Sub-saharan Africa By David Shinn (published By Elliott School Of International Affairs, Gw, 2004)

Sub-Saharan Africa David H. Shinn Low Foreign Policy Priority for Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) consistently has been at the bottom of U.S. geographical foreign policy priorities during conservative and liberal administrations. The fact that almost 13 percent of Americans trace their origin to Africa has had only a modest impact on the importance the United States attaches to SSA. In recent years, even the liberal Black Caucus has not collectively been significantly engaged on African issues. Having made this point, however, one can legitimately ask from the optic of American interests if any other region should have a lower priority than SSA. It is highly unlikely that U.S. interests in other world regions will fall below those of SSA in the foreseeable future. This section considers the 48 countries of SSA, i.e., the African continent and offshore islands, excluding the five countries in North Africa that border the Mediterranean. One

factor could change the equation: SSA’s growing importance as a source of American oil imports. SSA currently provides 15 percent of U.S. oil imports, and this figure is expected to rise to 25 percent in 10 years. More Similarities Than Differences in Conservative and Liberal Strategies Liberals and conservatives both want to engage in Africa. But they want to do so at least cost. Since the end of World War II conservative and liberal administrations have not differed dramatically in their approach to Africa. There have been a few exceptions to this generalization. Conservatives were more willing during the Cold War to support white minority regimes in southern Africa and to take a more hostile approach toward left-leaning governments. Liberals had a greater tendency to attack poverty by use of foreign aid, while conservatives were more comfortable with a focus on trade and private investment. Some of these differences are addressed in the sections below. Nevertheless, the fact remains that there are more policy similarities than differences when an administration changes from conservative to liberal or vice versa. Part of the explanation for this is the low priority that both groups attach to SSA and the larger role that career bureaucrats play in the SSA policy process. Conflict, Security, and Peacekeeping Conflicts have crippled Africa. Since the 1960s some 30 conflicts have claimed about 7 million lives and cost $250 billion. There are currently six U.N. peacekeeping missions in SSA—Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, and Sierra Leone. While there is positive movement in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the others present major challenges. In the meantime, a new crisis in Darfur threatens to overwhelm the peace process aimed at ending the civil war in Sudan. Conservatives and liberals acknowledge the problem of conflict. But ever since the 1992 U.S. military intervention in Somalia by a Republican administration and eventual pullout in 1994 by a Democratic administration, there has been a great reluctance by both liberals and conservatives to send American troops to Africa to deal with conflict situations. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda cried out for the use of Western, including American, forces. The Clinton administration refused and later apologized. There was an occasion during the Bush II administration when many believed U.S. troops should help end conflict in Liberia, the SSA country with historically the closest ties to the United States. American forces remained off shore from the capital city except for a brief landing primarily to secure the American Embassy. The Clinton administration initiated the African Crisis Response Initiative to train African soldiers and provide them with equipment for improving their indigenous peacekeeping capabilities. The Bush administration modified this initiative and renamed it the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program. In both cases, the goal was to assist African security needs without committing American troops. This continues to be the goal of liberals and conservatives. Both groups favor the expansion of training programs for select African armies, particularly if other Western countries are willing to

pay much of the cost. Liberals and conservatives support creation of an African 15,000-strong standby force, a proposal encouraged by the African Union (AU). They also agree on the need to work closely with the AU and subregional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the Southern African Development Community. The problems in Liberia have lessened but not gone away. As the principal Western proponent of the Sudan peace process, the United States will shirk its responsibility if it does not provide financing and personnel for security during the implementation phase, which has become more problematic because of the situation in Darfur. Other countries like France and the United Kingdom have appropriately taken the lead in conflicted countries such as Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Côte d’Ivoire. In order to enhance the prospect for success, outside peacekeepers will need to work closely with African forces. Perhaps the major difference in the agendas of liberals and conservatives is a somewhat greater willingness by liberals to engage in conflict situations in SSA because of the catastrophe in Rwanda that occurred on their watch. Liberals are also more likely to ensure that pledged resources survive the congressional authorization process. They may be more inclined to commit time and resources to conflict prevention efforts such as helping to avoid a water war among Nile Basin countries and to work with the African Union and African regional organizations. American Aid to SSA There are notable differences between liberals and conservatives in foreign assistance strategies toward SSA. In light of disappointing results of past aid, both liberals and conservatives have been stingy in providing development assistance as opposed to food aid and occasional special initiatives like HIV/AIDS prevention. The United States spends about $450 billion per year on the military and only $15 billion worldwide on development assistance. About $2 billion in development aid goes to SSA annually. Conservatives believe that trade and private investment are the keys to development and tend to remain skeptical about aid. Nevertheless, under pressure to respond to the growing public awareness of the plight of SSA, the Bush administration launched with bipartisan support the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) on top of the regular USAID development budget. Conservatives tend to prefer more conditionality. The MCA, which the Bush administration projects will provide an additional $5 billion annually worldwide by 2006, sets rigorous country selection criteria for development assistance. It evaluates governments on the quality of their economic policies, the level of their investments in education and health, and the legitimacy and functionality of their national institutions. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, in its first round of selection, identified 16 qualifying countries worldwide in 2004, half of which are in SSA. Most of them, e.g., Benin, Cape Verde, Lesotho, and Mali, have small populations and constitute relative development success stories. As a result, the MCA concept excludes the weak and failed states in SSA that pose the greatest threat to stability and security, although regular USAID assistance will be available for some of them. Liberals, by contrast, are more willing to fund programs that attack poverty with fewer conditions and to funnel more

assistance through international financial institutions such as the World Bank. Africans have taken some initiatives. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) recognizes, like the MCA, that Africa must establish peace, embrace good governance, and undertake policy reform. African governments that agree to the NEPAD guidelines undergo peer review to ensure that they comply. Unlike the MCA, which rewards countries that have already complied with requirements, the NEPAD anticipates that donors will provide assistance first, followed by compliance and then certification by peers. Based on the same principle of country selectivity as the MCA, the NEPAD is the obverse of the MCA in terms of the timing of foreign aid. Conservatives give lip service to the NEPAD but clearly intend to focus incremental American aid in the MCA. Liberals are more willing to accept the NEPAD at face value because it reflects a regional initiative and may permit aid to go to additional needy countries in SSA that have not met the strict MCA conditions and may never be able to meet them. Neither the MCA nor the NEPAD is, however, a solution to SSA’s foreign assistance needs. Only eight SSA countries have qualified so far for the MCA; only 16 have agreed to meet the NEPAD standards. Trade and Private Investment Conservatives view increased trade and foreign investment as the key to Africa’s development. Liberals also support trade and investment but tend to see them as supplements to grants and loans. The problem is that SSA accounts for only 1 percent of world economic activity and just over 1 percent of global trade. Many countries are still dependent on the export of one crop. Except for South Africa and oil- and mineral-producing countries like Nigeria and Angola, foreign investment, especially from the United States, has been disappointing. Conflict, poor governance, and corruption severely restrain trade and investment in many SSA countries. Africa receives only about 7 percent of foreign direct investment going to all developing countries. The concept of achieving development through trade and investment is a good one, but it has not yet produced the benefits touted by its proponents. The elimination of American and European agricultural subsidies could lead to significantly increased imports from SSA. The United States, for example, is moving toward the reduction of export subsidies on cotton, while the European Commission has pledged to lower by one-third its guaranteed price for sugar and reduce its sugar production quotas by 16 percent. U.S. action on cotton should benefit African cotton producers across the board. EC changes on sugar will benefit some African sugar producers but may adversely affect countries like Tanzania and Mauritius that export raw sugar to Europe under the current system. A bipartisan congressional group initiated and passed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which is designed to stimulate trade for African businesses by allowing products from beneficiary countries to enter the United States duty free. The Clinton administration eventually embraced and signed the legislation in 2000. The Bush administration made it a centerpiece of its Africa policy and worked hard to extend AGOA to 2015. Thirty-seven African countries are eligible for AGOA benefits. Although there has been a modest increase in African exports to the United States attributable to AGOA,

it has not transformed SSA’s foreign exchange situation. A liberal strategy is conflicted between protecting American jobs and allowing more duty-free imports, especially textiles, from SSA. A conservative strategy is more supportive of the Doha Round of trade talks. HIV/AIDS Of the world’s 25 most HIV/AIDS-affected countries, 24 are in SSA. Both liberals and conservatives agree on the need to attack the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The Clinton administration was the first to increase significantly HIV/AIDS assistance to SSA. Conservatives do not have a track record for supporting large social programs in SSA. To the surprise of many, the Bush administration raised ($15 billion over five years) the assistance level much higher and made this a key part of its Africa policy. Bush also expanded the campaign to include malaria and tuberculosis. Although both groups are prepared to devote substantial resources to this issue, there are differences in approach. Conservatives prefer a focus on abstinence, working with faith-based organizations, restricting anti-retroviral medication to brand names, and controlling the funding directly. Liberals are prepared to allow U.S. funding to be used in a wider variety of ways deemed appropriate by implementing organizations and support the use of cheaper generic anti-retroviral drugs. They also want to funnel a higher proportion of U.S. aid through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and allow funds to be linked to family planning programs. Liberal and conservative goals are the same; the ways to achieve them are quite different. Counterterrorism There is a growing realization that SSA, where al-Qaeda destroyed the American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998, is the world’s “soft underbelly” for global terrorism. Conservatives and liberals agree on the need to confront this threat. There are, however, nuanced differences in their approach to the problem. The Clinton administration focused on improving embassy physical security and removing the terrorist threat from Sudan. After 9/11 the Bush administration established a counterterrorist base in Djibouti, the only U.S. military installation in SSA. The 1,800 personnel provide training to governments in East Africa, the Horn, and Yemen and monitor terrorist activity in the region. The Bush administration also cobbled together a $100 million East African Counterterrorism Initiative and a modest Pan-Sahel Initiative for countering terrorism. Bush has been reluctant, however, to deal with some of the closely related factors, especially poverty and social and economic inequality, that provide a receptive environment for terrorists. Liberal counterterrorist policy in SSA gives greater attention to improving economic and social conditions in SSA. Liberals may also increase counterterrorism assistance to SSA and expand outreach to marginalized Islamic communities there. Food Security and Famine

Liberals and conservatives are unanimous in their willingness to respond generously to drought and famine in SSA. There is a long history for this policy, which also has strong support among American farmers who see the U.S. government as a major buyer of their surplus grain and vegetable oil. The Bush administration underscored its commitment to this policy at the last G-8 meeting when it announced three new food security programs. If not managed carefully, however, these programs can undercut African agriculture. Debt Relief SSA remains burdened by about $33 billion in foreign debt, most of it with international financial institutions, where the United States has considerable influence. Conservative and liberal strategies understand the need to lessen SSA debt. Both groups support the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative that helps countries achieve sustainable development and debt levels. Liberal and conservative administrations have worked hard to reduce and even forgive debt for the poorest countries. Both also agree on the need to provide new assistance in the form of grants rather than loans to especially poor countries. Liberals are inclined to make somewhat more SSA countries eligible for debt relief and may be prepared to take a stronger stand in the World Bank and IMF on decreasing debt. Democratization and Human Rights There are two policy considerations here—rhetorical support for the development of democratic societies and tangible assistance to achieve this goal. Conservatives and liberals are equally strong in their rhetorical desire to see democracy thrive in SSA. Both also claim to offer strong tangible support to help SSA societies establish democracies. The National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute have modest programs, but neither liberals nor conservatives have provided significant assistance. Liberal strategies tend to be more forthcoming than conservative ones. Current policy statements by liberals suggest assistance may increase for encouraging democracy. Both liberals and conservatives also profess strong support for good human rights practices in SSA. At the same time, both are quick to look the other way when oil, counterterrorism, and other important U.S. interests loom larger. Historically, liberals have taken the issue more seriously than conservatives, but the actual differences occur only on the margins. Petroleum Oil has become an increasingly important part of the relationship, especially as an alternative to imports from the Middle East. SSA is expected to add 2.5 to 3 million barrels a day to world markets in the next seven to 10 years. Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon are especially important sources of American imports. The Bush administration is also focusing attention on Congo-Brazzaville, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea as sources of supply. As in other parts of the world, oil has been a mixed blessing. It has led to significant corruption in countries like Nigeria and Angola and contributed to the fueling of civil wars in Sudan and Angola. A conservative strategy attaches greater security significance to SSA as a source for oil. A liberal strategy is being forced to do so in spite

of the fact that most of the oil-producing states have poor records on transparency, human rights, and democracy. Environment Liberals and conservatives give lip service to aiding the environment in SSA, and there is growing congressional interest in supporting African conservation. Inevitably, however, limited American resources and higher priorities limit the U.S. contribution to relatively small programs. The two key environmental programs during the Bush administration are modest—the Congo Basin Forest Partnership and the West Africa Water Initiative. The liberal strategy suggests it is more willing to support environmental projects, especially efforts to reduce greenhouse gases. As in the past, major environmental initiatives in SSA will encounter the reality of limited resources and higher priorities.

Latin America Cynthia McClintock

Latin America is not at the forefront of the war against terrorism, and the challenges for the next administration in Latin America are not as pressing as in the regional theaters of this war. However, Latin America does present challenges to the United States. Especially because of the proximity of the region, it is vital that Latin America remain a region where fundamentalist terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda are inactive. As elsewhere, the challenges of promoting democracy and fostering economic development are important both toward this security objective and in their own right. Further, largely because of its proximity to the United States, Latin America poses other important