4. Cases For Reading.docx

1.)THIRD DIVISION [A.C. No. 4346. April 3, 2002]

ERLINDA ABRAGAN, MILA GINA JAVIER, REYNALDO MERCADO, PATERNO TORRES, BENIGNA ANTIBO, ELEISER SALVADOR, EDNA SAPON, JULIANA CUENCA, ESPERANZA BUENAFE, VICENTE BARNAGA, MARTHA SAPON, JOSEFINA OPEA, PUREZA WABE, RONULFO LOPEZ, DOMINADOR HERNANDEZ, FELIPA EMBATE, ROQUE CATIIL, JERRY SAPON, CONCEPCION MATANOG, and PABLO SALOMON, complainants, vs. Atty. MAXIMO G. RODRIGUEZ, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers violate their oath of office when they represent conflicting interests. They taint not only their own professional practice, but the entire legal profession itself.

The Case and the Facts Before us is a verified Petition[1] praying for the disbarment of Atty. Maximo G. Rodriguez because of alleged illegal and unethical acts. The Petition relevantly reads as follows:

2. That sometime in 1986, the petitioners hired the services of the respondent and the latter, represented the former in the case entitled PABLO SALOMON et al vs. RICARDO DACALUZ et al., before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3 docketed as Civil Case No. 11204, for Forcible Entry with Petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages, [and] a Certified True and Correct Copy of the COMPLAINT by Clerk of Court III Gerardo B. Ucat of the said Court, is herewith attached to the original of this PETITION, while photocopies of the same are also attached to the duplicate copies of this same Petition and marked as Annex A hereof;

3. That after the Case No. 11204 was finally won, and a Writ of Execution was issued by the Honorable Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3, the same respondent lawyer represented the petitioners herein; 4. That when respondent counsel disturbed the association (Cagayan de Oro Landless Residents Association, Inc.), to which all the complainants belong, by surreptitiously selling some rights to other persons without the consent of the petitioners herein, they decided to sever their client-lawyer relationship; 5. That in fact, the National Bureau of Investigation of Cagayan de Oro City, is presently undertaking an investigation on the illegal activities of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez pertaining to his express involvement in the illegal and unauthorized apportionment, assignment and sale of parcels of land subject to the Case No. 11204, where he represented the poor landless claimants of Cagayan de Oro City, which include your petitioners in this case; 6. That petitioners herein later filed an indirect contempt charge under Civil Case No. 11204 against Sheriff Fernando Loncion et al., on August 2, 1991 engaging the services of Atty. LORETO O. SALVA, SR., an alleged former student of law of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, [and a] certified true and correct copy of the complaint thereat consisting of four (4) pages is herewith attached and photocopies of which are also attached to the duplicates hereof, and correspondingly marked as their Annex B; 7. That respondent lawyer, Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, (in the Indirect Contempt Case under the same Civil Case No. 11204,) REPRESENTED and actively took up the defense of FERNANDO LONCION et al. much to the dismay, damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners, [and] a copy of Atty. Rodriguezs Answer, which is also certified true and correct by Clerk of Court III Gerardo Ucat of Branch 3 of MTCC Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of three (3) pages, is attached to the original of this Petition, while photocopies of the same are attached to the other copies hereof and accordingly marked as Annex C; 8. That the records will bear the petitioners out that their counsel, Atty. SALVA SR. later on withdrew the case of Indirect Contempt upon the suggestion of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez; and instead, filed the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution;

9. That on January 12, 1993, the herein respondent, without consulting the herein Petitioners who are all poor and ignorant of court procedures and the law, filed in behalf of the plaintiffs (which include the herein Petitioners) in Civil Case No. 11204, a Motion to Withdraw Plaintiffs Exhibits, [and] a certified true and correct copy of said Motion by Mr. Gerardo Ucat of MTCC Branch 3, Cagayan de Oro City is herewith attached to the original of this Petition, while photocopies of the same are also attached to the rest of the copies of this same Petition, and are correspondingly marked as their Annex D. 10. That the illegal and unethical actions of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez are most obnoxious, condemnable, and highly immoral, to say the least, more so if we consider his social standing and ascendancy in the community of Cagayan de Oro City; 11. That the records of Civil Case No. 11204 which are voluminous will bear the petitioners allegations against the herein respondent, who, after representing them initially, then transferring allegiance and services to the adverse parties (Lonchion, Palacio and NHA Manager), came back to represent the herein petitioners without any regard [for] the rules of law and the Canons of Professional Ethics, which is highly contemptible and a clear violation of his oath as a lawyer and an officer of the courts of law; 12. That these acts are only those that records will bear, because outside of the court records, respondent, without regard [for] delicadeza, fair play and the rule of law, has assigned, apportioned and sold parcels of land[,] subject matter in Civil Case No. 11204 which legally have been pronounced and decided to be in the possession of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11204, who are partly the petitioners herein. Thus, they cannot yet enjoy the fruits of the tedious and protracted legal battle because of respondents illegal acts, which have instilled fear among the plaintiffs and the petitioners herein; 13. That respondent lawyer even represented ERLINDA ABRAGAN, one of the herein petitioners, in a later proceedings in Civil Case No. 11204 wherein the apportionment of parcels of land was erroneously, unprocedurally and illegally submitted to a commissioner, and that ERLINDA ABRAGAN, after winning in the said Civil Case was later on dispossessed of her rights by respondent counsels maneuver, after the decision (in Civil Case No. 11208) became final executory; 14. That to make matters worse, respondent Atty. Rodriguez eventually fenced an area consisting of about 10, 200 square meters within Lot No. 1982[,] the

subject matter in Civil Case No. 11204 without the consent of the herein petitioners. He even openly and publicly proclaimed his possession and ownership thereof, which fact is again and also under NBI investigation; 15. That all the foregoing acts of respondent lawyer plus his continuing and ongoing illegal and unethical maneuvers have deprived the herein petitioners of their vested rights to possess and eventually own the land they have for decades possessed, and declared as such by final judgment in Civil Case No. 11204. In his Comment,[2] respondent flatly denied the accusations of petitioners. He explained that the withdrawal of the exhibits, having been approved by the trial court, was not illegal, obnoxious, undesirable and highly immoral. He added that he took over the 8,000 square meters of land only after it had been given to him as attorneys fees. In his words:

14. Respondent ADMITS that he fenced an area of about 8,000 sq. [m]. after the association had awarded the same as attorneys fees in Civil Case Number 11204, the dismissal of the appeal by the NHA, the successful handling of three (3) cases in the SUPREME COURT, the pending case of QUIETING OF TITLE filed by the NHA, and for the pending reconveyance case, Civil Case No. 93-573, supra. These area of 8,000 sq. [m]., was awarded as attorneys fees, which [were] supposed to be ten percent of the 22 hectares, Lot No. 1982, the subject matter of Civil Case No. 11204, but the association and its members were able to take actual possession by judgment of the courts only o[f] the twelve (12) hectares. [This] area consisting of 8,000 sq. [m]., and consisting of two (2) lots [was] fenced by the respondent to prevent squatters from entering the area. The rights of possession and ownership o[f] this area by the respondent depends upon the outcome of Civil Case No. 93-573, supra, for reconveyance of title by the association and its members versus the NHA, et. al. If it is true that this is under investigation by the NBI, then why, not wait and submit the investigation of the NHA, instead of filing this unwarranted, false and fabricated charge based on preposterous and ridiculous charges without any proof whatsoever, except the vile [language] of an irresponsible lawyer.[3] Thereafter, petitioners filed a Reply[4] in which they reiterated their allegations against respondent and added that the latter likewise violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and/or decision.[5]

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In her Report and Recommendation dated January 23, 2001, Investigating IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Her report reads in part as follows:

From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent represented conflicting interest considering that the complainants were the same plaintiffs in both cases and were duly specified in the pleadings particularly in the caption of the cases. Under the said predicament even if complainants were excluded as members of the Association represented by the respondent; the latter should have first secured complainants written consent before representing defendants in the Indirect Contempt case particularly Macario Palacio, president of the Association, or inhibited himself. It is very unfortunate that in his desire to render service to his client, respondent overlooked the fact that he already violated Rule 15.03 of [C]anon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. We have no alternative but to abide by the rules.[6]

IBP Board of Governors Resolution Upholding the above-quoted Report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended via its May 26, 2001 Resolution that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) months for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

This Courts Ruling We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, but hold that the penalty should be six-month suspension as recommended by the investigating commissioner.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

At the outset, we agree with Commissioner Navarros conclusion that apart from their allegations in their various pleadings, petitioners did not proffer any proof tending to show that respondent had sold to other persons several rights over the land in question; and that he had induced the former counsel for petitioners, Atty. Salva Jr., to withdraw the indirect contempt case that they had filed. Neither did the IBP find anything wrong as regards the 8,000 square meters awarded to respondent as payment for his legal services. Petitioners bare assertions, without any proof to back them up, would not justify the imposition of a penalty on respondent. Having said that, we find, however, that respondent falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers. They are expected to uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times. The trust and confidence clients repose in them require a high standard and appreciation of the latters duty to the former, the legal profession, the courts and the public. Indeed, the bar must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealings. To this end, lawyers should refrain from doing anything that might tend to lessen the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession.[7] In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. The Court explained in Buted v. Hernando:[8]

[A] lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.[9] (Italics in the original) In the case at bar, petitioners were the same complainants in the indirect contempt case and in the Complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 11204.[10] Respondent should have evaluated the situation first before agreeing to be counsel for the defendants in the indirect contempt proceedings. Attorneys owe undivided allegiance to their clients, and should at all times weigh their actions, especially in their dealings with the latter and the public at large. They must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times. The Court will not tolerate any departure from the straight and narrow path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession. In Hilado v. David,[11] which we quote below, the Court advised lawyers to be like Caesars wife to be pure and to appear to be so.

This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well as to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. Because of his divided allegiance, respondent has eroded, rather than enhanced, the public perception of the legal profession. His divided loyalty constitutes malpractice for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of Attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. Any member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. x x x. Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. We find however that suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law, as recommended by Commissioner Navarro, is sufficient to discipline respondent. A survey of cases involving conflicting interests on the part of counsel reveals that the Court has imposed on erring attorneys[12] either a reprimand, or a suspension from the practice of law from five (5) months[13] to as high as two (2) years.[14] WHEREFORE, Maximo G. Rodriguez is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur. Vitug, J., abroad on official business.

2.) Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court, Manila SECOND DIVISION A.C. No. 11871 [Formerly CBD Case No. 154520] POTENCIANO R. MALVAR … Complainant versus ATTY. FREDDIE B. FEIR … Respondent PRESENT: CARPIO,* J, CHAIRPERSON; PERALTA; PERLAS-BERNABE; CAGUIOA AND REYES, JR, JJ Promulgated: 5 MAR 2018 DECISION PERALTA, J: This is a Petition for Disbarment filed by petitioner Potenciano R. Malvar against Atty. Freddie B. Feir for violation of Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath.1 The antecedent facts are as follows: On February 13, 2015, petitioner Potenciano R. Malvar filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Freddie B. Feir alleging that on December 17, 2014 and January 22, 2015, he received threatening letters from Feir stating that should he fail to pay the sum of P18,000,000.00 to his client, Rogelio M.

Amurao, a criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Documents and Estafa, a civil complaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title, and an administrative complaint for the revocation of his license as a physician would be filed against him.2 According to Malvar, Feir’s demands were tantamount to blackmail or extortion due to the fact that Feir tried to obtain something of value by means of threats of filing complaints.3 Said acts are in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath which provides that: “I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same.”4 In support of his complaint, Malvar submitted the following affidavits executed by: (1) his staff stating that said staff witnessed Amurao deliver to the office a Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Amurao, Noemi Amurao, Teodorico Toribio, and Fatima Toribio; 5 and (2) Amurao himself stating that he is one of the sellers indicated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, that the signature appearing thereon is his, and that he personally witnessed Noemi Amurao, Teodorico Toribio, and Fatima Toribio sign said document.6 For his part, Feir countered that the said letters merely demanded Malvar to explain how certain parcels of land Malvar was purchasing from his client, Amurao, were already registered in Malvar’s name when Amurao had never executed a Deed of Absolute Sale transferring the same. Feir narrated that sometime in 2008, Amurao was tasked by his co-owners, spouses Teodorico Toribio and Fatima Toribio, to sell their properties consisting of three. (3) parcels of land located in Antipolo City for P21,200,000.00. The buyer of said properties was Malvar, who initially paid the sum of P3,200,000.00 with a promise to pay the remainder of the purchase price after verification of the authenticity of the owner’s title to the properties. For this purpose, Malvar borrowed the original copies of said titles from Amurao. Malvar, however, failed to return the same despite several demands. To his surprise, Amurao later on learned that the subject properties were already transferred in Malvar’s name despite the fact that he never executed the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale nor received the balance of the purchase price. Upon further verification, Amurao discovered that there exists a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the sale of the subject properties in favor of Malvar exhibiting not only the signatures of Amurao and Teodorico but also the signature of Fatima, who had long been dead.7 But when asked, Malvar could not proffer any explanation as to the existence of the suspicious Deed of

Absolute Sale or the fact that the subject properties were already in his name. It is for this reason that Amurao consulted Feir on his legal remedies as regards his recovery of the subject properties and/or collection of the remaining balance of the purchase price. Clearly, therefore, Malvar’s complaint seeking his disbarment appears only to harass and intimidate Feir. The threat to sue Malvar based on the facts presented to Feir as a lawyer was not groundless as Amurao stands to lose his property while Malvar enriches himself at Amurao’s expense.8 Interestingly, moreover, it was pointed out that the purported Affidavit executed by Amurao must be a forgery in view of the fact that he never executed any such document and that his supposed Senior Citizen Identification Number indicated in the Acknowledgment thereof was left blank.9 After a careful review and evaluation of the case, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Feir for lack of merit on February 23, 2016.10 On November 5, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution11 adopting and approving the recommended dismissal of the complaint, thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner dismissing the complaint. The Court's Ruling The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and recommendations of the IBP. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27,12 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.13 Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law”. Moreover, Rule 19.01 thereof states that “a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding”. Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten

to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's client.14 In the instant case, Malvar claims that Feir sent him the demand letters in order to interpose threats that should he fail to pay the sum of P18,000,000.00, Feir will file criminal, civil, and administrative complaints which were, in truth, unfounded for being based neither on valid nor relevant facts and law. Such demands, according to Malvar, are tantamount to blackmail or extortion. The Court, however, does not find merit in Malvar’s contention. Blackmail is defined as "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints, x x x obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice". In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.15 In the instant case, it is undisputed that Malvar is the buyer of the properties subject herein and that Amurao, Feir’s client, is one of the owners of the same. It is also undisputed that said subject properties are already registered under Malvar’s name. But according to Amurao, he has yet to receive the remaining balance of its purchase price. To the Court, this fact alone is enough reason for Amurao to seek the legal advice of Feir and for Feir to send the demand letters to Malvar. As the IBP held, these demand letters were based on a legitimate cause or issue, which is the alleged failure of Malvar to pay the full amount of the consideration in the sale transaction as well as the alleged falsified Deed of Sale used to transfer ownership over the lots subject of the instant case. 16Whether the Deed of Sale used in transferring the properties in the name of Malvar was, indeed, forged and falsified is another matter for as far as the instant complaint for disbarment is concerned, Feir was simply acting in compliance with his lawyer’s oath to protect and preserve the rights of his client.

It bears stressing, moreover, that the monetary consideration Feir was demanding from Malvar in the amount of P18,000,000.00 cannot be considered as the subject of blackmail or extortion. Feir’s demand for said amount is not an exaction of money for the exercise of an influence but is actually a legitimate claim for the remaining balance subject of a legitimate sale transaction. Contrary to Malvar’s claims, there is nothing in the demand letters to show that the same was maliciously made with intent to extort money from him since it was based on a valid and justifiable cause. Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period.17 In the absence, therefore, of any evidence preponderant to prove that Feir committed acts constituting grounds for disbarment, such as the violation of Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath, Malvar’s claims must necessarily fail. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Freddie Feir for utter lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

3.) A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018 - ROMEO A. ZARCILLA AND MARITA BUMANGLAG, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR., Respondent.

EN BANC A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018 ROMEO A. ZARCILLA AND MARITA BUMANGLAG, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR., Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated February 9, 2006 filed by complainants Romeo A. Zarcilla (Zarcilla) and Marita Bumanglag (Bumanglag) against respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. (Atty. Quesada) for gross misconduct. The facts are as follows: On August 5, 2002, complainant Zarcilla executed an Affidavit-Complaint2 against respondent Atty. Quesada and complainant Marita Bumanglag, among others, for falsification of public documents docketed as I.S. No. 02-128-SF. Zarcilla alleged that Bumanglag conspired with certain spouses Maximo Quezada and Gloria Quezada (Spouses Quezada) and Atty. Quesada to falsify a Deed of Sale3 dated April 12, 2002 by making it appear that his parents, Perfecto G. Zarcilla and Tarcela A. Zarcilla, sold a parcel of land under TCT No. T-18490 in favor of the Spouses Quezada despite knowledge that his parents were already deceased since March 4, 2001 and January 9, 1988, respectively, as per Death Certificates4issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Santo Tomas, La Union. Said signing of deed of sale was allegedly witnessed by a certain Norma Zafe and Bumanglag, and notarized by Atty. Quesada. Other than the alleged falsified deed of sale, Zarcilla also claimed that on March 20, 2002, the Spouses Quezada filed a petition for the administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 18490 where they presented the Joint Affidavit of his then already deceased parents, the spouses Perfecto Zarcilla and Tarcela A. Zarcilla as the petitioners.5 Said Joint-Affidavit of the Spouses Quezada was again notarized by Atty. Quesada. However, on October 9, 2002, Bumanglag executed a Counter-affidavit6 in the same case where she claimed to be the real owner of the property after Perfecto Zarcilla sold the same to her mother. Bumanglag also stated therein that she facilitated the sale transaction to the Spouses Quezada which, in effect, exonerated her co-respondents,

including Atty. Quesada, the pertinent portion of which reads: xxxx 6. That after the death of my mother I needed money to pay for the expenses she incurred when she was sick and need medication and all the (sic) to pay for the expenses of her burial. I offered to sell the property to Spouses MAX QUEZADA and GLORIA QUEZADA. I showed them the Deed of Sale between PERFECTO ZARCILLA and my mother. I also showed them the paper that my mother signed giving me the land; 7. That the Spouses Quezada told me that they will buy the land provided I will be the one to transfer the said land to their name. They gave me an advance payment so that I could transfer the land to them. I made it appear that PERFECTO ZARCILLA sold the property to the said spouses because the title of the land was still in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla. I did not have [any] criminal intent when I did it because the land no longer belong to Perfecto Zarcilla. I did all the subsequent acts like Petition for Reconstitution in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla because then, the title was still in his name. However, there was no damage to the heirs of PERFECTO ZARCILLA because the land had long been sold to my mother and the sons and daughters no longer had no legal claim to the said land; 8. That SPOUSES MAXIMO QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA did not falsify any document because I was the one who facilitated the transaction knowing that the land I was selling really belonged to me. Not one of my brothers and (sic) sisters never (sic) complained when I sold the land. I just delivered the document to the Spouses MAXIMO QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA including the title in their name. I was paid the balance after the Certificate of Title in their name was finally delivered.7 All other respondents in the said falsification case, except for Atty. Quesada, also filed their respective counter-affidavits where they reiterated Bumanglag's admission.8 In a Resolution9 dated April 14, 2003, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union held Bumanglag only to undergo trial. All other respondents, including Atty. Quesada who did not even file his counter-affidavit, were exonerated for insufficiency of evidence. Both Zarcilla and Bumanglag filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but both were denied. Consequently, Bumanglag was indicted for four counts of falsification of

public documents before the Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas, La Union, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3594, 3595, 3597, and 3598. However, Zarcilla later on withdrew said cases when he learned that Bumanglag was not aware of the contents of her counter-affidavit when she signed the same. He also found out that Bumanglag was deceived by her co accused, including Atty. Quesada. Thus, upon the motion of Zarcilla, in an Order10dated July 27, 2005, the court dismissed all falsification cases against Bumanglag. In a Resolution11 dated June 26, 2006, the Court resolved to require Atty. Quesada to file a comment on the complaint against him. On August 28, 2006, Atty. Quesada file a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment12 due to voluminous workload. On September 18, 2006, Atty. Quesada filed a second motion for extension to file comment. In a Resolution13 dated November 20, 2006, the Court granted Atty. Quesada's motions for extension with a warning that the second motion for extension shall be the last and that no further extension will be given. On September 26, 2007, due to Atty. Quesada's failure to file a comment on the complaint against him within the extended period which expired on October 17, 2006, the Court resolved to require Atty. Quesada to (a) show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt from such failure, and (b) comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the required comment.14 Due to Atty. Quesada's failure to comply with the Show Cause Resolution dated September 26, 2007, the Court resolved to (a) impose upon Atty. Quesada, a fine of P1,000.00, and (b) require Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by filing the comment required therein.15 No payment of fine was made as of January 13, 2009 as evidenced by a Certification16 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer. Again, failing to comply with the directives of the Court to pay the fine imposed against him and to submit his comment, the Court, in a Resolution 17 dated February 16, 2009, resolved to (a) impose upon Atty. Quesada an additional fine of P1,000.00, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fines are not paid within 10 days from notice, and (b) order Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 to submit his comment on the complaint against him. Atty. Quesada was also warned that should he fail to comply, he shall be ordered arrested and detained by the National Bureau of Investigation until he shall have made the compliance or until such time as the Court

may order. Despite repeated notices and warnings from the Court, no payment of fine was ever made as of September 3, 2010 as evidenced by a Certification18 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer. On December 28, 2010, another Certification19 was issued anew showing no record of payment of fine by Atty. Quesada. Thus, in a Resolution20 dated March 9, 2011, the Court resolved to (1) increase the fine imposed on Atty. Quesada to P3,000.00, or imprisonment often (10) days if such fine is not paid within the prescribed period; and (2) require Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the required comment on the complaint. No payment of fine was made as of July 12, 2011, as evidenced by a Certification21 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer. It appearing that Atty. Quesada failed to comply with the numerous Resolutions of the Court to pay the fine imposed upon him and submit comment on the complaint against him, in a Resolution22 dated August 24, 2011, the Court ordered the arrest of Atty. Quesada, and directed the NBI to arrest and detain him until he shall have compli[ed] with the Court's Resolution dated March 9, 2011. Subsequently, the Court issued a Warrant of Arrest.23 Apparently forced by his looming detention, after five (5) years, Atty. Quesada filed his Comment24 dated October 10, 2011, in compliance with Resolution dated June 26, 2006. He claimed that he is a victim of political harassment, vengeance and retribution, and that the instant case against him was filed solely for the purpose of maligning his person. Attached to his compliance was postal money order in the amount of P3,000.00 as payment for the fine imposed upon him. In a Letter25 dated October 10, 2011, Atty. Ricardo S. Pangan, Jr., Regional Director of the NBI, informed the Court that Atty. Quesada voluntarily surrendered before the agents of the NBI on October 11, 2011, and claimed that he had already complied with the Resolution of the Court. Atty. Quesada submitted a copy of his comment and payment of fine, thus, on the same day, Atty. Quesada was immediately released from custody. On February 1, 2012, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.26

During the mandatory conference before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD), only Bumanglag and her counsel appeared. Atty. Quesada failed to appear thereto, thus, the mandatory conference was reset to July 11, 2012. However, on July 11, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the mandatory conference was reset anew to July 25, 2012. Meanwhile, Bumanglag informed the IBP-CBD that cocomplainant Romeo Zarcilla passed away in 2005. On July 23, 2012, Atty. Quesada requested that the mandatory conference be reset due to health reasons. He submitted his Medical Certificate dated May 2, 2012 showing that he underwent a head operation and that he is still on recovery period. On July 25, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the parties were directed to appear on August 23, 2012 and submit their respective verified position papers. However, on August 23, 2012, only Bumanglag and her counsel appeared, and Atty. Quesada failed to appear anew. Thus, considering that the parties were duly notified of the hearing, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. On May 30, 2014, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty. Quesada be disbarred from the practice of law. In a Resolution No. XXI-2015-097 dated January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. RULING We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP. A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. 27 The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices. However, in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. As in this case, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a

member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.28 Thus, in the instant case, the allegations of falsification or forgery against Atty. Quesada must be competently proved because falsification or forgery cannot be presumed. As such, the allegations should first be established and determined in appropriate proceedings, like in criminal or civil cases, for it is only by such proceedings that the last word on the falsity or forgery can be uttered by a court of law with the legal competence to do so. A disbarment proceeding is not the occasion to determine the issue of falsification or forgery simply because the sole issue to be addressed and determined therein is whether or not the respondent attorney is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Accordingly, We decline to rule herein whether or not the respondent had committed the supposed falsification of the subject affidavit in the absence of the prior determination thereof in the appropriate proceeding.29 We, however, noted that Atty. Quesada Violated the notarial law for his act of notarizing the: (1) Deed of Sale30 dated April 12, 2002 purportedly executed by and between the spouses Maximo F. Quezada and Gloria D. Quezada, the buyers, and complainant Zarcilla's parents, the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla; and the (2) Joint Affidavit31 dated March 20, 2002 purportedly executed by the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-18490, when in both occasions the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla could no longer execute said documents and appear before Atty. Quesada since they have long been deceased as evidenced by their death certificates. Tarcela Zarcilla died on January 9, 1988, while Perfecto Zarcilla died on March 4, 2001.32 Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the affiant's personal appearance before the notary public: xxx (b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. Thus, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the

same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed. Here, Atty. Quesada's act of notarizing the deed of sale appeared to have been done to perpetuate a fraud. This is more evident when he certified in the acknowledgment thereof that he knew the vendors and knew them to be the same persons who executed the document. When he then solemnly declared that such appeared before him and acknowledged to him that the document was the vendor's free act and deed despite the fact that the vendors cannot do so as they were already deceased, Atty. Quesada deliberately made false representations, and was not merely negligent. Thus, by his actuations, Atty. Quesada violated not only the notarial law but also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized the deed of sale without all the affiant's personal appearance. His failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment orjurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. 33 Time and again, We have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.34 For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to

enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed.35 Aside from Atty. Quesada's violation of his duty as a notary public, what this Court find more deplorable was his defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of the Court's directives to file his comment on the complaint. Despite several Court resolutions, notices, directives and imposition of fines for Atty. Quesada's compliance and payment, he ignored the same for more than five years. Consequently, this case has dragged on for an unnecessary length of time. More than five (5) years have already elapsed from the time the Court issued the first Resolution dated June 26, 2006 which required Atty. Quesada to file his comment until his eventual submission of comment on October 10, 2011. It took a warrant of arrest to finally move Atty. Quesada to file his Comment and pay the fines imposed upon him. While the Court has been tolerant of his obstinate refusal to comply with its directives, he shamelessly ignored the same and wasted the Court's time and resources. And even with the submission of his comment, he did not offer any apology and/or any justification for his long delay in complying with the directives/orders of this Court. We surmised that when Atty. Quesada finally complied with the Court's directives, his compliance was neither prompted by good faith or willingness to obey the Court nor was he remorseful of his infractions but was actually only forced to do so considering his impending arrest. There is, thus, no question that his failure or obstinate refusal without justification or valid reason to comply with the Court's directives constitutes disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders of Court, amounting to gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect.36 Atty. Quesada's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. His cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court's Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Atty. Quesada's obstinate refusal to comply with the Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which this Court will not tolerate."37 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,

grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer's obedience to court orders and processes.38 Considering Atty. Quesada's predisposition to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. Worse, with his repeated disobedience to this Court's orders, Atty. Quesada displayed no remorse as to his misconduct which, thus, proved himself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar. Clearly, Atty. Quesada is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We find respondent ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA JR. GUILTY of gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is, thus, ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken-off of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. We, likewise, REVOKE his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.

4.) A.C. No. 9119, March 12, 2018 - EUGENIO E. CORTEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. HERNANDO P. CORTES, Respondent.

FIRST DIVISION A.C. No. 9119, March 12, 2018 EUGENIO E. CORTEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. HERNANDO P. CORTES, Respondent. DECISION TIJAM, J.: The instant controversy arose from a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Eugenio E. Cortez2against respondent Atty. Hernando P. Cortes (Atty. Cortes) for grave misconduct, and violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code for Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Cortes as his counsel in an illegal dismissal case against Philippine Explosives Corporation (PEC). He further alleged that he and Atty. Cortes had a handshake agreement on a 12% contingency fee as and by way of attorney's fees.3 Atty. Cortes prosecuted his claims for illegal dismissal which was decided in favor of complainant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission ordering PEC to pay complainant the total amount of One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,100,000) three staggered payments. PEC then Issued City Bank Check No. 1000003986 dated March 31, 2005 in the amount of Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P550,000), Check No. 1000003988 in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P275,000) dated April 15, 2005, and Check No. 1000003989 also in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos

(P275,000) dated April 30, 2005, all payable in the name of complainant. 4 Complainant narrated that after the maturity of the first check, he went to China Bank, Southmall Las Pinas with Atty. Cortes and his wife to open an account to deposit the said check. Atty. Cortes asked complainant to wait outside the bank while he personally, for and in his behalf, facilitated the opening of the account. After thirty minutes, he was asked to go inside and sign a joint savings account with Atty. Cortes. 5 On April 7, 2005, complainant alleged that when he was about to withdraw the amount of the initial check deposited, Atty. Cortes arrived with his wife and ordered the bank teller to hold off the transaction. When complainant asked why he did that, Atty. Cortes answered that 50% of the total awarded claims belongs to him as attorney's fees. When complainant questioned him, Atty. Cortes became hysterical and imposingly maintained that 50% of the total awarded claims belongs to him.6 Complainant then tried to pacify Atty. Cortes and his wife and offered to pay P200,000, and when Atty. Cortes rejected it, he offered the third check amounting to P275,000, but Atty. Cortes still insisted on the 50% of the total award. Complainant was then forced to endorse the second and third checks to Atty. Cortes, after which he was able to withdraw the proceeds of the first check. With the help of the lawyers in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), complainant was able to have the drawer of the checks cancel one of the checks endorsed to Atty. Cortes before he was able to encash the same. Atty. Cortes, in his Answer, admitted that his services were engaged by complainant to pursue the labor claims. He, however, denied that they agreed on a 12% contingency fee by way of attorney's fees.7 Atty. Cortes claimed that complainant is a relative of his, but considering that the case was to be filed in Pampanga and he resided in Las Pinas, he would only accept the case on a fifty-fifty sharing arrangement.8 Atty. Cortes alleged that the checks were issued pursuant to the pre-execution agreement reached by the parties at the office of Labor Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo. He and complainant agreed that the amount of the first check be divided fifty-fifty, the whole of the second check would be the complainant's, and the third check would be his.9 Atty. Cortes further alleged that he had to assist complainant in the opening of an account to deposit the checks. Atty. Cortes had to convince the bank manager to accept

the checks issued in the name of Eugene E. Cortez despite the fact that complainant's ID's are all in the name of Eugenio E. Cortez.10 He claimed that anyone in his place would have demanded for the holding off of the transaction because of the base ingratitude, patent deception and treachery of complainant.11 Atty. Cortes posited that the check forms part and parcel of the judgment award to which he had a lien corresponding to his attorney's fees and complainant should have at least invited him to witness the "harvest of the fruits."12 Atty. Cortes insisted that the alleged 12% agreement is false, being merely a concoction of complainant's fertile and unstable mind. He also pointed out that the fifty-fifty sharing arrangement is not unconscionably high because the complainant was given the option to hire other lawyers, but still he engaged his services.13 After hearing and submission of position papers, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, in a Report and Recommendation dated April 11, 2007, recommended the six-month suspension of Atty. Cortes. It ruled that a contingent fee arrangement should generally be in writing, and that contingent fees depend upon an express contract without which the lawyer can only recover on the basis of quantum meruit. It also pointed out that the Labor Code establishes a limit as to the amount of attorney's fees that a lawyer may collect or charge his client in labor cases. The report and recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in an August 17, 2007 Resolution: RESOLUTION CBD Eugenio Atty.

NO. Case E. Hernando

No. Cortez P.

XVIII-2007-74 05-1482 vs. Cortes

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for violation of Article 11(b) of the Labor Code, Atty. Hernando P. Cortes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and Ordered to Return to complainant whatever amount he received in

excess of the 10% allowable attorney's fees in labor case (sic). TOMAS N. PRADO National Secretary14

A motion for reconsideration15 was filed by Atty. Cortes, which was denied by the IBP Board of Governors.16 The issue, plainly, is whether or not the acts complained of constitute misconduct on the part of Atty. Cortes, which would subject him to disciplinary action. We

rule

in

the

affirmative.

We have held that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction. It is generally recognized as valid and binding, but must be laid down in an express contract.17 The case of Rayos v. Atty. Hernandez18 discussed the same succinctly, thus: A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. The amount of contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement is the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained and have their rights 19 vindicated. (Emphasis Ours)

In this case, We note that the parties did not have an express contract as regards the

payment of fees. Complainant alleges that the contingency fee was fixed at 12% via a handshake agreement, while Atty. Cortes counters that the agreement was 50%. The IBP Commission on Discipline pointed out that since what respondent handled was merely a labor case, his attorney's fees should not exceed 10%, the rate allowed under Article 11120 of the Labor Code. Although we agree that the 50% contingency fee was excessive, We do not agree that the 10% limitation as provided in Article 111 is automatically applicable. The case of Masmud v. NLRC (First Division), et al.,21 discussed the matter of application of Article 111 of the Labor Code on attorney's fees: There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party, such that, in any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, e.g., those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the amount is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. x

x

x

x

Contrary to Evangelina's proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the extraordinary concept of attorneys fees. It regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered.22 (Emphasis Ours)

It would then appear that the contingency fees that Atty. Cortes required is in the ordinary sense as it represents reasonable compensation for legal services he rendered

for complainant. Necessarily, the 10% limitation of the Labor Code would not be applicable. Beyond the limit fixed by Article 111, such as between the lawyer and the client, the attorney's fees may exceed 10% on the basis of quantum meriut.23 We, however, are hard-pressed to accept the justification of the 50% contingency fee that Atty. Cortes is insisting on for being exorbitant. Generally, the amount of attorney's fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyers compensation. In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney's fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorneys services.24 Courts may ascertain also if the attorney's fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances. In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 13825 of the Rules of Court.26 Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees." Rule 20.01 of the same canon enumerates the following factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees: (a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required; (b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) The importance of the subject matter; (d) The skill demanded; (e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs; (g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service; (h) The contingency or certainty of compensation; (i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and (j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Here, as set out by Atty. Cortes himself, the complainant's case was merely grounded on complainant's alleged absence without leave for the second time and challenging the plant manager, the complainant's immediate superior, to a fist fight. He also claimed

that the travel from his home in Las Pinas City to San Fernando, Pampanga was costly and was an ordeal. We likewise note that Atty. Cortes admitted that complainant was a close kin of his, and that complainant appealed to his services because, since his separation from work, he had no visible means of income and had so many mouths to feed. These circumstances cited by Atty. Cortes to justify the fees; to Our mind, does not exculpate Atty. Cortes, but in fact, makes Us question all the more, the reasonableness of it. We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed by Atty. Cortes was, under the facts obtaining in this case, grossly excessive and unconscionable. The issues involved could hardly be said to be novel and Atty. Cortes in fact already knew that complainant was already hard up. We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants.27 Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits.28 The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation.29 Here, considering that complainant was amenable to a 12% contingency fee, and which we likewise deem to be the reasonable worth of the attorney's services rendered by Atty. Cortes under the circumstances, Atty. Cortes is hereby adjudged to return to complainant the amount he received in excess of 12% of the total award. If the Law has to remain an honorable profession and has to attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to such tenets and principles.30 We, however, find that the recommended suspension of six months is too harsh and considering that Atty. Cortes is nearing ninety years old and that there was no question that Atty. Cortes was able to get a favorable outcome, a reduction of the suspension is proper. We then reduce and sanction Atty. Cortes to a three-month suspension from the practice of law. WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Hernando P. Cortes is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months, and is ordered to return to complainant Eugenio E. Cortez the amount he received in excess of the 12% allowable attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.

5.)

FIRST DIVISION January 8, 2018 A.C. No. 10689 ROMEO A. ALMARIO, Complainant vs. ATTY. DOMINICA LLERA-AGNO, Respondent DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint filed by complainant Romeo A. Almario (complainant) before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking to disbar Atty. Dominica L. Agno (respondent lawyer), for notarizing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) without the personal appearance of one of the affiants therein. 1

Factual Background On July 5, 2006, a Complaint for Judicial Partition with Delivery of Certificate of Title, docketed as Civil Case No. 06115416 (civil case), was instituted before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila by the herein complainant against therein defendants Angelita A. 2

Barrameda and several other persons. It was therein alleged that complainant is the sole surviving registered owner of a parcel of land situated at No. 973 Del Pan Street, San Antonio, Tondo, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 244909, and that the defendants therein are co-owners of that parcel of land by virtue of intestate succession. Relative to the said civil case, herein respondent lawyer, as counsel for therein defendants, notarized and acknowledged a SPA which reads: 3

SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: WE, x x x the HEIRS OF THE LATE VICTORIA ALMARIO, to wit: RONALD A. GA TD ULA, of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of 973 Del Pan St., Tondo, Manila and FRANCISCA A. MALLARI, of the same address, do hereby appoint, name and constitute also MA. LOURDES ALMARIO P. PEDIA, above named, to do the following acts and things: 1. To act as our representative and agent in administering our property x x x located at District of Tondo, City of Manila consisting of SEVENTY EIGHT SQUARE METERS AND SIXTY FIVE DECIMETERS (78.65) Square meters, covered by TCT No. T-244909 of the [Register] of Deeds of the City of Manila; xxxx HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto our said attorney-in-fact full power and authority, whatsoever requisite to be done in or about the premises, as fully as we might or could lawfully do if personally present and hereby ratifying and confirming all that our said attorney shall do or cause to be done by virtue of these presents until revoked in writing by me. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed this instrument on the 26th day of July 2006 at Muntinlupa City. xxxx HEIRS OF THE LATE VICTORIA A. ALMARIO: (Signed) RONALD A. GATDULA (Signed) FRANCISCA A. MALLARI xxxx ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES) SS. CITY OF MUNTINLUPA ) BEFORE ME, a notary public for the City of Muntinlupa, personally appeared the following persons on the 26[th] day of July 2006: xxxx Ronald A. Gatdula with CTC No. 16785315 issued at Manila on 1-1906 Francisca Mallari with CTC No. 16785314 issued at Manila on 1-1906 known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing Special Power of Attorney, consisting of three (3) pages including this page where the acknowledgement is written, signed by the parties and their instrumental witnesses and they acknowledged to me that the same is their own true act and deed. WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL. (Signed) DOMINICA L. AGNO Notary Public Until 31 Dec 2006 PTR No. 0007769 Muntinlupa City 06 January 2006 IBP Life Roll 00577 Doc. No. 193 Page No. 55 Book No. 11 Series of 2006 It is complainant's contention: (l) that the said SP A was falsified because one of the affiants therein, Francisca A. Mallari (Mallari), could not possibly have executed the same because she was in Japan at the time the SP A was executed, as certified to by the Bureau of Immigration (BI); (2) that this SP A was used in the said civil case to perpetrate fraud and deception against complainant resulting in the filing of Criminal Case No. 452612-CR, for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Use of Falsified Document) against Ma. Lourdes Almario Pedia, (Pedia), the attorney-in-fact mentioned in the SPA; (3) that respondent lawyer notarized the SP A although Mallari did not personally appear before her; (4) that in the process of notarizing the SP A, respondent lawyer also accepted a Community Tax Certificate (CTC), which is no longer considered a competent evidence of identity pursuant to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; and (5) that, therefore, respondent lawyer violated Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which state 4

5

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause. xxxx CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. In her Answer, respondent lawyer prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and offered the following arguments: 6

1) On July 12, 2006, Pedia sent the SPA to Mallari in Japan and it was brought back to the Philippines on July 25, 2006 by Mallari's son, Roman Mallari-Vestido; 2) The SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006 for reasons of expediency, because therein defendants were pressed for time in filing their Answer in the civil case, and that in any event, Mallari undertook to have the SPA acknowledged before the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on August 28, 2006, (thereby giving it retroactive effect). Respondent lawyer claimed that the aforementioned circumstances showed that she acted in good faith in notarizing the SPA; 3) Mallari was able to acknowledge the SP A with red ribbon before the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on August 28, 2006; 7

4) Neither fraud nor deception was perpetrated as the parties in the said civil case executed a Compromise Agreement, which was approved by the RTC; 8

9

5) Contrary to complainant's claim, CTCs are still presently accepted as proof of personal identification in cases where no other proof of personal identification is available; and, 6) That, if at all, it was complainant himself who defrauded the RTC when he stated in his verified complaint that Mallari is a resident of No. 973 Del Pan St., San Antonio, Tondo, Manila, even though he knew that Mallari was in Japan at the time of filing of the civil case. Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner In a Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer liable for violation of Section 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and recommended that she be suspended for six months as notary public. 10

According to the Investigating Commissioner, it was evident that respondent lawyer notarized the SPA despite knowing that Mallari, one of the affiants therein, did not personally appear before her. Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors On April 16, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting the finding and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. 11

Respondent lawyer filed a verified Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution dated May 3, 2014. 12

13

Hence, the instant Petition for Review. Respondent lawyer admits the infraction imputed against her, and simply pleads that the penalty recommended by the IBP be reduced or lowered. She argues that: (1) this is her first offense since she was first commissioned as a notary public in 1973; (2) the case involved only one document; (3) the notarization was done in good faith; (4) the civil case wherein the questioned SP A was used ended in a Compromise Agreement; and finally (5) she is already 71 years old and is truly sorry for what she had done, and promises to be more circumspect in the performance of her duties as a notary public. 14

In his Comment to the Petition, complainant insists that respondent lawyer must be disciplined accordingly and that suspension is the appropriate penalty for such infraction. 15

The sole issue that this Court must thus address is the appropriate penalty to be meted out against respondent lawyer. Our Ruling The importance of the affiant's personal appearance when a document is notarized is underscored by Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which states: SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - 'Acknowledgment' refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete instrument or document; (b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and (c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes instrument or document, declares that he has executed the document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if

instrument or stated in the instrument or he acts in a

particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied) Furthermore, Section 2(b), Rule 1V of the same Rules provides that: (b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document – (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. (Emphasis supplied) These provisions mandate the notary public to require the physical or personal presence of the person/s who executed a document, before notarizing the same. In other words, a document should not be notarized unless the person/s who is/are executing it is/are personally or physically present before the notary public. The personal and physical presence of the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature/s of the affiant/s therein and the due execution of the document. Notaries public are absolutely prohibited or forbidden from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. They are the law's vanguards and sentinels against illegal deeds. The confidence of the public in the integrity of notarial acts would be undermined and impaired if notaries public do not observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties spelled out in the notarial law. 1âwphi1

This Court, in Ferguson v. Atty. Ramos, held that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act[;i]t is imbued with public interest x xx." 16

In cognate or similar cases, this Court likewise held that a notary public must not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same persons who executed the same, and personally appeared before him to attest to the truth of the contents thereof. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free and voluntary act and deed. 17

In the present case, the SPA in question was notarized by respondent lawyer despite the absence of Mallari, one of the affiants therein. Mallari could not have personally appeared before respondent lawyer in Muntinlupa City, Philippines where the SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006 because Mallari was in Japan at that time, as certified to by the Bureau of Immigration. It goes without saying that it was respondent lawyer's bounden duty, as a lawyer and notary public, to obey the laws of the land and to promote respect for legal processes. Respondent lawyer may only forsake this duty at the risk of forfeiting her membership in the Philippine

Bar and the revocation of her license as a notary public. Considering however, the circumstances attendant upon this case, we resolve to reduce or lower the recommended penalty on respondent lawyer. The Court opts to suspend respondent lawyer as a notary public for two months, instead of six months as the IBP had recommended. We are impelled by the following reasons for taking this course of action: first, the apparent absence of bad faith in her notarizing the SP A in question; second, the civil case wherein the flawed SP A was used ended up in a judicial Compromise Agreement; and finally, this is her first administrative case since she was commissioned as a Notary Public in 1973. In addition, respondent lawyer invites our attention to the fact that she is already in the twilight years of her life. ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Dominica L. Agno is hereby SUSPENDED as Notary Public for the aforesaid infraction for two months and WARNED that the commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Agno's personal record. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their info1mation and guidance. SO ORDERED.

6.) A.C. No. 5161

April 14, 2004

ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM: In a Complaint-Affidavit filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra TingDumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant’s 1

signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics. The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit: a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 43,908 square meters more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite; b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 16,073 square meters, more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite; c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 22,131 square meters, more or less and covered at that time by TCT No. T- 1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions: 1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false. He presented that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by, Felicisima and Miriam. 2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina. 3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy and Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainant’s sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false

testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names. With the reconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was even received pending the reconstitution proceedings. 4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee. In his Comment, the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that he did not take advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his parents-in-law. 2

Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely profit from the sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of the document. All the while he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever complainant’s signature was affixed on that document, it was done in good faith. The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., in LRC Case No. 5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of Marcelina in that case that she and Felicisima were the only children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could not be faulted on him because such was a clear oversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and his wife. His conformity through his signature was pro-forma because the property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent his alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution would be released by the end of November 1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk of Court, Mr. Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually uncontested and granted by courts. Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in bombarding him with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for "Annulment of Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages"; and a criminal case for Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents. In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her mother and allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in view of the following circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden death in 1967; and partition of the properties in total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible, since the latter was still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were still minors including respondent’s wife herself; (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response to the previous letter of

Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence of a toka. She further states that the respondent was not merely a passive onlooker but, as he admitted, the administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses. On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision. 3

On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both parties, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. 4

In its Resolution No. XV-2003-333 of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted Commissioner San Juan’s report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six years. 5

We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of culpability. The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus: LAWYER'S OATH I, ……………… , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. SO HELP ME GOD. This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyer’s oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice. This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: 6

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes. Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. ... CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. … Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. ... CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When the respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably failed. The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other siblings. There was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the estate of the deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to complainant’s sister, he knew of his wife’s siblings. In fact, he declared that the complainant stayed with them while she was in the Philippines. Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register of Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife and his sister-in-law Miriam. 7

8

It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted regarding the falsification of complainant’s signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by the complainant of her right over the property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainant’s name in that document. Such act of counterfeiting the complainant’s signature to make it appear that the complainant had participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to falsification of a public document. 9

10

11

12

Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against committing falsification, he presented such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife. He himself, therefore, may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the complainant and 13

14

her other co-heirs. Notably, he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the transfer of Lot 1603. 15

16

Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate. He should not, therefore, engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. He makes himself unfit to remain in the profession who commits any such unbecoming act or conduct. 17

18

19

20

21

Respondent’s argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister- in-law Marcelina of the other siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a mere oversight does not deserve credence in view of the following circumstances: First, the petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners when there were six siblings who were heirs of the unpartitioned lot.22 Second, during the hearing of said case when the respondent asked Marcelina whether she has brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the latter said none. The transcript of that hearing reads: ATTY. TORRES: Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. Vicente Ting, Jr. and Julita Reynante? WITNESS: A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I. Q Do you have other brothers and sisters? A None, sir.

23

The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony in court, and he never corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the case. Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony. 24

25

26

Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall "not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605. 27

The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him. 28

It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing of this administrative case, Marcelina admitted that her statement in that affidavit that the title was in her possession was false, as she was never in possession of the title and would not, therefore, know that the same was lost. 29

Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent requested the release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong that he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be released within the month. Respondent’s information was misleading because he presented evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after he sent the letter. Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on the part of the respondent. 30

31

Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar.

32

33

Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. Verily, given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondent’s gross misconduct calls for 34

the severance of his privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal files of the respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines. SO ORDERED

7.) Yap-Paras vs. Justo Paras A.C. # 4947, February 14, 2005

FACTS: Rosa Yap-Paras (Petitioner) filed a case against Atty. Justo Paras (respondent) praying for the disbarment of the latter, accusing that he committed acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, and violation of oath as a lawyer committed by the latter. The respondent was found guilty by the SC of falsehood and suspended him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that a similar offense committed in the future will yield a harsher penalty. The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the court as per his suspension. During its pendency, petitioner filed a Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment under the ground that Atty. Paras did not heed the SC’s suspension order and was still practicing his legal profession. Eventually, the MR was denied by the SC and asked respondent to comment on the current motion filed against him by the petitioner within 10 days. The respondent filed a Manifestation with the court after more than a year, stating that he has already complied with the 1-year suspension. In response, the SC issued another resolution that compels

respondent to explain why he should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the previous resolution. Respondent replied by denying the previous allegations made by petitioner that he was engaged in the practice of law during his suspension.

ISSUES: (1)Whether or not Atty. Justo Paras should be disbarred for violating the SC’s suspension order by practicing his legal profession during his suspension period. (2)Whether or not Atty. Justo Paras should be disbarred by failing to file a comment on time as demanded by the SC.

HELD: (1)

(2)

NO. The SC found no factual basis on the petitioner’s allegations that the respondent practiced law during his suspension. Respondent even took the initiative to inform the lower courts of his one-year suspension from the practice of law, as the SC noted. NO. While it is clear that resolutions of the SC are not mere requests that can be brushed aside or partially complied with and that the SC’s authority should always be respected and observed, the SC held that the respondent’s failing health and surgical operations that he underwent are reasonable excuses for him to not be able to file his comment on time. Moreover, the SC took note that respondent expressed his profound regret and immeasurable sorrow for not being able to comply with the court’s order. Hence, a REPRIMAND with WARNING was deemed sufficient punishment by the SC for respondent’s failures, coupled with a reminder that a more drastic punishment shall be meted out accordingly if such offense shall be repeated by the respondent.

8.) EN BANC October 3, 2017 A.C. No. 11483 LUZVIMINDA S. CERILLA, Complainant vs. ATTY. SAMUEL SM. LEZAMA, Respondent RESOLUTION PERALTA, J.: On November 22, 2010, complainant Luzviminda S. Cerilla filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct against respondent Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). 1

In her Complaint, complainant stated that she is one of the co-owners of a parcel of land located at BarangayPoblacion, Municipality of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, with an area of 730 square meters. The said property is covered by TCT No. 1-20416 and registered in the name of Fulquerio Gringio. It was later sold by his sole heir, Pancracio A. Gringio, to the heirs of Fabio Solmayor, including the herein complainant. Being a co-owner of the subject property, complainant engaged the services of respondent to file an unlawful detainer case against Carmelita S. Garlito with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental. At that time, the complainant was working at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, and for this reason, she executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of the respondent to perform the following acts, to wit: 2

(1) To represent and act on my behalf in filing a case of ejectment against Lita Garlito of Sibulan, Negros Oriental; (2) To appear on my behalf during the preliminary conference in Civil Case No. 497-04 and to make stipulations of facts, admissions and other matters for the early resolution of the same including amicable settlement of the case if necessary. 3

Complainant said that on the basis of the SPA, respondent entered into a compromise agreement with the defendant in the unlawful detainer case to sell the subject property of the complainant for ₱350,000.00 without her consent or a special authority from her. Paragraph 2 of the Compromise Agreement dated January 31, 2005 states:

2. The plaintiff is willing to sell [the] property in question to the defendant in the amount of ₱350,000.00 within a period of three months beginning February 1, 2005 up to April 30, 2005, the payment of which shall be paid in one setting. 4

The Compromise Agreement was approved by the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in an Order dated January 31, 2005. Subsequently, a Motion for Execution dated June 2, 2005 was filed due to complainant's failure to comply with the terms and conditions set forth in the compromise agreement, as complainant refused to execute a Deed of Sale. The MTC issued a Writ of Execution on June 10, 2005. 5

6

7

Complainant contended that respondent misrepresented in paragraph 2 of the Compromise Agreement that she was willing to sell the subject property for ₱350,000.00. Complainant averred that she did not authorize the respondent to sell the property and she is not willing to sell the property in the amount of ₱350,000.00, considering that there are other co-owners of the property. Complainant contended that by entering into the compromise agreement to sell the subject property without any special power to do so, respondent committed gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties to his client. She asserted that respondent's misconduct was the proximate cause of the loss of the subject property in the ejectment case, which prejudiced her and the other co-owners, as respondent knew that the ejectment case was filed by her for the benefit of all the co-owners of the property. According to complainant, the subject property is located near the Municipal Hall and town plaza of the Municipality of Sibulan, Negros Oriental and the property's market value is not less than ₱l,500,000.00. Since respondent sold the property for only ₱350,000.00, she (complainant) and the other co-owners suffer actual loss. Complainant contended that respondent's act of entering into the compromise agreement with the misrepresentation that she was willing to sell the property in the unlawful detainer case without her consent or conformity, which caused her material damage, warrants respondent's suspension or disbarment. In his Answer, respondent denied complainant's allegation that he misrepresented that complainant was willing to sell the property in the amount of ₱350,000.00, since he was duly armed with an SPA to enter into a compromise agreement, and the price of ₱350,000.00 was the actual price paid by the complainant to the owner of the property. 8

Respondent contended that complainant has no cause of action against him for the following reasons: (a) The SPA dated December 27, 2004 was executed by the complainant in favor of the respondent due to her inability to attend every hearing of the unlawful detainer case; (b) The SPA contains the sentence under number 2: "including amicable settlement of the case if necessary";

(c) During the preliminary conference of the unlawful detainer case, the respondent requested Presiding Judge Rafael Cresencio C. Tan, Jr. to allow him to contact the complainant by mobile phone before any compromise agreement could be executed. Respondent tried several times to contact complainant to no avail during the recess. When the case was called again, he requested a resetting, but the Presiding Judge insisted on a compromise agreement to be submitted because respondent was armed with the necessary SPA anyway, and the result was the Compromise Agreement of January 31, 2005; (d) Upon the signing of the Compromise Agreement, respondent was able to contact complainant, who objected to the agreement because the amount of ₱350,000.00 was small; (e) After writing a letter of repudiation to the counsel of the defendant in the unlawful detainer case, respondent filed a Manifestation dated February 24, 2005 with the MTC of Sibulan, attaching therewith the letter of repudiation, and he also filed a Motion to Set Aside Order and to Annul Compromise Agreement (on the ground of mistake). However, the MTC denied the said motion in an Order dated May 30, 2005. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied by the MTC; 9

10

(f) In 2006, the heirs of Favio Solmayor filed another unlawful detainer case over the same property with the same MTC against the same defendant, which was dismissed by the court on the ground of res judicata; and 11

(g) In 2008, complainant filed a civil case for annulment of judgment/quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages against Carmelita S. Garlito, respondent Atty. Lezama and the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, and the case is still pending before the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 35, Negros Oriental. 12

13

Further, respondent stated that the payment for the property in the amount of ₱350,000.00 is under the custody of the MTC of Sibulan, although the money was deposited with the Philippine Veterans Bank by defendant Carmelita S. Garlito, who opened an account in respondent's name. Respondent stated that he has never touched the said deposit. Respondent contended that the SP A given to him by the complainant was sufficient authority to enter into the said compromise agreement. The amount of ₱350,000.00 was the price of the subject property, because the complainant paid the same amount for the purchase of the property from the Gringio family. 1âwphi1

According to the respondent, he entered into the compromise agreement under the honest and sincere belief that it was the fairest and most equitable arrangement. Under the present policy of the Court, parties should endeavor to settle their differences (in civil cases, at least) amicably. To penalize lawyers for their judgment calls in cases where they are armed with authority to settle would wreck havoc on our system of litigation, making them hesitant, apprehensive and wary that their clients might file disciplinary cases against them for the

slightest reasons. While the filing of such complaint is part of the professional hazards of lawyering, the same should only be anchored on the most serious misconduct of lawyers, which respondent does not believe is present in this case. Hence, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. On June 10, 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline held a mandatory conference with the parties, who were required to submit their respective Position Papers thereafter. The Commissioner's Report On June 28, 2013, Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. submitted his Report, finding respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. 14

The Investigating Commissioner stated that during the mandatory conference, it was agreed upon that the SPA dated December 27, 2004 was the same SP A granted by complainant in favor of respondent. It was also agreed upon that by virtue of the said SP A, respondent entered into a compromise agreement with the defendant in the unlawful detainer case. According to the complainant, while it is true that she executed an SPA in favor of the respondent, there was no specific authority granted to him to sell the subject property for ₱350,000.00, and that was the reason why she refused to sign the Deed of Sale. Moreover, respondent admitted during the mandatory conference that complainant did not give him any instruction to sell the property, thus: Comm. De La Rama: Prior to the execution of the compromise agreement on January 31, 2005, were you under instruction by Ms. Cerilla to sell the property? Atty. Lezama: No, Your Honor. Comm. De La Rama: You were not? Atty. Lezama There was none. Comm. De La Rama: So what prompted you to [have] that idea that Ms. Cerilla is willing to sell this property in the amount of Php350,000.00? Atty. Lezama : Because that is the same amount that she paid [for] the property. It is an amicable settlement in meeting halfway. Comm. De La Rama: But you at that time, prior to the signing of the Compromise Agreement, you do not have any instruction from Ms. Cerilla to sell the property? Atty. Lezama No, Your Honor.

Comm. De La Rama : So it was your own volition? Atty. Lezama : Yes, my own belief.

15

The Investigating Commissioner stated that respondent must have overlooked the fact that the subject property was co-owned by complainant's siblings. Respondent knew about the co-ownership because of the existence of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, but he did not assert that his authority to compromise binds only the complainant. Respondent merely made a flimsy excuse as shown in the transcript of stenographic notes, to wit: 16

Comm. De La Rama: Are you aware, Atty. Lezama, that the property does not belong exclusively to Ms. Cerilla? Atty. Lezama I was of the impression that it was owned by complainant that's why the ejectment complaint filed speaks only of Luzviminda Cerilla but that was her claim because she said she paid for it. 17

The Investigating Commissioner stated that the transcript of stenographic notes shows that respondent admitted that complainant did not grant him the authority to sell the property in the amount of ₱350,000.00. Thus, knowing that he did not possess such authority, respondent cannot validly claim that his client, complainant herein, was willing to sell the property in the amount of ₱350,000.00. In order to save himself, respondent allegedly filed a Manifestation, but he failed to submit a copy of the same before the Commission. Further, the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary conference of the unlawful detainer case shows that it was the respondent who stated that the plaintiff (complainant herein) was willing to sell the property, and it was also the respondent who fixed the selling price of the property at ₱350,000.00, thus: Court : The plaintiff is willing to sell the property? Atty. Lezama : Yes, if the defendant is willing to pay the amount of sale. Court : How much? Atty. Lezama : ₱l00,000.00, although the record is more than that, your Honor. Court : They will also want to buy the property. You will sell it for ₱l00,000.00? Atty. Lezama : I don't think, your Honor. Maybe it's ₱300,000.00. Court : ₱300,000.00. How much?

Atty. Lezama : ₱350,000.00. x x x.

18

The MTC Judge also inquired about respondent's authority, and respondent replied, thus: Court Are you authorize[d] to make some suggestions to other matter, dismissal or other settlement? Do you have an authority? Atty. Lezama : Yes, your Honor, but I have some limitations. I think, your Honor, we need one more setting because I cannot agree on the proposal of the amount of the property your Honor. 19

The Investigating Commissioner stated that based on the foregoing, respondent acted beyond the scope of his authority. Respondent knew beforehand that no instruction was given by his client to sell the property, yet he bound his client to sell the property without her knowledge. Thus, he betrayed the trust of his client, complainant herein. The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. 20

21

The Ruling of the IBP Board of Governors On August 8, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014386, which adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Finding that the recommendation was fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and for violation of Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Board suspended respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years. 22

Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XXII-2016-179 dated February 25, 2016. 23

In a letter dated August 18, 2016, Director for Bar Discipline Ramon S. Esguerra notified the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the transmittal of the documents of the case to the Court for final action, pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. 24

Ruling of the Court The Court agrees with the finding and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. Respondent entered into the Compromise Agreement on the basis of the SP A granted to him by complainant. The SPA authorized respondent to represent complainant in filing the ejectment case and "[t]o appear on [complainant's] behalf during the preliminary conference in said ejectment case and to make stipulations of fact, admissions and other matters for the early resolution of the case, including amicable settlement of the case if necessary." 25

Nowhere is it expressly stated in the SPA that respondent is authorized to compromise on the sale of the property or to sell the property of complainant. The records show that respondent admitted that he entered into the compromise agreement with the defendant in the unlawful detainer case and stated that the plaintiff, who is the complainant herein, was willing to sell the property to the defendant in the amount of ₱350,000.00 even if the complainant did not instruct or authorize him to sell the property, and he merely acted upon his own belief. As the SPA granted to him by the complainant did not contain the power to sell the property, respondent clearly acted beyond the scope of his authority in entering into the compromise agreement wherein the property was sold to the defendant Carmelita S. Garlito. 26

Respondent, in his Answer and Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No. XXI-2014-386, stated that his action was based on an honest belief that he was serving both the interest of his client and the policy of the law to settle cases amicably. However, his justification does not persuade, because his alleged honest belief prejudiced his client, since the property she was not willing to sell was sold at a price decided upon by respondent on his own, which caused his client and her co-owners to file further cases to recover their property that was sold due to respondent's mistake. He overlooked the fact that he was not authorized by his client to sell the property. Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: CANON 5 - A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence. The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been reiterated in Hernandez v. Atty. Padilla, thus: 27

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes. 28

As found by the IBP Board of Governors, respondent also violated Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Responsibility: CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. The Court sustains the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be penalized with suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama is found guilty of violating Canons 5, 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of TWO (2) YEARS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal file of respondent. Likewise, copies shall be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

9.) EN BANC A.C. No. 11149 (Formerly CBD Case No. 13-3709), August 15, 2017 LAURENCE D. PUNLA AND MARILYN SANTOS, Complainants, v. ATTY. ELEONOR MARAVILLAONA, Respondent. The present administrative case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by complainants Laurence D. Punla and Marilyn Santos against respondent Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, charging the latter with violation of the lawyer's oath, for neglecting her clients' interests. Factual Background: Complainants met the respondent last January 2012 when they broached the idea to respondent that they intend to file two annulment cases and they wanted respondent to represent them; that respondent committed to finish the two annulment cases within six months from full payment; that the agreed lawyer's fee for the two annulment cases is P350,000.00; that the P350,000.00 was paid in full by complainants personally handed to respondent lawyer and evidenced by respondent's handwritten acknowledgement receipt.

On the commitment of respondent that she will finish the cases in six months, complainants followed up their cases in September 2012 or about 6 months from their last payment in March 2012. They were ignored by respondent. On 25 September 2012, complainants sent a letter to respondent demanding that the P3 50,000.00 they paid her be refunded in full within five (5) days from receipt of the letter, the Philpost of Dasmariñas, Cavite, attested that complainants' letter was received by respondent on 01 October 2012. No refund was made by respondent. In an Order dated January 25, 2013, the IBP directed respondent to file her Answer within 15 days. No answer was filed. A Mandatory Conference/Hearing was set on December 4, 2013 but respondent did not appear, so it was reset to January 22, 2014. However, respondent again failed to attend the mandatory conference/hearing as scheduled. Hence, in an Order dated January 22, 2014, the mandatory conference was terminated and both parties were directed to submit their verified position papers. Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner: The Investigating Commissioner was of the opinion that respondent is guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In addition, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found that respondent has been charged with several infractions, thus clearly showing that respondent lawyer has been a serial violator of the Canons of Professional Responsibility as there are thirteen pending cases filed against her. These cases were filed on different dates and by various individuals and is substantial proof that respondent has the propensity to violate her lawyer's oath - and has not changed in her professional dealing with the public. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred and ordered to pay complainants the amount of P350,000.00 with legal interest until fully paid. Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors:

The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XXI-2015-15612 dated February 20, 2015, resolved to adopt the findings of the Investigating Commissioner as well as the recommended penalty of disbarment. The issue in this case is whether respondent should be disbarred.

Our Ruling The Court resolves to adopt the findings of fact of the IBP but must, however, modify the penalty imposed in view of respondent's previous disbarment. This Court cannot overlook the reality that several cases had been filed against respondent, as pointed out by the IBP. In fact, one such case eventually led to the disbarment of respondent. In Suarez v. MaravillaOna, the Court meted out the ultimate penalty of disbarment and held that the misconduct of respondent was aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect towards the IBP and amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. Clearly, Atty. Maravilla-Ona exhibits the habit of violating her oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as defying the processes of the IBP. The Court cannot allow her blatant disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her sworn duty as a member of the Bar to continue. She had

been warned that a similar violation would merit a more severe penalty, and yet, her reprehensible conduct has, again, brought embarrassment and dishonor to the legal profession. While indeed respondent's condemnable acts ought to merit the penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar her anew, for in this jurisdiction we do not impose double disbarment. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ADOPTS the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and FINDS respondent ATTY. ELEONOR MARAVILLA-ONA GUILTY of gross and continuing violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and accordingly FINED P40,000.00. Respondent is also ORDERED to PAY complainants the amount of P350,000.00, with 12% interest from the date of demand until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment. This is without prejudice to the complainants' filing of the appropriate criminal case, if they so desire.

This Decision shall be immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC August 15, 2017 A.C. No. 11149 LAURENCE D. PUNLA and MARILYN SANTOS, Complainants, vs. ATTY. ELEONOR MARA VILLA-ONA,, Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: The present administrative case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) by complainants Laurence D. Punla and Marilyn Santos against respondent Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, charging the latter with violation of the lawyer's oath, for neglecting her clients' interests. 1

Factual Background The facts, as culled from the disbarment complaint, are summarized in the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Ricardo M. Espina viz.: 2

In a complaint-affidavit filed on 15 January 2013, complainants alleged that they got to know respondent lawyer sometime in January 2012 when they requested her to notarize a Deed of Sale; that subsequently, they broached the idea to respondent that they intend (sic) to file two (2) annulment cases and they wanted respondent to represent them; that respondent committed to

finish the two (2) annulment cases within six (6) months from full payment; that the agreed lawyer's fee for the two annulment cases is P350,000.00; that the ₱350,000.00 was paid in full by complainants, as follows: ₱100,000.00 on 27 January 2012 as evidenced by respondent's Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 55749 of even date (Annex "A"); ₱150,000.00 on 28 January 2012 as evidenced by respondent's Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 56509 of even date (Annex "B"); ₱50,000.00 on 14 March 2012 personally handed to respondent lawyer and evidenced by respondent's handwritten acknowledgement receipt of same date (Annex "C"); and, ₱50,000.00 on 15 March 2012 deposited to respondent's Metrobank account no. 495-3-49509141-5 (Annex "D"). On the commitment of respondent that she will (sic) finish the cases in six (6) months, complainants followed up their cases in September 2012 or about 6 months from their last payment in March 2012. They were ignored by respondent. On 25 September 2012, complainants sent a letter (Annex "E") to respondent demanding that the ₱350,000.00 they paid her be refunded in full within five (5) days from receipt of the letter. In a Certification dated 07 November 2012 (Annex "F"), the Philpost of Dasmarinas, Cavite, attested that complainants' letter was received by respondent on 01 October 2012. No refi.md was made by respondent. 3

In an Order dated January 25, 2013, the IBP directed respondent to file her Answer within 15 days. No answer was filed. A Mandatory Conference/Hearing was set on December 4, 2013 but respondent did not appear, so it was reset to January 22, 2014. However, respondent again failed to attend the mandatory conference/hearing as scheduled. Hence, in an Order dated January 22, 2014, the mandatory conference was terminated and both parties were directed to submit their verified position papers. 4

5

6

7

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner The Investigating Commissioner was of the opinion that respondent is guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: 8

There is clear violation of Canons 17 and 18, Canons of Professional Responsibility. These canons, quoted hereunder, [state]: CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Of particular concern is Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to always keep the client informed of the developments in his case and to respond whenever the client requests for information. Respondent has miserably failed to comply with this Canon. 9

In addition, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found that respondent has been charged with several infractions. Thus: Moreover, verification conducted by this Office shows that this is not the first time that respondent lawyer has been administratively charged before this Office. As shown in the table below, respondent is involved in the following active cases: COMPLAINANTS Ten (10) consolidated cases: 1. Felisa Amistoso, et al. 2. Anita Lagman 3. Isidro H. Montoya 4. NoelAngcao 5. Mercedes Bayan 6. Rustica Canuel 7. Anita Canuel 8. Elmer Canuel 9. Evangeline Sangalang 10. Felisa Amistoso

CASE NO.

A.C. No. 6369 A.C. No. 6371 A.C. No. 6458 A.C. No. 6459 A.C. No. 6460 A.C. No. 6462 A.C. No. 6457 A.C. No. 6463 A.C. No. 6464 A.C. No. 6469

STATUS

Pending with Supreme Court

PENALTY

WHEN FILED

Suspension

11. Beatrice Yatco, et al.

CBD Case No. 10-2733

Pending with Supreme Court

12. Nonna Guiterrez

CBD Case No. 12-3444

For report and recommendation

May 23, 2012

13. Bienvenida Flor Suarez

CBD Case No. 12-3534

For report and recommendation

August 01, 2012

Suspension

July 26, 2010

Clearly, respondent lawyer has been a serial violator of the Canons of Professional Responsibility as shown in the thirteen (13) pending cases filed against her. Add to that the present case and that places the total pending administrative cases against respondent at fourteen (14). That these 14 cases were filed on different dates and by various individuals is substantial proof that respondent has the propensity to violate her lawyer's oath- and has not changed in her professional dealing with the public. 10

Consequently, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred and ordered to pay complainants the amount of ₱350,000.00 with legal interest until fully paid. 11

Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XXI-2015-156 dated February 20, 2015, resolved to adopt the findings of the Investigating Commissioner as well as the recommended penalty of disbarment. 12

The issue in this case is whether respondent should be disbarred. Our Ruling The Court resolves to adopt the findings of fact of the IBP but must, however, modify the penalty imposed in view of respondent's previous disbarment. Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court provides the penalties of disbarment and suspension as follows: Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do x x x. Here, there is no question as to respondent's guilt. It is clear from the records that respondent violated her lawyer's oath and code of conduct when she withheld from complainants the amount of ₱350,000.00 given to her, despite her failure to render the necessary legal services, and after complainants demanded its return. 1âwphi1

It cannot be stressed enough that once a lawyer takes up the cause of a client, that lawyer is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence and zeal, especially when he/she accepts it for a fee. The lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him/her. Moreover, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the monies he/she holds for his/her client gives rise to the presumption that he/she has appropriated the said monies for his/her own use, to the prejudice and in violation of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her client. 13

14

What is more, this Court cannot overlook the reality that several cases had been filed against respondent, as pointed out by the IBP. In fact, one such case eventually led to the disbarment of respondent. In Suarez v. Maravilla-Ona, the Court meted out the ultimate penalty of disbarment and held that the misconduct of respondent was aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect towards the IBP and amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. 1âwphi1

15

In the same case, the Court took note of the past disbarment complaints that had been filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona viz.:

x x x In A.C. No. 10107 entitled Beatrice C. Yatco, represented by her AttorneyIn- Fact, Marivic Yatco v. Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, the complainant filed a disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for issuing several worthless checks as rental payments for the complainant's property and for refusing to vacate the said property, thus forcing the latter to file an ejectment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona. The IBP required Atty. Maravilla-Ona to file her Answer, but she failed to do so. Neither did she make an appearance during the scheduled mandatory conference. In its Resolution dated February 13, 2013, the IBP found Atty. Maravilla-Ona guilty of serious misconduct[,] and for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code. The Court later adopted and approved the IBP's findings in its Resolution of September 15, 2014, and suspended Atty. Maravilla-Ona from the practice of law for a period of one year. In yet another disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona, docketed as A.C. No. 10944[,] and entitled Norma M Gutierrez v. Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, the complainant therein alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Maravilla-Ona and gave her the amount of ₱80,000.00 for the filing of a case in court. However, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to file the case, prompting the complainant to withdraw from the engagement and to demand the return of the amount she paid. Atty. Maravilla-Ona returned ₱15,000.00[,] and executed a promissory note to pay the remaining ₱65,000.00. However, despite several demands, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to refund completely the complainant's money. Thus, a complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for grave misconduct, gross negligence and incompetence. But again, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to file her Answer and [to] appear in the mandatory conference before the IBP. The IBP found that Atty. Maravilla-Ona violated Canon 16, Rule 16.03 of the Code [of Professional Responsibility] and recommended her suspension for a period of five (5) years, considering her previous infractions. The Court, however, reduced Atty. Maravilla-Ona's penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. She was also ordered to return the complainant's money. Clearly, Atty. Maravilla-Ona exhibits the habit of violating her oath as a lawyer and the Code [of Professional Responsibility], as well as defying the processes of the IBP. The Court cannot allow her blatant disregard of the Code [of Professional Responsibility] and her sworn duty as a member of the Bar to continue. She had been warned that a similar violation [would] merit a more severe penalty, and yet, her reprehensible conduct has, again, brought embarrassment and dishonor to the legal profession. 16

Back to the case at bar: While indeed respondent's condemnable acts ought to merit the penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar her anew, for in this jurisdiction we do not impose double disbarment. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ADOPTS the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and FINDSrespondent ATIY. ELEONOR MARA VILLA-ONA GUILTY of gross and continuing violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and accordingly FINED ₱40,000.00. Respondent is also ORDERED to PAYcomplainants the amount of ₱350,000.00, with 12% interest from the date of demand until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment. This is without prejudice to the complainants' filing of the appropriate criminal case, if they so desire. 17

Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall append the same to the personal record of respondent; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, which shall circulate the same to all courts in the country for their information and guidance. This Decision shall be immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

10.) Cabiles v Cedo

Facts: Complainant Elibena Cabiles filed an administrative complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of Atty. Leandro Cedo for neglecting the two cases she referred to him to handle. Cabiles, engaged the services of respondent lawyer to handle an illegal dismissal case. Respondent lawyer was paid Php5,500.00 for drafting therein respondents' position paper and Php2,000.00 per appearance in the NLRC hearings. During the hearing only Danilo Ligbos, the complainant therein, showed up. According to Cabiles, respondent lawyer misled them by claiming that it was Danilo who was absent during the said hearing. Moreover Cabiles claimed that respondent lawyer failed to indicate his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance in the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal that he prepared. Cabiles presented a certification issued on June 29, 2010 by the MCLE Office that respondent lawyer had not at all complied with the first, second, and third compliance periods of the (MCLE) requirement. Anent the second case, Cabiles claimed that, despite payment of his professional fees, respondent lawyer did not exert any effort to seasonably file her Complaint for unjust vexation before the City Prosecutor's Office; that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City dismissed her Complaint for unjust vexation on the ground of prescription. Respondent lawyer did not refute Cabiles’ claim that he failed to indicate his MCLE compliance in the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal. The IBP’s investigating commissioner found respondent lawyer guilty of having violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension for two years. Aside from respondent lawyer's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements, the Investigating Commissioner also found him grossly negligent in representing his clients, particularly (1) in failing to appear in the NLRC hearing, and file the necessary responsive pleading; (2) in failing to advise and assist his clients who had no knowledge of, or were not familiar with, the NLRC rules of procedure, in filing their appeal and; 3) in failing to file seasonably

the unjust vexation complaint before the city prosecutor's office, in consequence of which it was overtaken by prescription. The IBP Board of Governors reduced the suspension to one year. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Cedo violated Canon 5 of the CPR when he failed to indicate his MCLE compliance in the pleadings? Ruling: The Court found Atty. Cedo guilty of having violated Canon 5 of the CPR and recommended his one suspension. Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for IBP members as an additional requirement to enable them to practice law. This is to ensure that they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law. Non-compliance with the MCLE requirement subjects the lawyer to be listed as a delinquent IBP member. In Arnado v. Adaza, the Court administratively sanctioned therein respondent lawyer for his non-compliance with four MCLE Compliance periods, in accordance with Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, even if therein respondent attended an MCLE Program covered by the Fourth Compliance Period, his attendance therein would only cover his deficiency for the First Compliance Period, and he was still considered delinquent and had to make up for the other compliance periods. In the present case, respondent lawyer failed to indicate in the pleadings filed in the said labor case the number and date of issue of his MCLE Certificate of Compliance for the Third Compliance Period, i.e., from April 15, 2007 to April 14, 2010, considering that NLRC case had been pending in 2009. In fact, upon checking with the MCLE Office, Cabiles discovered that respondent lawyer had failed to comply with the three MCLE compliance periods. For this reason, there is no doubt that respondent lawyer violated Canon 5.

A.C. No. 10245, August 16, 2017 ELIBENA A. CABILES, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEANDRO S. CEDO, Respondent. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: Complainant Elibena Cabiles (Elibena) filed this administrative complaint1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of Atty. Leandro Cedo (respondent lawyer) for neglecting the two cases she referred to him to handle. The Facts According to Elibena, she engaged the services of respondent lawyer to handle an illegal dismissal case,i.e., NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 entitled "Danilo Ligbos v. Platinum Autowork and/or Even Cabiles and Rico Guido," where therein respondents were Elibena's business partners. Respondent lawyer was paid Php5,500.002 for drafting therein respondents' position paper3 and Php2,000.004 for his every appearance in the NLRC hearings. During the hearing set on March 26, 2009, only Danilo Ligbos (Danilo), the complainant therein, showed up and submitted his Reply.5 On the other hand respondent lawyer did not file a Reply for his clients,6despite being paid his appearance fee earlier.7 In a Decision8 dated March 31, 2009, the Labor Arbiter ruled for Danilo, and ordered the clients of respondent lawyer to pay Danilo backwages, separation pay, and 13th month pay. Worse still, on October 27, 2009, the NLRC likewise dismissed the appeal of the clients of respondent lawyer for failure to post the required cash or surety bond, an essential requisite in perfecting an appeal. 9 According to Elibena, respondent lawyer misled them by claiming that it was Danilo who was absent during the said hearing on March 26, 2009; and that moreover, because of the failure to submit a Reply, they were prevented from presenting the cash vouchers10 that would refute Danilo's claim that he was a regular employee. With regard to the non-perfection of the appeal before the NLRC, Elibena claimed that respondent lawyer instructed them (his clients) to pick up the said Memorandum only on the last day to file the appeal, i.e., on May 28, 2009; that the memorandum was ready for pick up only at around 2:30 p.m. that day; that left to themselves, with no help or assistance from respondent lawyer, they rushed to file their appeal with the NLRC in Quezon City an hour later; that the NLRC Receiving Section informed them that their appeal was incomplete, as it lacked the mandatory cash/surety bond, a matter that respondent lawyer himself did not care to attend to; and, consequently, their appeal was dismissed for non-perfection. Elibena moreover claimed that respondent lawyer failed to indicate his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance11 in the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal that he prepared. Elibena pointed to a certification12 issued on June 29, 2010 by the MCLE Office that respondent lawyer had not at all complied with the first, second, and third compliance periods13 of the (MCLE) requirement. Elibena also averred that in May 2009, she hired respondent lawyer to file a criminal case for unjust vexation against Emelita Claudit; that as evidenced by a May 5, 2009 handwritten receipt, 14 she paid respondent lawyer his acceptance fees, the expenses for the filing of the case, and the appearance fees totalling Php45,000.00; and that in order to come up with the necessary amount, she sold 'to respondent lawyer her 1994 Model Mitsubishi Lancer worth Php85,000.00, this sale being covered by an unnotarized Deed of Sale15 dated August 1, 2009.

Elibena claimed that, despite payment of his professional fees, respondent lawyer did not exert any effort to seasonably file her Complaint for unjust vexation before the City Prosecutor's Office; that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City dismissed her Complaint for unjust vexation on September 10, 2009 on the ground of prescription; and that although she moved for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the case, her motion for reconsideration was denied by the City Prosecutor's Office in a resolution dated October 19, 2009.16 In his Answer,17 respondent lawyer argued that the March 26, 2009 hearing was set to provide the parties the opportunity either to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement, or give time for him (respondent lawyer) to decide whether to file a responsive pleading, after which the case would be routinely submitted for resolution, with or without the parties' further appearances. As regards the cash vouchers, respondent lawyer opined that their submission would only contradict their defense of lack of employer-employee relationship. Respondent lawyer likewise claimed that Elibena was only feigning ignorance of the cost of the appeal bond, and that in any event, Elibena herself could have paid the appeal bond. With regard to Elibena's allegation that she was virtually forced to sell her car to respondent lawyer to complete payment of the latter's professional fee, respondent lawyer claimed that he had fully paid for the car.18 Respondent lawyer did not refute Ebilena's claim that he failed to indicate his MCLE compliance in the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal. The IBP's Report and Recommendation In a May 18, 2011 Report and Recommendation,19 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer guilty of having violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two years. Aside from respondent lawyer's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements, the Investigating Commissioner also found him grossly negligent in representing his clients, particularly (1) in failing to appear on the March 26, 2009 hearing in the NLRC, and file the necessary responsive pleading; (2) in failing to advise and assist his clients who had no knowledge of, or were not familiar with, the NLRC rules of procedure, in filing their appeal and; 3) in failing to file seasonably the unjust vexation complaint before the city prosecutor's office, in consequence of which it was overtaken by prescription. In its March 20, 2013 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, but modified the recommended administrative sanction by reducing the suspension to one year. The Court's Ruling We adopt the IBP's finding that respondent lawyer violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. We also agree with the recommended penalty. Violation of Canon 5 Firstly, Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for IBP members as an additional requirement to enable them to practice law. This is ''to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law."20 Non-compliance with the MCLE requirement subjects the lawyer to be listed as a delinquent IBP member.21 In Arnado v. Adaza,22 we administratively sanctioned therein respondent lawyer for his noncompliance with four MCLE Compliance Periods. We stressed therein that in accordance with Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations,23 even if therein respondent attended an MCLE Program covered by the Fourth Compliance Period, his attendance therein would only cover his deficiency for the First Compliance Period, and he was still considered delinquent and had to make up for the other compliance periods. Consequently, we declared respondent lawyer therein a delinquent member of the IBP and suspended him from law practice for six months or until he had fully complied with all the MCLE requirements for all his non-compliant periods.

In the present case, respondent lawyer failed to indicate in the pleadings filed in the said labor case the number and date of issue of his MCLE Certificate of Compliance for the Third Compliance Period, i.e., from April 15, 2007 to April 14, 2010, considering that NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 had been pending in 2009. In fact, upon checking with the MCLE Office, Elibena discovered that respondent lawyer had failed to comply with the three MCLE compliance periods. For this reason, there is no doubt that respondent lawyer violated Canon 5, which reads:

CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. Violation of Canons 17 and 18 and Rule 18.03 The circumstances of this case indicated that respondent lawyer was guilty of gross negligence for failing to exert his utmost best in prosecuting and in defending the interest of his client. Hence, he is guilty of the following:

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Furthermore, respondent lawyer's act of receiving an acceptance fee for legal services, only to subsequently fail to render such service at the appropriate time, was a clear violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.24 Respondent lawyer did not diligently and fully attend to the cases that he accepted, although he had been fully compensated for them. First off, respondent lawyer never successfully refuted Elibena's claim that he was paid in advance his Php2,000.00 appearance fee on March 21, 2009 for the scheduled hearing of the labor case on March 26, 2009, during which he was absent. Furthermore, although respondent lawyer had already received the sum of Php45,000.00 to file an unjust vexation case, he failed to promptly file the appropriate complaint therefor with the City Prosecutor's Office, in consequence of which the crime prescribed, resulting in the dismissal of the case. We have held that:

Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the

client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer's mere failure to perform the obligations due his client isper se a violation.25 "[A] lawyer 'is expected to exert his best efforts and [utmost] ability to [protect and defend] his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice."'26 However, in the two cases for which he was duly compensated, respondent lawyer was grossly remiss in his duties as counsel. He exhibited lack of professionalism, even indifference, in the defense and protection of Elibena's rights which resulted in her losing the two cases. With regard to the labor case tor which he opted not to file a Reply and refused to present the cash vouchers which, according to Elibena, ought to have been submitted to the NLRC, we hold that even granting that he had the discretion being the handling lawyer to present what he believed were available legal defenses for his client, and conceding, too, that it was within his power to employ an allowable legal strategy, what was deplorable was his way of handling the appeal before the NLRC. Aside from handing over or delivering the requisite pleading to his clients almost at the end of the day, at the last day to file the appeal before the NLRC, he never even bothered to advise Elibena and the rest of his clients about the requirement of the appeal bond. He should not expect Elibena and her companions to be conversant with the indispensable procedural requirements to perfect the appeal before the NLRC. If the averments in his Answer are any indication, respondent lawyer seemed to have relied heavily on the NLRC's much vaunted 'leniency' in gaining the successful prosecution of the appeal of his clients in the labor case; no less censurable is his propensity for passing the blame onto his clients for not doing what he himself ought to have done. And, in the criminal case, he should have known the basic rules relative to the prescription of crimes that operate to extinguish criminal liability. All these contretemps could have been avoided had respondent lawyer displayed the requisite zeal and diligence. As mentioned earlier, the failure to comply with the MCLE requirements warranted a six-month suspension in the Adaza case. Respondent lawyer must likewise be called to account for violating Canons 17, 18, and Rule 18.03. In one case involving violation of Canons 17 and 18 where a lawyer failed to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, the lawyer was penalized with a six-month suspension.27In another case,28 involving transgression of the same Canons, the guilty lawyer was meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months and admonished and sternly warned that a commission of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. "[T]he appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts."29 Given herein respondent lawyer's failure to maintain a high standard of legal proficiency with his refusal to comply with the MCLE as well as his lack of showing of his fealty to Elibena's interest in view of his lackadaisical or indifferent approach in handling the cases entrusted to him, we find it apt and commensurate to the facts of the case to adopt the recommendation of the IBP to suspend him from the practice of law for one year. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leandro S. Cedo is hereby found GUILTY of violating Canons 5, 17, 18, and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of

law for a period of one (1) year effective upon receipt of this Decision, and warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Cedo's personal record as attorney-at-law. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate said copies to all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

11.) July 12, 2017 A.C. No. 10580 SPOUSES GERALDY AND LILIBETH VICTORY, Complainants vs. ATTY. MARIAN JOS. MERCADO, Respondent DECISION TIJAM, J.: This is a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath. The Facts Sometime in 2009, Spouses Geraldy and Lilibeth Victory (Spouses Victory) were enticed by respondent to enter into a financial transaction with her with a promise of good monetary returns. As respondent is a lawyer and a person of reputation, Spouses Victory entrusted their money to respondent to invest, manage, and administer into some financial transactions that would earn good profit for the parties. 1

Respondent called and asked Geraldy Victory (Geraldy) whether he wanted to invest his money. The respondent promised that for an investment of PhP 400,000, she will give Geraldy PhP 600,000 in 30 days; and for PhP 500,000, she will give Geraldy PhP 625,000. 2

The investment transactions went well for the first 10 months. Spouses Victory received the agreed return of profit. Some of such financial transactions were covered by Memoranda of Agreement. 3

Later on, respondent became evasive in returning to Spouses Victory the money that the latter were supposed to receive as part of the agreement. Respondent failed to settle and account the money entrusted to her by Spouses Victory. 4

Spouses Victory alleged that the outstanding obligation of respondent is PhP 5 Million plus interest or a total of PhP 8.3 Million. 5

Spouses Victory filed a criminal complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. 6

After the filing of said criminal case, respondent met with Spouses Victory. Respondent proposed to reduce her obligation from PhP 8.3 Million to PhP 7.5 Million in staggered payments, to which Spouses Victory agreed. Respondent then issued three postdated checks in the amount of PhP 300,000 each. However, said checks bounced. 7

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found that respondent indeed lured Spouses Victory in entering into a series of financial transactions with a promise of return of profit. Respondent, however, failed to deliver such promise. On such premise, the IBP-CBD recommended respondent's suspension, to wit: On the basis of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado be SUSPENDED for SIX (6) MONTHS from the practice of law. 8

Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-199, which reads: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A ", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violation of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for evading the settlement of her financial obligations to the complainants and for not bothering to appear in the investigation of this case, Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado is hereby DISBARRED. (Emphasis supplied) 9

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in Resolution No. XXI2014-158, to wit: 10

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. However, considering that Respondent is currently settling her financial obligations to Complainants and very apologetic and granting her good faith in her investment transaction with Complainants, Resolution No. XX-2013-199 dated March 20, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification, and accordingly the penalty earlier imposed on Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado is hereby reduced to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one (1) year. (Emphasis supplied) 11

Issue Should the respondent be held administratively liable based on the allegations in the pleadings of all parties on record? Our Ruling Emphatically, a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 7 provides: 12

CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Exercising its disciplinary authority over the members of the bar, this Court has imposed the penalty of suspension or disbarment for any gross misconduct that a lawyer committed, whether it is in his professional or in his private capacity. Good character is an essential qualification for the admission to and continued practice of law. Thus, any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action. 13

In this case, it is without dispute that respondent has an outstanding obligation with Spouses Victory, as the latter's investments which they coursed through the respondent fell through.

To make matters worse, respondent issued several checks to settle her obligation; unfortunately, said checks bounced. As a lawyer, respondent is expected to act with the highest degree of integrity and fair dealing. She is expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people's faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. She must, at all times, faithfully perform her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. 14

It must be considered that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. 15

We cannot exempt respondent from liability just because she encountered financial difficulties in the course of her investment deals. Respondent even admitted that she continued to do business despite such financial hardships; as such, her monetary obligations with different investors accumulated at an alarming rate. In an attempt to settle her obligations, respondent issued checks, which all bounced. To Our mind, the actuations of respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of every member of the bar. In this case, while respondent admitted her responsibility and signified her intention of complying with the same, We cannot close our eyes to the fact that respondent committed infractions. To uphold the integrity of the legal profession, We deem it proper to uphold the findings as well as the sanction imposed by the IBP Board of Governors. WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve to SUSPEND Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado from the practice of law for one (1) year to commence immediately from the receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's record as member of the Bar. SO ORDERED.

12.) En Banc DIVISION March 7, 2017 A.C. No. 11256 FLORDELIZA A. vs ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA, Respondent

MADRIA, Complainant

DECISION PER CURIAM: A lawyer who causes the simulation of court documents not only violates the court and its processes, but also betrays the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client and must be disbarred to maintain the integrity of the Law Profession. Antecedents In November 2002, complainant Flordeliza A. Madria consulted the respondent in his law office in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan to inquire about the process of annulling her marriage with her husband, Juan C. Madria. After giving th e details of her marriage and other facts relevant to the annulment, the respondent told her that she had a strong case, and guaranteed that he could obtain for her the decree of annulment. He told her, too, that his legal services would cost ₱25,000.00, and that she should return on November 19, 2002 inasmuch as he would still prepare the complaint for the annulment. At the time of the consultation, she was accompanied by her daughter, Vanessa Madria, and her nephew, Jayson Argonza. 1

The complainant returned to the respondent's office on November 19, 2002. On that occasion, he showed her the petition for annulment, and asked her to sign it. She paid to him an initial amount of ₱4,000.00. He acknowledged the payment through a handwritten receipt. 2

3

The complainant again went to the respondent's office on December 16, 2002 to deliver another partial payment, and to follow up on the case. The respondent advised her to just wait for the resolution of her complaint, and assured her that she did not need to appear in court. He explained that all the court notices and processes would be sent to his office, and that he would regularly apprise her of the developments. On December 28, 2002, she 4

returned to his office to complete her payment, and he also issued his receipt for the payment. 5

The complainant's daughter Vanessa thereafter made several follow-ups on behalf of her mother. In the latter part of April 2003, the respondent informed the complainant that her petition had been granted. Thus, Vanessa went to the respondent's office and received a copy of the trial court's decision dated April 16, 2003 signed by Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, in Tuguegarao City. 6

7

According to the complainant, the respondent advised her to allow five months to lapse after the release of the decision before she could safely claim the status of "single." After the lapse of such time, she declared in her Voter's Registration Record (VRR) that she was single. 8

The complainant, again through Vanessa, received from the respondent a copy of the certificate of finality dated September 26, 2003 signed by one Jacinto C. Danao of the RTC (Branch 4). 9

Believing that the documents were authentic, the complainant used the purported decision and certificate of finality in applying for the renewal of her passport. However, she became the object of an investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) because her former partner, Andrew 10

Dowson Grainge, had filed a complaint charging that she had fabricated the decision for the annulment of her marriage. Only then did she learn that the decision and the certificate of finality given by the respondent did not exist in the court records, as borne out by the letter signed by Atty. Aura Clarissa B. Tabag-Querubin, Clerk of Court of the RTC Branch IV, to wit: MS. RACHEL M. ROXAS Officer-in-Charge Regional Consular Office Tuguegarao City Madam: This is in reply to your letter dated June 23, 2011 inquiring on whether Civil Case No. 6149 for the Annulment of Marriage between Flordeliza Argonza Madria and Juan C. Madria was filed and decided by this Court. As per records of this Court, the above-entitled case was filed on April 25, 2003 but was dismissed as per Order of this Court dated April 6, 2004. The signature of the [sic] Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino as appearing in the alleged decision attached to your letter is a blatant forgery. For your information and guidance. Very truly yours, (sgd) AURA CLARISSA B. TABAG-QUERUBIN Clerk of Court V 11

As a result, the complainant faced criminal charges for violation of the Philippine Passport Act in the RTC in Tuguegarao City. She claims that she had relied in good faith on the representations of the respondent; and that he had taken advantage of his position in convincing her to part with her money and to rely on the falsified court documents. 12

13

In his answer, the respondent denies the allegations of the complainant. He averred that he had informed her that he would still be carefully reviewing the grounds to support her petition; that she had insisted that he should prepare the draft of her petition that she could show to her foreigner fiance; that she had also prevailed upon him to simulate the court decision to the effect that her marriage had been annulled, and to fabricate the certificate of finality; that she had assured him that such simulated documents would be kept strictly confidential; that he had informed her that the petition had been filed in April 2003, but she had paid no attention to such information; that she had not appeared in any of the scheduled hearings despite notice; and that he had not heard from her since then, and that she had not even returned to his office. 14

Findings and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) After conducting her investigation, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her Report and Recommendation wherein she concluded that the respondent had violated his Lawyer's Oath; and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years. 15

The IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, modified the recommendation of suspension from the practice of law for two years to disbarment through its Resolution No. XXI-2015-242, to wit: RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-242 CDB Case No. 14-4315 Flordeliza A. Madria vs. Atty. Carlos P. Rivera RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", considering violation of his lawyers' oath as a lawyer and a member of the Bar by preparing a simulated Court decision granting the petition for annulment of marriage of complainant and a certificate of finality of the annulment petition. Hence, Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. 16

Ruling of the Court We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The respondent acknowledged authorship of the petition for annulment of marriage, and of the simulation of the decision and certificate of finality. His explanation of having done so only upon the complainant's persistent prodding did not exculpate him from responsibility. For one, the explanation is unacceptable, if not altogether empty. Simulating or participating in the simulation of a court decision and a certificate of finality of the same decision is an outright criminal falsification or forgery. One need not be a lawyer to know so, but it was worse in the respondent's case because he was a lawyer. Thus, his acts were legally intolerable. Specifically, his deliberate falsification of the court decision and the certificate of finality of the decision reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part, and made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar. The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit of Rules 1. 01 and 1.02, Canon 1, and Rule 15.07, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. xxxx CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOY AL TY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS. Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness. The respondent would shift the blame to his client. That a lay person like the complainant could have swayed a lawyer like the respondent into committing the simulations was patently improbable. Yet, even if he had committed the simulations upon the client's prodding, he would be no less responsible. Being a lawyer, he was aware of and was bound by the ethical canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly those quoted earlier, which would have been enough to deter him from committing the falsification, as well as to make him unhesitatingly frustrate her prodding in deference to his sworn obligation as a lawyer to always act with honesty and to obey the laws of the land. Surely, too, he could not have soon forgotten his express undertaking under his Lawyer's Oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission." Indeed, the ethics of the Legal Profession rightly enjoined every lawyer like him to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. As we have observed in one case: 17

18

19

Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the 1âwphi 1

Bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. Also, Canon 15 and Rule 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility required the respondent be true to the complainant as his client. By choosing to ignore his fiduciary responsibility for the sake of getting her money, he committed a further violation of his Lawyer's Oath by which he swore not to "delay any man's cause for money or malice," and to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients." He compounded this violation by taking advantage of his legal knowledge to promote his own selfish motives, thereby disregarding his responsibility under Canon 17. 20

21

22

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred on any of the following grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do. 23

Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office, any of which was already a ground sufficient for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The moral standards of the Legal Profession expected the respondent to act with the highest degree of professionalism, decency, and nobility in the course of their practice of law. That he turned his back on such standards exhibited his baseness, lack of moral character, dishonesty, lack of probity and general unworthiness to continue as an officer of the Court. 24

25

26

We note that the respondent was previously sanctioned for unprofessional conduct. In CruzVillanueva v. Rivera, he was suspended from the practice of law because he had notarized documents without a notarial commission. This circumstance shows his predisposition to beguile other persons into believing in the documents that he had falsified or simulated. It is time to put a stop to such proclivity. He should be quickly removed through disbarment. 27

It is true that the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution and only for the most imperative reasons or in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. But we do not hesitate when the misconduct is gross, like in the respondent's case. We wield the power now because the respondent, by his gross misconduct as herein described, absolutely forfeited the privilege to remain in the Law Profession. As we reminded in Embido v. Pe, in which we disbarred the respondent lawyer for falsifying a court decision: 28

29

No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer's Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not

directly connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him. Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity. The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. 30

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. CARLOS P. RIVERA guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION OF THE LAWYER'S OATH; and, ACCORDINGLY, ORDERS his DISBARMENT. Let his name be STRICKEN from the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES; (c) the OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT for appending to the respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar; and (d) the OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE for possible criminal prosecution of the respondent. SO ORDERED.

13.) February 1, 2017 A.C. No. 5819 HEIRS OF SIXTO L. TAN, SR., represented by RECTO A. TAN, Complainants vs. ATTY. NESTOR B. BELTRAN, Respondent RESOLUTION SERENO, CJ.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint against respondent, Atty. Nestor B. Beltran. His derelictions allegedly consisted of his belated filing of an appeal in a criminal case and failure to relay a court directive for the payment of docket fees in a civil case to his clients complainants Heirs of Sixto L. Tan, Sr. represented by Recto A. Tan. The latter also accused him of unduly receiving ₱200,000 as payment for legal services. FACTS OF THE CASE After agreeing to pay attorney's fees of ₱200,000, complainants engaged the services of respondent counsel for the filing of cases to recover their commercial properties valued at approximately ₱30 million. On July 2001, complainants filed a criminal action for falsification of public documents and use of falsified documents against Spouses Melanio and Nancy Fernando and Sixto Tan, Jr. Docketed as LS. No. 2001-037, this case was dismissed by the provincial prosecutor of Albay. 1

Respondent was notified of the order of dismissal on 18 October 2001. On 6 November 2001, he filed an appeal via a Petition for Review before the Secretary of the Department of Justice (SOJ). It was, however, filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal. Consequently, in his Resolution promulgated on 5 March 2002, the SOJ dismissed the belated Petition for Review. Respondent no longer filed a motion for reconsideration to remedy the ruling. 2

3

4

On 11 September 2001, complainants instituted a related civil suit to annul the sale of their commercial properties before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2001-0329. After being given ₱7,000 by his clients, respondent tasked his secretary to pay the docket fees computed at ₱1,722. 5

Unfortunately, the Clerk of Court erred in the assessment of the docket fees. To correct the error, the RTC required the payment of additional docket fees through an Order dated 20 May 2002, which respondent received on 29 May 2002. However, two weeks earlier, on 13 May 2002, he had moved to withdraw as counsel with the conformity of his clients. No separate copy of the Order dated 20 May 2002 was sent to any of the complainants. 6

7

8

9

The balance of the docket fees remained unpaid. Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the civil case, citing the nonpayment of docket fees as one of its bases. 10

Aggrieved by their defeat, complainants wrote this Court a letter-complaint asking that disciplinary actions be meted out to respondent. They likewise contended that he had unduly received ₱200,000 as attorney's fees, despite his failure to render effective legal services for them. 11

Respondent claimed that he could no longer move for the reconsideration of the SOJ's dismissal of his belated Petition for Review as he had only learned of the dismissal after the period to file a motion for reconsideration had lapsed. He argued that while he prepared the Petition for Review, his clients themselves, through Nilo Tan and Recto Tan, signed and filed the same. Thus, he imputed to complainants the belated filing of the appeal. 12

As for the dismissal of the civil action for nonpayment of docket fees, respondent disclaimed any fault on his part, since he had already withdrawn as counsel in that case. 1âwphi 1

Anent his receipt of ₱200,000 as attorney's fees, respondent denied collecting that amount. He only admitted that he had received ₱30,000 to cover expenses for "the preparation of the complaints, docket fee, affidavits, and other papers needed for the filing of the said cases." He did not deny his receipt of ₱7,000 for fees and other sundry expenses, of which ₱l,722 had already been paid to the Clerk of Court for docket fees. In any event, Atty. Beltran argued that ₱200,000 as attorney's fees was inadequate, considering that the property under dispute was worth ₱30 million. 13

FINDINGS OF THE IBP In a Resolution dated 12 March 2003, this Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. 14

The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, in a Report dated 24 July 2006, found respondent guilty of neglect in handling the criminal case and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months. The gist of the report reads: 15

16

The Respondent admits that the Petition for Review in this case was not filed. This key detail leads the Commissioner to conclude that the Respondent was negligent in failing to seasonably file the Petition for Review in LS. No. 2001-037. The Respondent's bare defense is that he allegedly left the filing of this petition to the Complainants, who filed it out of time. Even assuming this is true, the Respondent cannot disclaim negligence, being the lawyer and knowing that the case related to the Complainants' claims on properties the Respondent himself states are worth about PHP30 million. xxx. Some of the Respondent's pleadings instead focus to the Motion for Reconsideration regarding the late Petition for Review's dismissal, which the Respondent explains by stating that the Complainants informed him of this when the period to file a Motion for Reconsideration had already lapsed. Even assuming this is true, it is irrelevant since it is clear that the Petition for Review itself was not seasonably filed. x x x. (Emphasis in the original) With respect to dismissal of the civil case, the Investigating Commissioner cleared respondent of any liability. The former gave credence to the fact that by the time respondent received the directive of the RTC requiring the payment of the balance of the docket fees, the latter had already filed his withdrawal from the case. Finally, as regards the factual claim of complainants that they paid respondent attorney's fees amounting to ₱200,000, the Investigating Commissioner determined that their allegation was unfounded, as none of them produced receipts evidencing payment. At most, what the Investigating Commissioner found was that respondent only admitted to receiving ₱30,000 for expenses, aside from ₱5,278. The former recommended that respondent be ordered to restitute these sums to complainants. 17

In its Resolution dated 1 February 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to fully dismiss the administrative case against respondent without any explanation. Neither party has filed a motion for reconsideration or petition for review thereafter. 18

19

ISSUES OF THE CASE l. Whether respondent neglected legal matters entrusted to him when he belatedly filed an appeal before the SOJ, resulting in the dismissal of LS. No. 2001-03 7 II. Whether respondent is guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and other ethical standards for failing to inform complainants of the RTC Order to pay the balance of the docket fees in Civil Case No. 2001-0329 III. Whether respondent unduly received ₱200,000 as attorney's fees RULING OF THE COURT We set aside the unsubstantiated recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. Its resolutions are only recommendatory and always subject to this Court’s review. 20

Respondent filed a belated appeal before the SOJ. In Reontoy v. Ibadlit, we ruled that failure of the counsel to appeal within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice. The Court elucidated that per Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." 21

In the case at bar, respondent similarly admits that he failed to timely file the Petition for Review before the SOJ. As a result of his delayed action, his clients lost the criminal case. Straightforwardly, this Court sanctions him for belatedly filing an appeal. The excuse forwarded by respondent - that he delegated the filing of the Petition for Review to complainants - will not exculpate him from administrative liability. As correctly explained by the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, respondent cannot disclaim negligence, since he was the lawyer tasked to pursue the legal remedies available to his clients. Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure. A client who deals with counsel has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence, but also a wholehearted fealty to the client's cause. Thus, we find that passing the blame to persons not trained in remedial law is not just wrong; it is reflective of the want of care on the part of lawyers handling the legal matters entrusted to them by their clients. 22

23

After surveying related jurisprudence, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three months given his infraction of filing a belated appeal before the SOJ. Yet, without explanation, the Board of Goven1ors resolved to ignore the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. 24

Accordingly, this Court will not adopt an unsubstantiated resolution of the Board of Governors, especially when jurisprudence shows that we have penalized lawyers for filing belated motions and pleadings. In the resolution of this Court in Reontoy, we suspended the counsel therein from the practice of law for two months, given that his belated filing of an appeal caused his client to lose the case. In Fernandez v. Novero, Jr., we likewise suspended the respondent counsel for a month after he filed a motion for reconsideration outside the reglementary period. In Barbuco v. Beltran, this Court imposed a six-month suspension on the lawyer, who had belatedly filed a pleading, among other derelictions. We stressed in that case that the failure to file a brief within the reglementary period certainly constituted inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of 43 days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal. 25

26

27

Respondent failed to inform complainants of the RTC Order requiring the payment of full docket fees. Respondent argues that he was no longer bound to inform complainants of the RTC Order requiring the payment of full docket fees, given that he had already moved to withdraw as counsel with the conformity of the latter. We find that argument unjustified. Mercado v. Commission on Higher Education is instructive on the effect of the withdrawal of counsel with the conformity of the client: 28

As a rule, the withdrawal of a counsel from a case made with the written conformity of the client takes effect once the same is filed with the court. The leading case of Arambulo v. Court of Appeals laid out the rule that, in general, such kind of a withdrawal does not require any further action or approval from the court in order to be effective. In contrast, the norm with respect to withdrawals of counsels without the written conformity of the client is that they only take effect after their approval by the court. The rule that the withdrawal of a counsel with the written conformity of the client is immediately effective once filed in court, however, is not absolute. When the counsel's impending withdrawal with the written conformity of the client would leave the latter with no legal representation in the case, it is an accepted practice for courts to order the deferment of the effectivity of such withdrawal until such time that it becomes certain that service of court processes and other papers to the party-client would not thereby be compromised - either by the due substitution of the withdrawing counsel in the case or by the express assurance of the party-client that he now undertakes to himself receive serviceable processes and other papers. Adoption by courts of such a practice in that particular context, while neither mandatory nor sanctioned by a specific provision of the Rules of Court, is nevertheless justified as part of their inherent power to see to it that the potency of judicial processes and judgment are preserved. (Emphasis in the original)

On 29 May 2002, when respondent herein received the RTC Order dated 20 May 2002, complainants still had no new counsel on record. Therefore, Atty. Beltran should have acted with prudence by informing his previous clients that he had received the directive of the court requiring the payment of docket fees. After all, lawyers are officers of the court. Like the court itself, respondent is an instrument for advancing the ends of justice and his cooperation with the court is due whenever justice may be imperiled if cooperation is withheld. 29

The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. In this case, we consider the fact that not only did respondent file a belated appeal before the SOJ, but he also failed to act with prudence by failing to inform complainants of the RTC Order dated 20 May 2002. 30

However, we cannot put the blame solely on Atty. Beltran for the nonpayment of the docket fees in the civil case. Although not discussed by the Investigating Commissioner, the records reveal that even if complainants' new counsel learned about the ruling on 30 May 2002, the former still failed to pay the additional docket fees. 31

Taking into consideration the attendant circumstances herein vis-à-vis the aforementioned administrative cases decided by this Court, we deem it proper to impose on Atty. Beltran a two-month suspension from the practice of law for belatedly filing an appeal before the SOJ. We also admonish him to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duty to administer justice. Complainants failed to prove that respondent received ₱200,000 as attorney's fees. In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. 32

33

Complainants have the burden to discharge that required quantum of proof. Here, as accurately assessed by the Investigating Commissioner, the records do not bear any receipt proving Atty. Beltran's collection of ₱200,000 as attorney's fees. 34

Complainants venture to argue that these sums were paid to respondent without receipts. However, that bare argument has no other supporting evidence - object, documentary, or testimonial. Even during the hearing of this case before the IBP, when confronted with particular questions regarding the sums paid to respondent, complainants could not answer when and where they gave installment payments to Atty. Beltran. 35

General allegations will not meet the evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence. Hence, we adopt the factual finding of the Investigating Commissioner that complainants failed to prove their claim of payment to respondent of ₱200,000 as attorney's fees. 36

As a final point, the Court must clarify that the resolution of this case should not include a directive for the return of the ₱35,278 as the Investigating Commissioner recommended.

The Investigating Commissioner did not explain the recommendation for the restitution of that sum. Moreover, complainants do not contest that respondent received this sum for fees and other sundry expenses. Neither do the records show that they demanded the return of this amount from respondent. In consideration of these facts, the proper corrective action is to order the accounting of the full sum of ₱35,278. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nestor B. Beltran is SUSPENDED FOR TWO MONTHS from the practice of law with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties. He is also ORDERED TO ACCOUNT for the ₱35,278 he received from his clients, with the obligation to return the entire amount, or so much thereof remaining, to complainants. This Decision shall take effect immediately upon receipt by Atty. Nestor B. Beltran of a copy of this Decision. He shall inform this Court and the Office of the Bar Confidant in writing of the date he received a copy of this Decision. Copies of this Decision shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to circulate copies of this Decision to all courts concerned. SO ORDERED.

14.) Sta. Ana v. cortez DEL CASTILLO,*** J.: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainants against Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes (respondent) against whom they imputed deceit and falsification of public documents in the sale of two parcels of property located at Bo. Lantic, Carmona, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-1069335 and T-1069336;

and in the donation of66 pieces of property by Atty. Cesar Casal (Atty. Casal) and his wife, Pilar P. Casal (Pilar). Factual

Antecedents

In a sworn letter dated August 4, 2005, complainants alleged that respondent was left ith the care and maintenance of several properties either owned or under the administration of Atty. Casal since the latter's death; that respondent abused his authority, as such administrator, and engineered the sale or transfer of the said properties, specifically the two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T1069335 and T-1069336, which were owned originally by their (complainants') ancestors; that on May 19, 2004, respondent, in connivance with Cesar Inis (Inis) and A Casal's alleged adopted daughter, Gloria Casal Cledera (Gloria), and her husband, Hugh Cledera (the spouses Cledera), sold the abovementioned parcels of land to the Property Company of Friends, Inc. (PCFI).[1] Complainants further averred that as the said properties were originally in the names of Inis, Ruben Loyola (Loyola), Angela Lacdan (Lacdan) and Cesar Veloso Casal (Veloso), these persons, in conspiracy with respondent, caused to be executed a Special Power of Attorney[2] (SPA) dated May 4, 2004, under which Loyola, Lacdan and Veloso purportedly authorized their co-owner Inis to sell the said properties; that this SPA was, however, forged or falsified, because Loyola was already dead on August 15, 1994, whereas Lacdan died on August 31, 2001, and at the time of the execution of the SPA in Catmona, Cavite, Veloso was in fact in Tacloban City; and that indeed, as a consequence of respondent's wrongdoing, criminal cases for Estata through Falsification of Public Document were filed against respondent and the spouses Cledera.[3] Complainants moreover claimed that respondent notarized 12 falsified Deeds of Donation, dated September 17 and 18, 2003, and

supposedly executed in Carmona, Cavite, under which it was made to appear that Atty. Casal purportedly donated 66 pieces of property to Gloria; that they (complainants) caused to be verified/examined Atty. Casal's "superimposed" signatures on these deeds of donation by the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and that in its Disposition Forms, the NBI concluded that "the signatures appearing on the said questioned documents are mere xerox copies which do not truly and clearly reflect the minute details of the writing strokes and other aspects relative to the preparation of the questioned signatures."[4] In his answer, respondent asserted that all the criminal complaints against him had been dismissed, and the criminal information/s instituted therefor had been withdrawn by the Department of Justice (DOJ), hence, he had been exonerated of all the charges against him. Respondent adverted to the Resolution of Regional State Prosecutor Ernesto C. Mendoza, which in part declared x x x the signatures of Cesar E. Casal appearing on the said questioned documents are mere xerox copies which do not truly and clearly reflect the minute details of the writing strokes and other aspects relative to the preparation of the questioned signatures. Nowhere in this report was there a categorical statement that the document was falsified or the signatures were forged. x x x[5] In a Resolution[6] dated November 27, 2006, the Court resolved to refer this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Report and Recommendation of the IBP

The Investigating Commissioner summarized the charges against respondent as follows: First, [r]espondent was involved in the preparation of the Loyola SPA, which was used to sell the [s)ubject [p]roperties to (a) PCFI, despite the fact that two (2) of the alleged signatories therein were already dead at the time the Loyola SPA was executed; Second, [r]espondent prepared and notarized 12 Deeds of (b) Donation, which [appear] to be spurious because the signatures of Atty. Casal thereon were only superimposed;

Third, [r]espondent notarized the 12 Deeds of Donation in Quezon City, within his territorial jurisdiction as a notary (c) public x x x despite the fact that Atty. Casal signed the same in x x x Cavite, or outside his jurisdiction as a notary public;

Fourth, [r]espondent caused the preparation of the Casal SPA, (d) which appears to be spurious because the signature of Atty. Casal thereon was only superimposed; and

Fifth, [r]espondent knowingly used the spurious Casal SPA and (e) executed a Deed of Sale in favor of PCFI involving other properties.[7] After due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner submitted a Report[8] dated May 14, 2010, finding respondent not only guilty of dishonesty and deceitful conduct, but also guilty of having violated hls oath as a notary public. In finding respondent guilty of using a falsified document, the

Investigating Commissioner noted that although there was no direct evidence that it was respondent himself who prepared or drafted the SPA, there was evidence nonetheless that respondent did actively participate, or take part, in the offer and sale of the properties to the PCFI; and that since the execution of the forged or falsified SPA is a crucial or critical component of the eventual consummation of the sale to PCFI, respondent could not be heard to say that he had no knowledge of the use of a falsified document.[9] As regards the 12 Deeds of Donation allegedly executed by Atty. Casal, the Investigating Commissioner lent more credence to the unbiased or impartial report of the NBI's finding that the signatures of Atty. Casal were per se mere xerox copies; and that moreover, respondent had violated Section 240[10] of the Revised Administrative Code, when he caused to be acknowledged the Deeds of Donation in his law office in Quezon City, despite the fact that these were supposedly signed and executed by Atty. Casal in Cavite. The Investigating Commissioner opined that respondent "ought to have known that since he was outside his territorial jurisdiction as a notary public, he could not have performed the acts of a notary public at the time of the signing of the 12 Deeds of Donation, including the taking of oath of the parties."[11] The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended: 1. ATTY. ANTONIO JOSE F. CORTES be suspended from the practice of law for a period ranging from six (6) months to two (2) years with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts or conduct shall be dealt with more severely; and 2. ATTY. ANTONIO JOSE F. CORTES be barred from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years, and in the event that he is presently

commissioned as notary public, that his commission be immediately revoked and suspended for such period.[12] In its Resolution[13] dated May 10, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the recommended penalty to a one-year suspension from the practice of law, with revocation of respondent's notarial license, plus a two-year disqualification from reappointment as notary public. The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part ofthis Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violation of the Notarial Law, Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and his Notarial Commission immediately REVOKED presently commissioned. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Publicfor two (2) years. No motions for reconsideration having been filed by any of the parties, the case is before us for fmal resolution. Our Ruling Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [It is only in living up to the very high standards and tenets of the legal profession that] the people's faith and confidence in the judicial system can be ensured. Lawyers

may be disciplined - whether in their professional or in their private capacity - for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.[14] In the instant case, respondent acted with deceit when he used the falsified documents to effect the transfer of properties owned or administered by the late Atty. Casal. In a letter[15] sent by Atty. Florante O. Villegas, counsel for the PCFI, to the spouses Cledera, the former explicitly stated that respondent did have a hand in the negotiation leading to the sale of the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-1069335 and T-1069336. In clarifying that it only entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale because of the "offer and representation that spouses Cesar and Pilar Casal are the true owners of the subject parcels of land,"[16] the PCFI, through its legal counsel, declared: We understand that you, together with Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes, offered to sell the said parcels ofland to our client, and that on September 17, 2003, an agreement of Purchase and Sale was executed between Spouses Cesar E. Casal and Pilar P. Casal (represented by Atty. Cortes as their attorney-in-fact) and our client.[17] (Emphasis supplied) Moreover, Mr. Guillermo C. Choa, President of the PCFI, narrated in his affidavit[18] the events leading to another sale likewise involving properties coowned by Atty. Casal through the use of the spurious SPA, to wit: 3) That sometime in August 2003, Sps. Hugh Cledera and Gloria Casal Cledera and Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes offered to me for sale several parcels of land owned by Cesar E. Casal (father of Gloria Casal Cledera) including Lot 5, Psu 10120 and Lot 6, Psu 101205 containing an area of 39,670 square meters and 47,638 square meters, more or less, located at Bo. Lantic,

Carmona, Cavite which was then registered in the name of Eduardo Gan, et al. under TCT No. T-79153 of the Register of Deeds fur the Province of Cavite. 4) That Sps. Hugh Cledera and Gloria Casal Cledera together with Atty. Cortes also presented to me the following documents, to wit: a)

TCT No. T-79153 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite.

Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 15, 1990 executed by b) heirs of Eduardo B. Gan, et al. in favor of Cesar E. Casal, Cesar Inis, Ruben Loyola and Angela Lacdan.

c)

Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 19, 1990 executed by Cesar Veloso Casal, et. al. in favor ofSps. Cesar and Pilar Casal.

xxxx 6) That in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, it was agreed that the seller shall register the several Deeds of Sale and deliver the titles over said properties to Profriends (PCFI). In the above-mentioned Agreement of Purchase and Sale, Sps. Casal were represented by their duly authorized attorney-infact, Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes, of legal age, Filipino, with address at 2/F ELCO Bldg., 202 E. Rodriguez, Sr., Blvd., Quezon City. Present during negotiations for the terms and conditions to be contained in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale aside from myself and Atty.Cortes were Sps. Hugh and

Gloria Cledera, the son-in-law and daughter, respectively of Sps. Casal; x x x[19] (Emphasis supplied) Likewise, it cannot be denied that it was respondent who engineered the execution of the 12 Deeds of Donation involving 66 pieces of Atty. Casal's property. Respondent was personally present dwing the alleged signing of the Deeds of Donation in Cavite, which deeds he brought afterwards to his law office in Quezon City, and notarized the same. Indeed, in his Affidavit, respondent stated: 11. When I presented the documents for signature of the donorsspouses, Cesar E. Casal and Pilar P. Casal, the late Cesar E. Casal stamped the rubber facsimile of his genuine signature in all the spaces provided in all copies of the Deeds of Donation. At the same time and place, I also saw his wife Pilar P. Casal affixed [sic] her own signature in the Deeds of Donation. Also present dming the signing occasion was the donee herself, Dr. Gloria P. Casal, as well as, [sic] her husband, Dr. Hugh Cledera who affixed their signatures in all the copies of the Deeds of Donation in my presence. 12. Thereafter, I gathered and brought all the signed copies of the Deeds of Donation to my office in Quezon City, and notarized them. Record shows that I notarized them and entered the documents in my Notarial Registry on September 17 and 18, 2003.[20] (Emphasis supplied) By using the falsified SPA and by knowingly notarizing documents outside of his notarial commission's jurisdiction, respondent was evidently bereft of basic integrity which is an indispensable sine qua non of his ongoing membership, in good standing, in the legal profession, and as a duly-commissioned notary public.

In actively participating in the offer and sale of property to PCFI, respondent was guilty of deceit and dishonesty by leveraging on the use of a spurious Special Power of Attorney There can be no debate either as to the fact that respondent made use of a forged or falsified SPA in his dealings with PCFI. As the lawyer who assisted in the sale of the properties through the use of the falsified SPA in question, he ought to know that the use of such falsified or forged SPA gives rise to grievous legal consequences which must inevitably enmesh him professionally. As a member of the Bar in apparent good legal standing, he effectively held himself out as a trustworthy agent for the principals he was purportedly representing in the transaction/s in question. Respondent's act of notarizing a forged Deed of Donation outside of his jurisdiction is a violation of his duties as a notary public, as well as a blatant falsification of public document This Court agrees with the fmdings of the IBP Board of Governors which upheld the impartial report of the NBI and its findings that the signatures on the Deeds of Donation were mere photocopies attached to the said Deeds.[21] Given the fact that respondent admitted to having been with the late Atty. Casal at the time of the execution of the Deed, it would not be far-fetched to say that the use of the said mere photocopies was with his knowledge and consent. What is more, his act of bringing the Deeds of Donation that were executed in Carmona, Cavite, to his law office in Quezon City, and notarizing them there, not only violated Section 240 of the Revised Administrative Code but "also [partook] of malpractice of law and falsification."[22] Section 240 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly states: Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. - The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the

province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.[23] (Emphasis supplied) Needless to say, respondent cannot escape from the clutches of this provision. The dismissal of the criminal complaints against respondent did not change the sui generis character of disbarment proceedings Respondent's contention that the DOJ had resolved to withdraw the criminal complaints filed against him and his co-accused, the spouses Cledera,[24] does not persuade. The dismissal or withdrawal of the criminal complaints/ information/sat the instance of the DOJ, is of no moment. As a member of the Bar, respondent should know that administrative cases against lawyers are sui generis, or a class of their own. "Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance."[25] Disbarment cases are aimed at purging the legal profession of individuals who obdurately scorn and despise the exalted standards of the noble profession of law. It is within this Court's power, as a check and balance to its own system, to ensure undeviating integrity by members of the Bar both on the professional and the personal level. It is only by maintaining this integrity and this loyalty to the law, to the Courts of Justice and to their client and the public at large, that lawyers are enabled to maintain the trust reposed upon them and to deliver justice inside and outside the courtroom. WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and his Notarial Commission immediately REVOKED, if he is presently commissioned. Furthermore, he is DISQUALIFIED from

reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years, reckoned from the date of finality of this Resolution. Furnish a copy of this Resolution to the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall append the same to the personal record of respondent; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, which shall circulate the same to all courts in the country for their infonnation and guidance. SO ORDERED.

15.) THIRD DIVISION [ A.C. No. 6933, July 05, 2017 ] GREGORIO V. CAPINPIN, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., RESPONDENT. DECISION TIJAM, J.: Before this Court is an administrative complaint[1] filed by complainant Gregorio Capinpin, Jr., praying for the suspension from the practice of law or disbarment of respondent Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for violating the Canons of Professional Ethics in connection with the foreclosure of complainant's properties. Factual Antecedents

On February 14, 1997, complainant executed a real estate mortgage (REM)[2] on his two lots in favor of Family Lending Corporation (FLC) as security for a loan amounting to PhP 5 Million with interest at two percent (2%) per month. On April 29, 2002, due to complainant's default in payment, FLC, through its President Dr. Eli Malaya (Dr. Malaya), initiated foreclosure proceedings against the mortgaged properties.[3] Complainant availed of legal remedies to stop the said foreclosure proceedings, to wit: (1) he filed a case for damages and injunction and also moved for the suspension of the sheriffs sale, wherein such motion for suspension was granted but the injunctive relief was denied after hearings. Complainant's motion for reconsideration (MR) therein was also denied; (2) he then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) with the Court of Appeals (CA), wherein no TRO was granted due to some deficiencies in the petition; (3) he also filed an annulment of REM with prayer for a WPI and/or TRO before the trial court, wherein this time a WPI was issued to stop the auction sale.[4] This prompted FLC to file a petition for certiorari before the CA, questioning the trial court's issuance of the injunctive writ. The CA nullified the said writ, mainly on the ground of forum shopping, which was affirmed by this Court on review.[5] For these cases, FLC engaged respondent's legal services. The complaint alleges that during the above-cited proceedings, respondent, without the knowledge of his client FLC, approached complainant to negotiate the deferment of the auction sale and the possible settlement of the loan obligation at a reduced amount without resorting to the auction sale. Respondent allegedly

represented himself as being capable of influencing the sheriff to defer the auction sale, as well as his client FLC through Dr. Malaya to accept the amount of PhP 7 Million to fully settle the loan obligation. For this, the complaint alleges that on April 13, 2005, respondent demanded payment of professional fees amounting to Php 1 Million from complainant.[6] In fact, complainant already gave the following amounts to respondent as payment of such professional fees: (1) PhP 50,000 check dated April 13, 2005; (2) PhP 25,000 check dated April 18, 2005; (3) PhP 75,000 check dated April 22, 2005; (4) PhP 20,000 check dated May 16, 2005; (5) PhP 200,000 on June 30, 2005; and (6) PhP 30,000 on August 17, 2005.[7] Despite such payments, the auction sale proceeded.[8] Hence, the instant complaint. For his part, respondent denies that he was the one who approached complainant for negotiation, the truth being that it was complainant who asked for his help to be given more time to raise funds to pay the loan obligation.[9] Respondent further avers that he communicated the said request to his client.[10] Aside from the checks dated April 13, 18, 22 and May 16, 2005, which respondent claims to be advance payments of his attorney's fees, respondent avers that he did not receive any other amount from the complainant.[11] All these, according to the respondent, were known to his client.[12] In fact, in a Letter dated April 22, 2005 signed by the complainant and addressed to FLC through Dr. Malaya, complainant expressly stated that he will negotiate for the payment of respondent's fees as FLC's counsel.[13] On July 16, 2007, this Court referred the instant administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision.[14] Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In his Report and Recommendation[15] dated June 4, 2010, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to complainant's allegations that respondent, without the knowledge of his client, negotiated with the complainant for the settlement of the loan obligation, and that the respondent demanded and received professional fees in negotiating the said settlement. According to the Investigating Commissioner, respondent's act of negotiating with the complainant on the deferment of the auction sale and the settlement of the loan for a substantially reduced amount was highly improper as respondent's primary duty, being FLC's counsel, was to protect the interest of FLC by seeing to it that the foreclosure proceedings be done successfully to obtain the best amount possible to cover the loan obligation.[16] The Investigating Commissioner explained that if a lawyer can collect professional fees or advanced payment thereof from the adverse party, it results to a conflict of interest.[17] From the foregoing, the respondent was found to have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which states that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.[18] The report further stated that the amounts collected by the respondent should be considered as money received from his client; as such, he has the duty to account for and disclose the same to his client in accordance with Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the said Code.[19] The Investigating Commissioner found nothing on record that showed that respondent made such accounting for or disclosure to his client.[20] Hence, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent was liable for malpractice and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing discussion, this Commissioner finds the respondent liable for malpractice and, accordingly, recommends that respondent be meted a penalty of ONE (1) YEAR suspension from the practice of law with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severity.[21]

Resolutions of the Board of Governors Integrated Bar of the Philippines

On September 28, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-84,[22] which states: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03, and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.[23] (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent's MR[24] was denied in the IBP Board of Governor's Resolution No. XXI-2014-280[25] dated May 3, 2014 as follows:

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-84 dated September 28, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.[26]

Necessarily, We now give Our final action on this case. Issue

Should Atty. Cesa, Jr. be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint and evidence on record? The Court's Ruling

We are in full accord with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the CPR. CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS. Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Based on the records, We find substantial evidence to hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the said Code. It must be stressed that FLC engaged respondent's legal services to represent it in opposing complainant's actions to forestall the foreclosure proceedings. As can be gleaned from respondent's position paper, however, it is admitted that respondent extended help to the complainant in negotiating with FLC for the reduction of the loan payment and cessation of the foreclosure proceedings.[27] The case of Hornilla v. Salunat[28] is instructive on the concept of conflict of interest, viz.: There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. x x x. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full

discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double[]dealing in the performance thereof.[29]

Evidently, respondent was working on conflicting interests – that of his client, which was to be able to foreclose and obtain the best amount they could get to cover the loan obligation, and that of the complainant's, which was to forestall the foreclosure and settle the loan obligation for a lesser amount. Indeed, the relationship between the lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be so. Part of the lawyer's duty to his client is to avoid representing conflicting interests.[30]It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[31] Respondent's allegation that such negotiation was within the knowledge of his client will not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the CPR. Respondent presented a number of documents to support his allegation that all the communications between him and the complainant were relayed to his client but We find no record of any written consent from any of the parties, especially from his client, allowing him to negotiate as such. Respondent's admission that he received advance payments of professional fees from the complainant made matters worse for him. As correctly found by the Investigating Commissioner, it was highly improper for respondent to accept professional fees from the

opposing party as this creates clouds of doubt regarding respondent's legal practice. As aptly stated by the Investigating Commissioner, if a lawyer receives payment of professional fees from the adverse party, it gives an impression that he is being paid for services rendered or to be rendered in favor of such adverse party's interest, which, needless to say, conflicts that of his client's. Simply put, respondent's professional fees must come from his client. This holds true even if eventually such fees will be reimbursed by the adverse party depending on the agreement of the parties. Respondent cannot justify his act of accepting professional fees from the complainant by alleging that such was in accordance with the arrangement between his client and the complainant as there is no clear proof of such arrangement. The April 22, 2005 Letter[32] signed by the complainant and addressed to FLC through Dr. Malaya, invoked by the respondent, does not, in any way, prove that there was an agreement between complainant and FLC. Moreover, the fact that respondent was already receiving several amounts from the complainant even before the date of the said Letter, supposedly stating an agreement between the complainant and FLC as regards the settlement of the loan obligation and the payment of his professional fees, is also suspicious. Such circumstance reveals that even before the complainant and FLC have come to such purported agreement, he was already receiving professional fees from the complainant. Respondent's allegations to the effect that negotiations had already been going on between the parties through him via phone calls even before that Letter do not hold water. To be sure, it would have been easy for the respondent, as a lawyer, to present documentary proof of such negotiation and/or arrangements but respondent failed to do so. At any rate, even assuming that there was indeed an arrangement between FLC and complainant that respondent's professional fees shall be paid by the complainant, which will be later on deducted

from whatever the latter will pay FLC for the settlement of his loan obligation, respondent's act of accepting such payments from the complainant and appropriating the same for his professional fees is still reprehensible. The said payments from the complainant are still considered FLC's money; as such, respondent should have accounted the same for his client. As correctly found by the Investigating Commissioner, there is nothing on record, aside from respondent's bare and self-serving allegations, that would show that respondent made such accounting or disclosure to his client. Such acts are in violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the CPR above-cited. In addition, this Court is baffled by the idea that complainant opted to pay respondent's professional fees first before his loan obligation was even taken care of, and that FLC would actually agree to this. This Court cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold, at all times, the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play, and nobility in the course of their practice of law. Clearly, in this case, respondent failed to uphold such ethical standard in his practice of law. In view of the foregoing disquisition, We hold that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner. ACCORDINGLY, this Court AFFIRMS the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governor's Resolution No. XX-2013-84 dated September 28, 2013 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-280 dated May 3, 2014 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. from the practice of law for one (1) year effective immediately upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of

respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

16.)

THIRD DIVISION July 12, 2017 A.C. No. 10580 SPOUSES GERALDY AND LILIBETH VICTORY, Complainants vs. ATTY. MARIAN JOS. MERCADO, Respondent DECISION TIJAM, J.: This is a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath. The Facts

Sometime in 2009, Spouses Geraldy and Lilibeth Victory (Spouses Victory) were enticed by respondent to enter into a financial transaction with her with a promise of good monetary returns. As respondent is a lawyer and a person of reputation, Spouses Victory entrusted their money to respondent to invest, manage, and administer into some financial transactions that would earn good profit for the parties.1 Respondent called and asked Geraldy Victory (Geraldy) whether he wanted to invest his money. The respondent promised that for an investment of PhP 400,000, she will give Geraldy PhP 600,000 in 30 days; and for PhP 500,000, she will give Geraldy PhP 625,000.2 The investment transactions went well for the first 10 months. Spouses Victory received the agreed return of profit. Some of such financial transactions were covered by Memoranda of Agreement.3 Later on, respondent became evasive in returning to Spouses Victory the money that the latter were supposed to receive as part of the agreement. Respondent failed to settle and account the money entrusted to her by Spouses Victory.4 Spouses Victory alleged that the outstanding obligation of respondent is PhP 5 Million plus interest or a total of PhP 8.3 Million.5 Spouses Victory filed a criminal complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna.6 After the filing of said criminal case, respondent met with Spouses Victory. Respondent proposed to reduce her obligation from PhP 8.3 Million to PhP 7.5 Million in staggered payments, to which Spouses Victory agreed. Respondent then issued three postdated checks in the amount of PhP 300,000 each. However, said checks bounced.7 Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found that respondent indeed lured Spouses Victory in entering into a series of financial transactions with a promise of return of profit. Respondent, however, failed to deliver such promise. On such premise, the IBP-CBD recommended respondent's suspension, to wit: On the basis of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado be SUSPENDED for SIX (6) MONTHS from the practice of law.8 Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-199, which reads: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A ", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violation of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for evading the settlement of her financial obligations to the complainants and for not bothering to appear in the investigation of this case, Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado is hereby DISBARRED.9 (Emphasis supplied) Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,10 which was denied in Resolution No. XXI2014-158, to wit: RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. However, considering that Respondent is currently settling her financial obligations to Complainants and very apologetic and granting her good faith in her investment transaction with Complainants, Resolution No. XX-2013-199 dated March 20, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification, and accordingly the penalty earlier imposed on Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado is hereby reduced to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one (1) year. 11 (Emphasis supplied) Issue Should the respondent be held administratively liable based on the allegations in the pleadings of all parties on record? Our Ruling Emphatically, a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.12 Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 7 provides: CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Exercising its disciplinary authority over the members of the bar, this Court has imposed the penalty of suspension or disbarment for any gross misconduct that a lawyer committed, whether it is in his professional or in his private capacity. Good character is an essential qualification for the admission to and continued practice of law. Thus, any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action.13

In this case, it is without dispute that respondent has an outstanding obligation with Spouses Victory, as the latter's investments which they coursed through the respondent fell through. To make matters worse, respondent issued several checks to settle her obligation; unfortunately, said checks bounced. As a lawyer, respondent is expected to act with the highest degree of integrity and fair dealing. She is expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people's faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. She must, at all times, faithfully perform her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.14 It must be considered that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system.15 We cannot exempt respondent from liability just because she encountered financial difficulties in the course of her investment deals. Respondent even admitted that she continued to do business despite such financial hardships; as such, her monetary obligations with different investors accumulated at an alarming rate. In an attempt to settle her obligations, respondent issued checks, which all bounced. To Our mind, the actuations of respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of every member of the bar. In this case, while respondent admitted her responsibility and signified her intention of complying with the same, We cannot close our eyes to the fact that respondent committed infractions. To uphold the integrity of the legal profession, We deem it proper to uphold the findings as well as the sanction imposed by the IBP Board of Governors. WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve to SUSPEND Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado from the practice of law for one (1) year to commence immediately from the receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's record as member of the Bar. SO ORDERED.

17.) Jocelyn Ignacio vs. Atty. Daniel T. Alviar A.C. No. 11482 July 17, 2017 FACTS: March 2014, respondent lawyer Atty. Alviar was handling the case of herein complainant’s son whom was detained and apprehended by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency in Quezon City. The respondent made mention before the complainant that an acceptance fee amounting to a P100, 000.00. Without any objections, complainant paid the said acceptance fee in to three divisions of payment. First two initial payments were made with the sum amount of P20, 000.00 and P30, 000.00. Third payment with the sum amount of P50, 000.00 was made and delivered by the demand of herein respondent after which he visited the Hall of Justice and subsequently filed his notice of appearance as legal counsel for complainant’s son. The first arraignment of the complainant’s son was set on April 29, 2014 and complainant gave prior notice to Atty. Alviar before the said stipulated date. As a response by Atty. Alviar to the said notice of schedule, respondent refused to attend for the reason of a previous scheduled hearing set on the same day. A letter was sent to the respondent by herein complainant dated April 26, 2014 for a request of intercession by another lawyer since respondent lawyer is not available on the arraignment of complainant’s son. As a result, during the day of the said arraignment, respondent lawyer Atty. Alviar did not appear before the court to represent complainant’s son nor any alternative lawyer was sent in lieu of his absence. Complainant, with the forgoing circumstances asked a withdrawal as counsel to herein respondent and also requested to retain some of the acceptance fee paid equivalent to the legal service rendered. But respondent denied such allegations. An administrative complaint was filed against herein respondent Atty. Alviar before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Respondent’s Argument: He did not receive any formal letter requesting for any intercession by another lawyer sent by the complainant and the failure to respond to the mandatory conferences was resulted to an excessive threats to his life by a former client. He reiterated that there was no negligence on his part to render any legal service to the complainant’s son.

Commission on Bar Discipline: As recommended by the Commission on Bar Discipline, respondent lawyer is ruled to be suspended if approved; six (6) months from the practice of law and to return the said P100, 000.00 to the complainant in violation of Canon 18.03 – Duty not to neglect legal matters. Resolution of Board of Governors: as per Commission on Bar Discipline recommendation was resolved to adopt with modifications to reduce from 6 months suspension to reprimand with stern warning. ISSUE: Whether or Not respondent is guilty of negligence in handling the case of complainant's son. RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court held respondent in violation of Canon 18.03 and hereby sustained the penalty proposed by the Board of Governors. It is said to be undisputed that negligence on the part of the respondent with all of his contentions, that he forgot the date of arraignment is a dismal excuse to make. With that the SC finds the respondent casual and lackadaisical regarding to treatment of the respondent to the complainant and the legal matter entrusted to him. The P100,000.00 acceptance fee according to the Supreme Court cannot be brought back to the complainant as a whole, herein respondent is entitled of quantum merit for the legal service rendered before the arraignment has transpired. An amount of P3, 000.00 was enough for the respondent as determined by the Supreme Court and the remaining P97, 000.00 should be returned as mandated by the court. Because according to Rule 20.01. A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees: (a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required. FALLO: WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Daniel T. Alviar LIABLE for violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. Atty. Daniel T. Alviar is ordered to RESTITUTE to complainant the amount of PhP97,000 out of the Phpl00,000 acceptance fee.”

18.) EN BANC

November 21, 2017 A.C. No. 5573 GIZALE O. TUMBAGA, Complainant vs. ATTY. MANUEL P. TEOXON, Respondent DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Gizale O. Tumbaga against respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teox.on, charging him with gross immorality, deceitful and fraudulent conduct, and gross misconduct. The parties hereto paint contrastive pictures not only of their respective versions of the events but also of their negative portrayals of each other's character. They are, thus, separately outlined below. The Complaint In a verified complaint dated October 9, 2001 filed directly with the Court, complainant narrated that she met respondent sometime in September 1999. He was then the City Legal Officer of Naga City from whom complainant sought legal advice. After complainant consulted with him a few times, he visited her often at her residence and brought gifts for her son, Al Greg Tumbaga. Respondent even volunteered to be the godfather of Al Greg. In one of his visits, respondent assured complainant's mother that although he was already married to Luzviminda Balang, his marriage was a sham because their marriage contract was not registered. In view of respondent's persistence and generosity to her son, complainant believed his representation that he was eligible to marry her. 1

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Complainant averred that on December 19, 1999, she moved in with respondent at the Puncia Apartment in Naga City. In April 2000, she became pregnant. Respondent allegedly wanted to have the baby aborted but complainant refused. After the birth of their son, Billy John, respondent spent more time with them. He used their apartment as a temporary law office and he lived there for two to three days at a time. After Billy John was baptized, complainant secured a Certificate of Live Birth from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Naga City and gave it to respondent to sign. He hesitantly signed it and volunteered to facilitate its filing. After respondent failed to file the same, complainant secured another form and asked respondent to sign it twice. On February 15, 2001, the Certificate of Live Birth was registered. Thereafter, complainant related that respondent rarely visited them. To make ends meet, she decided to work in a law office in Naga City. However, respondent compelled her to resign, assuring her that he would take care of her financial needs. As respondent failed to fulfill his promise, complainant sought assistance from the Office of the City Fiscal in Naga City on the second week of March 2001. In the early morning of the conference set by said office, respondent gave complainant an affidavit of support and told her there was no need for him

to appear in the conference. Complainant showed the affidavit to Fiscal Elsa Mampo, but the latter advised her to have the respondent sign the affidavit again. Fiscal Mampo was unsure of the signature in the affidavit as she was familiar with respondent's signature. Complainant confronted respondent about the affidavit and he half-heartedly affixed his true signature therein. In May 2001, complainant went to respondent's office as he again reneged on his promise of support. To appease her anger, respondent executed a promissory note. However, he also failed to honor the same. In June· 2001, complainant moved out of the Puncia Apartment as respondent did not pay the rentals therefor anymore. In the evening of September 9, 2001, respondent raided complainant's new residence, accompanied by three SWAT members and his wife. Visibly drunk, respondent threatened to hurt complainant with the bolo and the lead pipe that he was carrying if she will not return the personal belongings that he left in their previous apartment unit. As respondent barged into the apartment, complainant sought help from the SWAT members and one of them was able to pacify respondent. Respondent's wife also tried to attack complainant, but she too was prevailed upon by the SWAT members. The incident was recorded in the police blotter. To corroborate her allegations, complainant attached the following documents to her complaint, among others: (a) pictures showing respondent lying in a bed holding Billy John, respondent holding Billy John in a beach setting, complainant holding Billy John in a beach setting, respondent holding Billy John in a house setting, and respondent and complainant seated beside each other in a restaurant ; (b) the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John with an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity showing respondent's signature ; (c) the affidavit of support executed by respondent; (d) the promissory note executed by respondent; (e) the police blotter entry dated September 9, 2001; and (f) copies of pleadings showing the signature of respondent. 3

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Respondent's Answer In his answer, respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He asserted that complainant merely wanted to exact money from him. 13

Respondent alleged that he became the godfather of complainant's son, Al Greg, but he was only one of four sponsors. He began to visit complainant's residence to visit his godson. He also denied being the father of Billy John since complainant supposedly had several live-in partners. He cited the affidavit of Antonio Orogo, complainant's uncle, to attest to his allegations. According to the affidavit, Al Greg is the son of the complainant's live-in partner named Orac Barrameda. Cpmplainant allegedly used Al Greg to extort money from Alfrancis Bichara, the former governor of Albay, with whom complainant also had a sexual relationship. Respondent denied that he lived together with complainant at the Puncia Apartment since he was already married. As complainant was his kumadre, he would pass by her house whenever he visited the house of Representative Sulpicio S. Roco, Jr. Respondent was then a member of Representative Roco's legislative staff. Sometimes, respondent would leave a

bag of clothing in complainant's house to save money for his fare in going to the office of Representative Roco in the House of Representatives in Quezon City. In one instance, complainant and her mother refused to return one of his bags such that he was forced to file a replevin case. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Naga City decided the case in his favor. Respondent also claimed that complainant falsified his signature in the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John so he filed a complaint for the cancellation of his acknowledgment therein. Complainant allegedly made it look like he appeared before Notary Public Vicente Estela on February 15, 2001, but he argued that it was physically impossible for him to have done so as he attended a hearing in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur that day. He also contended that complainant forged his signature in the Affidavit of Support. As to the pictures of respondent with Billy John, he argued that the same cannot prove paternity. He explained that in one of his visits to Al Greg, complainant left Billy John in his care to keep the child from falling off the bed. However, complainant secretly took his picture as he was lying in the bed holding Billy John. As to his picture with Billy John taken at the beach, respondent alleged that at that time complainant gave Billy John to respondent as she wanted to go swimming. While he was holding the child, complainant secretly took their picture. Respondent accused complainant of taking the pictures in order to use the same to extort money from him. This is the same scheme allegedly used by complainant against her previous victims, who paid money to buy peace with her. Respondent further alleged that politics was also involved in the filing of the complaint as complainant was working in the office of then Representative Luis Villafuerte, the political opponent of Representative Roco. Respondent attached to his answer the following documents, among others: (a) the affidavit of Antonio Orogo ; (b) the Decision dated May 8, 2006 of the MTCC of Naga City in Civil Case No. 11546, which is the replevin case; (c) copies of the Minutes of Proceedings and the Order of the RTC of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, both dated January 15, 2001, showing that respondent attended a hearing therein on said date; and (d) a photocopy of respondent's credit card and automated teller machine (ATM) card showing his signature. 14

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The Proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline The parties appeared before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for a few hearings and the marking of their respective. evidence. Complainant marked the following documents, among others, in addition to those already attached to the complaint: (a) a picture showing respondent seated in a restaurant with complainant hugging him; (b) a receipt issued by the Clerk of Court of the MTCC of Naga City, enumerating the objects (consisting mostly of items of clothing) returned by complainant to respondent in the replevin case; and (c) receipts purportedly showing respondent's payment of the rentals for complainant's apartment unit. 19

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On motion of complainant, the IBP issued an order directing respondent, complainant, and Billy John to undergo DNA testing in the DNA laboratory of the National Bureau of 22

Investigation (NBI) to determine the child's paternity. Upon motion from respondent, however, the IBP annulled its prior order in the interest of the speedy disposition of the case. 23

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On November 14, 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report and Recommendation, finding that respondent maintained an illicit affair with complainant and that he should be meted the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years. 25

In the Resolution No. XVIII-2009-15 dated February 19, 2009, the IBP Board of Governors approved the above recommendation and increased the recommended period of suspension to three (3) years. 26

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution. Attached thereto were: (a) the affidavits of Representative Roco and respondent's wife, Minda B. Teoxon, which allegedly refuted complainant's contention that respondent lived with complainant at the Puncia Apartment in Naga City; (b) the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) dated May 10, 2005 in Civil Case No. 11546 for replevin, wherein complainant supposedly admitted to her past relationships; and (c) a letter from the University of Nueva Caceres that informed respondent that he was chosen to be the recipient of its Diamond Achiever Award. 27

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The IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution No. XX2012-539 dated December 14, 2012. 31

The IBP thereafter transmitted the record of the case to the Court for final action. The Ruling of the Court The Court agrees with the conclusion of the IBP that the actuations of respondent in this case showed his failure to live up to the good moral conduct required of the members of the legal profession. We held in Advincula v. Advincula that: 32

The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the practice of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional Responsibility states: Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. xxxx CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. xxxx

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the imposition of the penalty of disbarment or suspension if a member of the Bar is found guilty of committing grossly immoral conduct, to wit: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral .conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x. In order to justify the imposition of the above administrative penalties on a member of the Bar, his/her guilt must first be established by substantial evidence. As explained in Re: Rafael Dimaano, substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 33

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After a thorough review of the records of the case, the Court upholds the findings of the IBP as there is indeed substantial evidence that respondent committed gross immorality by maintaining an extramarital affair with complainant. One of the key pieces of evidence that the IBP considered in ruling against respondent is the Decision dated May 8, 2006 of the MTCC of Naga City in Civil Case No. 11546 for replevin. In said case, respondent made it appear that he was merely seeking to recover personal belongings that he left behind at one time in complainant's house. The items included a traveling bag with various articles of clothing and file folders of cases that he was handling. He also tried to recover the pieces of furniture that he allegedly bought for the complainant, which the latter failed to reimburse as promised. These include a brass bed with foam mattress, a plastic dining table with six plastic chairs, a brass sala set with a center table, and a plastic drawer. For her defense, complainant argued that the respondent gradually left the items of clothing in their apartment unit during the period that they cohabited therein from time to time. She also said that the furniture were gifts to her and Billy John. In its decision, the MTCC did rule in favor of respondent. However, the following elucidation by the MTCC is quite telling: 1âwphi1

To the Court, this is one case that should not have been brought to court because [respondent] could have resorted to a more diplomatic or tactful way of retrieving his personal belongings rather than going on record with a lot of pretext and evasion as if the presiding judge is too naive to appreciate human nature and the truth. [Respondent] would have done well if he was gentleman, candid and responsible enough to admit his misadventure and accept responsibility for his misdeeds rather than try to distort facts and avoid facing the truth. It is not manly. Of course, the [MTCC] is fully convinced that the personal belongings listed in the complaint [are] owned by him and the [furniture] that were eventually sold by [complainant] was bought by him, even without showing any receipts for it. However, the [MTCC] is not persuaded by his allegation that he left his bag with [complainant] because he was in a hurry in going to Manila. He boldly declared in [the trial court] that he has three residences in Naga City and of all places he had to leave his shirt and underwear with a lady whom he had visited "only twice". [Respondent] could deny all the way up to high heaven that he has no child with [complainant] but the [MTCC] will forever wonder why the latter would refuse to part with the shirts and pants unless she is a bareface extortionist. But to the [MTCC], she did not appear to be so. In fact, the [MTCC] had the occasion to observe [complainant] with two little handsome boys who appeared to be her sons. Hence, this lends credence to the fact that she might have really demanded money in exchange for the shirts and pants to support her children.

Be that as it may, the [MTCC] is duty bound to apply the law. There is no issue on the ownership of the personal belongings contained in a bag allegedly left by the [respondent] in the house of [complainant]. xxxx However, as far as the [furniture] is concerned, like the brass bed, sala set, dining table and plastic drawer, the [MTCC] is not persuaded by [respondent's] claim that he meant to be paid by [complainant] for it. [Respondent] is a lawyer and although he is not engage[d] in the buying and selling of [furniture] he should have known that if he really intended to be paid back for it, he should have asked [complainant] to [sign] a promissory note or even a memorandum. As it is, he failed to show any evidence of such an undertaking. That it was a gift of love is more like it. 35

The IBP posited that the above ruling was more than sufficient to prove that respondent tried to distort the truth that he and complainant did live together as husband and wife in one apartment unit. The Court agrees with the IBP on this matter. The MTCC plainly disbelieved respondent's claim that he merely left his bag of clothing in complainant's house before he left for his place of work in Metro Manila - a claim which he likewise made in the present case. The trial court further posited that the pieces of furniture sought to be recovered by respondent were indeed bought by him but the same were intentionally given to complainant out of love. Clearly, the MTCC was convinced that respondent and complainant were involved in an illicit relationship that eventually turned sour and led to the filing of the replevin case. A perusal of the above decision reveals that the findings and conclusions therein were arrived at by the MTCC after a trial on the merits of the case. In other words, the trial court first heard the parties and received their respective evidence before it rendered a decision. As such, the trial court cannot be accused of arriving at the aforementioned findings lightly. Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to mistrust the observations and findings of the MTCC. Respondent did not even point out any reason for us to do so. While the issues in the replevin case and the instant administrative case are indeed different, they share a common factual backdrop, i.e., the parties' contrasting account of the true nature of their relationship. From the evidence of both parties, the MTCC chose the complainant's version of the events. Incidentally, it was respondent himself who brought to light the existence of the MTCC decision in the replevin case when he attached the same to his answer in the present case to substantiate his narration of facts. Thus, he cannot belatedly plead that the decision be disregarded after the statements and findings therein were used against him . Complainant further attached pictures of respondent with her and Billy John as proof of their romantic relations. A perusal of these pictures convinces this Court that while the same cannot indeed prove Billy John's paternity, they are nevertheless indicative of a relationship between complainant ~d respondent that is more than merely platonic.

One of the annexed pictures shows the couple in a restaurant setting, smiling at the camera while seated beside each other very closely that their arms are visibly touching. Another picture shows the couple in the same setting, this time with complainant smiling as she embraced respondent from behind and they were both looking at the camera. From the facial expressions and the body language of respondent and complainant in these pictures, the same unfailingly demonstrate their unmistakable closeness and their lack of qualms over publicly displaying their affection towards one another. Thus, the attempts of respondent to downplay his relationship with complainant flop miserably. Curiously, respondent did not bother to explain the aforesaid pictures. In his answer to the complaint, respondent only managed to comment on the pictures of himself with Billy John. Even then, respondent's accounts as to these pictures are too flimsy and incredible to be accepted by the Court. Respondent previously admitted to the genuineness of the pictures but not to the alleged circumstances of the taking thereof. However, respondent's allegation that the pictures were surreptitiously taken by complainant falls flat on its face. The pictures clearly show that he and Billy John were looking directly at the camera when the pictures were taken. Moreover, the angles from which the pictures were taken suggest that the person taking the same was directly in front of respondent and Billy John. 36

In his motion for reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors Resolution No. XVIII-200915, respondent further argued that the pictures were not conclusive and the admission of the same was not in accordance with the Rules of Court as nobody testified on the circumstances of the taking of the pictures and the accuracy thereof. The IBP correctly disregarded this argument given that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense. 37

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With respect to the affidavit of support, the promissory note, and the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John that contained an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/ Admission of Paternity, respondent likewise failed to provide sufficient controverting evidence therefor. In the affidavit of support and the promissory note, respondent supposedly promised to provide monetary support to Billy John, whom he acknowledged as his illegitimate son. Respondent verbally repudiated said documents, pointing out that the same were typewritten while he used a computer in his office, not a typewriter. Respondent further accused complainant of falsifying his signatures therein and, to prove his charge, he submitted photocopies of his credit card and A TM card that allegedly showed his customary signatures. 39

The Court, still, finds this refutation wanting. To the naked eye, the sample signatures in the credit card and A TM card do appear to be different from the ones in the affidavit of support, the promissory note, and the Certificate of Live Birth. However, we likewise compared the sample signatures to respondent's signatures in his pleadings before the IBP and other documents submitted in evidence and we find that the signatures in the two sets appear to be likewise dissimilar, which suggests respondent uses several different signatures. Thus, respondent's claim of forgery is unconvincing. Moreover, as the IBP noted, the records of the

case do not indicate if he filed criminal charges against complainant for her alleged acts of falsification. As to the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John, respondent did file a complaint for the cancellation of his acknowledgment therein. Thus, the Court will no longer discuss the parties' arguments regarding the validity of respondent's signature in said certificate of birth as the issue should be threshed out in the proper proceeding. In his answer to the complaint, respondent attached the affidavit of Antonio Orogo in order to belie complainant's allegations and that she merely wanted to exact money from respondent. In the affidavit, Orogo claimed that respondent did not live with complainant in the Puncia Apartment in Naga City. Orogo further accused complainant and her mother of engaging in the practice of extorting money from various men since she was just 11 years old. The alleged instances of extortion involved the complainant falsely accusing one man of rape and falsely claiming to another man that he was the father of her first child. The Court can hardly ascribe any credibility to the above affidavit. Given the materiality of Orogo's statements therein, not to mention the gravity of his accusations against complainant and her mother, he should have been presented as a witness before the IBP investigating commissioner in order to confirm his affidavit and give complainant the opportunity to cross-examine him. For whatever reason, this was not done. As it is, Orogo's affidavit lacks evidentiary value. In Boyboy v. Yabut, we cautioned that: 40

It is not difficult to manufacture charges in the affidavits, hence, it is imperative that their truthfulness and veracity be tested in the crucible of thorough examination. The hornbook doctrine is that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, those affidavits must be excluded from the proceedings for being inadmissible and hearsay x x x. (Citation omitted.) In like manner, the Court cannot give much weight to the affidavits of Representative Roco and Minda B. Teoxon, both of whom attested to the statements of respondent regarding his places of residence during the time material to this case. It should be stressed that said affidavits were executed only on June 15, 2009 or about four months after the IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-15 on February 19, 2009, which affirmed respondent's culpability for grossly immoral conduct. This attenuates the credibility of the statements as the same were only given as corroborative statements at so late a time given the relevancy thereof. In the face of the accusations and the evidence offered against him, respondent was dutybound to meet the same decisively head-on. As the Court declared in Narag v. Narag : 41

While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he

is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. x x x. (Citation omitted.) Unfortunately, respondent failed to prove his defense when the burden of evidence shifted to him. He could neither provide any concrete corroboration of his denials in this case nor satisfactorily prove his claim that complainant was merely extorting money from him. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent should be held liable for having illicit relations with complainant. As to whether respondent also sired complainant's second child, Billy John, the Court finds that the same was not sufficiently established by the evidence presented in this case. The paternity and/or acknowledgement of Billy John, if indeed he is respondent's illegitimate child, must be alleged and proved in separate proceedings before the proper tribunal having jurisdiction to hear the same. As to the penalty that should be imposed against respondent in this case, the Court had occasion to rule in Samaniego v. Ferrer, that: 42

We have considered such illicit relation as a disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action. The penalty for such immoral conduct is disbarment, or indefinite or definite suspension, depending on the circumstances of the case. Recently, in Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr., we ruled that suspension from the practice of law for two years was an adequate penalty imposed on the lawyer who was found guilty of gross immorality. In said case, we considered the absence of aggravating circumstances such as an adulterous relationship coupled with refusal to support his family; or maintaining illicit relationships with at least two women during the subsistence of his marriage; or abandoning his legal wife and cohabiting with other women. (Citations omitted.) However, considering respondent's blatant attempts to deceive the courts and the IBP regarding his true relationship with complainant, we agree with the IBP Board of Governors that the proper penalty in this instance is a three-year suspension from the practice of law. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon GUILTY of gross immorality and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be punished with a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

19.) EN BANC September 5, 2017 A.C. No. 11478 SPOUSES ANDRE CHAMBON AND MARIA FATIMA CHAMBON, Complainants vs. ATTY. CHRISTOPHER S. RUIZ, Respondent DECISION TIJAM, J.: This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint for gross violation of Section 2 (b ), paragraph 2 of Rule IV and Section 2, paragraphs (a), (d), and (e) of Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice filed by complainant Spouses Andre and Maria Fatima Chambon (Spouses Chambon) against Atty. Christopher S. Ruiz (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP). 1

The Facts Spouses Chambon alleged that they were creditors of a certain Suzette Camasura Auman, also known as Mrs. Suzette Camasura Remoreras (Remoreras). To secure her obligation, Remoreras executed a real estate mortgage (REM) over a parcel of land with improvements covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 29490, which was registered in her maiden name. Said REM was annotated in the Registry of Deeds of Mandaue City in 2006. TCT No. 29490 was handed over to Spouses Chambon. 2

3

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As Remoreras failed to pay her loan obligation, Spouses Chambon were prompted to institute an extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings on the subject property before the ExOfficio Sheriff of Mandaue City. The public auction was set on April 27, 2010. 5

In February 2010, counsel for Spouses Chambon learned that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56, issued an Order dated March 24, 2008, which directed the issuance of a new Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 29490. Apparently, a Petition for Issuance of a new Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 29490, which was grounded on an alleged Notice of Loss/Affidavit of Loss of the subject title, was filed by Remoreras. 6

Before the scheduled public auction, Remoreras filed a complaint to enjoin the holding of the same on the basis of an alleged execution and delivery of a Release of Mortgage document on the subject property purportedly executed by Spouses Chambon. 7

Spouses Chambon discovered that the Notice of Loss/ Affidavit of Loss and the Release of Mortgage were notarized by the respondent in Cebu City and that certain defects were found in said notarized documents and in the Notarial Register. In the jurat of said Notice, there was no competent evidence of identity of the executor. Also, in said Release, Spouses Chambon denied having executed the same. 8

9

10

These incidents prompted Spouses Chambon to file a complaint for gross violation of Section 2 (b), paragraph 2 of Rule IV and Section 2, paragraphs (a), (d), and (e) of Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice before the IBP. In his Answer, the respondent denied the existence and notarization of the Release of Mortgage. As to the Notice of Loss/Affidavit of Loss, he admitted its existence and its entry in the Notarial Register. However, he imputed negligence on the part of his secretary as regards certain lapses in his Notarial Register. 11

After investigation, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) rendered a Report and Recommendation dated June 19, 2013, to wit: 12

Viewed from the foregoing, we recommend that the Respondent's present commission as notary public, if any, be revoked and that he be barrt!d from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of four (4) years. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 13

In a Resolution dated October 11, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings of the IBP-CBD, but modified the penalty, viz: 14

RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A'', and for violation of Rule IV, Section 2 (b), Rule VI, Section (a). par. 4, 5, and 6 and Rule VI, Section (2), par. (e) of the 2004 Rules of [sic] Notarial Practice, Atty. Christopher S. Ruiz's notarial commission if presently commissioned is immediately REVOKED. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as notary public for three (3) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years. (Emphasis supplied) 15

The Issue Should respondent be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint and evidence on record? Our Ruling

By law, a notary public is empowered to perform the following acts: acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature witnessing, copy certifications, among others. The duties of a notary public is dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. It is not a meaningless ministerial act of acknowledging documents executed by parties who are willing to pay the fees for notarization. For notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making the same admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity; thus, a notarial 16

17

document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.

18

In this case, We find that the respondent failed to live up with the duties of a notary public as dictated by the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The subject Notice of Loss/Affidavit of Loss, allegedly executed by Remoreras, was undisputedly notarized by the respondent and entered in his Notarial Register. However, a careful examination of said Notice reveals that violation of the 2004 Rules was committed. For one, the jurat was incomplete in that the competent proof of identity of the executor, Remoreras, was left in blank. Also, reference to the Notarial Register indicates that the entries pertaining to said Notice were also left in blank. The title/description of instrument, name and addresses of parties, competent evidence of identity, date and time of notarization, and type of notarial act were not filled up. We emphasize that Section 5 of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules provides: Sec. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate. - A notary public shall not: (a) execute a certificate containing information known or believed by the notary to be false. (b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete. Relevantly, Section 8 defines a notarial certificate as part of, or attachment to, a notarized instrument or document that is completed by the notary public, bears the notary's signature and seal, and states the facts attested to by the notary public in a particular notarization as provided for by these Rules. In this case, the respondent affixed his signature and seal on the notarial certificate without verifying the identity of the executor. Such was inferred from the fact that the competent proof of such executor's identity was left in blank. Hence, his act of signing the notarial certificate, notwithstanding the fact that it was incomplete, is a clear violation of the said Rules. No allegation as well that Remoreras is personally known to the respondent to dispense with the presentation of a competent evidence of identity. 19

Moreover, entries in the respondent's Notarial Register, which refer to said Notice of Loss/Affidavit ofLoss were also not properly accomplished. RULE VI - NOTARIAL REGISTER SEC. 1. Form of Notarial Register. - (a) A notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a

chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered page. xxxx SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. - (a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of notarization the following: (1) the entry number and page number; (2) the date and time of day of the notarial act; (3) the type of notarial act; (4) the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding; (5) the name and address of each principal; (6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the signatory is not personally known to the notary; (7) the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person's identity; (8) the fee charged for the notarial act; (9) the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular place of work or business; and (10) any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance. (b) A notary public shall record in the notarial register the reasons and circumstances for not completing a notarial act. Here, it is undisputed that the respondent's Notarial Register did not bear the details pertaining to said Notice of Loss/Affidavit of Loss. To exculpate himself from liability, he attributed negligence and omission on the part of his secretary who prepared the same. On this note, We reiterate that a notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary. The act of recording such entries in the Notarial Register is part and parcel of the duties of a notary public. Keeping in mind the nature of a notary public's responsibility, the respondent should not have shifted such responsibility to his office secretary and allowed her to make such pertinent entries. 20

As to the second subject document, i.e., Release of Mortgage, the respondent denied having notarized the same. He averred that reference to the book number, document number, and page number of the such alleged Release points to a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in his Notarial Register. The respondent admitted that while an SP A is indicated therein, it was actually a Deed of Absolute Sale, which he actually notarized. Such inadvertence was also blamed to his office secretary. Said Release of Mortgage bears similarities as to the signature and seal of the respondent as provided in the Notice of Loss/ Affidavit of Loss. Nevertheless, his admission that inadvertence on the part of his secretary was committed with regard to the entries in his Notarial Register also constitutes a violation under the Rules as aforementioned.

We stress that a notary public carries with him a duty imbued with public interest. At all times, a notary public must be wary of the duties pertaining to his office. Thus, those who are not qualified to live up with the mandate of such office must, in absolute terms, be stripped off such authority. As to penalty, We deem it proper to modify the same in accordance with jurisprudence. For failure to make proper entries in the notarial register, We imposed the penalty of revocation of the notarial commission and suspension from the practice of law for different durations. In the cases of Agadan, et al. v. Atty. Kilaan and Father Aquino v. Atty. Pascuai, the duration for the suspension is for three months, while in the case of Bernardo v. Atty. Ramos, the duration is for six months. On the other hand, for affixing signature and seal on an incomplete notarial certificate, the penalty of revocation of notarial commission, prohibition from being a notary public for two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year was viewed as wise in the case of Gaddi v. Atty. Velasco, Jr, while in the case of Flodeliza E. Coquia v. Atty. Emmanuel E. Laforteza, the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification from being a notary public for one year was considered proper. Lastly, in the case of Bartolome v. Basilio, wherein the notary public was found to have failed to make proper entries in his notarial register and affixed his signature in an incomplete notarial certificate, the penalty imposed was revocation of the notarial commissio, suspension from the practice of law for one year, and prohibition from being a notary public for two years. 21

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Guided by the foregoing precedents, the imposition of the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year is considered as just and proper. Also, We deem it proper to impose the penalty of perpetual disqualification from being a notary public. It is beyond question that respondent was doubly negligent in the performance of his duties as a notary public. Not only did he notarize an incomplete notarial document, but he also admittedly delegated to his secretary his duty of entering details in his Notarial Register. To recall, such admission was apparent from respondent's act of shifting the blame to his secretary when attention was called out as to the non-accomplishment of pertinent entries in his Notarial Register. To Our mind, such acts constitute dishonesty to this Court, warranting perpetual disqualification from being a notary public. WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is GRANTED. Respondent Atty. Christopher S. Ruiz is found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Accordingly, We hereby REVOKE his notarial commission and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFY him from being a notary public. Atty. Ruiz is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective immediately. He is STERNLY WARNED that repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be furnish all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's record as member of the Bar. 1âwphi1

SO ORDERED.

20.) FIRST DIVISION August 16, 2017 A.C. No. 10245 ELIBENA A. vs. ATIY. LEANDRO S. CEDO,, Respondent.

CABILES, Complainant,

DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: Complainant Elibena Cabiles (Elibena) filed this administrative complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of Atty. Leandro Cedo (respondent lawyer) for neglecting the two cases she referred to him to handle. 1

The Facts According to Elibena, she engaged the services of respondent lawyer to handle an illegal dismissal case, i.e., NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 entitled "Danilo Ligbos v. Platinum Autowork and/or Even Cabiles and Rico Guido," where therein respondents were Elibena’s business partners. Respondent lawyer was paid Php5, 500.00 for drafting therein respondents' position paper and Php2,000.00 for his every appearance in the NLRC hearings. 2

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4

During the hearing set on March 26, 2009, only Danilo Ligbos (Danilo), the complainant therein, showed up and submitted his Reply. On the other hand, respondent lawyer did not file a Reply for his clients, despite being paid his appearance fee earlier. 5

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7

In a Decision dated March 31, 2009, the Labor Arbiter ruled for Danilo, and ordered the clients of respondent lawyer to pay Danilo backwages, separation pay, and 13th month pay. 8

Worse still, on October 27, 2009, the NLRC likewise dismissed the appeal of the clients of respondent lawyer for failure to post the required cash or surety bond, an essential requisite in perfecting an appeal. 9

According to Elibena, respondent lawyer misled them by claiming that it was Danilo who was absent during the said hearing on March 26, 2009; and that moreover, because of the failure

to submit a Reply, they were prevented from presenting the cash vouchers that would refute Danilo' s claim that he was a regular employee. 10

With regard to the non-perfection of the appeal before the NLRC, Elibena claimed that respondent lawyer instructed them (his clients) to pick up the said Memorandum only on the last day to file the appeal, i.e., on May 28, 2009; that the memorandum was ready for pick up only at around 2:30 p.m. that day; that left to themselves, with no help or assistance from respondent lawyer, they rushed to file their appeal with the NLRC in Quezon City an hour later; that the NLRC Receiving Section informed them that their appeal was incomplete, as it lacked the mandatory cash/surety bond, a matter that respondent lawyer himself did not care to attend to; and, consequently, their appeal was dismissed for non-perfection. Elibena moreover claimed that respondent lawyer failed to indicate his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance in the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal that he prepared. Elibena pointed to a certification issued on June 29, 2010 by the MCLE Office that respondent lawyer had not at all complied with the first, second, and third compliance periods of the (MCLE) requirement. 11

12

13

Elibena also averred that in May 2009, she hired respondent lawyer to file a criminal case for unjust vexation against Emelita Claudit; that as evidenced by a May 5, 2009 handwritten receipt, she paid respondent lawyer his acceptance fees, the expenses for the filing of the case, and the appearance fees totallfil.g Php45,000.00; and that in order to come up with the necessary amount, she sold to respondent lawyer her 1994 Model Mitsubishi Lancer worth Php85,000.00, this sale being covered by an unnotarized Deed of Sale dated August 1, 2009. 14

15

Elibena claimed that, despite payment of his professional fees, respondent lawyer did not exert any effort to seasonably file her Complaint for unjust vexation before the City Prosecutor's Office; that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City dismissed her Complaint for unjust vexation on September 10, 2009 on the ground of prescription; and that although she moved for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the case, her motion for reconsideration was denied by the City Prosecutor's Office in a resolution dated October 19, 2009. 16

In his Answer, respondent lawyer argued that the March 26, 2009 hearing was set to provide the parties the opportunity either to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement, or give time for him (respondent lawyer) to decide whether to file a responsive pleading, after which the case would be routinely submitted for resolution, with or without the parties' further appearances. As regards the cash vouchers, respondent lawyer opined that their submission would only contradict their defense of lack of employer-employee relationship. Respondent lawyer likewise claimed that Elibena was only feigning ignorance of the cost of the appeal bond, and that in any event, Elibena herself could have paid the appeal bond. With regard to Elibena's allegation that she was virtually forced to sell her car to respondent lawyer to complete payment of the latter's professional fee, respondent lawyer claimed that he had fully paid for the car. 17

18

Respondent lawyer did not refute Ebilena's claim that he failed to indicate his MCLE compliance in the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation In a May 18, 2011 Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer guilty of having violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two years. Aside from respondent lawyer's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements, the Investigating Commissioner also found him grossly negligent in representing his clients, particularly (1) in failing to appear on the March 26, 2009 hearing in the NLRC, and file the necessary responsive pleading; (2) in failing to advise and assist his clients who had no knowledge of, or were not familiar with, the NLRC rules of procedure, in filing their appeal and; 3) in failing to file seasonably the unjust vexation complaint before the city prosecutor's office, in consequence of which it was overtaken by prescription. 19

In its March 20, 2013 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, but modified the recommended administrative sanction by reducing the suspension to one year. The Court's Ruling We adopt the IBP's finding that respondent lawyer violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. We also agree with the recommended penalty. Violation of Canon5 Firstly, Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for IBP members as an additional requirement to enable them to practice law. This is "to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law." Non-compliance with the MCLE requirement subjects the lawyer to be listed as a delinquent IBP member. In Arnado v. Adaza, we administratively sanctioned therein respondent lawyer for his non-compliance with four MCLE Compliance Periods. We stressed therein that in accordance with Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, even if therein respondent attended an MCLE Program covered by the Fourth Compliance Period, his attendance therein would only cover his deficiency for the First Compliance Period, and he was still considered delinquent and had to make up for the other compliance periods. Consequently, we declared respondent lawyer therein a delinquent member of the IBP and suspended him from law practice for six months or until he had fully complied with all the MCLE requirements for all his non-compliant periods. 1âwphi1

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In the present case, respondent lawyer failed to indicate in the pleadings filed in the said labor case the number and date of issue of his MCLE Certificate of Compliance for the Third Compliance Period, i.e., from April 15, 2007 to April 14, 2010, considering that NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 had been pending in 2009. In fact, upon checking with the MCLE Office, Elibena discovered that respondent lawyer had failed to comply with the three MCLE compliance periods. For this reason, there is no doubt that respondent lawyer violated Canon 5, which reads:

CANON 5 - A LA WYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACH1EVE HIGH ST AND ARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. Violation of Canons 17 and 18 and Rule 18.03 The circumstances of this case indicated that respondent lawyer was guilty of gross negligence for failing to exert his utmost best in prosecuting and in defending the interest of his client. Hence, he is guilty of the following: CANON 17 - A LA WYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Furthermore, respondent lawyer's act of receiving an acceptance fee for legal services, only to subsequently fail to render such service at the appropriate time, was a clear violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 24

Respondent lawyer did not diligently and fully attend to the cases that he accepted, although he had been fully compensated for them. First off, respondent lawyer never successfully refuted Elibena's claim that he was paid in advance his Php2,000.00 appearance fee on March 21, 2009 for the scheduled hearing of the labor case on March 26, 2009, during which he was absent. Furthermore, although respondent lawyer had already received the sum of Php45,000.00 to file an unjust vexation case, he failed to promptly file the appropriate complaint therefor with the City Prosecutor's Office, in consequence of which the crime prescribed, resulting in the dismissal of the case. We have held that: Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer's mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. 25

"[A] lawyer 'is expected to exert his best efforts and [utmost] ability to [protect and defend] his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice." However, in the two cases for which he was duly compensated, respondent lawyer was grossly remiss in his duties as counsel. He exhibited lack of professionalism, even indifference, in the defense and protection ofElibena's rights which resulted in her losing the two cases. 26

With regard to the labor case for which he opted not to file a Reply and refused to present the cash vouchers which, according to Elibena, ought to have been submitted to the NLRC, we hold that even granting that he had the discretion being the handling lawyer to present what he believed were available legal defenses for his client, and conceding, too, that it was within his power to employ an allowable legal strategy, what was deplorable was his way of handling the appeal before the NLRC. Aside from handing over or delivering the requisite pleading to his clients almost at the end of the day, at the last day to file the appeal before the NLRC, he never even bothered to advise Elibena and the rest of his clients about the requirement of the appeal bond. He should not expect Elibena and her companions to be conversant with the indispensable procedural requirements to perfect the appeal before the NLRC. If the averments in his Answer are any indication, respondent lawyer seemed to have relied heavily on the NLRC's much vaunted 'leniency' in gaining the successful prosecution of the appeal of his clients in the labor case; no less censurable is his propensity for passing the blame onto his clients for not doing what he himself ought to have done. And, in the criminal case, he should have known the basic rules relative to the prescription of crimes that operate to extinguish criminal liability. All these contretemps could have been avoided had respondent lawyer displayed the requisite zeal and diligence. As mentioned earlier, the failure to comply with the MCLE requirements warranted a sixmonth suspension in the Adaza case. Respondent lawyer must likewise be called to account for violating Canons 17, 18, and Rule 18.03. In one case involving violation of Canons 17 and 18 where a lawyer failed to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, the lawyer was penalized with a six.- month suspension. In another case, involving transgression of the same Canons, the guilty lawyer was meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months and admonished and sternly warned that a commission of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. 27

28

"[T]he appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts." Given herein respondent lawyer's failure to maintain a high standard of legal proficiency with his refusal to comply with the MCLE as well as his lack of showing of his fealty to Elibena’s interest in view of his lackadaisical or indifferent approach in handling the cases entrusted to him, we find it apt and commensurate to the facts of the case to adopt the recommendation of the IBP to suspend him from the practice of law for one year. 29

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leandro S. Cedo is hereby found GUILTY of violating Canons 5, 17, 18, and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon receipt of this Decision, and warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Cedo’s personal record as attorney-at-law. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate said copies to all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

21.) December 20, 2017 Virgilio J. Mapalad, Jr., Complainant, v. Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez, Respondent A.C. No. 10911, 6 June 2017 Facts: Complainant filed a disbarment case against the respondent for presenting falsified Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Number without indicating the date of issue. The respondent used the said falsified MCLE Number in several legal pleadings against the complainant. Upon inquiry with the MCLE Office, a certification was issued stating the respondent has yet complied his MCLE requirements. The complainant filed his complaint against the respondent at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for act of deliberately and unlawfully misleading the courts, parties and counsels concerned into believing that he had complied with the MCLE requirements when in truth he had not, is a serious malpractice and grave misconduct. The complainant, thus, prayed for the IBP to recommend respondent’s disbarment. The respondent was given the chance to comment on the complaint twice but the respondent didn’t provide any response. Both the complainant and the respondent were called for a hearing by the IBP-CBD – both parties attend. The IBP-CBD then directed both parties to submit position papers. Only the complainant complied. The IBP-CBD recommend the respondent be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. The IBP-BOG adopted and approved the IBP-CBD’s report. Issue:

Whether or not the respondent be administratively disciplined based on allegations in the complaint? Held: The Supreme Court find the respondent guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath; Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 10.01, Canon 10; Canon 17; Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name was ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

EN BANC A.C. No. 10911, June 06, 2017 VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent. DECISION TIJAM, J.: This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint for disbarment dated October 16, 2009 filed by complainant Virgilio Mapalad, Sr. against respondent Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez before the Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP).1 The Facts

Complainant alleged that in an action for Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 1635-1-784 before the Municipal Trial Court in Santiago City, Isabela, complainant was one of the plaintiffs while respondent was the defendants' counsel therein. As the said case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal dated May 22, 2009, in which respondent indicated his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance No. II-0014038 without indicating the date of issue thereof.2 On appeal, respondent filed the appellants' brief, again only indicating his MCLE Compliance Number.3

In another case docketed as Special Civil Action No. 3573, respondent, for the same clients, filed a Petition for Injunction wherein he once again only indicated his MCLE Compliance Number.4 Respondent also filed a Motion for Leave of Court dated July 13, 2009 in the said special civil action, indicating his MCLE Compliance Number without the date of issue.5 Upon inquiry with the MCLE Office, complainant discovered that respondent had no MCLE compliance yet. The MCLE Office then issued a Certification dated September 30, 2009, stating that respondent had not yet complied with his MCLE requirements for the First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 to April 14, 2004) and Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007).6 Hence, this complaint. Complainant argues that respondent's act of deliberately and unlawfully misleading the courts, parties, and counsels concerned into believing that he had complied with the MCLE requirements when in truth he had not, is a serious malpractice and grave misconduct.7 The complainant, thus, prayed for the IBP to recommend respondent's disbarment to this Court.8 In a resolution dated February 10, 2010, this Court required the respondent to file a comment on the complaint within 10 days from notice.9 Despite receipt thereof, however, respondent failed to comply with the said resolution.10 This Court, thus, issued another resolution dated July 11, 2011 requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and, again, to file a comment to the complaint.11 However, the respondent again failed to comply.12 On August 14, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing.13 On the date of the hearing, however, none of the parties appeared despite due notice.14 Nonetheless, the IBP directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 10 days from notice.15 Only the complainant filed his position paper, reiterating the allegations and arguments in his complaint.16 After investigation, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD rendered a report17 dated December 17, 2013 with the following recommendation, to wit: WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation of the pieces of evidence submitted by the complainant, it is recommended that ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ be DISBARRED and that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys upon finality of the decision. SO ORDERED.18

On September 28, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-685, adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the CBD-IBP Investigating Commissioner, viz.: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws, and for Respondent's violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he falsified his MCLE Compliance Number and used it in his pleadings in Court, including his having ignored the Orders and notices of the Commission on Bar Discipline and his having been previously sanctioned twice by the IBP, Atty. Anselmo Echanez is hereby DISBARRED and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.19

No motion for reconsideration was filed by either party. The Issue

Should respondent be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint and evidence on record? The Ruling

We answer in the affirmative. Preliminarily, let it be stated that there is no denying that the respondent was given ample opportunity to answer the imputations against him and defend himself but he did not do so despite due notices. At any rate, respondent's acts of misconduct are clearly manifest, thus, warranting the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power. First. It was clearly established that respondent violated Bar Matter No. 85020. No less than the MCLE Office had issued a certification stating that respondent had not complied with the first

and second compliance period of the MCLE.21 Second. Despite such non-compliance, respondent repeatedly indicated a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings before the trial courts.22 In indicating patently false information in pleadings filed before the courts of law, not only once but four times, as per records, the respondent acted in manifest bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit. In so doing, he indeed misled the courts, litigants – his own clients included – professional colleagues, and all others who may have relied on such pleadings containing false information.23 Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false information is a mockery of the courts, especially this Court, considering that it is this Court that authored the rules and regulations that the respondent violated.24 The Lawyer's Oath in Rule 138, Section 3 of the Rules of Court requires commitment to obeying laws and legal orders, doing no falsehood, and acting with fidelity to both court and client, among others, viz.: I, x x x do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these, voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (emphasis supplied)

Also, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides: CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon

10,

Rule

10.01

of

the

CPR

likewise

states:

CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice.

In using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings, respondent also put his own clients at risk. Such deficiency in pleadings can be fatal to the client's cause as pleadings with such false information produce no legal effect.25 In so doing, respondent violated his duty to his clients.26Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR provide: CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Third. The respondent also repeatedly failed to obey legal orders of the trial court, the IBP-CBD, and also this Court despite due notice. In the special civil action above-cited, the trial court directed the respondent to file a comment on a motion which raised in issue respondent's use of a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings but he did not file any.27 This Court also directed respondent to file a comment on the instant complaint but he failed to do so.28 We then issued a show cause order against the respondent to explain why he should not be disciplined or held in contempt for failing to file the required comment but again, respondent did not heed this court's order.29 The IBP-CBD also notified the respondent to appear before it for mandatory conference/hearing but the said notice was also ignored.30 Court orders should be respected not only because the authorities who issued them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the government, which is absolutely essential if our government is to be a government of laws and not of men.31 Clearly, respondent's act of ignoring the said court orders despite notice violates the lawyer's oath and runs counter to the precepts of the CPR. By his repeated dismissive conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court. Respondent's culpability is further highlighted by the fact that, as cited by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution, respondent had already been sanctioned by the IBP twice. In a decision dated April 11, 2013 by this Court en banc, respondent was found guilty of engaging in notarial practice without a notarial commission, and was thus suspended from the practice of law for two years with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.32 In another decision dated May 31, 2016, this Court en

banc again found respondent guilty of performing notarial acts without a notarial commission and was thus suspended from the practice of law for two years and barred permanently from being commissioned as notary public with a stem warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with severely.33 It is noteworthy that in both cases, respondent already manifested his lack of regard, not only for the charges against him, but most importantly to the orders of the IBP and the courts. In the said cases, the respondent likewise failed to file answers, comments, or position papers, or attended mandatory conferences despite due notices.34 Taken altogether, considering respondent's act of using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings35, his repeated failure to obey legal orders36, and the fact that he had already been sanctioned twice by this Court on separate cases37, We are constrained to affirm the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution No. XXI-2014-685, recommending his disbarment to prevent him from further engaging in legal practice.38 It cannot be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice.39As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain legal proficiency and a high standard of honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.40 Also, of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws.41 He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and ignore the very bonds of society, is unfaithful to his position and office and sets a detrimental example to the society.42 WHEREFORE, respondent Anselmo S. Echanez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

22.) EN BANC August 22, 2017 A.C. No. 10253 RAFAEL PADILLA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLENN SAMSON,, Respondent.

DECISION PERALTA, J.: This case stemmed from a complaint filed by Rafael Padilla against his former lawyer, Atty. Glenn Samson, for behavior unbecoming of a lawyer. The following are the procedural and factual antecedents of the case: Complainant Rafael Padilla filed a Complaint on November 25, 2013 against his former counsel, respondent Atty. Glenn Samson, in connection with his case, entitled Indelecia Balaga and Enrique Balaga v. Rafael Padilla, Case No. 00-05-07038-08. Padilla contends that Samson suddenly cut all communications with him, which almost caused him to miss the due date for the filing of a required pleading. He even wrote a demand letter asking Samson to withdraw his appearance and return all the documents pertinent to his case, but to no avail. Also, Padilla had been asking Samson for the refund of his overpayment amounting to ₱19,074.00. However, Samson failed to offer any response, despite aforementioned demands. Likewise, when ordered by the Court as well as the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to refute the allegations in Padilla's complaint and explain his side, Samson refused to do so. On January 26, 2016, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended Samson’s suspension for six (6) months. On February 25, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXII-2016-176, which adopted and approved, with modification, the abovementioned recommendation, hence: 1

2

RESOLVED to ADOPT, with modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner increasing the penalty to one (1) year suspension considering the gravity of the offense committed by the Respondent. The Court's Ruling The Court sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP that Samson should be held administratively accountable. Ordinarily, lawyers may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a position to carry it out effectively or competently. But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility (CPR) to undertake the task with zeal, care, and utmost devotion. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. Every case which a lawyer accepts deserves full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of importance. 3

Canons 15, and 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the CPR provide:

xxxx CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS. xxx CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxx Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. xxx CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW. Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. xxx In the case at bar, Samson completely abandoned Padilla without any justification, notwithstanding his receipt of the professional fees for services rendered as well as the latter's efforts to reach him. His continuous inaction despite repeated follow-ups reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his client's cause, in blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Also, despite numerous demands, Samson has unjustifiably refused to return Padilla's documents and the amount of P19, 074.00 as overpayment for his legal services. It is a hornbook principle that a lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes, not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without prodding from the client or the court. Further, Samson failed to file his Answer to the complaint despite due notice from the Court and the IBP. His unwarranted tenacity simply shows, not only his lack of responsibility, but also his lack of interest in clearing his name, which, as pronounced in case law, is indicative of an implied admission of the charges levelled against him. 4

Clients are led to expect that lawyers would always be mindful of their cause and, accordingly, exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. On the other hand, the lawyer is expected to maintain, at all times, a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether or not he accepts it for a fee. To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. 1âwphi1

5

The CPR requires lawyers to give their candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case. Knowing whether a case would be potentially successful is not only a function, but also an obligation on the part of lawyers. If ever Samson found that his client's

cause was defenseless, then he should have met with Padilla so that they would be able to discuss their possible options, instead of abruptly dropping the case without any notice or explanation. Samson's failure to fulfill this basic undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. 6

Withal, his persistent refusal to return Padilla's money and case files despite frequent demands clearly reflects his lack of integrity and moral soundness; he is clinging to something that does not belong to him, and that he absolutely has no right to keep or use without Padilla's permission. Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their client's money and property that may come into their possession. Thus, Samson's failure to return Padilla's money upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby betrayed the trust that was reposed upon him, which constitutes a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 7

The Code does not only exact from lawyers a firm respect for the law, legal processes, and the courts, but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. Verily, Samson fell short of the demands required of him as a faithful member of the bar. His inability to properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable, not just to Padilla, but also to the Court, to the legal profession, and to the general public. Given the crucial importance of his role in the administration of justice, his misconduct diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. 8

Therefore, pursuant to the aforecited principles, the Court finds Samson guilty of violating the pertinent Canons of the CPR, for which he must necessarily be held administratively liable. In previous cases, lawyers who have been held liable for infractions similar to those which Samson committed were suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. In Jinon v. Atty. Jiz, a lawyer who neglected his client's case, misappropriated the client's funds, and disobeyed the IBP’s directives to submit his pleadings and attend the hearings, was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. In Small v. Atty. Banares, the Court imposed a similar penalty against a lawyer who failed to render any legal service even after receiving money from the complainant, to return the money and documents he received despite demand, to update his client on the status of her case, to respond to her requests for information, and to file an answer and attend the mandatory conference before the IBP. Also, in Villanueva v. Atty. Gonzales, a lawyer who neglected complainant's cause, refused to immediately account for his client's money and to return the documents received, failed to update his client on the status of her case and to respond to her requests for information, and failed to submit his answer and attend the mandatory conference before the IBP, was likewise suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. 9

10

11

12

Finally, Samson must also return all the properties and documents in his possession relative to Padilla's case, and the amount of Pl 9,074.00 as overpayment of fees since the same is intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. While the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondentlawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that said rule remains applicable only when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct from and not intrinsically linked to his professional

engagement. And considering the fact that Samson's receipt of said amount and documents from Padilla remains undisputed, the Court finds the return of the same to be in order. 13

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Glenn Samson from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon finality of this Decision, ORDERS him to RETURN to complainant Rafael Padilla, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision, all the documents and properties entrusted to him by virtue of their lawyer-client relationship and the amount of Pl9,074.00 as overpayment of fees, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, from November 25, 2013, until fully paid, and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar offense, including the failure to return said amount and documents, shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be included in the personal records of Atty. Glenn Samson and entered in his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant. 1avvphi1

Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

23.) EN BANC A.C. No. 11149 (Formerly CBD Case No. 13-3709), August 15, 2017 LAURENCE D. PUNLA AND MARILYN SANTOS, Complainants, v. ATTY. ELEONOR MARAVILLAONA, Respondent. The present administrative case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by complainants Laurence D. Punla and Marilyn Santos against respondent Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, charging the latter with violation of the lawyer's oath, for neglecting her clients' interests. Factual Background: Complainants met the respondent last January 2012 when they broached the idea to respondent that they intend to file two annulment cases and they wanted respondent to represent them; that respondent committed to finish the two annulment cases within six months from full payment; that the agreed lawyer's fee for the two annulment cases is P350,000.00; that the P350,000.00 was paid in full by complainants personally handed to respondent lawyer and evidenced by respondent's handwritten acknowledgement receipt.

On the commitment of respondent that she will finish the cases in six months, complainants followed up their cases in September 2012 or about 6 months from their last payment in March 2012. They were ignored by respondent. On 25 September 2012, complainants sent a letter to respondent demanding that the P3 50,000.00 they paid her be refunded in full within five (5) days from receipt of the letter, the Philpost of Dasmariñas, Cavite, attested that complainants' letter was received by respondent on 01 October 2012. No refund was made by respondent. In an Order dated January 25, 2013, the IBP directed respondent to file her Answer within 15 days. No answer was filed. A Mandatory Conference/Hearing was set on December 4, 2013 but respondent did not appear, so it was reset to January 22, 2014. However, respondent again failed to attend the mandatory conference/hearing as scheduled. Hence, in an Order dated January 22, 2014, the mandatory conference was terminated and both parties were directed to submit their verified position papers. Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner: The Investigating Commissioner was of the opinion that respondent is guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In addition, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found that respondent has been charged with several infractions, thus clearly showing that respondent lawyer has been a serial violator of the Canons of Professional Responsibility as there are thirteen pending cases filed against her. These cases were filed on different dates and by various individuals and is substantial proof that respondent has the propensity to violate her lawyer's oath - and has not changed in her professional dealing with the public. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred and ordered to pay complainants the amount of P350,000.00 with legal interest until fully paid. Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors:

The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XXI-2015-15612 dated February 20, 2015, resolved to adopt the findings of the Investigating Commissioner as well as the recommended penalty of disbarment. The issue in this case is whether respondent should be disbarred.

Our Ruling The Court resolves to adopt the findings of fact of the IBP but must, however, modify the penalty imposed in view of respondent's previous disbarment. This Court cannot overlook the reality that several cases had been filed against respondent, as pointed out by the IBP. In fact, one such case eventually led to the disbarment of respondent. In Suarez v. MaravillaOna, the Court meted out the ultimate penalty of disbarment and held that the misconduct of respondent was aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect towards the IBP and amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. Clearly, Atty. Maravilla-Ona exhibits the habit of violating her oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as defying the processes of the IBP. The Court cannot allow her blatant disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her sworn duty as a member of the Bar to continue. She had

been warned that a similar violation would merit a more severe penalty, and yet, her reprehensible conduct has, again, brought embarrassment and dishonor to the legal profession. While indeed respondent's condemnable acts ought to merit the penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar her anew, for in this jurisdiction we do not impose double disbarment. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ADOPTS the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and FINDS respondent ATTY. ELEONOR MARAVILLA-ONA GUILTY of gross and continuing violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and accordingly FINED P40,000.00. Respondent is also ORDERED to PAY complainants the amount of P350,000.00, with 12% interest from the date of demand until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment. This is without prejudice to the complainants' filing of the appropriate criminal case, if they so desire.

This Decision shall be immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC August 15, 2017 A.C. No. 11149 LAURENCE D. PUNLA and MARILYN SANTOS, Complainants, vs. ATTY. ELEONOR MARA VILLA-ONA,, Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: The present administrative case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) by complainants Laurence D. Punla and Marilyn Santos against respondent Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, charging the latter with violation of the lawyer's oath, for neglecting her clients' interests. 1

Factual Background The facts, as culled from the disbarment complaint, are summarized in the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Ricardo M. Espina viz.: 2

In a complaint-affidavit filed on 15 January 2013, complainants alleged that they got to know respondent lawyer sometime in January 2012 when they requested her to notarize a Deed of Sale; that subsequently, they broached the idea to respondent that they intend (sic) to file two (2) annulment cases and they wanted respondent to represent them; that respondent committed to

finish the two (2) annulment cases within six (6) months from full payment; that the agreed lawyer's fee for the two annulment cases is P350,000.00; that the ₱350,000.00 was paid in full by complainants, as follows: ₱100,000.00 on 27 January 2012 as evidenced by respondent's Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 55749 of even date (Annex "A"); ₱150,000.00 on 28 January 2012 as evidenced by respondent's Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 56509 of even date (Annex "B"); ₱50,000.00 on 14 March 2012 personally handed to respondent lawyer and evidenced by respondent's handwritten acknowledgement receipt of same date (Annex "C"); and, ₱50,000.00 on 15 March 2012 deposited to respondent's Metrobank account no. 495-3-49509141-5 (Annex "D"). On the commitment of respondent that she will (sic) finish the cases in six (6) months, complainants followed up their cases in September 2012 or about 6 months from their last payment in March 2012. They were ignored by respondent. On 25 September 2012, complainants sent a letter (Annex "E") to respondent demanding that the ₱350,000.00 they paid her be refunded in full within five (5) days from receipt of the letter. In a Certification dated 07 November 2012 (Annex "F"), the Philpost of Dasmarinas, Cavite, attested that complainants' letter was received by respondent on 01 October 2012. No refi.md was made by respondent. 3

In an Order dated January 25, 2013, the IBP directed respondent to file her Answer within 15 days. No answer was filed. A Mandatory Conference/Hearing was set on December 4, 2013 but respondent did not appear, so it was reset to January 22, 2014. However, respondent again failed to attend the mandatory conference/hearing as scheduled. Hence, in an Order dated January 22, 2014, the mandatory conference was terminated and both parties were directed to submit their verified position papers. 4

5

6

7

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner The Investigating Commissioner was of the opinion that respondent is guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: 8

There is clear violation of Canons 17 and 18, Canons of Professional Responsibility. These canons, quoted hereunder, [state]: CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Of particular concern is Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to always keep the client informed of the developments in his case and to respond whenever the client requests for information. Respondent has miserably failed to comply with this Canon. 9

In addition, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found that respondent has been charged with several infractions. Thus: Moreover, verification conducted by this Office shows that this is not the first time that respondent lawyer has been administratively charged before this Office. As shown in the table below, respondent is involved in the following active cases: COMPLAINANTS Ten (10) consolidated cases: 1. Felisa Amistoso, et al. 2. Anita Lagman 3. Isidro H. Montoya 4. NoelAngcao 5. Mercedes Bayan 6. Rustica Canuel 7. Anita Canuel 8. Elmer Canuel 9. Evangeline Sangalang 10. Felisa Amistoso

CASE NO.

A.C. No. 6369 A.C. No. 6371 A.C. No. 6458 A.C. No. 6459 A.C. No. 6460 A.C. No. 6462 A.C. No. 6457 A.C. No. 6463 A.C. No. 6464 A.C. No. 6469

STATUS

Pending with Supreme Court

PENALTY

WHEN FILED

Suspension

11. Beatrice Yatco, et al.

CBD Case No. 10-2733

Pending with Supreme Court

12. Nonna Guiterrez

CBD Case No. 12-3444

For report and recommendation

May 23, 2012

13. Bienvenida Flor Suarez

CBD Case No. 12-3534

For report and recommendation

August 01, 2012

Suspension

July 26, 2010

Clearly, respondent lawyer has been a serial violator of the Canons of Professional Responsibility as shown in the thirteen (13) pending cases filed against her. Add to that the present case and that places the total pending administrative cases against respondent at fourteen (14). That these 14 cases were filed on different dates and by various individuals is substantial proof that respondent has the propensity to violate her lawyer's oath- and has not changed in her professional dealing with the public. 10

Consequently, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred and ordered to pay complainants the amount of ₱350,000.00 with legal interest until fully paid. 11

Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XXI-2015-156 dated February 20, 2015, resolved to adopt the findings of the Investigating Commissioner as well as the recommended penalty of disbarment. 12

The issue in this case is whether respondent should be disbarred. Our Ruling The Court resolves to adopt the findings of fact of the IBP but must, however, modify the penalty imposed in view of respondent's previous disbarment. Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court provides the penalties of disbarment and suspension as follows: Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do x x x. Here, there is no question as to respondent's guilt. It is clear from the records that respondent violated her lawyer's oath and code of conduct when she withheld from complainants the amount of ₱350,000.00 given to her, despite her failure to render the necessary legal services, and after complainants demanded its return. 1âwphi1

It cannot be stressed enough that once a lawyer takes up the cause of a client, that lawyer is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence and zeal, especially when he/she accepts it for a fee. The lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him/her. Moreover, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the monies he/she holds for his/her client gives rise to the presumption that he/she has appropriated the said monies for his/her own use, to the prejudice and in violation of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her client. 13

14

What is more, this Court cannot overlook the reality that several cases had been filed against respondent, as pointed out by the IBP. In fact, one such case eventually led to the disbarment of respondent. In Suarez v. Maravilla-Ona, the Court meted out the ultimate penalty of disbarment and held that the misconduct of respondent was aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect towards the IBP and amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. 1âwphi1

15

In the same case, the Court took note of the past disbarment complaints that had been filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona viz.:

x x x In A.C. No. 10107 entitled Beatrice C. Yatco, represented by her AttorneyIn- Fact, Marivic Yatco v. Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, the complainant filed a disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for issuing several worthless checks as rental payments for the complainant's property and for refusing to vacate the said property, thus forcing the latter to file an ejectment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona. The IBP required Atty. Maravilla-Ona to file her Answer, but she failed to do so. Neither did she make an appearance during the scheduled mandatory conference. In its Resolution dated February 13, 2013, the IBP found Atty. Maravilla-Ona guilty of serious misconduct[,] and for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code. The Court later adopted and approved the IBP's findings in its Resolution of September 15, 2014, and suspended Atty. Maravilla-Ona from the practice of law for a period of one year. In yet another disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona, docketed as A.C. No. 10944[,] and entitled Norma M Gutierrez v. Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, the complainant therein alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Maravilla-Ona and gave her the amount of ₱80,000.00 for the filing of a case in court. However, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to file the case, prompting the complainant to withdraw from the engagement and to demand the return of the amount she paid. Atty. Maravilla-Ona returned ₱15,000.00[,] and executed a promissory note to pay the remaining ₱65,000.00. However, despite several demands, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to refund completely the complainant's money. Thus, a complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for grave misconduct, gross negligence and incompetence. But again, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to file her Answer and [to] appear in the mandatory conference before the IBP. The IBP found that Atty. Maravilla-Ona violated Canon 16, Rule 16.03 of the Code [of Professional Responsibility] and recommended her suspension for a period of five (5) years, considering her previous infractions. The Court, however, reduced Atty. Maravilla-Ona's penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. She was also ordered to return the complainant's money. Clearly, Atty. Maravilla-Ona exhibits the habit of violating her oath as a lawyer and the Code [of Professional Responsibility], as well as defying the processes of the IBP. The Court cannot allow her blatant disregard of the Code [of Professional Responsibility] and her sworn duty as a member of the Bar to continue. She had been warned that a similar violation [would] merit a more severe penalty, and yet, her reprehensible conduct has, again, brought embarrassment and dishonor to the legal profession. 16

Back to the case at bar: While indeed respondent's condemnable acts ought to merit the penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar her anew, for in this jurisdiction we do not impose double disbarment. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ADOPTS the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and FINDSrespondent ATIY. ELEONOR MARA VILLA-ONA GUILTY of gross and continuing violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and accordingly FINED ₱40,000.00. Respondent is also ORDERED to PAYcomplainants the amount of ₱350,000.00, with 12% interest from the date of demand until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment. This is without prejudice to the complainants' filing of the appropriate criminal case, if they so desire. 17

Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall append the same to the personal record of respondent; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, which shall circulate the same to all courts in the country for their information and guidance. This Decision shall be immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

24.) EN BANC [ A.C. NO. 11385, March 14, 2017 ] ORTIGAS PLAZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY JANICE MONTERO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, RESPONDENT.D E C I S I O N PER CURIAM: Under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is sworn to respect the law and legal processes, and any violation thereof merits condign disciplinary action against the lawyer. The present complaint asks for the disbarment of Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak for his participation in the forcible intrusion into the complainant's property.

Antecedents

Complainant Ortigas Plaza Development Corporation owned the parcel of land located in Ortigas Avenue Extension, Pasig City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-126797 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal (property). The complainant alleges that at around 11:00 a.m. of November 29, 2012, Atty. Tumulak, accompanied by uniformed guards of the Nationwide Security Agency, Inc., unlawfully entered and took control of the entrance and exit of the property. It appears that prior to the incident, Atty. Tumulak had furnished several documents to the complainant, including the deed of assignment executed by one Henry F. Rodriguez as the administrator of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes R. Rodriguez designating Atty. Tumulak as an assignee.[1] The documents furnished by Atty. Tumulak were all related to the intestate proceedings of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez docketed as S.P. No. IR-1110 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, in Iriga City (RTC), which involved the claim of the heirs of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez to several parcels of land situated all over the country, including the Provinces of Rizal, Quezon, and Bulacan, and Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, Antipolo City, Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Marikina City, Baguio City, Angeles City, San Fernando City and Tagaytay City.[2] The complainant charges Atty. Tumulak with deceit, dishonesty and fraud for claiming to have coordinated with the proper government agencies prior to the illegal and forcible intrusion.[3] The complainant manifests that as a lawyer, Atty. Tumulak ought to know that the claim of his principal in the property was barred by res judicata due to the valid issuance of a Torrens title under its name. Accordingly, his conduct constituted conduct unbecoming of a lawyer deserving of sanction.[4]

In his answer to the complaint,[5] Atty. Tumulak denies having been present when the security guards of Nationwide Security Agency entered the complainant's property. He insists that the allegations against him were pure hearsay because Ms. Montero, the representative of the complainant, had no personal knowledge of the incident; that the documents he had furnished to the complainant included records of the intestate proceedings in the RTC involving the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez and Antonio Rodriguez; that he had no hand in procuring the documents; that he did not himself enter the property; and that the entry into the property was effected by the sheriff pursuant to a writ of execution.

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

After due hearing, IBP Commissioner of Bar Discipline Ricardo M. Espina submitted his Report and Recommendation,[6] wherein he found Atty. Tumulak to have violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Commissioner Espina recommended the suspension of Atty. Tumulak from the practice of law for two years. On October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXII-2015-57 adopting the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Espina[7] viz.:

RESOLUTION NO. XXII-2015-57 CIBD Case No. 13-3707 Ortigas Plaza Dev't Corp. vs. Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak

RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of facts and recommended penalty of 2 years su5pension of Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak by the Investigating Commissioner.

Issue

Did Atty. Tumulak violate Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he facilitated the implementation of the writ of execution and the entry into the complainant's property?

Ruling of the Court

Atty. Tumulak deserves to be severely sanctioned for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Pertinent portions of Commissioner Espina's Report and Recommendation, which adequately illustrated Atty. Tumulak' s transgressions, are worth quoting verbatim, viz.:

We enumerate respondent lawyer's violation of the following rules/principles when he led the forcible intrusion into OPDC office in Pasig City:

Atty. Tumulak knew, or ought to know, that property claims based on Spanish title can no longer be cited as a) legitimate basis for ownership as of 16 February 1976 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892;

Respondent lawyer, as a long-time practitioner (admitted to the Bar in 1971), is presumed to know that the Supreme Court has promulgated a case specifically addressing the fake titles arising from spurious "Deed of Assignment" of the supposed Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. This is the 2005 case of Evangelista, et al. vs. Santiago [G.R. b) No. 157447; April 29, 2005] where the same modus as the one adopted by respondent lawyer, was used by an "assignee" in claiming properties located in Paranque, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Cavitc, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal, allegedly as part of the Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez;

c) x x x x;

While respondent lawyer claims that the "deed of assignment" in his favor has a consideration, unfortunately we did not see any agreed consideration in the document. If there is no monetary d) consideration, it will be treated as a donation with the corresponding payable taxes. Respondent lawyer's documents don't show that taxes have been paid for the document to be legally binding;

Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally but can only be questioned in a principal action x x x. If respondent lawyer thinks that OPDC's title on the Pasig property is questionable, he could e) have tiled an action to annul OPDC's title and not bring in the cavalry, so to speak, in the form of uniformed security guards, to take over the property; and

We find respondent's actions highly questionable and contrary to legal protocol; (i) the court documents were issued by the RTCIriga City, Br. 94; (ii) it "affects" a property located in Pasig City; (iii) respondent lawyer became the "assignee" of a Pasig City property; (iv) no taxes were paid for the "assignment"; (v) assistance of the Sheriff of Pasig was not enlisted by respondent, instead, he enlists the help of the Sheriff of Manila; (vi) all that the f) Sheriff of Manila did was to deliver the RTC-Iriga, Br. 34 court documents to complainant but with a twist; the Sheriff and respondent lawyer were escorted by a phalanx of security guards; (vii) the uniformed guards, obviously upon instruction, took over and/or controlled the gates of OPDC offices with attendant force and intimidation. Respondent lawyer's claimed innocence cannot prevail over these illegalities of which he, or his agents, had a hand. With the above highly questionable acts totally irreconcilable with a seasoned practitioner like respondent lawyer, we find Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak liable for violation of Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 and 1.02 thereof. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis) Commissioner Espina correctly observed that the Court in the 2005 ruling in Evangelista v. Santiago[8] had already enjoined the successors and heirs of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez from

presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership in land registration proceedings, as follow:

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their predecessors-ininterest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by lsmael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the Subject Property on their possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since time immemorial carried the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. If the Subject Property was already private property before the Spanish conquest, then it would have been beyond the power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant to anyone. The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-interest could be traced only as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having acquired portions of the Subject Property by assignment, could acquire no better title to the said portions than their predecessors-ininterest, and hence, their title can only be based on the same Spanish title. Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from invoking the Spanish title as basis of their ownership of the Subject

Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the Torrens system by discontinuing the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring all lands recorded under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title, unregistered lands. It further provides that within six months from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their land under what is now P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system. Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing ownership over real property. P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the Subject Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners' Complaint that petitioners predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration proceedings. Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest title, but only confirm and record title already created and vested. By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on or quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but

would never be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to eliminate.[9]

Moreover, in Santiago v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority,[10] the Court denied the petition of the successors of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by applying the principle of stare decisis, ruling therein that the applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence were identical to those in the situation in Evangelista v. Santiago, thusly:

The present petition is substantially infirm as this Court had already expressed in the case of Nemencio C. Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago, that the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, the Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos of 1891, has been divested of any evidentiary value to establish ownership over real property. Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago anchor their right to recover possession of the subject real property on claim of ownership by Victoria M. Rodriguez being the sole heir of the named grantee, Hermogenes Rodriguez, in the Spanish title Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos. xxxx Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must be denied by virtue of the principle of stare decisis. Not only are the legal rights and relations of herein parties substantially the same as those passed upon in the aforementioned 2005 Evangelista Case, but the facts, the applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary

evidence are identical such that a ruling in one case, under the principle of stare decisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[11]

Finally, the 2011 ruling in Pascual v. Robles [12] affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) setting aside the amended decision rendered in S.P. No. IR-1110 by the RTC. This ruling should have alerted Atty. Tumulak from taking the actions giving rise to the complaint against him inasmuch as he has admitted to have derived his rights from the deed of assignment executed in his favor by Henry Rodriguez as the administrator of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez pursuant to said amended decision. Moreover, Atty. Tumulak is presumed as a lawyer to know the developments in S.P. No. IR-1110 not only by virtue of his becoming an assignee of the estate but also because of his being a lawyer with the constant responsibility of keeping abreast of legal developments.[13] Atty. Tumulak cannot shield himself from personal responsibility behind the deed of assignment. The deed was doubtful on its face, as borne out by the text, to wit:

DEED OF ASSIGNMENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS This Deed of Assignment is made and executed by and between The INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE HERMOGENES R. RODRIGUEZ AND ANTONIO R. RODRIGUEZ,represented

by HENRY F. RODRIGUEZ, of legal age, widower, Filipino, x xx Judicial Heir and Court-Appointed Administrator by virtue of AMENDED DECISION dated August 13, 19999 of Fifth Judicial Region, RTC Branch 34, lriga City in SPECS. PROCS. No. IR-1110 which settled the issue of Heirship, Administratorship and Settled [sic] of the Estate of Hem1ogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes Estate, hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNOR;

-and-

EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, of legal age, widower x x x hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNEE:

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the ASSIGNOR is the Court-Appointed Administrator and one of the Judicial heirs of the Intestate Estate of the late HERMOGENES and ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ y REYES Estate by virtue of AMENDED DECISION dated Augsut 13, 1999 of Fifth Judicial Region, RTC Branch 34, Iriga City in SPECS. PROCS. No. IR1110 which settled the issue of Heirship, Administratorship and Settlement of the Estate of Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes Estate, thereafter, petitions for certiorari tiled with the SUPREME COURT assailing the aforesaid Amended Decision were DENIED and declared FINAL & EXECUTORY in G.R. Nos. 140271, 140915, 168648, 142477 and 182645, affirming the same Amended Decision;

Whereas, the ASSIGNEE has secured the property and actual occupant/s over the same property they arc presently occupying and initiating steps for recovery of the same parcel and has shown exemplary loyalty and faithfulness to the ASSIGNOR and also consistently protected the rights and interest of the Estate against intruder, impostor, usurpers and false claimant with spurious title/s over the same property; NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing, the ASSIGNOR has agreed to execute this DEED OF ASSIGNMENT and the ASSIGNEE, has accepted and both parties have mutually agreed to the following terms and conditions herein stipulated; A parcel of land situated in Ortigas Avenue corner Raymundo Avenue, Barangay Rosario, Pasig City, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon, with containing an area of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGTH [sic] HUNDRED AND NINE[TY] ONE SQUARE METERS (35,891) more or less technical description described below, to xxxx 1. That the ASSIGNEE shall shoulder all the expenses in the performance of the task as indicated x x x above such as payment for the real taxes, titling, researching, liaising with government agencies, paying lawyers involved in the litigation, and other incidental expenses relevant in the consummation of the said transaction; 2. That the ASSIGNEE shall secure and facilities (sic] all documents from Land Registration Authority, DENR-LMB, DENR-LMS, Register of Deeds and such other government agencies concerned for the completion of titling process subject to the existing laws, rules and regulation in accordance to Land Registration Act;

3. That the ASSIGNEE shall perform the task of relocation and verification[,] land survey, possessing, fencing, guarding, surveying and or reviving plans, paying taxes, titling, selling, leasing, developing, segregating and mortgaging; 4. That the ASSIGNEE shall be the AD-LITEM representative of the ASSIGNOR, before of [sic] any Court[,] Administrative and QuasiJudicial body and to bring suit, defend, in connection with the actions brought for or against the ASSIGNOR of whatever nature and kind; and 5. That the ASSIGNEE shall report regularly to the ASSIGNOR per the above tasks and accomplishment. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their respective signatures on the date 22 March 2010 and place QUEZON CITY above written.[14] (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Atty. Tumulak cannot deny his personal participation in the unlawful and forcible intrusion into the property just because the complainant did not establish his physical presence thereat at the time. In fact, such physical participation was not even necessary in order to properly implicate him in personal responsibility for the intrusion after he admitted having furnished to the complainant the deed of assignment and other documents as the source of his authority. Specifically, his duties under the deed of assignment included "shoulder[ing] all the expenses in the performance of [securing the property x x x and initiating steps for recovery of the same parcel] x x x such as x x x or payment for the real taxes, titling, researching, liaising with government agencies, paying lawyers involved in the litigation, and other incidental expenses relevant in

the consummation of the said transaction;" and "possessing, fencing, [and] guarding" the property. It is notable in this connection that Atty. Tumulak had been discharging his role as the assignee since the time of the execution of the deed of assignment on March 22, 2010. Considering that he had been in charge of doing all the actions necessary to enforce the interest of his principal since March 22, 2010, and that the forcible intrusion complained about occurred on November 29, 2012, or more than two years from the execution of the deed of assignment, he is reasonably and ineluctably presumed to have coordinated all the actions leading to the intrusion. Finally, even assuming that the amended decision was valid and enforceable, Atty. Tumulak could not legitimately resort to forcible intrusion to advance the interest of the assignor. The more appropriate action for him would be to cause the annulment of the complainant's title instead of forcibly entering the property with the aid of armed security personnel. All told, Atty. Tumulak was guilty of misconduct for circumventing existing laws and disregarding settled rulings in order to commit injustice against the complainant. His conduct betrayed his Lawyer's Oath "to support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." He breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral

or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 -A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

To the best of his ability, every lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law, and to avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. The lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his or her commendable character but also inspires in the public a becoming respect and obedience to the law.[15] The sworn obligation of every lawyer under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility to respect the law and the legal processes is a continuing condition for retaining membership in the Legal Profession. The lawyer must act and comport himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the Legal Profession.[16] Members of the Bar are reminded, therefore, that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than to seek exceptions as loopholes.[17] A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act that warrants disciplinary action against him or her.[18] The suspension from the practice of law or disbarment of a lawyer is justified if he or she proves unworthy of the trust and confidence imposed by the Lawyer's Oath, or is otherwise found to be wanting in that honesty and integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar in the performance of their professional duties.[19] Although the Court imposed a six-month suspension from the practice of law on erring lawyers found violating Canon l, Rules 1.01 and 1.02,[20] we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to suspend Atty. Tumulak from the practice of law for a period of two years. Such penalty was appropriate and condign in relation to the misconduct he committed

as well as to the prejudice he caused the complainant. ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Canon 1, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of TWO(2) YEARS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the respondent's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the Philippines for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

25.) ZALAMEA vs. De Guzman, A.C. No. 7387 November 7, 2016

Facts: Complinant seeks the legal advised of the property of their ill mother. And sometimes respondent help them to pay their loan in the bank, however, complinant failed to pay the bank, so the wife of the lawyer paid for it. And they became the owner. Comes now, complinant filed an disbarment case against respondent lawyer, for the reason that he cannot aquire said property because of prohibition of lawyers- client relationship, and a violation under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited to acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial

auction, either in person or through the mediation of another, their client's property and rights in litigation, hence: ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another: 5. Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. 6. Any others specially disqualified by law.

Issue: Whether or not respondent lawyer violates such prohibition?

Held : The prohibition which rests on considerations of public policy and interests is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary and confidential relationship with him. De Guzman could not have possibly exerted such undue influence, as a lawyer, upon the Zalameas, as his clients. In fact, it was Manuel Enrique who approached the Spouses De Guzman and asked them if they would be willing to become business partners in a lechon business. It was also Manuel Enrique who turned to De Guzman for help in order to reacquire the already foreclosed Speaker Perez property. They had agreed that De Guzman would simply pay the required downpayment to BDO and EMZEE would pay the remaining balance in installment. And when EMZEE continued suffering losses, Angel took care of the monthly amortizations so as not to lose the property. Clearly, the re!ationship between the Spouses De Guzman and the Zalamea brothers is actually one of business partners rather than that of a lawyer and client. Atty. De Guzman's acquisition of the Speaker Perez property was a valid consequence of a business deal, not by reason of a lawyer-client relationship, for which he could not be penalized by the Court. De Guzman and his wife are very well allowed by law to enter into such a transaction and their conduct in this regard was not borne out to have been attended by any undue influence, deceit, or misrepresentation.

“Doctrine”

An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27,3 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Indeed, the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice. The persons mentioned in Article 1491 are prohibited from purchasing said property because of an existing trust relationship. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. The very first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility5 provides that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process." Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, while Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Further, Section 3, Rule 13 8 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities. And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Court. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will never countenance.

THIRD DIVISION A.C. No. 7387, November 07, 2016 MANUEL ENRIQUE L. ZALAMEA, AND MANUEL JOSE L. ZALAMEA, Petitioners, v. ATTY. RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN, JR. AND PERLAS DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO, VENTURANZA, QUIZONVENTURANZA, AND HERROSA LAW FIRM, Respondents. DECISION PERALTA,** J.: This is a Petition for Disbarment which petitioners Manuel Enrique L. Zalamea and Manuel Jose L. Zalamea filed against their lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo P. de Guzman, Jr., for acquiring their property by virtue of their lawyer-client relationship, in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The

following

are

the

factual

antecedents

of

the

case:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIn 2000, petitioners Manuel Enrique Zalamea and Manuel Jose Zalamea (the Zalamea brothers) sought respondent Atty. Rodolfo P. de Guzman, Jr.'s advice on the properties of their ailing mother, Merlinda L. Zalamea, who had a property situated at Scout Limbaga, Quezon City under her name. When Merlinda passed away, De Guzman then prepared a letter for a possible tax-free transfer of the Scout Limbaga property to the Merlinda Holding Corporation which was sought to be incorporated to handle Merlinda's estate, and notarized the incorporation papers of said corporation. In September 2001, the Zalameas put up EMZEE FOODS INC., (EMZEE) a corporation engaged in lechon business, with De Guzman providing the capital and operational funds. Sometime in 2002, Manuel Enrique informed De Guzman about the property located at Speaker Perez St. (Speaker Perez property) which was then under the name of Elarfoods, Inc. (Elarfoods), a corporation owned and run by the Zalamea brothers' aunts and uncles. Since said property had been mortgaged to Banco de Oro (BDO), the bank foreclosed it when Elarfoods failed to pay the loan. Elarfoods likewise failed to redeem the property, resulting in the consolidation of the ownership over the property in BDO's name. Later, Manuel Enrique approached De Guzman and convinced him to help in the reacquisition of the Speaker Perez property from BDO. De Guzman thus negotiated with BDO and was able to secure a deal over the property for P20 Million. The bank required 10% downpayment of the total price or P2 Million, to be paid in thirty-six (36) monthly installments, without interest. Due to lack of funds on Manuel Enrique's part, De Guzman's wife, Angel, agreed to shoulder the P2 Million downpayment in order not to lose the good opportunity, but under the condition that the Speaker Perez property would later be transferred in the name of a new corporation they had agreed to form, the EMZALDEK Venture Corporation, a combination of the names EMZEE Foods, Zalamea, and Dek de Guzman. By this time, EMZEE had also relocated to Speaker Perez. Subsequently, Angel was forced to pay the monthly installments and the additional 20% required for EMZEE to be able to transfer its office to the Speaker Perez property, since Manuel Enrique still could not produce sufficient funds and EMZEE continued to incur losses. All in all, Angel paid P13,082,500.00. Not long after, the relationship, between the Zalamea brothers and the Spouses De Guzman turned sour. The Spouses De Guzman wanted reimbursement of the amounts which they had advanced for the corporation, while the Zalamea brothers claimed sole ownership over the Speaker Perez property. Hence, the brothers filed a disbarment case against De Guzman for allegedly buying a client's property which was subject of litigation. After a careful review and evaluation of the case, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal of the complaint against De Guzman for lack of merit on October 12, 2011.1 On December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution2adopting and approving the recommended dismissal of the complaint, thus:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryRESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the complaint is without merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and recommendations of the IBP. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27,3 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.4chanrobleslaw Under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited to acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another, their client's property and rights in litigation, hence:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary x

x

x

x

5. Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. 6. Any others specially disqualified by law. Indeed, the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice. The persons mentioned in Article 1491 are prohibited from purchasing said property because of an existing trust relationship. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. The very first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility5 provides that "a lawyer shall uphold the

Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process." Canon 17 states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, while Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Further, Section 3, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities. And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Court. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will never countenance.6chanrobleslaw Here, the accusation against De Guzman stemmed from his wife's purchase of the Speaker Perez property from BDO when Manuel Enrique did not have the means to buy it. The Zalameas claim that De Guzman, as their counsel, could not acquire the property, either personally or through his wife, without violating his ethical duties. De Guzman therefore has breached the same when his wife purchased the subject property. However, the prohibition which the Zalameas invoke does not apply where the property purchased was not involved in litigation. De Guzman clearly never acquired any of his client's properties or interests involved in litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession. There exists not even an iota of proof indicating that said property has ever been involved in any litigation in which De Guzman took part by virtue of his profession. True, they had previously sought legal advice from De Guzman but only on how to handle their mother's estate, which likewise did not involve the contested property. Neither was it shown that De Guzman's law firm had taken part in any litigation involving the Speaker Perez property. The prohibition which rests on considerations of public policy and interests is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary and confidential relationship with him. De Guzman could not have possibly exerted such undue influence, as a lawyer, upon the Zalameas, as his clients. In fact, it was Manuel Enrique who approached the Spouses De Guzman and asked them if they would be willing to become business partners in a lechon business. It was also Manuel Enrique who turned to De Guzman for help in order to reacquire the already foreclosed Speaker Perez property. They had agreed that De Guzman would simply pay the required downpayment to BDO and EMZEE would pay the remaining balance in installment. And when EMZEE continued suffering losses, Angel took care of the monthly amortizations so as not to lose the property. Clearly, the relationship between the Spouses De Guzman and the Zalamea brothers is actually one of business partners rather than that of a lawyer and client. Atty. De Guzman's acquisition of the Speaker Perez property was a valid consequence of a business deal, not by reason of a lawyer-client relationship, for Which he could not be penalized by the Court. De Guzman and his

wife are very well allowed by law to enter into such a transaction and their conduct in this regard was not borne out to have been attended by any undue influence, deceit, or misrepresentation. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Rodolfo P. de Guzman, Jr. for utter lack of merit. SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

26.) A.C. No. 10675, May 31, 2016 - DATU ISMAEL MALANGAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL C. ZAIDE, Respondent.

EN BANC A.C. No. 10675, May 31, 2016 DATU ISMAEL MALANGAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL C. ZAIDE, Respondent. RESOLUTION DEL CASTILLO, J.: Before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of me Philippines (IBP), complainant Datu Ismael Malangas (complainant) instituted this verified complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Paul C. Zaide (respondent lawyer), Factual Antecedents Complainant accused respondent lawyer of committing acts of dishonesty, breach of trust, and violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics2 in relation to the complaint for damages (Civil Case No. 6380 of the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Lanao del Norte at Iligan City) that he filed against Paul Alfeche (Alfeche) and the NEMA Electrical and Industrial Sales, Inc/Melanio Siao (NEMA). Complainant averred mat on March 6, 2003, he figured in an accident while crossing Quezon Avenue, Iligan City, when two vehicles hit and pinned him in between them, causing him to lose consciousness; that he was then brought to a hospital where he was confined for four months; that

he was later transferred to other hospitals where he underwent different major operations for which he spent more than P1.5 million; and that despite the operations, he remained crippled and bed ridden. Because of these, he engaged respondent lawyer's professional services to prosecute his complaint for damages against therein defendants Alfeche and NEMA; that he gave respondent lawyer P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P50,000.00 as filing fees; that respondent lawyer made him believe that the amount of P50,000.00 was needed as filing fees in order to commence a P5 milliondamage suit covering the accrued and anticipated damages caused by the accident; that subsequently, respondent lawyer filed on his behalf a complaint for damages before the RTC of Iligan City, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 6380; that respondent lawyer then furnished him (complainant) with a copy of said Complaint seeking to recover damages in the amount of P5 million; and that to assure him that the complaint had indeed been filed, this complaint was stamped "received" by the RTC. According to complainant, he later discovered, however, that his Complaint had been dismissed by the RTC because of "failure to prosecute," for the reason that respondent lawyer did not attend two hearings in the case, and also because respondent lawyer did not submit an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed therein by NEMA; that on account of this, he asked respondent lawyer to file a Motion for Reconsideration, only to find out later that respondent lawyer not only did not file a motion for reconsideration from the Order of dismissal issued by the RTC, but worse, respondent lawyer instead filed a Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel effectiyely leaving him without counsel to prosecute his case; and that after this, he sent a relative to the RTC, where he further discovered through this relative that the amount of damages sought in the Complaint filed by respondent lawyer was only P250,000.00, and not P5 million, as stated in the copy of the Complaint given to him by respondent lawyer. Challenging complainant's allegations, respondent lawyer claimed that complainant was in fact a client of the Zaragoza-Macabangkit Law Offices, a law firm that he joined way back in 2002, right after he passed the Bar Examinations; and that as a junior associate in that law firm, he only received appearance fees in attending to complainant's civil case. Respondent lawyer specifically denied that he received an acceptance fee of P20,000.00, and explained that complainant was already an established client of the law office he was working for. As regards the amount of damages, respondent lawyer claimed that in the Complaint he filed before the RTC, he was even reluctant to ask for P250,000.00 in damages, as complainant's hospital bills did not reach this amount; but that he nevertheless prayed for this amount because he was anticipating that complainant would incur additional expenses as a result of the accident. According to respondent lawyer, the complaint which embodied a prayer for P5 million in damages "was clearly maneuvered to create an impression that (he, respondent lawyer) defrauded the complainant."3 Lastly, respondent lawyer contended that although he deliberately skipped attending the hearings set by the RTC in said Civil Case No. 6380, and that although he also intentionally filed no opposition to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss, these matters were initially agreed upon between him and complainant after he (respondent lawyer) discovered that NEMA's car did not in fact hit complainant, because NEMA's car was not illegally parked where it was at the time of the accident; that although complainant was aware of these facts, complainant suddenly changed his mind, and insisted on continuing with the case against NEMA, and pressing for the claim of P5 million in damages, because complainant believed that NEMA had more leviable properties than the other defendant Alfeche. According to respondent lawyer, he also found out that despite the fact that Alfeche had already settled with complainant, the latter still persisted in pursuing the civil case against Alfeche;4 that at this point, he realized that complainant was acting under the compulsion of greed in pressing for the continuation of the case against his adversaries; and that because of these reasons, he decided to withdraw from the case as complainant's counsel. Proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Following the investigation, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted his Report and Recommendation5 dated January 29, 2013 finding respondent lawyer guilty of dishonesty and breach of trust, for which he recommended a penalty of two years

suspension against respondent lawyer. Commissioner Cachapero found complainant's allegations more credible than respondent lawyer's explanations, thus Respondent further mentioned that he has been handling cases for or against Complainant since he embarked on law practice and has never received acceptance fee from Complainant. He pictured himself as giving out pro bono services to Complainant for two (2) years. However, he may have contradicted his declaration in this regard when in his Answer he mentioned that he received P7,000.00 for docket fee and the rest was paid as advance fees for his services and the usual visitation done by him at the hospital.6 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

As regards the true amount of damages sought in said Civil Case No. 6380, Commissioner Cachapero had this to say: The undersigned deems the complainant's tale plausible enough. The aforesaid page containing a statement of claim amounting to P5,000,000.00 shows impeccably feat it was typed simultaneously with the rest of the pages of the complaint. There is no showing that it was merely inserted as a supplement or addition after taking out a genuine page of the same. It is a constituent part of the complaint which could only have been printed and/or typed by the respondent or his agent. Respondent claimed that the insertion of the page (page 8) was 'maneuvered' by Complainant. If these were true, what would have motivated Complainant to do such a 'switching' act? None. In fact, following his discovery of the same, he conducted himself out like a man wronged. He wrote respondent twice in September 2004 (September 1 and 9, 2004) and castigated respondent for his switching act. Surprisingly, respondent did not care to take the matter up with complainant through letter or personal confrontation. To the undersigned, respondent's act of paying no heed to such claim from Complainant reveals a subtle affirmation of his fault in this regard.7 Ultimately, Commissioner Cachapero found respondent lawyer negligent in the handling of complainant's case, citing the RTC's Order of July 1, 2004, to witIn this regard the record will show that as early as May 18, 2004, plaintiff's counsel was furnished a copy of said motion, but for reasons only known to him no comment or opposition was registered by plaintiff. In fact, if only to afford plaintiff [a chance] to countervail movant's motion, last May 24, 2004, as prayed for, plaintiffs counsel was given ten (10) days to file an Opposition, but sad to say, until now, notwithstanding the lapse of practically 37 days no opposition, neither a comment was filed by plaintiff. With this development the Court will have to confine its scrutiny solely on the motion to dismiss of movant.8 Action of the IBP Board of Governors Via Resolution No. XX-2013-91,9 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Cachapero, viz.: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A', and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent committed Dishonesty, Breach of Trust and Negligence to Complainant, Arty. Paul C. Zaide is hereby SUSPENDED from practice of law for two (2) years. On January 11, 201410 respondent lawyer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution. But in its Resolution11 of May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent lawyer's Motion for Reconsideration. Our Ruling After a careful review of the records, we find respondent lawyer guilty of professional misconduct and of violating Canons 1,12 16,13 and 1814 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Not only

do we find complainant's version more credible but we also note the glaring inconsistencies in respondent lawyer's allegations. Respondent lawyer claims that as a mere associate in the Zaragoza-Macabangkit Law offices, "he has NO participation whatsoever regarding the fees the complainant is giving to the office."15 But, as pointed out by Commissioner Cachapero, respondent lawyer himself admitted that he received "P7,000.00 for the docket fees and the rest [was paid] as advance fees for his services and the usual visitation done [by] him at the hospital."16 Because of this admission, it can be concluded that respondent lawyer received fees "for his services" from the complainant himself. Further bolstering the fact that respondent lawyer did in fact receive fees for his professional services are complainant's demand letters17 - one received on September 1, 2004 and another delivered by registered mail on September 9,2004 -asking respondent lawyer to return the amount of P20,000.00 acceptance fee and to account for the docket fees paid to the RTC of Iligan City. To these, respondent lawyer merely replied that he "was made to understand that the 'docket fee' in Alfeche case is part of [respondent's] claims"18 without denying that he had received such amount. The complainant was thus constrained to conduct his own investigation against his own lawyer, in the course of which he discovered that of the F50,000.00 alleged filing fees that he gave respondent lawyer, only P2,623.60 was paid by respondent lawyer to the RTC. As Commissioner Cachapero aptly stated in his Report and Recommendation,19 "[respondent's act of paying no heed to such claim from [c]omplainant reveals a subtle affirmation" that he, indeed, received the acceptance fee. Finally, respondent lawyer's former law partners belied his claim that he did not receive, as in fact it was the law firm which received, the amounts paid by the complainant. In their Joint Affidavit,20 lawyers Leo M. Zaragoza and Alex E. Macabangkit averred that "the payment made by complainant to Atty. Zaide belongs to him exclusively and we do not interfere in the arrangement x x x and we do not [have] any share thereof."21 Respondent lawyer's refusal to account for the funds given to him, especially his refusal to return the amount paid in excess of what was required as docket fees, clearly violated Rules 16,01 and 16.03 of the CPR, to wit: Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. "The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship."22 Any lawyer who does not live up to this duty must be prepared to take the consequences of his waywardness. As regards the alleged switching of page 8 of the complaint, respondent lawyer claimed that it was complainant who switched the pages "to create an impression that respondent lawyer defrauded the complainant."23 He asserted in his Motion for Reconsideration that he came to learn of the P5 million claim only during the disbarment proceedings and that he "thought it was a joke as respondent, lawyer was NOT able to attend the preliminary conference at the IBP Cagayan de Oro City, where he could have seen the document."24 That respondent lawyer seems to find it hard to get together with himself is shown by the fact that on the very same page of his Motion for Reconsideration, he himself admitted mat "when respondent lawyer was told of the amount, he asked the clerk of the office to change it to a more reasonable and realistic relief, which was eventually heeded, which respondent lawyer was NOT aware that herein complainant was able to get a draft copy prepared by the office."25 To borrow Commissioner Cachapero's apt observation, this obvious contradiction renders his defense doubtful, to say the least. Notably, respondent lawyer's former law partners also belied his claim that Lorna B. Martinez, the person who supposedly typed the Complaint, was a personnel of their law firm. In their Joint Affidavit, they contended that "Lorna B. Martinez was never our Office Staff. She never prepared any pleading in

the office for any of us including that of Atty. Zaide."26 Respondent lawyer's transgressions did not end there. By his deliberate failure to file a Comment on or Opposition to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss in said Civil Case No. 6380, and by his failure to appear at the hearings in connection therewith, respondent lawyer unduly delayed the case as the trial court, had to postpone the hearings thereon, and this, in turn, naturally arrested the progress of the case insofar as NEMA was concerned. As previously mentioned, the RTC had to put off for 37 days its ailing on NEMA's Motion to Dismiss because respondent lawyer moved for time to oppose the same. Yet, despite the 10-day extension given to him, respondent lawyer still failed to appear at the hearings or file the appropriate pleading. These failings are clearly offensive to Rules 18.0327 and 18.0428 of the CPR. If respondent lawyer's claim that he and complainant had indeed agreed to drop the case against NEMA were true, then he as an officer of the court should have saved the Court's precious time by at least promptly manifesting his lack of objection to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss. This he did not do. Given the gravity of the offenses imputed against him, and considering that this is his second administrative case,29 respondent lawyer's defense that he was a young lawyer when he went astray, hardly merits sympathy from this Court. Surely respondent lawyer could not have been unaware that when he took the solemn oath to become a member of the bar, he did so not only to enjoy the rewards and privileges of an attorney and counsellor at law, but he also took upon his shoulders the heavy burden of responsibility and duty that a full-fledged membership in the Philippine Bar necessarily entailed. Respondent lawyer could not have been oblivious of the fact that the exercise of a right or privilege is always encumbered with the burden of responsibility and duty. chanrob leslaw

WHEREFORE, Atty. Paul C. Zaide is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years effective immediately. Atty, Paul C. Zaide is also ORDERED to promptly return to complainant the sums given to him as acceptance fee and docket fees in the amount of P70,000.00, from which should be deducted the amount of P2,623.60 paid as docketing fees. SO ORDERED.

cralawlawlibra ry

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Leonen, and Caguioa, JJ., concur. Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ., on official leave. chan roblesv irtuallaw lib rary

27.) SECOND DIVISION April 6, 2016 A.C. No. 6934 HELEN CHANG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE R. HIDALGO, Respondent. RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.: A lawyer cannot simply withdraw from a case without notice to the client and complying with the requirements in Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the lawyer will be held liable for violating Canons 17 and 18 ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant Helen Chang (Chang) filed this administrative Complaint before the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court on November 7, 2005. Chang prayed that this Court discipline respondent Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo (Atty. Hidalgo) for being remiss in his duties as her counsel and as an officer of the court. She claimed that Atty. Hidalgo failed to "handle [her] cases to the best of his ability and to deal with [her] in all honesty and candor." 1

2

3

In her Complaint, Chang alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Hidalgo as legal counsel to represent her in several collection cases pending in various courts. Pursuant to the contract they executed, Chang issued five (5) checks in favor of Atty. Hidalgo totaling ₱52,000.00. Atty. Hidalgo also collected ₱9,500.00 as "hearing fee." Chang claimed that despite receiving a total of ₱61,500.00, Atty. Hidalgo did not attend any of the hearings in the collection cases and, instead, sent another lawyer without her consent. The other lawyer failed to attend all hearings, which resulted in the dismissal of the cases. Chang prayed that Atty. Hidalgo be administratively disciplined by this Court. 4

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On December 12, 2005, Atty. Hidalgo was required to comment on the Complaint in the Resolution . The Notice of Resolution sent to Atty. Hidalgo in the address provided by Chang was returned unserved with the notation that Atty. Hidalgo had moved out from the address. 10

11

Chang was then ordered to submit Atty. Hidalgo’s correct and present address. She filed her Compliance and attached a Certification from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines stating Atty. Hidalgo’s known address. This Court also ordered the Office of the Bar Confidant to provide Atty. Hidalgo’s address "as appearing in its files[.]" 12

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Still, notices of the Resolution dated December 12, 2005 sent to these addresses were returned unserved with the notation that the addressee, Atty. Hildalgo, had already moved out. 16

Finally, on October 31, 2007, Atty. Hidalgo received the Notice of the Resolution requiring him to comment. However, he still failed to do so. Thus, in the Resolution dated June 2, 2008, this Court considered the submission of the comment as waived and referred the case "to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report[,] and recommendation[.]" 17

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The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines then set a Mandatory Conference/Hearing on September 30, 2008. During the mandatory conference, only Chang appeared. The Investigating Commissioner noted that the notice for Atty. Hidalgo was returned and not served on him. In the Order dated September 30, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner directed Atty. Hidalgo to file his Comment. This Order was received by Atty. Hidalgo. 21

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On November 10, 2008, the Commission on Bar Discipline received a handwritten and unverified Comment from Atty. Hidalgo. In his Comment, Atty. Hidalgo admitted that Chang 27

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retained him as counsel but countered that he attended the hearings. He denied allowing another lawyer to appear on his behalf. Although he denied waiving his appearance fee, he claimed that he did not receive "such a sum [referring to the acceptance fee] from [Chang] mainly because of the length of time [that] passed." Atty. Hidalgo insisted that due to the "transigient [sic] and uncooperative" attitude of Chang, he decided that he "could no longer perform [his job as Chang’s counsel] adequately." He reasoned that he could not put up an effective defense due to his illness and his impoverished state. He prayed that the administrative case against him be dismissed. 29

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After receiving the Comment, the Investigating Commissioner noted that it was not verified, in violation of the Rules of Procedure of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Thus, the Investigating Commissioner did not consider it. Instead, he set another mandatory conference on January 13, 2009. 36

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This Order was again returned unserved. The notation in the returned Order stated "RTS [Return To Sender], Refused to Accept[.]" The Investigating Commissioner set another mandatory conference on February 11, 2009. Chang appeared, but Atty. Hidalgo again failed to appear. 39

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On August 6, 2010, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Hidalgo guilty of gross misconduct and of violating Canons 17, 18, and 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Investigating Commissioner Albert R. Sordan discussed: 43

While this Commission commiserates with the hard luck story and plight of the impecunious respondent, the indubitable fact remains that his misconduct runs afoul with the Code of Professional Responsibility. Further, it is incumbent upon respondent to meet the issue head-on and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. These, respondent has failed miserably to do. The record is bereft of any evidence to show that respondent has presented any countervailing evidence to dispute the charges against him. In his unverified and belated answer, he has not even denied complainant’s allegations. He has only prayed that the complaint be dismissed out of pity for a man of straw. 44

The dispositive portion Recommendation reads:

of

the

Investigating

Commissioner’s

Report

and

45

WHEREFORE, premised [sic] considered, respondent Atty. Joel R. Hidalgo has been found GUILTY of gross misconduct. Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that he be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO (2) YEARS from the practice of law, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. (Emphasis in the original) 46

On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines passed the Resolution adopting with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Board of Governors recommended decreasing the penalty to one (1) year suspension from the practice of law and "[o]rdering [him] to [r]eturn the amount of Sixty One thousand (P61,000.00) [sic] Pesos to complainant [Chang] within thirty 47

(30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was made." 48

On April 11, 2013, Atty. Hidalgo moved for reconsideration. This time, he admitted receiving money from Chang as agreed attorney’s fees. He reiterated that he attended the hearings set for the cases. However, he claimed that he filed a Notice of Withdrawal as Counsel due to Chang’s stubbornness and uncooperative behavior in the handling of the cases. Since he transferred residence, he was not able to verify if the court granted his Notice of Withdrawal. Nonetheless, Atty. Hidalgo alleged that he was entitled to the acceptance fees for exerting time and effort in the preparation of the cases and in the collation of evidence. He maintained that the return of the fees, as ordered by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, was not possible because his only means of income was the Social Security System pension he has been receiving, and even that was not enough for his health maintenance. 49

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On February 11, 2014, the Board of Governors denied Atty. Hidalgo’s Motion for Reconsideration. 56

1âwphi 1

We resolve whether respondent Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo is guilty of gross misconduct for failing to render legal services despite receipt of payment of legal fees. In an administrative case against a lawyer, the complainant has the burden of proof to show by preponderance of evidence that the respondent lawyer was remiss of his or her duties and has violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 57

Here, it is established that respondent was engaged as counsel for complainant to represent her in various collection cases and that he received ₱61,500.00 from her as attorney’s fees. Respondent also admitted withdrawing from the cases allegedly due to complainant’s uncooperative demeanor. However, there is no showing that complainant agreed to the withdrawal, or that respondent filed the proper motion before the courts where the cases were pending. During the mandatory conferences before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant appeared but respondent did not make any appearance despite receiving notice. Respondent failed to present proof that he performed any act in relation to complainant’s collection cases or attended the hearings for the collection cases. Instead, respondent merely claimed: Also, respondent [Atty. Hidalgo] devoted substantial time and energy in researching and preparing the case for trial, and he even attended hearings to that effect. He exerted his best efforts in collating their evidences [sic] and their defense. However, the complainant [Helen Chang] would not listen to respondent. Complainant has other matters and line of defense on her mind because she keeps on insisting they do things her way. Respondent felt that he could no longer work for the complainant as [sic]. Left without any recourse, respondent advised the complaint [sic] to seek the services of another lawyer as he could no longer perform adequately and this was done in good faith. And the actuations of the complainant

apparently precipitated the respondent to file the withdrawal as counsel. The respondent is entitled to the acceptance fees he collected from the complainant, or at least a portion of it. 58

The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent failed to refute complainant’s allegations. Thus: Prescinding from the foregoing, Atty. Hidalgo acknowledged the special retainer he had with Helen Chang. Atty. Hidalgo failed to debunk claims of Helen Chang that he failed to perform his bounden duty despite receipt of the sixty-one thousand five hundred pesos (₱61,500.00). Worse, the cases were dismissed summarily. 59

We find respondent remiss of his duties as complainant’s counsel. Respondent’s acts constitute violations of Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which state: CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. .... Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In Layos v. Villanueva, this Court reiterated that a "lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his [or her] actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his [or her] client." 60

61

Due to respondent’s withdrawal as complainant’s counsel for the cases, he did not anymore attend any of the hearings. Since the withdrawal was without the conformity of complainant, new counsel was not engaged. This necessarily resulted in the summary dismissal of the collection cases as alleged by complainant. Complainant could have obtained the services of another lawyer to represent her and handle her cases with the utmost zeal and diligence expected from officers of the court. However, respondent simply opted to withdraw from the cases without complying with the requirements under the Rules of Court and in complete disregard of his obligations towards his client. Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court provides, in part: RULE 138 Attorneys and Admission to Bar ....

SECTION 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party. Respondent admittedly withdrew from the cases but he failed to provide any evidence to show that complainant, his client, agreed to the withdrawal or, at the very least, knew about it. The offensive attitude of a client is not an excuse to just disappear and withdraw from a case without notice to the court and to the client, especially when attorney’s fees have already been paid. In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo:

62

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is "imbued with utmost trust and confidence." Lawyers are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to them. They commit not only to review cases or give legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their ability without need to be reminded by either the client or the court. (Citations omitted) 63

Similarly, in Nonato v. Fudolin, Jr.:

64

A lawyer is bound to protect his client’s interests to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. He should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent, and efficient manner; and provide the quality of service at least equal to that which he, himself, would expect from a competent lawyer in a similar situation. By consenting to be his client’s counsel, a lawyer impliedly represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by his profession, and his client may reasonably expect him to perform his obligations diligently. The failure to meet these standards warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. (Citations omitted) 65

We sustain the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. In several cases, this Court has imposed the penalty of one (1) year suspension from the practice of law for violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 66

Further, restitution of acceptance fees to complainant is proper. Respondent failed to present any evidence to show his alleged efforts for the cases. He failed to attend any of the hearings before the Commission on Bar Discipline. There is no reason for respondent to retain the professional fees paid by complainant for her collection cases when there was no showing that respondent performed any act in furtherance of these cases. 67

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo is found guilty of violating Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with warning that repetition of the same or

similar acts will merit a more severe penalty. Respondent is also ORDERED to return to complainant Helen Chang the amount of P61,500.00, with interest at 6% per annum from the date of promulgation of this Resolution until fully paid. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

28.) FIRST DIVISION A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016 NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS, Respondent. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney towards his client in which the former is found and declared to be lacking in knowledge and skill sufficient for the engagement. Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney fails to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected to perform during his professional engagement? Antecedents

Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent) with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional services despite his not having performed the contemplated professional services. She avers that in March 2005, she sought the

legal services of the respondent to represent her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the respondent accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing; that she then gave to him the initial amount of P90,000.00; 1 that she had gone to his residence in May 2005 to inquire on the developments in her case, but he told her that he would only start working on the case upon her full payment of the acceptance fee; that she had only learned then that what he had contemplated to file for her was a petition for legal separation, not one for the annulment of her marriage; that he further told her that she would have to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage;2 that she subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he refused to do the same as he had already started working on the case;3 that she had sent him a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less whatever amount corresponded to the legal services he had already performed;4 that the respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having rendered any appreciable legal services to her;5 and that his constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her to bring an administrative complaint against him6 in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007. In his answer dated May 21, 2007,7 the respondent alleges that the complainant and her British fiancee sought his legal services to bring the petition for the annulment of her marriage; that based on his evaluation of her situation, the more appropriate case would be one for legal separation anchored on the psychological incapacity of her husband; that she and her British fiancee agreed on P150,000.00 for his legal services to bring the action for legal separation, with the fiancee paying him P70,000.00, as evidenced by his handwritten receipt;8 that for purposes of the petition for legal separation he required the complainant to submit copies of her marriage contract and the birth certificates of her children with her husband, as well as for her to submit to further interviews by him to establish the grounds for legal separation; that he later on communicated with her and her fiancee upon finalizing the petition, but they did not promptly respond to his communications; that in May 2005, she admitted to him that she had spent the money that her fiancee had given to pay the balance of his professional fees; and that in June 2005, she returned to him with a note at the back of the prepared petition for legal separation essentially requesting him not to file the petition because she had meanwhile opted to bring the action for the annulment of her marriage instead.

The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from Atty. Martinez, but states that he dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of paper because the demand lacked basis in law. It is noted that he wrote in the last part of his answer dated May 21, 2007 in relation to the demand letter the following: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for refund dated 15 August 2005 (Annex "B" of the complaint) as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ, who unskillfully relied on an unverified information furnished him, to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful purpose.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) summoned the parties to a mandatory conference on August 3, 2007,10 but only the complainant and her counsel attended the conference. On his part, the respondent sent a letter dated July 20, 2007 to the IBP-CBD to reiterate his answer.11 Due to his non-appearance, the IBP-CBD terminated the conference on the same day, but required the complainant to submit a verified position paper within 10 days. She did not submit the position paper in the end. In his commissioner's report dated July 25, 2008,12 IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent's insistence that he could have brought a petition for legal separation based on the psychological incapacity of the complainant's husband was sanctionable because he himself was apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal separation; that because he rendered some legal services to the complainant, he was entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the value of the services rendered under the principle of quantum meruit; and that, accordingly, he should be made to return to her the amount of P30,000.00. IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. observed that the respondent's statement in the last part of his answer, to the effect that the demand letter sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the complainant should be treated as a scrap of paper, or should have been addressed "to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful purpose," was uncalled for and improper; and he opined that such offensive and

improper language uttered by the respondent against a fellow lawyer violated Rule 8.0113of the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. ultimately recommended as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary The undersigned Commissioner is most respectfully recommending the following: To order the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of P30,000.00 which he received for the purpose of preparing a petition for legal (1) separation. Undersigned believes that considering the degree of professional services he has extended, the amount of P40,000.00 he received on March 10, 2005 would be sufficient payment for the same.

(2)

For failure to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and annulment of marriage, respondent should be sanctioned.

Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness towards his colleagues and for using offensive or improper language in his pleading, which (3) was filed right before the Commission on Bar Discipline, he must also be sanctioned and disciplined in order to avoid repetition of the said misconduct.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be ordered to return to complainant Nenita D. Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00 which the former received as payment for his services because it is excessive. It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for failure to show

his respect to his fellow lawyer and for using offensive and improper language in his pleadings. Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008,14 the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr., but modified the recommendation of the penalty, viz.: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent's failure to show respect to his fellow lawyer and for showing offensive and improper words in his pleadings, Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos, is hereby WARNED and Ordered to Return the Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,16 which the IBP Board of Governors denied through Resolution No. XXI-2014-177 dated March 23, 2014.17 Issues

The two issues for consideration and resolution are: (a) whether or not the respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct; and (b) whether or not he should be ordered to return the attorney's fees paid. Ruling of the Court

We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-177, but modify the recommended penalty. 1. Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to return the entire amount received from the client

The respondent offered himself to the complainant as a lawyer who had the requisite professional competence and skill to handle the action for the annulment of marriage for her. He required her to pay P150,000.00 as attorney's fees, exclusive of the filing fees and his appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing. Of that amount, he received the sum of P70,000.00. On the respondent's conduct of himself in his professional relationship with the complainant as his client, we reiterate and adopt the thorough analysis and findings by IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary As appearing in Annex "4", which is the handwritten retainer's contract between the respondent and the complainant, there is a sweeping evidence that there is an attorney-client relationship. The respondent agreed to accept the case in the amount of P150,000.00. The acceptance fee was agreed upon to be paid on installment basis. Excluded in the agreement is the payment of appearance fee, filing fee and other legal documentation. That next question is - for what case the P150,000.00 was intended for? Was it intended for the filing of the annulment case or legal separation? In the verified Answer filed by the respondent, even the latter is quite confused as to what action he is going to file in court. The intention of the British national and the complainant was to get married. At that time and maybe up to now, the complainant is still legally married to a certain Jovencio C. Sanchez. That considering that the two are intending to get married, we can safely assume that the complainant was contemplating of filing a petition for annulment of marriage in order to free her from the marriage bond with her husband. It is only then, granting that the petition will be granted, that the complainant will be free to marry the British subject. The legal separation is but a separation of husband and wife from board and bed and the marriage bond still exists. Granting that the petition for legal separation will be granted, one is not free to marry another person. A reading of the answer filed by the respondent would show that he

himself is not well versed in the grounds for legal separation. He stated the following; . . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a legal separation case for the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband to comply with his marital obligations developed or of their marriage on February 6, 1999. (please see par. 2 of the Answer). If the intention was to file a petition for legal separation, under A.M. 0211-11-SC, the grounds are as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Sec.

2.

Petition-

(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the husband or the wife, as the case may be, within five years from the time of the occurrence of any of the following causes: (a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; (b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation; (c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement; (d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned; (e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent; (g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in or outside the Philippines; (h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent; (i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or (j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. Psychological incapacity, contrary to what respondent explained to the complainant, is not one of those mentioned in any of the grounds for legal separation. Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, psychological incapacity is never a ground for the purpose of filing a petition for legal separation. On the other hand, psychological incapacity has always been used for the purpose of filing a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage. That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it stales that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in continuing legal education program (Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent repetition of such kind of advise that respondent gave to the complainant. In giving an advise, he should be able to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and grounds for annulment of marriage. But as the respondent stated in his answer, it appears that he is mixed up with the basic provisions of the law.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either causes of action. His explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other than an action for annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her British fiancee. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered. As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an attorney. He thus transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter. Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis supplied) The next to be dealt with is the matter of the attorney's fees. We can easily agree that every attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client. As long as the

attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services.19 The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between the client and the attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order. 20 The underlying theory is that the retainer's agreement between them gives to the client the reasonable notice of the arrangement on the fees. Once the attorney has performed the task assigned to him in a valid agreement, his compensation is determined on the basis of what he and the client agreed.21 In the absence of the written agreement, the lawyer's compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which means "as much as he deserved."22The determination of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is also authorized "when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion."23 Moreover, quantum meruit becomes the basis of recovery of compensation by the attorney where the circumstances of the engagement indicate that it will be contrary to the parties' expectation to deprive the attorney of all compensation. Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is reasonable compensation based on the obtaining circumstances,24 provided that the attorney does not receive more than what is reasonable, in keeping with Section 24 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees - An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. The courts supervision of the lawyer's compensation for legal services rendered is not only for the purpose of ensuring the reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees charged, but also for the purpose of preserving the dignity and integrity of the legal

profession.25cralawred The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was later revealed, it was way above his ability and competence to handle the case for annulment of marriage. As a consequence, he had no basis to accept any amount as attorney's fees from the complainant. He did not even begin to perform the contemplated task he undertook for the complainant because it was improbable that the agreement with her was to bring the action for legal separation. His having supposedly prepared the petition for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage was either his way of covering up for his incompetence, or his means of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him to retain the amount he had already received. The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows that the respondent received P70,000.00 as acceptance fee. His refusal to return the amount to the complainant rested on his claim of having already completed the first phase of the preparation of the petition for legal separation after having held conferences with the complainant and her British fiancee. In this respect, IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. opined that the respondent could retain P40,000.00 of the P70,000.00 because the respondent had rendered some legal services to the complainant, specifically: (a) having the complainant undergo further interviews towards establishing the ground for legal separation; (b) reducing into writing the grounds discussed during the interviews based on her statement in her own dialect (Annexes 1 and 2) after he could not understand the written statement prepared for the purpose by her British fiancee; (c) requiring her to submit her marriage contract with her husband Jovencio C. Sanchez (Annex 3), and the certificates of live birth of her four children: Mary Joy, Timothy, Christine, and Janette Anne, all surnamed Sanchez (Annexes 4, 5, 6 and 7); and (d) finalizing her petition for legal separation (Annex 8) in the later part of April, 2007. The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. in favor of the respondent was too generous. We cannot see how the respondent deserved any compensation because he did not really begin to perform the contemplated tasks if, even based on his version, he would prepare the petition for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage. The attorney who fails to accomplish the tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform during his professional engagement does not discharge his professional responsibility and ethical duty toward his client. The respondent was thus guilty of misconduct, and may be sanctioned according to the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he may be ordered to restitute to the

client the amount received from the latter in consideration of the professional engagement, subject to the rule on quantum meruit, if warranted. Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for his misrepresentation of his professional competence, and he is further to be ordered to return the entire amount of P70,000.00 received from the client, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment. 2. Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleague

The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to "abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged."26 This duty of lawyers is further emphasized in the Code of Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically demands that: "A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper." The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has necessitated lawyers to use strong language in the advancement of the interest of their clients.27 However, as members of a noble profession, lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent their clients' cause, or, as in this case, to represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal but that should not be used as license for the use of offensive and abusive language. In maintaining the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language - spoken or in his pleadings - must be dignified.28 As such, every lawyer is mandated to carry out his duty as an agent in the administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect not only towards his clients, the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal Profession. The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez should be treated "as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose" constituted

simple misconduct that this Court cannot tolerate. In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive and improper language by asserting that the phraseology was not per se uncalled for and improper. He explained that he had sufficient cause for maintaining that the demand letter should be treated as a mere scrap of paper and should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not excuse the offensiveness and impropriety of his language. He could have easily been respectful and proper in responding to the letter. As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded, with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense will be severely punished.chanrobleslaw WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional competence to the client, and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper language towards his fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense shall be severely punished. The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant within thirty (30) days from notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment. Let copies of this decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos as a member of the Philippine Bar, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

29.) EN BANC AC. No. 10912, January 19, 2016 PAULINA T. YU, Complainant, v. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.

DECISION PER CURIAM: Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2014 Resolution1 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) which adopted and approved the findings and the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner for the disbarment of Atty. Berlin Dela Cruz (respondent lawyer). It appears from the records that respondent lawyer agreed to represent Paulina T. Yu (complainant) in several cases after having received various amounts as acceptance fees, to wit: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Case Title

Acceptance Fees

People v. Tortona for attempted homicide (Case No. 06-359) filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Bacoor, Cavite

P 20,000.00

Paulina T. Yu v. Pablo and Rodel Gamboa for qualified theft/estafa (I.S. No. XV-07-INV-116-05339) filed with the City Prosecutor of Manila

P 8,000.00

Paulino T. Yu v. Roberto Tuazon et al. (Civil Case No. LP-00-0087) filed before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas2

P 15,000.00

cralawla wlibra ry

On November 29, 2011, while the lawyer-client relationship was subsisting, respondent lawyer borrowed pieces of jewelry from complainant and pledged the same with the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. for the amount of P29,945.50, as shown in the Promissory Note with Deed of Pledge.3 Respondent lawyer appropriated the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to facilitate the redemption of the said jewelry, respondent lawyer issued to complainant, Citystate Savings Bank Check No. 0088551, dated August 31, 2011, in the amount of P34,500.00. Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the check was dishonored for the reason, "Account Closed."4 Complainant immediately notified respondent lawyer of the dishonor of the check. In a letter,5 dated March 23, 2012, complainant demanded for the refund of the acceptance fees received by respondent lawyer prior to the "abandonment" of the cases and the payment of the value of the jewelry, but to no avail. In another letter,6 dated April 18, 2012, this time represented by another lawyer, Atty. Francisco C. Miralles, complainant yet again demanded the redemption of the check in cash within five days from notice; the refund of the paid acceptance fees, in exchange for which no service was rendered; the payment of the value of the pledged jewelry in the amount of PI00,000.00 in order to avoid the interests due and the possible foreclosure of the pledge; and moral damages of P 300,000.00.

For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pinas City, against him.7 On June 7, 2012, a verified complaint was filed with the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD),8where complainant prayed for the disbarment of respondent lawyer on account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and commission of acts in violation of the lawyer's oath. The IBP-CBD required respondent lawyer to submit his answer to the complaint.9 Despite having been duly served with a copy of the complaint and the order to file his answer, as shown in a certification 10 issued by the Post Master of the Las Piñas Central Post Office, respondent still failed to file an answer. Respondent lawyer was likewise notified of the scheduled mandatory conference/hearing on November 23, 2012, but only the complainant and her counsel appeared on the said day. The IBP-CBD then ordered the resetting of the mandatory conference for the last time to January 11, 2013 and the personal service of the notice thereof to respondent lawyer's given address.11 Notwithstanding the receipt of the notice by respondent lawyer's mother,12 he still failed to appear during the conference, prompting complainant to move for the termination of the conference and the submission of the case for report and recommendation. On June 7, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of respondent lawyer from the practice of law.13 Based on the evidence on record, respondent lawyer was found to have violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which proscribed the borrowing of money from a client, unless the latter's interests were fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Worse, respondent lawyer had clearly issued a worthless check in violation of law which was against Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR stating that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct." On September 28, 2014, the IBP-BOG affirmed the said recommendation in Resolution No. XXI-2014698.14 Neither a motion for reconsideration before the BOG nor a petition for review before this Court was filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of the case for appropriate action with the IBP Resolution being merely recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.15 The Court acknowledges the fact that respondent lawyer failed to refute the accusations against him despite the numerous opportunities afforded to him to explain his side. All means were exhausted to give respondent lawyer a chance to oppose the charges against him but to no avail and for reasons only for known to him. Whether respondent lawyer had personally read the orders by the IBP-CBD or his mother failed to forward the same for his personal consideration may only be an object of surmise in which the Court cannot indulge. "Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession."16Surely, respondent lawyer's failure or refusal to participate in the IBP-CBD proceedings does not hinder the Court from determining the full extent of his liability and imposing an appropriate sanction, if any. After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent lawyer's violation of Canons 1, 17 16,18 17,19 and Rules 1.01,20 16.04,21 of the CPR. In the case at bench, the complaint stemmed from the use by respondent lawyer of his client's property. He had, indeed, come into possession of valuable pieces of jewelry which he presented as security in a contract of pledge. Complainant voluntarily and willingly delivered her jewelry worth P135,000.00 to respondent lawyer who meant to borrow it and pawn it thereafter. This act alone shows respondent lawyer's blatant disregard of Rule 16.04. Complainant's acquiescence to the "pawning" of her jewelry becomes immaterial considering that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are proscribed from borrowing money or property from clients, unless the latter's interests are fully protected by the nature of the case

or by independent advice. Here, respondent lawyer's act of borrowing does not constitute an exception. Respondent lawyer used his client's jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate for himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he had abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his client. That he might have intended to subsequently pay his client the value of the jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves detestation was the very act of his exercising influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue benefits from the latter's property. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to abuse. 22 The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.23 The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.24 Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or property from a client outside the limits laid down in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction. Due to complainant's respect for respondent lawyer, she trusted his representation that the subject jewelry would be redeemed upon maturity. She accepted respondent lawyer's check, which was eventually dishonored upon presentment. Despite notice of the dishonor, respondent lawyer did not take steps to remedy the situation and, on the whole, reneged on his obligation, constraining complainant to avail of legal remedies against him. Given the circumstances, the Court does not harbor any doubt in favor of respondent lawyer. Obviously, his unfulfilled promise to facilitate the redemption of the jewelry and his act of issuing a worthless check constitute grave violations of the CPR and the lawyer's oath. These shortcomings on his part have seriously breached the highly fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients. Specifically, his act of issuing worthless checks patently violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR which requires that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." This indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action,25 and thus seriously and irreparably tarnishes the image of the profession.26 Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when exhibited by a member of the Bar.27 In this case, respondent lawyer turned his back from the promise that he once made upon admission to the Bar. As "vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."28 As to the penalty commensurate to respondent lawyer's actions, the Court takes heed of the guidepost provided by jurisprudence, viz.: "Disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of the erring person."29 Hence, caution is called for amidst the Court's plenary power to discipline erring lawyers. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,30 the Court finds it proper to impose the penalty of three-year suspension against respondent lawyer, with a stern warning that a repetition of any of the infractions attributed to him in this case, or any similar act, shall merit a heavier penalty. Anent the monetary demands made by complainant, the Court reiterates the rule that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.31 Thus, the Court is not concerned with the erring lawyer's civil liability for money received from his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. Accordingly, it cannot order respondent lawyer to make the payment for the subject jewelry he pawned, the value of which is yet to be determined in the appropriate proceeding. As to the return of acceptance fees, a clarification is in order. The Investigating Commissioner erred in referring to them as "attorney's fees"—

As to the charge that respondent abandoned the cases he accepted after payment of attorney's fees, this commission

is not fully satisfied that the complainant was able to prove it with substantial or clear evidence. It was not fully explained in the complaint how or in what manner were the cases "abandoned" by the respondent; and what prejudice was caused to the complainant. This Commission noted that not a single document or order coming from the court of prosecutor's office was appended to the Complaint-Affidavit that would at least apprise this body of what the respondent actually did with the cases he represented.32 cralawla wlibra ry

There is a distinction between attorney's fee and acceptance fee. It is well-settled that attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept.33 In its ordinary sense, attorney's fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fee is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages.34 On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus, this incurs an opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the client which is therefore indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal services rendered.35 In the case at bench, the amounts of P20,000.00, P18,000.00, and P15,000.00, respectively, were in the nature of acceptance fees for cases in which respondent lawyer agreed to represent complainant. Despite this oversight of the Investigating Commissioner, the Court affirms the finding that aside from her bare allegations, complainant failed to present any evidence showing that respondent lawyer committed abandonment or neglect of duty in handling of cases. Hence, the Court sees no legal basis for the return of the subject acceptance fees. WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz GUILTY of violating Canons 1, 16, 17, and Rules 1.01 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for THREE YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be entered in the personal record of the respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED.

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30.) CASE DIGEST | Case #6: Cobalt Resources Inc. v Atty. Ronald Aguado Digested by: Joahna G. Goyagoy | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics Cobalt Resources Inc. v Atty. Ronald Aguado FACTS: This is an administrative case filed by CRI against Atty. Agualdo before the IBP for violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the lawyer’s oath. The CRI alleged that on March 5, 2010, a group of armed men, clad in vests bearing the mark “PASG” and pretending to be agents of the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group (PASG), hijacked its delivery van containing cellular phones worth P1.3 million. Dennis Balmaceda, delivery van driver, and his companions were all forcibly taken away at gun point and were dropped at the Country Hill and Golf Club. Balmaceda called Antonio Angeles, the Security Director of CRI, about the incident and immediately reported the same to the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation Detection Unit (PNP-CIDU). Through Global Positioning Satellite (GPS)Tracking Device installed in the cellular phones, Angeles and the PNP-CIDU tracked down the location of the cellular phones in front of Pegasus Bar along Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. The PNP-CIDU found three vehicles parked in front of the said bar, one of which is a Toyota Fortuner owned by Atty. Aguado. The PNP-CIDU approached the vehicles and arrested Palmes who at first tried to ran away. Atty. Aguado, who was then standing in the reception area of Pegasus Bar was not arrested. When the PNP-CIDU searched the vehicles, they found the seized cellular phones, an ID showing Atty. Aguado as Legal Consultant of the PASG, the Mission Order identifying Atty. Aguado as the Assistant Team Leader, and a vest bearing the mark PASG. Thus, two separate Informations for Robbery and Carnapping were filed against Atty. Aguado and several others. The IBP directed Atty. Aguado to submit his answer but, despite several extensions, he failed to do so. The IBP then set the case for mandatory conference. Atty. Aguado submitted his conference brief averring that his car was carnapped on the day the alleged hijacking happened. He likewise reported said carnapping to police authorities. Thus, the IBP– Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Aguado liable for unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in falsifying the ID and mission order showing him as the Legal Consultant and the Assistant Team Leader, respectively, of the PASG. The IBP-CBD recommended that he be suspended for two years. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the same. The CRI filed a motion for reconsideration asking for the ultimate penalty of disbarment instead of just a suspension of 2 years. Such motion was denied. Aggrieved, CRI field a petition for review to the Supreme Court.

CRI’s contention: Atty. Aguado be meted out the penalty of disbarment for his falsification of a PASG mission order and ID and for his involvement in the hijacking of the CIR delivery van and its cargo. Atty. Aguado’s contentions: 1. The charges of usurpation of authority and falsification filed against him had been dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City; 2. That he could not be presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was never in possession of the falsified ID and mission order; 3. That he never used, took advantage or profit therefrom; and 4. That the case should, at the very least, be suspended pending the resolution of the robbery and carnapping charges against him. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Aguado should be meted out the ultimate penalty of disbarment. RULING: YES. It must be emphasized that a disbarment proceeding, being administrative in nature, is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer and they may proceed independently of each other. The dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence against an accused, who is also a respondent in an administrative case, does not necessarily exculpate him administratively because the quantum of evidence required is different. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required.“In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.” Clearly, Atty. Aguado committed the act complained of as it was established that he was in possession of a falsified ID showing him as a legal consultant of the PASG and mission order identifying him as the Assistant Team Leader of the anti-smuggling operation. From the sworn statement of Palmes, it can be clearly deduced that Atty. Aguado had participation in the crime as charged in the complaint, from the planning stage up to its execution. Moreover, his story of the carnapping of his Fortuner cannot be given credence considering his inconsistent statements on the matter. In the QC PD alarm sheet, Respondent reported that the carnapping took place at 2:30 of March 5, 2010 while in his sworn statement, he claimed that his car was carnapped at 4:31 p.m. Further, the reporting did not prove the fact of carnapping especially where, as in this case, no eyewitness account was presented, no suspect apprehended, and no criminal case was filed. Atty. Aguado has committed acts that showed he was unfit and unable to faithfully discharge his bounden duties as a member of the legal profession. Because he failed to live up to the exacting standards demanded of him, he proved himself unworthy of the privilege to practice law.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is DISBARRED for gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF the roll of attorneys.

31.) Reyes v. Nieva Complainant works at the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) as an Administrative Aide on a Job. Sometime in January 2009, she was reassigned at the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary under the supervision of respondent, who was then acting as CAAP Acting Board Secretary. Complainant notice that during office hours, respondent would often watch ”pampagana” videos saved in his office laptop, all of which turned out to be pornographic films. Complainant also averred that whenever respondent got close to her, he would hold her hand and would sometimes give it a kiss. He even offered her a cellular phone and load necessary load for their private communication. In the afternoon of April 1, 2009, respondent texted her to wait for him at the office. Fearing that respondent might take advantage of her, complainant convinced two (2) of her officemates to accompany her until respondent arrived. Upon respondent’s arrival and seeing that complainant had companions, he just told complainant and the other two (2) office staff to lock the door when they leave. On the following day, April 2, 2009, respondent called her on her cellular phone, asked if she received his text message, and told her he would tell her something upon his arrival at the office. Respondent then placed his hand on complainant’s waist area near her breast and started caressing the latter’s torso. Respondent told complainant he was willing to give her P2,000.00 a month from his own pocket. In the morning of the same day, while complainant and respondent were left alone in the office, respondent suddenly closed the door, grabbed complainant’s arm, and uttered “let’s seal it with a kiss,” then attempted to kiss complainant. This prompted complainant to thwart respondent’s advances with her left arm, raised her voice

in order to invite help, and exclaimed “wag naman kayo ganyan sir, yung asawa nyo magagalit, sir may asawa ako.” Complainant immediately left the office to ask assistance from her former supervisor who advised her to file an administrative case against respondent before the CAAP Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI). Complainant alleged that she was traumatized and was even diagnosed by a psychiatrist to be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major depression. Eventually, complainant filed the instant complaint. In his defense, respondent denied all of complainant’s allegations. He maintained that as a 79year old retiree who only took a position at the CAAP on a consultancy basis, it was very unlikely for him to do the acts imputed against him, especially in a very small office space allotted for him and his staff. In a Resolution 18 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) unanimously reversed the aforesaid Report and Recommendation. As such, respondent was found guilty of committing sexual advances, and accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months. The IBP Board referred the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for study, evaluation, and submission of an Executive Summary to the IBP Board. The director adhere to the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner as it is supported by the evidence on record; on the other hand, the reversal made by the previous IBP Board is bereft of any factual and legal bases, and should therefore, be set aside. In this light, the current IBP Board issued a Resolution22 dated August 10, 2014 setting aside the previous IBP Board’s Resolution, and accordingly, dismissed the administrative complaint against respondent. Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Ruling: Yes. CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The provision instructs that “[a]s officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.” CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. xx xx Rule 7.03 -A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Good moral character is a trait that every practicing lawyer is required to possess. It may be defined as “what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.” 24 Such requirement has four (4) ostensible purposes, namely: (a) to protect the public; ( b) to protect the public image of lawyers; ( c) to protect prospective clients; and ( d) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. 25 Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. This proceeds from the lawyer’s bounden duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar’s integrity, and the legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that “as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also behave himself so as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.” Consequently, any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Verily, lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred

for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. An excerpt of transcript shows that IBP erred in concluding that such Transcript shows that respondent did not perform the acts complained of. On the contrary, said Transcript proves that there was indeed a period of time where complainant and respondent were left alone in the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary which gave respondent a window of opportunity to carry out his acts constituting sexual harassment against complainant.

More importantly, records reveal that complainant’s allegations are adequately supported by a Certificate of Psychiatric Evaluation dated April 13, 2009 stating that the onset of her psychiatric problems – diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major depression – started after suffering the alleged sexual molestation at the hands of respondent.

In the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, the quantum of proof by which the charges against respondent were assessed was preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence “means evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.”

Complainant has established her claims through relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion – that is, that respondent had harassed her and committed despicable acts which are clear ethical violations of the CPR. In fine, respondent should be held administratively liable and therefore, penalized.

32.) MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C. GUEVARRA, Respondent. Facts: a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares (complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc., respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio), who filed criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks. Respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online social networking site, insulting and verbally abusing complainant.He called petitioner a quack doctor and imputed that she has payola budget and would pay the DOJ, the media. He also called for a Boycott of the products of the clinic and called it names. Petitioner filed the said complaint to the IBP. Respondent however claimed that the complaint was filed against his constitutional right to privacy and his exercise of his right to freedom of speech. Stating that the quoted statements were posted in his personal facebook account and that it only is availble to his group of friends which the petitioner does not belong to. IBPCBD recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of law, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent cannot invoke the "private" nature of his posts, considering that he had at least 2,000 "friends" who can read and react thereto. Moreover, the IBP-CBD maintained that the criminal cases he had filed against complainant on behalf of Norcio had been dismissed for insufficient evidence; therefore, he can no longer campaign against complainant whose alleged crimes against Norcio had not been established. Issue: whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based on the allegations of the verified complaint Held: The defense is untenable. Social media are web-based platforms that enable online interaction and facilitate users to generate and share content. The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." 68 Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated. Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks were written in the exercise of his freedom of speech and expression. Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute.69 While the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.70 As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute. A scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI.

33.) MARIA FATIMA JAPITANA vs. ATTY. SYLVESTER C. PARADO 

On June 22, 2006, Atty. Parado notarized the Real Estate Mortgage between RC Lending Investors, Inc. (RC Lending), as mortgagee, and Maria Theresa G. Japitana (Theresa) and Ma. Nette Japitana (Nette), as mortgagors.

        

It was supposedly witnessed by Maria Sallie Japitana (Sallie) and Maria Lourdes Japitana-Sibi (Lourdes) and her husband Dante Sibi (Dante), Fatima's sisters and brotherin-law, respectively. The mortgage covered a parcel of land on which the family home of the Japitanas was constituted. On the same date, Atty. Parado notarized the Affidavit allegedly executed by Theresa, Nette, Lourdes, Dante, and Sallie to show their conformity to the Real Estate Mortgage over the land where their family home was situated. On October 23, 2006, RC Lending, through Cristeta G. Cuenco (Cuenco), filed its Petition for ExtraJudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. Consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under the name of RC Lending. On February 3, 2009, it filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a break-open order, for RC Lending to effectively take the possession of the subject property as it was gated and nobody would answer in spite of the sheriffs repeated knocking. Fatima, however, assailed that the signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage as well as in the Affidavit, both notarized on June 22, 2006, were forgeries. She asserted that Atty. Parado did not require the persons who appeared before him to present any valid identification. More importantly, Fatima averred that Atty. Parado had no notarial authority, as certified8 by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (RTC).

IBP  

Commissioner Cachapero opined that there was no evidence to support that Atty. Parado lied as the court had not set aside his testimonies. Consequently, he concluded that it was not proven that Atty. Parado forged the assailed documents and notarized the same. Commissioner Cachapero, however, found that Atty. Parado was dishonest when he testified that he was issued a notarial commission effective until 2008. His claim was belied by the certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC stating that Atty. Parado had not been issued a notarial commission for 2006. As such, he recommended that Atty. Parado be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.

IBP-BOG 

resolved to revoke Atty. Parado's notarial commission, if presently commissioned, for testifying that he had a notarial commission valid until 2008, contrary to the certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC and for ignoring the notices sent by the Commission on Bar Discipline. Likewise, the Board of Governors disqualified Atty. Parado from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years and suspended him from the practice of law for six (6) months.

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the IBP BOG but modifies the penalty imposed. A close perusal of the records reveals that Atty. Parado had no existing notarial commission when he notarized the documents in question in 2006. This is supported by the certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC stating that based on the Notarial Records, Atty. Parado had not been issued a notarial commission for the year 2006. He failed to refute the same as he neither appeared during the mandatory conference nor filed his position paper. Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,16 a person commissioned as a notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made. Commission either means the grant of authority to perform notarial or the written evidence of authority.17 Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity.A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times. Atty. Parado knowingly performed notarial acts in 2006 in spite of the absence of a notarial commission for the said period. Further, he was dishonest when he testified in court that he had a notarial commission effective until 2008, when, in truth, he had none. Atty. Parado's misdeeds run afoul of his duties and responsibilities, both as a lawyer and a notary public. Moreover, even if Atty. Parado had a valid notarial commission, he still failed to faithfully observe the Rules on Notarial Practice when he notarized the Real Estate Mortgage and the Affidavit of Conformity with the persons who executed the said documents merely presenting their Residence Certificate or Community Tax Certificate (CTC) before him. Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires the presentation of a competent evidence of identity, if the person appearing before the notary public is not personally known by him. Section 12, Rule II of the same Rules defines competent evidence of identity as: (a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual; or (b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the

instrument, document or transaction, who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public a documentary identification. Atty. Parado did not claim to personally know the persons who executed the said documents. Hence, the presentation of their CTCs was insufficient because those cannot be considered as competent evidence of identity, as defined in the Rules. Reliance on the CTCs alone is a punishable indiscretion by the notary public.19 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sylvester C. Parado is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as Notary Public.

FLORA C. MARIANO, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. ANSELMO ECHANEZ, FACTS

 

Complaint Affidavit for Disbarment by Flora C. Mariano (Mariano) against respondent Atty. Anselmo Echanez (Atty. Echanez), for violation of the Notarial Law by performing notarial acts on documents without a notarial commission. In support of her complaint, Mariano attached several documents to show proof that Atty. Echanez has indeed performed notarial acts without a notarial commission, to wit: (1) Complaint dated June 18, 2007; (2) JointAffidavit of Gina Pimentel and Marilyn Cayaban dated May 8, 2008; (3) Affidavit of Ginalyn Ancheta dated May 8, 2008; and (4) Joint-Affidavit dated May 8, 2008.



Also attached to the complaint is a document containing the list of those who were issued notarial commissions for the year 2006-2007 signed by Executive Judge Efren Cacatian of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City where Atty. Echanez's name was not included as duly appointed notary public.

IBP-CBD     

during the mandatory conference, only Mariano appeared. The IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their position papers but again only Mariano submitted her verified position paper. In her position paper, Mariano maintained that Atty. Echanez is unauthorized to perform notarial servicesIBP-CBD found Atty. Echanez liable for malpractice for notarizing documents without a notarial commission. The IBP-CBD further noted that Atty. Echanez ignored the processes of the Commission by failing to file an answer on the complaint, thus, it recommended that Atty. Echanez be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and that he be permanently barred from being commissioned as notary public.

IBP- Board of Gcwemors 

adopted and approved in toto the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

RULING We concur with the findings and the recommended penalty of the IBP-CBD. Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized

may act as notaries public. It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. In the instant case, it is undisputable that Atty. Echanez performed notarial acts on several documents without a valid notarial commission. The fact of his lack of notarial commission at the time of the unauthorized notarizations was likewise sufficiently established by the certifications issued by the Executive Judges in the territory where Atty. Echanez performed the unauthorized notarial acts. Atty. Echanez, for misrepresenting in the said documents that he was a notary public for and in Cordon, Isabela, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, he further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer's oath. This transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Likewise, Atty. Echanez' conduct in the course of proceedings before the IBP is also a matter of concern. Atty. Echanez, despite notices, did not even attempt to present any defense on the complaint against him. He did not even attend the mandatory conference set by the IBP. He ignored the IBP's directive to file his answer and position paper which resulted in the years of delay in the resolution of this case. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Atty. Echanez's failure to attend the mandatory conference and to submit his Answer and Position paper without any valid explanation is enough reason to make him administratively liable since he is duty-bound to comply with all the lawful directives of the IBP, not only because he is a member thereof but more so because IBP is the Court-designated investigator of this case. As an officer of the Court, Atty. Echanez is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but anorder which should be complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP.

respondent Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision

OSCAR M. BAYSAC v ATTY. ELOISA M. ACERON-PAPA, Facts    

 

 

 

 

Complainant Oscar M. Baysac (complainant) owns a property. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Trece Martires City. The property was mortgaged by complainant to Spouses Emmanuel and Rizalina Cruz (Spouses Cruz). The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage3 was notarized by Atty. Renelie B. Mayuga-Donato on December 20, 2000. In February 2003, complainant went to the Registry of Deeds of Trece Martires City to get a certified true copy of the certificate of title of the property because the property had a prospective buyer. However, complainant was surprised to find out that the Title had already been cancelled, and in lieu thereof, another title was issued in favor of Spouses Cruz. After further investigation, complainant found out that the property was transferred in the name of Spouses Cruz pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly executed on January 13, 2003 for the consideration of P100,000.00. The Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly signed by complainant, as the owner of the property, was notarized by respondent on January 13, 2003. Complainant, however, vehemently denied having ever signed the Deed of Absolute Sale and having ever appeared before a notary public on January 13, 2003 to acknowledge the same. He claimed that he was in Tanza, Cavite that entire day with Ms. Flocerfida A. Angeles (Ms. Angeles) searching for a buyer of the property. Complainant further stated that the Deed of Absolute Sale showed that what he allegedly presented to the notary public when he acknowledged having executed the document was his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) issued on May 26, 2000 or three years prior to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. The same CTC was used for the notarization of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage on December 20, 2000. the NBI confirmed that the signature of complainant in the Deed of Absolute Sale and the signatures in other sample documents which he actually signed were not made by one and the same person.







More, a few months after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and subsequent to the transfer of the title to Spouses Cruz, Atty. Estrella O. Laysa (Atty. Laysa) as counsel for Spouses Cruz, allegedly sent a letter to complainant. The letter demanded him to vacate the property subject of the alleged sale. According to complainant, Atty. Laysa is respondent's partner in Laysa Aceron-Papa Sayarot Law Office. Thus, complainant claimed that respondent's act of improperly notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale caused him injustice because he was ousted from his property

Records show that The Order17 dated April 23, 2009 directing respondent to answer was returned to the Commission on Bar Discipline with a notation "Moved Out, Left No Address." 19 Nevertheless, the Commission on Bar Discipline, in its Order20 dated August 27, 2009, terminated the mandatory conference and directed the parties to submit their verified position papers so as not to delay the early disposition of the case. Despite the Order dated August 27, 2009 being received by respondent as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt21 signed by a certain Zyra N. Ningas, Findings and Recommendation of the IBP  

respondent did not file any answer to the complaint. During the mandatory conference on August 27, 2009, only the counsel for complainant was present,

 

found respondent administratively liable for notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. Despite due notice, respondent failed to submit her position paper, and is therefore deemed to have waived her right to present her position to the case. recommended that respondent be suspended for two years as notary public.



IBP Board of Governors  

adopted the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the recommended penalty. Instead of suspension for two years as notary public, the IBP Board of Governors recommended the disqualification of respondent from being commissioned as notary public for three years

The Court's Ruling We affirm the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding respondent administratively liable, but we modify the penalty imposed.

We note that the complainant and the IBP Board of Governors cited Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice28 as basis for the complained acts of respondent. However, we find Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103,29 otherwise known as the Notarial Law, to be the applicable law at the time the complained acts took place. Nonetheless, as will be seen below, both laws provide for a similar provision on acknowledgment. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides: (a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. (Emphasis added.) Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice emphasizes the requirement of affiant's personal appearance in an acknowledgment: Section 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete instrument or document; (b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and (c)

represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis added.)

Based on the foregoing, the party acknowledging the document must appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents. To be sure, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of

the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed. In this case, however, it would have been physically impossible for complainant to appear before respondent and sign the Deed of Absolute Sale on January 13, 2003. On that same day, complainant was with Ms. Angeles in Tanza, Cavite the whole day. Ms. Angeles, in her affidavit, confirmed this fact. Further, the NBI's findings in its Questioned Documents Report show that the signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale was not signed by complainant. These allegations remain unrebutted despite the opportunity given to complainant to do so. Therefore, the affidavit of Ms. Angeles, and the findings of the NBI prove that respondent violated the Notarial Law when she notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale without the personal appearance of complainant. It was respondent's duty as notary public to require the personal appearance of the person executing the document to enable the former to verify the genuineness of his signature. 34 Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence of the affiant does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the affiants may not be who they purport to be. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantial public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. 36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Failing to comply with the Notarial Law, respondent was even very lenient and negligent in accepting the outdated CTC of complainant as competent evidence of identity. Although the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized on January 13, 2003, respondent allowed the presentation of a CTC issued on May 26, 2000. Respondent should have been diligent enough to make sure that the person appearing before her is the same person acknowledging the document to be notarized. Respondent should have checked the authenticity of the evidence of identity presented to her. Further, she should not have relied on the CTC in view of the ease with which CTCs are obtained these days.37 It should likewise be pointed out that the CTC is not included in the list of competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons appearing before them to have their documents notarized. 38chanrobleslaw We have emphasized that among the functions of a notary public is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements.39 By affixing her notarial seal on the instrument, she converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document. As a consequence, respondent, in

effect, proclaimed to the world that: (1) all the parties therein personally appeared before her; (2) they are all personally known to her; (3) they were the same persons who executed the instrument; (4) she inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (5) they acknowledged personally before her that they voluntarily and freely executed the same. 40chanrobleslaw By notarizing a spurious document, respondent has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment.41 Respondent's failure to perform her duty as a notary public resulted not only in the damage to those directly affected by the notarized document, but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public, and in degrading the function of notarization. Precisely because of respondent's act, complainant was unlawfully deprived of his property.

Atty. Eloisa M. Aceron-Papa GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility. REVOKES her incumbent commission, if any PROHIBITS her from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years; and SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective immediately.

34.) EN BANC [ AC. No. 9807, Feb 02, 2016 ] ERLINDA SISTUAL v. ATTY. ELIORDO OGENA + DECISION PER CURIAM: In a Complaint,[1] dated June 1, 2006, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),complainants Erlinda C. Sistual, Flordelisa[2] S. Leysa, Leonisa S. Espabo, and Arlan C. Sistual (complainants) alleged that respondent Atty. Eliordo Ogena (Atty.

Ogena), who was the legal counsel of their late father, Manuel A. Sistual (Manuel), wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified several documents which included, among others, a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate, Affidavit of Identification of Heirs, Deed of Donation, and a Deed of Absolute Sale by making it appear that all the children of Manuel and their mother, Erlinda Sistual (Erlinda), executed the documents; that as a result of the falsification of the said documents, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 60467, registered in the name of "Heirs of Martin Sistual, represented by Manuel Sistual,"[3] was cancelled and was subdivided into several lots; and that these lots were sold to interested buyers. In his Answer with Affirmative/Special Defenses and Motion to Dismiss,[4] Atty. Ogena denied the allegations. He averred that in 1987, he was engaged by Manuel to represent the heirs of Martin Sistual in a complaint for recovery of possession filed by Abid Mendal (Abid) and Abundio Sistual (Abundio)[5] that Manuel was the representative of the Heirs of Martin Sistual; that the heirs of Martin Sistual were able to obtain a favorable decision[6] in the said case; that pursuant to the said decision, Lot 464 was awarded to the heirs of Martin Sistual and TCT No. T-60467 was issued in their names; that when Manuel died on November 15, 1993, the heirs of Martin Sistual executed an SPA,[7] dated December 31, 1993, designating Bienvenido Sistual (Bienvenido) as their attorney-in-fact; that Erlinda, the wife of Manuel, manifested her desire to represent the heirs of Martin Sistual, so her two children, Isidro Sistual and Flordelisa Sistual, also executed an SPA in her favor; that the heirs of Martin Sistual opposed the appointment of Erlinda and executed another SPA,[8] dated October 5, 1995, in favor of Bienvenido; and that in the October 5, 1995 SPA, Atty. Ogena wrote the names of complainants Erlinda and Flordeliza Sistual but they did not sign it. As to the incident that led to the subdivision of TCT No. T-60467,

Atty.Ogena explained that Bienvenido, upon the prodding of the heirs of Martin Sistual with the exception of the complainants, caused the subdivision of the property covered by TCT No. T-60467 into several sub-lots identified as TCT Nos. 76078,[9] 76079,[10] 76080,[11] 76081,[12] 76082,[13] 76083,[14] 7 6084,[15] 76085,[16] and 76086,[17]and that the corresponding subdivision plans and technical descriptions thereof were duly approved by the Regional Director, Bureau of Lands, Davao City; and that the subdivided lots were in the names of all the heirs of Martin Sistual including the complainants. On September 7, 1996, the heirs of Dolores Sistual Tulay executed an Extrajudicial Settlement[18] whereby the 1/7 share of their mother in the lot covered by TCT No. T-60467 was waived, repudiated and relinquished in favor of their father, Domingo Tulay; that the heirs of Manuel Sistual also executed an Extrajudicial Settlement[19] waiving their 1/7 share in the same property in favor of their mother, Erlinda. On April 10 and 15, 1997, the heirs of Martin Sistual including complainants executed two deeds of donation[20] in favor of Barangay Lamian conveying the lot covered by TCT Nos. T-76083 and T-76086 to be used for its public market. Atty. Ogena denied that the aforementioned documents were falsified as they were actually executed and duly signed by all the parties therein; and that all the signatures of complainants appearing in the aforementioned documents were identical; that the deeds of donation were duly attested to by Barangay Captain Conrado Toledo and the barangay kagawads;[21] and that the aforementioned documents did not in any way prejudiced the complainants. The execution thereof did not defraud them or any of the heirs of Martin Sistual as the issuance of the nine (9) new and separate titles in the names of all the heirs, as co-owners, was beneficial and favorable to all of them.

Finally, as to the Absolute Deed of Sale,[22] dated July 18, 1989, executed by spouses Manuel and Erlinda in favor of Socorro Langub, Atty. Ogena also denied that this was falsified as this was duly executed, signed and subscribed by all the parties. Atty. Ogena submitted a copy of the said deed of sale[23] to prove that it was duly executed and signed by Manuel and Erlinda, as the vendors; and Socorro Langub, as the vendee. In its Report and Recommendation,[24] the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) stated that it is bereft of any jurisdiction to determine whether Atty. Ogena committed forgery in the aforementioned documents. It, however, found several irregularities in the documents notarized by Atty. Ogena. First, in the SPA, the signatures of Flordelisa Sistual and Isidro Sistual were absent and the Community Tax Certificates (CTC) of the signatories namely: Bernardina Sistual Anson, Jesusa Sistual Español, and Erlinda, were not indicated. In the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Manuel, although all the heirs signed, only the CTC of Erlinda and Flordelisa were indicated. In the Affidavit of Identification of Heirs of Martin Sistual, the CTC of Solfia S. Maribago was absent; and in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Dolores Sistual with Waiver of Hereditary Shares, only the CTC of Domingo Tulay was indicated. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Ogena's notarial commission be revoked and that he be permanently disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public; and that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The IBP Board of Governors revoked Atty. Ogena's commission as notary public and permanently disqualified him from reappointment as Notary Public. It, however, deleted the penalty of suspension.[25]

On March 29, 2012, Atty. Ogena filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. In a Resolution, dated November 10, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed with modification its earlier resolution, revoking Atty. Ogena's notarial commission indefinitely. The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty it imposed. To begin with, complainants' allegation of forgery was not clearly substantiated and there was no concrete proof that the complainants were prejudiced. They submitted a copy of the affidavits[26] for falsification executed by Erlinda and Flordelisa, both subscribed before the City of Prosecutor on February 20, 2006; Memoranda for Preliminary Investigation[27] issued by Office of the City Prosecutor, Koronadal, South Cotabato; Letter,[28]Memorandum,[29] and Order[30] issued by the Bureau of Lands, but these do not suffice to prove the allegation of forgery and/or falsification. Atty. Ogena, however, violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice specifically Rule IV, Section 2(b), which provides: Section

2.

Prohibitions.

-

(a)

x

x

x

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

Doubtless, Atty. Ogena was negligent in the performance of his duty as a notary public. He failed to require the personal presence of the signatories of the documents and proceeded to notarize the aforementioned documents without the signatures of all the parties. Likewise, Atty. Ogena failed to comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do -to require the parties to present their residence certificates or any other document to prove their identities. This Court, in Gonzales v. Atty. Ramos,[31] wrote: Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of the document would be undermined. By notarizing the aforementioned documents, Atty. Ogena engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[32] His conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord to notarized documents.[33] His failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in damaging complainants' rights but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. Thus, Atty. Ogena should be liable for such negligence, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. Pursuant to the pronouncement in Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice,[34] Atty. Ogena should be suspended for two (2) years from the practice of law and forever barred from becoming a notary public.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eliordo Ogena is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and is BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. Let copies of this decision be furnished all courts in the country and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. Let also a copy of this decision be appended to the personal record of Atty. Eliordo Ogena in the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED.

35.) EN BANC A.C. No. 10132, March 24, 2015 HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY DAVID ALILANO, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROBERTO E. EXAMEN, Respondent. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by the heirs of Pedro Alilano against Atty. Roberto E. Examen for misconduct and malpractice for falsifying documents and presenting these as evidence in court thus violating the Lawyer’s Oath,2 Canons 1,3 104and 19,5 and Rules 1.01,6 1.02,7 10.01,8 and 19.019 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Pedro Alilano and his wife, Florentina, were the holders of Original Certificate of Title

(OCT) No. P-23261 covering a 98,460 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1085 Pls544-D located in Paitan, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat. Pedro and Florentina died on March 6, 1985 and October 11, 1989, respectively. It appears that on March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale10 were executed by the Spouses Alilano in favor of Ramon Examen and his wife, Edna. Both documents were notarized by respondent Atty. Roberto Examen, brother of the vendee. Sometime in September 1984, Spouses Examen obtained possession of the property. On January 12, 2002, the heirs of Alilano filed a suit for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat against Edna Examen and Atty. Roberto Examen.11 It was during this proceeding that Atty. Examen introduced into evidence the March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale. On November 15, 2003,12 the heirs of Alilano filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Examen, based on Barretto v. Cabreza,13 violated the notarial law when he notarized the absolute deeds of sale since a notary public is prohibited from notarizing a document when one of the parties is a relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or affinity within the second civil degree. It is also alleged that Atty. Examen notarized the documents knowing that the cedula or residence certificate number used by Ramon Examen was not actually his but the residence certificate number of Florentina. Atty. Examen also falsely acknowledged that the two witnesses personally appeared before him when they did not. Lastly, it is alleged that despite knowing the infirmities of these documents, Atty. Examen introduced these documents into evidence violating his oath as a lawyer and the CPR. In his defense, Atty. Examen pointed out that there was no longer any prohibition under the Revised Administrative Code for a notary public to notarize a document where one of the parties is related to him by consanguinity and affinity.14 With regard to the use of Florentina’s residence certificate as Ramon’s, Atty. Examen said that he was in good faith and that it was office practice that the secretary type details without him personally examining the output.15 In any event, he reasoned that the use of another’s residence certificate is not a ground for disbarment and is barred by prescription based on IBP Resolution No. XVI-2004-13 dated January 26, 2004 where it was proposed that the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Section 1, Rule VIII, be revised to include a prescription period for professional misconduct: within two years from the date of the act.16cralawred

In its Report and Recommendation,17 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Examen liable for breach of the Notarial Law and introducing false Absolute Deeds of Sale before court proceedings. It stated that there was ample evidence to support the complainants’ contention that the Spouses Alilano did not voluntarily and knowingly convey their property, i.e. denials under oath by attesting witnesses and NBI Report by Handwriting Expert Jennifer Dominguez stating that Pedro Alilano’s signature in the September 1984 Absolute Deed of Sale was significantly different from the specimen signatures. It also noted that Ramon Examen’s residence certificate number, date and place of issue were also falsified since the residence certificate actually belonged to Florentina Pueblo. It thus recommended that the penalty of disbarment be imposed. The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) in its June 26, 2007 Resolution 18 adopted the IBP CBD’s report but modified the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years and a suspension of Atty. Examen’s Notarial Commission for a period of two years. Atty. Examen moved for reconsideration. In its Notice of Resolution, the IBP BOG denied the motion for reconsideration. It also modified the penalty imposed to suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year and disqualification from re-appointment as Notary Public for a period of two years.19cralawred We agree with the IBP that Atty. Examen is administratively liable and hereby impose a modified penalty. In disbarment cases the only issue that is to be decided by the Court is whether the member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not.20 It is not therefore the proper venue for the determination of whether there had been a proper conveyance of real property nor is it the proper proceeding to take up whether witnesses’ signatures were in fact forged. NO ACTS

PRESCRIPTION OF ERRING

OF MEMBERS

ACTIONS OF THE

FOR BAR

In Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,21 the Court En Banc opined that there can be no prescription in bar discipline cases. It pointed out this has been the policy since 1967 with the Court’s ruling in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo22 and reiterated in Heck v. Santos23 where we had the chance to state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact

that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’ s Oath. x x x Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer…. (Italics supplied)24cralawlawlibrary

We therefore ruled in Frias, that Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP CBD was void and had no legal effect for being ultra vires and thus null and void.25cralawred This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Bengco v. Bernardo,26 where the Court stated that putting a prescriptive period on administrative cases involving members of the bar would only serve to embolden them to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. Atty. Examen’s defense of prescription therefore is of no moment and deserves scant consideration. THE SPANISH 1889 WAS ADMINISTRATIVE

NOTARIAL REPEALED BY CODE

LAW THE OF

OF REVISED 1917

Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. However, the law governing Notarial Practice is changed with the passage of the January 3, 1916 Revised Administrative Code, which took effect in 1917. In 2004, the Revised Rules on Notarial Practice27 was passed by the Supreme Court. In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of Appeals,28 the Court had the opportunity to state that enactment of the Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary It is petitioners’ contention that Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, who was related to the parties in the donation within the fourth civil degree of affinity, was, under Articles 22 and 28 of the Spanish Notarial Law, incompetent and disqualified to authenticate the deed of donation executed by the Kapunan spouses in favor of their daughter Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo. Said deed of donation, according to petitioners, became a mere private instrument under Article 1223 of the old Civil Code, so that under the ruling laid down in the case of Barretto vs. Cabreza (33 Phil., 413), the donation was inefficacious. The appellate court, however, in the decision complained of held that the Spanish Notarial Law has been repealed with the enactment of Act No. 496. We find this ruling to be correct. In the case of Philippine Sugar Estate vs. Poizart (48 Phil., 536), cited in Vda. de Estuart vs. Garcia (Adm. Case No. 212, prom. February 15, 1957), this Court held that “The old Spanish notarial law and system of conveyance was repealed in the Philippines and another and different notarial law and system became the law of the land with the enactment of Act No. 496.”29 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary

In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty. Examen was prohibited to notarize the absolute deeds of sale since he was related by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree with the vendee, Ramon. The prohibition might have still applied had the applicable rule been the Spanish Notarial Law. However, following the Court’s ruling in Kapunan, the law in force at the time of signing was the Revised Administrative Code, thus, the prohibition was removed. Atty. Examen was not incompetent to notarize the

document even if one of the parties to the deed was a relative, his brother. As correctly observed by the IBP CBD:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary At the time of notarization, the prevailing law governing notarization was Sections 231-259, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code and there was no prohibition on a notary public from notarizing a document when one of the interested parties is related to the notary public within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or second degree of affinity.30cralawlawlibrary

Note must be taken that under 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Section 3(c), a notary public is disqualified among others to perform the notarial act if he is related by affinity or consanguinity to a principal within the fourth civil degree, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he: x

x

x

x

(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree.cralawlawlibrary

That Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as a notary public in the present case does not mean that he can evade administrative liability under the CPR in conjunction with the provisions of the Notarial Law. NOTARIES PUBLIC MUST PERFORM THEIR DUTIES DILIGENTLY AND WITH UTMOST CARE In Nunga v. Atty. Viray,31 this Court stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary …[N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that

interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.32 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)cralawlawlibrary

Thus under the prevailing law at the time of notarization it was the duty of the notary public to comply with the requirements of the Notarial Law. This includes the duty under Chapter 11, Section 251 of the Revised Administrative Code:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary SEC. 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of cedula [residence] tax. – Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper cedula [residence] certificates or are exempt from the cedula [residence] tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such certification the number, place of issue, and date of each cedula [residence] certificate as aforesaid. cralawlawlibrary

Under Chapter 11, Section 249 of the Revised Administrative Code provided a list of the grounds for disqualification:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. – The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission: x

x

x

x

(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula

certificates.chanrobleslaw x cralawlawlibrary

x

x

x

In Soriano v. Atty. Basco,33 the Court stated that notaries public are required to follow formalities as these are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected. Thus, the Notarial Law requires them to certify that a party to the instrument acknowledged before him has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of the certification. Failure to perform his duties results in the revocation of a notary’s commission. The Court said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary As a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge with fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment are sacrosanct. He cannot simply disregard the requirements and solemnities of the Notarial Law.34 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary

Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear that the residence certificate number used by Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in both Absolute Deeds of Sale was not in fact the residence certificate of Ramon but Florentina’s residence certificate number.35 Atty. Examen interposes that he was in good faith in that it was office practice to have his secretary type up the details of the documents and requirements without him checking the correctness of same. A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.36 Good faith cannot be a mitigating circumstance in situations since the duty to function as a notary public is personal. We note that the error could have been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently performed his functions: personally checked the correctness of the documents. To say that it was his secretary’s fault reflects disregard and unfitness to discharge the functions of a notary public for it is he who personally acknowledges the document. He was behooved under Section 251, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code to check if the proper cedulas were

presented and inspect if the documents to be acknowledged by him reflected the correct details. This Court cannot stress enough that notarization is not a routinary act. It is imbued with substantive public interest owing to the public character of his duties37. Atty. Examen posits that the failure of a notary to make the proper notation of cedulas can only be a ground for disqualification and not the proper subject for a disbarment proceeding. We disagree. In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty. Examen also transgressed the his oath as a lawyer, provisions of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.cralawlawlibrary

By his negligent act of not checking the work of his secretary and merely perfunctorily notarizing documents, it cannot be said that he upheld legal processes thus violating Canon 1 of the CPR. Neither can it be said that he promoted confidence in the legal system. If anything, his acts serve to undermine the functions of a diligent lawyer. He thus ran afoul Rule 1.02 of the CPR. We cannot stress enough that as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession.38 A lawyer’s mandate includes thoroughly going over documents presented to them typed or transcribed by their secretaries.39cralawred The Court notes that the case between the parties is not the first that reached this

Court. In Edna Examen and Roberto Examen v. Heirs of Pedro Alilano and Florentina Pueblo,40 Atty. Examen and his sister-in-law questioned via a petition for certiorari41 the propriety of three Court of Appeals’ Resolutions relating to a case involving Lot No. 1085 Pls-544-D this time with respect to its fruits. There the Court of Appeals (CA) after giving Atty. Examen 90 days to file his appellant’s brief, denied a second motion for extension of time merely on the basis of a flimsy reason that he had misplaced some of the transcript of the witnesses’ testimonies. The CA did not find the reason of misplaced transcript as good and sufficient cause to grant the extension pursuant to Section 12,42 Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court. It stated that it was a “flimsy and lame excuse to unnecessarily delay the proceedings.”43 The CA was of the opinion that defendant-appellant’s, herein respondent, motion was “a mockery of the procedural rules.”44 This Court denied the petition for various procedural defects.45cralawred With respect to the penalty imposed, given that Atty. Examen not only failed to uphold his duty as a notary public but also failed to uphold his lawyer’s oath and ran afoul the provisions of the CPR, the Court deems it proper to suspend Atty. Examen from the practice of law for a period of two years following this Court’s decision in CaalimVerzonilla v. Pascua.46cralawred WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto E. Examen is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law forTWO (2) YEARS. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years from finality of this Decision. He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

36.) ARCATOMY S. GUARIN v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015, VILLARAMA, JR., J.: FACTS: This case started in 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance. On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a General Information Sheet (GIS) for LCI for “updating purposes”. The GIS identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President. On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the IBP CBD claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He also never received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI. Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008. She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October 13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so he may sign a Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the affirmative and said that he would

meet with her however, Guarin neglected to show up at the arranged time and place for reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarin’s positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November 27, 2008. Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents, thus, “when the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory

findings.”

Ruling of the IBP CBD: in favor of petitioner Guarin and that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPRi and thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three months. Based on the evidence presented, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint or designate directors or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this procedure was not legally permissible. Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be dictated upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and president of the company. ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment case may prosper. RULING: YES. Atty. Limpin is hereby suspended for 6 months. The SC ruled in favor of petitioner Guarin. Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. As Justice Malcolm stated “[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath.”rary

Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice. There is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company. It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We also note that there was no submission which would support the allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR. We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR. However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin’s action in submitting a false document we see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from

the

practice

37.) ERLINDA FOSTER v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG

Ponente: PER CURIAM

of

law.

Violation: Canons 1, 15 and 16 Penalty: Disbarment Dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.

FACTS: In 2009, Erlinda Foster engaged the services of Atty. Jaime Agtang in a realty dispute in Ilocos Norte, regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty which Atty. Agtang notarized. Agtang’s acceptance fee was P20,000.00 plus P5,000.00 for incidental expenses. For the case, Agtang collected P150,000.00 from Foster as filing fee. He also advised Foster to shell out a total of P50,000.00 for them to bribe the judge and get a favorable decision. Although reluctant, Foster gave in to Agtang’s demands. On various occasions, Agtang borrowed money from Foster for his personal use, i.e. car repair, and “emergency”. Such loan amounted to P122,000. Foster, being prudent, asked for receipts for all funds she handed over to Agtang. Further, it turned out that Agtang was once the lawyer of the opposing party as the complainant discovered that respondent was the one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that there are material matters not included in the complaint filed. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during the hearings. Later, Foster’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal when she personally checked the status of the case with the court. She also found out that the filing fee therefor was only P22,410 (not P150k). She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal. Complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and wrote him a letter of termination, after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently,

complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.

Respondent’s Position: Respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of law since 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor.

He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction was declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He basically denied the accusations of the complainant.Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past. Complainant’s reply Complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the receipts in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him. While respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never considered as “no loan.” IBP: Found respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. IBP-BOG: Adopted and approved with modification the recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution and file a motion for reconsideration. IBP‐ BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00.

ISSUES: 1) Did the respondent violate the Code of Professional Responsibility? YES. 2) Can the Court order the respondent to return the money he borrowed from the complainant?

RULING: 1) Yes, the respondent violated the CPR. The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-‐established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.” In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules; in other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal profession. Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from

his client.” Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as “representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client. Respondent likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that: “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.”

In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. These acts were committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.

The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests.” Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in complainant’s case. The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is 34 abused or violated the entire profession suffers.”

2) NO. The Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his private capacity. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other.

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.” In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable. Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible. Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00 representing the balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyer‐client relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent received from complainant, as representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant. While respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against him.

38.) HEINZ R. HECK v. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS 401 SCRA 46 (2003) Delegating to a counsel of one of the parties the preparation of a decision and parroting it verbatim reflect blatant judicial sloth. Heinz R. Heck is one of the defendants in a Civil Case before the Regional Trial presided by Judge Anthony E. Santos. Heck and his co-defendant did not receive a copy of the order to schedule the

trial on June 10 and 11, 1996. Consequently, they and their counsel failed to appear therein. Since only the plaintiff’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Singson, appeared in that hearing, Judge Santos considered the non-attendance of Heck and his codefendant as waiver of their right to present evidence. Judge Santos thereafter ordered that the case to be submitted for decision. He therefore authorized Atty. Singson to prepare the draft of the decision. The decision issued by Judge Santos was copied verbatim from the draft which Atty. Singson prepared. Hence, Heck filed an administrative complaint charging Judge Santos with violation of Section 1, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Judge Santos guilty for adopting Singson’s work as his own. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Santos is guilty of gross ignorance of the law HELD: The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA. Santos’ order for the counsel of one of the parties to draft the decision and his adoption verbatim of the draft clearly violate the Code of Judicial Conduct. The pertinent canons of which read: Canon 2, a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Canon 3, a Judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence adjudicative responsibilities. By such order, Judge Santos abdicated a function exclusively granted to him by no less than the fundamental law of the land. It is axiomatic that decisionmaking, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member of the bench. He must use his own perceptiveness in understanding and analyzing the evidence presented before him and his own discernment when determining the proper action, resolution or decision. Delegating to a counsel of one of the parties the preparation of a decision and parroting it verbatim reflect blatant judicial sloth. Lack of malice or bad faith is not an excuse. It bears emphasis that a judge must not only render a just, correct and impartial decision. He should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.

HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, respondent.

FACTS May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite notary commission more than twenty years ago be disciplined therefor? Judge Santos was not duly commissioned as notary public until January 9, 1984 but still subscribed and forwarded (on a nonregular basis) notarized documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980 uncommissioned until the 9th of January 1984. That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and submitted by the respondent before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said notarized documents and therefore not the proper party to raise the said issues; It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. He merely alleged that there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register. And, as already observed, he presented no evidence, particularly on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983 (assuming he was so commissioned) and submission of notarial reports and notarial register. Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. RULING YES The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession. It is a continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning ones mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own, distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. As we held in the leading case of In re Almacen: [D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. .... Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated

from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyers Oath. This should particularly apply in this case, considering the seriousness of the matter involved the respondents dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial documents. Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint, will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without the requisite authority therefor.