Cait Ethics

Caitlin O'Byrne Mr. Alan Tomhave Ethics final Paper 14 November 2007 Jan Narveson states, "If the fact that others are starving is not our fault, we have no duty of justice to aid them. If we have no duty of justice to aid them, we may not be forced to do so. The fact that others are starving is not our fault. Therefore, we may not be forced to aid them." Narveson believes all of these premises are true in regard to both other countries, as well as our own. This is an issue of famine relief. Narveson emphasizes the difference between the duty of justice and the duty of charity. He argues it is not our duty to provide for those less fortunate; it is a matter of charity. However, the government violates this by imposing taxes to support welfare programs and foreign aid. I agree with Narveson. I believe that although it is a virtuous idea to help with famine relief, we are not obligated to do so. So, is famine relief an obligation or just an act of charity? I will answer this question and, in addition, explore the question of the government’s role in famine relief; is it ethical for the government to impose taxes to help the people in financial aid? Is it our duty out of justice or out of charity to help those in need? To answer these questions, I will examine Narveson’s view on this issue found in his article, as well as the government’s actions. I will also point out a regular criticism of Narveson’s view and provide a response to the critique. We must examine the premises of the argument. Citizens alone cannot create poverty. Poverty has always existed since the beginning of time. There is no way to place blame on citizens of a certain country for the continuous problem of poverty. Therefore, we have no duty of justice to participate in famine relief. “So if someone is starving, we may pity him or we may be indifferent, but the question so far as our obligations are concerned is this: how did he get that way? If it was not the result of my previous activities, then I have no obligation to him, and may help him out or not, as I choose. If it was such a result, then of course I must do something. If you live and have long lived downstream from

me, and I decide to dam up the river and divert the water elsewhere, then I have deprived you of your water and must compensate you, by supplying you with the equivalent, or else desist. But if you live in the middle of a parched desert and it does not rain, so that you are faced with death from thirst, that is not my doing and I have no compensating to do” (Narveson, Starving and Allowing to Starve). Poverty is not a direct result of our actions. We should not be forced by the government to aid those in need. When examining the issue of famine relief, Narveson emphasizes there are two main questions we must ask ourselves: “First, is there a basic duty of justice to feed the starving? And second, if there is not, then is there a basic requirement of charity that we be disposed to do so, and if so, how strong is the requirement?” (Narveson, The Basic Issues). Narveson’s view of famine relief supports the “Entitlement Principle”. This principle states we have the rights to all of our properties. These rights entitle us to determine how we will use our properties, as long as our actions do not violate the rights of others. This principle is true regardless of whether or not we can significantly benefit others at no major costs to ourselves. Narveson states that the “tendency and desire to do good for others is a virtue. Moreover, it is a moral virtue, for we all have an interest in the general acquisition of this quality” (Narveson, Charity). He reminds us we must look at famine relief as a way to help people, a non-enforceable act of charity we should all strive to do. Donating time and goods to places and people in need should be encouraged, not mandatory. If famine relief is looked at as a duty of all people - something that is mandatory - then people will be doing it for the wrong reason. People will have less empathy and compassion, and only help people because they “have to”, and not because they “want to”. The overall lesson Narveson’s argument reminds us we may not forcibly impose a duty on others to feed those in need. Contributing to famine relief is the “nice thing to do, and is morally recommended” (Narveson, Summing Up), but it is not an obligation. Throughout his article, Narveson reminds us charity is a virtue. Narveson points out even though we are taxed by the government to benefit the poor and educate the uneducated, much of the worlds’ starvation is often caused by the government and

governmental policies. For instance, in the United States, there are many programs that enthusiastically encourage visits these foreign impoverished places to “help”. By help, we mean force the “American way” on foreign people. We give them the help we think they need. We force our way of thinking, our way of life on cultures that have sustained their own traditions for centuries. We need to cater to the traditions of those cultures. Not every community needs cell phones or a Mercedes. In some communities, wealth is about the spirit. Not everyone believes in taking a pill to lose weight or to be happier. Some believe in letting nature take its course. And we should respect those cultures’ traditions. Narveson also argues people should have a stronger desire to help famine in our own country. We have better chance of success of helping if we internalize our desires and focus on poverty within our own country, rather than trying to help foreign countries where we sometimes end up causing more pain than good. Again, the government should not tax and force citizens to contribute to famine relief in other countries. Narveson does not argue there is no value of such government-imposed taxes. Rather, he poses a deeper and more complex question; Do these “programs produce benefits that outweigh their costs?” (Narveson, Duties of Justice and Duties of Charity). He also takes a closer look at the impact of government on starvation. “In fact, all of the substantial starvation (as opposed to the occasionally flood) in the middle-to-later parts of the twentieth century has been due to politics, not agriculture” (Narveson, Notes on the Real World). He includes examples of how in countries like Nicaragua, China, and even the Soviet Union, where the government has been the catalyst of starvation, not the relief thereof. They did this by imposing artificially low food prices and artificially inefficient agricultural systems on their people. The governments have not helped the people, just further perpetuated the problem of poverty. Once again, that supports the premises of Narveson’s argument. It is for this reason Narveson believes the government should not get involved in agriculture systems and let the farmers serve to their best own interests. He does not believe the issue of starvation will be solved by having first world countries tax their own citizens just to send over food that will

most likely not reach those who need it most. “Even if the local government will let people have this bounty (they often don’t - corrupt officials have been known to go out and privately resell the grain elsewhere instead of distributing it to their starving subjects), providing it indiscriminately hooks them on Western charity instead of enabling them to regain the self-sufficiency they enjoyed in earlier times, before modern Western benefits such as ‘democracy’ enabled incompetent local governments to disrupt the food supply” (Narveson, Notes on the Real World). One country cannot support the people of another, nor should it be expected that they do so. While it is a virtuous to try and help these countries as best we can, there is very little outside agenciessuch as the United States, can do. Therefore, the government should not impose taxes that force the people to contribute to famine relief. Rather, the government should leave the issue up to the conscience of the people. There are many philosophers who believe we are morally obligated to donate to famine relief. These philosophers have one main criticism of Narveson’s view on famine relief. They raise the issue of whether there is a difference between starving a person and allowing a person to starve. While some such as Singer, argue that there is no difference between killing someone and letting someone die by starvation, Narveson disagrees. Narveson states there is not only a logical difference, but also a difference of being morally unequal. That is, would people honestly place the same punishments on those who did not contribute to famine relief with the punishments given to mass murderers? No, the levels of these actions are different. Murder requires a violent action performed by the killer, whereas letting someone die requires no action whatsoever. Therefore, the actions should receive different consequences. Timothy McVey received the death penalty for the Oklahoma bombing. According to some philosophers who support famine relief as matter of justice, we would be doing somewhat of the same thing as Timothy McVey did every time we did not give to famine relief. Therefore, we should all be given the death penalty. When looking at famine relief as a matter of justice, the line of obligation becomes fuzzy.

Poverty is a worldwide problem that people are continually trying to find the answer to. Narveson believes the solution is found in a world where people want to do good. He supports the notion that people should not be forced by governmental authorities to contribute to famine relief programs. There are more ways to contribute to make the world a better place, than just donating time and money to government programs. The best thing to do is to use your own gifts and talents to help make the world brighter. For Narveson, the solution to the questions asked in today’s paper is simple: “The basic question of this chapter is whether the hungry have a positive right to be fed. Of course we have a right to feed them if we wish, and they have a negative right to be fed. But may we forcibly impose a duty on others to feed them? We may not.” (Narveson, Summing Up)