Analysis Afghanistan Freedom Support Act 2002

Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 Public Law 107-327

Inayet Hadi Professor Gage PAD 5001, Section 001 December 14, 2006

Afghanistan Freedom

Table of Contents

Executives Summary

3

Legislative History I.

Historical Background

4

II.

House's Committee on International Relations (HCIR) Action

7

III.

Committee of the Whole Takes Action

8

IV.

Senate Action

10 Provisions of the Law

VI.

Title I Economic and Democratic Development Assistance for Afghanistan

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VII.

Title II Military Assistance for Afghanistan and Certain other Foreign Countries and International Organizations

17

VIII. Title II Miscellaneous Provisions

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IX.

Analysis of Impact

21

Bibliography

25

22

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Executive Summary This paper reviews the background and legislative history of P.L. 107-327, short title “Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002,” which was passed on December 04, 2002, and provided military and humanitarian support to the new Afghanistan government. The Act has three titles with a total of nineteen sections. The first title addresses economic and development assistance for Afghanistan. The second title focuses on military assistance for Afghanistan and certain other foreign countries and international organizations involved in Afghanistan. The last title concentrates on miscellaneous provisions, such as, forbidden the United States government helping drug traffickers. It also supports providing body guard services to President Karzai, and encouraging other nations to disburse the funds pledged to Afghanistan during the first international conference held in Tokyo, Japan after the Bonn Agreement. The turbulent political and civil strife Afghanistan faced over the past three decades did not end with the enactment of public law 107-327 “Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002.” The Act formalized the framework from which the United States justified its involvement in Afghanistan after the Taliban government was removed from political power. The Act became a guiding principle for the United States government to ensure Afghanistan does not again becomes a safe haven for the enemies of the United States. The introduction of House Resolution 3994 in the House of Representatives, and its referral to the Committee on International Relations on the same day was swift and quick because of Congress’s concern with placing a policy framework to guide the

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Executive branch actions in Afghanistan. The introduced bills in the House, and subsequent Senate approved version did not differ dramatically, nor were there any major disagreements between the Senate and House versions of the Bill. The impact of the Act on the reconstruction sector of Afghanistan was considered phantom reconstruction, where the reconstruction is of low quality not having any substantive effect on the targeted areas or people. The majority of the aid for Afghanistan reconstruction never left US soil. The aid was disbursed to high priced US consultants, firms, and organizations that did not achieve either long or short term benefits to the people of Afghanistan in regards to the reconstruction and development field. Legislative History Historical Background The withdrawal of Soviet (i.e. Russian) troops from Afghanistan in 1989 resulted in a civil war against the communist government. By 1992, the western backed opposition forces toppled the Afghan communist government. The various Afghan opposition forces that toppled the communist government could not agree on sharing power peacefully, because each group wanted to be the first among the many. As a consequence a brutal internecine civil war was fought between the various factions that toppled the communist government. After nearly seven years of civil war the Afghan people were sick and tired of war, and insecurity in Afghanistan. This was one reason that the Taliban group was able to assert political control vast areas in such a short period of time by promising to end civil war, and bring order, peace, and security to the Afghan people. The Taliban initial existence as a group started in 1995 by taking over Kandahar,

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the capitol of a province with the same name in Afghanistan. They were formed by Mullah Omar promising to end the civil war, bring peace, security, and justice to the people. Initially, the Taliban group was sustained and supported by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency of Pakistan along with assistance from other western nationsstates in the late 1990’s. A year later in 1996 the Taliban effectively gained control of Kabul from the many warring factions involved in the civil war. The civil war participants after losing to the Taliban formed the Northern Alliance to safeguard their interests against the new group. The Taliban had asserted direct political control over ninety five percent of the territory of Afghanistan by the middle of 2001. Within the same time period that the Taliban came into existence, Osama Bin Laden (OBL) needed a different state sponsor to move his operation from Sudan, in order to be able to create a new political order within his native country, Saudi Arabia. President Bill Clinton’s Administration and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had pressured the Sudanese Government to expel OBL. When OBL was asked to leave Sudan he sought Afghanistan, and its controlling regime to offer him protection and sanctuary (Frontline, n.d. screen. last). Afghanistan was chosen by OBL because of his past involvement with fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan during1980s. The Taliban regime welcomed OBL for two primary reasons. First, OBL had resources to procure military hardware, and support the Taliban government's offensive against the opposition with men. The Taliban group as the legitimate Government of Afghanistan (GOA) was recognized by only three other nation-states, United Arab

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Emirate (UAE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. The United Nations did not recognize the Taliban controlled GOA as the legitimate government. As a result it could not secure capital from inter-governmental groups (IGG) or private firms to sustain its offensive against the Northern Alliance. Second, it is the tradition of Afghans that if a person seeks your protection then one is obliged to offer it to him, even though if he had killed your close families relative the day before in order to show your generosity. This practice is called Nanewatei (Momand, 2000, para. 2). The aim of the practice is to provide hospitality and protection to anyone that asked for your assistance. In the late 1990’s the U.S. Government accused and later indicated OBL of bombing its Navy Ships and Embassy’s abroad, and demanded that the Taliban leadership extradite OBL to its authorities. The Taliban leadership’s response was two fold, first was, ‘we have no extradition treaty with the US Government,’ and second, no evidence was presented to the Taliban controlled Afghan Courts of OBL involvement in terrorist activities. As a result they would not extradite OBL to US jurisdiction. Later, the Taliban agreed to hand over OBL only to a Muslim nation-state that was neutral, and acceptable to USA. United States Government did not consider this offer as being viable (Borchgrave, 2001, para. 33). The Taliban government could not convince the US government to “sign a treaty of extradition” or “offer evidence in Afghan court” of OBL involvement in terrorist activities, the last option left for the Taliban government was to offer OBL to a neutral Muslim country to be tried according to Islamic law. The Taliban movement feared that if it buckled under US pressure, then it would have difficulty continuing governing because it would have lost face.

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With the airplane attacks on the United State’s World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a cornfield on September 11, 2001 the U.S. Government changed its rhetoric into actions. One year after the attack to dethrone the Taliban Government, US Congress passed and President signed into law on December 04, 2002 the “Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002.” The Act laid the foundation of US Government involvement in Afghanistan. House's Committee on International Relations (HCIR) Action House Resolution (H.R.) 3994 was sponsored and introduced by Representative Henry J. Hyde R-IL, Chair of the House’s Committee on International Relations (HCIR) on March 19, 2002. On the same day it was referred to the House's Committee on International Relations. The following day it was “[o]rdered reported, amended, by House Committee on International Relations” (H.R. 3994 Bill Tracking). The speed with which the resolution was introduced, reported to a committee on the same day, and ordered reported, amended, by the HCIR the following day, demonstrated the urgency of Congress in wanting to design a framework of US involvement in Afghanistan. On April 25, 2002 HCIR issued a report titled 107 H. Rpt. 420 that unanimously recommended the passage of the Act. The report also contained historical background information, purpose of the proposed legislation, and section-by-section analysis of the Bill. The report states that only two amendments were agreed to in the Markup session, however, HCIR Markup session itself reads that three amendments were agreed to. The Markup session records acknowledge three amendments were agreed to, while the report only mentions that two amendments were agreed to. I will discuss the three amendments

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that were agreed to in the HCIR Markup session. The first amendment offered in the HCIR, and agreed to was by Representative Rohrabacher, which included language for the removal of landmines, and to provide ten million dollars to “carrying out a loya jirga [sic], as well as national, regional and local elections and political party development” (United States. Cong. House. Committee on International Relations [USC-HCIR], “Amending,” 2002, p. 49). Loya Jirga translates to Supreme Assembly, where important public decisions are made in times of crisis and great change. Representative Hoeffel introduced the second amendment in HCIR, which was also approved. The Amendment added a statement of Congress to “foster stability and democratization… that advances the development of democratic civil authorities and institutions in the broader Central Asia region” (USC-HCIR, “Amending,” 2002, p. 53). The aim of this amendment was to broaden U.S. foreign policy objectives in the central Asian region to promote relationships with the Central Asian nation-states. In order to build military bases to support, and sustain military operations in Afghanistan. Representative Lee introduced the third Amendment to authorize funding for the Ministry of Women Affairs of Afghanistan (MoWA). The text of the amendment does not allocate a certain amount of funding to MoWA, but only that MoWA should be funded (USC-HCIR, “Amending,” 2002, p. 56). The amendment intention was to demonstrate the US government commitment to Afghan women rights. Committee of the Whole Takes Action House Resolution 3994 was considered by the Committee of the Whole (CotW) on May 21, 2002, and passed with several amendments to the Senate on the same day.

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There were a total of eight amendments introduced at the CotW, with only two amendments being withdrawn by the Representatives who had offered them. The other six amendments were agreed to by CotW with overwhelming majority, near unanimously. The first amendment introduced was by Representative Hyde. His amendment applied certain sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to help counter the growing of poppies, and to use research performed by U.S. land grant colleges and universities in the areas of agriculture and rural development to assist Afghanistan. The amendment offered by Rep. Hyde was agreed to by a voice vote (Bill tracking HR 3994). Representative Lantos, a Ranking Minority Member on HCIR offered an amendment with a recorded vote of 415 yeas to 4 nays that would promote “the secure delivery of humanitarian and other assistance in Afghanistan and require the submission of the strategy for meeting its security needs within 45 days of enactment” of this Bill (Bill tracking HR 3994). Another amendment was offered by Representative Hoeffel, and later withdrawn by him. It would have required and mandated a central coordinator for the thirteen federal agencies working in Afghanistan to coordinate with other countries and organizations to ensure that greater cooperation was assured in Afghanistan by the U.S. government. Representative Hyde (2002) asserted that such an amendment was not necessary as the State Department already had an individual in that capacity (p. H2769). Representative Jackson-Lee offered four amendments to H.R. 3994 number 3, 4, 5, and 6. Representative Jackson-Lee withdrew amendment 6, it would have limited fiscal assistance to Afghanistan, if the President did not certify that the Government of

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Afghanistan prohibited the use of children soldiers. Amendments 3 and 4 dealt with the need for basic healthcare, a good education for Afghan children and orphans. Amendment 5 prohibited the use of children in armed conflict. All three amendments offered by Rep. Jackson-Lee were near unanimously agreed to (Representative Lee, 2002, p. H2772). Representative Waters's amendment was agreed to unanimously, which prohibited U.S. involvement “in poppy cultivation or illicit narcotics growth, production, or trafficking, and requires reports concerning the Government of Afghanistan’s progress in the eradication of poppy cultivation” (Bill tracking HR 3994). The amendment required the US Government to identify any instrumentality of the Government of Afghanistan if they were involved in the growth, production, and trafficking of narcotics. This applied if the instrumentality received U.S. Government funding. As a result of the passage of this amendment the President was required to issue a report annually of progress in eliminating poppy cultivation, and heroin production. Senate Action The six amendments introduced in the Committee of the Whole were agreed to and passed. House Resolution 3994 was referred to the Senate on May 22, 2002 and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SCFR) on July 09, 2002 to be come Senate Bill S. 2712 (Bill Tracking S. 2712). Senator Hagel (2002) of Nebraska who sponsored S. 2712, supported the passage of the Act with an emphasis that the State Department designates “an ambassadorial level coordinator to oversee and implement these programs and to advance United States interests in Afghanistan” (p. S6600). The appointed ambassador would then be responsible to coordinate the activities of US

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Federal Agencies with other countries and international organizations towards a common goal of maintaining a peaceful Afghanistan. A few months later, SCFR reported, amended, the Act on August 01, 2002. Senator Biden (2002) of Delaware sponsored the SCFR report 107 S. Rpt. 278, which discussed the impact of the Act on the budget, examined the purpose of the legislation, issued a summary, and analyzed each title of the Act and its impacts. Senator Reid (2002) of Rhode Island offered Senate Amendment 4956, also known as the Hagel-Biden-Helms amendment, was unanimously agreed to. The amendment required that Afghanistan guarantee in its legal structures fostering religious freedom, welcoming pluralistic society, and monitoring of human rights. The amendment also added US Government support for Afghan and international efforts to investigating crimes committed by the Taliban regime and other parties in the past (p. S11147). However, mass graves sites were not physically protected, or excavated for the purpose of keeping evidence of war crimes. The mass grave sites as a result of war crimes committed by the opposition to the Taliban were cleaned up, or removed. Furthermore, witnesses had come out into the open, and were willing to testify that Taliban fighters were murdered in cold blood after they had surrendered to the Northern Alliance (Deliso, 2004, para. 33). Instead of the witness receiving protection, they were left to be murdered, and threatened themselves. The amendment also discouraged U.S. Operations Enduring Freedom (US-OEF) military integration with United Nation's International Security Assistance Force (UNISAF). The US-OEF military operations was US led, its main mission was to hunt and

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destroy al’qaida and Taliban remnants. While ISAF was sanctioned by the UN Security Council to provide security to the new Afghan Interim Authority in Kabul (UNSC Res. 1386, 2001). Operations Enduring Freedom was only to provide technical support to other countries involved with the UN-ISAF but no troops. This early separation between the two military forces working cooperatively had a detrimental effect for Afghanistan's peace and security. This early separation resulted in the resurgence of the Taliban group early in 2005 and continuing through 2006 because of the overlapping of command between the two international missions. The final version passed by the Senate was agreed to by unanimous consent. Provisions of the Law Public Law 107-327 is divided into three titles with a total of nineteen sections. The original Public Law’s sections have has been amended several times over the years, I will only discuss the provisions of the Law that were passed and amended as of 2005. There were no provisions in this title that were considered controversial, except by the few Congress Members that opposed the bill on ideological grounds of not wanting to be involved with nation building, or that resources were needed to be pay off the national debt (Paul, 2002, para. 20). If the quotation marks are not provided with citation in this section then they are directly taken from the section of the public law that is being analyzed. The engrossed Bill from the House had twenty-two votes against its passage, with three hundred ninety members voting aye.

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Title I Economic and Democratic Development Assistance for Afghanistan; This title has eight sections defining it. Section 101 is a Declaration of policy of Congress; to support the Bonn Agreement, which was an agreement reached by various Afghan personalities in Bonn Germany during December 2001, to reconstitute Afghan Government institutions after the Taliban were removed from power. The language in this section is broad; it aims to “to foster stability and democratization and to effectively eliminate the causes of terrorism.” Congress provided discretionary authority to the President to execute the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA 2002). Section 102 describes the Purpose of assistance to Afghanistan. The primary purpose of assistance to Afghanistan was to ensure security for the United States itself. Second, to support a broad based government that would have the capacity to be self sufficient in “projects [conceptions, implementations, and evaluation] and activities that meet the needs of the Afghan people.” Including supporting alleviating a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, to eliminating drug trafficking and production of illicit narcotics. The aim of this section was to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for the enemies of United States. Section 103 Authorization of assistance; it is categorized into six subheadings. The first subheading authorizes assistance for urgent humanitarian assistance provisions for emergency requirements such as food, shelter, water, health care and landmine clearance. The second subheading addressed repatriating and resettling refugees both internally displaced Afghans and Afghans outside of the country. It authorized assistance to international organizations and governments hosting Afghan refugees to ensure to

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screen out “individuals not eligible for assistance from the United States.” The language specifically authorizes by name the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to voluntary repatriate Afghans back to Afghanistan from neighboring countries. The third subheading is titled Counternarcotics (sic) efforts. The subheading’s language directs the US Government to support eradicating poppy cultivation, to establish programs for alternative livelihood, and to “purchase nonopium (sic) products from farmers in opium-growing areas.” This is to be accomplished by providing training and equipment to Afghan State High Commission for Drug Control to ensure a favorable policy outcome is achieved in totally eradicating poppy cultivation. To execute the activities outlined above, the President was authorized to spend between fiscal year 2003 through 2006 a total of fifteen million dollars to support the United Nations Drug Control Program in Afghanistan. The fourth subheading authorized the reestablishment of food supplies by rehabilitating the agriculture sector, and reconstructing basic infrastructure such as irrigation systems, rural roads, and health clinics. The subheading's language enables the Executive Branch to stay focused, but allowing enough flexibility to achieve the policy outcomes of this subheading without being micromanaged. The fifth subheading addressed a framework for reestablishing the nation-state in Afghanistan by providing support to the education sector, to provide advisers to the government of Afghanistan in order to write and implement a new constitution, promulgate new laws, and issue regulations. The subheading also authorized ten million dollars to hold a successful constitutional convention that was composed of representatives of Afghans who were

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elected in a fair and free manner, and providing assistance to political parties development. The last two subheadings of section 103 required that Afghanistan establish a market economy, and to assist Afghan women being represented in public service and the political structure. The section places limits on the disbursement of authorized funding if the government of Afghanistan fails to adopt a constitution, and establish democratically elected government, unless the President certifies that the Afghan Government is making progress towards adopting a constitution and “establishing a democratically elected government.” The two requirements can be waived if the President can certify to Congress that it is in the national interest of the United States to do so. Section 104 Coordination of assistance; strongly urges the State Department to designate a coordinator having the status of an ambassador in order to design strategy for securing United States interests in Afghanistan. The Coordinator is required to ensure that US Government actions in Afghanistan are consistent with this Act. Also, he is charged with resolving disputes between the numerous US Agencies that are involved in Afghanistan. Section 105 Sense of Congress regarding promoting cooperation in opium producing areas; is divided into three subsections. First, the President is authorized to withhold aid, both bilateral aid directly and indirectly of multilateral aid to opium producing areas, if it would promote cooperation. Second, to redistribute the aid withheld from the opium producing areas to other areas within Afghanistan. Third, to continuously readjust the boundaries of opium-producing areas. The language is specific as to what

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Congress would like to be the outcome of this Public Law, but it allows the Executive Branch the latitude to execute US Government interests in Afghanistan. For example, the President can delegate authority to an Executive Branch Agency defining which areas of Afghanistan constitute opium-producing areas. Section 106 Administrative provisions; discuss how administrator’s authorities were to be recognized in relations to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and to include Afghan-Americans in both personnel and contracts “to the extent feasible.” The section encouraged the private sector to donate “appropriate excess or obsolete manufacturing equipment” for the development of Afghanistan. The language of this section encourages the use of research and personnel of colleges and university for “agriculture and rural development” in Afghanistan. The section allows only seven percent of the total allocated funds can be used for administrative expense. The Comptroller General (CG) director of the Government Accountability Office was authorized to monitor the implementation of this Act, and the Inspector General (IG) of USAID was to “…conduct audits, inspections, and other activities…associated with the expenditure of the funds to carry out this title.” On the websites of CG there were only two annual reports available, and on IG websites there were only two projects audits reports done in 2003, and only a few more project audits completed in 2004. As a result of the vast amount of funds were not being appropriately monitored by the CG and IG. There have been reports from nongovernmental groups that shed light on corruption and misappropriation of aid intended for Afghanistan development, including the reports conducted by the CG and IG.

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Section 107 Relationship to other authority; this title provides additional authority, and does not reduce funding or authority provided by other acts legislation. Section 108 Authorization of appropriations; the President is provided with four hundred twenty five million dollars each fiscal year to execute this Act except section 103(c) of this Act, funds authorized by this Act will remain until spent. President Bush referred to the Marshall Plan developed for Europe after world war two when discussing U.S. Government commitment to Afghanistan. However, the intentions have not been translated into commitments. The language of this section is flexible enough that it provides the President with the resources to make his rhetoric a reality, but sadly enough the focus and resources necessary were diverted from the reconstruction of Afghanistan to the war in Iraq (Maloney, 2004, para. 13). The shift in attention, focus, and funds away from the mission in Afghanistan to the war in Iraq hampered the implementation of this Act on the ground in Afghanistan. Title II Military Assistance for Afghanistan and Certain other Foreign Countries and International Organizations. Title two addresses the military aspect of US Government involvement in Afghanistan. It also stipulates the benefits that other countries are to receive for their military involvement in Afghanistan. This title has eight sections defining it. Section 201 Support for security during transition in Afghanistan; address the sense of congress to support and create “a civilian controlled and centrally-governed standing Afghanistan army,” and to establish “a professional civilian police” force that respect human rights. In addition, section 201 express supports from Congress to the

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multinational military forces serving in Afghanistan. Section 202 Authorization of assistance; the President is authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to drawdown military hardware, training, and education for the Government of Afghanistan and other eligible countries and organizations involved in Afghanistan. The President is also giving the authority to contract or use other means to execute section 202 with three hundred million dollars, which can be increased with requesting more funds from Congress. This section creates new authority for the President in order to successfully use the available capital, hardware, and personnel to execute U.S. interests in Afghanistan. The language of this section is precise in expressing Congress's preference in the direction of U.S. policy in Afghanistan with providing the necessary funds, yet, it gives latitude to the President on how this section is executed. Section 203 Eligible foreign countries and eligible international organization; describes in detail what type of activities are covered for assistance, and what countries and international organization can be eligible under section 202, providing non of the countries have committed gross human rights violations, supported international acts of terrorism, or are in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. Although Iran is involved with encouraging that a peaceful and secure Afghanistan is established, this section, I believe was intended to prevent U.S. assistance from going towards the Iranian government. Section 204 Reimbursement for assistance; does not require that assistance provided under this Act be reimbursed except if assistance is provided under section

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644(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The amount of assistance provided under section 644(m) are in addition to funds allocated by this Act. Section 205 Congressional notification requirements; requires the President to notify Congress in both classified and unclassified report form fifteen days before assistance is provided under this title. The report must detail the importance of assistance “to the national security interests of the United States.” The report form does not have to be approved by Congress in order to take effect, unless there is a two third vote in each chamber prohibiting the President from providing assistance to such country or international organization. The purpose of this section is to keep abreast members of Congress on the assistance provided under title two of this Act. Section 206 Promoting secure delivery of humanitarian and other assistance in Afghanistan and expansion of the International Security Assistance Force; Describes the findings of Congress that require the US Government to provide humanitarian and military intervention in Afghanistan, which forms the policy statement under this section. The implementation of this section requires the President to submit a strategy to Congress no later then sixty days after the passage of this Act that would cause Afghanistan to become a viable nation-state. After the initial report, the President is required to submit after every six months a report updating Congress of progress of US involvement in Afghanistan. This section’s language is very specific as to what should be included in the report, and when the reports should be submitted to Congress. The last part of this section express the sense of Congress that the President sponsor a resolution at the United Nations Security Council to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

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throughout Afghanistan. The President also must enlist allies of the U.S. to provide military forces to expand ISAF. In August of 2003 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officially took over command of ISAF. In October 2006 NATO-ISAF deployed throughout Afghanistan. There are some countries within the NATO alliance that have caveats that restrict where and how their troops can be used in Afghanistan (NATO, 2006, last screen). Section 207 Relationship to other authority; the authority provided to the President under this Act “is an addition to any other authority to provide assistance to the Government of Afghanistan.” The authority is limited by section 512 of Public Law 107115. Section 208 Sunset clause; this Act expired on September 30, 2006. Title III of this Act Miscellaneous Provisions. This title has three sections defining it. Section 301 Requirement to comply with procedures relating to the prohibition on assistance to drug traffickers; this section prohibits any US assistance to drug traffickers. The section was original introduced by Representative Waters with the intent of raising awareness that there is potential for U.S. personnel to get involved in drug trafficking. With objections from Representative Hyde that the original amendment would greatly restrict U.S. interests in Afghanistan, Rep. Waters agreed to modify the original language of the Bill to assuage Rep. Hyde concerns. The language of this section that was enrolled for the President’s signature removed any mention of potential U.S. Government personnel involvement in drug trafficking, instead it referred to other public laws that addressed assistance to drug traffickers. Section 302 Sense of Congress regarding protecting Afghanistan’s President;

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After the assassination of the Vice President of Afghanistan in July of 2002, and subsequent assassination attempts on President Karzai life, this section required the U.S. diplomatic security, law enforcement, and military personnel to protect President Karzai from being killed. These U.S. personnel were to “be succeeded by qualified Afghan security forces as soon as practicable,” in order to provide lasting self-sustaining security to the President of Afghanistan. The language required the need for such personnel to be provided, but allows enough flexibility to the President as to how to achieve this requirement. Section 303 Donor contributions to Afghanistan and reports; the very first donor conference held in Tokyo after the defeat of the Taliban regime provided an inadequate level of support for Afghanistan development, and worse still the amount pledged was not being disbursed. Thus Congress in very explicit terms stated “the United States should use all appropriate diplomatic means to encourage all states that have pledged assistance to Afghanistan to deliver as soon as possible.” Even with this requirement the amount of assistance pledged was not delivered effectively for the development of Afghanistan, most of the aid that was disbursed was considered phantom aid, which was returned to the host country. Analysis of Impact The direct economic beneficiaries of this Act were U.S. corporations who were awarded hundreds of million of dollars in contracts either by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Pentagon through the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE). Also, there was a political benefit for the Bush Administration prior to

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the 2004 Presidential elections in boosting of the success in Afghanistan. However, the Afghan people were the losers as the result of implementation of this Act. The two principal US Government agencies responsible for spending US funds allocated for the development of Afghanistan were USAID and the Pentagon. The USAID was the lead agency responsible for managing US funds to reconstruct Afghanistan, and Pentagon was responsible for ensuring that Afghanistan had a properly trained national army to protect Afghan territory and government. Both of these agencies contracted out their responsibilities to US private firms. They in turn subcontracted out the work to other companies that resulted in finished work not meeting minimum international quality standard or having the intended results (United States Government Accountability Office [USGAO], 2005, p. 21; United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2006, p. 7). US government issued reports detailing the shabby reconstruction work approved in Afghanistan bordered on corruption and nepotism, damaging the prospects for a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan. According to an independent investigative report by Nawa (2006), USAID contracted out agriculture development program called Rebuilding Agriculture Markets Program (RAMP) to Chemonics International Inc (CII). Whose owner, Scott Spangler was a senior USAID director under the first Bush Administration. According to the report, Scott Spangler and his wife gave the Republican Party between 1990 to 2003 about one hundred thousand dollars (p. 22). RAMP’s intention was to rebuild the irrigation systems, build markets for Afghan agriculture products both domestic and international, and rebuild the livestock sector (USAID, 2006, p. 2). United States GAO

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audit found that CII had failed to develop international markets for Afghan products or to ensure that the projects were self-sustainable. Another direct benefit to a U.S. corporation was to Contrack International, Inc., was awarded two contracts for the same scope of work from two different offices within ACE (Dept. of Defense Office of the Inspector General [DoDOIG], 2005, p. 13). The DoDOIG (2005) audit report discovered that contracts awarded were not being properly tracked of, or designed (p. 28). Furthermore, the contracts were awarded to one firm when in fact it could have been successfully contracted out to more then one firm (p. 14 ). These contracts issued to politically connected corporations hoodwinked the taxpayers here in the States, and robbed the people of Afghanistan from the generosity of the American people. Besides US corporations benefiting from this Act directly, the Bush Administration was able to paint a story of success in Afghanistan. For example, the Bush Administration reminded the US public prior to the 2004 Presidential elections the number of students attending primary school, the number of returning refugees from neighboring countries, the adoption of a constitution, and etc... While these milestones were in fact achieved on the surface, there was another undercurrent that was brewing to the situation that is faced today. This was the unlimited influence of warlords supported by the United States armed forces, the foreign corruption, the lack of aid circulating in the Afghan economy, all contributed to the dissatisfaction of the Afghan people from their own government, which led to support for the Taliban, and while harsh in its methods achieved security, peace, and brought a defined justice.

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The funding that was allocated to Afghanistan as the result of the passage of this Act was in reality phantom aid, which never leaves the soil of the donor nation and the receiving nation has no control over the allocation or the use of the aid money (Jones, 2006). Former member of Congress Don Ritter and Chairman of Afghanistan-American Foundation testified before the House Committee on International Relations (2006) that more or less of fifteen percent of US aid stays in Afghanistan, the rest of the intended aid circulates directly back into US economy (USC-HCIR, “Afghanistan: Is the Aid Getting Through,” p. 11). Audits have been conducted by the various entities of US Government such as the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, the Comptroller General of Government Accountability Office, and USAID Inspector General have all mentioned in their audit reports of a lack of clear instructions to the contractors for requiring quality work, not requiring reports from the contractors, and not monitoring the contracts awarded. The recommendations provided by these audits, if acted upon in a coherent manner would achieve long term benefits both for Afghanistan, and the States. The shabby work conducted by these contractors will no doubt cause long term loss not only to the Afghan people, but will in fact support the armed opposition in Afghanistan. The armed opposition can always remind the people that the foreign troops have only supported those in government that aim to steal their land and resources without providing peace, security, or defined justice.

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5001 Bibliography Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-327, 116 Stat. 2797-2813 (2002), http://dev.globalhealth.gov/ Afghan%20Freedom%20Support%20Act1.pdf Borchgrave, A. (2001, June 14). UPI Exclusive: Osama bin Laden - 'Null and Void'. United Press International. Retrieved September 26, 2006, from http://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2001/upi061401.Html?StoryID=1 Deliso, C. (2004). Afghan Massacre: The Convoy of Death. Retrieved November 06, 2006, fromhttp://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=3209 “H.R. 3994—Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002.” (107th Congress; Introduced: 3/19/02). Text from: Bill Tracking Report. Available from: LexisNexis® Congressional; Accessed: 9/15/06. Jones. A. (2006, September 3). How U.S. dollars disappear in Afghanistan: quickly and thoroughly. San Fransisco Chronicle. Retrieved November 16, 2006, from http://www.sfgate.com Maloney, Sean M. "Afghanistan: From Here to Eternity?." Parameters 34.1 (2004): 4+. Questia. 3 Dec. 2006 . Momand, W. (2000).Pashtunwali: The Way of the Pashtuns. Retrieved September 20, 2006, from http://afghanland.com/culture/pashtunwali.html Nawa, F. (2006). A CoprWatch Investigative Report: Afghanistan, Inc. Retrieved November 23, 2006, from http://corpwatch.org/downloads/

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