The Learning Center Case Digest.docx

Police Power: General Welfare clause and limitations thereof GR 134269; 133440; 144518– The Learning Center and Sps Alfonso v Ayala Alabang Homeowners Assoc PONENTE Ayala Land sold land to sps Yuson who in turn sold the same to Sps Alfonso. Said TCT of lot has a restriction indicating that the lot be used exclusively for establishing and maintaining a preparatory school. Sps Alfonso opened The Learning Child Center which eventually expanded to include grade school program. Ayala Alabang protested claiming various violations of the contract. Concurrent with this case is a zoning case where the Municipality submitted a rezoning ordinance and then a subsequent resolution to correct a typographical error. In said rezoning case, HLURB held that said resolution did not only rectified an error and in fact was an actual rezoning of the property. OP reversed HLURB and in turn ruled a judgment favorable to TLC and sps Alfonso freeing them from the Deed of Restriction. CA modified OP decision by upholding the Deed of Restriction. SC affirmed CA modifying decision however by allowing the present grade school students to graduate until Grade 7 and disallowing further enrolment of new grade school students.

DOCTRINE  An LGU has the power to reclassify land within its jurisdiction as exemplified by the Ortigas v Feati case where a reclassification was done as a valid exercise of Police Power. In the present case the reclassification was done by the submission of the Municipality a resolution to both HLURB and MMC for their appropriate action respecting their function as the agency having the power to evaluate, approve, or disapprove zoning ordinance.  A resolution correcting a typographical error does not require another notice and hearing

under the Barangay Ordinance, prohibited parking on either side of street measuring 8 meters in width (which applies in the streets where the school is located). 6.

RTC rendered decision in favor of AAVA holding the spouses liable for violation of the contract. RTC however reversed decision upon MR because the spouses alleged that the passage of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No 91-39 reclassified said property as institutional thereby ceasing the legal basis to uphold the Deed of Restrictions. AAVA MR denied.

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AAVA appealed to CA which in turn granted appeal, setting aside the RTC resolution. MR was denied hence the separate Petitions for Review with the SC.

ON THE ZONING CASE 1. However, (while the MR of the sps Alfonso was pending in the RTC), the municipality of Muntinlupa passed Reso 94-179 correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of the parcel of land under the heading Institutional Zone in Ordinance 9139 (adjusting description from Lot 25 Block 1 to Lot 25 Block 3). a. From the foregoing error, the HLURB issued a Resolution which stated that the Resolution 94-179 is not a case of mere correction of error but an ACTUAL REZONING of property into an institutional area, therefore remanded it to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa to conduct public hearings. b. Hence the Municipality, TLC, and sps Alfonso appealed the HLURB resolution to the Office of the President. 2.

The Office of the President held that the Resolution 94-179 merely rectified the issuance to an alleged typographical error, hence does not need to comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. Notable in said decision is that the Ayala Corporation itself consented to the transfer from Yusons to the Alfonso of the said property agreeing in turn that the LOT SHALL BE USED FOR SCHOOL AND RELATED ACTIVITIES, freeing appellants from deed restriction. Also the said Zoning Ordinance which classifies the appellant’s school operated within the area where De la Salle-Zobel, Benedictine Abbey School, Woodrose School hence rendering arguments that sps Alfonse violated the dignity personality, privacy, and peace of mind of the Village.

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CA modified the ruling, disagreeing that the Deed of Restrictions lost its force and effect in view of the passage of Ordinance 91-39 because to do so would amount to exceeding the authority by the Office of the President.

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From the foregoing, the AAVA then filed another petition for Review with the SC assailing the CA resolution.

FACTS 1.

Subdivision developer Ayala Land Inc (ALI) sold land to sps Jose and Cristina Yuson. Said spouses sold the same to sps. Felipe and Mary Ann Alfonso. Noted in the TCT is a deed of restriction indicating that said property shall be used exclusively for establishment and maintenance of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school.

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ALI then turned over the right and power to enforce said restriction to Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA).

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The sps Alfonso then opened on said lot The Learning Child Center Pre-School (TLC). In 1991 said school expanded to include grade school program (The School of the Holy Cross).

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AAVA wrote letters to TLC protesting due to the violation of the Deed of Restrictions (for operating grade school despite the restriction allowing only nursery and kindergarten classes).

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AAVA then filed with RTC an action for injunction against the spouses and TLC for the breach of contract. Also in the action, they alleged violation of Metropolitan Manila Commission Ordinance 81-01 (MMC 81-01) or the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for NCR, and Barangay Ordinance No. 03. Under MMC 81-01 Ayala Alabang was classified as a low-density residential area thereby limiting use of subject property for operation of nursery and kindergarten school and not exceed 2 classrooms, while

ISSUE with HOLDING Primary issue: W/N TLC could continue holding grade school classes due to the changes in zoning classification? NO What is the function of Reso 94-179 and does it require notice and hearing? – TO correct typographical error, and no need for notice and hearing  Petitioners AAVA asserts that Notice and Hearing are required under Uniform Guideline for Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area (Reso 12, 1991 of Metropolitan Manila Council of MMC). They also asserted that the Muntinlupa Resolution is not a mere rectifying enactment.

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SC: Upon looking at the whereas clauses of said resolution and the contents of it shows that there was indeed typographical error in Appendix B of Ord 91-39 especial since in both Zoning maps of Muntinlupa and that of Ayala Alabang show that the subject property (Lot 25 of Block 3 Phase V of Ayala Alabang Village) is classified as institutional, while neither map classify Lot 25 Block 1 as institutional. Another factor bolstering position that it was a mere error is that Blocks 1 and 3 are not near the map, In fact, the very purpose of Ord 91-39 was to update the zoning map of the municipality.

AAVA also assertion following the case of Resins Inc v Auditor General (Yung enrolled bill statute case) that the proper remedy assuming that there was typographical error, is to legislate a new zoning ordinance. o SC disagrees because in Resins it was a taxpayer who alleged that there was error in printing of stature, unlike here where the Municipality itself which seeks to correct its own error. In Resins there would be a violation of separation of powers to interfere with wordings of statute. o In this case however no violation of the principle for the court to merely affirm the correction made by the same entity which committed the error.

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(TOPIC AT HAND) AAVA also claims that the power to evaluate, approve, or disapprove zoning ordinances lies with the HLURB under Article IV Section 5(b) EO 648 and further reminding SC that decisions of admin agencies on matters pertaining to their jurisdiction will generally not be disturbed by courts. o SC disagrees and held that it was actually the CA which first reexamined the case at bar affirming the decision of the OP (which set aside the HLURB ruling). The authority of HLURB is subordinate to that of OP and acts of the former may be set aside by the latter. o While the courts would not interfere in matters addressed to sound discretion of government agencies, it should be noted that HLURB and MMC were both task to regulate rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area. o The Municipality of Muntinlupa submitted resolution 94-179 to both HLURB and MMC for their appropriate action. The MMC approved the resolution while HLURB disapproved it. o However SC gave weight more to the approval by MMC because it was MMC itself which issued the Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of Metropolitan Manila Area (the same reason why HLURB denied it claiming violation thereof by the Municipality). Hence from the foregoing set of arguments the ordinance is for the correction of error and is not invalidated by lack of notice and hearing as AAVA contends.

What then would be the effect of the ordinance at hand to the deed of restrictions imposed on the lot? – Harmonization of interests and reconciling the rights affected – HENCE no removal of the Deed of Restriction placed upon the said lot.

1 Ortigas v Feati Bank - A certain lot was restricted to residential purposes as contained in the Deeds of Sale. Feati Bank acquired said properties. The Municipality of Mandaluyong then passed a resolution declaring said area to be an industrial and commercial zone, thus Feati Bank tried to build commercial bank building on that lot.

Petitioners TLC and Sps Alfonso insist on the application of Ortigas v Feati1. Applying in this case, the petitioner TLC and sps Alfonso insist that the reclassification of properties is a valid exercise of Police power with which contractual obligations should be reconciled. AAVA on the other hand counters and claims that although the exercise of PP is valid, it does not automatically negate other legal relationships in existence because the better policy would be to reconcile the conflicting rights. o SC in this instant agrees with AAVA because the documents yields the conclusion that there is a way to harmonize the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions and the Zoning Ordinance. o Though the subject lot was declared as institutional, it nevertheless lies WITHIN A RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISION and surrounded by RESIDENTIAL LOTS. As opposed to the Ortigas case, there is no radical change in zoning because the area remained purely residential. In fact the lot occupied by TLC is still located along the smaller roads (less than 8 meters in width), hence the restriction by the developer to mere preparatory school. The Municipality on this instance did not have any special justification for declaring the lot as institutional property, hence it was not asserting any interest contrary to that of the subdivision developer. SC reconciled the rights of the herein parties upholding in turn the DEED OF RESTRICTION thus disallowing further enrolment of Grade School students, but allowing the present grade school students to continue until their graduation to Grade 7.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION Petition Partially Granted (1) the two-classroom restriction is deleted, and (2) the current students of the School of the Holy Cross, the Learning Child Schools grade school department, be allowed to finish their elementary studies in said school up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The enrollment of new students to the grade school shall no longer be permitted. OTHER NOTES  Estoppel was claimed by TLC and sps wherein AAVA allegedly abrogated restrictions by their own acts. SC rejected argument since they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence of facts surrounding said estoppel and the circumstances surrounding the case shows otherwise that there was in fact no intention to abrogate the deed of restrictions  (NOTES) Following the above case, an LGU has the power to reclassify land within its jurisdiction as exemplified by the Ortigas v Feati case where a reclassification was done as a valid exercise of Police Power. In the present case the reclassification was done by the submission of the Municipality a resolution to both HLURB and MMC for their appropriate action respecting their function as the agency having the power to evaluate, approve, or disapprove zoning ordinance.

DIGESTER: Dino De Guzman

SC upheld the ordinance as being passed in the exercise of police power, valid for being reasonable and being a reasonable response to public need

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