Consti 2.docx

White Light Corporation et al. v. City of Manila G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009 Petitioner: White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist & Development Corporation Respondent: City of Manila Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled ―An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.‖ On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the prayer that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-inintervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-inhotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review on certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power Ruling: Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

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Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc. G.R. No. 179554 December 16, 2009 Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority Respondent: Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc. Facts: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the Government. In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertising media in the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar forms of advertisement. Issue: Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3. Ruling: That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertising media in the MRT3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government. Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc., this Court expressly recognized Trackworks’ right to install the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to said contract. The latter’s right should, therefore, be respected. It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied.

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Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals G.R. No. 100152 March 31, 2000 Petitioner: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist. On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs. Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise of police power, in the grant of business permits Ruling: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law. In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power. The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry

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Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989 Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines Respondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657. G.R. No. 79777 The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310 G.R. No. 79310 This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. G.R. No. 79744 The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation. G.R. No. 78742 Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner. The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.

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Philippine Press Institute, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No.119694 May 22, 1995 Petitioner: Philippine Press Institute, Inc. Respondent: Commission on Elections Facts: On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 which reads in part Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city. In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Issue: Whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain Ruling: The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

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Forfom Development Corporation vs. Philippine National Railways G.R. No.124795 December 10, 2008 Petitioner: Forfom Development Corporation Respondent: Philippine National Railways Facts: Forfom is the registered owner of several parcels of land in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna. Said parcels of land were originally registered in the name of Felix Limcaoco, predecessor-in-interest of Forfom. In a cabinet meeting held on 1 November 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved the Presidential Commuter Service Project, more commonly known as the Carmona Project of the President. Per Resolution No. 751 dated 2 November 1972 of the PNR Board of Directors, its General Manager was authorized to implement the project. The San Pedro-Carmona Commuter Line Project was implemented with the installation of railroad facilities and appurtenances. During the construction of said commuter line, several properties owned by private individuals/corporations were traversed as right-of-way. Among the properties through which the commuter line passed was a 100,128 square-meter portion owned by Forfom Issue: Whether the petitioner Forfom can recover possession of its property because respondent PNR failed to file any expropriation case and to pay just compensation. Ruling: The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State. Being inherent, the power need not be specifically conferred on the government by the Constitution. Section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation The fundamental power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. It may be delegated by Congress to the local governments, other public entities and public utilities. In the case at bar, PNR, under its charter, has the power of expropriation. A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public purpose or otherwise informally, appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. It can be gathered from the records that Forfom accepted the fact of the taking of its land when it negotiated with PNR for just compensation, knowing fully well that there was no expropriation case filed at all. Forfom's inaction for almost eighteen (18) years to question the absence of expropriation proceedings and its discussions with PNR as to how much petitioner shall be paid for its land preclude it from questioning the PNR's power to expropriate or the public purpose for which the power was exercised. In other words, it has waived its right and is estopped from assailing the takeover of its land on the ground that there was no case for expropriation that was commenced by PNR.

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Republic v. Cancio G.R. No.170147 January 30, 2009 Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines Respondent: spouses Agustin and Imelda Cancio Facts: Petitioner Philippine Economic Zone Authority is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is vested with governmental functions, including the power of eminent domain, thus enabling it to acquire private land within or adjacent to the ecozone for consolidation with land for zone development purposes. Then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1811 which reserved certain parcels of land of the public domain in favor of petitioner (then Export Processing Zone Authority or EPZA) for the establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone. However, some of the parcels covered by the proclamation, including that of respondent spouses Agustin and Imelda Cancio, were private land. Petitioner offered to purchase respondents’ lot. The letter containing the offer further instructed respondents "to consider and accept, otherwise we will initiate expropriation proceedings in the proper court." Instead of accepting the offer, respondents filed an unlawful detainer case against Maitland. Thereafter, petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents’ property. Accordingly, it sought a writ of possession for the property for which it was willing to deposit 10% of the offered amount with the Land Bank of the Philippines in accordance with Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 50. Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to comply with RA 8974, which requires that, upon the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property an amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation thereof for purposes of the issuance of a writ of possession. The trial court granted respondents’ motion. Petitioner moved for its reconsideration arguing that RA 8974 was inapplicable as the payment required under the law applied only to instances where the property was still in the owner’s possession and had yet to be transferred to the government. It could not be validly invoked when the property was already in the government’s possession, as in this case. It also averred that it should be made to pay only the price of the land at the time of its taking. Corollarily, if it was ordered to pay the amount required under RA 8974, it would be unjustly penalized for its own improvements to the property. Issue: Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to this case for purposes of the issuance of the writ of possession. Ruling: A perusal of RA 8974 readily reveals that it applies to instances when the national government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects. Undeniably, the economic zone is a national government project. Also, the complaint for expropriation was filed only on August 27, 2001 or almost one year after the law was approved. Thus, there is no doubt about its applicability to this case. The inapplicability of R. A. No. 8974 is further highlighted by the fact that it requires a deposit based on the current zonal valuation of the property. To apply such valuation to the instant case would be to violate the cardinal principle in eminent domain proceedings that the just compensation for the property should be its fair market value at the time of taking. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner (National Power Corporation vs. Henson, 300 SCRA 751 [1998]). Clearly, there was a confusion regarding the nature of the amount to be paid for the issuance of a writ of possession. In Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, we clarified that the payment of the provisional value as a condition for the issuance of a writ of possession is different from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.

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Land Bank of the Philippines v. Martinez G.R. No. 169008 July 31, 2008 Petitioner: Land Bank of the Philippines Respondent: Raymunda Martinez Facts: After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of respondent Martinez’s land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres, Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the offered amount was unjust and confiscatory, respondent rejected it. Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of just compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the CARL. On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, finding some marked inconsistencies in the figures and factors made as bases by LBP in its computation, rendered judgment ordering the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay landowner-protestant Raymunda Martniez A petition for the fixing of just compensation was then filed by LBP’s counsel before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC). After filing her answer to the said petition, respondent, contending that the orders, rulings and decisions of the DARAB become final after the lapse of 15 days from their receipt, moved for the dismissal of the petition for being filed out of time. Petitioner opposed the motion. On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash was yet unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA. LBP primarily contended that the Office of the PARAD gravely abused its discretion when it issued the writ of execution despite the pendency with the SAC of a petition for the fixing of just compensation. Issue: Whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) has jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution due to the pending petition for determination of just compensation with Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Ruling: The Court reiterates its ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC within the said period. This conclusion, as already explained in the assailed decision, is based on the doctrines laid down in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica. In Lubrica, the Court, citing Philippine Veterans Bank, ruled that the adjudicator’s decision had already attained finality because LBP filed the petition for just compensation beyond the 15-day reglementary period. This ruling, however, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, runs counter to the Court’s recent decision in Suntay in which the Court ruled that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for determination of just compensation on the ground that it was filed out of time. The Court in that case stressed that the petition was not an appeal from the adjudicator’s final decision but an original action for the determination of just compensation. To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, that the better rule is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated in Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case. Thus, while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator’s decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, after the land valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to the true value of his property.

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Eusebio v. Luis G.R. No. 162474 October 13, 2009 Petitioner: Hon. Vicente Eusebio et al. Respondent: Jovito M. Luis et al. . Facts: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land. Said parcel of land was taken by the City of Pasig and used as a municipal road. The Sanggunian of Pasig City passed Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of land. However, the Appraisal Committee assessed the value of the land only at P150.00 per square meter. Respondents requested the Appraisal Committee to consider P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land. One of the respondents also wrote a letter to Mayor Eusebio calling the latter’s attention to the fact that a property in the same area, as the land subject of this case, had been paid for by petitioners at the price of P2,000.00 per square meter when said property was expropriated in the year 1994 also for conversion into a public road. Subsequently, respondents’ counsel sent a demand letter to Mayor Eusebio, demanding the amount of P5,000.00 per square meter, or a total of P7,930,000.00, as just compensation for respondents’ property. In response, Mayor Eusebio wrote a letter informing respondents that the City of Pasig cannot pay them more than the amount set by the Appraisal Committee. Thus, respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages. Respondents prayed that the property be returned to them with payment of reasonable rental or in the event that said property can no longer be returned, that petitioners be ordered to pay just compensation in the amount of P7,930,000.00 and rental for sixteen years of use. In addition, respondents prayed for payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. RTC ruled that the taking of the properties are unjust and illegal and ordered the return of the same. Petitioners then appealed the case to the CA, but the CA affirmed the RTC judgment Issue: Whether respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by the city government in the 1980’s and, in the event that said property can no longer be returned, how should just compensation to respondents be determined Ruling: These issues had been squarely addressed in Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National Railways, which is closely analogous to the present case. Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to question the taking of their property for a long period of time and, when asked during trial what action they took after their property was taken, witness Jovito Luis, one of the respondents, testified that ―when we have an occasion to talk to Mayor Caruncho we always asked for compensation.‖ It is likewise undisputed that what was constructed by the city government on respondents’ property was a road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein respondents are also estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are entitled to just compensation. The prevailing doctrine on judicial determination of just compensation is that set forth in Forfom. Therein, the Court ruled that even if there are no expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the trial court is still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the appointment of not more than three competent and disinterested commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the subject property. The Court reiterated its ruling in National Power Corporation v. Dela Cruz that ―trial with the aid of commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all.‖ It was also emphasized therein that although ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners’ findings may only be disregarded or substituted with the trial court’s own estimation of the property’s value only if the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.

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National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011 Petitioner: National Power Corporation Respondent: Cebu Macabangkit et.al. Facts: On November 21, 1997, the respondents, as the owners of land sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. They alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project traversed their land; that their discovery had occurred in 1995 after President of the Federation of Arabic Madaris School, had rejected their offer to sell the land because of the danger the underground tunnel might pose to the proposed Arabic Language Training Center and Muslims Skills Development Center; that such rejection had been followed by the withdrawal by Global Asia Management and Resource Corporation from developing the land into a housing project for the same reason; that Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept their land as collateral because of the presence of the underground tunnel; that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent; that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation because of the loud sound of the water rushing through the tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds. NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was established; that their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement, any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years. Issue: Whether the Heirs of Macabangkit’s right to claim just compensation had prescribed. Ruling: The liability of NPC for payment of just compensation was upheld. The court ruled that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land. The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. The latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary. The action to recover just compensation is based on the Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.

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Vda. De Ouna v. Republic G.R. No. 168770 February 9, 2011 Petitioner: Anunciacion Vda. De Ouna et al Respondent: The Republic of the Philippines et al. Facts: Petitioners Anunciacion vda. de Ouano, Mario Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez (the Ouanos) seek to nullify the Decision dated September 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming the Order dated December 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a suit to compel the Republic of the Philippines and/or the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to reconvey to the Ouanos a parcel of land. Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos. The Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to exercise their right to repurchase the aforementioned lot, but the MCIAA ignored the demand. On August 18, 1997, the Ouanos instituted a complaint before the Cebu City RTC against the Republic and the MCIAA for reconveyance. Answering, the Republic and MCIAA averred that the Ouanos no longer have enforceable rights whatsoever over the condemned Lot No. 763-A, the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 has not found any reversionary condition. Issue: Whether or not under the ruling of this Honorable Court in the heirs of Moreno Case, and pursuant to the principles enunciated therein, petitioners herein are entitled to recover their litigated property. Ruling: In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the complaint. Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of ―usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public].‖ If the genuine public necessity—the very reason or condition as it were—allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the government’s retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is offensive to our laws. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play.

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Secretary of Justice v. Lantion G.R. No. 139465 October 17, 2000 Petitioner: Secretary of Justice Respondent: Hon. Ralph C. Lantion Facts: Respondent is charged before the district court of Florida with conspiracy to defraud, attempted tax evasion, fraud through the use of radio – television, false statements, and unlawful election contributions. The United States Government sent to the Philippine Government documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez. Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) which prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the Secretary of Justice in a Petition before the SC. The Court dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration A 58-page Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B. Jimenez, opposing petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Ruling: As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." To be sure, private respondent’s plea for due process deserves serious consideration involving as it does his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process, however, collides with important state interests which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law." The approach requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation." These interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government’s promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other. In the case at bar, on one end is the private respondent’s claim to due process predicated on Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." Without a bubble of doubt, procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized society which accords paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be accorded the weight it deserves. Petitioner avers that the Court should give more weight to our national commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite the extradition to the United States of persons charged with violation of some of its laws. The Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party. 12

Government of the United States of America v. Purganan G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002 Petitioner: Government of the United States of America Respondent: Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan Facts: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government sent to the Philippine Government documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order by the RTC which prohibited the Department of Justice from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before the SC. Initially, the Court dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration the Court issued a resolution which reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC the appropriate Petition for Extradition. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud; (4) false statements; and (5) illegal campaign contributions. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest". Jimenez prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. Issue: Whether Jimenez is deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due process. Ruling: Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness. Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge’s independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the court’s custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.

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Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998 Petitioner: Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. Respondent: Commission on Elections Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress. Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. Issue: Whether Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 deny radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws Ruling: Petitioners' argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires." It is noteworthy that §40 of R.A. No. 6388, from which §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 was taken, expressly provided that the COMELEC Time should "be considered as part of the public service time said stations are required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of public information and education under their respective franchises or permits." There is no reason to suppose that §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 considers the COMELEC Time therein provided to be otherwise than as a public service which petitioner is required to render under §4 of its charter (R.A. No. 7252). In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an invalid amendment of petitioner's franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege. Petitioners' assertion therefore that §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 denies them the equal protection of the law has no basis. With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art III, §7 of the Constitution provides that "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized," while Art. XII, §6 states that "the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands."

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Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010 Petitioner: Louis ―Barok‖ C. Biraogo Respondent: The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 Facts: For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010." The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. The second case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010. Issue: Whether E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause Ruling: According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.‖ It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities." It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Specifically, these are *** In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. 15

Commission on Election v. Cruz G.R. No. 192935 November 20, 2009 Petitioner: Commission on Elections Respondent: Conrado Cruz Facts: Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the highlighted portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9164 (entitled ―An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended: Sec. 2. Term of Office.–The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years. No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, that the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected. The petition is based on the following arguments: I. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively. II. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal protection of the law. The RTC agreed with the respondents’ contention that the challenged proviso retroactively applied the threeterm limit for barangay officials and declared this retroactive application unconstitutional. It explained that the Congress has violated not only the principle of prospective application of statutes but also the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Issue: Whether the implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution of the law Ruling: The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides: “Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated differently in law. Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the present case for an equal protection challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions. We see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the challenged proviso did not result in any differential treatment between barangay officials and all other elective officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the retroactivity issue that the challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive application. 16

Manalili v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009 Petitioner: Alain Manalili y Dizon Respondent: Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines Facts: Policemen were conducting surveillance along A. Mabini Street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the cemetery. They then chanced upon Manalili in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When he tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked Manalili what he was holding in his hands. Manalili tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu, one of the policemen, asked him if he could see what he had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. Manalili was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit and was turned over for investigation. The confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents were also turned over. Issue: Whether or not there was an illegal search Ruling: The court disagrees with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s). In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: ―(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.‖ In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the AntiNarcotics Unit, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were ―high.‖ The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner’s possession.

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People v. Tangliben G.R. No. 63630 April 6, 1990 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Medel Tangliben y Bernardino Facts: Late evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan, together with Barangay Tanod Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound. The surveillance was aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers. Said Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him. The person was requested to open the red traveling bag but refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified themselves. Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less. The person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves. The accused was taken to the police headquarters for further investigation. The following morning, a field test on the marijuana leaves was conducted and found positive result for marijuana. Issue: Whether the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful search without a warrant. Ruling: One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides: . . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.

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People v. Chua Ho San G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San Facts: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Cid, as Chief of Police, began patrolling the coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area, he intercepted a radio call requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat. When the speedboat landed, Chua alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored straw bag. He then walked towards the road. Officers became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. A policeman prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his arm. Cid requested Chua to open his bag. He tried speaking English, Tagalog, then Ilocano, but Chua seem not to understand. Cid then resorted to ―sign language.‖ The man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. A qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic packets to be positive of shabu, a regulated drug. Issue: Whether the search was lawfully conducted despite the absence of search and seizure warrants Ruling: The Court finds that there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of Chua’s participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court. After introducing themselves, the police officers immediately inquired about the contents of the bag. What else could have impelled the officers from displaying such inordinate interest in the bag but to ferret out evidence and discover if a felony had indeed been committed by CHUA -- in effect to "retroactively establish probable cause and validate an illegal search and seizure." It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated substance. But this is a trifling matter. If evidence obtained during an illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial information or suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree how much more of "forbidden fruits" which did not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal enterprise as in this case - because the police admitted that they never harbored any initial suspicion. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chua’s conviction.

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People v. Malmstedt G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991 Petitioner: The People of the Philippines Respondent: Mikael Malmstedt Facts: Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. On 11 May 1989, Vasco, the Commanding Officer of NARCOM ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. The officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag with four (4) wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. Accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. The officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. It was established that the objects examined were hashish, a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Issue: Whether the facts in the case at bar make out a legitimate instance of a warrantless search and seizure Ruling: Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

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Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008 Petitioner: Social Justice Society (SJS) Respondent: Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Facts: The constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. Issue: Whether paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause Ruling: The Court holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. It is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. The mandatory but random drug test for officers and employees of public and private offices is also justifiable. Petitioner SJS, other than saying that ―subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,‖ has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. But the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionlessxv 4r drug testing for students emanates from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement. The situation is entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor’s office. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are ―randomness‖ and ―suspicionless.‖ In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.

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People v. Johnson G.R. No. 138881 December 18, 2000 Petitioner: The People of the Philippines Respondent: Leila Johnson y Reyes Facts: Accused-appellant Johnson was a resident of California, U.S.A. She arrived in the Philippines to visit her son’s family. She was due to fly back to the United States. Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked Johnson, she felt something hard on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior. She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest women’s room for inspection. Inside the women’s room, accused-appellant was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her ―to bring out the thing under her girdle.‖ Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs. The confiscated packs contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or ―shabu.‖ Issue: Whether Johnson was arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional rights Ruling: What is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person. The constitutional right of the accused was not violated but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. Travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search are admissible. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of ―shabu‖ in her person in flagrante delicto. There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellant’s passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other personal effects. Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her

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People v. Valdez G.R. No. 129296 September 25, 2000 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz Facts: At around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, SPO3 Tipay received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. A team was formed to verify the report. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same.‖ Said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants. Appellant was then arrested. Qualitative examination conducted and gave positive result to the test for marijuana, a prohibited drug." Issue: Whether the search and seizure of the marijuana plants is lawful Ruling: In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions. The guarantee refers to "the right of personal security" of the individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. The Court holds that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. The Court also finds that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.

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The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008 Petitioner: The Secretary of National Defense et al. . Respondent: Raymond et al. . Facts: The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a Writ of Amparo filed before this Court. Respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted from their houses on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained for eighteen (18) months until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The respondents initially filed an action for ―Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order‖ to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007, prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers’ enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion. Issue: Whether the petition for a Writ of Amparo be granted Ruling: The Court affirmed the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses and were detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents’ harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. While respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not ―free in every sense of the word‖ as their ―movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents’ rights to life, liberty and security.‖ Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person. The right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. There is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents’ right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government

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Reyes v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009 Petitioner: Reverend Father Robert Reyes Respondent: Court of Appeals et al. . Facts: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. Petitioner was brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. Respondent DOJ Secretary issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List the name of petitioner in the interest of national security and public safety. After finding probable cause against petitioner, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information. Petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the accused. Upon Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be made personally by a judge. The RTC dismissed the charge for Rebellion for lack of probable cause. Petitioner requested the lifting of HDO in view of the dismissal of criminal case. Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioner’s right to travel is illegal. CA dismissed the petition and denied the privilege of the Writ of Amparo. Issue: Whether the petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo. Ruling: The petition must fail. The Court, in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, made a categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of ―extralegal killings‖ and ―enforced disappearances,‖ or to threats thereof. Petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to travel. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo are: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. Petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.

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Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo G.R. No. 191805 November 15, 2011 Petitioner: In the matter of the petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel Rodriguez Respondent: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo et al. . Facts: Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. On 6 September 2009, Rodriguez, four men forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Rodriguez was ordered to confess to his membership in the NPA, was detained inside a room and asked to identify the location of the NPA camp. He was subject to beating, torture and electrocution. Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured. He was advised not to file a case against his abductors because they had already freed him. On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data was granted but the prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order was denied. Issue: Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor Ruling: The Court held in Yano v. Sanchez that ―these provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition.‖ Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.

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Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Dy G.R. No. 170270 & 179411 April 2, 2009 Petitioner: Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. et al. . Respondent: Hon. Ceasar Dy et al. . Facts: Newsounds run Bombo Radyo which operates several radio stations. It was issued a building permit authorizing the construction of a commercial establishment. HLURB certified the property as commercial. The stations successfully secured all necessary operating documents, including mayor’s permits from 1997 to 2001. In 2002, when petitioners applied for the renewal of the mayor’s permit, they were required to submit "either an approved land conversion papers from DAR, or an approved resolution from the local sanggunian." Petitioners filed their applications, attaching the DAR Order but was claimed spurious or void. The deadline for application for the mayor’s permit lapsed. Respondents closed the radio stations. Through the intervention of the COMELEC, petitioners were able to resume operation of the stations until 10 June 2004, when respondents again closed the radio stations. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus with an application for the issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, both denied by the RTC. Petitioners appealed but lost both of their cases with the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether there was a violation of the freedom of expression of the petitioner Ruling: It is clear enough that respondents’ acts constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Any system of prior restraints of expression bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Newsound’s only rival station is owned by Dy. The closure of radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives. Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the election irregularities in 2001 elections that favored Dy. It was only after then that the Mayor’s Office started questioning petitioners’ applications for renewal. Dy said he will "disenfranchise the radio station." It manifests and confirms that denial of the renewal applications on the ground that the property is commercial is merely a pretext and their real agenda is to remove and suppress the petitioner’s voice. This is a blatant violation of the constitutional right to press freedom. Petitioners had duly complied with the requirements for the issuance of the mayor’s permit they had obtained without issue in years prior. There was no basis for respondents to have withheld the zoning clearances, and the mayor’s permit, depriving petitioners of the right to broadcast as certified by the Constitution and their particular legislative franchise. The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

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Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010 Petitioner: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. Respondent: Anti-Terrorism Council et al. . Facts: This is a case of six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), ―An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,‖ otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007, signed into law on March 6, 2007. Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. Five other similar petitions were filed impleading as respondents in the various petitions the Anti-Terrorism Council. Issue: Whether RA 9372 regulates speech Ruling: The crime of terrorism under RA 9372 has the following elements: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under the Revised Penal Code, or special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. Petitioners contend that the element of ―unlawful demand‖ in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech. Before a charge for terrorism may be, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an ―unlawful demand.‖ Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech. Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion perceptible. Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct.

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Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza G.R. No. 175241 February 24, 2010 Petitioner: Integrated Bar of the Philippines et al. . Respondent: Hon. Manila Mayor Jose ―Lito‖ Atienza Facts: IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations. Respondent issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge. The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge. Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program. The MPD thereupon instituted a criminal action against Cadiz, National President of IBP for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit. Issue: Whether the partial grant of the application for a permit to rally violates their constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly. Ruling: Yes. In Reyes v. Bagatsing, the Court explained: The public official concerned shall appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit. Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof. The Court ruled that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the rally permit issued.

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Estrada v. Escritor A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006 Petitioner: Alejandro Estrada Respondent: Soledad Escritor Facts: Complainant Alejandro Estrada requested for an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, for living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Consequently, respondent was charged with committing ―disgraceful and immoral conduct‖. Escritor was already a widow when she entered the judiciary. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. Issue: Whether Escritor is exempted from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion Ruling: The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights — ―the most inalienable and sacred of human rights,‖ in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the state’s interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. In the application of the compelling interest test, the State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or symbolic. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. The State’s asserted interest thus amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests as required by the Free Exercise Clause. Respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed.

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People v. Galit No. L-51770 March 20, 1985 Petitioner: The People of the Philippines Respondent: Francisco Galit Facts: Mrs. Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her house. Galit was arrested for killing the victim on the occasion of a robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment. Issue: Whether the extra judicial confession extracted from Galit be admissible. Ruling: The Court finds that the evidence presented by the prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by competent evidence. This Court laid down the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. There should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto. Accused Francisco Galit is acquitted for the crime charged.

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People v. Ordoño G.R. No. 132154 June 29, 2000 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Pacito Ordoño and Apolinario Medina Facts: The decomposing body of a young girl was found among the bushes. The girl was 15 years old who 3 days before was reported missing. Acting on a lead, the police invited the 2 suspects and brought them to the police station for questioning but were allowed to go home for lack of evidence directly linking them to the crime. Ordoño and Medina returned to the police station and acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime. The police immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing. The investigators however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the 2 accused in the course of the investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the remote town. But before doing so, both accused were apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional rights. Upon their acquiescence and assurance that they understood their rights and did not require the services of counsel, the investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police officers in attendance to listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary statements of the 2 suspects who admitted their participation in the crime. On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the 2 accused pleaded not guilty. Issue: Whether their extrajudicial confessions are admissible despite the lack of counsel to assist them during custodial investigation. Ruling: The extrajudicial confession of the accused is rendered inadmissible in evidence. In this case, custodial investigation began when the accused voluntarily went to the police station to confess and the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit information and/or confession from them. At such point, the right of the accused to counsel automatically attached to them. RA 7438 does not propose that the accused's parents, older brothers and sisters. etc. appear in the alternative or as a substitute for counsel without any condition. RA 7438 does not eliminate the necessity of counsel but underscores its. Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the 2 accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, any admission obtained from the 2 accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.

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People v. Lugod G.R. No. 136253 February 21, 2001 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Clemente John Lugod Facts: Helen Ramos was asleep in her house together with her husband and children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube, the victim. At around 12:30 a.m., her husband woke her up because he sensed someone going down the stairs of their house. She noticed that Nairube was no longer in the place where she was sleeping. She went downstairs to check and found that Nairube is missing. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her for help. Then, in the morning of September 16, 1997, she went to the police station to report the loss of her child. She also reported the discovery of the pair of slippers, not belonging to any member of the family. She then went home while the police began their search for Nairube. During the search, Alma Diaz found a panty which she recognized as that of Nairube. They continued the search and found a black collared T-shirt. Veloria identified a black collared T-shirt in court as the one he saw the accused wearing that night and on two other occasions, aw well as the slippers found in Helen’s house. Vice-Mayor of Cavinti testified the accused confessed to the commission of the offense, when he visited his sell. Issue: Whether the appellant’s confession and pointing of the location of the victim’s body are admissible Ruling: Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, the accusedappellant’s act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed accused-appellant’s rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the same vein, the accused-appellant’s act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the appellant’s right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the uncounselled confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Also, the records do not support the confession allegedly made by the appellant to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Moreover, the testimony of the ViceMayor with respect to the alleged confession is not conclusive. Clemente John Lugod is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.

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People v. Baloloy G.R. No. 140740 April 12, 2002 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Juanito Baloloy Facts: At the waterfalls the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn was found. Her father asked her to borrow some rice from their neighbor. She left but never returned. Juanito arrived at Ernesto’s house, trembling and apparently weak. Juanito was then bringing a sack and a kerosene lamp. He said that he would catch frogs. After thirty minutes, Juanito returned and told Ernesto that he saw a foot of a dead child at the waterfalls. It was Genelyn’s body. A black rope was recovered at the waterfalls where the body was found. When asked, Juanito claimed it was his. Barangay Captain Ceniza asked him why his rope was found at the place where Genelyn’s body was discovered. He answered that his intention was only to frighten her, not to molest and kill her. Judge Dicon, the presiding judge, after reading the affidavit, asked him whether the charge against him was true. Juanito responded that he was demonized, and he spontaneously narrated that after he struck her head with a stone he dropped her. Issue: Whether the alleged confession of the accused to Barangay Captain Ceniza and the presiding judge were admissible Ruling: It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope. He voluntarily narrated that he raped Genelyn. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the offense. However, Juanito’s constitutional rights during custodial investigation were violated when Judge Dicon propounded to him incriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense without the assistance of counsel. The fact remains that at that time Juanito was already under the custody of the police authorities. Even if JUANITO’s confession or admission is disregarded, there is more than enough evidence to support his conviction. The decision of the RTC is affirmed.

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People v. Taboga G.R. No. 144086-87 February 6, 2002 Petitioner: Respondent: Facts: At 2:00 in morning, woke up to the sound of loud explosions. He went out of the house to fetch water, and he saw the house of Francisca Tubon on fire. Ceria was also awakened by the explosions. She rushed to her aunt’s house and, seeing it on fire, shouted for help. She called out the name of her aunt but there was no response. Barangay Captain Pagao and other barangay officials and residents helped in dousing out the fire using a water pump. When they entered the burned house, they discovered the charred remains of Francisca Tubon. They examined the body and found stab wounds on the chest of the deceased. Pagao reported the incident to the police authorities. SPO1 Panod went to the scene of the crime to investigate and gather physical evidence. He confronted Taboga, and the latter readily admitted that he killed Francisca Tubon. SPO1 Panod prepared a written extra-judicial confession for Taboga. During the inquest, however, Taboga refused to sign the confession upon the advice of his lawyer. The following day, a radio announcer of DZNS, interviewed the suspect. Again, Taboga admitted killing the deceased and setting her and her house on fire. Accused-appellant claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and forced to admit the crime. Issue: Whether the extrajudicial confession made by the accused to a radio reporter is admissible in evidence Ruling: There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the police authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is there anything on record which even remotely suggests that the radio announcer was instructed by the police to extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the reporter even asked permission from the officer-in-charge to interview accusedappellant. Nor was the information obtained under duress. In fact, accused-appellant was very much aware of what was going on. He was informed at the outset by the radio announcer that he was a reporter who will be interviewing him to get his side of the incident. The court did not err in admitting in evidence accusedappellant’s taped confession. Such confession did not form part of custodial investigation. It was not given to police officers but to a media man in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy. The record even discloses that accused-appellant admitted to that he clubbed and stabbed the victim even before the police started investigating him at the police station. Accused-appellant Edralin Taboga is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

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People v. Bato G.R. No. 113804 January 16, 1998 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Abraham Bato Facts: On May 9, 1988 at about three o’clock in the afternoon, Ernesto Flores, Jr. together with his father Ernesto Flores, Sr., were called by the two appellants, Abraham and Sergio Bato, to join them in a drinking spree, which Ernesto, Sr. accepted. Ernesto, Jr. sat about two (2) meters away from his father while the latter joined appellants for two hours drinking tuba. When his father was already drunk, appellants tied his father with his hands placed at the back. Later, he saw appellants bring his father to somewhere else. Seeing his father being held, he ran away, as he was afraid he would also be taken by appellants. It was only the following morning that they found his father already dead at the Binaha-an River, five kilometers away from the place where he last saw him in the previous afternoon. Issue: Whether the prosecution evidence met the quantum of proof required to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence Ruling: The conviction of Appellant Abraham Bato is based on circumstantial evidence gleaned from the sole testimony of the son of the deceased. In the absence of direct proof, a conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, with the following requisites: (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the defendants are guilty, to the exclusion of any other conclusion. The circumstances proved must be concordant with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and, at the same time, inconsistent with any hypothesis other than that of guilt. As a corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence. In the instant case, the totality of the prosecution evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused. The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Where the State fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to an acquittal regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his defense. In acquitting the herein appellant, this Court is not decreeing that he did not participate in the killing. It is merely ruling that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

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People v. Alcanzado G.R. No. 138335 May 20, 2004 Petitioner: The People of the Philippines Respondent: Oscar Alcanzado Facts: On June 17, 1998, the Barangay Tanods of Bel-Air, while on duty, which is adjacent to TGIF American Bar, heard two (2) shots; when they investigated they found a dead body of the victim with two (2) gunshot wounds inside the storeroom of TGIF being guarded by the accused. The accused, who was the security guard of the TGIF, surrendered his service firearm to the policeman. The ballistic report states that the two (2) spent shells were fired from the gun surrendered by the accused. The accused opted to file demurrer to evidence which was denied by the Court, instead of testifying and could have explained what really happened and why he surrendered his service firearm. There was no eye-witness to the shooting incident. The RTC relied principally on the admission of appellant to the police officer that he shot the unknown victim when he surrendered his service firearm. Issue: Whether the constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense has been violated. Ruling: Contrary to the RTC’s assertion in its decision that the demurrer to evidence was denied, the records of the case do not reveal that there was any prior order denying appellant’s demurrer to evidence before the rendition of the assailed judgment. Evidently, the trial court violated the aforequoted provisions of Section 15, Rule 119. Appellant had filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by the RTC and therefore upon denial of his demurrer, if indeed it was denied, the trial court should have given appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. In effect, appellant has not been accorded due process. Due to the procedural unfairness and complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings in the RTC, a remand of the case for reception of defense evidence is warranted. The constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense has been violated. The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in outrightly convicting appellant of the crime of murder when appellant has not been given the opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense.

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People v. Bayya G.R. No. 127845 March 10, 2000 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Lodrigo Bayya Facts: Sometime in 1994 when Rosie Bayya was still 12 years old, her father, the accused, forced her at the point of a knife to have sexual intercourse with her in the family house. Her father repeated this bestial act in their house about twice a week when her mother was not at home. Appellant unhesitatingly admitted having carnal knowledge of his daughter twice but theorized that he was "out of his mind". Appellant does not dispute the trial court’s finding of guilt. However, appellant questions the penalty imposed contending that since the information made no reference to Republic Act No. 7659, it was a reversible error to convict thereunder. And because the only penal provision relied upon by the prosecution is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, he could only be sentenced to the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua Issue: Whether there was a transgression of the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him Ruling: The purpose of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law of the land. The objectives of right to be informed are: (1) To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make the defense; (2) To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and (3) To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction. It is thus imperative that the Information filed with the trial court be complete - to the end that the accused may suitably prepare his defense. Corollary to this, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as it is the recital of the essentials of a crime which delineates the nature and cause of accusation against the accused. In the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the minority of the victim. The omission is not merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried would constitute unauthorized denial of that right

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People v. Manlansing G.R. No. 131736-37 March 11, 2002 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Joey Manlansing and Mario Manlansing Facts: Appellants are brothers. For four years they were tenants of the spouses Magin and Jorja Soriano. A concerned citizen informed the police of an alleged killing. A team of police officer spotted bloodstains on the ceiling. In the stockroom on the first floor, they found the lifeless body of Magin in a pool of blood. Upstairs, they found the corpse of his spouse, Jorja, on the floor, her throat slit and her neck hacked. Mario claimed he alone was responsible for the deaths and insisted that his brother had nothing to do with the deaths. In an amended information, appellants were charged with the murder of Jorja Soriano In an amended information, and similarly worded except for the victim’s name appellants Joey and Mario Manlansing were likewise charged with the murder of Magin Soriano. On arraignment, Joey Manlansing pleaded not guilty to both charges, while Mario Manlansing pleaded guilty to two counts of murder. After they waived pre-trial, both cases were heard on the merits. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating qualifying and aggravating circumstances and further erred in imposing death penalty upon accused-appellants. Ruling: A review of the informations filed against appellants, in relation to prevailing law and jurisprudence as well as the newly adopted revisions of the Rules of Court favorable to the accused will show that the crimes of the brothers could not be qualified as murder. Only recently in People vs. Gario Alba the Court ruled that pursuant to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the information should state not only the designation of the offense and the acts and omissions constituting it but shall also specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Although the circumstance of treachery was stated in the information, it was not alleged with specificity as qualifying the killing to murder. Since the information ailed to specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the killing to murder, treachery was considered only a generic aggravating circumstance. So is it with the present case. None of the aggravating circumstances were alleged in the informations nor in the amended informations with specificity as a qualifying circumstance elevating either killing to murder. Thus, the offenses committed by appellants only constitute two counts of homicide and not murder. Since the penalty for homicide under 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal, it is incorrect to sentence both appellants to death. Appellants are each declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of homicide.

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People v. Bohol G.R. No. 171729 July 28, 2008 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Ricardo Bohol Facts: On August 2, 2002, at around 8:30 p.m., a confidential informant came to the police station and tipped P/Sr. Insp. Nitullano that a certain Ricardo Bohol is engaged in illegal drug trade. He formed a team of six police operatives to verify the informant’s tip, and, if found positive, to launch then and there a buy-bust entrapment of Bohol. PO2 Ferdinand Estrada was assigned to act as poseur buyer. That same day, the team proceeded to the site of their operation. Guided by the informant, PO2 Estrada proceeded to the house of Bohol. Following a short introduction, PO2 Estrada and the informant told Bohol of their purpose. Bohol handed to the former the marked P100-bill. In turn, Bohol gave PO2 Estrada a plastic sachet containing white crystalline granules. The illicit transaction having been consummated, PO2 Estrada gave to his companions their pre-arranged signal. Emerging from their hiding places, PO2 Luisito Gutierrez and his companions arrested Bohol. PO2 Gutierrez frisked Bohol and recovered from him the buy-bust money and three plastic sachets containing similar white crystalline granules suspected to be shabu. Issue: Whether there was a violation of the right of the accused to confront witness directly Ruling: As ruled by the appellate court, Bohol cannot insist on the presentation of the informant. During trial, the informant’s presence is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. The appellate court held that police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court. Further, what is material to the prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Both requirements were sufficiently proven in this case. The police officers were able to testify positively and categorically that the transaction or sale actually took place. The subject shabu was likewise positively identified by the prosecution when presented in court. Hence, we agree that Bohol’s guilt has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal is denied.

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People v. Chua G.R. No. 128280 April 4, 2001 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Alicia A. Chua Facts: Chua received a facsimile message from Harmony Electronics Company in Taiwan asking her to call up To-ong and Tercenio and tell them that they were needed in Taiwan. Accused Chua contacted To-ong and told him the message. Both went to the office of accused Chua, and the latter told them that she could send them to Taiwan upon payment of a placement fee of P15,000.00 each. She also asked them to secure NBI clearances and medical certificates. They went back to the office of accused Chua and submitted the requirements. They paid P15,000.00 each for which they were issued a receipt bearing the name Man Tai Trading and General Services with accused Chua’s signature. Accused Chua assured them that they would be able to leave for Taiwan soon. Three months passed, but they were not deployed. Tercenio became apprehensive and told accused Chua that he would withdraw his application and ask for refund of the placement fee. Chua repeatedly promised that she would give back the money to him, but she never did. After a few more months, Chua could not anymore be located. Issue: Whether accused was denied her constitutional right to compulsory process Ruling: The Court finds it to be without merit. The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expanded the right to compulsory process which now includes the right to secure the production of evidence in one’s behalf. By analogy, U.S. vs. Ramirez which laid down the requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses may be applied to this expanded concept. Thus, the movant must show: (a) that the evidence is really material; (b) that he is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the production of such evidence; (c) that the evidence will be available at the time desired; and (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained. In the case at bar, the trial court correctly denied appellant’s motion for the production of the records which were the basis in issuing the POEA Certification dated February 3, 1994, as the same would not in any way alter the undisputed fact that appellant was not issued a license until then.

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People v. Malimit G.R. No. 109775, November 14, 1996 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Jose Encarnacion Malimit alias ―Manolo‖ Facts: On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Malaki was attending to his store. Batin, Malaki's houseboy was busy cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen. Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. Batin had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store to ask his employer (Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant coming out of the store with a bolo while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor "struggling for his life". Rondon also saw appellant rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo. Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-law, saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood and readily noticed that the store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket Issue: Whether the admission as evidence of Malaki’s wallet violates appellant’s right against self-incrimination. Ruling: The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, 26 ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said: ―If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles — a clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege . . . but testimonial compulsion‖

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People v. Rondero G.R. No. 125687, December 9, 1999 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Delfin Rondero Facts: On the evening of March 25, 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta. He noticed that his sister, Mylene, was not around. Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father sought the help of the neighbors, a barangay kagawad and a barangay captain to search for Mylene. The group began searching at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning of March 26, 1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary School and the seashore in vain. They even returned to the school and inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way home. Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw herein accusedappellant Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian well. Accused-appellant had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. Accused-appellant had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however, revealing that the person he saw was the latter’s own son. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found Mylene’s lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene’s body, he saw accused-appellant washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well. Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested accused-appellant. Issue: Whether the hair strands taken from appellant without his consent and submitted to the NBI for investigation was a violation of his right against self-incrimination Ruling: What is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

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People v. Gallarde G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Radel Gallarde Facts: At the house of the Talan spouses their neighbors converged. Among them were appellant Gallarde. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. As they partook of the meal, appellant suddenly left. Jaime stepped out of the kitchen and chanced upon appellant and Editha talking. Jaime whistled at appellant but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the road leading to his house. Editha said she would look for appellant. By 10:00 o’clock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed. Later, Roger arrived and informed the group that Editha was missing. When Jaime mentioned that appellant was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the searchers went back to the house of appellant. The searchers found appellant squatting with his short pants. His hands and knees were covered with soil. When asked where he came from because he was not in the toilet earlier, appellant said he was at Kiko’s house sleeping which is unbelievable because Kiko was drinking with one of the searchers. After the confrontation at the toilet, appellant was brought to the barangay captain. Later, the body of Editha was found buried in a loose soil. Issue: Whether photographs taken of Gallarde immediately after the incident was a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Ruling: The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.

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COMELEC v. Tagle G.R. No. 148948 & 148951-60, February 17, 2003 Petitioner: Commission on Elections Respondent: Hon. Lucenito N. Tagle Facts: Bautista ran for the position of mayor. He filed with the COMELEC a complaint against then incumbent mayor and ten (10) others for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The complaint was supported by the separate affidavits of forty-four (44) witnesses attesting to the vote-buying activities. The Law Department of COMELEC filed the corresponding information against the respondents before the RTC. Before the trial began, Rodelas and Macapagal filed a complaint against the witnesses for violation of Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. The witnesses appealed before the COMELEC the Resolution by the Provincial Prosecutor to file separate information for vote selling against them. The COMELEC declared such resolution as null and void. It held that witnesses are exempt from criminal prosecution. The Law Department filed a motion to dismiss the cases. The judge denied the motion stating that it is necessary that the witnesses have already performed an overt act of voluntarily giving information or testifying for one to be exempt from prosecution. Issue: Whether the witnesses should be exempted from criminal prosecution Ruling: One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote was bought. This grant of immunity will encourage the recipient or acceptor to come into the open and denounce the culpritcandidate, and will ensure the successful prosecution of the criminal case against the latter. Congress saw the wisdom of this proposition, and so Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646 on Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-Selling concludes with this paragraph: The giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, That any person, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference to which his information and testimony were given: Provided, further, That nothing herein shall exempt such person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony. Petitioner COMELEC found that witnesses voluntarily admitted that they were the acceptors or recipients in the vote-buying done by the accused in said case. It was precisely because of such voluntary admission and willingness to testify that the COMELEC en banc held that the respondents therein are exempt from criminal prosecution.

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Almario v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 127772, March 22, 2001 Petitioner: Roberto P. Almario Respondent: Court of Appeals et al. . Facts: Petitioner is one of the accused for estafa thru falsification of public document, and another for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended party in both cases. After re-setting and postponements, counsel for accused moved that the case against the latter be dismissed for failure to prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial. The case was dismissed. Upon motion of the private prosecutor, respondent court reconsidered the Order dismissing the case. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the order but was denied. Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the presiding judge but was also denied and dismissed for lack of merit. Issue: Whether, in petitioner’s cases, double jeopardy had set in so that petitioner’s constitutional right against such jeopardy had been violated Ruling: Jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of the accused before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial. As observed by respondent appellate court, delay in the trial was due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties and of the trial court. There was no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the chronology of the hearings with the reasons for their postponements or transfers. It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that order was reconsidered seasonably. The Court have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. However, these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.

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Manantan v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001 Petitioner: George Manantan Respondent: Court of Appeals et al. . Facts: Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas. In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in a state of intoxication. It found that petitioner’s act of driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136) and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code,a statutory presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioner’s act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself ―because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation.‖ Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the motion. Issue: Whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy Ruling: Petitioner’s claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in double jeopardy is misplaced. When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court’s judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner’s claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.

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Merciales v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002 Petitioner: Leticia R. Merciales Respondent: Court of Appeals et al. . Facts: Criminal cases for rape with homicide were filed against the private respondents. During the trial, prosecutor filed a motion for the discharge of one accused to be a state witness. The respondent judge denied the motion for discharge. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari before the SC, questioning the respondent judge's denial of the motion to discharge the accused. The trial judge did not set the case for further hearing so as to give the prosecution time to secure such temporary restraining order from the SC. Private respondents filed a motion to set the case for hearing, invoking their constitutional right to speedy trial. The respondent judge granted the motion. The respondent Judge reset the hearing after a motion for reconsideration. Again the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, invoking its pending petition for certiorari with the SC. The defense then moved that the cases be deemed submitted for decision, and asked leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The Court dismissed the case. Petitioner Merciales filed before the respondent CA a petition to annul the Order of the trial court. Issue: Whether the reopening of the criminal case will violate the accused’s right against double jeopardy Ruling: It is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in court. Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to due process in criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy. By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the accused are charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their consent. Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.

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Potot v. People G.R. No. 143547, June 26, 2002 Petitioner: Joey Potot y Surio Respondent: People of the Philippines et al. . Facts: Potot was charged with homicide. He pleaded guilty to the charge. He invoked not only the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, but also the circumstance of voluntary surrender, He was convicted for homicide. He filed a manifestation with motion informing the trial court that he is not appealing from the Decision, wife of the victim), filed a motion for reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set aside and that the case be heard again because ―there were irregularities committed before and during the trial which caused miscarriage of justice. Issue: Whether the trial court’s order for re-evaluation of evidence would place the accused in double jeopardy Ruling: The Court agrees with the petitioner that the assailed orders would violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such right prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. These requisites have been established. Records show that petitioner was charged with homicide under a valid information before the trial court which has jurisdiction over it. He was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis of his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted the corresponding penalty. As petitioner has been placed in jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he cannot be prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense charged.

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People v. Astudillo G.R. No. 141518, April 29, 2003 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Clarence Astudillo et al. . Facts: Respondents were charged with the crime of murder. The trial court rendered a decision convicting appellants of the crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and, assuming that it did, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not having been alleged in the information, cannot be appreciated against them. Appellants’ motion for reconsideration was denied. However, an Amended Decision was rendered where the phrase ―abuse of superior strength‖ was replaced with treachery. Issue: Whether the reconsideration of the judgment of conviction should be limited only to the issues raised in their motion for reconsideration Ruling: A motion for reconsideration of a judgment of conviction may be filed by the accused, or initiated by the court, with the consent of the accused. The requisite consent of the accused to such motion for reconsideration or modification is intended to protect the latter from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked. Accordingly, once the judgment has been validly promulgated, any reconsideration or amendment to correct a manifest substantial error, even if unwittingly committed by the trial court through oversight or an initially erroneous comprehension, can be made only with the consent or upon the instance of the accused. Errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the accused consents thereto, or himself moves for reconsideration of or appeals from, the decision. The protection against double jeopardy in the foregoing rules may be waived by the accused. Thus, when the accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the accused waived his right not to be placed therein by filing such motion. His motion gives the court an opportunity to rectify its errors or to reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of law and make them conformable with the statute applicable to the case in the new judgment it has to render. The raison d’etre is to afford the court a chance to correct its own mistakes and to avoid unnecessary appeals from being taken. In effect, a motion for reconsideration or modification filed by or with consent of the accused renders the entire evidence open for the review of the trial court without, however, conducting further proceedings. Having filed a timely motion for reconsideration asking the court to acquit, or convict them of the lesser offense of homicide, appellants waived the defense of double jeopardy and effectively placed the evidence taken at the trial open for the review of the trial court.

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Cordora v. COMELEC G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009 Petitioner: Gaudencio M. Cordora Respondent: Commission on Elections and Gustavo S. Tambunting Facts: In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC, Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections and Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections. Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements. Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration Tambunting claimed that he is an American. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth. Issue: Whether Tambunting’s met the citizenship requirements. Ruling: Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office. Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.

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De Guzman v. COMELEC G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009 Petitioner: Roseller De Guzman Respondent: Commission on Elections and Gustavo S. Tambunting Facts: De Guzman and Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor. Private respondent filed against petitioner a petition for disqualification alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America. Petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, he applied for dual citizenship. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Private respondent won as vice-mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest on grounds of irregularities and massive cheating. COMELEC First Division rendered Resolution disqualifying petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was dismissed for having been rendered moot in view of private respondent’s victory. Later, the trial court in Election Protest declared petitioner as the winner for the Vice-Mayoralty position. Issue: Whether petitioner is disqualified from running as Vice-Mayor because of his failure to renounce his American citizenship. Ruling: R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) naturalborn citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen. There is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance. However, R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement ―Those seeking elective public office shall xxx make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship. R.A. No. 9225 requires the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. In the instant case, petitioner’s Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice-mayor.

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Republic v. Lim G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004 Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines Respondent: Chule Y. Lim Facts: A petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court was filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the RTC. During the hearing, first, she claims that her surname ―Yu‖ was misspelled as ―Yo‖. Second, she claims that her father’s name in her birth record was written as ―Yo Diu To‖ when it should have been ―Yu Dio To.‖ Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen. Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the correction of the citizenship of Chule Y. Lim from ―Chinese‖ to ―Filipino‖ Ruling: Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention ―in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.‖ Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

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Bengson III v. HRET G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004 Petitioner: Antonio Bengson III Respondent: House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Teodoro Cruz Facts: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac of Filipino parents. However, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation. He ran for and was elected as the Representative. He won over petitioner Bengson III. Petitioner filed a case with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen Issue: Whether HRET erred when it ruled that Cruz is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part. Ruling: CA No. 63 enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Repatriation may be had by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity. Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. If he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. In Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance and having registered in the Civil Registry, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a naturalborn citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

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Tabasa v. CA G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006 Petitioner: Joevanie Arellano Tabasa Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals et al. . Facts: Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. when petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as a ―balikbayan‖ for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained. Consul of the US informed the BID that Tabasa’s passport has been revoked because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest or violation of Section 1073, ―Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution.‖ The BID ordered petitioner’s deportation to his country of origin, the United States. Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau. Issue: Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171. Ruling: The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. If a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his ―repatriation‖. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation. Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation. In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the country, became an undocumented alien who can be summarily deported. His subsequent ―repatriation‖ cannot bar such deportation especially considering that he has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

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Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006 Petitioner: Loida Nicolas-Lewis et al. . Respondent: Commission on Elections Facts: Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189. Ruling: Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote. There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that ―duals‖ are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. The Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003

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Valles v. COMELEC G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000 Petitioner: Cirilo R. Valles Respondent: Commission on Elections et al. Facts: Lopez, private respondent, was born in Australia to a Filipino father and Australian mother. At the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. She was married to a Filipino citizen. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. Her election was contested by her opponent, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition. The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles but the petition was dismissed. Issue: Whether private respondent Lopez is a Filipino citizen and qualified to run for governor Ruling: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born to a Filipino citizen father and an Australian mother. Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. Further, in order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration and her Australian passport is bereft of merit. Lopez is adjudged qualified to run for governor.

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Tecson v. COMELEC G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004 Petitioner: Ma. Jeanette C Tecson Respondent: Commission on Elections et al. Facts: FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. A petition was filed to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Issue: Whether Fernando Poe, Jr. is a natural-born Filipino Ruling: The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the ―en masse Filipinization‖ that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

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Cabiling Ma v. Fernandez G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010 Petitioner: Balgamelo Cabiling Ma et.al. Respondent: Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez Facts: Petitioners are the children of a Taiwanese father and a Filipina mother. Records reveal that Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the 1935 Constitution. They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years. Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required. A complaint was received alleging that Felix Ma and his seven (7) children are undesirable and overstaying aliens. Issue: Whether petitioners are citizens of the Philippines despite failure to immediately file the documents of election of Philippine citizenship with the civil registry Ruling: The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are the following: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. However, registration of the documents of election with the civil registry was done belatedly. Under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election. Their exercise of suffrage, being elected to public office, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship do not on their own take the place of election of citizenship. The election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, registration of the documents of election beyond the timeframe should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have been done publicly, consistently and continuously. These acts constitute constructive registration. In other words, the actual exercise of Philippine citizenship for over half a century by the petitioners is actual notice to the Philippine public, which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under C.A. No. 625 that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat that election and negate the permanent fact that petitioners have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.

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