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THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 136843. September 28, 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PEDRO ABUNGAN alias "Pedring," RANDY PASCUA and ERNESTO RAGONTON Jr., accused; PEDRO ABUNGAN alias "Pedring," appellant. RESOLUTION PANGANIBAN, J.: The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities arising from the delict or crime. Hence, the criminal case against him, not the appeal, should be dismissed. The Case and the Facts Before us is an appeal filed by Pedro Abungan assailing the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50,[2] in Criminal Case No. V-0447, in which he was convicted of murder, sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased. In an Information[3]dated March 9, 1993, Prosecutor I Benjamin R. Bautista charged appellant, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. (both at large), with murder committed as follows: "That on or about the 4th day of August 1992, at Barangay Capulaan, Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with long firearms, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Camilo Dirilo, [Sr.] y Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds on the different parts of his body x x x injuries [which] directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. "Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code."[4] With the assistance of Atty. Simplicio Sevilleja, appellant pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment on April 30, 1993.[5] After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the assailed August 24, 1998 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the [Appellant] Pedro Abungan is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and such penalties accessory thereto as may be provided for by law. The x x x [appellant] is hereby further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Camilo Dirilo Sr. in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and to pay the costs."[6] Appellant, through counsel, filed the Notice of Appeal on September 14, 1998. On January 9, 1999, he was committed to the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in Muntinlupa. On October 26, 1999, he filed the Appellant's Brief[7] before this Court. The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, submitted the Appellee's Brief[8] on February 4, 2000. The case was deemed submitted for resolution on June 5, 2000, when the Court received the Manifestation of appellant stating that he would not file a reply brief. In a letter dated August 7, 2000,[9] however, Joselito A. Fajardo, assistant director of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Appellant Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital. Attached to the letter was Abungan's Death Certificate. Issue The only issue before us is the effect of Appellant Abungan's death on the case and on the appeal. This Court's Ruling The death of appellant on July 19, 2000 during the pendency of his appeal extinguished his criminal as well as his civil liability, based solely on delict (civil liability ex delicto). Main Issue: Effect of Appellant's Death During Appeal The consequences of appellant's death are provided for in Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, which reads as follows: "Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; x x x x x x x x x" Applying this provision, the Court in People v. Bayotas[10] made the following pronouncements: "1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, 'the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.'" "2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) x x x x x x x x x e) Quasi-delicts "3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. "4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription." In the present case, it is clear that, following the above disquisition in Bayotas, the death of appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the appeal and before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. Moreover, we hold that the death of Appellant Abungan would result in the dismissal of the criminal case against him.[11] Necessarily, the lower court's Decision -- finding him guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased -- becomes ineffectual. WHEREFORE, the criminal case (No. V-0447, RTC of Villasis, Pangasinan) against Pedro Abungan is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed Decision SET ASIDE. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 141931. December 4, 2000] ANICETO RECEBIDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. RESOLUTION KAPUNAN, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 21347 entitled People of the Philippines versus Aniceto Recebido, dated September 9, 1999 which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Document; and its Resolution dated February 15, 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The antecedent facts are the following, to wit: On September 9, 1990, private complainant Caridad Dorol went to the house of her cousin, petitioner Aniceto Recebido, at San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon to redeem her property, an agricultural land with an area of 3,520 square meters located at San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon, which Caridad Dorol mortgaged to petitioner sometime in April of 1985. Petitioner and Caridad Dorol did not execute a document on the mortgage but Caridad Dorol instead gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973 (Exhibit A) executed in her favor by her father, Juan Dorol. In said confrontation, petitioner refused to allow Caridad Dorol to redeem her property on his claim that she had sold her property to him in 1979. Caridad Dorol maintained and insisted that the transaction between them involving her property was a mortgage. Caridad Dorol verified from the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon that there exists on its file a Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979 (Exhibit J), allegedly executed by Caridad Dorol in favor of petitioner and that the property was registered in the latters name. After comparison of the specimen signatures of Caridad Dorol in other documents (Exhibits K to K-10) with that of the signature of Caridad Dorol on the questioned Deed of Sale, NBI Document Examiner Antonio Magbojas, found that the latter signature was falsified (Exhibits L-1 to L-2). Thereafter, Caridad Dorol filed her complaint against petitioner Aniceto Recebido with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Legaspi City and its Questioned Documents Division conducted an examination in the original copy of the Deed of Sale in question allegedly signed by Caridad, particularly her signature affixed thereon. Mr. Magbojas report was approved by the Chief of the Questioned Documents Division, Arcadio Ramos, and the Deputy Director of Technical Services, Manuel Roura, both of the NBI.[1] Thus, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon filed the information indicting petitioner for Falsification of Public Document with the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Branch 51, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, reading as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1979, in the Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a private individual, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud, falsify and/or imitate the signature of one Caridad Dorol and/or cause it to appear that said Caridad Dorol has signed her name on a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property in favor of the herein accused and Notarized as Doc. No. 680; page No. 54; Boon No. XIV and Series of 1979 of the Registry of Notary Public Dominador S. Reyes, when in truth and in fact accused well knew, that Caridad Dorol did not execute said document, to the damage and prejudice of the latter. Contrary to law.[2] Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. As narrated by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contends that the land in question was mortgaged to him by Juan Dorol, the father of Caridad, on February 25, 1977 and was subsequently sold to him on August 13, 1983 although it was made to appear that the deed of sale was executed on August 13, 1979. It was also on the said date that Recebido gave Caridad the amount of P1,000.00 in addition to the P2,600.00 mortgage price given to Juan Dorol which culminated into the execution of the Deed of Sale signed by Caridad.[3] After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the decision on December 2, 1996, convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentencing him as follows: ACCORDINGLY, accused ANECITO RECEBIDO is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment. Accused is ordered to pay P5,000.00 damages and to vacate the land in question owned by the offended party. SO ORDERED.[4] On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, with the modification that the award for damages is DELETED, the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects. SO ORDERED.[5] The petitioner raises his case before this Court seeking the reversal of the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Based on his petition, the following issues are before this Court: 1. Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the information was filed? 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the conviction of the petitioner? 3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grievous error in affirming the decision of the trial court for the petitioner to vacate the land in question owned by the offended party? We rule in the negative on the three issues. On the first issue: While the defense of prescription of the crime was raised only during the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, there was no waiver of the defense. Under the Rules of Court, the failure of the accused to assert the ground of extinction of the offense, inter alia, in a motion to quash shall not be deemed a waiver of such ground.[6] The reason is that by prescription, the State or the People loses the right to prosecute the crime or to demand the service of the penalty imposed.[7] Accordingly, prescription, although not invoked in the trial, may, as in this case, be invoked on appeal.[8] Hence, the failure to raise this defense in the motion to quash the information does not give rise to the waiver of the petitioner-accused to raise the same anytime thereafter including during appeal. Nonetheless, we hold that the crime charged has not prescribed. The petitioner is correct in stating that whether or not the offense charged has already prescribed when the information was filed would depend on the penalty imposable therefor, which in this case is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000.00 pesos.[9] Under the Revised Penal Code,[10] said penalty is a correctional penalty in the same way that the fine imposed is categorized as correctional. Both the penalty and fine being correctional, the offense shall prescribe in ten years.[11] The issue that the petitioner has missed, however, is the reckoning point of the prescriptive period. The petitioner is of the impression that the ten-year prescriptive period necessarily started at the time the crime was committed. This is inaccurate. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, x x x. In People v. Reyes,[12] this Court has declared that registration in public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. The prosecution has established that private complainant Dorol did not sell the subject land to the petitioner-accused at anytime and that sometime in 1983 the private complainant mortgaged the agricultural land to petitioner Recebido. It was only on September 9, 1990, when she went to petitioner to redeem the land that she came to know of the falsification committed by the petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner contends that the land in question was mortgaged to him by Juan Dorol, the father of private complainant, and was subsequently sold to him on August 13, 1983. This Court notes that the private offended party had no actual knowledge of the falsification prior to September 9, 1990. Meanwhile, assuming arguendo that the version of the petitioner is believable, the alleged sale could not have been registered before 1983, the year the alleged deed of sale was executed by the private complainant. Considering the foregoing, it is logical and in consonance with human experience to infer that the crime committed was not discovered, nor could have been discovered, by the offended party before 1983. Neither could constructive notice by registration of the forged deed of sale, which is

favorable to the petitioner since the running of the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned earlier, have been done before 1983 as it is impossible for the petitioner to have registered the deed of sale prior thereto. Even granting arguendo that the deed of sale was executed by the private complainant, delivered to the petitioner-accused in August 13, 1983 and registered on the same day, the ten-year prescriptive period of the crime had not yet elapsed at the time the information was filed in 1991. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the crime had not prescribed at the time of the filing of the information. On the second issue: We hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed petitioners conviction by the trial court. The petitioner admits that the deed of sale that was in his possession is a forged document as found by the trial and appellate court.[13] Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that notwithstanding this admission, the fact remains that there is no proof that the petitioner authored such falsification or that the forgery was done under his direction. This argument is without merit. Under the circumstance, there was no need of any direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As keenly observed by the Solicitor General, the questioned document was submitted by petitioner himself when the same was requested by the NBI for examination. Clearly in possession of the falsified deed of sale was petitioner and not Caridad Dorol who merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial Assessors Office of Sorsogon.[14] In other words, the petitioner was in possession of the forged deed of sale which purports to sell the subject land from the private complainant to him. Given this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence of his authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of the falsification.[15] As it stands, therefore, we are unable to discern any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. On the third issue: Petitioner submits that the trial court is without jurisdiction to order petitioner to vacate the land in question considering that the crime for which he is charged is falsification.[16] The petitioner insists that the civil aspect involved in the criminal case at bar refer to the civil damages recoverable ex delito or arising from the causative act or omission.[17] In addition, petitioner argues that he is entitled to possession as mortgagee since the private complainant has not properly redeemed the property in question. These are specious arguments. The petitioner based his claim of possession alternatively by virtue of two alternative titles: one, based on the forged deed of sale and, two, as mortgagee of the land. As already discussed, the deed of sale was forged and, hence, could not be a valid basis of possession. Neither could his status as mortgagee be the basis of possession since it is the mortgagor in a contract of mortgage who is entitled to the possession of the property. We have taken note of the practice in the provinces that in giving a realty for a collateral, possession usually goes with it.[18] Besides, even assuming that petitioner had a right to possess the subject land, his possession became unlawful when the private complainant offered to redeem the property and petitioner unjustly refused. Petitioner cannot profit from the effects of his crime. The trial court, therefore, did not commit any error in ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property. In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in its Decision dated September 9, 1999 and its Resolution dated February 15, 2000. ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 139033. December 18, 2002] JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSARIO TORRECAMPO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Camarines Sur, Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: The instant petition is one for the review, by way of appeal by certiorari, of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated November 20, 1998, and of the Resolution dated June 14, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. Petitioner was charged on March 8, 1983 with violation of Section 178 (nn)[2] of the 1978 Election Code in Criminal Case No. F-1447 before Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur. The Information alleged: That on May 17, 1982, (Barangay Election Day), at around 8:15 P.M. in Barangay Ombao, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and there unlawfully conducted himself in a disorderly manner, by striking the electric bulb and two (2) kerosene petromax lamps lighting the room where voting center no. 24 is located, during the counting of the votes in said voting center plunging the room in complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the proceedings of the Board of Election Tellers.[3] On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On January 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declared petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code, as amended, and sentenced petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals which eventually affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Said decision became final and executory. Thus, the execution of judgment was scheduled on October 14, 1987. On October 12, 1987, an urgent motion to reset the execution of judgment was submitted by petitioner through his counsel. But it was denied for lack of merit. During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of his bond. However, petitioner was never apprehended. He remained at large. Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court a motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. However, it was denied. His motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailing the orders of the trial court denying both his motion to quash the warrant of arrest and motion for reconsideration. On November 20, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the instant petition was filed before us. Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the penalty imposed upon petitioner has not prescribed. Petitioner maintains that Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. The Court of Appeals, in its interpretation of the said provision, engaged in judicial legislation when it added the phrase by escaping during the term of the sentence thereto, so petitioner claims. Going over the merits of the petition, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari. The threshold issue in the instant case is the interpretation of Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 157 of the same Code. In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals ruled: Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows: When and how penalties prescribe The penalties imposed by the final sentence prescribed as follows: 1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years; 2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years; 3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years; 4. Light penalties, in one year. And Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, provides as follows: Computation of the prescription of penalties The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which his Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription. The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is one (1) year of imprisonment as minimum to three (3) years of imprisonment as maximum. The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a special law, the 1978 Election Code. This law does not provide for the prescription of penalties. This being the case, We have to apply the provision of the Revised Penal Code which allows the application of said code in suppletory character when it provides that: Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provision of this code. This code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is a correctional penalty under Article 25 in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code. Being a correctional penalty it prescribed in ten (10) years. The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June 14, 1986. Such judgment would have been executed on October 14, 1986 but the accused did not appear for such proceeding. And he has never been apprehended. The contention of the petitioner is that said judgment prescribed on October 24, 1996. The issue here is whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has prescribed. The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as follows: 1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence. 2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. 3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty or committed another crime. 4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time form the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict. (p. 93, Revised Penal Code by L. Reyes 93 ed.) From the foregoing elements, it is clear that the penalty imposed has not prescribed because the circumstances of the case at bench failed to satisfy the second element, to wit That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the service of his sentence. As a matter of fact, the petitioner never served a single minute of his sentence. The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of this Court in Tanega vs. Masakayan, et. al.,[4] where we declared that, for prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment. The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling reason to deviate from our earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in the Tanega case. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, escape in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioners guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence and applicable laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted the pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placed in confinement, prescription never started to run in his favor. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Morales, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 135457. September 29, 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA JESSIE" and TEN (10) JOHN DOES, accused-appellant. DECISION BUENA, J.: Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra" and "Ka Jessie," appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 2773 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias 'Ka Django,' 'Carlos Narra,' 'Ka Jessie,' and 21 John Does" convicting him of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., charging them of murder committed as follows: "That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening in the Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence and brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO AREVALO thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs. "CONTRARY TO LAW." Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial of the three cases was conducted considering the substantial identity of the facts and circumstances of the case. Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June 30, 1987, the accused, with ten (10) armed companions, requested permission to rest in his house, which was granted. They had with them a person who was hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house be extinguished and Malto complied. Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was awakened by a gunshot. When he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering the person who was hogtied to lie down. After several minutes, Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused direct his companions to carry away the dead man. Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo when Patriarca went back to his place, together with the military, on March 29, 1990. The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property of a Rubuang Tolosa and were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the victim. The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa Arevalo. She knew Patriarca, alias "Ka Django", as he told her on March 10, 1987 not to let her son join the military. She, however, replied that they were only seeking employment. Her son Alfredo was her companion in attending to their farm and he was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in their locality. After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio Alcantara that her son was abducted by the New People's Army (NPA) led by Patriarca, she reported the matter to the military and looked for him. She was informed by the residents of the place where the NPA passed, that they saw her son hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking water, and complained that he was being maltreated by the NPA. After three days of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an NPA member and a relative of hers, notified her that her son Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca, Jr. In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her son's death in the hands of Ka Django. Consequently, a Death Certificate was issued by the Local Civil Registrar. When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to identify them as belonging to her son by reason of the briefs found in the burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used to print his name on the waistband of his briefs so that it would not get lost. The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco Derla who admitted that accused is a member of the NPA operating in Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the victims in the three criminal cases filed against him. On January 20, 1998, a decision was rendered convicting the accused and imposing the following penalty: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django, alias Carlos Narra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory provided by law and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim Alfredo Arevalo, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and as regards Crim. Case No. 2665 and Crim. Case No. 2672, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra, Ka Django, is hereby acquitted. "In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be given full credit of his period of detention. "With cost de-oficio. "SO ORDERED."[1] Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following lone error allegedly committed by the trial court: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER, AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN PURSUANCE OR IN FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION. Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board. Attached to appellant's brief is the Notice of Resolution of the National Amnesty Commission (NAC) dated November 17, 1999 which states: "Quoted below is a resolution of the National Amnesty Commission dated 22 October 1998.[2] 'RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 refers to Application No. 02125 of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA filed with the Local Amnesty Board of Legazpi City on 18 February 1997. 'Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under the Sandatahang Yunit Pampropaganda and participated in the following armed activities: 'a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Hirawon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 14 February 1986; 'b) Encounter with elements of the Philippine Constabulary at Barangay Godon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 15 February 1986; 'c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Banwang, Gurang, Donsol, Sorsogon in 1987; 'd) Liquidation of ELMER CADAG an alleged military informer at Barangay Boroan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 21 March 1987, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; 'e) Liquidation of a certain RUDY DEBORJA, a thief and nuisance of the community, at Donsol, Sorsogon, on 09 March 1984, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; 'f) Liquidation of a certain ALEJANDRINO MILITANTE for his misconducts at San Antonio, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 12 February 1986, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; 'g) Liquidation of a certain ALFREDO AREVALO, a former member of the CHDF at Sitio Abe (sic), Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 30 June 1987, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; 'h) Liquidation of one DOMINGO DONQUILLO, a barangay captain, at Barangay Tinanogan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 20 September 1986 in which a (sic) Criminal Case No. 2663 was filed against him.

'After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of the applicant, the Local Amnesty Board concluded that his activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty. 'The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999, resolved to approve the recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board. 'WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA under Proclamation No. 724 is hereby GRANTED for rebellion constituted by the acts detailed above, provided they were committed on or before the date he was captured on 22 June 1988. Let a Certificate of Amnesty be issued in his favor as soon as this Resolution becomes final. It shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party within said period.'"[3] On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of the National Amnesty Commission, wrote the following letter to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon, Sorsogon: "Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca" "Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting herewith the attached copy of RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 granting amnesty to JOSE N. PATRIARCA. The grantee was accused of the following cases: "1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. "2. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. "3. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. "4. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. "5. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2663 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. "He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. "The purpose of this transmittal is to provide you, as the chief prosecutor of the province, the opportunity to take whatever action you may deem appropriate from receipt of this note. This grant of amnesty shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party within said period. "Thank you for your continued support for the Peace Process."[4] The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to the National Amnesty Commission, requested information as to whether or not a motion for reconsideration was filed by any party, and the action, if there was any, taken by the NAC.[5] In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there has been no motion for reconsideration filed by any party.[6] Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 dated May 17, 1996. It amended Proclamation No. 347 dated March 25, 1994. Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus: "Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply therefor and who have or may have committed crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their political beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but not limited to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or agents of such person; tumults and other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of War; Provided, That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for personal ends." Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations.[7] Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.[8] Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects. In the case of People vs. Casido,[9] the difference between pardon and amnesty is given: "Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense." This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.[10] WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder. Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,[11] Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664, which are both filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,[12] are ordered DISMISSED. The release of Jose N. Patriarca who is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon is likewise ORDERED unless he is being detained for some other legal cause. The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10) days his compliance with this decision. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 81337 August 16, 1991 RICHARD V. PETRALBA, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. PARAS, J.: This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision* of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on October 5, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 9390 entitled "The People of the Philippines vs. Richard V. Petralba" convicting herein petitioner of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated December 15, 1987 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Abstract from the records are the following facts: Herein petitioner Richard V. Petralba was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal Treasury of Alcoy Cebu on October 23, 1 979. Fourteen (14) months after designation, petitioner's cashbook balance was audited by Auditors Constantino Alagar and Rene Flores. He was found short of P28,107.00, Petitioner, theretofore, was charged with, and convicted of, 31 counts of "Malversation of Public Funds," "Illegal Use of Public Funds" and "Falsification of Public Documents." Petitioner was granted probation and continued his function as Municipal Treasurer of Alcoy Cebu, from December 23, 1980 until he was succeeded by Mrs. Lilia Suico on March 15, 1981. Petitioner's cash and accounts from the period of December 23, 1980 to March 15, 1981 were audited by Leticia Trazo and Flora Pacana. Petitioner was found short in the amount of P50,447.06 which was arrived at as follows: GENERAL INFRASTRUCTURE TRUST FUND FUND FUND SEF TOTAL Balance last examination 12/23/80 P 10,336.91 P 302.07 P35,513.48 P145.86 P46,298.32 ADD: Re-receipts, collections withdrawalsDec. 24-31, 1980 P 1,264.22 P -P -P -1,264.22 January, 1981 12,515.04 12,515.04 February, 1981 23,479.07 23,479.04 March, 1981 4,418.65 _________ ________ ________ 4,418.65 41,676.98 ---41,676.98 Total P52,013.89 P 302.07 P35,513.48 P 145.86 P87,975.30 LESS:Disbursements: Dec. 24-31, 2,962.93 P -764.40 P -3,727.23 1980

January, 1981 4,041.94 1,769.84 3,383.98 -9,195.76 February, 1981 5,019.00 1,768.84 16,402.71 -23,191.55 March, 1981 293.60 1,000.00 120.00 -1,413.60 12,317.47 4,539.68 20,671.09 -37,528.24 Balance as of March 15, 1981 (Date of turnover) P39,696.42 P(4,237.61) P14,842.39 P145.86 P50,447.06 (pp- 106-107, Rollo) On December 4,1981, the Trazo Team sent a letter (Exhibit "H") to the petitioner demanding the turnover of the latter's cash accountability. Vouchers amounting to P43,468.84, which were previously allowed by Auditors Constantino Alagar and Rene Flores, were presented by petitioner to Auditors Trazo and Pacana. Only the amount of P21,348.87 was allowed reducing the petitioner's accountability to only P29,098.19 while the remaining vouchers amounting to P22,119.97 were disallowed for want of administrative approval. On July 30, 1984 herein petitioner, Richard V. Petralba, was charged with Malversation of Public Funds, in violation of Article 217, Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows: That on the 5th day of November, 1981 and for some time prior thereto, in the Municipality of Alcoy Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, a Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer then designated as the Officer -in- Charge of the Municipal Treasury of Alcoy Cebu, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and misappropriate the amount of P29,098.19 representing various receipts and collection and, therefore, public funds, which he had custody or control by reason of the duties of his office and for which he was accountable, and despite repeated demands for him to produce or restitute the amount, failed and still fails to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount aforestated. In violation of Article 217 of the Revised (Penal) Code. (Rollo, "Information," pp. 21-22) During the pre-trial inquest, the parties stipulated and agreed on the following facts: (A) The accused admits that he had been appointed Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer of Alcantara, Cebu as shown by Exh. A; (2) That on October 23, 1979, he was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal Treasury of Alcoy Cebu and acted as such until March 15,1981 as shown by Exh. B (3) Accused also admits that on March 15, 1981 the office of the accused as Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal Treasurer of Alcoy Cebu was turned over to Mrs. Lilia Suico; (4) That accused admits that after the turn-over of the office to Suico the statement of his cash accountability was prepared and signed by him as shown in Exh. C and C-1; (5) Accused admits that on November 5,1981 COA Examiners Leticia Trazo and Flora Pacana conducted an examination on the cash and accounts of his (sic) as shown by the Reports of Examination for General Funds marked Exh. D, Trust Funds marked Exh. E, Infrastructure Funds as Exh. F and Special Educational Funds marked as Exh. G and that certified the findings of the COA examiners as reflected in said report and his signatures already marked as Exhs. D-1, F-1 and G-1; (6) Likewise, accused admitted that on December 7, 1981, a letter of demand was served on and received by him as reflected in Exh. H, as shown by his signature acknowledging receipt thereof; (7) Accused admits that COA Examiners Leticia Trazo and Flora Pacana were duly authorized to conduct an examination of the cash and accounts of the accused as shown by Exh, 1; (8) That accused admits that he was originally found short in the amount of P50,447.00 as shown by Exh. J, however, after he submitted vouchers which were allowed, his shortage was reduced to P29,098.19 as shown by Exhs. J-1 and K ; (9) That accused denies that up to the present he has not yet paid the amount of P29,098.19, and which he will explain on the witness stand. (Rollo, Annex "B", pp. 24-24) In view of the admission of the petitioner that he was short of P29,098.19, the prosecution waived the presentation of testimonial evidence. Instead, it offered its documentary evidence, marked as Exhibits "A" to "K", and rested its case. The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence. The respondent Court found that the vouchers disallowed by the Trazo team in the amount of P22,119.19 were either supported by invoices or receipts or duly signed by respective payees. Thus, the amount of P6,978.22 out of the P29,098.19 remained unaccounted for. The respondent Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Richard V. Petralba guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds described in and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, Appreciating in favor of the accused the mitigating circumstance of Voluntary Surrender, there being no aggravating circumstance adduced and proven by the prosecution, the accused should be, as he is, hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of, from Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law to pay a fine in the sum of P6,978.22, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification; to indemnify the government in the aforesaid sum of P6,978.22; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 68-69, Rollo) Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner dated December 15, 1987. Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY AUDITED AND WHETHER EXHIBITS "10" TO "11-M" WERE INCLUDED IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ACCOUNT OF THE PETITIONER. II WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER HAS ADDUCED EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE MISSING FUNDS WERE NOT PUT TO HIS PERSONAL USE. On August 10, 1989, while this case was pending before Us, petitioner's counsel filed a manifestation that his client, Richard V. Petralba, had died, evidenced by a death certificate dated July 10, 1989. (Rollo, Annex "A" of Manifestation, p. 173). Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, death of the convict extinguishes criminal liability. In view of the fact that one of the juridical conditions of penalty is that it is personal. Actio personalis moritur cum persona; actio peonalis in haeredem non datur nisi forte ex damno locupletior haeres factus sit. (A personal right of action dies with the person. A penal action is not given against an heir, unless, indeed, such heir is benefited by the wrong.) Criminal liability does not only mean the obligation to serve the personal or imprisonment penalties but it also includes the liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties. Pecuniary liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. (Art. 89(l), Revised Penal Code). In the case at bar, petitioner Richard V. Petralba died pending appeal and before any final judgment therein. Hence, the death of Richard V. Petralba extinguished his personal and pecuniary (such as the fine) liabilities. Though the death of an accused-appellant during the pendency of an appeal extinguished his criminal liability, his civil liability survives. Extinction of criminal liability does not necessarily mean that the civil liability is also extinguished. In People vs. Navoa, 132 SCRA 410, and in People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, We ruled that only the criminal liability (including the fine, which is pecuniary but not civil) of the accused is extinguished by his death, but the civil liability remains. The claim of the government for the civil liability survives Petralba but only if the offense can be proved. The Supreme Court continues to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the petitioner's possible civil liability for the money claims of the government arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, in much the same way as when no criminal action had been filed. No separate civil action need be instituted (People v. Senday-diego supra). Going now into the civil liability of the accused, be it noted that he claimed that no shortage ever occurred because: 1. The discrepancy between Exhibit "4" prepared by the accused and Exhibit "H" prepared by the Trazo team casts doubt on the veracity of the latter. Petitioner's total collection for the month of January, 1981 in Exhibit "4" appears to be P13,515.04 while Exhibit "H" indicates a collection of P12,515.04, or a difference of P 1,000.00. For the month of February, 1981 petitioner's collection, as reflected in Exhibit "4", is P21,532.36, while Exhibit "H" indicates a collection of P23,479.07, or a difference of P 1,946.71. 2. The respondent Court failed to include Exhs. "11" to "11-M" representing the amount of P6,835.48 to settle the account of petitioner. The above allegations are devoid of any merit. Exhibit "4" was prepared by the petitioner to apprise Suico of his transactions from January 1, 1981 to March 15,1981. Due to the in veracity of Exhibit "4", an audit was performed, the result of which is listed in Exhibit "H". Evidently, Exhibit "4" is self-serving and unreliable and, therefore, cannot prevail over the official findings of the Trazo team contained in Exhibit "H". Besides, petitioner himself acknowledged and signed the official findings of the Trazo team. He is estopped from impugning the veracity of Exhibit "H". Equally baseless is the claim of the petitioner that Sandiganbayan did not consider his Exhibit "l1 " to "l1-M". It is admitted by petitioner that Exhibit "l1 " to "l1-M" were among the vouchers listed in Exhibits "2-A" and "2-B" allowed by the Alagar team and by the Trazo team. (Memorandum for the accused, p. 11). Auditor Alagar declared that Exhibits "2-A" and "2-B" were taken into account during his audit. (Decision of Sandiganbayan, p. 7, Rollo, p. 58). Thus, the amount appearing in Exhibit its "11" to "11-M" was included in the amount of P22,119.97 allowed by the Trazo team in reducing the original unaccounted amount of P50,447.06 to P29,098.19. (Exhibit "8-B"). Petitioner alleges that Exhibit "2", indicating a total of P10,296.47, should total P10,371.47.1âwphi1 His argument is based on the non- inclusion of the amount of P75.00. However, a perusal of Annex "B" of petitioner's Reply (Rollo, p. 126) indicates that the name of creditor opposite the amount of P75.00 was erased, and the same was not presented by petitioner as part of his Exhibit "7". Thus, the Trazo team did not commit any abuse of discretion in their failure to credit P75.00. Petitioner was able to explain the amount of P22,119.97 out of the shortage of P29,098.19, but he failed to explain the remaining balance of P6,978.22, thereby giving rise to the conclusion that he had spent such amount for his personal use. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the estate of the deceased petitioner is hereby sentenced to indemnify the government in the amount of P6,978.22. With costs. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant. ROMERO, J.: In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered. We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability? In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime? It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition: Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished. The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory? We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites: La responsabilidad penal se extingue. 1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme. xxx xxx xxx The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute? XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says: SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto. "Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860) The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal." By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him. Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra. Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding." This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases. As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case: The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed. On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before

final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the administratorappellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein: We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately. In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that: xxx xxx xxx It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours) xxx xxx xxx In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains." Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction. To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiffappellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants." It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto. However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction. This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus: The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23). The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8). When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court). The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394). The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583). In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused. But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling. To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. Article 30 of the Civil Code provides: When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of. Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; xxx xxx xxx However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things. In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30. Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision: Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13 In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion: "When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court). The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal. Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado: xxx xxx xxx I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable. Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . . Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused. Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction. Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced. If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him. This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort. Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law 20 b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) . . . e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22 Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification. WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Cruz, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-1809 January 23, 1948 NARCISO ALVAREZ Y CORTES, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent. FERIA, J.: This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner against the Director of Prisons on the ground that he is being illegally detained in the New Bilibid Prisons, notwithstanding the fact that the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the recommendation of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, granted the petitioner on December 23, 1946, absolute pardon of the crime of murder which he committed and of which he was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua on June 5, 1945, by the Court of First Instance of Manila in criminal case no. 70022. The Director of Prisons, in his return, which according to section 13, Rule 102, is considered prima facie evidence of the cause of the restraint, alleges that the petitioner, while serving the sentence of reclusion perpetua for the crime of murder above mentioned, escaped from prison on October 21, 1945, and for said evasion he was prosecuted and sentenced on March 22, 1946, by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case no. 73820, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional; that on April 8, 1946, the petitioner again escaped and evaded the service of the same sentence, and for the second evasion he was prosecuted and sentenced on August 20, 1946, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in case No. 14862 by the Court of First Instance of Rizal; and that on May 24, 1946, the petitioner was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearm, convicted and sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila, in case No. 74312, to six (6) months of imprisonment, and to pay a fine of three hundred pesos (P300), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Under the commitment orders issued by the respective Courts of First Instance in said cases Nos. 73820, 14862, and 74312, the petitioner is confined in the New Bilibid Prisons to serve a total of six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of imprisonment, commencing with the date of his pardon of the crime of murder above mentioned. The petitioner could have successfully set up the defense of double jeopardy in case No. 14683 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, where he was prosecuted again for the first evasion of sentence of which he had already been convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 73820; but petitioner did not set up said defense, and was convicted on August 8, 1946, by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in case No. 14683 and sentenced two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. And petitioner could also have successfully alleged the same defense in case No. 74311 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, where he was prosecuted for the second time for the evasion of which the petitioner had already been convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in case No. 14862; but the petitioner did not set up said defense, and he was convicted on May 16, 1946 by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 74311 and sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. As the petitioner has not yet completed the service of the total penalty of six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of imprisonment, to which he was sentenced in cases Nos. 73820, 14862, and 74312, it is not necessary for us to decide now whether or not he has to serve also the sentences rendered in the above mentioned cases Nos. 14683 and 74311. The penalties imposed upon the petitioner for evasions of service of sentence have not been affected by the absolute pardon granted to him remitting the unserved penalty to which he was finally sentenced for the crime of murder; because petitioner was convicted of evasions of service of sentence before the pardon and while he was serving said sentence of conviction for murder, which was then still in full force. Petition is therefore denied. So ordered. Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ. concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-1278 January 21, 1949 LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ, petitioners, vs. ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE and FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Commissioners of the Fourteenth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, respondents. FERIA, J.: This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the petitioners against the respondents who composed the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty. Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. As the latter had not yet been arrested the case proceeded against the former, and after trial Court of First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided to submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents herein, and the other petitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the same. After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commission, prescribed by the respondents, issued on January 9, 1947, an order returning the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of he said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the offense, because Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty. The Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, issued by the President with the concurrence of Congress of the Philippines, reads in part as follows: WHEREAS, since the inception of the war until the liberation of the different areas comprising the territory of the Philippines, volunteer armed forces of Filipinos and for of other nationalities operated as guerrillas and other patriotic individuals and groups pursued activities in opposition to the forces and agents of the Japanese Empire in the invasion and occupation of the Philippines; WHEREAS, members of such forces, in their determined efforts to resist the enemy, and to bring about his ultimate defeat, committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code; WHEREAS, charges have been presented in the courts against many members of these resistance forces, for such acts; WHEREAS, the fact that such acts were committed in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy is not a valid defense under the laws of the Philippines; WHEREAS, the persons so accused should not be regarded as criminals but rather as patriots and heroes who have rendered invaluable service to the nation; and WHEREAS, it is desirable that without the least possible delay, these persons be freed form the indignity and the jeopardy to which they are now being subjected; NOW, THEREFORE, I Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim an amnesty inn favor of al persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy control and occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to crimes against chastity or to acts committed from purely personal motives. It is further proclaimed and declared that in order to determine who among those against whom charges have been filed before the courts of the Philippines or against whom charges may be filed in the future, come within the terms of this amnesty, Guerrilla Amnesty Commissions, simultaneously to be established , shall examine the facts and circumstance surrounding each case and, if necessary, conduct summary hearings of witnesses both for the complainant and the accused. These Commissions shall decided each case and, upon finding that it falls within the terms of this proclamation, the Commissions shall so declare and this amnesty shall immediately be effective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or discharged. The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does ""nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (section 10[6], Article VII, Philippine Constitution; State vs. Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs, 135 N.C., 118; 47 S.E. 402., 403; Ex parte Law, 35 GA., 285, 296; State ex rel Anheuser—Busch Brewing Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71 S.W 52, 61; Burdick vs United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267; 271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.) In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented show that the accused is entitled to said benefits. The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented either by the complainant or prosecution, or by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation which has the force of a law, not only as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punishment as a criminal. Just as the courts of justice can not convict a person who, according to the evidence, has committed an act not punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person considered by law not a criminal, but as a patriot and hero, for having rendered invaluable services to the nation inn committing such an act.

While it is true that the evidence must show that the offense charged was against chastity and was committed in furtherance of the resistance against the enemy, for otherwise, it is to be naturally presumed that is has been committed for purely personal motive, it is nonetheless true that though the motive as a mental impulse is state of mind or subjective, it need not be testified to be the defendant himself at his arraignment or hearing of the case. Generally the motive for the commission of an offense is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words hat may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. The statement of testimony of a defendant at the time of arraignment or the hearing of the case about said motive, can not generally be considered and relied on, specially if there is evidence to the contrary, as the true expression of the reason o motive he had at the time of committing the offense. Because such statements or testimony may be an afterthought or colored by the interest he may have to suit his defense or the purpose for which he intends to achieve with such declaration. Hence it does not stand to reason and logic to say, as the dissenting opinion avers, that unless the defendant admits at the investigation or hearing having committed the offense with which he is charged, and states that he did it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, and not for purely personal motive, it is impossible for the court of Commission to verify the motive for the commission of the offense, because only the accused could explain of the offense, because only the accused could explain his belief and intention or the motive of committing the offense. There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the commission of a criminal act before a court of Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the benefits of amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guilty or that he has not committed the act with which he is charged, does not necessarily prove that he is not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding his denial, the evidence for the prosecution or complainant may show the contrary, as it is generally the case in criminal proceedings, and what should in such a case be determined is whether or not the offense committed is of political character. The plea of not having committed the offense made by an accused simply means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged because he is not guilty thereof, and, even if the evidence would show that he is, because he has committed it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons a ding in the war efforts of the enemy, and not for purely political motives. According to Administrative Order No. 11 of October 2, 1946, creating the Amnesty Commissions, issued by the President of the Philippines, cases pending in the Courts of First Instance of the province in which the accused claims the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation, and cases already decided by said courts but not yet elevated on appeal to the appellate courts, shall be passed upon and decided by the respective Amnesty Commission, and cases pending appeal shall be passed upon by the Seventh Amnesty Commission. Under the theory of the respondents and the writer oft he dissenting opinion, the Commissions should refuse to comply with the directive of said Administrative Order, because is almost all cases pending in the Court of First Instance, and all those pending appeal form the sentence of said courts, the defendants must not have pleaded guilty or admitted having committed the offense charged for otherwise, they would not or could not have appealed from the judgment of the Courts of First Instance. To hold that a Amnesty Commission should not proceed to the investigation and act and decide whether the offense with which an accused was charged comes within the Amnesty Proclamation if he does not admit or confess having committed it would be to defeat the purpose for which the Amnesty Proclamation was issued and the Amnesty Commission were established. If the courts have to proceed to the trail or hearing of a case and decide whether the offense committed by the defendant comes within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant has plead not guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions can not do so. Where a defendant to admit or confess having committed the offense or being responsible therefor before he can invoke the benefit of amnesty, as there is no law which makes such admission or confession not admissible as evidence against him in the courts of justices in case the Amnesty Commission finds that the offense does not come within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation, nobody or few would take the risk of submitting their case to said Commission. Besides, in the present case, the allegation of Loreto Barrioquinto that the offended party or victim was shot and killed by Agapito Hipolito , does not necessarily bar the respondents from finding, after the summary hearing of the witnesses for the complaints and the accused, directed in the said Amnesty Proclamation and Administrative Order No. 11, that the petitioners are responsible for the killing of the victim, either as principals by cooperation, inducement or conspiration, or as accessories before as well as after the fact, but that they are entitled to the benefits of amnesty, because they were members of the same group of guerrilleros who killed the victim in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately proceed to hear and decide the application for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the courts have in the meantime already decided, expressly and finally, the question whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 of September 7, 1946. So ordered. Moran, C. J., Paras, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.

EN BANC G.R. No. L-34334 November 28, 1930 PATRICIO SANTOS, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE "PHILIPPINE TRAINING SCHOOL FOR GIRLS," respondent-appellant. ROMUALDEZ, J.: The ruling appealed from holds that Virginia Santos, a minor, accused in the municipal court of Manila of violating an ordinance, and by said court committed to the Philippine Training School for Girls, is entitled to her liberty, and orders that she be immediately released, and that the bond filed by her be cancelled.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This ruling is based on the contention that the act for which she was tried in the municipal court had already prescribed when the complaint was filed, and that there was therefore no cause of action against her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Attorney-General assails the ruling of the court below. He contends that the evidence does not positively show the violation prosecuted has prescribed, and that even if it has, the defense of prescription is of no avail in habeas corpus proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We agree with the court below that alleged prescription has been proved of record. Nor is the fact that the date shown in the complaint may be changed by the evidence a bar to this conclusion. There is, indeed, no evidence to prove a different date, and so, that set forth in the complaint must stand; and such an allegation amounts to an admission by the prosecution of one of the essential elements to the computation of prescription; and upon the date thus alleged and not altered at the hearing, the defense was certainly entitled to rely. Nor is the doctrine cited by the Attorney-General, laid down in the case of United States vs. Cardona (1 Phil., 381), a bar to this conclusion, though it upholds the right of the prosecution to adduce evidence to show that the crime was committed on a different date from that alleged in the information; it was not said in that case that the date of the offense as given in the information was not sufficient proof for the purposes of prescription. This allegation, if not altered by the evidence, is a solid and sufficient ground for invoking prescription against the prosecution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library But it happens that the plea of prescription now invoked by the petitioner was not advanced during the hearing of the case before the municipal court, and as the Attorney-General correctly contends, such a plea will not lie in habeas corpus proceedings. In granting the writ, the lower court relied upon the ruling by this court in People vs .Moran (44 Phil., 387), which was an ordinary criminal case and not an habeas corpus proceedings and where the prescription of the violation of the Election Law was only alleged after the whole proceedings were over, because only then had the Legislature passed a law to that effect. In that case there was no waiver of that defense for the simple reason that there was prescription. If the plea of prescription will not be admitted by the courts in habeas corpus proceedings, it is precisely for the reason that it is deemed to have been waived. Although that decision in People vs .Moran arose from the allegation of prescription made after the proceedings had terminated, it is but an affirmance of the principle that penal laws have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the culprit. Therefore it is not applicable in the case before us.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library That the defense of prescription must be alleged during the proceedings in prosecution of the offense alleged to have prescribed, is a doctrine recognized by this court in United States vs. Serapio (23 Phil., 584 ) where the principle is supported by citations of Aldeguer vs. Hoskyn (2 Phil., 500), Domingo vs. Osorio (7 Phil, 405), Maxilom vs. Tabotabo (9 Phil., 390), Harty vs. Luna (13 Phil., 31), and Sunico vs. Ramirez (14 Phil., 500)chanrobles virtual law library That the defense of prescription is no ground for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a doctrine recognized by the North American jurisprudence, as may be seen from the following: If the statute of limitations is relied upon, it must be set up at the trial, either by a special plea or under the general issue. It is not a ground for a demurrer to the indictment, at least where the indictment does not show on its face that defendant is not within the exception of the statute. Nor is the defense available on a motion in arrest of judgment, or on an application for a writ of habeas corpus. (16 C. J., 416.) (Emphasis ours.)chanrobles virtual law library All questions which may arise in the orderly course of a criminal prosecution are to be determined by the court to whose jurisdiction the defendant has been subjected by the law, and the fact that a defendant has a good and sufficient defense to a criminal charge on which he is held will not entitle him to his charge on habeas corpus. (12 R. C. L., 1206.) (Emphasis ours.) The petitioner cites cases both local and from the courts of the United States to the effect that lack of jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense is a ground for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. This is true, inasmuch as lack of jurisdiction constitutes a fatal defect annulling all proceedings; but the prescription of an offense does not deprive a court of jurisdiction .By prescription the State or the People loses the right to prosecute the crime or to demand the service of the penalty imposed; but this does not mean that the court loses jurisdiction either over the matter of litigation or over the parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library For this reason, the action which should be taken by a competent court upon the plea of prescription of the offense or the penal action, duly alleged and established is not to inhibit itself, which would be proper if it had no jurisdiction, but on the contrary to exercise jurisdiction, and to decide the case upon its merits holding the action to have prescribed, and absolving the defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thus, the Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure of September 14, 1882, known as suppletory law and as a sound doctrine contained in rule 95 of the Provisional Law for the application of the provisions of the Penal Code to the Philippine Islands, in treating in articles 666 et seq. of the preliminary defenses (the prescription of crimes is there so considered), distinguishes cases of prescription from those of lack of jurisdiction, and clearly provides (article 674) that when the question of lack of jurisdiction is raised, and the court deems it well taken, it shall abstain from taking cognizance of the case, whereas if the exception taken refers to the prescription of the crime, then (article 675) the court decides the case by dismissing it and ordering that the defendant be set at liberty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It cannot be contended that the municipal court had no jurisdiction to commit Virginia Santos to the Philippine Training School for Girls, for Act No. 3203 confers such jurisdiction upon any court before whom a minor is accused. Section 3 of said Act provides: Whenever any boy or girl less than eighteen years of age shall be accused in any court of an offense not punishable by life imprisonment or death, etc. Finding no merit in the habeas corpus petition filed by the petitioner, the order appealed from is reversed and the writ denied, without express pronouncement of costs. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-25265 May 9, 1978 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SOCORRO C. RAMOS, defendant-appellee, PHOENIX PUBLISHING HOUSE INC., intervenor. SANTOS, J.: The above-entitled cases — the first an appeal and the second a special civil action — are decided jointly because they raise a common — issue which arose from the prosecution of a common defendant, Socorro C. Ramos, for alleged violations of the copyright law—viz, whether or not the extra day in the leap year, 1964 should be taken into consideration in the computation of the two-year period of prescription provided in Section 24 of the copyright law. The factual and procedural antecedents follow. On September 3, 1965, two criminal cases — No. 80006 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch III, and No. 80007 also of the same Court, Branch XIV— identical in every respect, except for the fact that they pertain to different editions of the same textbook, were filed against Socorro C. Ramos, for alleged violations of Act 3134, otherwise known as the Copyright Law, as amended. The information in Criminal Case No. 80007 alleged — That on or about July to September, 1963, in the City of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, as the proprietor aid general manager of the National Book Store, as enterprise engaged in the business of publishing, selling and distributing books, did then and there, wilfully and illegaly sell and distribute spurious and pirated copies of the high school textbook, entitled General Science Today for Philippine School, First Year, by Gilam, Van Houten and Cornista, said accused knowing that said book was duly copyrighted by the Phoenix Publishing House, Inc., and was being distributed exclusively by its sister corporation, Alemar's or Sibal and Sons, Inc.1 On September 7, 1965, identical motions to quash 2 were filed by accused Ramos on the ground of prescription, alleging therein, inter alia, that: xxx xxx xxx Consequently, the delivery of the alleged offense was made as early as July 17, 1963 and all subsequent knowledge or discoveries of posterior sales and possession of said books by the respondents, including that involved in the police search of September 4, 1963 were only confirmatory of the first. Under 91 of the Revised Penal Code and in the light of the afore-quoted ruling announced in the Pangasinan Trans. Co. case, supra; the prescriptive period, therefore, commenced to run on the day after such discovery on July 17, 1963 and, accordingly, the offense has long since prescribed since under the Copyright Law, Act 3134: Sec. 24. All actions, suits, or proceedings arising under this Act shall be originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance of the Philippine Islands and shall prescribe after two years from the time the cause of action arose. Assuming arguendo, that the last actual sale should be the starting point of computation, again the offense charged has prescribed, since, as already pointed out, the documented evidence on this point shows that the last sale was made on August 30, 1963. The prosecution, also in both cases, filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash 3 raising two issues, to wit: 1. That the issue of prescription in this case can be resolved only after the presentation of evidence and hence, it is premature to raise that issue before trial 2. That, as the violation committed by the defendant was a continuing offense, the two-year prescriptive period may be counted from September 3, 1963, or one day before the search in defendants' premises , which confirmed her possession of spurious and pirated copies of the textbook in question. The prosecution's theory is that "(T)he crime being a continuing offense, the statute of limitations begins to run from the completion of the last act or series of acts which constitute the offense, " and this last act was committed on September 3, 1963. Therefore when the information was filed on September 3, 1965, it was filed within the two-year period, albeit the last day of the prescriptive period. Again, in both the accused filed a "Reply to Opposition to Motion to Quash." 4 She alleged that even assuming that the crime is a continuing offense, the prescriptive period should start from August 30, 1963, the date of the last invoiced sale, and not September 3, 1963, as there was no indubitable proof that she had sold copies of the questioned book on that date. Nonetheless, accused contended that even if the prescriptive period should start from September 3, 1963, as proposed by the prosecution, the two-year period was tolled on September 2, 1965. She pointed out that two years mean a period of 730 days in accordance with Article 13 of the New Civil Code, and 1964, being a leap year consisting of 366 days, the 730th day fell on September 2, 1965. Hence, "... . when the information was filed on September 3, 1965, the offense, if any, had already prescribed. " The prosecution filed a Rejoinder 5 in both cases alleging as follow: l. That February 28, and 29, 1964, should be regarded as one day only, and consequently, the two-year period commencing on September 3, 1963 would end on September 3, 1965; 2. That under Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period was interrupted by the filing of the proceedings in the fiscal's office; 3. That prescription would not lie in this case because the complainant never waived the right to prosecute the defendant. Accused Ramos, also in cases, filed an Urgent Motion to Strike the Rejoinder, 6 on the ground that it was filed after the case had been submitted for resolution. She prayed that "in the event that the same should at all be considered and allowed, that the accused be notified thereof and granted reasonable opportunity to file a surrejoinder...". It appears that the Rejoinder was admitted by both trial courts, but a Surrejoinder 7 was filed only in Criminal Case No. 80006. Here, the accused traversed the prosecution's contentions in the Rejoinder, thus: 1. Under applicable and specific provisions of Philippine law, the two-year period of prescription commencing on September 3, 1963 ended on September 2, 1965 ...; 2. The filing (of) proceedings in the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila did not interrupt the prescriptive period. In Criminal Case No. 80007, Hon. Jesus De Veyra granted the motion to quash by an order dated October 7, 1965. 8 Pertinent portion of his order reads: . . . . And now to the main issue - whether the crime has prescribed. In the Opposition to the Motion to Quash, the Prosecution, in its insistence on the theory of a continuing crime, admits that the two-year prescriptive period should run from September 3, 1963. This case was filed on September 3, 1965 one day too late. Article 13, CCP provides that year shall mean a period of 365 days. This had been applied to criminal cases (People v. del Rosario, 51 O.G., 2686). 1964 was a leap year so that when this case was filed, it was filed one day too late. The Motion to Quash is, therefore, granted and this case dismissed on the ground that the crime has already prescribed. (Emphasis supplied.) The prosecution appealed the above order to this Court on October 15, 1965. 9 Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 80006, the motion to quash was not resolved until December 23, 1965. On this date, Hon. Placido Ramos denied the motion to quash, and set the arraignment of the accused on January 12, 1966, thus — Wherefore, finding the information to have been filed well within the statutory period of two years from the date of the last offense committed by the accused the Court denies the motion to quash. The arraignment of the accused is hereby set on January 12, 1966 at 8:30 A.M. The trial court refused to accept the prosecution's view that the prescriptive period should run from September 3, held instead, that the same should commence on September 4, 1963. xxx xxx xxx The evidence shows that on September 4, 1963, the Manila Police by virtue of a search warrant procured by the offended party, seized, among other articles, 69 copies of General Science Today for Philippine Schools, First Year, by Gilman, Van Houten and Cornista and one copy of the same textbook for Second Year (Exhibit 5). The evidence likewise shows that on September 3, 1963, the National Book Store, run and managed by the accused, sold one said

textbook, Exhibit 'D' and Exhibit '2'. The mere possession by the accused on September 4, 1963 of several copies of this textbook which is the textbook alleged to be spurious and pirated, indicates that said accused was distributing or selling said textbook on September 4, 1963 . . . This being the case, it follows of necessity that the period of prescription commenced to run from September 4, 1963 and two years from this date, by excluding the first and including the last, would expire on September 4, 1965 and hence, the action, which was instituted on September 3, 1965 is well within the prescriptive period. xxx xxx xxx Furthermore, the trial court ignored the accused's theory on leap year: Even if the last sale of said textbook could be considered to have taken place on September 3, 1963, Exhibits 'D' and '2', the Court is also of the opinion that the two-year period would expire September 3, 1965. The argument that inasmuch as 1964 is a leap year the two-year period must contain 731 days, as contemplated by Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, is, in the opinion of the Court, without merits for this particular legal provision that a year is understood to be of 365 days each is applicable only in determining the number of days a year must legally contain but not for the purpose of ascertaining the period of prescription based on years. In the computation of the period of prescription, a year should be construed as the calendar year comprising the whole period from January 1 to December 31, regardless of the number of days it contains. Consequently, in this particular case, if it is considered that the last sale took place on September 3, 1963, the two-year period, following the rule exclude the- first-and-include-the-last, will expire on September 3, 1965. The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 10 Two more pleadings were filed, 11 after which, the trial court finally denied said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, 12 and reset the arraignment of the accused on February 24, 1966 at 8:30 A.M. The accused thus filed with this Court this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, 13 with the following prayer: (a) Forthwith issue, upon filing by petitioner of a bond in such amount as this Honorable Court may fix, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining, enjoining and prohibiting respondents from further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 80006 of the Court of First instance of Manila, Branch III, daring the pendency of this Action: (b) After due hearing, to render judgment in favor of petitioner and against respondents — (1) Annulling and setting aside the Orders of the respondent Judge of December 23, 1965 (Annex 'G') denying petitioner's motion to quash, and of January 20, 1966 (Annex 'K') denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration; (2) Ordering respondent Judge to dismiss Criminal Case No. 80006 aforesaid; and (3) Making the writ of preliminary injunction hereafter La be issued permanent and final. This Court on February 11, 1966, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the trial Court from further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 80006. 14 Also on the same date, the two cases, G.R. No. L-25265 and G.R. No. L-25644, were consolidated. 1. In G.R. No. L-25265, the appeal, then Solicitor General Arturo Alafriz filed a four-page brief dated December 21, 1965 15 wherein he recommended affirmance of the order of 'Judge De Veyra quashing the information, and the dismissal of the appeal, for the simple reason that "the order appealed from is in accordance with law." Accused, now appellee Ramos, filed a brief dated January 21, 1966 16 reiterating her previous allegations in the lower court. The Phoenix Publishing House, Inc., the offended party, filed a motion to intervene in this appeal, on the following grounds: a) That the Solicitor General, instead of prosecuting the appeal, recommended its dismissal b) That, to protect its interest, it is necessary that the movant be allowed to intervene and to submit memorandum to sustain its view that the criminal action against the accused had not yet prescribed. 17 Over the opposition of the accused-appellee, this Court granted the same. 18 Accordingly, the Phoenix Publishing House, Inc. filed its Memorandum 19 wherein it alleged that the trial court erred I. IN ACTING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH WITHOUT REQUIRING THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE PLEA OF PRESCRIPTION. II. IN NOT APPLYING TO THIS CASE THE FOUR-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN ACT NO. 3326. III. IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PROCEEDINGS IN THE MANILA CITY FISCAL'S OFFICE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTERRUPTED PRESCRIPTION. IV. IN NOT CONSIDERING FEBRUARY 28 AND 29, 1964, AS ONE DAY FOR PURPOSES OF PRESCRIPTION. Accused-appellee, Ramos, filed a Reply Memorandum 20 refuting intervenor's assignment of errors. Subsequent pleadings 21 focused on whether February 28, and 29 of a leap year should be counted as one day or separate days in computing the period of prescription. 2. In G.R. No. L-25644-the special civil action — the issues raised in the foregoing assignment of errors were relied upon in respondent People's Answer. 22 And, following respondent Judge Ramos' reasoning, it was contended that the period of prescription should start from September 4, 1963, and not September 3, 1963, as originally proposed by the prosecution. Furthermore, as an affirmative defense, it was alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus since Judge Ramos did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the information. Respondent contended that the "(P)etitioner's remedy is to appeal the judgment of conviction rendered after a trial on the merits. " This allegation was opposed by petitioner Ramos; 23 she insisted that she had a cause of action for certiorari prohibition and mandamus. Respondent People filed a Reply Memorandum 24 disputing petitioner's allegations. We are, thus, faced with conflicting orders of two different Branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila-one holding that the crime has prescribed, the other that it has not. 1. Now to resolve the preliminary issues: a. On the propriety of the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. We find for petitioner. As We had occasion to hold in Quizon vs. Baltazar, 76 SCRA 559: As to the contention of respondents that the denial of a motion to quash is not a ground for certiorari and prohibition, suffice it to state that to allow an accused to undergo the ordeals of trial and conviction when the information or complaint against him is patently defective or the offense charged therein has been indisputably shown to have already prescribed is unfair and unjust for which reason, procedurally, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. As to mandamus, We are incline to agree with respondent's allegation that "petitioner has no cause of action for mandamus which is a writ intended to control the exercise of a purely ministerial function. To quash an information is not a ministerial function," 25 However, mandamus as a remedy is a superfluity here, considering that petitioner can obtain full relief thru certiorari and prohibition. b. On the applicability of the four-year prescriptive period provided in Act No. 3326. 26 The same is not applicable. Said Act provides: Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a)........... (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; ... (Emphasis supplied.) Act No. 3326 applies only if the special act does not provide for its own prescriptive period. It has no application here, where the Copyright Law provides for its own prescriptive period, viz: Section 24. All actions, suits, or proceedings arising under this Act shall be originally cognizable by the Courts of First Instance of the Philippines and shall prescribe after two years from the time the cause of action arose. 2. Now on the main issue of prescription. The question to be resolved is the proper computation of the two-year period of prescription from September 3, 1963. Resolution of this issue hinges, in turn, on whether February 28, and 29 of a leap year, 1964, should be counted as one day, as proposed by the prosecution; or as separate days, as alleged by the defense. This issue which was in 1965 still undetermined is now a settled matter. It was held in 1969 in Namarco vs. Tuazon 27 that February 28 and 29 of a leap year should be counted as separate days in computing periods of prescription. Thus, this Court, speaking thru former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that where the prescriptive period was supposed to commence on December 21, 1955, the filing of the action on December 21, 1965, was done after the ten-

year period has lapsed — since 1960 and 1964 were both leap years and the case was thus filed two (2) days too late. Since this case was filed on September 3, 1965, it was filed one day too late; considering that the 730th day fell on September 2, 1965 — the year 1964 being a leap year. In explaining the rationale for its holding, the Court took pains to trace the antecedent decisional and statutory bases for its conclusion, thus — Prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof held, on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a 'natural' month or 'solar' month, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared that, pursuant to Article 7 of said Code, 'whenever months are referred to in the law. it shall be understood that months are of 30 days,' not the 'natural', 'solar' or 'calendar' months, unless they are 'designated by name,' in which case, 'they shall be computed by the actual number of days they have.' This concept was, later, modified in the Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, pursuant to which 'month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month.' With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (RA 386) we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-month and not the solar or civil month with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Civil Code merely mentioned 'months, days or nights,' ours has added thereto the term 'years' and explicitly ordains in Article 13 that it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days. 28 With respect to the opinion of some members of the Court that Article 13 of the Civil Code is unrealistic, the Court adverted to the proper remedy thus — Although some justices of the Supreme Court are inclined to think that Article 13 of the Civil Code defining 'years' to mean 365 days is not realistic, the remedy is not judicial legislation. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree. 29 Finally, there is no merit in the allegation that the reckoning of the prescriptive period should start from September 4, 1963. This was the date when the police authorities discovered several pirated books in accused's store. But the accused was charged, in both Criminal Cases Nos. 80006 and 80007, with having allegedly sold and distributed spurious and pirated copies of the textbook in question, not of illegal possession of the same. The prosecution's claim that the preliminary investigation proceedings in the Manila City Fiscal's Office and in the prosecution Division of the Department of Justice interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, is also without merit. We held in People vs. Tayco 30 that the running of the period of prescription is interrupted not by the act of the offended party in reporting the offense to the final but the filing of the complaint or information in court. WHEREFORE, the order dated October 7, 1965 of the Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XIV in Criminal Case No. 80007 dismissing the case on the ground of prescription, is AFFIRMED. The order dated December 23, 1965 of the same court, Branch III, in Criminal Case No. 80006, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the case is DISMISSED, on the ground that the crime charged therein had already prescribed. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC G.R. Nos. L-8848-58 May 23, 1957 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. JOHN CANSON, JR., ET AL., Defendants-Appellees. MONTEMAYOR, J.: In eleven (11) separate informations of the same tenor, John Canson, Jr., et al. were, on November 27, 1954, charged in the Justice of the Peace Courts of Makati, San Juan del Monte, Mandaluyong and Para�aque, Rizal, with the violation of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: That, on or about the 28th day of July, 1954, and for sometime prior thereto, in the municipality of Makati, province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did, then, and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take part in the exploitation or use of slot machines (jackpots) as maintainer and operator, which are mechanical inventions or contrivances to determine by chance the loser or winner of money or any object representative of value and/or mechanical inventions or contrivances used as a game of scheme, the result of which depends wholly or chiefly upon chance or hazards and permit the operation of said slot machines in their place of business. In each said cases counsel for the accused filed a motion to quash on the ground of prescription. The Justice of the Peace Courts dismissed all said cases. The Provincial Fiscal appealed said orders of dismissal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Involving as they did a common question of law, by agreement of the parties, all the cases were heard jointly, after which, the lower court affirmed the appealed orders of dismissal. The prosecution is now appealing said order to us.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The lower court ruled that the offense charged in each case was a light felony under paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads: Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both, is provided. and applied article 90 of the same Code, the fifth paragraph of which reads: Light offenses prescribe in two months. The Solicitor General cites Article 26 of the same Code which provides: ART. 26. Fine - When afflictive, correctional or light penalty. - A fine, whether as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty, if it be less than 200 pesos. and contends that inasmuch as the penalty imposable under Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto menor, or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, then a fine of 200 pesos, imposable as a single or as an alternative penalty, may be considered as a correctional penalty, and so under Article 90 of the same Code whose paragraph 2 reads: Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of the punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. the offense charged prescribes in ten years and not two months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We deem it unnecessary to enter into an extended and elaborate discussion of the legal point raised in this appeal, for the reason that we have already passed upon and ruled on the same in at least two cases, as recently as last year. In the case of the People of the Philippines vs. Yu Hai alias "Haya", 1 G.R. No. L-9598, August 15, 1956, this Tribunal, through Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that a violation of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable with arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, is a light felony under Article 9 of said Code and prescribes in two months, according to Article 90, paragraph 6, of the same Code. The reason behind our ruling is well explained in the decision. Said ruling was reiterated and applied in our decision through Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo, in the more recent case of The People of the Philippines vs. Pedro Aquino, et al 2 G.R. Nos. L-9357-70, promulgated on August 21, 1956, which involved the same violation of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code, particularly the exploitation or use of slot machines (jackpots).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We see no reason for abandoning the doctrine laid down in said two cases. At the same time, we realize the conflict or discrepancy between Articles 9 and 26 of the Revised Penal Code, as pointed out by the lower court and the prosecution. It would greatly be desirable if the Legislature resolved this conflict by suitable legislation, or amendment of the Revised Penal Code. The Executive Department, through the office of the Secretary of Justice and the Office of the Solicitor General, might make representations with the Legislature as to the necessity or wisdom of making an exception in the case of a violation of the gambling law (Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code), classified as a light offense, for purposes of prescription. It has always been the policy of the Government to curb and minimize, even eliminate, the evils of gambling, specially in the form of slot machines, popularly known as "one-arm bandits", which are often patronized by that element of the community which could least afford to lose money on the same, not realizing the inexorable law of averages, namely, that despite occasional and rare hits of the jackpot, in the long run, they always lose. Or if the Legislature is not favorably inclined towards the amendment suggested, the, Department of Justice might brief and circularize prosecuting attorneys to be more alert in the prosecution of violations of the gambling law, so that the corresponding complaints or informations could be filed within the present prescriptive period of two months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The present case involves no less than eleven separate violations of the gambling law (exploitation of slot machines), and the last cited case of the The People of the Philippines vs. Pedro Aquino, et al., 99 Phil, 713, involved no less than fourteen separate cases, also for operating the same slot machines. The informations in all these cases had to be quashed, not because them persons accused were not guilty, but simply because the prosecuting attorneys filed the information's beyond the relatively short two month period.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. Nos. L-10249-60 January 14, 1958 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RUFINO CRISOSTOMO, JUANITA FERNANDEZ, A. O. JEAN OR ALFREDO DE JESUS, NG GUAT, GEORGE PHILIPS, KHO SUI, NENA TAN, IRINEO SIA, TIU TIAN, YAO TION, SEE LAI, TIU TOC, CHUA CHEOK and TAN PO, defendants-appellees. REYES, J.B.L., J.: On October 26, 1954, Ng Guat, et al. were under nine separate informations of the same tenor, charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal before the Justice of Peace Court of Caloocan with a violation of Article 195 (a) of the Revised Penal Code for maintaining and operating, on or about July 19, 1954, in their respective places of business, slot machines (jackpots), which are mechanical devices or contrivances whereby the winning or losing of money by the players or bettors wholly or chiefly depends upon chance or hazard. Similarly, on November 15, 1954, Rufino Crisostomo, et al. were charged before the Justice of the Peace Court of Navotas with the same offense, under three separate informations. Upon motion to quash the counsel of the accused in all the aforementioned criminal cases, the Justice of the Peace of Courts of both Caloocan and Navotas ordered the dismissal of the charges on the ground of prescription of the offenses alleged, with the exception of the case against accused George Philips, wherein the Justice of the Peace of Court of Caloocan reconsidered the order of dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of the charges against him, because when the offense charged was discovered by the authorities, as well as when the information against him was filed, this particular accused was outside the country. From the orders of dismissal of the Courts of Navotas and caloocan, the Provincial Fiscal appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal; the latter, however, affirmed the orders of the inferior courts. Whereupon, the prosecution interposed the present appeals to this Court (G.R. Nos. L-10249 to 10260). The sole question raised by these appeals is whether the offenses in question, being punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, prescribe in 2 months. The trial court so held, in the light of Article 9 taken in connection with the penultimate paragraph of article 90 of the Revised Penal Code which considers said offenses as light offenses that prescribe in two months; but the State contends that the offenses prescribe in 10 years, since under the provisions of Article 27 in conjunction with the third paragraph of article 90, also the Revised Penal Code, a fine of not less than 200 pesos is a correctional penalty that prescribes in ten years. The above question has already been decided and settled by this Court in the case of People vs. Yu hai1 G.R. L-9598, promulgated on August 15, 1956 (52 Off. Gaz., No. 11, 5116), followed by the cases of People vs. Aquino,2 G.R. L-9357-70, promulgated August 21, 1956, and People vs. Canson3 L-8848-58, promulgated May 23, 1957 (53 Off. Gaz., No. 19, 6512). In said cases we have ruled, for the reasons stated therein, that an offense punishable by arresto menor or a fine of not exceeding 200 pesos is only a light offense under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, and prescribes in two months under Article 90, par. 6. The trial court, therefore, did not err in quashing the present informations on the ground that the offenses charged had already prescribed. However, considering that the informations here in question also involve twelve violations of the gambling law which have to be dismissed, not because of the innocence of the accused, but simply because of the failure of the prosecution to file the charges on time, we deem it apposite to reiterate our comments in People vs. Canson, supra, to wit: We see no reason for abandoning the doctrine laid down in said two cases. At the same time, we realize the conflict or discrepancy between Articles 9 and 26 of the Revised Penal Code, as pointed out by the lower court and the prosecution. It would greatly be desirable if the Legislature resolved this conflict by suitable legislation, or amendment of the Revised Penal Code. The Executive Department, through the office of the Secretary of Justice and the Office of the Solicitor General, might make representations with the Legislature as to the necessity or wisdom of making an exception in the case of a violation of the gambling law (Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code), classified as a light offense for the purposes of prescription. It has always been the policy of the Government to curb and minimize, even eliminate, the evils of gambling, specially in the form of slot machines, popularly known as "one-arm bandits", which are often patronized by that element of the community which could least afford to lose money on the same, not realizing the inexorable law of averages, namely, that despite occassional and rare hits of the jackpot, in the long run, they always lose. Or if the legislature is not favorably inclined towards the amendment suggested, the Department of Justice might brief and circulize prosecuting attorneys to be more alert in the prosecution of violations of the gambling law, so that the corresponding complaints or information could be filed within the present prescriptive period of two months. The orders appealed from are affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemeyor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 139405. March 13, 2001] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondent. DECISION DE LEON, JR., J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution[1] dated February 3, 1999 of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) granting the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution[2] dated October 20, 1998 denying herein respondents Motion to Dismiss the Information in Criminal Case No. 13044 and the Resolution[3] dated July 23, 1999 which denied petitioners urgent motion for reconsideration. On October 27, 1988, herein respondent, Arturo Pacificador y Fullon, and his erstwhile co-accused, Jose T. Marcelo,[4] were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in an Information[5] that reads: That on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, Arturo Pacificador, then Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, a government-owned corporation, and therefore, a public officer, and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then President of the Philippine Smelters Corporation, a private corporation, conspiring and confederating with one another and with other individuals, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, and with evident bad faith promote, facilitate, effect and cause the sale, transfer and conveyance by the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation of its ownership and all its titles, rights and interests over parcels of land in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte where the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant is located including all the reclaimed and foreshore areas of about 50 hectares to the Philippine Smelters Corporation by virtue of a contract, the terms and conditions of which are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government as the consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair market value thereof at that time was P862,150.00, thereby giving the Philippine Smelters Corporation unwarranted benefits, advantages and profits and causing undue injury, damage and prejudice to the government in the amount of P777,005.50. After his arraignment, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information in Criminal Case No. 13044 on July 15, 1998 on the following grounds: 1) The court has no jurisdiction since the crime charged had been extinguished by prescription; and 2) The information does not charge an offense in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of San Mauricio Mining Corporation, et al., vs. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al., G.R. No. L-47859 and L-57132 dated July 10, 1981. On August 21, 1998 the petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. On November 10, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the Motion to Dismiss the Information ruling that: The information in this case, dated October 19, 1988, was filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988 on which date the existing jurisprudence on matters of prescription of the offense was the ruling enunciated in Francisco v. Court of Appeals (May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 538) to the effect that the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office also interrupts the period of prescription of the offense. The offense charged was allegedly committed from December 16, 1975 to January 6, 1976. The running of the period of prescription of the offense may have started on January 6, 1976 but was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the appropriate investigating body. In the case at bench, We find in the record no proof, or even an allegation, of the precise date of filing of the complaint with the appropriate investigating body which investigated this case,to enable us to determine with certainty if the offense charged have (sic) indeed prescribed. The second ground submitted by the accused-movant is precipitate at this stage of the proceedings, as it involves a matter of defense. Thereupon, on December 7, 1998, respondent Pacificador moved for the reconsideration of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his Motion to Dismiss, contending that: 1) The prosecution of the crime charged is time-barred by prescription as shown by facts and circumstances on record and of judicial notice; and 2) It is not precipitate for the Honorable Court to consider the Supreme Court ruling in San Mauricio Mining Co. vs. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al., declaring the basic deed of sale as not illegal and with justly adequate consideration. On February 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its Resolution of November 10, 1998 and dismissed the Information in Criminal Case No. 139405 against the respondent on the ground of prescription. It ruled thus: In Our resolution denying accused Pacificadors Motion to Dismiss, We applied Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code and the doctrine laid down in Francisco vs. CA (122 SCRA 538) to the effect that the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office or investigating body interrupts the running of the period of prescription. This is where We committed an oversight. Instead of applying Act No. 3326, as amended, xxx, We utilized Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. In this case, as the offense involved is the violation of R.A. 3019, a special law, it follows that in computing the prescriptive period of the offense, it is not the provision contained in the Revised Penal Code that should govern but that of Act No. 3326. xxx In Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr., (211 SCRA 277), the Supreme Court, in a clear language, held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are judicial proceedings and do not include administrative proceedings. xxx The offense imputed on accused was allegedly committed from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976. The offense prescribed on January 3, 1986, or ten years from January 6, 1976. The Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the Sandiganbayan on July 23, 1999. Hence, the petition. In its Brief,[6] the petitioner contends that, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, the provision of Act No. 3326[7] on prescription of offenses punishable under special laws is not applicable to the instant criminal case for the reason that Republic Act No. 3019 provides for its own prescriptive period. Section 11 thereof provides that offenses committed and punishable under the said law shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. However, inasmuch as Republic Act No. 3019 does not state exactly when the fifteen-year prescriptive period begins to run, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied suppletorily.[8] Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which adopts the discovery rule for the prescription of offenses, provides: ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.- The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. Petitioner also contends that the crime, subject of this case should be deemed as discovered only on May 13, 1987 when a complaint was filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) by the then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez. Hence, the filing of the information on October 27, 1988 with the Sandiganbayan was well within the prescriptive period. Additionally, petitioner contends that the ordinary principles of prescription do not apply in this case for the reason that the respondent effectively concealed his criminal acts which prevented the discovery of the offense until May 13, 1987. Even on the assumption that the registration of the Deed of Sale was on December 29, 1975 when that document was executed by the parties, and thus, amounted to a constructive notice to the whole world of the existence of the said Deed of Sale, the registration thereof could not have given notice of fraudulent acts of the parties to the sale. The situation prevailing at that time, that is, during the authoritarian regime of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, did not permit the investigative and prosecuting arms of the government to institute complaints against him, his wife and his cronies. In his Comment,[9] respondent Arturo Pacificador argued that Act No. 3326 governs the prescription of offenses punishable under special laws; that the registration of the Deed of Sale in question is the correct reckoning or starting point for prescription inasmuch as the fact of registration of said Deed of Sale in effect gave notice to the whole world not only of its existence but also of all the facts contained therein; that, aside from the ground of prescription, the Information in Criminal Case No. 13044 should be dismissed on the ground that it does not charge an offense inasmuch as the issue of whether or not the contract of sale was disadvantageous to the government had long been settled in the case of San Mauricio Mining Co. v. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et

al.,[10] and that the dismissal of the criminal case against him by the Sandiganbayan on the ground of prescription is tantamount to acquittal which bars prosecution of the respondent for the same offense under Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The petition is not impressed with merit. It has been settled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined and penalized by special laws. In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan,[11] this Court ruled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 was correctly applied by the anti-graft court in determining the reckoning period for prescription in a case involving the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. In the fairly recent case of Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[12] we categorically ruled that: Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides: Sec. 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. (Emphasis ours) The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against the guilty person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was committed. It can be gleaned from the Information in this case that respondent Pacificador allegedly committed the crime charged on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976. Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides that the offenses committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976. The petitioner, however, vehemently denies having any knowledge of the crime at the time it was allegedly committed by the respondent. It claims that the crime charged in the Information should be deemed as discovered only on May 13, 1987 when the then Solicitor General, Francisco Chavez, filed a complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against the respondent, for violation of the provision of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. We are not convinced. This Court takes notice of the fact that the subject Deed of Sale dated December 29, 1975 relative to the sale of the parcels of land by the National Steel Corporation to the Philippine Smelters Corporation, was registered shortly thereafter in the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title No. 0440 in the name of the National Steel Corporation was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13060 was issued in the name of the vendee Philippine Smelters Corporation. On February 28, 1977, the Philippine Smelters Corporation even filed an action for quieting of title with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2882,[13] which case forms the basis for the Sandiganbayan to deduce that the subject Deed of Sale may be deemed registered on the said date, at the latest.[14] While petitioner may not have knowledge of the alleged crime at the time of its commission, the registration of the subject Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds constitutes constructive notice thereof to the whole world inlcuding the petitioner. Well entrenched is the jurisprudential rule that registration of deeds in the public real estate registry is a notice thereof to the whole world. The registration is a constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains.[15] Hence, even if the period of prescription is reckoned from February 28, 1977, the crime had already prescribed when the Information in this case was filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988. It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted.[16] The said legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case of People v. Moran,[17] this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of limitations in criminal cases, as follows: The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence, it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. The instant case should be distinguished from the cases of People v. Duque[18] and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto[19] wherein we upheld the view that the prescriptive period started to run only upon the discovery of the illegal nature of the acts constituting the offense. The first case involves the crime of illegal recruitment where the accused, Napoleon Duque, was found to have misrepresented himself to several job applicants as a registered employment agent duly recognized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). Due to the said misrepresentation of the accused, the applicable prescriptive period began to run not from the time of recruitment of job applicants by the accused but from the time his recruitment activities were ascertained by the complainants and the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government. The second, or Desierto case, which was decided by this Court on October 25, 1999, involves the grant of alleged behest loans by certain governmentowned and controlled financial institutions to several individuals and corporations closely associated with the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his relatives. It was alleged that the public officials concerned, who were charged in the corresponding Informations, connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans in covering up the anomalous transactions. Under the circumstances, it was impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made. The prescriptive period started to run only upon discovery of the alleged illegality of the transactions after the investigations thereon were conducted. In the case at bar, the petitioner contends that respondent concealed his criminal acts that effectively prevented discovery thereof. The records of this case do not specifically show how the respondent allegedly employed acts that could prevent the discovery of any illegality in the transaction other than the bare assertion of the petitioner. There is also no allegation that the government officials involved in the transactions connived or conspired with respondent Pacificador. The said government officials were not even charged in the instant Information. On the other hand, it was never disputed by the petitioner that the subject Deed of Sale was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte and that the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13060 was subsequently issued to the vendee, Philippine Smelters Corporation.[20] In view of the foregoing, we do not find it necessary to discuss the other points raised by the respondent in his Comment as additional grounds for the denial of the instant petition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

EN BANC G.R. No. 147780 - May 10, 2001 PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, Petitioners, v. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, Respondents. RESOLUTION MELO, J.: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed before the Court (1) G. R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) filed by Panfilio M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao; (2) G. R. No. 147781 for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago; (3) G. R. No. 147799 for prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order filed by Ronaldo A. Lumbao; and (4) G. R. No. 147810 for certiorari and prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino. All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the "rebellion." He states that what is extant are general instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38. Indeed, as stated in respondents' Joint Comments: [I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police authorities to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means that preliminary investigations will henceforth be conducted. (Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R. No. 147781, p. 18; G.R. No. 147799, p. 16; G.R. No. 147810, p. 24) With this declaration, petitioners' apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion." Moreover, petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-Santiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time (Section 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise inevitably call for the dismissal of the petitions at bar. G.R. No. 147780 In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and mancao pray that the "appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved." This relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same are later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuant of a duly issued warrant. As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which remains speculative up to this very day. G.R. No. 147781 The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one for mandamus. It is basic in matters relating to petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue unless the right to relief is clear at the time of the award (Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to the present time, petitioner Defensor Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have categorically stated that petitioner will not be arrested without a warrant. G.R. No. 147799 Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to "determine or interpret" what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers. We disagree. To be sure, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000): x x x The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof. On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. x x x

(at pp.22-23) The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted. G.R. No. 147810 Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf (KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here, petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement. At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that its right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution. However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5[1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the Court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. However, in G.R. No. 147780, 147781, and 147799, respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the may 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Vitug, separate opinion. Kapunan, dissenting opinion. Pardo, join the dissent of J. Kapunan. Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion. Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-41692 April 30, 1976 EUGENIO CABRAL, petitioner, vs. HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF BULACAN, and SILVINO SAN DIEGO, respondents. ANTONIO, J.:p Certiorari and prohibition to nullify the Order of respondent Judge dated May 21, 1975, reviving the Information in Criminal Case No. B-537-74 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Baliwag Branch, and to prohibit said court from conducting further proceedings on the case. On the complaint of private respondent Silvino San Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed an Information on September 24, 1974 with respondent court, accusing petitioner Eugenio Cabral of the crime of Falsification of Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale of a parcel of land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the Information on the ground of prescription of the crime charge, as the said document of sale of Lot No. 378-C was notarized on August 14, 1948, registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on August 26, 1948 and as a consequence the original certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title issued, and since then Eugenio Cabral had publicly and continuously possessed said property and exercised acts of ownership thereon, which facts are apparently admitted in the letter of San Diego's lawyer to Cabral on September 17, 1953. After hearing said motion, Judge Juan F. Echiverri, in a Resolution dated March 25, 1975, granted the motion to quash and dismissed the Information on the ground of prescription. The order of dismissal was predicated upon said court's finding that the factual averments contained in the notion to quash were supported by the evidence. Private prosecutor, who was not present during the hearing of the motion to quash, filed a motion dated April 8, 1975, for the reconsideration of said Resolution. This was opposed by petitioner on the ground that San Diego can no longer intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action in April 1974 against the same accused (Eugenio Cabral) on the basis of the same factual averments contained in the criminal Information. Acting on the motion for reconsideration, respondent. Judge Benigno M. Puno, now presiding, ordered on May 12, 1975 the Fiscal to "make known his position to the Court." In compliance with said Order, the Fiscal submitted his comment dated May 19, 1975, expressing the view that the crime, has not prescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he only discovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and "... that, in the interest of justice, arraignment and trial is proper to ventilate the respective evidence of both parties in their total meaning and import in determining once and for all the direction direction and thrust of these evidence of both parties." Two (2) days later on, or on May 21, 1975, respondent Judge set aside the Resolution of March 25, 1975, and reinstated the Information. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order on the ground that (a) "the judgment of acquittal which became final immediately upon promulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled for correction or amendment"; and (b) by instituting Civil Case No. 120-V-74, respondent San Diego lost his right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. This motion was denied, as well as the second motion for reconsideration, hence this petition, raising the issue of whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside its Resolution of March 25, 1975. The issue being purely legal and considering that the matter has been amply discuss in the pleadings, 1 this case was deemed submitted for decision without need of memoranda. The Solicitor General was required to appear in this case, and he recommends giving due course to the petition and the reversal of the challenged order. According to the Solicitor General, the Resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing the Information on the ground of prescription of the crime became a bar to another charge of falsification, including the revival of the Information. This is more so, because said Resolution had already become final and executory, inasmuch as the Fiscal neither sought its reconsideration nor appealed therefrom within the. reglementary period of fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a copy thereof on March 31, 1975. When the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21, 1975, or about two (2) months from receipt of a copy of the order of dismissal, the same had already long been final. We agree with the Solicitor General. The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. 2 Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code also provides that "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which carries an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00. This crime prescribes ten (10) years. 3 Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948. In Pangan v. Pasicolan, 4 where the trial court set aside its own order dismissing the criminal case nine (9) months thereafter, this Court held that the order was null and void for want of jurisdiction, as the first order had already become final and executory. Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga setting aside its order of September 10, 1956 dismissing the case against petitioners nine months thereafter, or on June 11, 1957. The issue is whether or not the court had jurisdiction to enter that order. While the court may find it necessary to hear the views of a private prosecutor before acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal, it does not follow that it can set aside its order dismissing the case even if the same has already become final. There is no law which requires notice to a private prosecutor, because under the rules all criminal actions are prosecuted "under the direction and control of the fiscal" (Section 4, Rule 106). It appearing that the order already final, the court acted without jurisdiction in in issuing the the subsequent order. And likewise, in People v. Sanchez, 5 it was held that "a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, ... Under the circumstances, the sentence having become final, no court, not even this high Tribunal, can modify it even if erroneous ...". We hold that these rulings are applicable to the case at bar. While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion 'for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the running of the period for appeal. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for appeal. 6 The right of the offended party to appeal is recognized under the old Code of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 4 of Rule 110 which provides that the prosecution shall be "under the direction and control of the fiscal" without the limitation imposed by section 107 of General Order No. 58 subjecting the direction of the prosecution to the right "of the person injured to appeal from any decision of the court denying him a legal right", said right to appeal by an offended party from an order of dismissal is no longer recognized in the offended party. ... (U)nder the new Rules of Court, the fiscal has the direction and control of the prosecution, without being subject to the right of intervention on the part of the offended party to appeal from an order dismis ing a criminal case upon petition of the fiscal would be tantamount to giving said party as much right the direction and control of a criminal proceeding as that of fiscal. 7 More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on September 24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and Eugenia Alcantara, on the basis of the same allegations that San Diego's signature on the deed of August 14, 1948 was a forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action against Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the Bulacan Court of First Instance (Civil Case No. 120-V-74) for the recovery of the same property and damages. It appearing, therefore, from the record that at the time the order of dismissal was issued there was a pending civil action arising out of the same alleged forged document filed by the offended party against the same defendant, the offended party has no right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case,, and consequently cannot ask for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal, or appeal from said order.8 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and Orders of May 21, 1975, August 4, 1975 and September 3, 1975, of respondent Judge are hereby set aside. No pronouncement as to costs. Fernando, C.J., Barredo (Chairman), Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-23534 May 16, 1967 JOSE A. ARCHES, petitioner-appellant, vs. ANACLETO I. BELLOSILLO and JAIME ARANETA, respondents-appellees. BENGZON, J.P., J.: Petitioner-appellant Jose Arches filed on February 27, 1954 his income tax return for 1953. Within five years thereafter, or on February 26, 1959, deficiency income tax and residence tax assessments were issued against him. Said assessments not having been disputed, the Republic represented by the Bureau of Internal Revenue Regional, Director, filed suit on December 29, 1960, in the municipal court of Roxas City, to recover from petitioner-appellant the sum of P4,441.25 as deficiency income tax and additional residence tax for 1953. Arches then moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not expressly show the approval of the Revenue Commissioner, as required by Section 308 of the Tax Code, and on the further ground of prescription of the action. 1äwphï1.ñët The municipal court denied the motion. Petitioner-appellant, his motion to reconsider having been denied also, resorted to the Court of First Instance of Capiz on a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the order denying his motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the petition. Hence, this appeal. The only question here is the correctness of dismissal of the petition by the Court of First Instance. The order was predicated upon the impropriety of the writ. We find no error committed by said court. The municipal court had jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter, the amount demanded being less than P5,000.00.1 The suit below instituted by the Republic, based on an uncontested assessment, was one merely for the recovery of a sum of money where the amount demanded constitutes the jurisdictional test.2 Petitioner-appellant would make much of the lack of approval of the Revenue Commissioner. First of all, in this case, such requisite is not jurisdictional, but one relating to capacity to sue or affecting the cause of action only.3 So, in ruling on said question, whatever error — if any — the municipal court committed, was merely an error of judgment, not correctible by certiorari.4 Neither was there grave abuse of the discretion on the part of the municipal court in ruling that the express approval of the Revenue Commissioner himself was not necessary. The court relied upon Memorandum Order No. V-634 of the Revenue Commissioner, approved by the Finance Secretary of July 1, 1956, wherein the former's functions regarding the administration and enforcement of revenue laws and regulations — powers broad enough to cover the approval of court actions as required in Section 308 of the Tax Code — were expressly delegated to the Regional Directors. This regulation, the issuance of which was authorized by statute, has the force and effect of law.5 To rely upon it, hence, would not be tantamount to whimsical, capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment. The verification by the Regional Director of the complaint constitutes sufficient approval thereof already. It states, inter alia, that said Director has caused the preparation of the complaint and that he has read the allegations thereof and they are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. Pleadings are to be liberally construed.6 Assuming, therefore, in gratia argumenti, that the suit is being erroneously — but not invalidly — entertained, for lack of express approval of the Commissioner or the Regional Director, certiorari would still not lie. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and the remedy of the unsuccessful movant is to await the judgment on the merits and then appeal therefrom.7 And, as the Court of First Instance rightly observed, there was no showing of a special reason or urgent need to stop the proceedings at such early stage in the municipal court. Petitioner-appellant would also raise the question of prescription. Again, this is not jurisdictional. And, We have already ruled8 that the proper prescriptive period for bringing civil actions is five years from the date of the assessment, under Section 332 of the Tax Code. The three-year period urged by petitionerappellant under Section 51 (d) refers only to the summary remedies of distraint and levy. Here, the action was commenced one year, ten months and three days after the assessments were made; hence, well within the period. Wherefore, the dismissal of appellant's petition for certiorari by the Court of First Instance is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner-appellant. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-17616 May 30, 1962 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FELIPE ABUY, defendant-appellee. BARRERA, J.: On April 1, 1959, Felipe Abuy was charged in the Municipal Court of Zamboanga City with the crime of "trespass to dwelling" (Crim. Case No. 6751), in an information which reads: That on or about February 21, 1959, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter the dwelling of Ruperto Carpio without his knowledge or consent. Contrary to law. On arraignment, the accused Abuy pleaded not guilty, and the case was thereafter tried. When the case was called for continuation of trial on November 5, 1959, the prosecution moved for the dismissal of the case, on the ground that the evidence so far presented by it would not sustain the accused's conviction of said crime charged. The motion was granted by the court. Subsequently, on November 13, 1959, the accused Abuy was charged before the same Municipal Court of Zamboanga City with the crime of "unjust vexation" (Crim. Case No. 7201) under the following information: That on February 21, 1959, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused with intent to cause vexation upon Nicolasa B. de Magadia, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously embrace, and take hold of her wrist, thereby causing vexation upon her person; that there being present the aggravating circumstance that it was committed in the dwelling of said Nicolasa B. de Magadia. Contrary to law. On November 19, 1959, the accused Abuy filed a motion to quash the above information for "unjust vexation", on the ground that said offense "has already prescribed". To this motion, the prosecution filed its answer (opposition) on December 23, 1959. On May 14, 1960, the court granted said motion to quash, in an order which partly states: The record of this case show that on February 21, 1959, on the complaint of complainant Michaela B. de Magadia, the Prosecuting Officer, Special Counsel Vicente Largo filed an information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6751, for Trespass to Dwelling, against the accused Felipe Abuy. This case for Trespass to Dwelling called for trial when the accused aided by the same counsel that appeared for him in Criminal Case No. 7201, for Unjust Vexation, when arraigned pleaded not guilty to the crime of Trespass to Dwelling. On the day when Criminal Case No. 6751, was called for continuation of the trial on November 5, 1959, the Prosecuting Officer, Special Counsel Vicente Largo, moved for the dismissal of the information charging Felipe Abuy of Trespass to Dwelling, on the alleged ground that the evidence so far presented by the prosecution would not sustain the conviction of the accused of the crime of Trespass to Dwelling, which motion was duly granted by the Court, ordering the acquittal of the accused with costs de oficio, ordering further the cancellation of the bail bond filed by the accused for his provisional liberty. Subsequent to the dismissal, rather the acquittal of the accused Felipe Abuy of the crime of Trespass to Dwelling on motion of the prosecuting officer, Special Counsel Largo, another information charging the same accused Felipe Abuy acquitted of the crime of Trespass to Dwelling with the crime of Unjust Vexation, the present case to which the motion to quash, was filed by the defense attorney, on the ground of prescription. The Court, taking into consideration the above findings of fact together with the motion to quash filed by the defense attorney and the opposition filed by the Special Counsel, the arguments advanced by the counsels on the motion and opposition to the motion to quash, and the additional oral arguments, taken by the Court Stenographer at the time of the formal hearing conducted by this Court on the motion and opposition to the granting of the motion to quash, believes that the crime of Unjust Vexation, for which the accused is presently charged under Criminal Case No. 7201, filed after the said accused based on the same facts complained by complainant Michaela de Magadia, for which the accused Felipe Abuy was charged and wherein he was acquitted on motion of the prosecuting officer in the first case of Trespass to Dwelling which after dismissal of the same, the accused is now again charged of Unjust Vexation which crime this Court believes had already prescribed as provided for under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 5 of Article 89 and Article 91 of the same Code and, therefore, the motion to quash the information filed under Criminal Case No. 7201, for Unjust Vexation is hereby granted, ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 7201, with costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. From this order, the prosecution appealed to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. On July 30, 1960, said court denied the appeal, in an order of this tenor: ORDER The appeal in this case taken by the City Attorney's Office being unmeritorious and unfounded, the same is hereby DENIED and let the records of this case be returned to the court of origin. SO ORDERED. Hence, this appeal. There is no merit in the People's appeal. There can be no question that the crime of "unjust vexation" (Art. 287 [2], Revised Penal Code) is a light offense (Art. 9[3], id.) and, therefore, prescribes in 2 months (Art. 90[6], id.). Now, the information dated November 13, 1959 charging appellee Abuy with said offense, expressly alleges that he committed it "on February 21, 1959" on the person of Nicolasa (Michaela) B. de Magadia." According to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription of an offense "shall commence to run upon the day on which the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents". From February 21, 1959 to November 13, 1959 (date of filing of the information) is 6 months and 20 days, far beyond the 2-month prescriptive period of said offense. In the circumstances, appellee Abuy correctly moved to quash said information, and the Municipal Court properly granted the same. The Court of First Instance, on its part, committed no reversible error in dismissing the prosecution's appeal from said quashal by the Municipal Court, for being "unmeritorious and unfounded".1äwphï1.ñët The prosecution argues, however, that the offense of "unjust vexation" had not yet prescribed when it filed the information (Crim. Case No. 7201) against appellee Abuy, on November 13, 1959, reasoning thus: The acts complained of occurred on February 21, 1959. The information for trespass to dwelling against the accused was filed on April 1, 1959, 39 days after (p. 1, mun. court folder). The filing of the information for trespass to dwelling on April 1, 1959 interrupted the running of the two-month prescriptive period (Art. 91, Rev. Penal Code). After the municipal court of the City of Zamboanga dismissed the case on November 5, 1959 on motion of the prosecution (p. 17, mun. court folder), it was only then that the prescriptive period commenced to run again. The information for unjust vexation was received by the Municipal court of the City of Zamboanga on November 13, 1959, 8 days after the dismissal of the information for trespass to dwelling was handed down by the court. Adding the 30 days which had elapsed prior to the filing of the information for trespass to dwelling with the 8 days, prior to the filing of the information for unjust vexation, the aggregate total of 47 days would still be shy of the 2-month prescriptive period allowed by law for the latter crime. This contention of the prosecution is not in accordance with Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that, "The period of prescription . . . shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him (accused)". The "complaint or information" or "such proceedings"

mentioned in the law must be the proper information or complaint corresponding to the offense committed in order that "such proceedings" thereunder may interrupt the prescriptive period. Here, the first information was trespass to dwelling committed against Ruperto Carpio, the elements of which as described in the information are, the prosecution expressly admits (see appellant's brief, page 8), entirely different from the elements of the other offense of unjust vexation against Nicolasa B. de Magadia charged in the second information. There is nothing in the two informations to show that the two offenses are related to each other except that they were committed by the same accused on the same date and within the jurisdiction of the same court. The one, in fact, is not a bar to the other. Consequently, the filing of the one does not interrupt the prescriptive period as to the other. Neither is the other contention of the prosecution tenable — that the municipal court should not have discharged the accused but should have committed him to answer to the proper offense, as there appears to have been a mistake in charging the correct offense. (Sec. 12, Rule 115, Rules of Court). In the first place, the fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case, not because of an alleged mistake, but because the evidence so far presented by him would not sustain the accused's conviction of the crime charged in the information. Secondly, even if the intention was to subsequently charge the accused with unjust vexation, since the offense has clearly prescribed, it would not be proper to further commit the accused to answer to the proper charge where this is no longer available. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-45674 May 30, 1983 EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DE CASTRO, J.: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 25, 1976 which modified the decision of the lower court by finding petitioners guilty of the crime of simple slander instead of grave oral defamation as the former Court of First Instance has held, and imposed on him a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and ordered them to pay complainant the amount of P1,000.00 as moral damages. On February 6, 1966 complainant Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, who was then the Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital, filed a case for intriguing against honor allegedly committed on December 26, 1965 against Dr. Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. On May 3, 1966, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in the former Court of First Instance of Rizal accusing Francisco and Bernardino of the crime of grave oral defamation. On October 8, 1966 the information upon order of the court, was amended by adding the particular statements uttered by each accused allegedly constituting the crime of slander to wit: AMENDED INFORMATION The undersigned Special Counsel accuses Harry Bernardino and Emiliano Francisco of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, committed as follows: That on or about the 26th day of December, 1965, in the municipality of Tanay, province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the abovenamed accused conspiring and confederating together, with the deliberate intent of bringing one Dr. Patrocinio Angeles into public discredit, disrepute and contempt, after having knowledge that the wife of one Romulo Cruz who was a former patient of the Morong Emergency Hospital was operated thereat by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly speak and utter the following insulting and defamatory words and expressions, to wit: Dr. Francisco (To Romulo Cruz): Your wife should not have been operated. If I were the doctor, all that I should have done was to do a curretage raspa on her. Atty. Bernardino: Those doctors are incompetent. They are not surgeons. They are just bold. Dr. Francisco: The operation was unusual. Atty. Bernardino: The doctors who operated on your wife could be charged for murder thru reckless imprudence. The doctors there are no good. They are not surgeons. thereby imputing upon the offended party, Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, the attending physician of the wife of Romulo Cruz and one of the physicians at the Morong Emergency Hospital, professional incompetence, inefficiency, or negligence thus casting public contempt and ridicule upon the reputation of the said Dr. Patrocinio Angeles. Contrary to law. Pasig, Rizal, October 8, 1966, (Sgd.) ZENAIDA S. BALTAZAR Special Counsel On February 1, 1973 the trial court rendered its decision convicting the accused Harry Bernardino and Emiliano Francisco of the crime of grave oral defamation, sentenced each of them to suffer a penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum and each of the accused was directed to pay complainant t the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). On appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the trial court as already stated was modified finding the accused guilty of simple slander. As found out by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case are as follows: The evidence of the prosecution is that Mrs. Lourdes Cruz, wife of Romulo Cruz, had been suffering from a vaginal bleeding since November 24, 1965; that she consulted a Dr. Custodio about her ailment and the latter was able to stop the bleeding for two days; that thereafter her bleeding recurred that Mrs. Cruz then consulted a Dr. Floreza who advised her that if her bleeding continued she should go to a hospital; that her bleeding continued so on December 9, 1965 Lourdes Cruz entered the Morong Emergency Hospital that she was attended by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, the complainant; that her ailment was tentatively diagnosed by Dr. Angeles as "H-Mole, abortion and pregnancy"; that an x-ray examination conducted on Mrs. Cruz, however, revealed that she was negative for pregnancy; that Mrs. Cruz continued to lose blood and had to be given a transfusion of fresh blood on December 11, 1965; that as the bleeding did not stop Mrs. Cruz was operated on by the complaint Dr. Patrocinio ; that her uterus which contained three (3) dead foetal triplets was removed that the operation was successful and her bleeding was arrested, that on December 26, 1965 at about 9:20 o'clock in the evening the two accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino together with Dr. Crisologo Golla and Ernesto Ocampo went to the house of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz in Tanay, Rizal that the two accused interviewed Mrs. Cruz and her husband Romulo Cruz about her operation; that the couple informed the two that they are satisfied with the operation; that in the course of this interview the accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco said that the operation was not correctly done and Mrs. Cruz should not have been operated on and that if he were the one he would not conduct an operation but only curretage (raspahin); that on the same occasion the accused Atty. Harry Bernardino that the physicians in Morong Emergency Hospital were no good, are incompetent and they are not surgeons and said accused told Romulo Cruz that he could file charges for murder through reckless imprudence; that the accused Dr. Francisco was formerly a member of the Courtesy Medical Staff on the Morong Emergency Hospital and as such he could bring in his private patients who needed the facility of the hospital for proper management; that, however, on December 15, 1965 his membership in the said staff was cancelled by the Credential Committee of said hospital at a meeting called for that purpose by the complainant Dr. Angeles who was then the Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital; that the accused Harry Bernardino, as counsel of a Dr. Lerma, had earlier moved for the ouster of Dr. Angeles as Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital; that the case was bitterly contested that it even reached the Office of the President; that, furthermore, during the incumbency of the accused Atty. Bernardino as Mayor of Morong, Rizal he caused the passage of a resolution wherein he was given authority to recommend all charity cases for admission to the Morong Emergency Hospital and that this resolution, however, was ignored by the complaint Dr. Angeles in accordance with the policy of the Director of the Bureau of Medical Services. The evidence of the defense is that as Chairman of the Ethics Committee of the Eastern District of Rizal Medical Society, the accused Dr. Francisco sought to find out what could be done with the reported wrong operation of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz by complainant Dr. Angeles which resulted in the removal of triplets; that so the accused Dr. Francisco consulted the other accused Atty. Bernardino on the proper steps to take; that upon the advice of accused Atty. Bernardino, the accused Dr. Francisco accompanied by Dr. Crisologo Golla who was a Committee member, and the accused, Atty. Bernardino went on December 26, 1965 to Tanay, Rizal the hometown of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz; that they interviewed the spouses Romulo Cruz and Lourdes Cruz regarding the operation performed on Mrs. Cruz on December 13, 1965; that in that interview the two accused sought the facts regarding the case pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision to conduct the fact finding investigation; and that after the interview with the Cruz spouses Dr. Golla and the accused Dr. Francisco went to Dr. Floreza, in coming president of the Rizal Medical Society on December 27, 1965, to take up the matter with him but they were advised to take it up with the Eastern District of Rizal Medical Society, which they did.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals concluded that while it is true that the statements were made on the occasion of the so-called fact finding interview pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision, the accused went out of bounds by imputing to the complainant acts which are not only derogatory but constitute a crime that can be prosecuted de oficio. It went on to rule however that the defamation committed by the accused cannot be considered as grave under the circumstances, and the worst that was said of the complainant was that he should not have performed the operation, and that he could be prosecuted for murder through reckless imprudence. Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the present case was instituted. While the case was pending, Atty. Harry Bernardino one of the petitioners herein died, hence in the resolution of April 10, 1979 the case was dismissed insofar as he is concerned. Petitioners' brief, prepared by their counsel with notable zeal raises several questions. In synthesis, they are: 1. Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the Court of Appeals to be the offense committed by the petitioners has prescribed; 2. Whether or not the alleged defamatory remarks of petitioners may be considered libelous; 3. Whether or not there was conspiracy; 4. Whether or not the failure to allege in the information that petitioners acted with "malice" is fatal; and 5. Whether or not the Court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. As the case against the late Harry Bernardino has already been dismissed, We shall discuss only those matters as may be pertinent to petitioner Francisco. Francisco argues that since the Court of Appeals had found that the offense committed was the lesser offense of simple slander, which prescribed in two months under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the said court should have dismissed the case, and sustained the acquittal of the accused on the ground that said crime had already prescribed. He pointed out the alleged defamatory remarks were committed on December 26, 1965, and the information charging the accused of the greater offense of grave oral defamation was filed with the court more than four (4) months later on May 3, 1966. Disputing the foregoing, the Solicitor General contends that for the purpose of determining the proper prescriptive period, what should be considered is the nature of the offense charged in the information which is grave oral defamation, not the crime committed by the accused, as said crime was found by the Court to constitute only simple slander. Hence, the period of prescription here should be six (6) months. Moreover, according to the Solicitor General, the complaint was filed by the offended party before the Fiscal's office on February 3, 1966 or only thirty-nine (39) days after the incident in question which is still within the prescriptive period. He cited the case of People v. Olarte 1 which overruled the case of People v. del Rosario 2 and held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. It makes no difference whether the case was filed in the Fiscal's Office and not in the Municipal Court as in the Olarte case, since Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code does not require that the complaint be one filed in court in order to toll the running of the period. Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense. The principle has the support of overwhelming authorities in American jurisprudence: The general rule, as stated in 22 CJS, Criminal Law, sec. 225b, is "as a general rule, one indicted for an offense not barred by limitation, but convicted of a lesser included offense which is so barred, is entitled to discharge", and in 15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Sec. 343; "It frequently happens that a change of felony includes an offense of a lower grade with a different period of limitation so that, while the felony is not barred, the statute has ran as to the lesser offense. In this situation, the rule is that if the statute has not run against the felony, while the lesser offense is barred. the bar cannot be evaded by the defendant for the felony and convicting him of the lesser offense." 3 Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities. or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him." Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco 4 held that the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal's Office. This is so, according to the court, because under this rule it is so provided that the period shall commence to run again when the proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint or information terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding that the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in the acquittal or conviction of the accused. The basis of the doctrine in the Tayco case, however, was disregarded by this Court in the Olarte case, cited by the Solicitor General. It should be recalled that before the Olarte case there was diversity of precedents on the issue of prescription. One view declares that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the (or municipal judge) does in the course of prescriptive term. This view is found in People v. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. The other pronouncement is that to produce interruption, the complainant or information must have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case on its merits, found in the cases of People v. del Rosario, L15140, December 29, 1960; People v. Coquia, L- 15456, June 29, 1963. The Olarte case set at rest the conflict views, and enunciated the doctrine aforecited by the Solicitor General. The reasons for the doctrine which We find applicable to the case at bar reads: In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription "shall commence to run again when such p terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted", thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint or information is filed must have power to acquit or convict the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal if the court should discharge the accused because no prima facie case has been shown. As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a p investigation, a proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal. As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed: To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with equal force, for the express overruling also of the doctrine in People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint or denuncia by the offended party with the City Fiscal's Office which is required by law to conduct the preliminary investigation does not interrupt the period of prescription. In chartered cities, criminal prosecution is generally initiated by the filing of the complaint or denuncia with the city fiscal for preliminary investigation. In the case of provincial fiscals, besides being empowered like municipal judges to conduct preliminary investigations, they may even reverse actions of municipal judges with respect to charges triable by Courts of First Instance. ... 5 Clearly, therefore, the firing of the denuncia or complaint for intriguing against honor by the offended party, later changed by the Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if it were in the Fiscal's Office, 39 days after the alleged defamatory remarks were committed (or discovered) by the accused interrupts the period of prescription.

Nevertheless, petitioner Francisco cannot be held liable, for his statements — Your wife would not have been operated, If I were the doctor, all that I should have done was to do a curretage raspa on her. xxx xxx xxx The operation was unusual. are clearly not libelous per se. Complainant Angeles had admitted that he committed a mistake in the management of the case of Mrs. Cruz. The remarks made by Francisco were but a harmless expression of his opinion on what should have been done in treating her, if he were the doctor managing her. His statements were nothing more than a comment that complainant committed a mistake in the diagnosis and management of the patient. An impartial observer would readily note that such remarks do not degrade the competency of a doctor, for the latter, because of human limitations cannot be expected to be accurate at all times in the diagnosis of patients. As noted in the case of Blende vs. Hearst Publications, 93 P 2d. 733, a "physician is only required to possess the ordinary knowledge and skill of his profession, and is not liable for mistakes if he uses the methods recognized and approved by those reasonably skilled in the profession. Clearly, a criticism in a physician's wrong management of the case, such as that of Francisco cannot be considered libelous. In the same American case, it was held: It is clear that to charge a physician merely with the mismanagement of the making of a wrong diagnosis in a particular case is not of itself actionable. Such a charge implies nothing more, at most, than ignorance or unskillfulness in that case, and does not materially affect his reputation as respects his general competency to practice his profession. To charge a professional man with negligence or unskillfulness in the management or treatment of an individual case is not more than to impute to him the mistakes and errors incident to fallible human nature. The most eminent and skillfull physician or surgeon may make mistake on the symptoms of a particular case without detracting from his general professional skill or learning. To say of him, therefore, that he was mistaken in that case would not be calculated to impair the confidence of the community in his general professional competency. We cannot see our way clear on how Francisco's questioned statements could be branded as libelous. To stigmatize them as libelous would be a dangerous precedent whereby a mere criticism on the actuation of another will generate criminal liability for slander. His alleged defamatory remarks may be likened to a criticism of a lawyer's or Judge's erroneous handling of the case. It may be mentioned here that in the brief of the Solicitor General, the statements quoted and stigmatized as defamatory are those only of accused Bernardino. 6 That latter's statements are what the Solicitor General considered as "strong words that are evidently serious and damaging." Nothing has been said by the Solicitor General regarding the statements uttered by Francisco. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General would like to hold Francisco liable by the utterances of Bernardino on the ground of conspiracy. Assuming that Bernardino's statement is libelous, Francisco cannot be held liable for the same. Neither the lower court nor the Court of Appeals found that they conspired with each other to commit the alleged crane. This is so because no evidence was offered to show that there was prior consultation on what each would say. The fact alone that they were together when those words were uttered is not proof that there was conspiracy to utter those words. Clearly, each accused spoke spontaneously and individually. Conspiracy being of a very far-reaching effect, the degree of proof required for establishing it must be the same as that required to support a finding of guilt for the crime itself 7 which must be upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. 8 The finding of the Court of Appeals that the "statements were made on the occasion of the so-called fact-finding interview pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision" is obviously incompatible with the notion that petitioners had gone to the residence of the Cruz pursuant to a conspiracy to defame or slander Dr. Angeles. The legitimate purpose of going to Tanay, Rizal, having been accepted as a fact by the Court of Appeals, it is incongruous to allege, as respondents now do, that Atty. Bernardino and Dr. Francisco had conspired to slander Dr. Angeles. From what has been said, there is no further need to discuss the other issues raised in this case. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused Emiliano Francisco is hereby acquitted, with cost de oficio. SO ORDERED. Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-4164 December 12, 1952 In the matter of the petition of Antonio Infante for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ANTONIO INFANTE, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent-appellant. TUASON, J.: This was a petition of habeas corpus filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental by Antonio Infante, and the petition having been granted, the Provincial Fiscal has appealed to this Court. It appears that the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, which he recommended to serve on June 21, 1927, and that on March 6, 1939, after serving 15 years, 7 months and 11 days he was granted a conditional pardon and released from imprisonment, the condition being that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines". On April 25, 1949, Infante was found guilty by the Municipal Court of Bacolod City of driving a jeep without license and sentence to pay a fine of P10 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On July 13, 1950, "by virtue of the authority conferred upon His Excellency, the President, by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code", the Executive Secretary ordered Infante re-arrested and re-committed to the custody of the Director of Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, for breach of the condition of the aforesaid pardon.lawphil.net It was the main contention of the petitioner that section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code upon which he was ordered re-incarcerated, had been abrogated, and he was sustained by the court below. Since this appeal was taken, this Court has handed down a decision (Sales vs. Director of Prisons * 48 Off. Gaz., 560) in which these ruling were laid down: The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930, contains a repealing clause (article 367), which expressly repeals among other acts sections 102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the Administrative Code. It does not repeal section 64 (i) above quoted. On the contrary, Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which is subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, in its section 9 expressly preserves the authority conferred upon the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of the President to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any person who violates the condition or conditions of his pardon notwithstanding the enactment of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. In this connection, we observed that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code and article 159 of the Revised Penal Code are but a reiteration of 3?3 Acts Nos. 1524 and 1561, under which a violator of a conditional pardon was liable to suffer and to serve the unexpired portion of the original sentence. We are of the opinion that article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes violation of a conditional pardon as an offense, and the power vested in the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the recommitment to prison of a violator of a conditional pardon to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence, can stand together and that the proceeding under one provision does not necessarily preclude action under the other. . . . The second ground of the petition was that the remitted penalty for which the petitioner had been recommitted to jail — one year and 11 days — had prescribed. This contention was also sustained in the appealed decision. Said the Court: Segun el articulo 92 del Codigo Penal Revisado, la pena de un (1) año y once (11) dias que corresponde a la pena de prision correccional, prescribe a los diez (10) años. Por manera que, habiendo transcurrido mas de diez (10) años la responsabilidad criminal del solicitante proviniente de la infraccion de su indulto bajo condicion, ha prescrito con exceso. The contention is not well taken. According to article 93 of the Revised Penal Code the period of prescription of penalties commences to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. It is evident from this provision that evasion of the sentence is an essential element of prescription. There had been no such evasion in this case. Even if there had been one and prescription were to be applied, its basis would have to be the evasion of the unserved sentence, and the computation could not have started earlier than the date of the order for the prisoner's rearrest. We think, however, that the condition of the pardon which the prisoner was charged with having breached was no longer operative when he committed a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law. Pardon is an act of grace, and there is general agreement that limitations upon its operation should be strictly construed (46 C.J. 1202); so that, where a conditional pardon is susceptible of more than one interpretation, it is to be construed most favorably to the grantee. (39 Am. Jur., 564) Thus, in Huff vs. Dyer, 40 Ohio C.C. 595, 5. L R A, N S, Note 1064), it was held that the duration of the conditions subsequent, annexed to a pardon, would be limited to the period of the prisoner's sentence unless an intention to extend it beyond that time was manifest from the nature of the condition or the language in which it was imposed. In that case, the prisoner was discharged on habeas corpus because the term of the pardon in question did not, in the opinion of the court, imply that it was contemplated to have the condition operated beyond the term of his sentence. The herein petitioner's pardon, it will be noted, does not state the time within which the conditions thereof were to be performed or observed. In adopting, which we hereby do, the rule of strict construction, we take into account, besides the benevolent nature of the pardon, the fact that the general run out prisoners are unlettered or at least unfamiliar with the intricacies and legal implications of conditions subsequent imposed in a pardon. There are courts which have gone so far as to hold, not without plausible argument, that no conditions can be attached to a pardon that are to extend after the expiration of the term for which the prisoner was sentence, although this view is not shared by the weight of authority. (39 Am., Jur. 564, 567; 46 C.J. 1201.) Unless the petitioner's pardon be construed as above suggested, the same, instead of an act of mercy, would become an act of oppression and injustice. We can not believe that in exchange for the remission of a small fraction of the prisoner's penalty it was in the Executive's mind to keep hanging over his (prisoner's) head during the rest of his life the threat of recommitment and/or prosecution for any slight misdemeanor such as that which gave rise to the order under consideration.1awphil.net There is another angle which militates in favor of a strict construction in the case at bar. Although the penalty remitted has not, in strict law, prescribed, reimprisonment of the petitioner for the remainder of his sentence, more than ten years after he was pardoned, would be repugnant to the weight of reason and the spirit and genius of our penal laws. If a prisoner who has escaped and has given the authorities trouble and caused the State additional expense in the process of recapturing him is granted immunity from punishment after a period of hiding, there is at least as much justification for extending this liberality through strict construction of the pardon to one who, for the same period, has lived and comported as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen. Not improper to consider in this connection is the circumstance that the prisoner's general conduct during his long confinement had been "excellent", which had merited his classification as a trustee or penal colonist, and that his release before the complete extinguishment of his sentence could have been intended as a reward for his past exemplary behavior with little or no thought of exacting any return from him in the form of restraint from law violations, for which, after all, there were independent and ample punishments. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, without costs. Pablo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-30364 July 28, 1969 ANGEL C. BAKING and SIMEON G. RODRIGUEZ, petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent. ----------------------------G.R. No. L-30603 July 28, 1969 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, JOSE LAVA, RAMON ESPIRITU, FEDERICO R. MACLANG, FEDERICO BAUTISTA, ONOFRE MANGILA and CESARIO TORRES, petitioners. SANCHEZ, J.: Before us for resolution are two identical petitions for habeas corpus filed by petitioners: (1) Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez in L-30364; and (2) Jose Lava, Ramon Espiritu, Federico R. Maclang, Federico Bautista, Onofre Mangila, and Cesario Torres in L-30603. Petitioners concededly had been under detention for more than eighteen (18) years under the charge of respondent Director of Prisons when, on May 16, 1969, this Court in its decision in People vs. Lava, et al., G.R. Nos. L-4974-5-6-7-8, convicted petitioners for the crime of rebellion and sentenced each of them to ten (10) years' imprisonment. This decision has since become final. Previously, on March 31, 1969, petitioners Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez registered their petition for habeas corpus in G.R. No. L-30364, one of the cases at bar. They claimed that they had been denied the right to a speedy trial. On May 24, 1969, after this Court rendered its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of rebellion, Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez filed a motion for early decision of their petition for habeas corpus and for their immediate release, based primarily upon an averment similar to the other petition for habeas corpus before us in L-30603, filed on June 17, 1969. The present thrust of the two petitions is that petitioners should now be released because they have already served the ten (10) year sentences meted out to them. They give as reasons: First. Petitioners have been detained in prison pending the decision of their cases for more than eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months. By Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, 1 one-half of their preventive imprisonment is to be deducted from their sentence. In other words, they are already credited with more than nine (9) years and three (3) months, representing one-half of eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months. This is not disputed.2 Second. Petitioners would go farther and claim for themselves benefits accorded by Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code granting time allowance for good conduct. Petitioners would apply said Article 97 through all the time of their detention period of over eighteen years. We directed respondent Director of Prisons to produce before us the bodies of the petitioners. He did. In his return, thru the Solicitor General, he balks vehemently at the application of Article 97 to petitioners' case. After hearing and submission of memoranda, the present cases are now up for decision. 1. The key problem that now confronts us in the two petitions at bar is whether or not Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable to detention prisoners. Said provision of law in its English version reads: ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. — The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence: 1. During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days for each month of good behavior; . 2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of eight days for each month of good behavior; . 3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and 4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of fifteen days for each month of good behavior. Petitioners who have been detention prisoners prior to the finality of this Court's judgment of May 16, 1969, lay heavy stress on the phrase "any prisoner" in the English text of Article 97. In asking that the provision be made to apply to them when they were still detention prisoners, they say that the law does not distinguish between a prisoner who is serving sentence and decision prisoner. The Spanish text of Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code reads: 1äwphï1.ñët ART. 97. Abono de tiempo por buena conducto. — La buena conducta, observada por el penado en cualquier establiciemento penal le hara acreedor a las siguientes reducciones del tiempo de su condena. 1.a Cinco dias cada mes de buena conducta durante los dos primeros años de privacion de libertad; 2.a Ocho dias por mes durante los años tercero al quinto inclusive; 3.a Diez dias por mes, durante los demas años hasta el decimo inclusive; y 4.a Quince dias por mes desde el undecimo en adelante. It must be stated that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs. 3 The term "any prisoner" in the Spanish text is "el penado." Who is a convict or a person already sentenced by final judgment. For, "el penado" means a "delincuente condenado a una peña." 4 There is thus no doubt that Article 97 does not embrace detention prisoners within its reach. Because it speaks of the buena conducta observada por el penado — not one under "prision preventiva." The allowance for good conduct "for each month of good behavior" then unquestionably refers to good behavior of a prisoner while he is serving his term as a convict and not otherwise. Indeed, under Article 24 (1), Revised Penal Code, the arrest and temporary detention of accused persons are not considered as penalties. By necessary implication from the statutory scheme of the Revised Penal Code, especially Article 28 thereof, 5 the service of a sentence of one in prison begins only on the day the judgment of conviction becomes final. More to this. While Article 97 talks of "any prisoner" in the English text, it speaks, however, of that prisoner as being entitled to deductions for good conduct allowances "from the period of his sentence" ("del tiempo de su condena"). An accurate reading, therefore, of the provision yields the plain implication that the prisoner concerned is one who already has a sentence clamped upon him, i.e., a definite sentence by final judgment. The term "any prisoner" should thus be limited to those convicted by final judgment. This is the import of the law as written. 2. And then, there is the familiar precept that a codal provision is not to be interpreted in isolation. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that a code, such as the Revised Penal Code, should be construed as a whole. Courts are duty-bound to harmonize the various provisions thereof. The rule we should go by is that "a code enacted as a single comprehensive statute, is to be considered as such, and not as a series of disconnnected articles or statutes." 6 The reason why we now take stock of the foregoing rule is that we find in the same Revised Penal Code, Article 94, which provides as follows: ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. — Criminal liability is extinguished partially: 1äwphï1.ñët 1. By conditional pardon; 2. By commutation of the sentence; and 3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his sentence.7 As originally written in Spanish, this article reads: ART. 94. Como se extingue parcialmente la responsabilidad penal. — La responsabilidad penal se extinguira parcialmente: . 1.o Por indulto condicional;

2.o Por conmutacion de la sentencia; y 3.o Por abonos de buena conducta que obtenga el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia. By the above provision, good conduct allowances are given only to the culprit who earns the same "while he is serving his sentence" ("el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia"). 8 What is crystal clear in Article 94 then is that good conduct allowances are awarded only to those who are serving their sentences. Petitioners, as detention prisoners, cannot by any stretch of the imagination, be said to be serving sentence during the period of their preventive imprisonment. And this, even in the face of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code which reduces petitioners' respective sentences by one-half of their preventive imprisonment. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, Article 29 merely credits said time [of one-half of the preventive imprisonment] to convicts by final judgment. Said article does not in any way imply that detention prisoners, thereafter convicted by final judgment, have been serving sentence during their detention period. So it is, that Article 97 is to be read in conjunction with Article 94 which, under the circumstances, should likewise be deemed to give meaning to the term "any prisoner" in Article 97. Article 94 above-quoted, we must say, is embraced in the same chapter of the Revised Penal Code as Article 97 relied upon by petitioners. Both of them are in Book One, Title Four, Chapter Two, entitled "PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY", the very same heading of Article 94. And Article 94 appears to be the lead article of Chapter Two, because it talks in general terms of everything contained in said Chapter Two. To elaborate, Article 95 speaks of conditional pardon, provided in Article 94(1); Article 96 deals with commutation of sentence, mentioned in Article 94(2); and Articles 97, 98 and 99 (the rest of the Chapter) refer to good conduct allowances treated by Article 94(3). Obvious from all these is that it is from Article 94(3) that Articles 97 (the provision under interpretation), 98 and 99 should take their bearings. And it says — we repeat — that: "La responsabilidad penal se extinguira parcialmente: ... 3.o Por abonos de buena conducta que obtenga el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia. Our view on the meaning of Article 97 gets a tremendous lift from Article 98 of the Revised Penal Code, viz.: ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. — A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article.9 While Article 98 also contains the phrase "any prisoner" (translated from the Spanish text which uses the words "los penados"), it is clear that this phrase is confined to convicts who have "evaded the service of [their] sentence" ("que quebrantaren su sentencia"). The position we here take is not without jurisprudential support. In People vs. Martin, 68 Phil. 122, the accused was convicted of abduction and sentenced to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal. After having served 8 years, 1 month and 17 days, he was pardoned "on condition that he should not again be found guilty of any crime." He left unserved 6 years, 6 months and 14 days. Subsequently, he was prosecuted, tried, found guilty of another crime — attempted robbery in band with physical injuries — and sentenced by final judgment to pay a fine of 330 pesetas, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment. He was thereafter charged with a violation of the condition of his pardon. After trial, he was adjudged guilty and sentenced "to suffer the penalty which was remitted in the pardon namely, six years, six months and fourteen days." In upholding that judgment of conviction on appeal, this Court, amongst others, said: "The appellant's contention that there should be deducted from this remitted penalty the allowance of time provided in article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, is unsound. This allowance is given in consideration of the good conduct of the prisoner while serving his sentence. Not having served this remitted penalty, there is no reason for the allowance, namely, the good conduct of the appellant while serving his sentence." 10 We accordingly hold that, by a consideration of the terms of Article 97 alone, and also in conjunction with other parts of the Revised Penal Code, the phrase "any prisoner" in Article 97 thereof is to be regarded as referring only to a prisoner serving sentence. 3. A formidable argument against the tenability of petitioners' plea is Section 5 of Act 1533 of the Philippine Commission (enacted on August 30, 1906), the old law "providing for the diminution of sentences ... in consideration of good conduct and diligence." Section 5 of said Act 1533 reads: SEC. 5. Detention prisoners who voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them shall be entitled to a credit in accordance with the provisions of this Act, which shall be deducted from such sentence as may be imposed upon them in the event of their conviction.11 This provision of law, it must be said, still subsists. The repealing clause of the Revised Penal Code, Article 367 thereof, expressly abrogated Sections 1, 2 and 6 only of Act 1533. Section 5 thereof must therefore be deemed to form part of the present law on good conduct allowances. By Section 5 just transcribed, detention prisoners are entitled to good conduct allowances it they "voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them." In which case, the credit they receive "shall be deducted from such sentence as may be imposed upon them in the event of their conviction." This is the sole exception to the rule that only those serving sentence shall be entitled to good conduct allowances. If detention prisoners do not follow the condition imposed by Section 5, Act 1533, they cannot earn credit for good conduct. In the cases before us, there is not as much as an intimation that petitioners have voluntarily offered in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them. Petitioners have not even told us that they worked during the period of their preventive imprisonment. The burden to show that the condition imposed by Section 5, Act 1533 has been met, is certainly upon petitioners. They have not discharged this burden. It is thus our firm conclusion that they cannot avail of the benefits granted to detention prisoners under Section 5 of Act 1533. Upon the law we read it, petitioners' remedy is not with this Court. The law is the law. We cannot change the law under the guise of interpretation. Under our system of government, we may not tread on forbidden grounds; we cannot rewrite the law. This is the function of Congress. 12 For the reasons given, the petitions herein to set petitioners at liberty are hereby denied. No costs allowed. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Teehankee, JJ., concur. Castro, Barredo and Capistrano, JJ., took no part.