Case Digest.docx

V. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL Article III, Section 6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS (1989) 177 SCRA 668 Facts: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events: 1.

Failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2.

Channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists

3.

Plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar

4.

Honasan’s failed coup

5.

Communist insurgency movements

6.

Secessionist movements in Mindanao

7.

Devastated economy because of a)

accumulated foreign debt

b)

plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction. According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order. Issue: 1) WON in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. 2) WON the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return. Decision: No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

Ratio: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the dayto-day operation of the State. The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution. MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS 178 SCRA 760 Facts: In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state and society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines. A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments: 1.

Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country of birth and

all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.

the knowledge and permission of this Court”. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

2.

The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily.

Issue: WON the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.

3.

There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.

Issue: WON the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be granted. Decision: No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit. Ratio: 1.

Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.

2.

Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president.

3.

4.

President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers. It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily SILVERIO V. CA (1991) 195 SCRA 760

Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings. Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner’s passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Court’s finding that since the filing of the Information, “the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that “An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending. Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. COJUANGCO V. SANDIGANBAYAN (1998) 300 SCRA 367 No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The clause unequivocally means that the judge must make his own determination — independent of that of the prosecutor — of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, based on the complainant's and his witnesses' accounts, if any. Supporting evidence other than the report and recommendation of the investigators and the special prosecutor should be examined by the court

Facts: January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), petitioner, former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and the former members of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for having conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of their public positions and/or using their powers; authority, influence, connections or relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted a donation in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence to the grave ( sic) and prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic of the Philippines. Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was directed to transmit the complaints and records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.

In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended the filling of an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal information. In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed the recommendation as contained in the Resolution dated June 2, 1992. August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel of investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial question posed by respondent Lobregat. In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators recommended that the motion to suspend proceedings be granted. On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for comment to the Office of the Special Prosecutors the Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 of the panel of investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicial question. On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the respondent Sandiganbayan. On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise filed, through counsel, a Manifestation stating that he was posting bail without prejudice to the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For Leave To File a Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution which he filed. In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred petitioner from leaving the country except upon approval of the court. On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty to the Information. In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil found no probable cause to warrant the filing against petitioner and recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation for dismissal was approved by the Honorable Ombudsman on November 15, 1996. On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging that with the reversal of the earlier findings of the Ombudsman of probable cause, there was therefore nothing on record before the respondent Sandiganbayan which would warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the assumption of jurisdiction over the instant case. YAP, JR. V. CA (2001) 358 SCRA 564 Facts: Petitioner, Francisco Yap, Jr. was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was sentenced to four years and two months of Prision correctional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated February 17, 1999. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000 on condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the

area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.” He sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He also contests the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel. Issue: Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner’s right against excessive bail. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel. Ruling: The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so. Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him from leaving the Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which issued the order. In fact, the petition submits that the hold-departure order against petitioner is already sufficient guarantee that he will not escape.Thus, to require him to inform the court every time he changed his residence is already unnecessary. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states: The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. MIRASOL V. DPWH (2006) 490 SCRA 318 Facts: Petitioners filed before the court a petition for declaratory judgment with application for temporary restraining order and injunction. It seeks the declaration of nullification of administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act) which was enacted in 1957. Previously, pursuant to its mandate under RA 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 Dept. Order no. 215 declaring the Manila Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities. Petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along NLEX, SLEX, Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) toll Expressway under DO 215. RTC, after due hearing, granted the petitioner’s application for preliminary injunction conditioned upon petitioner’s filing of cash bond in the amount of P100, 000 which petitioners complied.

DPWH issued an order (DO 123) allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways). Upon assumption of Hon. Presiding Judge Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were required to file their Memoranda. The court issued an order dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123. The petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. RTC ruled that DO 74 is valid but DO 123 is invalid being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution Issue: 1) WON RTC’s decision is barred by res judicata? 2) WON DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulation contravene RA 2000. 3) WON AO 1 is unconstitutional. Held: 1. NO. The petitioners are mistaken because they rely on the RTC’s Order granting their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Since petitioners did not appeal from that order, the petitioners presumed that the order became a final judgment on the issues. The order granting the prayer is not an adjudication on the merits of the case that would trigger res judicata. A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination of the issues, it being a provisional remedy. 2. YES. The petitioners claimed that DO 74, DO 215 and TRB’s rules and regulation issued under them unduly expanded the power of the DPWH in sec. 4 of RA 2000 to regulate toll ways. They contend that DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts like redesigning curbings or central dividing sections. They claim that DPWH is only allowed to redesign the physical structure of toll ways and not to determine “who or what can be qualifies as toll ways user”. The court ruled that DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities. Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing limited access facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place. 3. NO. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then Department of Public Works and Communications had issued AO 1 in February 1968, as authorized under Section 3 of Republic Act 2000, prior to the splitting of the department and the eventual devolution of its powers to the DOTC. Because administrative issuances had the force and effect of law, AO 1 enjoyed the presumption of validity and constitutionality. The burden to prove its unconstitutionality rested on the party assailing it, more so when police power was at issue and passed the test of reasonableness. The Administrative Order was not oppressive, as it did not impose unreasonable restrictions or deprive petitioners of their right to use the facilities. It merely set rules to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within those limited-access facilities.

The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a tollway. Petitioners were free to access the tollway as much as the rest of the public. However, the mode in which they wished to travel, pertaining to their manner of using the tollway, was a subject that could validly be limited by regulation. There was no absolute right to drive; on the contrary, this privilege was heavily regulated. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES V. MACARINE (2012)

677 SCRA 1 Facts: On August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court Administrator, now Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, requesting for authority to travel to Hongkong with his family for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he would celebrate his 65th birthday. The respondent stated that his travel abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave. However, he did not submit the corresponding application for leave. For his failure to submit the complete requirements, his request for authority to travel remained unacted upon. The respondent proceeded with his travel abroad without the required travel authority from the OCA. On January 28, 2010, the respondent was informed by the OCA that his leave of absence for the period of September 9-15, 2009 had been disapproved and his travel considered unauthorized by the Court. His absences shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from his salary corresponding to the seven days that he was absent, pursuant to Section 50 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave. The respondent was also required to submit his explanation on his failure to comply with OCA Circular No. 49-2003. Issue: WON there exists a violation to the right to travel. Ruling: There is no violation on the right to travel. True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule. VI. RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION Article III, Section 12: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and

rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA (1966) 384 US 436 In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that detained criminal suspects, prior to police questioning, must be informed of their constitutional right to an attorney and against self-incrimination. The case began with the 1963 arrest of Phoenix resident Ernesto Miranda, who was charged with rape, kidnapping, and robbery. Miranda was not informed of his rights prior to the police interrogation. During the two-hour interrogation, Miranda allegedly confessed to committing the crimes, which the police apparently recorded. Miranda, who had not finished ninth grade and had a history of mental instability, had no counsel present. At trial, the prosecution's case consisted solely of his confession. Miranda was convicted of both rape and kidnapping and sentenced to 20 to 30 years in prison. He appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, claiming that the police had unconstitutionally obtained his confession. The court disagreed, however, and upheld the conviction. Miranda appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reviewed the case in 1966. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, ruled that the prosecution could not introduce Miranda's confession as evidence in a criminal trial because the police had failed to first inform Miranda of his right to an attorney and against self-incrimination. The police duty to give these warnings is compelled by the Constitution's Fifth Amendment, which gives a criminal suspect the right to refuse "to be a witness against himself," and Sixth Amendment, which guarantees criminal defendants the right to an attorney. The Court maintained that the defendant's right against selfincrimination has long been part of Anglo-American law as a means to equalize the vulnerability inherent in being detained. Such a position, unchecked, can often lead to government abuse. For example, the Court cited the continued high incidence of police violence designed to compel confessions from a suspect. This and other forms of intimidation, maintained the Court, deprive criminal suspects of their basic liberties and can lead to false confessions. The defendant's right to an attorney is an equally fundamental right, because the presence of an attorney in interrogations, according to Chief Justice Warren, enables "the defendant under otherwise compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in the interrogations process." Without these two fundamental rights, both of which, the Court ruled, "dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings," "no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice." Thus, to protect these rights in the face of widespread ignorance of the law, the Court devised statements that the police are required to tell a defendant who is being detained and interrogated. These mandatory "Miranda Rights" begin with "the right to remain silent," and continue with the statement that "anything said can and will be used against [the defendant] in a court of law." The police are further compelled to inform the suspect of his or her right to an attorney and allow for (or, if necessary, provide for) a defendant's attorney who can accompany him during interrogations. Because none of these rights was afforded to Ernesto Miranda and his "confession" was thus unconstitutionally admitted at trial, his conviction was reversed. Miranda was later retried and convicted without the admission of his confession.

Miranda v. Arizona, in creating the "Miranda Rights" we take for granted today, reconciled the increasing police powers of the state with the basic rights of individuals. Miranda remains good law today. HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE (2011) 659 SCRA 624 Facts: When Gilda Cinco search the bag of Ho Wai Pang in the Baggage Declaration at the arrival area, she found boxes of chocolate which when she saw inside had white substance. They were then brought to the PNP after the procedures in the airport. The RTC found Pang guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The CA while affirming the RTC decision took note that their right to counsel during custodial investigation was violated. Issue: Whether the violation of the petitioner's right to counsel made the evidence taken from the petitioner inadmissible. Ruling:The SC held in the negative. The SC reiterated that infractions to the accused during the custodial investigation render only extrajudicial confession or admissions of the suspect inadmissible as evidence. Also, the guilt of Pang was based on the testimony of Cinco when she caught Pang in flagrante delicto transporting shabu. LUZ V. PEOPLE (2012) 667 SCRA 421 Facts: PO3 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet and so he flagged him down. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the sub-station to where he is assigned as a traffic enforcer. The accused violated a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle. While the officers were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on reaching something from his jacket. He was alerted and told the accused to take out the contents of his jacket’s pocket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. The accused obliged, slowly put out the contents of his jacket’s pocket which included two plastic sachets of suspected shabu. The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as the substances are positive of methampethamine hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision. Upon a petition for reiew on certiorari, petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him. Issue: WON the arrest, searches and seizure were invalid. Held: Yes, there was no valid arrest. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter. At the time that he was waiting for PO3

Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. rior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time.

RATIO:1. The petition was erroneously filed under Rule 65 when it should be filed under Rule 45. In any case, the Court brushed aside this procedural defect because of the important issues the petition raised.

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

The Supreme Court may dismiss the petition by treating it as having been erroneously filed under Rule 65 when the proper remedy is Rule 45.

1.

Miranda Rule not applicable to Confessions PEOPLE V. RIBADAJO (1986) 142 SCRA 637

On Nov. 20, 1971, the appellants confessed participation in the slaying of a fellow inmate, Bernardo Catamora, at the New Bilibid Prison. On the basis of their confession, they were found guilty of murder. On appeal, they claimed that their extrajudicial confessions had been obtained by force. HELD: The proscription against the admissibility of confessions obtained from an accused during the period of custodial investigation, in violation of procedural safeguards, applies to confessions obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Const. No law gives the accused the right to be so informed before the enactment of the 1973 Const., even of presented after Jan. 17, 1973. That Constitutional guaranty relative to confessions obtained during custodial investigation does not have any retroactive effect. FILOTEO V. SANDIGANBAYAN (1996) 142 SCRA 637 Facts: Petitioner was charged with hijacking a Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Post along MacArthur Highway in Meycauayan, Bulacan, together with ten others, in that on May 3, 1982, the accused, two of whom were armed with guns, stopped the Delivery Truck at gunpoint, and then robbed and carried away the truck with them, including Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers, Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers Treasury Warrants, and several Mail Matters from abroad worth P253,728.29 belonging to US Government Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries and Private Individuals. Based on a signed confession, the Sandiganbayan, on June 18, 1987, convicted petitioner and his cohorts as co-principals for the violation of Section 2 (e), in relation to Section 3 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 532, or Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. Issues: 1. 2.

3.

4. 5. 6.

Whether a petition can be treated alternatively as filed under either Rule 45 or Rule 65 – YES Whether an extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer, is admissible in evidence against him – YES Whether statements of accused obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and intimidation are illegal and inadmissible – NO Whether warrantless arrest of petitioner was valid and proper – YES Whether the evidence of the prosecution is sufficient to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt – YES Whether the crime committed was Brigandage or Robbery – ROBBERY

The petition submitted alternatively under either rule 45 or rule 65 gave the Supreme Court the prerogative to decide how to treat said petition, and may dismiss the petition on the grounds that it is unqualified for the rule that the court decided the petition falls under. The petition was considered as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 as in Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, because under P.D. No. 1486, amended by P.D. No. 1606, which created the Sandiganbayan, specified that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be subject to review on certiorari by the Supreme Court, ruling out a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 because certiorari may be invoked only where there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy. This petition could have been dismissed on these grounds but due to the importance of the issues raised, the Court assumed jurisdiction. 2. Extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer, are admissible in evidence against the petitioner under the 1973 Constitution, but is no longer the case in the 1987 constitution. The petitioner’s extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer, is admissible in evidence against the petitioner because it falls under Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, which did not contain the right against an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution as it had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. The latter provision cannot be applied retroactively because while Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal,” what is being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is not a penal statute. Nor is the petitioner protected by the Morales and Galit rulings, that the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel, because he executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982 unlike in People vs. Sison where the extrajudicial confession was executed after April 26, 1983 . It is in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code, “judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines,” and Article 4 of the same Code, “laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided.” The petitioner’s affidavit of May 30, 1982 waiving the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was made voluntarily and intelligently, categorically and definitively, and rested on clear evidence. Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he told the petitioner of his right to counsel, even in waiving that right. The petitioner did not even inform Sgt. Carlos that his father-in-law was a lawyer nor did he invoke his right to counsel.

The petitioner could not have been ignorant of his rights as an accused because he was a fourth year criminology student and a topnotch student in the police basic course as well as having been in the police force since 1978, with stints at the investigation division or the detective bureau, so he was knowledgeable on the matter of extrajudicial confessions. 3. Accused’s extrajudicial confession was admissible because there was no proof of torture, duress, maltreatment and intimidation. There was no evidence of physical injuries upon his person, according to the medical report. When he was presented before Judge Mariano Mendieta of the municipal court in Meycauayan, he waived his right to present evidence instead of challenging his confession on account of the torture allegedly inflicted upon him. An examination of his signatures in the different documents on record bearing the same discloses an evenness of lines and strokes in his penmanship which is markedly consistent in his certification, extrajudicial confession and waiver of detention. Therefore, his extrajudicial confession is presumed to have been voluntarily made, as there was no conclusive evidence showing that petitioner’s consent had been vitiated. The question of whether petitioner was indeed subjected to torture or maltreatment is a factual question addressed primarily to trial courts, the findings of which are binding on the Supreme Court whose function is principally to review only of questions of law as in section 2 of rule 45. The respondent Court performed its duty in evaluating the evidence. 4. Petitioner’s warrantless arrest is valid. On the petitioner’s arrest, that the arresting officers “invited” him without a warrant of arrest and brought him to Camp Crame where he was allegedly subjected to torture almost a month after the commission of the crime. As he did not question his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial, any irregularity in his arrest, if any, was cured as explained in People vs. Lopez, Jr., because it is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea. The illegal arrest of an accused is also not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. 5. Prosecution proved accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt The petitioner’s culpability has been proven beyond reasonable doubt and his alibi has been correctly considered by the Sandiganbayan to be weak and implausible. Having already ruled on the admissibility of petitioner’s confession, the Supreme Court holds that the full force of the totality of the prosecution’s evidence proves his guilt well beyond reasonable doubt. Added to that is the well-settled doctrine under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that findings of facts of the the Sandiganbayan itself, is binding upon this Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error because the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 6. The crime committed was Robbery because there was no proof that the group was formed for multiple indiscriminate instances of robbery. The Court believes that the question of which law was violated by the accused should be discussed and passed upon even if

it was not raised as an issue and not argued by the parties in their pleadings as it may have reduced the petitioner’s penalty. That P.D. No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, assumed to have been the statute violated, because the robbery was perpetrated on a national highway (McArthur Highway), has been debunked by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Isabelo Puno, where it was ruled in that it takes more than the site of the robbery to bring it within the ambit of PD 532. The Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers that were purposely organized for several indiscriminate commissions of robbery. It would not be necessary to show that a member or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art. 306. But, if robbery is committed by a band, the crime would be only robbery. There had been no evidence presented that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for such purpose as well as of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused to show the “indiscriminate” commission thereof. Instead the evidence proved that robbery was committed as defined in Art. 293 in relation to Art. 295 and punished by Art. 244, par. 5, all of the Revised Penal Code that personal property belonging to another were unlawfully taken by the accused with intent to gain with intimidation against three persons (Art. 293) in an uninhabited place, or by an band, or by attacking a moving motor vehicle on a highway; and the intimidation was made with the use of firearms (Art. 295). 2. Not Applicable to res gestae statements/spontaneous statements PEOPLE V. BALOLOY (2001) 381 SCRA 31 Facts: At Barangay Inagasan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of August 3 1996, the body of 11 years old Genelyn Camacho was found at the waterfalls at the said barangay. Autopsy report found the Genelyn was raped before she was drowned. The one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself, Who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in the nearby creek. While in the wake of Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the barangay captain that he only wanted to frighten the girl but ended up raping and throwing her body in the ravine. While in the custody of authorities, he was asked incriminating questions by Judge Dicon who justified his actions saying that Juanito was not yet in custodial investigation. Based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with circumstantial evidence, the trail court violated Section 12 (1) of Article III of the barangay captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him of his Constitutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the incriminatory information. It is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators, for as public officials it was incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. While these rights may be waiver executed in the presence of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. Issue: WON Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the barangay captain was amissible. Ruling: Yes, as to his confession with the barangay captain Ceniza, it has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities

but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. In the instant case, Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he rapes Genelyn and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinaty manner. It was given before he was arrested or place under custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the offense. Moreover, Juanito did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the party of Ceniza, which could have compelled her testify falsely against him. JESALVA V. PEOPLE 640 SCRA 253 Custodial investigation refers to “any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him. The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992. Thus, the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the instant case. 3. Not applicable to Administrative Investigations

statements

given

in

PEOPLE V. TIN LAN UY (2005) 475 SCRA 248 Facts: Sometime in July 1990, accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a public accountable officer, being the Treasurer of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), and Ernesto Gamus and Jaime Ochoa, both public officers being the Manager of the Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division and Foreign Trader Analyst, respectively, of NAPOCOR; and accused Raul Gutierrez, a private individual being a foreign exchange trader, falsify or cause to be falsified the NAPOCOR's application for managers checks with the Philippine National Bank in the total amount of 183 805 291.25 pesos, intended for the purchase of US dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank, by inserting the account number of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-121204-4,when in truth and in fact that the Payment Instructions when signed by the NAPOCOR authorities did not indicate the account number of Raul Gutierrez, thereby making alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning, and with the use of the said falsified commercial documents, accused succeeded in diverting, collecting and receiving the said amount from NAPOCOR, which they thereafter malverse, embezzle, misappropriate, and convert to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the NAPOCOR. Gamus, Uy, and Ochoa pleaded not guilty. Gutierrez remained at large. During pretrial, it was found that Gamus does not have any custody to public funds. However,

because of preponderance of evidence, he is civilly liable for the damages. Issue: WON the rights under Article 12 available to a suspect if he is under investigation but by a private person, Ruling: The rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accused-appellant are not available before government investigators enter the picture. Thus we held in one case that admissions made during the course of an administrative investigation by Philippine Airlines do not come within the purview of Section 12. The protective mantle of the constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or confessions made to a private individual, or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the investigation, or even to a mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity. The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted at the time the sworn statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his predicament. The essence of the constitutional safeguard is protection from coercion. The interview where the sworn statement is based was conducted by NPC personnel for the NPC’s administrative investigation. Any investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding separate, distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter.