Ambition And Self Preservation

Keith Benson Military/Diplomatic History Dr. Dorwart 1.27.2007 Self Preservation and Ambition When studying the movements an entity, such as an organization, a company or even a sports team, usually much can be learned by examining the central philosophy of that entity. For instance, in order to develop a more informed perspective behind Phil Jackson’s coaching decisions and overall approach to the game of basketball, one need only be familiar with his core philosophy concerning the sport. Simply put, Jackson’s coaching philosophy is, “the whole is greater than the some of it parts”. Being familiar with his philosophy would clearly explain why the Triangle Offense Phil Jackson employed en route to nine NBA championships is completely reliant on teamwork and unselfish play. In the same manner Phil Jackson’s coaching can be better understood by knowing his core philosophies and beliefs, so to can we learn much about American foreign policy, and its workings and movements. We all have heard the saying, “…as American as baseball” or “…as American as apple pie”; but what is truly American has nothing to do with sports or food. As evidenced by early happenings during America’s infancy, we recognize that what truly dictates American foreign policy, as exemplified in the Pequot War, participation in the Revolutionary War, and in Washington’s Farewell Address, are the very human instincts of self-preservation against any perceived threat, and ambition to achieve higher standing in our world. The book I chose to read for my weekly response was Felix Gilbert’s, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy. In Major Problems in American Military History, John Chambers and G. Kurt Piehler devote an entire chapter to the early colonists’ war against the Pequot Indians of Connecticut, and the massacre of the Pequots at Mystic River during the 1630s. Although primary accounts by John Winthrop, John Underhill, John Mason and others are included in the text, and various explanations as to the origins of conflict are stated, what is obvious is this: the colonists, rightfully or wrongfully viewed the Pequot Indians as an immediate threat to their security, and their perceived God-given right entitling colonists’ to expand their colonies and settlements. Possibly aware of other settlements being destroyed by Indians, colonists in Connecticut perceived the Pequot Indians as a potential threat. Consequently, colonists ventured to form alliances with other Indian tribes against the Pequots. Furthermore as the massacre at Mystic River brutally exhibited, colonists also employed traditional European battle tactics and total warfare to alleviate even the possibility of a Pequot threat. Similarly, as Felix Gilbert explains in his book, To the Farewell Address, George Washington, who sought the aid of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison in the address’ forming, acknowledged possible threats that could result in the death of the new American republic, and sought to avoid them. Quite simply, the Farewell Address issues two warnings and one request on Washington’s behalf. Washington recognized an immediate threat to the well-being of the nation with the increasing allegiance and bitterness toward amongst parties.

In no other instance during Washington’s presidencies was this potential danger realized than in 1795 surrounding Jay’s Treaty. Hamiltonian Federalists wanted to stay neutral in the affairs surrounding the French and English war which began in 1793; and even sought to normalize and improve relations by increasing trade with England. This infuriated Jeffersonian Republicans since America and France were allies since 1778. This perceived alliance with Great Britain, rather than France was a “threat to [American] Republicanism” by Jeffersonians. As such, in 1795 when the Treaty went to the floor of Congress to be passed, “a vehement struggle developed; but the treaty was accepted with a number of votes just equaling the constitutionally necessary two-thirds majority. (118)” In the House, during the Spring of 1796 when the time came to vote on providing the requisite funds to enact the Treaty, bitter partisan debates occurred between the Federalists and Republicans; as the “Republicans under Madison’s leadership tried to upset the whole arrangement by refusing this financial request.(119)” Thus, American progression was at stake. Though eventually ratified and funded in 1796, Washington recognized that fanatic partisan-ism could cripple America’s fledgling government. Washington’s second warning illustrated in his Address was against the forming of permanent alliances with other countries. Washington states, “Although in particular emergencies America might be forced to make a temporary alliance, permanent alliances must be avoided. (130)” Gilbert summarizes that Washington recognized the closeness of proximity of European nations and that their conflicts, because of their closeness is best handled amongst themselves. America, being separated by the Atlantic Ocean geographically from Europe, would be better served staying neutral in European and global conflicts whenever possible. At the time this Address was composed, only nineteen years after the American Revolution, Washington saw America’s survival could be threatened if it involved itself in yet another war so close to the conclusion of the Revolution. As a result Washington advised, “America must do everything possible to keep the peace for twenty years, until which her position in the world is unassailable. (122)” Also, ambition has also been a driving motivator behind the decisions and actions of American foreign policy. Again, reflecting on the Chambers and Piehler reading on the American Revolution, we understand the motives behind individuals’ personal participation in our country’s struggle for independence, were not completely due to patriotism as we, or myself, for so long, were made to believe. While it is commonly believed that colonial Americans were united in a spirit of patriotism against England during the American Revolution, Chapter 3 of Major Problems in American Military History clarifies that this was not the case entirely. Indeed American patriots, both in emotion and deed, may not have been one the “fringes” of colonial society, many other colonists took little interest in the Revolution; much less participated. But many that did participate however, as the book communicates, took part because of their own personal drive to achieve more for themselves, or their new nation. The personal accounts of Lieutenant Scott and Samuel Sutphin explain how both men desired more for their lives. Says Lieutenant Scott, “When this rebellion came on, I saw some of my neighbors get into Commission, who were no better than myself. I was very ambitious and did not like to see those men above me.” Sutphin, who was an African

American slave, fought in the Revolution with hopes of becoming a free man at the conclusion of the war. While the accounts of Gen. George Washington and Jeremiah Greenman are not those explaining their own personal ambitions, they do suggest their was an overall desire shared among regiments of the Continental Army to see that no outside country, specifically England, would control this county any longer. It cannot be understated that the very action of uniting colonies, forming a Continental Congress, drafting the Declaration of Independence, and ultimately battling the world’s most powerful empire with a collection of, relatively, untrained citizen soldiers was ambitious in itself. Also, the fact that the Revolutionary war lasted eight years and with little money to compensate the Continental Army, their sustained participation exemplifies the level of ambition shared amongst them. In, To the Farewell Address, George Washington’s ambition for America to survive and succeed in the world, along with his pride in this nation is clear. Washington wrote, as explained previously, that “America should avoid war at all costs for twenty years, so that her position in the world is unassailable.” The urge to build most powerful nation was not an idea that was far from Washington’s mind. Furthermore, in his Farewell Address, Washington hopes that colonists “take pride in America as a distinct nation” and that its citizens “take pride in the name of an American.” These colonies that consisted of thirteen completely individual areas, and made up of mostly first generation Americans or European immigrants, were being urged by their former general and first President to shed their allegiance toward their respective colony, though strong, and be take pride in the glory it is to an American. By examining the bedrock motives behind American foreign policy, we see that the most basic and most human of instincts, the desire to preserve oneself and ultimately desire more, can explain many foreign policy decisions this country has made in the past, and will make in the future. I trust this assertion will sustain itself throughout our nation’s military and diplomatic events and thus, this course.