Conflicts (1).docx

CONFLICTS OF LAW (Private International Law) – part of the law of each State which determines whether, in dealing with a legal situation, the law of some other State will be recognized, given the effect or applied I.

Cases A. Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998 i. Defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia ii. While on a lay-over in Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew members (Thamer and Allah, both Saudi nationals). They returned to their hotels and agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When Allah left the room, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately a roomboy and several security personnel rescued her. Police arrested Thamer and Allah (as accomplice) When plaintiff returned to Jeddah, she was interrogated about the incident and requested to go back to Jakarta and help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. Negotiation with the police for the release of the detained crew member did not succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked because of her inability to understand the local dialect and declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in the local dialect. SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights After 2 weeks of detention Thamer and Allah was deported and eventually put in servce by defendant SAUDI iii. After 2 years, plaintiff was brought to the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Police pressured her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. iv. 1 and a half year later, when plaintiff was about to fly to Manila, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic and told her that this was necessary to close the case v. Plaintiff was brought to the Saudi Court again. Without her knowledge she was tried together with Thamer and Allah for what happened in Jakarta. The Court found the plaintiff guilty of (1) Adultery, (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws, and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition vi. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause vii. Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA viii. SAUDIA alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction on the basis of Art. 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It maintains that private respondent's claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule ix. private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law

x. Trial court and CA ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. xi. W/n CA erred in holding that the RTC has jurisdiction and in holding that PH law should govern – NO xii. Although there is foreign element in this case which consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. And the fact that the events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, RTC of QC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit on the basis of Sec. 1 of RA 7691 and Rules of Court on venue. xiii. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. xiv. Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing Morada to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her. xv. Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the Morada should be upheld. xvi. RTC has jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. By filing a complaint, Morada has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. By filing several motions and praying for reliefs (such as dismissal), SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction. xvii. As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification." It is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule." The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law xviii. These “test factors” or “points of contact” or “connecting factors” could be any of the following: 1. (1) the nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin; 2. (2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation; 3. (3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved; 4. (4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will

signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts; 5. (5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised; 6. (6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis; 7. (7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori—the law of the forum—is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of ‘procedure’ not going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and 8. (8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.” xix. Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here B. Hasegawa vs. Kitamura G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007 i. Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines, entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement with Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the PH. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manager in the contract. ii. Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project. iii. Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD. iv. Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The

claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus. v. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. vi. CA ruled that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis. vii. whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the "state of the most significant relationship rule," or forum non conveniens – NO viii. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. ix. petitioners, do not claim that the trial court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the most significant relationship rule." x. as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for. xi. Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved xii. Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense. xiii. Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss. C. Small vs United States 544 U.S. 385 (2005) i. Petitioner Small was convicted in a Japanese Court of trying to smuggle firearms and ammunition into that country. He served five years in prison and then returned to the United States, where he bought a gun. Federal authorities subsequently charged Small under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which forbids “any

person … convicted in any court … of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year … to … possess … any firearm.” ii. Small pleaded guilty while reserving the right to challenge his conviction on the ground that his earlier conviction, being foreign, fell outside §922(g)(1)’s scope. The Federal District Court and the Third Circuit rejected this argument. iii. Section 922(g)(1)’s phrase “convicted in any court” encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions iv. In considering the scope of the phrase “convicted in any court” it is appropriate to assume that Congress had domestic concerns in mind. This assumption is similar to the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application, v. it is difficult to read the statute as asking judges or prosecutors to refine its definitional distinctions where foreign convictions are at issue. To somehow weed out inappropriate foreign convictions that meet the statutory definition is not consistent with the statute’s language; it is not easy for those not versed in foreign laws to accomplish; and it would leave those previously convicted in a foreign court (say of economic crimes) uncertain about their legal obligations D. Puyat vs. Zabarte 405 Phil 413 i. Ron Zabarte commenced to enforce the money judgment rendered by the Superior Court for the State of California on petitioner. ii. petitioner said that the said court had no jurisdiction over the people involved. Respondent on the other hand said that petitioner’s appeal is not material. Petitioner maintained that that said Judgment on Stipulations for Entry in Judgment was obtained without the assistance of counsel and without sufficient notice to him and therefore, was rendered in violation of his constitutional rights to substantial and procedural due process. iii. Respondent said that petitioner can no longer question the judgment of the said court because he failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction in his answer. iv. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Zabarte. The claim for moral damages, not having been substantiated, is denied. v. Petitioner said that the RTC should have dismissed the action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment, on the ground of forum non conveniens. It reasoned out that the recognition of the foreign judgment was based on comity, reciprocity and res judicata. The CA denied this appeal, hence this case. vi. Whether or not the CA acted in a manner contrary to law when it affirmed the Order of the trial court granting respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment and rendering judgment against the petitioner. vii. Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, and not a genuine issue as to any material fact. It is resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. Petitioner contends that by allowing summary judgment, the two courts a quo prevented him from presenting evidence to substantiate his claims. The court does not agree. Summary judgment is based on facts directly proven by affidavits, depositions or admissions. In this case, the CA and the RTC both merely ruled that trial was not necessary to resolve the case. Petitioner’s affidavit of facts had raised no genuine issue, thus no necessity for a resolution of issues.

viii. In the absence of proof of California law on the jurisdiction of courts, we presume that such law, if any, is similar to Philippine law. The court based this conclusion on the presumption of identity or similarity, also known as processual presumption. Petitioner failed to establish substantial proof that the foreign court had no jurisdiction over the case. In any event, contrary to petitioner’s contention, unjust enrichment or solutio indebiti does not apply to this case. This doctrine contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it. In this case, petitioner merely argues that the other two defendants whom he represented were liable together with him. This is not a case of unjust enrichment. The court does not also see this case to be contrary to law, morals, public policy or the canons of morality obtaining in the country. Petitioner owed money, and the judgment required him to pay it. That is the long and the short of this case. The petition is denied. E. Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Rebesencio G.R. No. 198587 January 14, 2015 i. Various flight attendants got pregnant while working for Saudi Arabia Airlines, to which they requested for Maternity leaves. Apparently there was a recently passed Unified Employment Contracts which allowed for them to be terminated should they ever be pregnant due to lack of physical fitness. The flight attendants were made to resign upon threat of losing any benefits they might have should they have resigned, and thus petition for illegal dismissal; Petitioner Airlines claim that the Labor Arbiter and NLRC do not have jurisdiction. ii. No doubt that the pleadings were served to Petitioner Airlines through their counsel, however they claim that the NLRC and Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction since summons were served to Saudi Airlines Manila and not to them, Saudi Airlines Jeddah. Saudi Airlines Manila was neither a party to the Cabin attendant contracts nor funded the Respondents, and it was to Saudi Jeddah that they filed their resignations. Court ruled however that b y its own admission, Saudia, while a foreign corporation, has a Philippine office, and that under the Foreign Investments act of 1991, they are a foreign corporation doing business in the Phils and therefore are subject to Philippine jurisdiction iii. DOCTRINE: Labor Contracts are a matter of Public Policy, and thus Philippine laws clearly find application in this case. iv. F. Manila Hotel vs. NLRC i. FACTS: Private respondent Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker employed as printer at the Mazoon Printing Press, Sultanate of Oman. While in Oman, on May 2, 1998, he received a letter from Mr. Gerald R. Shmidt, General Manager of Palace Hotel, Beijing, China, offering him the same position as printer with a higher monthly salary and increased benefits as he was recommended by his friend Nestor Buenio. Palace Hotel is a member of the Manila Hotel Group. Santos signified his acceptance. Subsequently, an employment contract for a period of two years beginning September 1, 1998 was perfected. ii. However, since it was only on November 5, 1988 that Santos left for Beijing, China, the employment contract was amended. The amended employment contract was signed by Mr. Shmidt as the representative of Palace Hotel, and was noted by the Vice President for Operations and Development of MHICL,

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Miguel O. Cergueda. On August 10, 1989, the Palace Hotel informed respondent Santos by letter signed by Mr. Shmidt that his employment at the Palace Hotel print shop will be terminated due to business reverses brought about by the political upheaval in China. On February 20, 1990, respondent Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against MHC, MHICL, the Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt before the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, National Labor Relations Commission. The Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt were not served with summons and neither participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Subsequently, the Labor Arbiter decided against MHC and MHICL. MHC and MHICL appealed to the NLRC which decided in favor of Santos. Hence, the petition for certiorari. 2. WON the rule of forum non conveniens may be applied? NO. The main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions, and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving Filipino citizens can be tried here. This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve controversies involving foreign employers. If Santos were an "overseas contract worker," a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him. However, he is not an "overseas contract worker," a fact which he admits with conviction. He was hired directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to the Sultanate Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. Respondent Santos was hired directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed. He was hired without the intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the government. . . .SC fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient forum given that all the incidents of the case — from the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither are they "doing business in the Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the Philippines. Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made). The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines. Respondent Santos signified his acceptance by writing a letter while he was in the Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in the People's Republic of China. Neither can the NLRC determine the facts surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took place in Beijing, People's Republic of China. The NLRC was not in a position to determine whether the Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected operations of

the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent Santos' retrenchment. Even assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired. "To determine which body has jurisdiction over the present controversy, we rely on the sound judicial principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein." c Considering that the NLRC was forum non-conveniens and considering further that no employer-employee relationship existed between MHICL, MHC and respondent Santos, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana clearly had no jurisdiction over respondent's claim in NLRC NCR Case no. 00- 02-01058-90. . . . The lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter was obvious from the allegations of the complaint. His failure to dismiss the case amounts to grave abuse of discretion.