Aimma - Ulema Article Modified

The Role of Muslim Scholars (‘ulema) and Prayer Leaders (imams)1 in Formulation of Public Religious Policy towards Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan. By Syed Akif and Kafeel Ahmed Abstract Religion is increasingly an important constituent of public policy discourse in Pakistan. While numerous factors, most particularly the complicated geo-politics of the region, have further convoluted the already complex relationships between the sacred and the secular in Pakistan, it is important to make sense of the thought processes of leading players in both realms, which come together at least five times a day when police guards take up positions outside most mosques to protect worshippers. An important aspect of the religious discourse in Pakistan is sectarian conflict between the two main Muslim faith streams. As apparent from the title, the principal objective for undertaking this study was to determine the public perceptions about the status of and actual role(s) played by Muslim scholars and prayer leaders (‘ulema and imams) in the formulation of public policy. While these two groups of public opinion leaders are undoubtedly important in terms of the influence they exert on the thoughts and actions of common Pakistanis through their very regular interactions, especially the formal sermons on Fridays and in special congregations, it is important to determine what exactly is the extent of their persuasive power. Given the fact that the public canvas is a very large one, it was felt necessary to limit the scope of this study to a particular area of focus. For this we chose the sectarian conflict between the two major faith streams, the Shia and Sunni, in Pakistan which in spite of having receded after peaking in the early part of this decade is never too far from the public domain. It is certainly a weighty factor in the national religious and political discourses, especially in places like Parachinar and the annual Muharram commemorations. The study is a primarily a quantitative one and employed a questionnaire to elicit responses. Keeping in view the theme of the research, the generally perceived awareness and intellectual level and linguistic skills of ‘ulema and imams, their division on sectarian lines, a detailed questionnaire was developed in Urdu to facilitate responses by members of these groups who are generally not well versed in English.

1

Although the correct Arabic plural of imam is aimma, this study uses the Anglicized plural ‘imams’ as the word has now come to be incorporated in English and is found in most contemporary English dictionaries. However, the term ‘ulema - the plural of ‘alim – has been retained on account of its not being so widely used in English.

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The questionnaire was administered through a random sampling process in Karachi to 10 ‘ulema and over 50 imams in Karachi; the respondents were randomly selected from lists of ‘ulema and mosques made available to the authors by a national security agency in confidence. While no amount of care can ever be perceived to be totally unbiased when it comes to religious issues in Pakistan which is highly fragmented between various “sects” and sub-denominations, an attempt was made to maintain a balance in the representation of various groups and sub-groups on the basis of what is arguably the best available official list (even though the same may not conform to “generally held perceptions.”) From findings of a pre-administration piloting, the form required between 30 and 40 minutes to fill out. As with any research study, there were constraints and limitations. Some of the respondents were skeptical about the aims and objectives of the survey and apprehended the involvement of some government security agency working behind the scene for some hidden agenda under the prevailing political circumstances. A number of them were hesitant to return the questionnaire, in all likeliness on account of their perceived apprehensions. Accordingly, only the voluntarily/freely responded replies have been analyzed for this study. Introduction Historically, the ‘ulema have considered themselves to be the successors of Prophets2 and by association a group tasked by the Qur’an (3:104) and Prophet Muhammad to propagate Islam throughout mankind’s stay on this planet. They have taken on as one of their prime responsibilities, partly self-assumed and partly socio-culturally mandated, to advise not only common Muslims but more specifically Muslim rulers and governments on Islamic tenets and issues demanding contemporary solutions. From the earliest days of Islam, ‘ulema have held important positions in various governments and tasked with overseeing the dispensation of justice. For instance Imam Abu Yousuf (d. ), the lead disciple of Imam Abu Hanifa [Noman ibn Thabit], who provided the foundational interpretation and documentation of one of the four Sunni schools of religious jurisprudence, the Hanafi Fiqh, was the Chief Justice of Abbaside government of Haroon Rashid (786-809 CE). In South Asia, ‘ulema like Bahauddin Zakaria (d. ) and Qazi Abu Mansoor (d.) occupied important positions like those of Qadi-al-Quda (Chief Justice), Sheikhul Islam (Chief Scholar), and Sadar-ul-Sadoor (Chief Court Advisor) during various Muslim dynasties that ruled parts of South Asia ever since the Muslims first ventured there under Muhammad Bin Qasim (711-12 CE) and up to the Mughal Empire (15261857). Burhanuddin Balkhi, a well known faqih (expert in Islamic jurisprudence) of the 13th century C.E. impressed Sultan Ghayauddin Balbun (d. )so much that he 2

This belief is based upon the Islamic tenet that Prophet Muhammad was the last of the Divinely ordained messengers and owes its origin to a hadith – a saying of the Holy Prophet – appearing in a chapter of the most widely acclaimed book of the Prophet’s sayings, Sahih Bukhari (Kitabul Islam)

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was made an advisor of the court. As late as the mid-19th century C.E. the Sultanul-’ulema of the Shia state of Awadh (19th century) used to crown the new ruler. On the other hand, ‘ulema were never wanting of taking principled stands against kings who naturally displayed extreme arrogance towards all persons and things they considered to be hindrances in their political ascendancy. Some scholars like Shaikh Shahabuddin and Chiragh Delhvi (d. 757 Hijra; c. 1350) annoyed Muhammad Bin Tughlaq and earned his wrath. Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi, who challenged Din-e-Ilahi, the religious aberration of Mughal emperor Akbar (ruled 1556-1606 CE) was imprisoned for a very long period. Not shy of intervening in political matters, scholars like Shah Waliullah ( ) took on a very active role and invited foreign Muslim forces like those of Ahmed Shah Durrani ( )to help stabilize the enfeebled Muslim rule quell Hindu Marhatas who were on the verge of over-running the capital at Delhi ( C.E.). Still others took up militant uprising themselves: Syed Ahmed Barelvi (d. 1831 CE) tried to establish an Islamic state in the Pashtun area of the Kaghan Velley (now in Pakistan) in the early 19th century. Maulvi Liaquat Ali, Maulana Mehmoodul Hassan and others participated in 1857 War of Independence (a.k.a. as “Indian Mutiny”) and were sentenced to life imprisonment in the Andaman Islands (called kala pani or “dark waters”). Mufti Barkatullah tried to seek Afghan and Russian help against British occupation. For their part, the British also used “the religious card” by establishing and propping up pro-government religious personages from amongst the Sufic orders who presided over as administrators of tombs and shrines as Gaddi Nasheens. These “official molvis” were used by colonial authorities to condemn the ‘ulema who did not tow the official line by branding them as ‘Wahabis’ – a very convenient ploy to discredit anyone by ascribing them a connection with the austere Islamic interpretation of 19th century religious leader and ideologue of the Saudi Arabian regime. Official reverence was accorded to the graves of scholars and religious leaders from British times by the visit of important officials and political leaders. Owing to their delicate position which has demanded arbitration between contrasting demands of orthodox religious doctrine and real-politik of rulers, very often genuine religious scholars (as opposed to the official or “market-players”) have also faced the wraths of governments for speaking truth or not towing and supporting the official line.3 The `ulema have also played an important role in knowledge-propagation by establishing major Islamic educational institutions like Jamia Al-Azhar in Egypt, Madarsa-e-Nizamia in Baghdad, Houza-e-Ilmia at Najaf, Islamic University in Madina and India’s great seminary at Deoband. 3

Such examples are many and include the case of execution of Ahmed Bin Naser on the orders of the Abbaside ruler Wasiq, torture of Imam Ahmed Bin Humbal on the orders of Abbaside ruler Mamoon and imprisonment of Imam Abu Hanifa on the orders of the Abbaside ruler Mansoor. In recent times also Muslim religious scholars have faced not just torture and imprisonment (Maulana Mawdudi in Pakistan) but also death (Sayyid Qutub in Egypt); throughout Muslim lands.

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AIMS & OBJECTIVES The main aim of this research was to determine the role played by ‘ulema and imams in the formulation of public policies concerning religious affairs in Pakistan. This important and sensitive segment of the society plays its role by way of influencing its major constituency, the Muslim citizens of the country who form nearly 99 percent of the population. It also addresses the government not only through their direct participation in the political process but also indirectly by exercising their social and cultural influence. On the one hand the ‘ulema demand legislative and administrative actions for promoting the causes of Islam as perceived by them and on the other they react to policies adopted by the government, either for their repeal or instituting changes according to their points of view. It is a general perception that successive governments have been quite alive to the issues relating to, if not actually wary and apprehensive of, the influence of ‘ulema on the Pakistani society and have generally put forth a guarded and defensive posture, if not offering continuous appeasements. The unprecedented success of the religious parties led by the ‘ulema in the 2002 national elections, especially in the two provinces bordering Afghanistan, was an important development, in spite of the fact that these were almost totally routed in the 2008 elections. The government was, however, able to get the better of them by obtaining their support on the issue of 17th Constitutional Amendment in 2003. However, with the government having reportedly gone back on its commitments made to the ‘ulema, they felt betrayed and started flexing their muscles and displaying shows of force which have surfaced many times not just in the insurgency hit Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) but surprisingly even in the national capital Islamabad where the Lal Majid incident of 2007 became an embarrassing international headline. The hypothesis of this study is that there is no consensus among the ‘ulema as to the nature of an Islamic state and hence on how policy formulation should take place in a modern Muslim polity like that of Pakistan.4 With the nation being divided on almost every facet on national discourse, religion is no exception.5 The polarization is Muslim scholarly opinion has become more pronounced and prevalent in the post 9/11 era and thus warrants a middle course.

4

Justice Munir in his report on 1953 incidents of Punjab had probably correctly observed that “no two ‘ulema agree on the precise definition of a muslim or Islamic sate”. [REFERENCE] 5 . Four different groups, deriving inspiration from different phases of Islamic history, can be easily identified in present-day Muslim polities: the “conservatives” wanting a return to Khilafa (the Caliphate), the “traditionalists” accepting malookiat (rule by non-democratic ‘Divine Rightists’), “progressives” insisting on a re-interpretation of the Qur’an in the light of modern knowledge and the secularists considering Islam only a social code. The first two categories primarily interpret Islam in terms of practices and institutions of seventh-century Arabia and are not prepared to follow the Westernoriented Muslim intelligentsia calling for brotherhood, equality, moderation, toleration and social justice. They project Islam as merely a static collection of injunctions and prohibitions.

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The ‘ulema and imams have not been able to adjust themselves to the changed scenario. The questionnaire devised to seek opinions and perceptions of ‘ulema and imams on policies having a religious aspect covered the following important themes:

(i)

Basic concepts on what comprised ‘a true Muslim’, an Islamic state, Jihad, blasphemy etc.

(ii)

Nature and direction of the “Pakistan Movement”, the Objectives Resolution, PNA agitation against Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977. (iii) ‘ulema ’s perception and their role in Islamization. (iv) Sectarian strife, its characters and effectiveness of government actions. (v) Merits and demerits of Zakat system, Haj scheme, Ruet Hilal Committee. (vi) Perception about registration of Madarsas, inclusion of modern subjects in their syllabi, acceptance of government grant etc. (vii) Response to changes/implementation of Blasphemy Act, Hudood Ordinance etc. (viii) Impact of unity of religious parties on one hand and the five boards of madarsas on the other. (ix) Overall level of satisfaction with government policies. METHODOLOGY ADOPTED For the purpose of primary reach to collect data, a 28-item questionnaire was developed in Urdu as most of the ‘ulema and imams do not know English. It was pilot tested on a number of imams who found no difficulty in attempting it. They generally required 35-40 minutes to fill it. Thereafter, 12 known ‘ulema and 60 madarsa teachers/imams were randomly selected from different sects. Their regional/ethnic affiliation was not taken into consideration. According to figures available with a number of civil authorities, there were 1084 Barelvi, 1082 Deobandi, 211 Shia and 62 Ahle Hadith registered mosques in Karachi. They were mostly approached by trusted persons pretending to be students of higher classes doing some assignment. Quite a few of them showed reluctance in giving a response apprehending some hidden motive behind the exercise which was expected under the prevailing circumstances. Names of respondents, their sect, place (mosque/Madarsas) etc., were not asked but recorded separately by the worker. The secondary research was based on a survey of available literature (newspapers, magazines, books, government records etc.) and has already been reflected in the introduction. Following is a denomination-wise break-up of the respondents: S.No. i. ii.

Sect Barelvi Deobandi

Ulema 04 03 {5}

imams 21 19

iii. iv.

Shia Ahle Hadith TOTAL

02 01 10

07 03 50

Limitations: This survey was conducted as an academic requirement for completion of promotion requirement at the National Institute of Public Administration. With the duration of the course being about three months and the pressure to perform in a range of areas the study was limited in terms of the time duration available to the researchers. Added to this was the fact that the fasting month of Ramadan fell this period, further burdening the researchers in terms of shorter office hours on the one hand and extra-occupation of ulema and imams in the heightened religious activities of the month. Furthermore, while the survey was done through random sampling, it was felt that the sample was small and limited to Karachi. The absence of training and past experience of respondents in engaging with similar surveys was another limiting factor. This was similar to the poor performance of students on IQ tests to which they are not accustomed. Yet another stumbling block was the lack of full trust between the surveyors and the respondents, many of whom remained skeptical about the whole process. FINDINGS Following is a table summarizing the findings extracted from the questionnaires. The serial numbers refer to the original questions in the form. S. No . 1 . 1

Question / response options

%

What are the minimum beliefs for being a Muslim? [Please mark as many as applicable] a) Tauhid (Unity of Godhead) b) Risalat (Prophethood) c) Qiyamat (Belief in the Hereafter) d) Imamat (Belief in an imam - a post-Prophetic guide) e) Ibadat (a set of ritual worship) f) Adalat (Justice) g) Khatam-e-Nabuwwat (End of Prophethood with Muhammad)

100.00 100.00 93.60 31.91 17.02 12.76 78.72

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42.55

h) Ikram-e-Sahaba (Reverence of the Companions of the Holy Prophet) Any other j) k) Don’t know. What are the minimum requirements for a state to be called Islamic. a) Elected Amir (head of state) b) Just Ruler c) Nizam-e-Salat (a state-run system for ritual prayer) d) Nizam-e-Zakat (a state-run system for collection of alms) e) Any other f) If any of country may be considered a model Islamic state, which of the following would it be? a) Saudi Arabia b) Jamhoori Iran c) c)Taliban’s Afghanistan d) General Zia’s Pakistan e) Malaysia f) None How can an “Islamic system” (of governance) be established? a) by bringing pressure to bear upon governments b) by preparing / motivating the masses c) by having a government of ‘ulema d) Any other e) Do not know What was the nature of Pakistan’s independence (Pakistan Movement) a) It was an Islamic movement b) It was a political campaign c) It was an economic struggle d) Do not know What were the effects of adoption of Qarardad-e-Maqasid (The Objectives Resolution – a Statement of Principles that is now part of the Constitution) a) It set of the country’s ideological orientation b) Created a confrontation between ‘ulema and politicians c) c) Do not know. What was the outcome of the agitation was the opposition alliance (PNA) against the Bhutto government led by religious parties a) Partial implementation of Islamic way of life. b) Imposition of Martial Law. c) Damage to religious forces. d) d) Do not know Implications of Zakat System a) Help to poors. b) Creation of more beggers. c) Sectarian divide.

-

i)

2 . i

3 . i

4 . i

5 . v

6 .

7 .

8 .

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44.68 65.95 42.55 34.04

48.93 21.27 02.12 14.89 12.76 72.34 06.38 10.63 65.95 40.42 02.12 06.38

82.97 04.25 17.02

29.78 25.53 14.89 44.68 55.31 29.78 02.12

9 .

1 0 . 1 1 .

1 2 .

1 3 .

1 4 .

1 5 .

1 6 .

d) Don’t know. Utility of ‘ulema moved Bills in Islamization a) Shariat Bill b) Namoos-e-Sahaba Bill. c) Husba Bill d) None Results of religious rituals a) Stability of faith. b) Sectarianism. c) Public annoyance. d) Don’t know. Effects of declaration of Qadianis as non-Muslim a) Service to religion b) Sectarian conflict c) Defamination abroad. d) Don’t know. If any foreign country(s) abetted sectarian extremists a) Saudi Arabia b) Jamhoori Iran c)Taliban’s Afghanistan d) Saddam’s Iraq e) Israel f) India g) America h) None Who is authorized to initiate Islamic Jihad a) Every muslim. b) Any Islamic group. c) Islamic Govt. d) Imam e) Muslim Army f) Don’t know Who can be held responsible for sectarian terrorism a) LJ (SSP) b) SMP c) Foreign hand d) Govt. Agencies e) Don’t know. The outcome of imposition of ban on extremists sectarian/Jihadi groups a) Terrorism decreased. b) Terrorism increased. c) No difference. d) Don’t know. Results of ban on misuse of loudspeakers a) Iblagh-e-Din affected. b) Sectarianism curtailed. c) Public satisfied. d) Don’t know.

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17.02 51.06 21.27 08.51 34.16 53.19 23.04 25.53 06.38 76.59 -10.83 02.12 17.02 25.53 21.27 48.93 31.91 26.65 21.27 06.38 04.25 72.34 08.51 04.25 14.89 34.04 44.68 65.96 19.14 14.89 51.06 06.38 34.04 10.63 36.17 27.65 27.65

1 7 .

1 8 .

1 9 .

2 0 .

2 1 . 2 2 .

2 3 .

2 4 .

If Ruet-e-Hilal Committee is abolished a) More than one Eid’s. b) Sectarian divide. c) Public disruption. d) End of govt. intervention e) Don’t know How sectarian divide/ extremism can be minimized a) Govt. punitive actions b) Reconciliatory role of ‘ulema c) Public awareness d) Something else If the formation of religious parties alliance MMA a) Promoted sectarian harmony. b) Created further sectarian divide. c) No effect d) Don’t know Effects of alliance of six religious Madarsa Boards a) Sectarian harmony b) Govt. confrontation. c) Routine/timely matter. d) Don’t know. Opinion on registration of Deeni Madaris a) Agree b) Disagree c) Not clear Which modern subject may enhance academic and economic capability of Madarsa students a) Computer b) Science c) Maths d) English e) Any other subject f) None Opinion about acceptance of govt. grant for Deeni Madaris a) No harm. b) Govt. intervention c) Neutrality effected d) Don’t know. What is the source of law of Blasphemy a) Qura’an b) Hadith c) Act of Sahaba d) Ruling of Imam

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38.29 70.21 31.91 04.25 10.63 10.63 51.06 40.42 29.78 19.14 30.04 04.25 31.93 31.91 36.17 19.14 27.65 21.27 38.29 27.65 36.17 85.10 65.95 38.29 27.78 10.63 42.55 36.17 27.65 57.44 57.44 23.40 08.51 29.78

2 5 .

2 6 .

e) Ijma f) Fiqah g) Don’t know What is needed to make Blasphemy Act more acceptable a) Equitable application. b) No change c) Abrogation d) Punishment if disproved e) Don’t know How the objection on Hudood Ordinance can be removed a) Cancellation of law. b) Criteria of witness c) Transparent application d) Something else e) Don’t know

27.65 23.40 82.97 14.89 04.25 04.25 17.02 74.46 06.38 10.63

2 7 .

Which of the objections on Haj policy are true a) Ballot/Quota b) Increased expenses c) Unsatisfactory residences d) Long period of stay e) Irresponsible Mauallameen f) Plunder of tour operators g) Something else h) Don’t know

23.40 76.59 80.85 02.12 17.02 29.78 02.12 06.38

2 8 .

In which degree govt.’s religious policies are acceptable a) Fully agreed. b) Generally agreed. c) Partially agreed d) Slightly agreed e) Disagreed

02.12 08.51 51.06 08.51 27.65

** Only one respondent (A Shia Aalim) gave detailed replies using extra pages. An Ahle Hadith Aalim also made some small clarifications. ANALYSIS OF DATA (i)

Basic Concept

AS could have been expected, In this probe a complete consensus was found on Tauheed and Risalat as the basic requirement for being a Muslim followed by 93.6 support to ‘Qiamat’ (Qura’anic requirements 2:62 & 3:114 Al-Qura’an). In addition 73.72% respondents preferred Khatam-e-Nabuwwat and 42.55% (mainly Sunnis) weight Ikram-e-Sahaba while 31.91% (mostly Shias) described Imamat also as the minimum requirement. Ibadat were listed by 17.02% and Adal was mentioned by 12.76%. It indicates that beliefs of Khatam-e-Nabuwwat, Ikram-e{10}

Sahaba and Imamat have been given over emphasis in due course of time by respective sects (Q. 1). As regards the criteria for an Islamic state, a justice ruler has been preferred by a majority of 65.95% rulers followed by 44.68% support to an elected Ameer. 42.55% respondents also necessitated Nizam-e-Salat while 34.04% ranked Nizame-Zakat. It indicates that ‘ulema prefer a justice ruler over the elected one. The opinion about Islamic state of present day remained divided. 48.93% respondents mostly the Sunnis choose Saudi Arabia while 21.27% mostly Shias took Jamhoori Iran as an Islamic state. 14.89% respondents replied in negative while only 2.12% favoured ex-Taliban government. It is probably due to its non-existence now as most of the Deobandis were in its favour in those days. No one considered General Zia’s Pakistan as an Islamic state although, he introduced Nizam-e-Salat/Zakat and Blasphemy Act which have been weighed high in the subsequent questions (Q. 3). As regards the mode of establishment of an Islamic system, a vast majority of 72.34% urged for motivation of the masses. Besides 12.76% urged continuing pressure on the government while only 6.38% desired an ‘ulema ’s government for the purpose. 10.63% respondents had no opinion on this issue (Q. 4). Religious rituals have also been favoured by a majority of 53.19% as contributory to stability of faith while a slightly lesser number has described the same as the cause of public annoyance (25.53%) and sectarianism (23.04%) respectively (Q. 10). The ‘ulema appearing clear on the authority to initiate Islamic Jihad, overwhelmingly authorized Islamic government by 72.34%. Other options attracted little support including Imam (8.51%) by Shias. 14.89% respondents were not certain. (Q. 13). (ii)

Movements led/participated by Ulema

‘ulema having played an active role in the religio-political campaigns, described the Pakistan Movement as an Islamic movement by a majority of 65.95% followed by 40.42% who identified it as a political movement as well. Only 2.12% described it as an economic move. It is obvious because the secular and leftist lobby used to call it an economic movement. About the outcome of PNA agitation a majority of 44.68% showed ignorance while 29.78% described the gain of implementation of some Islamic rules while 25.53% identified it with the imposition of Martial Law followed by 14.89% who saw damage to the credibility of religious elements (Q. 7). As regards the declaration of Qadianis as non-Muslim as a result of a mass movement led by ‘ulema , a dominant majority of 76.59% described it a service to the religion while only 10.63% gave weight to the defamation of the country abroad (Q. 11). {11}

On the other hand the formation of MMA, a alliance of six religious parties which performed well in elections 2002, was not given due importance by the ‘ulema . Only 30.74% respondents saw promotion of sectarian harmony due to its formation, while a equal number of 31.91% did not see any impact and exactly the same number remained ignorant of its effect. 4.25% witnessed creation of sectarian divide. It indicates that vast majority of ‘ulema /imams do not see MMA with a positive eye atleast now (Q. 19). The opinion about the impact of alliance of six Madarsa Boards remained divided. 36.17% i.e a little more than 1/3rd observed a help to sectarian harmony, while 27.65% described it a routine affairs and 21.27% had no opinion whereas 19.14% apprehended a confrontation with government (Q. 20). These two issues indicate lack of harmony/enthusiasm at lower level despite unity at higher level probably effected by compulsion of circumstances. iii.

Steps for Islamization

The adoption of objective resolutions on the pressure and basis of ‘ulema 32point, was pre-dominantly described by 82.97% as having set ideological destination of the country. 17.02% showed ignorance about it (Q. 6). Some 51.06% i.e a little more than half of the respondents considered ‘ulema moved Shariat Bill important towards Islamization, while 21.27% also supported Namoos-e-Sahaba Bill and 8.51% also favoured Husba Bill of NWFP. A little more than 1/3rd i.e 34.6 did not support any of these bills (Q. 9). The Zakat system in practice was supported by a majority of 55.31% including Shias as helpful for the poor while 29.78% have seen creation of a new class of beggars. 17.02% are not clear. They are mostly not satisfied with the management of the system (Q.8). Dissolution of Ruet-e-Hilal Committee as demanded by JUI-F, NWFP recently was opposed by a vast majority of 70.21% who apprehended more than one Eids otherwise. 31.91% also apprehended a sectarian divide in the absence of the Committee. Only 10.63% respondents visualized an end of government intervention into the matter. An equal number was uncertain about the outcome (Q. 17). Amongst the major objections on the existing Haj policy, a dominant majority of 80.85% expressed dissatisfaction with the Hajis accommodation while 76.59% respondents took notice of increasing expenses. Other complaints including plunder of tour operators, ballot/quota system and irresponsible attitude of guides was listed by 29.78%, 23.40% and 17.02% respondents, respectively (Q. 27). Umrah system is also under criticism and mosque level protest was observed on November 19, 2004 against mishandling of returning pilgrims by PIA in KSA. iv.

Sectarianism {12}

The view point of ‘ulema /imams of the mosques about foreign involvement in the sectarian extremism in Pakistan was divergent. The largest proportion i.e 48.93% held Israel responsible followed by 31.91% for India, 26.65% for US, 25.53% for Iran, 21.27% for Taliban and 17.02% for Saudi Arabia. Sectarian divide was also visible in this ranking. Deobandis were generally found against Iran while Shias against Taliban and Saudi Arabia. Israel, India and US were the common foes (Q. 12). As regards responsibility of sectarian terrorism, a majority of 65.95% including all sects held foreign hand responsible for it. Amongst local groups 44.68% accused SMP (Shia group) and 34.04% charged LJ/SSP (Deobandi) for the same. A sizeable 19.14% of the respondents put the blame on government agencies. 14.89% remained uncertain about the matter (Q. 14). The recent imposition of ban on use of loudspeakers for other than Arabic sermons and Azan is yet to show its impact as a majority of 38.29% was not clear about the outcome followed by 36.17% who considered it an impediment for preaching. 27.65% saw a check on promotion of sectarianism and an equal number noticed rid of the public from a nuisance (Q.16). Regarding checking of sectarianism 51.06% respondent favoured government steps effective while 44.42% considered reconciliatory role of ‘ulema effective for the goal. 29.78% favoured creation of public awareness while 19.14% desired other measures but did not give any suggestions (Q. 18). v. Madarsa Policy The opinion of ‘ulema and prayer leaders about compulsory registration of their Madarsas remained divided. 38.29% agreed in principle with the proposal while 27.65% did not agree. A little more i.e 36.17% was not clear on the issue (Q. 21). As regards introduction of modern subjects into the syllabi of Madarsas, the response remained very encouraging. 85.10% favoured computer, 65.95% opted for science, 38.29% advocated maths and 29.78% supported teaching of English in order to improve academic and economic capabilities of Madarsa students. Only 10.63% opposed inclusion of any such subjects. One Madarsa gave practical proof of adoption of computer by reproducing the questionnaire on their computer (Q. 22). The opinion about acceptance of government aid for Deeni Madaris is divided. Some less than half i.e 42.55% saw no harm in it while 36.17% apprehended opening of government intervention into Madarsa affairs while 27.65% feared a damage to the neutrality of the Madarsas (Q. 23). vi.

Blasphemy Act / Hudood Ordinance {13}

Although the respondents have overwhelmingly supported declaration of Qadianis a non-Muslim minority (Q. 11 above), they were not clear about the source of law of blasphemy. 57.44% each quoted Qura’an and Hadith in this regard but could not cite the exact verse/saying of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) describing the guilt and its punishment according to scholars. 29.78% quoted Ijma, 27.65% quoted Fiqah, 23.40% quoted act of Sahaba in this regard. 8.51% mainly Shias described ruling of Imam. 23.40% a little less than 1/4 th were uncertain about the base of legislation (Q. 24). Despite above 82.97% respondents favoured an equitable implementation of the act in order to remove any doubts. 14.89% advocated punishment to the complainant if proved in correct. No one supported abrogation or any change in the act (Q. 25). Same applies to the objection on Hudood Ordinance wherein almost 3/4th i.e 74.46% respondents urged transparent application of the law. 17.02% also urged soundness of the witnesses. 10.63%, however, remained uncertain while 4.25% advocated cancellation of the law (Q. 26). vii. Overall perception The respondent were tested on a five stage scale ranging from full agreement to disagreement with regard to religious policies of the government. The general trend was not very much encouraging as 51.06% i.e just half showed partial agreement while 27.65% exhibited a disagreement. 8.51% equally showed general agreement and slight agreement on the right and left flanks respectively (Q. 28). CONCLUSION ‘ulema are a sensitive and important segment of our society. Besides performing religious rites, they are also alive to issues, developments policies having a bearing or connection with the religion. They appear touchy on some issues like Blasphemy. Using the easy platform of pulpit and various religious occasions and bodies, they ventilate their feelings on topical issues of their interest and channelize the public opinion. They are perturbed with the current scenario but do not want a confrontation on religious issues. They are trying to adjust themselves in the new environment and protect their institutions. From above study, the following conclusions have been draw:

 ‘ulema ’s concept of minimum requirement for being a muslim is beyond what has been prescribed in Qura’an. Khatam-e-Nabuwwat has gained undue importance over the years besides rituals. (Deletion of religious column from computerized passports is being criticized in the same context).

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 Pakistan movement was Islamic in character and passage of objectives resolution has set its Islamic destination.  Religio-political alliances like PNA, MMA etc., have not contributed much towards Islamization.

 Islamization can be achieved principally by preparing the masses for it and at the same time keeping the government under pressure. A government of ‘ulema is least wanted.  Sectarian violence/terrorism is basically a foreign sponsored phenomenon and US, Israel and India are to be primarily blamed. A thin section also put it fingers on government agencies.  Imposition of ban on militant sectarian/Jihadi organizations has not yielded sound results but continuing government action in the form of raids/arrests/trials, confiscation of funds/subversive literature etc., is bound to achieve the goal.  Only an Islamic government and its regular army can initiate jihad against any hostile/infidel/atheist inimical force rather than any individually or organization.  A kind/justice ruler is the prime requirement of an Islamic state. Requirement of his election by people is secondary. Nizam-e-Salat and Zakat come next.

 ‘ulema are not unanimous about the source of Blasphemy, yet they consider declaration of Qadianis as non-Muslim minority, a great service to their faith, oppose any change in Blasphemy Act and necessitate its transparent application. Same is their view about Hudood Ordinance.  Opinion about registration of Madarsas, acceptance of government aid for improvement and inclusion of modern subjects in their curricula and ban on loudspeakers is divided but generally soft.

 Existing Hajj policy is not popular on account of over increasing expenses, uncomfortable residences, irresponsibility of mohtamim, uncertain return schedule etc. They are also not satisfied with management of Zakat system. RECOMMENDATIONS:  Government may tactfully continue with its policy against terrorism but assure transparency of the process. {15}

 Blasphemy Act may not be touched for the time being, but its equitable application be ensured.  Policy about Madarsas be pursued cautiously in consultation with ‘ulema bodies.  ‘ulema may be engaged in social activities like primary teaching, first aid, learns vocational skills for integration into the society learning from experiences of Bangladesh and other countries.  Every effort be made to redress grievances about Hajj and Umrah policy particularly the return schedule.  Only clean and well reputed persons be engaged in Zakat admin at all levels for the smooth functioning of this vital system. ***

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References (i)

(ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)

(viii) (ix) (x)

(xi)

Constitution of Pakistan (1956, 62 and 73). Political systems of Pakistan by Dr. Varnider Groxer and Dr. Ranjna Arora (India). Pak 50 years of Indpendence by Dr. V.C & Ranjna Arora (India). Aab-e-Kausar/Raud-e-Kausar by S. M. Ikram (2002 & 2003 SBC Edition). Muslim League Ka Daur-e-Hukoomat (1947-54) by Dr. Safdar Mehmood, Lahore. Pak Tareekh-o-Siasat (47-88) by Dr. Safdar Mehmood, Jang Publications, Lahore. Tehreek-e-Pakistan Uska Siasi Pas Manzar by Asghar A. Jafri. Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas by Prof. Atta and Zafar Umer Zubairi, Karachi. Hukoomat Aur Siasat by M. Mujahid Farooq, Lahore. Official records. Newspapers/Magazines.

References: 1. Pages 158 and 364 – Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas. 2. Pages 144, 145, 154 and 363 – Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas. 3. Page 56, Khilfat-e-Bannu Abbas. 4. Pages 367 and 404 – Ab-e-Kausar. 5. Pages 75-77, 136, 190-93, 278-79 – Raud-e-Kausar. 6. Pages 130-33 – Raud-e-Kausar. 7. Press/Pakistan Ki Nazaryati Tareekh by Mujahid Farooq – Lahore (Page 66). 8. Weekly Takbeer, Karachi (June 1991/Nov. 2004) and Pakistan Ki Nazaryati Tareekh by Mujahid Farooq – Lahore (Page-401). 9. Printed material of JI/Newspapers/book of G.A. Parvez. 10. Weekly Takbeer, Karachi (June 1991/Nov. 2004) 11. Press. 12. Pages 168, 198, 206 and 232 – Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas. 13. Pages 262-64 – Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas. 14. Pages 288-91 and 332 – Khilfat-e-Banu Abbas. 15. Pages 94 and 115 – Ab-e-Kausar. 16. Pages 16, 25-6 and 207 – Raud-e-Kausar. 17. Page-247 – Raud-e-Kausar. 18. Special Branch Report on Sectarianism – 1997. 19. Raud-e-Kausar (Page-442). 20. Raud-e-Kausar (Page-430-31).

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The following question was also asked from a few respondents verbally on personal interaction but they were found divergent rather confused: What are Pakistan’s main problems in the order of priority: (a) Islamization (b) Provision of justice (c) Democracy (d) Economic uplift (e) Crime/law and order/terrorism (f) Feudalism/Tribalism (g) Regionalism/sectarianism (h) Not certain While the West has long been comfortable with the established boundaries of the sacred-secular divide, popular forces – driven in no small part by global politics of “the War on Terror” have seized upon Islamic revivalism not only as an issue to force through their local political demands for justice and devolution (as in Swat) but also to bring to the fore a more wide spread dissent against the Pakistani federation and its Western backers. Thus, it is not just “the anti-Islamic symbols of decadence” like music and video shops and ski resorts which have been put to the torch but anything seen to threaten ancient cultural ways like girls’ schools.

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