Chinese Lifeweek Magazine

Chinese Lifeweek Magazine Interview with David Shinn East Africa and the Horn 1 November 2009 Question: You studied East Africa when you were a student at George Washington University. Your career as a professional diplomat is also related to East African countries such as Ethiopia and Somalia. Why did you take an interest in these countries and continue the interest throughout your career? Answer: You are correct. While obtaining a Master’s degree at George Washington University in the early 1960s, I studied African affairs and wrote my final thesis on the Pan-Somali movement. To some extent, I was encouraged by university professors to focus on Africa and particularly Somalia. At the same time, I was preparing to join the U.S. Foreign Service and concluded that Africa was a part of the world that was not well understood in the Department of State in the 1960s. It seemed like an ideal career opportunity to get in on the ground floor by having an academic background on Africa. I also concluded that Africa is a fascinating continent. Question: Have you been to Somalia before 1991? If so, could you tell us something about your trip? What was your impression of Somalia? What was Somalia like before 1991? Answer: Early in my Foreign Service career, from 1969 to 1971, I was the State Department desk officer in Washington for Somalia and Djibouti and the assistant desk officer for Ethiopia. I made my first trip to the region—Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia— in 1970. Siad Barre had seized power in Somalia in a military coup in the fall of 1969, soon after I became desk officer. Somalia went from nine years of democratic government since its independence in 1960 to a dictatorship soon after Siad Barre seized power. Nevertheless, my recollections from that first visit are entirely positive. I visited Mogadishu and several locations outside the capital in addition to the northern city of Hargeisa, where the United States had a consulate. Somalia was a relatively prosperous and peaceful country at that time. The capital, Mogadishu, which today is largely destroyed, was attractive and had a special charm. This trip also allowed me to take the train from Djibouti to Addis Ababa on the narrow gauge railway built at the beginning of the 20th century and to visit parts of Ethiopia. Question: When you where the Deputy Director of the Somali Task Force and Coordinator for Somalia in 1992 and 1993, what problems in Somalia did you face? What tasks were on the agenda? What’s your observation of Somali society at that time? What things did you do when you held this post? What were some of the important decisions that you were involved in on behalf of the U.S. government?

2 Answer: The United States, the United Nations and the international community faced three major issues during this period. First, was the need to end the Somali famine, which was the reason the international community intervened in Somalia. The international community was successful in achieving that goal. Second, was the need to impose security over a country that had no government and was under the control of various war lords. The international community succeeded briefly in this effort and then lost control of the situation. Third, there was the goal of nation building in Somalia and helping Somalis to rejoin the community of nations. This effort failed. By late 1992, Somali society had begun to disintegrate. The national government had disappeared. War lords were replacing elders and clan leaders. Individual militias were controlling various parts of the country. Government services had largely broken down. My task was to coordinate actions concerning Somalia within the State Department and to serve as the State Department liaison person with other agencies such as the National Security Council, Department of Defense and U.S. Agency for International Development. My most important role was to support the State Department presence in Somalia, ensure that the most senior officials in the State Department received regular briefings on the situation in Somalia, brief Congressional committees on Somalia and make recommendations for resolving new problems that arose. In July 1993, I led an interagency team to Somalia that had responsibility for reviewing U.S. policy there and making recommendations for possible changes. Question: You were ambassador to Ethiopia from 1996 to 1999 and served earlier as a political officer at the American embassy in Kenya. What did decision makers think at the time? What were the most important events and moments? How were you involved? How has the situation in Somalia changed? Could you tell us your stories with an insider’s view as an ambassador in Ethiopia? Answer: Let me turn first to Kenya, where I served at the U.S. embassy during 19661967. At the time, Somalia pursued a pan-Somali policy, which was an effort to unite with Somalia those Somalis who lived across the border in neighboring Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. This policy envisaged incorporating territory from these three countries and making it part of Somalia. The leaders, not surprisingly, of these three countries opposed this goal. There were periodic conflicts, especially with Kenya and Ethiopia. This situation had quieted down by the time I arrived in Kenya, but it was still a contentious issue. Relations between Kenya and Somalia were not good at the time. During my time in Ethiopia from 1996 to 1999, Somalia had no national government and it was not in a position to challenge the government of Ethiopia in those parts of the country inhabited by Somalis. There was an Islamic extremist organization, al-Ittihad al-Islami, based in Somalia that conducted a few attacks inside Ethiopia, including one attempt to assassinate in Addis Ababa the Ethiopian minister of communications, an ethnic Somali, who was severely injured. During these years, Ethiopia was primarily concerned with isolating Somali dissident activity inside Somalia so that it would not spread into neighboring Ethiopia. To achieve this purpose, Ethiopian troops occasionally crossed the border into Somalia to neutralize suspected opposition elements.

3 Question: During your stay in East Africa, you must have become acquainted with many Somali politicians, businessmen, war lords and local people. What do they believe? How do they think and behave? Could you tell us two or three stories about your acquaintances with Somali people that have impressed you most? What is the unique culture that defines their way of social networking and behavior? Answer: Somalis are a highly individualistic people. One of the earliest pieces of advice I received concerning the Somali approach to diplomacy is that every Somali sees himself as his own minister of foreign affairs. I found that to be useful guidance. At the same time, Somalis have very close attachments to their clans, sub-clans, sub-sub-clans and extended family. With the passage of time, there has been some weakening of clan ties, but it remains an important part of Somali society. Based on my contact with many Somalis over the years, they are also a highly nationalistic people. Although clan distinctions remain important, they ultimately think of themselves, wherever they live, as Somalis. Somalis are incredibly entrepreneurial. They are excellent business persons. In that sense, they have something in common with Chinese. They know how to drive a good bargain and establish a successful business. This applies to both men and women. At the same time, many Somalis have adopted the harmful practice of chewing chat (also known as khat or qat), an addictive stimulant grown in the highlands of Kenya and Ethiopia that produces amphetamine-like effects. Somalis usually chew the fresh green leaves of the plant while talking endlessly with friends. The chewing of chat consumes an enormous amount of time and reduces productivity. After-effects include lack of concentration, numbness and insomnia. Somalis who live in rural parts of the Horn of Africa are exceptionally hospitable towards visitors who bear them no harm. Their way of live is pastoral. The weather is often harsh. Their very existence is difficult. Yet, they are unusually sharing with visitors even when they have little themselves. Question: Based on your observation and experiences, why and how do war lords and religious organizations take power in Somali society, mobilize and organize people, especially in rural Somalia? Answer: War lords and extremist religious groups are a relatively new phenomenon in Somalia, although there are some similarities with the political activities of Muhammad Abdille Hassan, better known in the West as the “Mad Mullah,” who dates back to the early part of the 20th century. Sayyid, as he is called by most Somalis, received fundamentalist Islamic training in Saudi Arabia and fought the imposition of foreign values in northern Somalia. Most of the recent extremist groups arose after the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. Initially, the war lords were the greatest threat to Somali society and the obstacle to the reconstruction of a national Somali government. An extremist Islamic group, alIttihad al-Islami, also posed a threat until it disappeared a number of years ago. More recently, zealous Islamic groups such as al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam pose the greatest challenge to the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). They want a religious state under a strict interpretation of Islam. This runs counter to the traditional Sufi Islam

4 that has long predominated in the country. The coming months and years will determine the outcome of this fundamentalist Islamic challenge. Question: After 1991, former soldiers were forced to go back home. What happened to them? Do they form the backbone of the war lords, local government, fishermen and arms dealers? Could you tell us from your observation and experience how piracy is organized and thrives? Answer: As is the case throughout Somalia since the collapse of the government in 1991, the former soldiers can be found in all walks of life. Some became war lords or joined war lord militias. Others became businessmen. Some are now living outside Somalia in the diaspora while still others are part of the TFG. They are just trying to make a living like any other Somali. Somali pirates are an interesting collection of people who are examples of Somali entrepreneurialism, albeit criminal entrepreneurialism. Most of the Somalis who attack ships in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean are young, unemployed men attracted by quick ransom profits. There is almost no work for them in Somalia. Some are former fishermen who were unable to compete with foreign fishing vessels engaged illegally off Somali shores. Most are not; they just see piracy as a way to make a lot of money. The pirate masters who organize the attacks remain on land and do not take the risk of attacking foreign vessels in the open ocean. They take most of the ransom profits at little risk to themselves. Then there are the providers of information on ship movements, ransom negotiators and money handlers who live in foreign countries. They probably make most of the money from the ransom payments. War lords, extremist organizations and even local government officials may also benefit from the ransom money occasionally, but piracy is essentially a criminal business with a profit motive. Question: How did the former Somali central government manage to protect and control the coastline? How did the coastline gradually become lawless and chaotic? Answer: Until 1991, Somalia had a central government in control of the land and a small navy and coast guard capable of patrolling Somali waters. When the government collapsed, the navy and coast guard also ceased to exist. As the economy deteriorated, unemployment rose. Somalis became increasingly desperate. A small number of Somalis, especially along the coast of Puntland, learned they could make a lot of money by seizing foreign vessels and demanding ransom for the release of the ships and their crew. Although this has been a problem for many years, it became especially serious in 2007 and has worsened every year since then. A successful pirate attack now results in an average ransom payment of about $2 million. That is an enormous amount of money even when it is divided among all the intermediaries involved in release of a ship and its crew. Until a Somali government regains control of the country, this problem will not end. Ship owners can take better measures to prevent pirate attacks. International naval vessels, including those from China, that patrol pirate-invested waters can reduce the number of pirate attacks. These measures can not, however, stop Somali piracy.