Clr 002.docx

Republic Act No. 7055

June 20, 1991

AN ACT STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN SUPREMACY OVER THE MILITARY RETURNING TO THE CIVIL COURTS THE JURISDICTION OVER CERTAIN OFFENSES INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, OTHER PERSONS SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAW, AND THE MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, REPEALING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PRESIDENTIAL DECREES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including members of the citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code other special penal laws, or local government ordinances regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by courtmartial: provided, that the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts. As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the penalty prescribed thereforee in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances. Section 2. Subject to the provisions of Section 1 hereof, all cases filed or pending for filing with court-martial or other similar bodies, except those where the accused had already been arraigned, shall within thirty (30) days following the effectivity of this Act transferred to the proper civil courts: provided, that the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall, upon petition before commencement of trial and with the written consent of the accused, order the transfer of such excepted case or cases to the proper civil courts for trial and resolution. Section 3. Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822, 1822-A, 1850 and 1952, and all acts, general orders, executive orders, and other presidential issuances, rules and regulations inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. Section 4. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. Approved: June 20, 1991.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1850 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1850 - PROVIDING FOR THE TRIAL BY COURTS-MARTIAL OF MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE AND FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS-MARTIAL OVER MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES WHEREAS, under Section 12, Article XV of the Constitution, the State shall establish and maintain an integrated national police force whose organization, administration, and operation shall be provided by law; WHEREAS, under and pursuant to existing laws, the various municipal/city police and fire departments and jails have been integrated into law-enforcement units under the operational control and organization set-up of the Philippine Constabulary; WHEREAS, in the interest of discipline and public service, it is desirable that members of the Integrated National Police be subject to trial by courts-martial under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the "Article of War for the Armed Forces of the Philippines," for all crimes of offenses which are heretofore cognizable by the civil courts; WHEREAS, as a complementary measure, there is a need to clarify existing provisions of law relating to jurisdiction of courts-martial and the Tanodbayan/Sandiganbayan and the regular civil courts over crimes and offenses committed by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E, MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree: Section 1. Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding — (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime of offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached before hand unless otherwise provided by law. As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers, policemen, firemen and jail guards. Sec. 2. Segregation of Criminal Cases of Armed Forces and Integrated National Police from Civilian Co-accused. — In cases where there are two or more accused one or some of whom is or are civilian(s), the case against the latter shall be segregated from accused Armed Forces or Integrated National Police member, and filed with the appropriate civil court for trial in accordance with existing laws; Provided, however, that should such civilian accused waive in writing civil court jurisdiction and submit himself to court-martial jurisdiction, then the whole case involving members of the Armed Forces or the Integrated National Police as well as the civilian(s) shall be referred for trial to a court-martial. Sec. 3. Appointing Authorities. — (a) Where uniformed member(s) of the Integrated National Police are charged. — The President of the Philippines and the Chief of Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National Police are hereby empowered to appoint general, special and summary courts-martial for the trial of uniformed members of the Integrated National Police. The Constabulary Regional Commanders/Directors, Integrated National Police may appoint special and summary courts-martial, and when empowered by the President, they may also appoint general courts-martial. Other subordinate field commanders of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police may appoint summary courts-martial when empowered by the President. (b) Where military personnel and Integrated National Police members are commonly charged. — The court-martial shall be appointed by the appointing authorities specified in Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. Sec. 4. Composition of Courts-Martial. — Membership, whether military personnel or Integrated National Police members, in a general or special court-martial for

the trial of a member of the Integrated National Police shall be in a ratio as determined by the appointing authority; Provided, however, that the number of Integrated National Police personnel detailed shall not be less than one-third of the total membership of the court. Sec. 5. Administrative Action. — Court-martial action against uniformed personnel of the Integrated National Police as herein provided shall not preclude the taking of administrative action against said personnel as may be warranted pursuant to the provisions of existing law. Sec. 6. Transitory Provisions. — All cases pending before the civil courts against military personnel in the active service Integrated National Forces of the Philippines or against Integrated National Police personnel where, on the effective date of this Decree, the accused have been arraigned, shall continue to be tried and decided by said civil courts. All other cases against such personnel shall be tried by courts-martial or disposed of pursuant to this Decree. Sec. 7. Promulgation of Rules. — The Chief of Staff, AFP, shall formulate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this Decree, which shall, upon recommendation of the Minister of National Defense, be subject to the approval of the President. Sec. 8. Appropriations. — The amount of two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) is hereby authorized to be appropriated out of the funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated to carry out the purpose of this Decree and, thereafter, such amounts as may be necessary for this purpose shall be included in the annual appropriation of the Integrated National Police. Sec. 9. Repealing Clause. — All laws, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, which are contrary to, or inconsistent with, the provisions of this Decree, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 10. Effectivity. — This Decree shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this 4th day of October, the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-two.

[Gonzales vs. Abaya] [GR No. 164007, August 10, 2006] Summarized by [Hillary Go} After the events of the Oakwood mutiny, the Supreme Court has to decide whether the military or the civil court is the one who has true jurisdiction over the petitioners’ case. Important People: Petitioners: Lt. (SG) Eugene Gonzales Lt. (SG) Andy Torrato Lt (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV Cpt. Gary Alejano Lt. (SG) Nicanor Faeldon Lt. (SG) Manuel Cabochan Ens. Armand Pontejos Lt. (JG) Arturo Pascua 1Lt. Jonnel Sanggalang Respondents: Gen. Narciso Abaya – Chief of Staff of the AFP B. Gen. Mariano M. Sarmiento Jr. – Judge Advocate General of the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) FACTS: 1. July 26, 2003 – PGMA received reports that some members of the AFP with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated posts, aiming to destabilize the government. She directed the AFP and the PNP to track and arrest them. 2. July 27, 2003 – Around 1 AM, over 300 heavily-armed junior officers and enlisted men from the AFP (mostly from the Scout Rangers and the Navy’s Special Warfare Group) entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati. They disarmed the security guards and pu explosives all over the building. They were led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV. The troops, through broadcast media, announced their grievances against PGMA administration and decried the graft and corruption in the military. Thy demanded that she, her Cabinet members, and the top brass of the AFP/PNP to resign. 3. Aroud 12 pm of the same day, PGMA issues Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4. She then called on the soldiers to surrender their weapons at 5 PM the same day. After sending in negotiators, the the government panel succeeds in convincing them to lay down their arms and return to the barracks. A total of 321 soldiers, petitioners included, surrender to the military.

Procedural History: 4. July 31, 2003 – The NBI investigated, and recommended that the military personnel be charged with violating Art 134-A of the RPC (coup d’etat.) the Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ recommends the filing of the corresponding information against them.

5. August 2, 2003 – Gen. Abaya ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers who participated in the Oakwood incident, directed the AFP to conduct its own investigation. 6. August 5, 2003 – the DOJ filed with the RTC of Makati an Information for coup d’etat against the soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and raffled off to Branch 62, presided over by Judge Romeo F. Barza. Subsequently this case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2673, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC Makati, presided over by Judge Oscar Pimentel. 7. August 13, 2003 – the RTS directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of CC No. 03-2784, and Gen. Abaya issued Letter No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filinf with the military tribunal charges of violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408 (The Articles of War) against the soldiers. Specifically, Arts. 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97. 8. 243 of the original accused filed an Omnibus Motion with Branch 148 of the RTS, praying that said trial court could assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked RA No. 7055 (An Act 9. Sept. 15, 2003 – the petitioners filed a motion praying for the suspension of the JAGO’s proceedings until after the RTC shallhave resolved their motion to assume jurisdiction. 10. October 29, 2003 – th AFP’s Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to Gen. Abaya, recommending that the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident be charged before a general court martial with violating Arts. 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War. 11. Nov. 11, 2003 – After the DOJ’s reinvestigation, they find probable cause against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in CC No. 032784. The prosecution filed an Amended Information against the RTC. 12. Nov. 14, 2003 – the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped the charges of coup d’etat against the 290 accused. 13. Dec. 12, 2003 – the Pre=Trial Invesitgaton Panel submitted its Final Pre-Investigation Report to the JAGO, recommending that following the “doctrine of absorption”, those charged with oup d’etat before the RTS should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War. 14. Fenruary 11, 2004 – The RTC issued an Order stating that “all charges” before the court-martial against the accued are hereby declared not serviceconnected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat.” The trial court proceeded to hear petitioners’ applications for bail. 15. Col. Julius A. Magno, as OC of the JAGO, reiewed the findings of the pre-Investigation Panel and recommendd that 29 of the officers should be persecuted before a general court martial for violation of Art 96 (conduct unbecoming a soldier or a gentleman) of the AOW. 16. June 17, 2004 – Magno’s recommendation was approved by the AFP’s top brass. The AFP Judge Advocate General directed petitioners to submit their anwer to the charge, but instead petitioners filed an Instant Petition for Prohibition praying for respondents to desist from charging them with Art. 96. Their reason: the RTC in its Feb 11 Order that their violating Art 96 is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat. The military cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction. 17. The SolGen doesn’t buy their reasoning, countering that RA 7055 specifies the service-connected offenses covered by the Articles of War. Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional issue that the offense before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitoners alleged that durng the pendency of their origina; petition, respondents had proceeded with the pre-trial investigation in order to charge the with violation of Art 96. The re-trial investigation panel had forwarded the case to the GeneralCourt Martial but in the two years that had passed since the Oakwood Mutiny, only Lt. Trillanes had been arraigned. On the hearing of July 26, 2006, petitioners moved to have the case dismissed bc the charge against them had prescribed on July 25, 2005. The General Court Martial, however, ruled that the prescription period would end at midnight, July 26, 2005, And that since it became clear that the accused could not be arraigned, the prosecution changed its position and asserted that

23 of the accused had already been arraigned. (Guys, pa-check please kasi medj nalito ako sa wording dito). The petitioners moved for a motion of reconsideration, but it was denied by the general court martial in its Order September 14, 2005. 18. The SolGen, in his comment, prays that the Supplemental position be denied for lack of merit, since he alleges that all the acused had been arraigned on July 13 nd 18, 2005.

ISSUE(s): 1. Whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition. 2. What crime/offense can the petitioners really be charged with? 3. Whether the military or the civil court may hold jurisdiction over the case. HOLDING: Majority opinion written by Justice Sandoval-Guttierez: Since the petitioners are military personnel, they are subject to military law. According to Section 1 of RA No. 7055, the general rule is that any military personnel who commits crimes punishable under the RPC or any other special laws or penal ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court, unless their crimes are service-connected. If so, then the soldier shall be tried under court-martial, except when the President of the Philippines directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court. According to RA 7055, service-connected crimes are limited to those defined in Articles 54-70, Articles 72-92, and Articles 95-97 of the Articles of War. This delineation emphasizes the difference between civilian and military justice systems: The military enforces discipline above all in its members, not just in times of war but also in times of peace. Hence, the charges of violation of Art 96 against the petitioners (conduct unbecoming an officer or a gentleman).They violated their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the authorities, causing dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. Because of this, petitioners stand to be dismissed from the military. Petitioners argued that they can no longer be charged for violating Art 96 because according to the RTC, this crime has been absorbed into the crime of coup d’etat.(this is called the doctrine of absorption of crimes). But their argument holds no water because the RTC hasn’t the jurisdiction over service-connected crimes. Such a declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is therefore, void. The “doctrine of absorption” doesn’t apply here. As to the issues with prescription, these are questions of fact and not within the SC’s power of review.

VERDICT: The respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and in charging petitioners with violation of Art 96 of the Articles of War. The instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

Concurring Opinion (Callejo, Sr., J)

Elaborates on the “doctrine of absorption” as pertains to political crimes (coup d’etat, rebellion, etc.). Also describes how “mutiny” as described in Art 67 of the Articles of War was basically incorporated into 134-A of the RPC, thereby criminalizing it in the civil courts and leaving the court-martial unable to charge the soldiers under Art. 67.

Separate Opinion (Concurring and dissenting, Tinga, J.) States the abuses military leaders can commit if the civil courts are denied their power to try soldiers for crimes and offenses. Court Martials can lead to inordinately light punishments for those who commit crimes but have powerful connections. Also, since being tried both in the civil court and military tribunal can lead to double jeopardy, it leads to further injustice as the case can then be dismissed, the petitioners acquitted.

Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War before the court martial, thus: All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City, Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and abused their constitutional duty to protect the people and the State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-elected and legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing the peace and tranquility of the people and the nation they are sworn to protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW 96 of the Articles of War.

ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. Any officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service. (Underscoring ours)

Articles 54 to 70: Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment. Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment. Art. 56. False Muster. Art. 57. False Returns. Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion. Art. 59. Desertion. Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert. Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter. Art. 62. Absence Without Leave. Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National Defense.

Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer. Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer. Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer. Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition. Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition. Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders. Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement. Articles 72 to 92: Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners. Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received. Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority. Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities. Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy. Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender. Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign. Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard. Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service. Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property. Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy. Art. 83. Spies. Art. 84. Military Property.Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or wrongful Disposition. Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to Soldiers. Art. 86. Drunk on Duty. Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel. Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions. Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court. Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions. Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed. Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures. Art. 92. Dueling. Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government. Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. Art. 97. General Article. Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. x x x. It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered service-connected crimes or offenses. In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.

RPC Article 1. Time when Act takes effect. - This Code shall take effect on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-two. Article 21. Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. NCC Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (3) RPC FELONIES Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

PEOPLE V. GONZALES March 19, 1990 | SARMIENTO, J. Topic: Felonies: Act Facts: At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall. Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence. There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom. The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981. The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information, dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime. Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd Penacerrada. His findings revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4) punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one weapon might have caused all the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, opined that due to the number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least 2 instruments used is high. According to Huntoria while passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for help. Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana trees. From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in moonlight. Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan".

Huntoria explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of his life. In October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's widow

The herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep in his house which was located some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime when the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him. The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria. On appeal the Court of Appeals rejected the appellant's defense of alibi and upheld the credibility of Huntoria. All the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for parole. This case was certified to the SC. 1) W/N The Anti-Subversion Act is a Bill of Attainder — NO Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them. He stated that "The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I only saw the rapid movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot determine who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw the hacking and the stabbing blow." From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation, inducement, or indispensable cooperation. Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world." In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death. Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the five accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction cannot be sustained SIDE ISSUES: WON Huntoria is credible – No

Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility, here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his veracity. Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the accused, why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that the rest of the accused were then still free and around. Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified. A tenant owes the very source of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord. Tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial distress he was in. Shortly after he volunteered and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the protective wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging for his family. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-year old father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence was about one kilometer from the scene of the crime, we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons. DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED.

RPC Article 116. Misprision of treason. - Every person owing allegiance to (the United States) the Government of the Philippine Islands, without being a foreigner, and having knowledge of any conspiracy against them, conceals or does not disclose and make known the same, as soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of the province, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which he resides, as the case may be, shall be punished as an accessory to the crime of treason. Article 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon public officers or employees who have failed to resist a rebellion by all the means in their power, or shall continue to discharge the duties of their offices under the control of the rebels or shall accept appointment to office under them. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187). Article 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and suspension shall be imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses. Article 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 10,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any public officer who: 2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts, shall be guilty or any of the following acts or omissions: (b) Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by him officially.

When the culprit is an officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs, the provisions of the Administrative Code shall be applied. Article 224. Evasion through negligence. - If the evasion of the prisoner shall have taken place through the negligence of the officer charged with the conveyance or custody of the escaping prisoner, said officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification. Article 234. Refusal to discharge elective office. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who, having been elected by popular election to a public office, shall refuse without legal motive to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office. Article 275. Abandonment of person in danger and abandonment of one's own victim. - The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon: 1. Any one who shall fail to render assistance to any person whom he shall find in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying, when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission shall constitute a more serious offense.

PEOPLE v. SILVESTRE and ATIENZA 14 Dec 1931 | Villareal, J. | Appeal from CFI | Conejero PETITIONER: The People of the Philippine Islands RESPONDENT: Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza SUMMARY: Atienza and Silvestre were cohabiting defendants who were convicted as principal and accomplice respectively for the crime of arson under Art. 550, para. 2 of the Penal Code. Atienza and Silvestre had moved barrios from Masocol to Santo Nino in Bulacan pursuant to an agreement between them and Silvestre’s husband Joaquin where the latter would withdraw his complaint for adultery. The defendants eventually started cohabiting again in Masocol (in the home of her son Nicolas de la Cruz from her first marriage!). Atienza then burned down the de la Cruz house, saying prior to the arson that it was the only way he could revenge himself against the people of Masocol who accused them of adultery. In this appeal from CFI Bulacan, Silvestre was acquitted as accomplice as her acts did not constitute a crime: she merely listened to her codefendant's threat without raising a protest, and did not give the alarm when the latter set fire to the house. DOCTRINE: Passive presence at the scene of another's crime, silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity as an accomplice in the commission of the crime. 1. The accused Silvestre was on her second marriage (with Domingo Joaquin) and cohabiting with a third man, her co-defendant Atienza, starting March 1930. Three months later, on May 16, the husband Joaquin filed a complaint for adultery with the justice of the peace of Paombong Municipality, Bulacan which was eventually withdrawn when the defendants sent him a signed agreement that they would stop cohabitation, and not live again in the barrio of Masocol. 2. Silvestre met her son Nicolas in November and “followed him home” to Masocol “under pretext of asking him for nipa leaves” and Atienza followed. 3. On the night of November 25, 1930, after supper, Atienza told Nicolas and his wife to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it. Upon being asked why, Atienza said that the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who instigated the charge of adultery against him and his lover. No one dared respond as Atienza was armed with a pistol, and the de la Cruz couple left the house at once to tell barrio lieutenant Buenaventura Ania. 4. The couple had not gone a hundred arms' length (0.5km) when they heard "Fire! Fire!" and looked back to see their home in flames. Nicolas went to the

home of his parents-in-law to get the furniture he deposited there and carry it to the schoolhouse where Antonia took refuge with their baby. Three people testified to witnessing Atienza going away from the house where the fire started, and Silvestre leaving as well. 5. The defendants were convicted by the CFI Bulacan of arson under Art. 550 par. 2, Penal Code1 and were sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the owners and families of the 48 houses that burnt down. Atienza was deemed a principal by direct participation (14y 8m 1d cadena temporal) and Silvestre an accomplice (6y 1d presidio mayor).

ISSUES/RATIO: 1. Whether Silvestre should be acquitted—YES.  Article 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with article 13, defines an accomplice as one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions. There must be a certain degree of cooperation, whether moral (advice, encouragement, or agreement) or material (external acts).  Silvestre’s acts were not acts of complicity: she merely was silent at Atienza’s declaration of intentions and was present when Martin Atienza set fire to the house. There is no cooperation without showing that her acts encouraged or nerved Atienza to commit the crime. Her subsequent failure to raise the alarm does not make her liable as there is no sign of agreement. 2. Whether Atienza should be acquitted—NO. While Atienza knew that it was only he and Silvestre in the de la Cruz house, he cannot be convicted merely of arson less serious than what the trial court sentenced him for, as that house was the means of destroying the others, and he did not know whether the others were then occupied or not. Atienza might even have been convicted of arson in the most serious degree if the information alleged that he knew the other houses were occupied, taking into account that barrio residents are accustomed to retire at the tolling of the bell for the souls in purgatory (8 PM).

1

ART. 550. The penalty of cadena temporal shall be imposed upon:

2. Any person who shall set fire to any inhabited house or any building in which people are accustomed to meet together, without knowing whether or not such building or house was occupied at the time, or any freight train in motion, if the damage caused in such cases shall exceed six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.

RPC FELONIES Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.

UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARSON TAYLOR, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-9726 December 8, 1914 Nature of the Action: An appeal for criminal libel Facts: Defendant, as alleged, was then and there the acting editor and proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher of Manila Daily Bulletin, a paper of large circulation edited in English and Spanish. Thereafter, an article against one Atty. Ramon Sotelo was published in said newspaper which implicated that there had been conspiracy and fraud between said attorney and owner of the burnt building so as to collect insurance. Atty. Sotelo further contended that the article was of a certain false and malicious defamation and libel. The CFI agreed to Atty. Sotelo; hence, this appeal. Issue: Did the lower court err in ruling that the defendant was criminally liable? Ruling: For the foregoing reasons, therefore, there being no proof whatever in the record showing that the defendant was the “author, the editor, or the proprietor” of the newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower court must be reversed, the complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de officio. Ratio Decidendi: Yes; explained by the Supreme Court, common law crimes do not exist in the Philippine islands. Thus, an act does not constitute a crime when no law makes it so. In the instant case, although libel is made a crime, the defendant is not the author, editor, or proprietor of the said newspaper—instead, only its manager. Neither does the proof show in the record that the manager played a part in the publication of the article.

Corpuz v. People 29 April 2014 | Peralta, J. | Rule 45 certiorari | I. General principles – B. Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege | Conejero PETITIONER: Lito Corpuz RESPONDENT: People of the Philippines SUMMARY: Corpuz offered to sell jewelry which Tangcoy was selling, for a commission, and after failing to return the goods or remit the proceeds within 60 days, promised Tangcoy he would pay. After demand went unsatisfied, Corpuz was sued and convicted for estafa. The imposable penalty was disputed by several justices who believed the Court must take current factors such as inflation when imposing the penalty (based on 1932 values of money as approximations for damage). The Court held that it must impose the penalties based on Article 315 of the RPC in relation to Article 65, quoting Guillermo Guevara’s book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code regarding Article 5 that the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh, “based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute. DOCTRINE: See Issue/Ratio 3. The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation. SEPARATE OPINIONS: Brion concurred, saying thr ''plain meaning rule" and the principle of separation of powers prevented the SC from judicially legislating a new penalty. Both Sereno and Leonen concurred and dissented as they voted to affirm the conviction but recompute the penalty, saying that jurisprudence and statutory construction both permit recomputation. Carpio and Abad, dissenting separately, stated that the penalty in Art 315(1) is unconstitutional for violating the proscription against cruel punishment.

FACTS: 1. Petnr. Corpuz seeks to reverse his RTC San Fernando conviction for estafa [Article 315(1)(b) RPC2] (30 Jul 2004) and the CA Decision and Resolution (Mar 22 and Sept 5, 2007) affirming the same. 2. On May 2, 1991 Danilo Tangcoy was approached by and entrusted to Corpuz ₱98k worth of jewelry items 3 for the latter to sell on commission. Corpuz was to tum over either the proceeds or the items after 60 days. ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow… 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. 3 The pieces of jewelry were an 18k diamond ring for men worth ₱45k; a 2-baht [one baht = 15.244 grams] woman's bracelet worth ₱12k; one (1) men's necklace and a 3-bath men's bracelet worth ₱25k. 2

3. Corpuz neither remitted the stated proceeds nor returned what he got after 60 days. He promised Tangcoy he would pay the value but did not. Consequently, the Public Prosecutor of Olongapo charged him with estafa before the RTC. 4. Corpuz said at trial that he and Tangcoy were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, a financer of loans to Base employees. Corpuz said he signed a blank receipt dated 2 May 1991 to obtain a loan from Balajadia in 1989, which was being used to frame him. 5. After trial, the RTC on 30 July 2004 found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to pay 98k plus serve a minimum 4y 2m prison correccional in the medium period to a maximum 14y 8m reclusion temporal in its minimum period. 6. The CA denied Corpuz’s appeal but changed the penalty to 4y 2m prison correccional as minimum, to 8y prison mayor as maximum, plus 7 years (a year for each additional P10k over P22k). 7. Corpuz filed with the SC this petition saying that there was a best evidence violation due to photocopy evidence, a fatal defect in the information for estafa, and insufficient evidence—it was denied. ISSUE/RATIO: 1. Whether the crime of estafa was proven—YES.  Whether Corpuz may submit objection to photocopy evidence—NO, as he waived it by not raising it at testimonial identification of the evidence.  Whether the information for estafa was defective—NO, as the period for return of the jewelry is not material to the crime and was sufficiently approximated as substantial compliance.  Whether asking about the jewelry was sufficient demand—YES. Tancoy testified that he located Corpuz after 2 months and “talked to him about the items he gave,” but was “promised he would pay the amount.. Demand need not be formal or written; even a verbal query is demand as the law does not qualify, and even so the crime may be proven by other evidence (Tubb v. People). Prosecution herein proved misappropriation with the 2 May 1991 receipt, and its witness was credible by both CA and RTC findings. 2. Whether the penalty imposed was appropriate—NO. The penalty imposed should be 3y 2m 11d prison correccional as minimum, to 15y reclusion temporal as maximum. Based on People v. Cosme: under Art. 315, estafa is punished by prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is 12,001-₱22k; if such exceeds ₱22k, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding 1 year up to 20 years for each additional ₱10k pesos (prision mayor/reclusion temporal).  Maximum: Prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65. Here, the maximum penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6y 8m 21d to 8y of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year (up to a max 20 years) shall be added to the penalty f or every additional ₱10k defrauded over ₱22k.₱98k is ₱76k or 7 times more than the ₱22k ceiling set by law, so the maximum period of 6y 8m 21d to 8y of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. The maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus 7 years, makes the maximum 15 years.  Minimum term of the indeterminate sentence: 6 to m 1d to 4y 2m after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty for estafa is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, and the penalty next lower is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. 2. Whether the Court may adjust penalties fixed by law—NO. The Court here went into a long discussion about the correct penalties to be imposed because they were excessive, as based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money in 1932. It decided that it could not modify the said range of penalties as it would be judicial legislation. It would be encroachment to remedy the legislature's failure in amending penalties through judcicial decisions. Article 5 RPC provides that in case of excessive penalties, the Court shall render the proper decision and report to the Chief Executive reasons for legislative action.4 DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED. CA and RTC affirmed with MODIFICATION that the penalty is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 3y 2m 11d of prision correccional, as minimum, to 15y of reclusion temporal as maximum. Pursuant to Article 5 RPC, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the President, through the DOJ; also, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the HOR 4

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.

CONCURRENCE: Brion o Present day application of the 1930 values will not result in the denial of Corpuz' s right to equal protection. o The permissible solution to perceived disparity between the prescribed penalty and the crime in light of he present values of money and property is the President’s grant of executive clemency through pardon or parole. o I disagree that the incremental penalty for estafa is unconstitutional as a cruel and unusual punishment; Lim v. People and People v. Tongko prove otherwise. o Some statutes increased the penalties for estafa under certain conditions despite the then already declining monetary value on account of inflation: (1) Presidential Decree No. 818 (enacted in October 22, 1975) increased the penalties in cases of estafa resulting from bouncing checks under Article 315(2)(d); and (2) Presidential Decree No. 1689 (enacted on April 6, 1980) increased the penalty for certain forms of estafa under Articles 315 and 316. o Justice Abad’s view is not agreeable: (1) the modification of the penalty transgressed the clear intent of the legislature as the adjustment for inflation is not supported by the letter of Article 315 of the RPC nor by its intent; (2) in adjusting for inflation the monetary values to modify the penalties CONCURRING AND DISSENTING: Sereno and Leonen 



Sereno: Inaction would erroneously endanger the accused’s right to liberty contrary to the presumed intention of the legislature, and the law must be construed in favor of the accused. o Money is an assigned representation, similar to People v. Pantoja (1968) on compensatory damages for death, where the Court explained that P9k was imposed based on the pre-war purchasing power. The NCC in post-war 1950 imposed P3k damages since the peso was 1/3rd pre-war value. As the Court then found the 1968 peso as 1/4th the pre-war purchasing power, damages were set at P12k. o The purchasing power of the peso was accepted as a "judicially manageable standard": for adjustment of penalty, valuation in expropriation cases, penalties in criminal cases, and damages and indemnities. o The Court must construe criminal rules in favor of the accused, as based on the equally vital doctrine of presumption of innocence. o Article 10 of the Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail." Leonen: We must reflect the purchasing power of the peso after 80yrs, as part of construing the law. o The gravity of a crime where someone was defrauded of ₱50 of property in 1932 is not the same as the gravity of the same offense in 2014. Even the inflation rate can be derived from comparing one year’s price index with another year’s price index. same index from one year to the next. Price index is the "measure of the average level of prices," the most common being the Consumer Price Index (1948).

DISSENTS: Carpio and Abad  Carpio: Penalty should be 3y 1m 11d prision correccional, as minimum, to 4y 9m 11d of prision correccional, as maximum; and the portion of the first paragraph of Article 315 RPC is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting cruel punishment as well as the UDHR in 1948 and the ICCPR in 1986. o Jurisprudence shows standards of disproportionality for the threshold for the breach of the Cruel Punishment Clause. Punishments that "shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people" or "[are] flagrantly and plainly oppressive" are violative of the Clause. o Impermissible disproportionality is gauged by using alternative parameters: (1) whether more serious crimes are equally or less severely punished; or (2) whether the punishment reasonably advances the state interest behind the penalty. o Article 315 of the Code calibrates the maximum penalty for estafa on an escalated basis of one year imprisonment for every ₱10k fraud, with 20 years as ceiling. For a fraud of ₱98k, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a maximum term of 15 years (within the range for homicide or kidnapping and 3-day detainment). By imposing a level of punishment for estafa equal to more serious crimes against persons such as homicide and kidnapping, Article 315’s system of calibration is arbitrary and disproportionate to the severity of the crime punished. Crucially, the calibration does not take into account the real value of the peso. o The enormous disparity in the values of fraud between these points in time (exceeding 100%) and the imposition of the same level of maximum punishment in both instances remove any semblance of reasonability in the manner by which the punishment is derived and its connection to the purpose of the law. The arbitrary differential treatment of estafa (and theft) crosses the line separating the exercise of valid legislative discretion and the Cruel Punishment Clause.  Abad: The penalty should be the indeterminate penalty to 2m arresto mayor, as minimum, to 1 y 8m prision correccional, as maximum, entitling him to

probation under Colinares v. People. o As a general principle, RPC crimes carry the same penalties whatever year the accused commits them (e.g. mutilation of a Philippine coin in 1932 and in 2014 would still mean the same 2 year and 4 month maximum penalty). But proportional correspondence between the gravity of the offense and severity of the penalty changes for RPC crimes re: property. o There is violation of the equal protection clause in comparing uneven treatment: ₱98k jewelry items subject of his offense would be valued at ₱980 in 1932 when he would have been imprisoned for only 2y 4m maximum, but in 1991 he gets a 15 years maximum. o Carpio’s view annuls the incremental penalty but maintain the validity of the basic penalties for fraud. The uniform adjustment in the base amounts using the PSA formula (from a 2013 study) of ₱1 in 1949 to ₱100 in 2013 will maintain uniform levels of legislative indignation or outrage over the wrongs committed in these crimes. o The clear intent of the law can be given by "harmonizing" the law or "aligning the numerical figures to the economic realities.  When the Code Commission drafted the Civil Code in 1949, it fixed the new minimum civil indemnity for death to ₱3k but the Court in the light of inflation t ₱75k in 2009.  The Court emphasized in People v. Pantoja that these judicial adjustments are dictated by: "the difference between the value of the present currency and that at the time when the law fixing a minimum indemnity was passed. Pantoja explained that, then, the purchasing power of the peso has declined further until the rate of exchange in the free market was U.S. $1.00 to ₱4.00 Philippine pesos. o In case of doubt the RPC is to be construed in favor of the accused. While the Court has in 1964 construed the minimum in Article 2206 as subject to adjustment to cope with inflation although this worked against the accused. The Court has not similarly constructed to the favorable, inflationaffected penalty provisions of Article 315 RPC.

RPC FELONIES Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. - Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos. A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. 2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957). Article 205. Judgment rendered through negligence. - Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by arresto mayor and temporary special disqualification. Article 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and suspension shall be imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses. Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer: 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos. 2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos. 3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos. 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060). Article 224. Evasion through negligence. - If the evasion of the prisoner shall have taken place through the negligence of the officer charged with the conveyance or custody of the escaping prisoner, said officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification.

United States v. Apostol September 2, 1909 | Arellano, C.J. | Appeal from CFI | Felonies - How Committed - Dolo - Presumption of Intent PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: United States DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Catalino Apostol SUMMARY: Apostol set fire to a hut of 3 men over some missing carabaos. He argued that there was no proof of criminal intent in his actions. SC decided otherwise. DOCTRINE: Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a crime are always presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. (Art. 1, Penal Code.) FACTS: 1. On Dec. 16, 1907, 5 individuals, one of them being Defendant-Appellant Apostol, went to the house where Tabilisima, Vergara, and Manipul were living. They were asking about some carabaos that disappeared. 2. The 3 housemates said that they did not know about any missing carabaos. Apostol told them to leave the house, but the 3 refused. 3. Because the 3 refused to leave the house, Apostol set fire to the hut they were in and it burned down. 4. Trial Court: Apostol's responsibility has been fully established by the injured parties under Art 549 of the Penal Code. Apostol was sentenced to 16 years and 1 day of cadena temporal, to the accessories of the law, to indemify the value of the burnt hut for P1.00, and to pay the costs. 5. Hence this appeal to the SC.  (offender)APOSTOL'S ARGUMENTS: o No proof of criminal intent o Art. 554, not 549, should apply.  (victim) TABILISIMA et al's TESTIMONY: o Testified that they were in the hut and that when they answered that they knew nothing about the missing carabaos, Apostol burned the hut down. o Hut was in an uninhabited place, surroudned by fields; nearest houses were far away and their cries for help couldn't be heard o Burnt hut was not more than P1.00 because it was a small one  (victim) VERGARA'S TESTIMONY: o Apostol et al. asked them for carabaos that they claimed to have lost o Apostol et al. wounded Manipul and Tabilisima and forced them to leave the house o Apostol set fire to the house ISSUE: WON? NO.

RULING: For the reasons above set forth the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the Appellant. Ten days from date let a confirming judgment be entered, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the lower court for action. Without prejudice to the immediate execution of the judgment, let the clerk of this court, as provided in the said article 2 of the Penal Code, respectfully address a communication to the Honorable, the Governor-General of these Islands, giving the result of this decision and the sentence, requesting him, should he so desire, to make use of the prerogative with which he is invested in order to reduce or mitigate the penalty imposed. So ordered. RATIO: 1. Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a crime are always presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. (Art. 1, Penal Code.) 2. The argument that Apostol advanced based on Art. 554, in connection with Art. 553, punishes the setting fire to a building intended for habitation, in an uninhabited place, does not apply because the article in question refers to an edifice intended for human habitation in an uninhabited place at a time when the same is unoccupied. 3. Hence, it's Art. 549 that's controlling because it punishes with the very severe penalties of cadena temproal to cadena perpetua "those who shall set fire to any edifice, farmhouse, hut, shed, or vessel in port with knowledge that one or more persons were within the same", that must be applied. 4. The court, in view of the nature of the crime and considering the circumstances attending the same, recognizes the extreme severity of the penalty; therefore we apply the remedy afforded it by article 2, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, when a strict application of the provisions of the code would result in an excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the crime.

G.R. No. L-6486

March 2, 1911

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFAEL B. CATOLICO, defendant-appellant. MORELAND, J.: FACTS: 1. Appellant Catolico (Justice of the Peace of Baggao, Cagayan) was convicted of the crime of malversation of public funds and sentencing him to two months' imprisonment, to perpetual disqualification to hold public office or public employment of any kind, and to the payment of the costs. 2. Catolico had before him sixteen separate civil cases commenced by Juan Canillas against sixteen distinct individuals, each one for damages resulting from a breach of contract; Catolico decided in favor of Canillas. Each one of the defendants in said cases appealed from the decision of the justice of the peace and deposited P16 as required by law, at the same time giving a bond of P50, each one of which was approved by the court; 3. Canillas objected to their appeal – basis: He presented a writing to Catolico, alleging that the sureties on the said bonds were insolvent 4. Catolico, satisfied with the evidence presented by Canillas, ordered the cancellation of the said bonds and, in the same order, required each of the appellants to file another bond within fifteen days; but none of the appellants presented new bonds within the time fixed.

5. Thus, Canillas applied for an order declaring final the judgment entered in each of the said sixteen cases and commanding the execution of the same, at the same time asking that the sums deposited by the defendants in said actions be attached (so called in the record) and delivered to him in satisfaction of said judgments; 6. Catolico granted petition of Canillas, and ordered said sums attached and delivered same to the plaintiff, at the same time requiring of the plaintiff a bond of T50 for each attachment, conditioned that he would respond for the damages which should result from such attachment. 7. For issuing that order, Catolico was charged and convicted of malversation of public funds. 8. Hence this appeal ISSUE: Whether or not the case made against the appellant lacks many essential elements required by law to be present in the crime of malversation of public funds. HELD:    

The case made against the appellant lacks many of the essential elements required by law to be present in the crime of malversation of public funds. The accused neither used the money for his own benefit nor for the benefit of other people. That he delivered the said sums to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the judgment which he held in those cases, cannot be considered an appropriation or a taking of said sums within the meaning of Act No. 1740. All his action were done in good faith and under the belief that he was acting judicially and correctly upon requiring the appellant to pay P16 as presiding officer of the court of justice of the peace. To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent.

Dispositive: The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant ordered discharged from custody forthwith. CARSON, J., I am strongly inclined to doubt the bona fides of the defendant in the transactions herein set out, but in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt upon this point I concur in the judgment of acquittal of the crime charged in the information. RULE 131 Sec. 3 . Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (b)That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;

PEOPLE V. DELIM G.R. No. 142773 FACTS: Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon and Ronald. Modesto, the victim, took the surname Delim after he was adopted by the father of Marlon, Manuel and Robert. Modesto’s wife, Rita, and 16-year old son, Randy, continued using Manalo Bantas as their surname. Modesto and his family and they resided in Barangay Bila, Sison, Pangasinan. The 3 accused and Manuel (alias Bong) and Robert, all surnamed Delim, were charged with the crime of murder of Modesto Delim committed on January 23, 1999. January 23, 1999 - 6:30PM - Modesto and family were about to have dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald suddenly barged into the house armed with a short handguns. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto.[4] Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by the intruders not to leave the house. They were guarded by Leon and Manuel, who were also armed with short handguns. Leon and Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day. As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle and informed the latter of the incident. They searched for Modesto to no avail. On January 26, 1999, Randy reported the incident to the police authorities. January 27, 1999 – 3:00PM - Randy and relatives searched for Modesto again in Paldit, Pangasinan and this time found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was already dead. Rita and Randy divulged to the police investigators the names and addresses of Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom they claimed were responsible for the death of Modesto, but they were at a loss as to why the five seized Modesto and killed him. DEFENSES: Ronald - he, was at his house in Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan about two kilometers away from Modestos house. Rita and Randy falsely implicated him upon the coaching of Melchor Javier who allegedly had a quarrel with him concerning politics. Leon - in the house of his sister in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte where he had been living since 1997. Alibi is corroborated by boss and sister. Marlon - on vacation in Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to January 29, 1999 RTC: found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. “JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond reasonable doubt is hereby rendered against Ronald Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon Delim (for) the commission of Aggravated Murder … the Court sentences Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim to suffer the penalty of DEATH” ISSUE 1: Whether the crime charged in the Information is murder or kidnapping. HELD 1: The crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof. RATIO 1:

I. In determining what crime is charged in an information, the material facts describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling. If intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged, such intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. 

People v. Isabelo Puno, et al. - for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor.

That means: if the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victims liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping, as it is merely a preparatory act to the killing. The "preparatory act" is absorbed by the crime of homicide or murder. What is primordial is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with-that of murder or kidnapping. II. Court’s Discussion on “Specific Intent” 

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What is Specific Intent? o Specific Intent is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act. It must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent. o Proof: by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence; it may be inferred from the circumstances o Example: Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes. o Relations to MOTIVE: NOT synonymous What is Motive? o Motive is the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. It is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. o Proof of motive does not show guilt. Absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crim e charged such as murder. Why? Because crime is rarely rational. Specific Intent v. Motive o In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. o In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. o In murder, such as where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge. o In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom.

III. In this case  

It is evident in the information that the specific intent of accused was to kill him, and that he was taken from his house in order to kill him. The abduction was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. There is no specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty, and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping. ----------------------end of Specific Intent portion----------------------

ISSUE 2: whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder

HELD 2: Yes, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused, but only for the crime of Homicide because the prosecution failed to prove the element of treachery to make the crime murder. Also, the Court found that Leon is a principal by direct participation, even if he did not participate in the killing of Modesto. RATIO 2: I. Burden of Proof – prove the corpus delicti, which comprises of a) the criminal act, and b) defendants agency in the commission of the act II. Elements of Corpus Delicti  

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Wharton - first, the objective; second, the subjective element In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. If murder is to be proved, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); it may be proved by looking at: o use of weapons o nature of wounds o location of wounds o number of wounds o words uttered by accused

III. Circumstantial Evidence  

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proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience How to use Circumstantial Evidence o (a) there is more than one circumstance o (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established o (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution if prosecution presents circumstantial evidence. In this case, the prosecution used circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellants of murder.

IV. Not Murder But Homicide  

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Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved clearly and conclusively as the crime itself. Treachery – elements: o (a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate o (b) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted. To take advantage of superior strength - purposely use force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked In this case, prosecution provided no evidence as to the particulars of how he was assaulted and killed – no proof of acts constituting treachery or abuse of superior strength.

V. Other Matters

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Credibility of Witnesses Even if the statements of Rita and Randy were inconsistent, the Court found that such inconsistencies is insufficient for the desired impeachment the testimonies. The inconsistencies were found to "bear the earmarks of truth and sincerity" -- they responded with consistency upon material details that could only come from a firsthand knowledge of the events. Medico Legal was also used as evidence While it is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the accused, the prosecution was able to show, from testimonies of the witnesses and the medico legal report of the cadaver of Modesto that Marlon and Ronald committed the murder. Leon as a Principal by Direct Participation Leon, while he did not participate in the killing of Modesto, still stood by the door to prevent Modesto's family from leaving the house. He on may not have been at the situs criminis when Modesto was killed, but still, he is a principal by direct participation. “No matter how wide may be the separation of the conspirators, if they are all engaged in a common plan for the execution of a felony and all take their part in furtherance of the common design, all are liable as principals. Actual presence is not necessary if there is a direct connection between the actor and the crime.”

1. Information: That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with short firearms barged-in and entered the house of Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to kill, treachery, evident premedidation (sic), conspiring with one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

People v. Temblor (May 28, 1988) Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines Defendant-appellant: Vicente Temblor Ponente: Griño-Aquino J. Facts Temblor was charged with murder in CFI Agusan del Norte and Butuan City for shooting a certain Julius Cagampang to death on the evening of December 30, 1980. Upon the arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty and was thereafter tried, convicted, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusio perpetua. The evidence of the prosecution is as follows: At around 7:30 PM on the aforementioned date, while Cagampang was with his wife and their children in the store near their house, Temblor arrived and asked for a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While the victim was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of gunfire and he instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. His wife, Victorina, shouted his name, and two persons (including one of whom she later Identified as the accused), barged into the store and demanded that she bring out her husband's firearm. She then hurried to get the suitcase where the said firearm was hidden, and gave it to the accused who inspected its contents, took the .38 caliber revolver inside, and left. A few months after the incident, she was summoned to the Buenavista police station where she saw and identified Temblor as her husband’s murderer. Temblor’s alibi was that from 4:00 PM on the day of the crime to 8:00 AM of the next day, he and his father were in the house of a certain Silverio Perol in Barangay Camagong, Nasipit, and spent the night drinking away. It is worth noting that Temblor and his companion were admitted members of the NPA (New People's Army), though they were not apprehended earlier as they were hiding in the mountains of Malapong. He later surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass surrender in August, 1981, and was subsequently arrested and detained at the Buenavista municipal jail.

In his defense, Temblor emphasized that the victim's widow did not know him by name, thus rendering her identification of the accused as unreliable. She did, however, positively identify him during his trial, as she was less than a meter away when the murder occurred. Further, Claudio Sabanal, a tricycle driver, corroborated her testimony, which held water also because he was a long-time acquaintance of Temblor. He saw the accused enter the store of Cagampang at the aforementioned time and place, heard the gunshots coming from inside the store, and saw people scampering away. Rebutting the accused's alibi, the prosecution presented a Certification of the Nasipit Lumber Company's Personnel Officer and the NALCO Daily Time Record of Silverio Perol proving that he was not at home drinking with the accused and his father as he was at work that at that date and time. Interestingly, the accused did not bother to overcome this piece of rebuttal evidence. Issues: 1. Did the court err in finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the killer? 2. Did the court err in rejecting his defense of alibi? 3. Is the appellant’s alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang a valid defense? Held: 2. Yes. The trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor. Its findings, when supported by credible evidence, shall not be disturbed on appeal. Thus, while there were minor inconsistencies in Victorina’s testimony, such did not diminish her credibility, especially given that she had positively identified Temblor as her husband's murderer, and her testimony is agreed upon by the other witnesses. 3.

No. the appellant’s self-serving and unsupported alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses who had no reason for false accusation. Further, in order for an alibi to be an acceptable defense, the appellant must prove beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the scene of the crime. In addition to the previously mentioned proof, it was also admitted that Perol's house is accessible to barrio Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle in 15-20 minutes. Therefore, his alibi, as a defense, must fail.

4.

No. His alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court since the accused’s very knowledge that Cagampang possessed such a firearm was enough of a motive to kill him. It was known at the time that members of the NPA would engage in killings for in order to collect more arms and ammunition for their group, a practice prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte, also but elsewhere in the country (“agaw armas" campaign). Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively Identified, as in the case at bar. Finally, the accused fled after the murder and hid in the mountains of Agusan del Norte, which was an implied admission of guilt.

Ruling: The appeal has no merit. The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed in all respects, except as to the civil indemnity payable to the heirs of the Julius Cagampang, which is increased to P30,000.00.

US v. Ah Chong GR No. L-5272, March 19, 1910 Topic: Felonies – Dolo – Mistake of Fact Doctrine: There is no criminal liability, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. Facts:  The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in one of the Officers’ quarters at Fort McKinley, Rizal Province. Together living with him in the said quarters was the deceased, Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a houseboy.

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There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley prior to the incident thus prompting the defendant and his roommate to reinforce the flimsy hook used to lock the door of their room by placing a chair against it. The defendant and the deceased had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock on the door and say his name. On the night of Aug. 14, 1908, Ah Chong, who was alone in his room, was awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room. The defendant called out twice, asking the identity of the person but heard no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, the defendant called out that he would kill the intruder if he tried to enter. At that moment, the door was forced open and the defendant was struck first above the knee by the edge of the chair. Because of the darkness of the room, the defendant thought he was being hit by the intruder and tried to defend himself by striking wildly at the intruder using a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow. It turned out that the said intruder was actually the defendant’s roommate, Pascual Gualberto. The roommate was brought to the military hospital where he died from the effects of the wound the following day.

Issue: WON the defendant was criminally liable for committing a felony. NO. Held: Requisites for mistake of fact to be a valid defense:  that the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be.  that the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful, and  that the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused. Had the intruder been a robber as the defendant believed him to be, then Ah Chong acted in good faith, without malice or criminal intent, and would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness. Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been justified in killing the intruder under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, which requires, to justify the act, that there be — (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. As applied in this case: (1) If the intruder was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah Chong, there would have been unlawful aggression on the part of the intruder. (2) There would have been a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to defend himself and/or his home. The knife would have been a reasonable means to prevent or repel such aggression. (3) And Ah Chong gave no provocation at all. Under Article  of the Revised Penal Code, there is nothing unlawful in the intention as well as in the act of the person making the defense. If such ignorance or mistake of facts is sufficient to negative a particular intent, it destroys the presumption of intent and works an acquittal

The rule does not apply (1) where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions governing negligence and (2) in cases where a person voluntarily committing an act incurs criminal liability even though the act be different from that which he intended to commit. The mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused. There is an innocent mistake of fact without any fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, because, having no time or opportunity to make any further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, the accused had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing the deceased.

People v. Oanis FACTS: Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal and escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They went to the suspected house then proceeded to the room where they saw the supposedly Balagtas sleeping with his back towards the door. Oanis and Galanta simultaneously or successively fired at him which resulted to the victim’s death. The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson, an innocent man. ISSUE: 1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties. 2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the performance of their duty. HELD: 1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. “Ignorance facti excusat” applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The fact that the supposedly suspect was sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have checked whether it is the real Balagtas. 2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2 requisites to justify this: (1) the offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, only the first requisite is present.

Topic: Felony (Culpa) G.R. No. L-6641 July 28, 1955 FRANCISCO QUIZON, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF BACOLOR, PAMPANGA, ET AL., respondents. Summary: Chief of Police of Bacolor Pampanga filed a criminal complaint with Justice of the Peace Court against Quizon for the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence with damage amounting to Pp 125. Quizon questioned the jurisdiction of the Peace Court given the fine which may be imposed for the crime ranges from Php 125-375, w/c is in excess of what can be imposed by it by law. CFI said Peace Court as jurisdiction but SC reversed and said that the latter has jurisdiction to try the case. Doctrine: The actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. Facts: The case is very short. You can just refer to the summary. Issue: Whether or not the justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction with the court of First Instance when the crime charged is damage to property through reckless negligence or imprudence if the amount of the damage is P125. NO. Ratio: Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) provides in part as follows: Original jurisdiction.—Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: (f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos: Section 87 of said Acts reads as follows: Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases.—Justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over: (c) All criminal cases arising under the laws relating to: (6) Malicious mischief: The fact that Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to try cases of malicious mischief, does not mean that it has jurisdiction over cases of damage to property through reckless negligence because the two are different. Malicious mischief necessitates deliberate act or malice in the commission of the crime. It follows that, in the very nature of things, malicious mischief cannot be committed through negligence, since culpa (negligence) and malice ( or deliberateness) are essentially incompatible. Criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In international crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefore, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. However, for reckless imprudence, the

Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes a penalty at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional minimum, if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. Ruling: Decision of CFI reversed. Jurisdiction over the offense lies solely with CFI.

Sevilla v. People of the Philippines

SUMMARY: Venancio Sevilla was a councilor of Malabon City who was charged in the Sandiganbayan with willfull falsification of a public document under Art 171(4) of the RPC. Sevilla pleaded not guilty. He argued that he did not willfully nor had any intention to make a false statement in his PDS. On the same day that he was informed to file his PDS by 5pm of said day, he immediately instructed his staff to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him, Sevilla claims that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer. The Sandiganbayan found Sevilla guilty of falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence. DOCTRINE: Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudence is punishable. While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi-offense, in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.

FACTS:   

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Venancio Sevilla was a councilor of Malabon City who was charged in the Sandiganbayan with willfull falsification of a public document under Art 171(4) of the RPC. It was alleged that in July 2001 made a willful and false statement in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS) which he submitted with the city council’s secretariat. The false statement was regard to the question in the data sheet whether there is a pending criminal case against him to which he marked the answer box “No.” It was later found out that there was a pending case against Sevilla filed in the MeTC of Malabon for assault upon an agent of a person in authority. Sevilla pleaded not guilty. He argued that he did not willfully nor had any intention to make a false statement in his PDS. He narrated that at the time he was elected councilor he still was not assigned to an official office. He was home when he was informed by his staff that he needed to submit his PDS by 5 o’clock of the same day. He then instructed the staff to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him, Sevilla claims that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer. The Sandiganbayan found Sevilla guilty of falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence and imposed on him the penalty prescribed under Art. 365 of 4m arresto mayor minimum to 2y 10m 1d of prision correctional max plus costs. The Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of

falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC since he did not act with malicious intent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. However, considering that Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC.

RULING: Petition denied.

Whether there is distinction between intentional felonious and culpable felonies based on the nature of the acts punished – YES. 

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At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan’s designation of the felony supposedly committed by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a public document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as "falsification of public document through reckless imprudence." The foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime. The notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. We already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it" on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes: The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to person or property. (Ivler vs Modesto-San Pedro)

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Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudence is punishable. Much of the confusion has arisen

from the common use of such descriptive phrase as ‘homicide through reckless imprudence’, and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, ‘reckless imprudence resulting in homicide’; or ‘simple imprudence causing damages to property’." There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed penalty for the guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent. Thus, the proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents and not falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence. (Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People) Whether the crime reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of a public document AS PROVED is necessarily absorbed willful or intentional falsification of a public document under Art. 171(4) AS CHARGED – YES. 

The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which isincluded in the offense proved.

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Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convicted of the offense proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved. There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution – the Information charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove reckless imprudence resulting to falsification ofpublic documents. Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is whether reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is necessarily included in the intentional felony of falsification ofpublic document under Article 171(4) of the RPC. In the case of Samson v CA, therein appellant Samson argued that he cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa through falsification by imprudence for the reason that the information filed against him charges only a willful act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part. Nor can it be said, that the alleged imprudent act includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the information because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of negligence. The court explained: While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi-offense, in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of checks in question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal. Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.

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In a similar case, Sarep v Sandiganbayan, the petitioner therein falsified his appointment paper which he filed with the CSC. An Information was then filed against him for falsification of public document. Nevertheless, the Court convicted the accused of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document upon a finding that the accused therein did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person. The Court, quoting the Sandiganbayan’s disposition, held that: We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit of the circumstance that he did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person. Since he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his having passed the Regional Cultural Community Officer (Unassembled) Examination and educational attainment were sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position, then he should only be held liable for falsification through reckless imprudence. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence or quasi-offenses, furnishes the middle way between a wrongful act committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise to a felony, and a wrongful act committed without any intent which may entirely exempt the doer from criminal liability. It is the duty of everyone to execute his own acts with due care and diligence in order that no prejudicial or injurious results may be suffered by others from acts that are otherwise offensive (Aquino, R.P.C. Vol. III, 1976, Ed., p. 1884). What is penalized is the mental attitude orcondition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness and lack of care or foresight although such mental attitude might have produced several effects or consequences. Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC, reckless imprudence resulting in falsification of public document is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the penalty on Sevilla.

NOTES: 

For those details which are not important but seems important.

PEOPLE VS CARMEN Topic: Culpa - elements Short summary: This case involves the death of a boy that resulted from a ritual performed by a cult which was consented to by the victim’s parents (basically inexorcise yung bata kasi may sakit daw.) The lower courts convicted the people involved of murder but the SC reversed this and held that they were guilty of reckless imprudence only due to the absence of intent to kill. There was no malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil in this case. Doctrine: Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

• At around 2 o’clock in the afternoon of January 27, 1997, Honey Fe Abella, 10, and her friend Frances Claire Rivera, 7, were playing takyan when suddenly they heard a child shout, Tabang ma! (Help mother!) from the direction of the house of accused-appellant Carmen

• They ran to the house and saw victim Randy Luntayao being immersed by the accused-appellants in a drum of water. The victim was shouting and being restrained.

• Accused-appellants were subjecting the boy to various physical abuses such as banging his head against a bench, forcing him to drink water, pounding his chest with their fists, and finally, holding him down and stabbing him slowly with a knife to collect his blood

• It appears that Randy’s parents had sought the help of Carmen after Randy had a nervous breakdown. Eddie, the father, was told that Randy was possessed by a bad spirit which Carmen would then exorcise

• Eddie and his family were locked inside a room in the house while the ritual was ongoing and only saw Randy’s lifeless body after the ritual was finished

• Randys face was bluish and contused, while his tongue was sticking out of his mouth. It was clear to Eddie that his son was already dead. He wanted to see his sons body, but he was stopped from doing so by accused-appellant Eutiquia Carmen who told him not to go near his son because the latter would be resurrected at 7 oclock that evenin

• Thus, after Randy was buried, Eddie sought the help of the NBI and filed a complaint for murder against the appellants • The autopsy conducted by the NBI showed that the victim died due to the internal effects of a traumatic head injury and/or traumatic chest injury, such as the banging of his head against the bench

• RTC: FOUND APPELLANTS GUILTY OF MURDER due to killing with treachery • Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death occurs, it is presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. Since the defendant did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the voluntary presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. All the accused in the case at bar had contributed different acts in mercilessly inflicting injuries to the victim.

• Hence, this current appeal. W/N the appellants are guilty of murder — NO. Only reckless imprudence.

• Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act

• Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

• IN THIS CASE, the elements of reckless imprudence are apparent in the acts done by accused-appellants which, because of their lack of medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged ailment, resulted in the latters death. As already stated, accused-appellants, none of whom is a medical practitioner, belong to a religious group, known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which is engaged in faith healing.

• The reliance on the rule that criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act is untenable because such presumption is disputable • In this case, the facts show that there was an absence of intent to kill on the part of the accused-appellants • Neither can treachery be applied because in the absence of intent to kill, there is no treachery or the deliberate employment of means, methods, and manner of execution to ensure the safety of the accused from the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the victim

People v. Pugay 17 November1988 | J. Medialdea | Culpa vs. dolo Facts   

For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, Fernando Pugay and Benjamin Samson were charged with murder before the CFI of Cavite. Both pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Miranda, then 25 years old, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay at times they slept together. A town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite, wherein there was a ferris wheel. Sometime after midnight, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with one Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.

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The accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame. The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof. The police officers took all those present to the municipal building for interrogation. Only the 2 accused remained in custody.

RTC – Found both guilty of murder, but credited in favor of Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.

Issue: WON Pugay and Samson are guilty – YES    

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The accused Pugay admitted in his statement that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense. However, these written statements were not the sole basis for the findings of facts in the CFI’s decision. The CFI categorically stated that even without such statements, there is still Gabion’s straightforward, positive and convincing testimony. There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime. There appears on record the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. Considering that their testimonies would be merely corroborative, their nonpresentation does not give rise to the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she never talked to Gabion and that he saw the latter for the first time when the instant case was tried. Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them. It is clear that prior to the incident, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire. However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accusedappellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to m ake fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him. Pugay’s criminal responsibility: Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undersirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. He is guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence under A365 RPC. Samson’s criminal responsibility: There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. There is no doubt that

Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it can be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. He is guilty only of homicide, there having been no qualifying circumstance proven. He was aware that burning the clothes of the victim would at least cause physical injuries. His act resulted to a graver offense, for which he must be held responsible. A4 RPC provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. He is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning.

DISPOSITIVE Judgment of the CFI affirmed. Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.