China's Sco Strategy

journalofIPS/spring2006/Sznajder_SCO

China’s Shanghai

ARIEL PABLO SZNAJDER

Cooperation Organization Strategy China’s strategy for establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is pragmatic and far-sighted. Resolving border issues, trade, trust and mutual security with neighboring states is geopolitically sound. The SCO has the opportunity to expand its scope, restore political stability to the organization and act on global issues. China’s success in creating a positive public image of the SCO, maintaining stability in Xinjiang, Tibet and member states of the SCO, preserving close ties with Russia and promoting cultural exchange and trade will safeguard China’s leadership of the SCO. The SCO has been labeled “antiwestern” and “shadowy” in the press, but SCO policies regarding fighting “three fundamental evils of terrorism, extremism and separatism,” are consistent with US and European ideology. China and the SCO must be transparent with journalists to ensure their organization is portrayed accurately. China also has to step in and make strong policy decisions, working in concert with the SCO instead of working through the organization as a proxy. By working in concert, I mean synergizing. By saying China should not use SCO as proxy, I mean that China, with the backing of SCO states, should make strong policy statements and defend nuclear cooperation with Russia and other states. The SCO’s purpose is not purely to further China’s hegemony, but it is a vehicle for China to do that. If the SCO is for one thing, it is to strengthen

Editor: Andrés Gentry

cooperation with states to become an economic, political and security bloc that can tip the global balance of power. China will be treated as a world power by developed countries when it acts like a strong country with the backing of strong coalitions and exudes hegemony. China has been having joint antiterrorism military exercises with SCO members as well as India, Pakistan, UK and France since 2002.1 As one native regional expert articulated, given Central Asia’s rich strategic and physical resources, “one can expect potential clashes of global interests of great powers for domination of the region.”2 Strengthening Borders and Surrounding Xinjiang Province

Stability

Historically, unsettled border regions have led to regional disputes. The unresolved status of national demarcation lines has led to war in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as between Macedonia and Greece, South Ossetia in Georgia and Transdneister in Moldova. The SCO has settled most border disputes between the Russian Federation, China and the Central Asian states. The Tajikistan-China border is an exception. China has been successful in persuading SCO member-states to restrict the activities of the Uighur population living within their borders. Countries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and even Turkey have disbanded several Uighur political parties and restricted

Spring 2006 | Volume 5

93

journalofIPS/spring2006/Sznajder_SCO

their ability to assemble.3 infrequently but not unnoticed, Uyghurs The current reduced militarization from China's Xinjiang province.” Islamic of borders has allowed member states to groups in Xinjiang have allegedly received commit troops elsewhere. This “good support for education and religious neighbor strategy” engages Central Asia organization from the Afghan Taliban, the in international issues involving China, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), thereby extending China’s influence and the Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan beyond the region: it extends China’s These groups believe in pan-islamism and influence outside Asia on international a militant return to a caliphate and issues so that China can take a strong Islamic society.5 stance on issues such as not adding new There have been sporadic market countries to the UN Security Council. The bombings in Urumqi and Kashgar since SCO can act as a substantial voting bloc if 1970, and the Chinese Embassy in members agree on UN Security Council Ankara, Turkey, was attacked in 1997. resolutions The nonand WTO violent treaties. struggle of The SCO can act as a substantial voting Strengthened Kurash bloc if members agree on UN Security communicatio Sultan, a Council resolutions and WTO treaties. n will benefit Uighur all members in separatist Strengthened communication will benefit international musician in all members in international forums. forums. exile in Clearly Sweden, has delineated the potential to become a “cause-celebre” because of borders with neighboring states will recent increased media coverage in undermine Uighur hopes for an October 2005 in the New Internationalist independent East Turkestan and cut off Far Eastern Economic magazine,6 links with international Islamists. Review,7 Washington Times, Freemuse Because of the Uighurs currently under online magazine, and a number of CSIS detention in Guantanamo Bay, there has policy briefs. This undermines China’s been more sympathy in the Islamic world image in Europe. for them and more funding from Saudi China and Russia have determined Arabia for Islamic education. Evidence (like the US in Afghanistan) that it is also exists of Uighur mujahadeen fighting better to fight Islamists in Central Asia with the Taliban in Afghanistan, up to than within their own national borders. one hundred Uighur fighters may have China has made strong demands for the been aiding the Taliban at the time of the extradition of any wanted Uighur U.S. invasion, with another thousand nationalists who escape into neighboring militants from Xinjiang attending Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. China will be training camps in Afghanistan.4 “Although the biggest names and able to better maintain stability and largest percentage of captured Al Qaeda economic prosperity in Xinjiang with a members continue to be primarily of strong coalition of stable SCO neighboring Middle Eastern or South Asian origin, states. every now and then reports mention The Tarim basin in Xinjiang other, more exotic figures in the mix of province is believed to hold immense captured and killed: Chechens from the untapped oil reserves. Three quarters of Caucuses, Uzbeks, Filipino Moros, and, China's mineral wealth is concentrated in

Spring 2006 | Volume 5

94

journalofIPS/spring2006/Sznajder_SCO

Xinjiang province.8 The cities of Turpan and Jungar overlooking the basin are of great strategic importance for energy security in China. Russia has been dealing with an Islamic separatist war in Chechnya for decades, but China has not suffered this scale of combat in Xinjiang. The SCO has planned a regional antiterrorism center in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, to pool the intelligence operations of each member country and maintain a standing rapid deployment force of Russian and Chinese troops and a Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. But, a pro-US Bishkek would do less to help China root out Uighur separatists. The US only recognizes one out of four separatist groups in Xinjiang as “terrorist groups.”9 Stability is threatened by violent repression of demonstrations in Uzbekistan, revolutions in Kyrgyzstan and porous borders throughout the region. Instability in Central Asia and the Color Revolutions Political instability in Uzbekistan must be confronted by the SCO through a multinational agreed-upon policy of giving concessions, coordination of immediate responses to violence and allowing limited autonomy to disenfranchised groups. China’s pragmatic approach to finding resolutions within SCO states aims to contain violent or disruptive activity within those states where there is a detailed procedure for managing instability. When unrest is not dealt with rapidly with minimal force and moves outside of SCO jurisdiction or attracts international scrutiny, then it must be dealt with on a case by case basis and is detrimental to the international relations of the SCO. Islamic states, Europe and the US have criticized President Islam Karimov's brutal repression of Islamic and democracy activists. On May 13, 2005,

Uzbek troops fired into a crowd of protesters, killing an estimated 400 to 1000 people in what has been termed the Andijan massacre. Violent disturbances subsequently spread to a number of other cities in the region. Although there was potential for this to spread to surrounding countries, there was no evidence of SCO intervention. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the unrest was an "internal affair.” The Uzbek authority’s handling of Andijan met with fierce criticism and an investigation into the matter was organized. Several European nations refused to participate in this questionable, Uzbekistan-sponsored "international" investigation that included Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), China, Iran, India and Pakistan.10 After the US called for a truly independent international investigation, the Government of Uzbekistan placed restrictions on the operation of the U.S. base in Karshi-Khanabad. When the US participated in the international effort to relocate over 400 Andijan refugees from neighboring Kyrgyzstan (where they were constantly under threat of illegal extradition to Uzbekistan) to third countries (initially Romania), the Government of Uzbekistan ordered the Karshi-Khanabad base to be closed within six months. This iron-fisted reaction raises the question as to whether the SCO and Karimov came to this outcome together. The US wasted hard-earned diplomatic and political capital by trying to fight this unnecessary battle whose costs outweighed its benefits. I argue that it was not worth the cost, especially since the encouragement of greater transparency and democracy was not successful. This is my opinion, but in Uzbekistan it seemed to be a lose-lose situation because the NGOs can no longer operate there, democracy training was not effective and US lost a base. NATO will soon lose its bases as well. Pressuring

Spring 2006 | Volume 5

95

journalofIPS/spring2006/Sznajder_SCO

Karimov does not appear to have further promoted democracy within Uzbekistan. The closure of the US air force base in Karshi-Khanabad was a major victory for the SCO in reducing the US military presence in Central Asia. The closure coincided with SCO’s call to set a timetable for the US military withdrawal from Central Asia. “US experts suspect that Moscow and Beijing exerted pressure on both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to close US military facilities in the respective countries. Karimov obliged, while President Kurmanbek Bakiyev's administration in Kyrgyzstan said that American forces could stay at the Manas air base as long as the Islamic radical threat remains in Afghanistan.”11 This set the stage for the Astana Summit in July 2005 where the US was urged to set a timetable for withdrawing troops from member states. “For authoritarian states like Uzbekistan, closer ties with China present one great advantage; unlike the US, Beijing does not pressure its allies to democratize or liberalize their markets.”12 Russia and China do not oppose the severe domestic policies of Uzbekistan or SCO member nations which severely repress religious and political opposition movements. China’s response to the Andijan massacre was to extend Karimov a $600 million natural-gas development contract13 and a ceremonious welcome to China to show support for his maintenance of stability. Although this strategy is working in Uzbekistan, it has failed in Serbia and Kygyzstan. Personal ties between the Chinese government and unpopular leaders such as Slodoban Milosevic of Serbia and Askar Akayev of Kygyzstan have led to the waste of China’s financial and diplomatic capital after these leaders’ political downfalls. The removal of Askar Akayev from power in Kyrgyzstan during the Tulip Revolution in April 2005 was a loss of face for the SCO because of the time they had

spent endorsing and engaging Akayev’s government and the inability to maintain a pro-SCO government in power in a crucial Chinese border state where a US base is less than 200 miles from the Chinese border. The revolution was sparked in Osh and Jalal-abad by a law that placed new restrictions on trade, making it illegal for traders to use intermediaries or middle-men, as well as by corruption, the economic hardships in the coal mining industry, and unfinished office flats in Bishkek built for expected economic growth that did not materialize.14 The government stated this legislation would keep prices down, but many feared that tens of thousands of businesses would collapse. Thousands of protestors went to the streets and called for Akayev’s resignation. When Akayev resigned from the Kyrgyzstan Embassy in Moscow, SCO suffered another diplomatic blow. Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing reportedly offered a selfcriticism for his poor intelligence on this sudden development.15 Kazakhstan, which is known for having progressive laws on NGO regulations compared to other Central Asian nations has recently had a spat of political killings.16 On November 13, 2005 in Almaty, Kazakhstan, a former minister in the government of President Nursultan A. Nazarbayev who had threatened to speak publicly about high-level corruption was found shot to death, according to the police and an opposition leader. The killing came three weeks before a presidential election in this oil-rich former Soviet state. The victim, Zamanbek K. Nurkadilov, 61, was a member of the leading opposition group, For a Fair Kazakhstan.17 Altynbek Sarsenbaev, CoChairman of the Kazakhstan opposition party Naghyz Ak Zhol (True Bright Path) was killed on February 13, 2006 in a politically motivated murder after he protested against Nazarbayev’s

Spring 2006 | Volume 5

96

journalofIPS/spring2006/Sznajder_SCO

authoritarian rule. According to Reuters, five members of Kazakhstan’s secret service elite Arystan unit were arrested in connection with the assassination. These activities were not condemned by China and Russia, but are creating an atmosphere of fear in Kazakhstan and proving as Yevgeny Zhovtis, Director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law says, “Killing is no longer taboo”18 and that Nazarbayev is unable to control infighting, corruption and assassinations by officials in his government. Political apathy and a growing economy are pivotal in keeping Nazarbayev in power. When US Vice President Richard Cheney visited Kazakhstan on May 5-6, 2006 and made a US$158 million investment for national nuclear nonproliferation, energy and business projects, he did not stress democratic reform and spoke highly about the Kazakh government’s newly established Commission on Democracy.19 Cheney did not call for democratic reform in Kazakhstan although he emphasized it in every other country he visited in his Eastern European visits after blasting Russia for using its energy resources to manipulate countries and being 20 Kazakhstan is undemocratic. strategically important as a non-OPEC state that is increasing oil production over the next ten years. Kazakhstan is gaining leverage and its status as an SCO member is boosting its status. In addition, being the only Central Asian country to have committed troops in Iraq it has close ties with the US. Mr. Zhovtis says the Kazakh government has grown impatient with what it sees as the Soros Foundation's interference in the political affairs of postSoviet countries. According to Wikipedia, Zhovtis believes the Soros FoundationKazakhstan might follow the fate of the Open Society Institute (OSI) in Uzbekistan. China and Russia became

especially suspicious of NGO and foreign government involvement in the color revolutions.21 Following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in November 2004, several Central Asian nations took action against the OSI. Uzbekistan closed OSI regional offices, while Tajik state-controlled media have accused OSI-Tajikistan of corruption and nepotism.22 Evidence suggests US government involvement in encouraging demonstrations and communication between opposition parties through the internet Freenet structure supported by USAID and the United Nations Development Program, which is known to comprise a major part of the internet structure in Kyrgyzstan. IGO and foreign government involvement in political advocacy is growing throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia.23 In April 1999, Uzbekistan established a favorable new law regulating non-governmental, noncommercial, non-profit and all legal entities that do not pursue economic gain as their main goal. Agencies such as UNDP, USAID, ICNL, OSCE and the Counterpart Consortium had been pushing for a reform in these laws by describing how NGOs can play a major role in the overarching development of a country. According to an article by Richard Remias published by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, the registration and establishment of philanthropic organizations and foreign and Uzbek-run NGOs was simplified substantially by a bill passed by the Olyi Majilis (Uzbek parliament) on April 15, 2006.24 Shortly after the Rose Revolution brought opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili to power in Georgia in late 2003, Uzbek authorities amended a law requiring all nongovernmental organizations to re-register. It is difficult to substantially improve the regulatory environment for NGOs because most SCO

Spring 2006 | Volume 5

97

journalofIPS/spring2006/Sznajder_SCO

countries have similar laws to the Sovietstyled Law on Public Associations. This law leaves undefined the authority of government bodies which may require reregistration with expansion of NGO activities and even denial of registration with an unclear means to appeal. This is similar to Russia and China’s law requiring NGO’s to be registered with a host country and the requirement that organizations have government oversight. US government agencies25 and NGO’s such as Freedom House and Internews are closely watched and face closure in Uzbekistan. Beijing is working to counter what it perceives as Washingtonfomented instability in the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. China and Russia are staunch opponents of NGOs and outside interference in the affairs of any sovereign state. The Sino-Russian Relationship The SCO has been a strong rallying point between China and Russia. Sino-Russian relations are the closest they have been since before the SinoSoviet split. China and Russia are resolving their “three fundamental obstacles” concerning the Outer Mongolia border, diplomatic relations with Vietnam and Cambodia and the Taiwan issue. China’s dismay at the breakup of the Soviet Union and the emergence of 15 republics is a large motivator for regional unity. China’s strategic partnership with Russia is based on Beijing’s desire to create a multi-polar world that synergizes with Moscow’s long-standing desire to strengthen influence over Central Asia. However, if the “pragmatic” nature of the Russian-Chinese friendship foreshadows the future of the SCO, the future is not so bright.26 In a show of sovereignty, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan all reached border agreements clearly delineating where one country ends and

the other begins with China without consulting Russia.27 If Russia feels left out and thinks that China and Central Asian states are having private conversations at the expense of Russia, there may be conflict. Russia is looking to revive military bases in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. The USA has a base in the Kyrgyz Republic and until recently in Uzbekistan and NATO has two bases in Tajikistan and one in Uzbekistan. Resource conflicts will be difficult to avert because of China and Russia’s hard stance on water issues in Central Asia. China has diverted more than 30 rivers in Xinjiang since the start of the SCO.28 Uzbekistan, courted by the US, China and Russia, has closer ties with Beijing and is suspicious of Moscow, although this is changing. On November 14, 2005 Uzbekistan and Russia signed an agreement on allied relations intended to better inter-governmental cooperation.29 Russia is concerned about illegal Chinese throughout Russia and residents30 especially concentrated in the Far East. After Russia made an oil pipeline deal with Japan that excluded China, Beijing realized that Moscow’s economic needs make it a weak partner. If Jiang Zemin was seen as proUS, Hu Jintao is viewed as pro-Russian in Beijing foreign policy circles.31 Hu is relying on Russia for diplomatic and military support against Washington’s recent “aggressive” activities in Central Asia. US troops in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic are only 200 miles from the Chinese border. Military anti-terrorism exercises with Kazakhstan and Russia have proven to be successful. Russiabased political scientist, Zhou Liang, predicts that if the US and China ever go to war over Taiwan, Russia would assist in impeding US forces stationed in Central Asia. China and Russia have done well to foster military and strategic ties with Central Asia. Developing cultural ties is also part of the SCO plan. The SCO

Spring 2006 | Volume 5

98

journalofIPS/spring2006/Sznajder_SCO

funds students from member countries to study in other member countries to promote cultural exchange. The Ministers of Culture of all SCO member nations also have periodic meetings under the Council of Heads of Governments and the Council of Heads of States. Cultural and Trade Ties China and Russia focus attention on cultural interactions with their Central Asian neighbors to promote educational exchange and emphasize similarities between the countries. China called for the six ministers of culture to meet and initiate language exchange programs.32 China has a large cultural and language barrier to overcome. Samat Smagulov, a 30-year-old construction worker in Almaty, cites a popular proverb to explain why Kazakhstan should favor Russia over China as an ally: "If the 'black' Chinese [hordes] come, the 'white' Russian will seem like your own father."33 Iran and Turkey have more ethnic, religious and cultural ties with Central Asia, but have not put Central Asia on the top of their list. According to Svante Cornell, research director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program at Uppsala University in Sweden, Turkey’s foreign policy priorities lie with the EU, the Kurds, Cyprus and Iraq. Iran’s priorities lie with the Persian Gulf states and deflecting criticism from Israel and the US. Currently, most Central Asian states are secular, which benefits cooperation with China. China’s revival of the ancient Silk Road is very attractive to Central Asia. Xinjiang has developed a comprehensive 86,000-kilometer road network, including highways linking various border 34 Kazakhstan has great gateways. petroleum potential and China is bidding for a pipeline east from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang and Shanghai. A court in Canada on 25 October approved the

purchase of oil producer PetroKazakhstan (actually a Canadian company) by China's biggest state oil company, China National Petroleum Corp. This venture will diversify China’s energy supply. Kazakhstan and China have agreed on a one billion dollar trade goal, greatly benefiting Kazakhstan’s development. In Uzbekistan, Karimov’s decision to close borders with Kyrgyzstan in 2003 devastated the local economy by preventing the importation of Chinese consumer goods.35 India as a Potential Great Power Rival While looking primarily to western neighbors, China should also look at its southwestern neighbors and not focus myopically on Central Asia. The Dalai Llama, chief leader of the separatist resistance movement of Tibet and a celebrity in the West, was granted political asylum in Dharamsala by the Indian government. India has the potential to stir up separatist conflicts in Tibet. The Free Tibet movement has many followers in Nepal, India, Bhutan, Japan, Australia, United States and Canada. Although China is winning the hegemony game in most of Southeast Asia, India is winning in Vietnam, Indonesia and most of Africa. Although China is now buying a lot of wood from and selling a lot of weapons to Indonesia, anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia happened less than two decades ago. East and Southern Africa are full of Indian business communities. Although Indian communities were forced out of Uganda in the 1970s, millions of Indians still live in Africa and some hold ministerial positions in the government, such as Dipak K.A. Patel, the Minister of Commerce in Zambia. The Chinese business community has not been able to penetrate Africa as much as India. The cultural hegemony of India through Buddhism has been

Spring 2006 | Volume 5

99

journalofIPS/spring2006/Sznajder_SCO

widespread in China and Southeast Asia instead of leading a crackdown on Islamic since it originated in the Indian extremism that might garner the support subcontinent many millennia ago. In of the US and Russia. Even without the Cambodia, many scholars of Buddhism, support of the US, China must be able to often paid for by the Indian government, make strong international still go to India to learn from the pronouncements, however controversial, birthplace and cultural home. against separatist movements, terrorism Indian student enrollment in MBA and extreme Islam when necessary to programs in the US tops Chinese defend its actions. But this must be done enrollment. Indian Institute of in a way that does not disturb trade and Technology (IIT) is one of the best diplomatic alliances. China is becoming a computer science schools in the world, different kind of world power and attracting students from around the therefore must project strength and world. China has no counterpart to IIT control to the international community in and has yet to create an answer to the a way that is different from how the high-tech capital United of Asia, States does Bangalore. this. Success for the SCO depends on China has also If farsightedness, conflict resolution with been unable to China Russia and India, growth of SCO create makes no indigenous strong membership, and the stability and innovation to the moves, there prosperity of its members. level India has is always a in the high tech possibility or other that the industries. China would be well advised SCO will end up an irrelevant not to underestimate India as a potential organization such as the CIS. CIS lost a superpower rival in the future and to lot of power when the leaders of three of include them as a permanent member in its member states (Georgia, Ukraine and the SCO. India’s historical resistance to Kyrgyzstan) were ousted during the “color alliances, as well as its recent nuclear revolutions.” Yet, if power is measured by agreements with the United States, waging war without military reprisals indicate that India is less likely to join the from sovereign states, (as Russia has done SCO, but Pakistan may be more likely. in Chechnya and the US in Iraq) then China must strive to include India in the China does have a reason to be cautious. SCO, because the strength of the SCO will This caution is working to China’s grow substantially with a major player advantage because China is developing like India. diplomacy and internal conflict management skills without the huge The Future of the SCO burden of resorting to war. The US recently snubbed Taiwanese leader Chen Success for the SCO depends on Shui-Bian by only allowing him to land farsightedness, conflict resolution with for a few hours in Alaska on the way to Russia and India, growth of SCO official visits to Latin America.36 There is an international understanding that you membership, and the stability and must ascribe to the “one-China policy” in prosperity of its members. China’s order to engage China. China is biding its policymakers are timid, preferring to deal time quite well with separatist with Uighur extremism through the SCO

Spring 2006 | Volume 5

100

journalofIPS/spring2006/Sznajder_SCO

movements, including Taiwan, while it develops it economy. Since economic development is the top priority, the Chinese government is able to develop diplomatic skills and learn how to act like a superpower without undergoing costly wars like the US, Russia have engaged in, as well as the India-Pakistan conflicts in Kashmir. The SCO will not substantially expand if it limits its scope to regional security issues and combating Islamic extremism. Uzbekistan gladly welcomed US requests to station its military forces on their soil. This lack of internal unity, compounded with its inability to mount a cohesive Afghan strategy has hurt SCO’s credibility. To the Western media, the SCO calls itself merely a law enforcement cooperation organization. Secrecy and a lack of transparency are not effective ways to market the diplomatic strength of the SCO. Although neither China nor Russia are politically open societies, the SCO must broadcast its mission more clearly and try to elevate its international status to that of NATO’s. The SCO does not have to publish every meeting or

agreement, but positive press would shed more light on the organization. Many scholars agree that Russian and Chinese, rather than Western, interests are assumed to most heavily shape Central Asia’s future.37 But the recent Western attention to Central Asia since the war in Afghanistan has shown that the region has the potential to fall into the US sphere of influence. It is in China’s interest to strengthen the SCO because China stands to gain the most from the SCO. India, China and Russia met in Vladivostok in early June 2005 to discuss a “strategic triangular relationship.” The participation of Pakistan and India in the latest SCO meeting has shown promise for the future of the organization. Xu Xiaotian of the China Institute on Contemporary International Relations and Zhao Suisheng of University of Denver agree that the SCO is the largest international security organization in existence. The future will reveal whether it can influence the world with one strong voice.

1

Xinhua News Agency “Iron Fist-2004 expands China’s Military Cooperation with foreign armed forces” 9/25/2004 2 Yom, Sean L. “Power Politics in Central Asia The Future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” 3 Kurlantzick, Joshua. "Repression and Revolt in China's Wild West" Current History Sep. 2004: 262-267. p. 265. 4 Christoffersen, Gaye. "Constituting the Uyghur in U.S.—China Relations: The Geopolitics of Identity Formation in the War on Terrorism" Strategic Insight 2 Sep. 2002 (Accessed 11/30/04). 5 Fuller, Graham E. and Jonathan Lipman. "Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland.” S. Frederick Starr, ed. New York: Central Asia Caucasus Institute, 2004. p.336. 6 http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JQP/is_383/ai_n15756291 7 http://web.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=11011 8 Rudelson, Justin J. Oasis Identities New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. p. 35. 9 East Turkestan Opposition Party, the Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan, the Organization for Turkestan Freedom, and the Organization for the Liberation of Uighurstan are active groups. According to Chien-peng Chung, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore. 10 CIS includes: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine 11 Cohen, Ariel. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6158 (Accessed 4/29/06). 12 http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/e127caba-2007-4b14-8744-0ffe06ab697a.html (11-9-2005) 13 Cohen, Ariel. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6158 (Accessed 4/29/06). 14 http://en.wikipedia.org.

Spring 2006 | Volume 5

101

journalofIPS/spring2006/Sznajder_SCO

15

http://jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=408&issue_id=3390&article_id=2369973 http://cango.net.kg/news/archive/july-30-99/a0002.asp 17 Kramer, Andrew “Ex-Kazakh Official Who Made a Threat Found Slain” New York Times International November 14, 2005 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/14/international/asia/14kazakhstan.html 18 Gorst, Isabel. “Political Rot Spreading Through Kazakhstan.” Financial Times May 4, 2006. 19 www.whitehouse.gov vice president media releases 20 Espo, David “Cheney Promotes Democratic Reform Overseas” Associated Press May 8, 2006 21 Color revolutions are the names given collectively to a series of related movements that developed in postcommunist societies in Central and Eastern Europe and are possibly spreading elsewhere including some places in the Middle East. Their participants use mostly nonviolent revolutionary change to protest against governments seen as entrenched and authoritarian, and to advocate democracy, liberalism, and national independence. They usually also adopt a specific color or flower as their symbol, and the protests are notable for the important role of NGOs and particularly student activist organizations in organizing creative nonviolent resistance. source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_revolution (11-12-2005) 22 http://www.dream.net.gr/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1372 (11-9-2005) 23 Activists from Otpor in Serbia and Pora in Ukraine have said that publications and training they received from the US based Albert Einstein Institute. 24 http://www.icnl.org/journal/vol2iss2/cr_nis.htm#UZBEKISTAN (5-5-06) 25 USAID, National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, and Freedom House 26 Hu, Richard W. X. “China’s Central Asia Policy: Making Sense of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” Central Asia at the End of the Transition ed. Boris Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, Inc. New York 2005 27 China and USSR fought a border war in 1969, yet the borders were resolved with the SCO states without military conflict. 28 Hu, Richard W. X. “China’s Central Asia Policy: Making Sense of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” Central Asia at the End of the Transition ed. Boris Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, Inc. New York 2005. 29 http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=29970 30 Estimated more than two million 31 Lam, Willy. “Hu's Central Asian Gamble To Counter The U.S. "Containment Strategy"” China Brief Volume 5, Issue 15 Jamestown Foundation Washington DC: July 05, 2005. 32 http://www.setsco.org 33 http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/e127caba-2007-4b14-8744-0ffe06ab697a.html (11-9-2005) 34 “Xinjiang Becomes Bridgehead for Trade Ties with Central Asia” (Xinhua News Agency September 23, 2005) http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/143261.htm (11/14/2005) 35 http://www.en.wikipedia.org. 36 5/6/2006 BBC Monitoring Service, UK 16

37

Yom, Sean L. “Power Politics in Central Asia The Future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”

Spring 2006 | Volume 5

102