rizal Street, Guimbal, Iloilo. At about 9:00 a.m. on August 5, 1976, while Severina Gayomali, wife of Santiago Gayomali, was at the ground floor of their house at Rizal, Street, Guimbal, Iloilo (which ground floor was also used as a store) she saw petitioner and heard her utter the following words from a distance of about five meters: ... Usurper of land. They are shameless. They go to church but they are shameless; they steal the land of others. They ride in an automobile and when they walk on the road they are as if somebody but they are shameless. The land in Igcocolo would better be surveyed and given to Santiago Gayomali'. The next day Santiago Gayomali was at the store at the ground floor of his residence at Rizal Street, Guimbal, Iloilo. With him were his wife, Severina, and their maid. At that time, petitioner, who stood on the boundary of the lot of her mother and that of Santiago Gayomali, and while facing the store of the latter from a distance of about five meters, uttered the following words: ... Judge who is a thief. Santiago is a land usurper. Che. Punyeta, a lawyer who is a thief. Thunder, if I only know that to be a lawyer is a good course, I would have taken it. Because if you are an attorney, you just have the land of others surveyed, it becomes yours, the genital organ of Severina is dilated in smile and the penis of Santiago is in erection in stealing the land of others', and other similar words of import. ISSUE: whether or not the abusive remarks considered as serious oral defamation.

be

HELD: Although uttered on three different occasions; they originated from the same anticedents, and were fomonted by the same basic dispute. Fanning fire to the situation was a feeling of desperation and anxiety, over the final consequences because of the position. and alleged influence of complainant Judge Gayomali..Although the abusive remarks may ordinarily be considered as serious defamation, under the environmental circumstances of the case, there having been provocation on complainant's part, and the utterances complained of having been made in the heat of unrestrained anger and obfuscation, petitioner is liable only for the crime of Slight Oral Defamation. Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes Slight Oral Defamation with arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00. April 14, 2018 – Article 359 – SLANDER BY DEED ALILIAN, Enna B.

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June 28, 2017 G.R. No. 223844 DANILO CALIVO CARIAGA vs. EMMANUEL D. SAPIGAO and GINALYN C. ACOSTA FACTS: Claiming that the statements in the blotter entries were completely false and were made to dishonor and discredit him, Cariaga filed a complaint against respondents for in their respective capacities as Barangay Chairman and Secretary of Brgy. Carosucan Sur, Asingan, Pangasinan, made two (2) spurious entries in the barangay blotter. ISSUE: WoN respondents were liable under Art 359 rpc HELD: No. The questioned blotter entries were all made in good faith and merely for recording purposes; done in the performance of respondents' official duties; and based on personal knowledge of what actually transpired. November 13, 1934 G.R. No. L-41757 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. ANTONIO NOSCE FACTS: Antonio Nosce slapped the Reverend Father Ulric Arcand, a catholic priest, before a large congregation. ISSUE: WoN appellant was liable under Art 259 RPC HELD: Yes. The offended party is invested with sacerdotal dignity in his religion and was officiating as such priest during solemn religious ceremonies before a large congregation. There certainly could have been no other circumstances under which greater dishonor, discredit and contempt could be cast upon him before the faithful over whom he held so high a dignity. April 14, 2018 – Article 360 – PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR LIBEL ARANCES, Javy Ann G. BONIFACIO ET AL VS RTC OF MAKATI AND JESSIE JOHN GIMENEZ G.R. NO. 184800, Marh 5, 2010 Ponente: Justice Carpio Morales ISSUE: Whether or not the offended party can file the criminal case for libel in the place where he gained access to the libelous article published over the Internet. FACTS: Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime of libel after private respondent Gimenez, on behalf of Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance Co., filed a criminal complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with several John Does, publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco family for exposing them to public hatred and contempt, and published in the said website (http://www.pepcoalition.com) a defamatory article persuading the public to remove their investments and policies from the said company. Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion to Quash on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC. Petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published, and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article. Since the article was first published and accessed by Gimenez at Makati City, pursuant to Art. 360 of the RPC as amended by RA 4363. HELD: No. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. Art. 360 of the RPC provides: “Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. xxxx The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. xxxx” That venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited only to: 1. Where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2. Where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published was used as basis for the venue of the action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published. The same measures cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the point of its printing and first publication. To give credence to Gimenez’s argument would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Art. 360 of the RPC sought to

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discourage and prevent. It would do chaos wherein website author, writer, blogger or anyone who post messages in websites could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines. The information is quashed and the case is dismissed. TULFO VS PEOPLE G.R. NO. 161032, SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 PONENTE: JUSTICE VELASCO, JR. ISSUE: Whether or not lack of participation in the preparation of libelous articles does shield the persons from liability of libel. FACTS: Atty. Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs filed and charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel. That private respondent was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having acquired his wealth illegally. Petitioner Cambri, managing editor of Remate, testified that she classifies the news articles written by the reporters, and that in the Editorial Division, the officers are herself; Briones, her supervisor; Lydia Bueno, as news and city editor; and Salao as national editor. She testified that petitioner Barlizo is her subordinate, whose duties and responsibilities are the typesetting, editing, and layout of the page assigned to her, the Metro page. She further testified that she had no participation in the writing, editing, or publication of the column of Tulfo because the column was not edited. She claimed that none among her co-accused from the Remate newspaper edited the columns of Tulfo, that the publication and editing of the subject articles were the responsibility of Tulfo, and that he was given blanket authority to write what he wanted to write. She also testified that the page wherein Tulfos column appeared was supervised by Bueno as news editor. HELD: The Court held that the publisher could not escape liability by claiming lack of participation in the preparation and publication of a libelous article. The claim that they had no participation does not shield them from liability. The provision in the RPC does not provide absence of participation as a defense, but rather plainly and specifically states the responsibility of those involved in publishing newspapers and other periodicals. It is not a matter of whether or not they conspired in preparing and publishing the subject articles, because the law simply so states that they are liable as they were the author. Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they had no participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which the subject articles appeared, when

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST they themselves clearly hold positions of authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in the publishing company. As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill his responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply say that they are not liable because they did not fulfill their responsibilities as editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and control of its management, conduct, and policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the owner for the publication therein of a libelous article. On the theory that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the paper, it is held that said person cannot evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to employees, so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor or manager knew the contents of the publication. Under Art. 360 of the RPC, as Tulfo, the author of the subject articles, has been found guilty of libel, so too must Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay. TIME, INC. VS REYES G.R. NO. L-28882 MAY 31, 1971 PONENTE: JUSTICE REYES ISSUE: Whether or not, under the provisions of RA 4363 the respondent CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civil suit for damages arising from an allegedly libelous publication, considering that the action was instituted by public officers whose offices were in the City of Manila at the time of the publication. FACTS: The petition alleges that petitioner Time, Inc., is an American corporation with principal offices at Rocketfeller Center, New York City, N. Y., and is the publisher of "Time", a weekly news magazine; the petition, however, does not allege the petitioner's legal capacity to sue in the courts of the Philippine. In the aforesaid civil case, therein plaintiffsrespondents Antonio J. Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile seek to recover from petitioner Time, Inc. damages upon an alleged libel arising from a publication of Time (Asia Edition) magazine, in its issue of Aug. 18, 1967, of an essay, entitled "Corruption in Asia", which talks about the investigation of Manila mayor Antonio Villegas due to the discovery of his excessive and unreasonable resources. More specifically, the plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Time magazine published a libelous article, publicly, falsely and maliciously imputing to plaintiffs the commission of the crimes of graft, corruption and nepotism, that said publication particularly referred to plaintiff Mayor Antonio J. Villegas as a case in point in connection with graft, corruption and nepotism in Asia; that said publication without any doubt referred to coplaintiff Juan Ponce Enrile as the high government official who helped under curious circumstances plaintiff Mayor Villegas in lending

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the latter approximately P30,000.00 without interest because he was the Mayor's compadre; that the purpose of said Publications is to cause the dishonor, discredit and put in public contempt the plaintiffs. At the time of the publication of the allegedly offending essay, private respondents Antonio Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile were the Mayor Of the City of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance and concurrently Acting Commissioner of Customs, respectively, with offices in the City of Manila. On February 26, 1968, respondent court deferred the determination of the motion to dismiss until after trial of the case on the merits, the court having considered that the grounds relied upon in the motion do not appear to be indubitable. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the deferment private respondents again opposed. Respondent judge issued an order reaffirming the previous order of deferment for the reason that "the rule laid down under Republic Act. No. 4363, amending Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, is not applicable to actions against non-resident defendants, and because questions involving harassment and inconvenience, as well as disruption of public service do not appear indubitable. ..." Failing in its efforts to discontinue the taking of the depositions, previously adverted to, and to have action taken, before trial, on its motion to dismiss, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition. HELD: The respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of its Civil Case. Provisions of RA No. 4363 provides that Art. 360 of the of the Revised Penal Code is further amended to read that any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The limitation of the choices of venue, as introduced into the Penal Code through its amendments by Republic Act 4363, was intended " to minimize or limit the filing of outof-town libel suits" to protect an alleged offender from "hardships, inconveniences and harassments" and, furthermore, to protect "the interest of the public service" where one of the offended parties is a public officer. But since the offending publication was not printed in the Philippines, the alternative venue was not open to respondent Mayor Villegas of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance Enrile, who were the offended parties. CAMPITA VS VILLANUEVA G.R. NO. L-20228, NOVEMBER 28, 1964 PONENTE: JUSTICE CONCEPCION ISSUE: 1. Whether or not a complaint by the offended party necessary in action for oral defamation. 2. Whether or not an action for defamation imputes a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST FACTS: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, dismissing the petition in the above entitled case. In a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the municipal mayor of Lukban, was charged by petitioner Romana Campita with the crime of acts of lasciviousness. On June 7, 1962, an officer of the Constabulary, in turn, accused petitioner of serious oral defamation, for having allegedly made on May 27, 1962, the following defamatory statement: "Yang si Mayor Dator ay walang hiya, bastos, masamang tao at manggagahasa". Petitioner moved to dismiss this complaint against her upon the ground that the said Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case, because the aforementioned defamatory statement imputes to Dator the crime of either rape or acts of lasciviousness, none of which may be prosecuted except upon complaint of the offended party, pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. HELD: 1. The fourth paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code requiring the complaint in an action for defamation imputing a private offense to be expressly filed by the offended party, applies not only to written but also to oral defamation. Consequently, a complaint for oral defamation imputing rape does not confer jurisdiction on the lower court where it was not expressly filed by the offended party but by a Constabulary Officer. 2. A statement in a complaint for defamation that the accused therein allegedly used the term "manggagahasa" in referring to the offended party, is held to impute a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio because the word "gahasa" does not refer to force in general but only to force or violence when applied to a woman for the purpose of satisfying the lust of the actor. The crimes which may not be prosecuted de oficio are adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness (Art. 344, Revised Penal Code). April 16, 2018 – Article 361 – PROOF OF THE TRUTH BANUELOS, Kelvinn L. G.R. No. L-48498 September 30, 1942 SALVADOR G. TUMANG vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Ponente: YULO, C.J. FACTS: TUMANG made many imputations against Felix Manalo. He was then filed with libel and found guilty on the lower courts. It appears that the libelous article contained imputations which insinuate the commission of criminal acts as well as of many other acts which do not constitute a crime. As to those imputations insinuating the commission of a crime, the Court of Appeals found that the petitioner was allowed to

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introduce evidence on the truth thereof but that said evidence was insufficient. CA: The case before us does not fit within the rules just cited and, therefore, TUMANG cannot seek the protection of the provisions of said article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, in order to justify his criminal intent and secure his acquittal, it appearing that many of the imputations made against Felix Manalo in the libelous article in question do not constitute a crime; while in others where an insinuation was made of some criminal, act, the evidence submitted to prove the truth has completely failed to support the stand of the accused, and in general the imputations made against Manalo are not at all connected with the discharge of the duties of a Government official or employee, as it is well known that Felix Manalo is not a Government employee and proof of the truth of the imputations would not be admissible. LEGAL ISSUE: W/N TUMANG should be acquitted based on Article 361 of the RPC. HELD: NO. Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code reads: Art 361. Proof of the truth. — In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendant shall be acquitted. Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted unless the imputation shall have been made against Government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties. In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted. In view of the above, we find no merit in petitioner's contention that he had been unlawfully deprived of his right to prove the truth of the libelous imputations. The Court of Appeals has rightfully held that proof of the truth of those acts imputed the offended party which do not constitute a crime can be admitted, since he is not a government employee, and, consequently, none of those imputations can have any reference to facts related to the discharge by a government employee of his official duties. This is in consonance with the second paragraph of article 361 which limits the scope of the general rule set forth in the first paragraph of the same article. G.R. No. 172203 February 14, 2011 DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR. Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J. FACTS: Evidence introduced for the prosecution reveals that in the early part of November 2002, while exercising his official duties as Mayor of Cadiz

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST City, private respondent saw billboards with the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" with a blank space before the word "NEVER" directly under said phrase. Those billboards were posted on the corner of Gustilo and Villena streets, in front of Cadiz Hotel and beside the old Coca-Cola warehouse in Cadiz City. He became intrigued and wondered on what the message conveyed since it was incomplete. Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private respondent received a phone call relating that the blank space preceding the word "NEVER" was filled up with the added words "BADING AND SAGAY." The next day, he saw the billboards with the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" printed in full. Reacting and feeling that he was being maligned and dishonored with the printed phrase and of being a "tuta" of Sagay, private respondent, after consultation with the City Legal Officer, caused the filing of a complaint for libel against petitioner. He claimed that the incident resulted in mental anguish and sleepless nights for him and his family. He thus prayed for damages. Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards because he is aware of all the things happening around Cadiz City. He mentioned "BADING" because he was not in conformity with the many things the mayor had done in Cadiz City. He insisted that he has no intention whatsoever of referring to "Bading" as the "Tuta" of Sagay. He contended that it was private respondent who referred to Bading as "Tuta" of Sagay. He further maintained that his personal belief and expression was that he will never love Bading and Sagay. He concluded that the message in the billboards is just a wake-up call for Cadiz City. LEGAL ISSUE: W/N Lopez should be acquitted on the crime of libel based on Article 361 of the RPC. HELD: YES. For that matter, granting that the controversial phrase is considered defamatory, still, no liability attaches on petitioner. Pursuant to Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegations is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. As the Court held in United States v. Bustos,22 the policy of a public official may be attacked, rightly or wrongly with every argument which ability can find or ingenuity invent. The public officer "may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged by the balm of a clear conscience. A public [official] must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts." In arriving at an analogous finding of guilt on petitioner, both lower courts heavily relied on the testimony of the petitioner pertaining to the reasons behind the printing of the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER." Our in-depth scrutiny of his testimony,

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however, reveals that the reasons elicited by the prosecution mainly relate to the discharge of private respondent’s official duties as City Mayor of Cadiz City. April 16, 2018 – Article 362 – LIBELOUS REMARKS BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A. DORR, ET. AL. VS. UNITED STATES 195 U.S. 138 (1904) DAY, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of Libelous remarks. FACTS: The case was a prosecution for libel, brought at the instance of Don Benito Legarda, a member of the Philippine Commission, against the plaintiffs in error, Dorr and O'Brien, who were proprietors and editors of a newspaper published in the city of Manila known as the 'Manila Freedom.' It appears that Legarda was the prosecuting witness against one Valdez, editor of a certain Spanish newspaper called the 'Miau.' At the time of the trial of Valdez, under the Spanish law then in force in the islands, the truth could not be given in defense in a prosecution for criminal libel. Notwithstanding this fact, counsel for Valdez, in the form of an offer of proof, read a paper in court, making certain statements with reference to the libel charged, tending to show the truth thereof. In what purported to be a report of the proceeding, the Manila Freedom printed an article containing the matter set forth in the offer to prove, with headlines in large type, as follows: 'TRAITOR, SEDUCER, AND PERJURER. SENSATIONAL ALLEGATIONS AGAINST COMMISSIONER LEGARDA. MADE OF RECORD AND READ IN ENGLISHSPANISH READING WAIVED. Wife would have killed him. Legarda pale and nervous.' The prosecution of the plaintiffs in error was based upon the [195 U.S. 138, 150] publication of these headlines, which were charged to be a false and malicious libel, printed in the English language, of and concerning Don Benito Legarda. At the time Valdez was tried, in which case the occurrence undertaken to be reported took place, the Spanish law was in force, denying the right to put in evidence the truth of the alleged libelous matter. At the time of the trial of the plaintiffs in error the Philippine Commission had passed act No. 277, known as the libel law. Sec.8 of the said law provides that: Libelous remarks or comments connected with matter privileged by the last section receive no privilege by reason of being so connected. RULING: Yes. The contention is that the publication is privileged under 7 and 8, the claim being that the publication was a fair and truthful report of judicial proceedings. Testimony was introduced in the court below tending to show malice, and there was no proof to support the truth of the charges in the alleged libel, which were found to

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST be without basis and wanton, and as the findings of the two lower courts in a case brought in review here are not ordinarily disturbed, the case upon this branch might rest upon that proposition. It is evident, however, that the publication in question did not stop with a simple report of the judicial proceedings. Indeed, the paper offered in evidence could not have been received under the law then in force,-a fact concerning which no comment was made in the report of the proceedings. Furthermore, 8 of the law, while permitting, as privileged, a fair and truthful report of judicial proceedings, except upon express proof of malice, does not make privileged libelous remarks or comments in connection with the privileged matter. The draftsman of the law evidently had in mind the law of criminal libel in newspaper publications as it exists in this country. The privilege extends to a full and correct report of judicial proceedings without prejudicial comment. These headlines were not privileged matter at the common law, and were libelous remarks or comments if the matter could be deemed otherwise privileged, within the meaning of 8 of the Philippine libel law. An inspection of them would seem to be sufficient to demonstrate this fact. The complainant was held up to the public where the paper circulated in striking headlines as 'Traitor, Seducer, Perjurer,' and while these words were quoted, as well as the phrase 'Wife would have killed him,' their publication in this manner was certainly the equivalent to a remark or comment unnecessary to a fair and truthful report of judicial proceedings, and likely to raise inferences highly detrimental to the character and standing of the one concerning whom they were printed and published. April 16, 2018 – Article 363 – INCRIMINATING INNOCENT PERSON CEBALLOS, Jesus C. PEOPLE V. RIVERA G.R. NOS. 38215 & 38216 DECEMBER 22, 1933. ISSUE: WoN Rivera was guilty of Art. 363 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: Vito and Moreno were charged with theft by Sgt. Ranas, Q. with Faustino Rivera as the witness of the crime. The charge against them was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Lucena. Thereafter, Vito and Moreno filed a case against Rivera for violation of Art. 363, Incriminating innocent person. The case was also dismissed. The Attorney-General appealed to the Supreme Court. HELD: No, he is not guilty of the crime. Art. 363 do not apply to the instant case since it would open the door to a flood of prosecutions in cases where the defendants were acquitted. The gravamen of the offense is performing an act which "tends directly" to such an imputation It will be observed that under article 326 of the former Penal Code, the gravamen of the offense

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is the imputation itself when made before an administrative or judicial officer, whereas in article 363 of the Revised Penal Code the gravamen of the offense is performing an act which "tends directly" to such an imputation. Article 326 of the old Penal Code punishes false prosecutions whereas article 363 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any act which may tend directly to cause a false prosecution. The subject article punishes the acts of “planting” evidence and the like, which do not themselves constitute false prosecutions but tend directly to cause false prosecutions. April 16, 2018 – Article 364 – INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR DAHIROC, Janice L. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENEDICTO BAO G.R. No. L-12102 September 25, 1959 ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution establish the crime of intriguing against honor penalized by article 364 of the revised Penal Code and not the oral defamation as appealed. FACTS: This is an appeal by the Government from an order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, dismissing, upon defendantappellee's motion the case against him for serious oral defamation. On May 13, 1955, Benedicto Bao was charged with oral defamation in the justice of the Peace Court of Aloran, Misamis Occidental, in a complaint filed by the offended party, Maximina Banguis for allegedly speaking publicly and uttering "Si Maximina Banguis, aking nakuha" (Maximina Banguis was carnally taken by me) and other words of similar import and meaning implying that the offended party no longer a virgin despite her being a single woman, thus exposing her to public contempt, disrepute and ridicule. The said complaint was later amended to charge the crime or serious defamation. The defendant having waived his right to the preliminary investigation and the justice of the peace court being of the opinion that the case did not fall within its jurisdiction, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of the province for trial on the merits. Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty and the case was tried. After the prosecution had rested its case, the accused, thru his counsel, filed a motion to quash on the grounds the facts alleged in the information did not constitute the crime of serious oral defamation and that the evidence presented was insufficient to convict him of any criminal offense. The prosecution opposed the motion to quash, but the trial court, in its order of November 3, 1956 - finding that the evidence adduced by the prosecution establish the crime of intriguing against honor penalized by article 364 of the revised Penal Code, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court to try, and not oral defamation as

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST defined and punished under article 358 of the same code - granted the motion and dismissed the case with costs de oficio. In that the same order the court directed the provincial fiscal to file the corresponding action before the proper justice of the peace court. The prosecution moved for reconsideration of the order but the motion having been denied, it appealed directly to this Court. HELD: We believe the appeal if bereft of merit. This Court has already held that the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of variance between the allegations in the information and the evidence amounts to an acquittal. (People vs. Opemia, et al., 98 Phil., 698; 52 Off. Gaz., 1951.) And while there appears to be merit in the Solicitor General's contention that the offense of intriguing against honor is necessarily included in the crime of serious oral defamation charged in the information and therefore the accused could be validly convicted by the trial court of that crime under the same information, the fact remains that the case was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case and upon motion by the defendant on the grounds that the fact remains that the case alleged in the information did not constitute the crime charged and that, at any rate, the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish his guilt. The dismissal, likewise, amounts to an acquittal or discharge of the defendant, from which the prosecution cannot appeal without doing violence to the constitutional provision on double jeopardy. (People vs. Cabarles, 54 Off. Gaz., 7051, and the case cited therein). It goes without saying that such dismissal constitutes a bar to another prosecution not only for the offense charged, but also "for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included" therein. Wherefore, the appeal filed on behalf of the Government must be, as it is hereby, dismissed with costs de oficio. Article 244. Unlawful Appointments. - Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO G.R. No. 164185 July 23, 2008 ISSUE: Whether or not Villapando is guilty of the crime of Unlawful appointment under article 244 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman towards the decision of the Sandiganbayan, granting private respondent Alejandro A. Villapando's Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code.

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Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan when the alleged crime was committed. On July 1998, the accused appointed Orlando Tiape, who lost in May 1998 election, as Municipal Administrator of the said municipality. However, respondents contend that the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code does not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code. HELD: Yes. Villapandos contention and the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Divisions interpretation of the term legal disqualification lack cogency. Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be circumscribed lexically. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Its interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nosdistinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division having acted with grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the basic rules of statutory construction resulting in its decision granting Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting the latter, we can do no less but declare its decision null and void. The petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in granting private respondent Alejandro A. Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Let the case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, for further proceedings.

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST every undesirable accident. Furthermore, the act of offering to the mother of the deceased a carabaos and a horse by way of indemnity, indicates on the one hand that the defendant admitted the commission of the crime, on the other it shows that he performed that act without criminal intent and only through a real imprudence. G.R. NO. 195671 JANUARY 21, 2015 ROGELIO J. GONZAGA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. ISSUE: Whether or not Rogelio is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with MDouble Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property punishable under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC.

TITLE FOURTEEN – QUASI-OFFENSES April 19, 2018 – Article 365 – IMPRUDENCE AND NEGLIGENCE DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J G.R. NO. L-24084 NOVEMBER 3, 1925 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, VS. PEDRO RAMIREZ, ISSUE: Is the defendant criminally liable, and if so, did he act with malice? FACTS: The defendant, along with Victoriano Ranga, the deceased, and Agustin Menor, were invited by one Bartolome Quiaoit to hunt in the mount Balitok of the municipality of Nueva Era, Province of Ilocos Norte. The three proceeded to hunt, leaving Quiaoit in a hut approximately 1 kilometer from the scene of the crime. Upon arrival on said mount Balitok, defendant, who was then carrying the shotgun of Quiaoit and a lantern, happened to hunt a deer, and thereafter told his companions to stay there, watch over the prey, while he was going away looking for another; that being far away from his companions, he seemed to have seen with his lantern something like the eyes of a deer about fifty meters from him and then he shot it. But much to his surprise, on approaching what he thought was a deer, it proved to be his companion, Victoriano Ranga. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that although there was no malice on the part of the defendant, he is still criminally liable for homicide through reckless imprudence. The defendant, knowing that he had two companions, should have exercised all the necessary diligence to avoid

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FACTS: At around 6 o'clock in the morning of June 25, 1997, Dionesio Inguito, Sr. (Dionesio, Sr.) was driving his motorcycle along Brgy. Kiara, Don Carlos, Bukidnon towards Brgy. Bocboc of the same municipality, to bring his two (2) minor children, Dionesio Inguito, Jr. (Dionesio, Jr.) and Cherry Inguito (Cherry), to school. While they were ascending the curving road going to Bocboc on their proper lane on the right side of the road, a Toyota Land Cruiser (Land Cruiser)driven by Rogelio was swiftly descending the same lane from the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained.8 In order to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same direction and collided head-on with the motorcycle. As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were thrown off the motorcycle. Dionesio, Sr. was pinned beneath the Land Cruiser, while Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the hood of the Land Cruiser and fell on the side of the road, causing injuries to their legs. Siblings Rolf, Cherry, and Jenny Ann Aquino, who were traversing the same road aboard their own motorcycle, stopped to help and placed the victims together on the rightmost side of the road facing Brgy. Bocboc, while Rogelio remained inside the Land Cruiser. In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial prosecutor filed an Information charging Rogelio for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property "with the aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured party such help that was in his hands to give" before the RTC. Upon arraignment, Rogelio entered a plea of not guilty. HELD: YES. Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of

CRIMINAL LAW II DAILY CASE DIGEST inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another, either with knowledge fserious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault. In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior. As a motorist, Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary care in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, as this would enable him to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway. Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a driver slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the opposite direction at any moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined with other circumstances such as the occurrence of the accident on or near a curve, as in this case, constitutes negligence. Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom. Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the collision was Rogelio’s reckless driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or absence of the limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon the offender who "fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands

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to give." Based on case law, the obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent on the means in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance that he/she, at the time and place of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate proof.