Dmg Paper Published In Pakistan Studies

Members’ Perceptions of the District Management Group in the federal civil services of Pakistan By Syed A. Akif1 and Richard C. Pratt2 ABSTRACT: [This paper has been adapted from a larger study entitled “Members’ and Opinion Leaders’ Perceptions of the Pakistani Federal Civil Services’ District Management Group” undertaken as the Capstone Project submitted for completion of the MPA degree at the University of Hawaii, USA. The actual study was carried out from August 1999 onwards.]

The District Management Group (DMG) is generally considered to be the most prestigious of the numerous civil service “occupational groups” in Pakistan. Even now, in a period which is generally considered to be one of decline for the civil services,3 more than 80 percent of the candidates in the annual competitive examination opt for DMG as their first choice.4 This study was carried out through a 80-item questionnaire distributed to 107 DMG officers (and a 50-item common version sent out to 67 Opinion Leaders.) The primary aim of this survey was to ascertain stakeholders’ views of the DMG on a wide range of issues, both those directly related to DMG as well as those of more general interest relating to governance issues including the following: 1. Pakistani governance and DMG: the present and future status of bureaucracy. 2. Pakistani attitudes, especially those of civil servants, towards democracy, rule of law, national problems. 3. Empowered local government, decentralization and role of civil servants as agents of change in the Pakistani public administration. 4. Relations between elected officials and civil servants – degree of political interference/ cronyism - and their impact on bureaucratic competence levels. 5. Reform in DMG; change of DMG nomenclature. 6. Civil services’ selection, the “ merit vs. quota” debate, contractual employment and other issues in civil service recruitment. 7. Gender issues in the civil services.

8. Corruption: what is it; how bad is it; why is it there; improvements. 9. Officers’ reasons for joining; job satisfaction levels; postings; political networks. 10. Training: access; quality; and recommendations for the future 11. Performance evaluation and promotions. This paper summarizes the views of 60 DMG officers serving in the province of Sindh (both in the federal and provincial governments) in grades 17 through 21 as elicited through the above referred questionnaire. The views of the “Opinion Leaders” as well as a comparison between the two groups are available in the complete paper, which is the believed to be the first quantitative study of the Pakistani bureaucracy. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1.

What is this study about and why is it important? For over one hundred years, the District Management Group (DMG), and its legal

predecessors, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) and the Indian Civil Service (ICS), have been considered to be the most powerful government structures amongst the various service/functional groups of the higher bureaucracy in Pakistan.5 Indeed, most of the older writers on the subject [Philip Woodruff, Ralph Braibanti, Frank Goodnow] have called these officers to be “the heaven-born,” “the kept class,” and the “Brahmins of the Bureaucracy” while the Indian Civil Service (or ICS), the predecessor of the CSP/DMG, was itself called the “Steel Frame on Which India Rested” or the “Governing Corporation.” Indeed, the administration of Imperial India’s 500 million people was, for the most part, entrusted to a few hundred ICS Officers and their police counterparts in the IPS, whose philosophical basis was in the combination of elitist roots which went back to Plato’s Republic and imperial origins in Confucian China. As a reminder of the latter, the civil services’ cricket club in Lahore continues to be fondly named, “The Mandarins.” As of June 1999, the 716 members of the DMG occupied some of the most prestigious and powerful jobs in Pakistani government employment sector, reported to be close to three million strong. Charles Kennedy in his book Bureaucracy in Pakistan [1987] notes that DMG was the first choice of nearly 70 percent of all civil service

probationers (training at the Academy) during the “post-Reform” period of 1974-81.6 This was itself down from the first-preference rating for the DMG’s lineal predecessor, the CSP, which stood at 83 percent in 1971.7 According to figures specially made available for this study by the Federal Public Service Commission, the percentage of candidates qualifying the annual Competitive Examination who opted for DMG in the 1998 examination as their first choice stood at 82.4% for males and 80% for female candidates. While the DMG continues to be an organization of great public significance, objective research on its role, especially the difference between the way its role(s) is/are perceived by outside observers and actually experienced by the officers themselves, has not been undertaken. Indeed, in spite of the DMG deserving serious inquiry, it is remarkable and surprising that no scholarly research is available on the subject, let alone a quantitative one, in spite of DMG being in existence for 27 years. This study was undertaken to fill a vital gap by ascertaining the validity of perceptions of the DMG expressed in the media, by opinion leaders and in DMG professional circles. Another fact that makes this study important is the coincidence that the topics addressed herein comprise some of the main points of the new military regime’s agenda: reforming bureaucracy, revamping local government, addressing gender imbalance, and fighting corruption.

2.

How was this study undertaken?

This study was carried out through an 80-item questionnaire distributed to 107 DMG officers and a 50-item version sent out to 67 Opinion Leaders. The figure for DMG officers represents virtually the total number of DMG officers in the province (as only 8 officers could not be contacted as they were on long leaves/ on suspension and in one case a “proclaimed absconder”.) The actual questionnaire appears at the end of this paper. Of the 174 questionnaires distributed ninety (90) responses were received in time: 60 from DMG officers and 30 from Opinion Leaders. Due to time and resource constraints, the population from which the DMG Officers' sample was to be drawn was restricted to a sample of convenience in the Province of Sindh. The questionnaires were

distributed by mail and courier, and were followed by phone calls and some personal visits (but actual filling out was not done in presence of the researcher so as to avoid any bias.)

3.

The sample

As of 29th June, 1999, the total number of serving DMG officers in grades 17 through 22 (also called basic pay scales or BPS) was 716. Thus the sample formed a substantial 8.38% of the total population.

All the same, even in absolute terms

(notwithstanding its non-representativeness) the sample failed to meet statistical validity figure of 248.8 While it is true that DMG Officers present a rather homogenous population (by virtue of their common selection and training procedures as well as subsequent professional experience), the sample was not representative in terms of provincial/ethno-linguistic origins of officers.

Ideally the sample

should have been drawn from the whole population9, however, for several reasons this could not be done. In addition to time and funding constraints, the DMG Officers Posting List is an internal document of the government and one not available publicly (to prevent misuse in legal cases regularly brought against the government by officers claiming restitution/ correction of their seniority positions). Moreover, the frequent transfers of officers makes event the latest list redundant even before it is published. TABLE Grade /Basic Pay Scale

17 18 19 20 21 22 All

GRADE WISE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE NATIONAL POPULATION OF DMG OFFICERS AND SAMPLE No. and percentage of all DMG offrs (national pop) in the grade

130/ 18.16% 229/ 31.98% 169/ 23.60% 158/ 22.07% 21/ 02.93% 09/ 01.26% 716/ 100.00%

No. of respondents in the grade

13 21 18 07 00 01 60

Sample statistics Sample as % of Representation DMG offrs. in of this grade that grade in sample (%)

10.00 08.73 10.65 05.09 00.00 11.11 08.38

21.66 35.00 30.00 11.66 00.00 01.66 99.98

Diff betw. Repres. in national pop & sample (%)

+03.50 +03.02 +06.40 -10.41 -02.93 -00.40

4.

Major findings and Interpretation of the Data

The results of the survey are quite clear and require little interpretation for those initiated in Pakistani issues, especially those related to the civil services. All considered, there were few surprises in the data for common Pakistanis. Indeed, the issues framed in the questions had been chosen for their ubiquity as expressed in public/ private discussions and press coverage

♦ Questions 1 –6: General perceptions about bureaucracy & DMG's role therein: In Pakistan only a very small number of public officials working in “prestigious cadres” are considered “bureaucrats,” a term, which is overwhelmingly negative in its Pakistani usage. In addition to formal office-holders, the Pakistani ruling/ decision making elite comprises senior military officers and “bureaucrats” closely allied to the ruling political establishment. DMG is the most powerful group within the bureaucracy. Amongst DMG Officers, opinion about whether Pakistani civil servants still retain colonial/elitist attitudes remains divided. Interestingly the respondents – well informed, responsible members of the DMG who, in all probability know the book definition of bureaucracy– do not consider all public servants in the “bureaus” as bureaucrats but consider only a few of them to be so. In this departure from the classical Weberian definition of bureaucracy, only a few thousand Pakistani public officials (of nearly three million) working in “prestigious cadres” are seen to be “bureaucrats” (while others are just public servants or government employees). Linked with the finding that that the term “bureaucracy” is overwhelmingly negative in its Pakistani usage, by linkage it appears that these top level public functionaries, the bureaucrats, are held responsible for the negative image of the “civil services” (a term which is again used only for the select group of officers who gain employment through the Competitive Examination). This negative image of the bureaucracy was not at all surprising in the light of day to day press reports and public

expressions about the difficulties the common citizens have in their dealings with government offices. Given their clout in public affairs, the senior military officers and “bureaucrats” (above Grade 20) who are closely allied to the ruling political establishment are considered part of the Pakistani ruling/ decision making elite. This perhaps is true of any political system which is still in its early stages of development and much more of one in which the drive towards maturity has often interrupted by overt military coups or internal “soft” coups (that have blessings of external players, like the Army).

Given the

bureaucrats’ openly partisan alignments and the weakness of party and governance structures which are susceptible to external pressures, more often than not, they are quite central to the happenings in corridors of power. DMG Officers still consider theirs to be the most powerful group within the bureaucracy. This – and the fact that candidates still opt for DMG as their first choice indicates that mental perceptions change at a slower pace than ground realities. The least powerful group, non-formally speaking, comprises “meritorious, upright officers without political links” and, formally it is the Postal Group amongst the established civil service structures.

♦ Questions 7-8, 16: Elitism in the civil services/ DMG For all its 53 years of independence, one of the biggest accusations made against civil servants in Pakistan (by the political parties, people and media at large) has been that they still behave like the anti-people, former colonial masters. This retention of old habits and elitism is considered to be direct linked to the absence or very slow pace of social change in the patterns of land holding, limited breakdown of traditional social organization, and poor literacy levels. Nonetheless, it is clear that of whatever elitism that remains, DMG officers espouse and practice it equally or more than other civil servants. A reflection of the fast deteriorating status of the DMG’s erstwhile superiority (still indicated in its being the candidates’ No. 1 choice in the Competitive Examination) was the fact that only about one-fourth respondents considered DMG to be the “most powerful group” within the bureaucracy. This would not have been the case, perhaps a decade ago.

♦ Questions 9-15: Democratic governance in Pakistan Though not yet in the ignoble camp of “failed states”, many academics have included Pakistan in the category of states ripe for failure. While numerous reasons are quoted for this state of affairs, when asked to rank the problems facing the nation, the researcher’s personal hypothesis about authoritarian and corrupt governance being the worst problem facing the country was proven true. As shown by the military coup that took place during the process of data gathering (on Oct. 12, 1999), Pakistan’s democratic credentials are very poor. From these findings of authoritarianism and elitism, it naturally follows that Pakistani elected office holders (should) have little or no regard for the rule of law. While this is also true for a majority of Pakistanis in general, civil servants are regarded as still more “democratically inclined” than politicians involved in formal electoral activities. A possible reason for this is that a large majority of civil servants come from the middle class while it is the land-owning feudal class which still sends forth the bulk of politicians. Another reason is the fact that politics requires greater compromise and expediency as compared to government work which is still based on formal rules of business and that civil servants have traditionally been subject to jurisdiction of courts to an much greater extent than the politicians

♦ Questions 17-20: Local Government and Devolution of Power One of the paradoxes seen from the data was the response from the officers who while considering elected local government essential to greater national democracy, did not support devolution of power to locally elected officials.

This was clearly an

indication of the hostile reaction shown by the bureaucracy towards the “Devolution Plan” presented by the military rulers. Under this plan the DMG’s most prestigious role is to be abolished and the historic legacy of the Group is now seen close to its logical end. Another possible interpretation could be that this is an indication of the centralist tendency supported by the bureaucratic elite.

♦ Questions 21-27, 65: Change in Pakistani governance and DMG Nearly half the Officers said that Pakistani administration has changed much over the past 50 years. In an earlier item many officers said that Pakistani civil servants were still “colonial” (elitist). This response about continuation of the old order (elitism) again contradicted the officers who thought that the administrative structure had changed. The majority want the DMG to be reorganized. This is keeping in with the feelings expressed in all public forums that for the nation to have any chance of a future revival, the Civil Service-dominated administrative structure must be totally replaced with one run by elected representatives.

Even though few believe in the sincerity of the military

government to foster democracy (as twice in the past the military has promoted local government as an eyewash designed to keep central power to itself). Indeed, the first test - elections for local bodies in Dec 2000 - has not gone well in terms of attracting either candidates or voters.

♦ Questions 25-27, 65: DMG: generalist vs. specialist role Again for over 50 years there has been a great debate on the generalist vs. specialist role of Pakistani civil services. Naturally, the civil servants have wished to reserve all the top management posts for themselves – even when they are part of technocratic ministries like health, education, and power. The DMG’s “jack of all” claim has generally been countered with the “master of none” argument.

Even at present DMG Officers

continue to manage all and sundry, while many professionals are left out of truly deserved positions. In this survey, naturally, a majority of DMG officers thought that their group was “just right” in terms of the generalist-specialist divide; in an apparent contradiction an even greater number favored specialization in some field themselves. Being honest to themselves DMG officers accepted that they were preferentially treated in terms of postings. As expected, while the officers did not wish any restrictions placed on their horizontal mobility (i.e. continue to retain high level of generalism). Generally, there is widespread popular support for bureaucratic reorganization. If and when the proposed local government set-up takes root, the DMG is bound to suffer

the most, as its traditional role will not only be formally disbanded but even the coordinating position of the District Coordination officer will be opened to all groups of civil servants. While it is natural that the DMG officers see reorganization within their own context, the military government has been keen to cut them down to size, just as the Bhutto government did through the 1973 administrative reforms.10 Indeed, far from even a symbolic return to the past, the new outlook is that DMG as it was traditionally known in the ICS/CSP paradigm is now destined to be history. Already massive inter-provincial transfers have broken the officers’ provincial power-bases, as could only have been possible in a non-elected/ non-democratic regime where there are no politicians to influence.

A new breed of reformers from the NGO-sector have

combined with the military to bring about a big change in the way that Pakistan is governed (several of the ministers in the new set up are from NGOs). Although much skepticism prevails, it is better to wait and see if the proposed experiments work (without the fundamental change in mind-set and resource availability that is required).

♦ Questions 28-30, 67: DMG's political linkages The time frame of the responses – arriving just before or after the military coup toppled what was generally believed to be a highly corrupt and non-transparent regime – should be kept in mind here. The respondents thought that relations between bureaucrats and elected politicians were “uneasy, based on mutual mistrust and interests and not on principles.” This leads to the conclusion that both bureaucrats and politicians are to be blamed equally for the country’s problems. Since then – after the military has been in power for over a year – the focus of criticism has shifted against the military’s periodic interventions which have not solved the country’s many problems. There is virtual unanimity in both groups on the perception that sought-after postings go to those with strong political or bureaucratic links. Perhaps, if the data had been collected now, there would have been considerable change in this regard (as the rule of the law is being strengthened).

♦ Questions 31-32: Change of Nomenclature/ Restoration of the CSP

DMG Officers have long lamented the loss of their coveted service label of Civil Service of Pakistan which is almost a religious relic with most of them. The importance of this historical and emotional baggage can be realized by few people outside the DMG/ ex-CSP circles, especially after the PSP and FSP (Police and Foreign Service of Pakistan) labels were re-instituted in the past decade. Most officers wish to have the CSP-label reinstated. Perhaps as a detour around the issue, many officers also proposed the Pakistan Administrative Service as an alternate name to DMG.

♦ Questions 33-39: Selection, Quota System, Promotion The issue of having or abolishing geographically, linguistically or ethnically based quota reservations in all government jobs has also been a very controversial one throughout Pakistan’s history. An early formula of “parity” between the eastern and western wings of the country maintained a uneasy peace until the former seceded to become Bangladesh. In 1973, the new Constitution provided the “quota system” for 10 years to maintain Federal harmony. The period has since been extended time and again, so much so that two years ago the results of the Competitive Examination could not be declared due to a Supreme Court stay. While the urban intelligentsia and print media oppose the quota, this survey shows considerable support for the quota system from the DMG Officers, primarily because it provides a sense of justice and fair representation to all constituents in a pluralistic federal country. The fact that Central Superior Services/DMG selection (procedure) is considered to be as good as possible in Pakistan or at least far better than national average is generally accepted by common Pakistanis. The extensive opposition to the special reservation of 10% seats for armed forces personnel for recruitment without appearing in the examination reflects a general opinion that the military in Pakistan is already overpampered. As expected from persons used to enjoying secure life-long employment, a majority of officers oppose the proposal for contractual employment in the civil services.

♦ Questions 40-41: Gender Issue

There were only two (02) female respondents amongst the DMG Officers’ sample; this 3.33% representation was small even in comparison with the low national figure of 4.46% females in the DMG (32 individuals in 716). The low representation of females in the DMG is thought to be a reflection of the socio-cultural perception about their lack of effectiveness in field offices which carry a macho image and supposedly require a male presence. So far there have been only two female Deputy Commissioners in Pakistan’s history (of which one was from DMG). Perhaps this is reflection of the greater society at large which is definitely male dominated and chauvinistic. The opinion of most DMG Officers that there would be “little or no change” if more females were to be selected for DMG may perhaps be a reflection of their experiences with female colleagues, who act as quasi-men and defy the societal stereotype of the female (to the extent of competing favorably with men in corruption).

♦ Questions: 42-50: Corruption in Pakistan Economically reeling under heavy debt serving (c. 55% of the budget), high military costs (31% of the budget) and runaway population growth, Pakistan has also been labeled as one of the most corrupt countries in the world a rating considered to be justified in this survey. Opinion in this category was likely to be biased as the DMG Officers, while labeling more than 90% of Pakistani civil servants and elected politicians as corrupt had a better opinion about themselves: DMG Officers were stated to be better to the extent that “only 75%” of them are considered to be corrupt! Almost every respondent felt that the level of corruption in Pakistan had increased greatly over the past 20 years. This too was keeping in with popular belief. The strategy of paying market-driven salaries – which is seen as an effective way to curb corruption. has now finally caught on with national policymakers who have begun to offer realistic compensation in very selected areas (given the strong resource constraints).

♦ Questions 51-56: Reasons for joining DMG; satisfaction levels; future plans While the one main reason for joining DMG which is expressed in popular circles – social prestige (due to the Group’s role as a power broker in a largely feudal-tribal set-

up) – was validated, an equal number of respondents also cited “rapid promotion and high horizontal mobility” as the reason for their having joined DMG. While the DMG’s top position may still be continuing with the candidates, future recruitment in the group is uncertain due to the new government’s devolution plan. DMG would generally lose its raison d’etre as new local governments bodies are led be elected persons

and

“coordinated” by civil servants from all groups. The second option – in case the respondents had not been successful in landing a DMG slot – Foreign Service – was an aberration as in fact it is generally rated much lower (at around 5th or 6th place). The normal position of the Foreign Service – otherwise a better paying and more sophisticated job is reflective of social conditions in which civil servants generally join to have a strong domestic presence in order to safeguard the interests of friends and family. Although majority of the Officers was “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with their DMG employment, there were many contradictions in this regard: The future of DMG was thought to be worse than its present state. A very large proportion had considered or could consider moving away from DMG. The top two reasons cited for a possible departure from DMG are “poor pay and benefits” and “excessive politicization.”

♦ Questions 57-58; 79-80: Family Backgrounds and Service/Political Networks Given real life networks in the bureaucracy and political establishment, the officers’ family backgrounds are thought to be “important” for their career. It is well known that probationary officers at the Academy are actually approached by feudal or political families with offers of marriage that will enhance the positions of both. Thus, of the six most important linkages that could help officers along their careers, the most important – by a wide margin - is “family relations – like sons or sons-in-law, cousins.” Popular belief was once again validated by way of the second response being linguistic or provincial links.

♦ Questions: 59-61: DMG's Federal Character; Provincial Postings/ PCS

While DMG was seen to be suffering from a lack of “Federal identity” as most DMG officers settled down in their own provinces, paradoxically the DMG officers still did not wish to see a disbanding of the Provincial Civil Services (PCS) nor an Indian system in which Federal Indian Administrative Service Officers stayed in one province for long periods. In recent months, one of the “corrective” measures taken by the military government has been the widespread transfer of DMG officers all over Pakistan. Some of these officers moved for the first time in their long careers spanning two decades or more. Thus, an attempt has been made to restore the Federal character of DMG – which had been dented by the collusion of the officers with their political sponsors who always blocked the Establishment Division’s orders for inter-provincial transfers. This was perhaps only possible during their military regime.

♦ Questions 62-65: Posting Choices/ Pressures/ Specialization Not all posts are equal in prestige and more importantly in their political utility (to elected governments). Indeed, politics is just another name for sharing spoils (“Who gets what, when and how.”) Therefore, no amount of rules would be able to ensure totally fair treatment for all officers. In an earlier item, the weakest group in the system was said to consist of officers without political clout. The feeling that competence and merit do not count very much in postings is very wide spread. The informal connections that have replaced the formal system are a natural bypass mechanism that has grown from the clogged up arteries of the DMG secretariat. Most officers have been ostracized to marginal postings or made “Officers on Special Duty” (OSDs) for not conforming to the existing norms. As could be expected, most officers prefer a field posting as opposed to one in the secretariats (as the former is far more well-provided in terms of physical facilities). The fact that most DMG officers wish to specialize in some functional area is linked to the doubts expressed about the future of DMG, a generalist civil service.

♦ Questions: 66, 68-73: Training

The survey showed that while officers believed training to be very important for improvement in job performance, most had received no further training after their initial pre-service training. Thus there is general dissatisfaction with the training facilities available to DMG officers. On the one hand there are few short training programs and on the other hand the two long mandatory ones at NIPA and Staff College have become a promotion formality (in which everyone who attends passes almost automatically). The fact is that training facilities have also deteriorated considerably as the overall efficiency of the state apparatii have gone down in the face of deep-rooted intervention in day to day bureaucratic decisions by the political establishment (ministers, members of parliament, ruling party officials). Indeed, all domestic training is looked as being irrelevant to careers while foreign trainings are seen as mechanisms of nepotistic or political reward. National training institutions also do not enjoy the reputation of being “good postings” and are, as a result, avoided by career officers – many of whom are sent there as a “punishment.” In contrast, “career” armed forces’ officers are posted in training institutions. Thus there is a need to improve the image of such institutions and make training more genuine and merit based.

♦ Questions 74-77: Performance Evaluation Among the many problems that plague the Pakistani bureaucracy today, low morale and loss of confidence in the system’s fairness is an important one. While officers are generally dissatisfied with the present performance evaluation system marked by excessive dependence on a subjective Annual Confidential Report (ACR), which is, by and large, a reflection of personal relations with superiors than actual performance, they are to be blamed themselves for the loss of systemic credibility. Because of their own non-merit based incursions into the service structures (by family or political networks which they use and encourage) annual reports have just become formalities. However the Establishment Division is also to be blamed for not maintaining the performance evaluation system at a functional level: Often the officers run from one officer to the other to get their reports completed at the time of being considered for promotion.

Relaxed attitudes mean that the central office has no track of which officer was serving under whom during the period being reported; thus fraud is quite prevalent in ACRs. All the same, all the officers must not necessarily get the blame for violating a theoretical code (of independent performance evaluation), but instead the senior policy making incumbents who should take the fall for not maintaining a system even in a bare level of operational efficiency.

LIMITATIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS Like all studies this was not a perfect one; therefore, future researchers should consider implementing the following recommendations (being made in the light of experience gained in the present exercise) so as to complement and further the present study. 1. The DMG Officers sample should be more representative (of the national DMG population). In this study, the percentage of respondent-officers belonging to Sindh Rural and Sindh Urban domicile categories (45% and 21.66% respectively) was much larger than the percentage of these groups in the nation-wide DMG population (9.63% and 6.42% respectively). Similarly officers from provinces having a large number of officers in the national population (Punjab 52% and NWFP 15.5%) were under-represented in the sample (28.33 and 1.66% respectively). There was also a skew in terms of grade-wise distribution of respondent-officers compared to the percentage of various grades in the national DMG population. Future researchers should, resources permitting, consider working from this point onwards to validate the results of this study by either conducting a more representative nation-wide survey on the national DMG population or conduct a separate study with officers holding Balochistan, Punjab and NWFP domiciles in a way that the grade and provincial domiciles represented in the sample are reflective of their respective national levels. 2. Electronic data processing of responses should be undertaken, if required through a custom designed computer database program; this would allow easy cross tabulations and data classification as well as prevention of hazards inherent in manual tabulations.

3. The survey instrument should be redesigned to improve questionnaire length and construction of some items. Although the length of the questionnaire (80 items over 10 pages) had always been a problem area, a deliberate trade-off had been made in view of the desire to obtain as much data as possible in one exercise (in view of it being the first or its kind in over two decades and the difficulty in organizing such an effort). Even though not many respondents commented about the instrument’s undue length (in the infrequent meetings that were held with them after they filled the forms as no such option about the design was posed in the form itself), it is almost certain that in case of a shorter questionnaire the response would have been better. There were many politically loaded questions with which respondents may have felt uneasy. Many later commented that in the Pakistani cultural setting, where academic surveys are few and far between people always have that feeling that their responses could be used for non academic purposes – included being reported to secret services. Thus it is recommended to divide a long questionnaire into several short and separate instruments to pre-empt respondent fatigue and improve quality of responses Alternately, through better pre-testing a more convenient sized questionnaire be developed with more detailed follow-up surveys in each of the major blocks of issues. Important note: A problem that probably affected the survey process was the fact that the questionnaires were returned over a period of time that stretched over the last days of the Nawaz Sharif government and the early days of the new military regime. In the process came what paradoxically became both an interesting and troubling aspect of this study: The change of government became the cause of a possible bias. Many of the responses are likely to have been affected by this turn of events, for instance, question 9 listed “corrupt and authoritarian governance as one of responses to a question which asked as to which was the worst problem facing the country and question 10 asked “what kind of democracy does Pakistan have.” Other questions sought to learn what was the level of the partisan politicization and corruption in the services or what was the attitude of (professional) politicians and citizens towards the rule of law. Also inquired about were future dispensations in local government.

In some of the earliest speeches the new military "Chief Executive of Pakistan" made repeated references to all these issues. In subsequent personal comments, some respondents actually did mention that the turn of events would have had/ did have a bearing on their responses. Unfortunately a full record of the dates on which the responses were received was not maintained and hence the effect of this external factor could not be tabulated

APPENDIX: TABLE: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY DMG OFFICERS & TEXT OF QUESTIONNAIRE The “No.” indicates the question number in the questionnaire. Almost all questions had an “Any other, please specify” or a “Don’t Know/ Uncertain” option (which may not be listed or completely listed below)

No 1.

2. 3.

4.

Statement/ Variable in Questionnaire

Summary of responses Only prestigious cadres

Who is covered by the term ‘bureaucracy’ in Pakistan? Mark as many as applicable (a) All government functionaries (from grades 1-22) (b) All gazzetted officers (grades 17 and above) © Only officers belonging to the CSS/ PCS and other “prestigious” cadres (d) Only senior policy making officers, say grades 20 and above (e) All government employees involved in administrative work (including educators, doctors heading govt. hospitals, even SHO’s (f) A certain class of officials demonstrating a negative attitude towards the people by maintaining willful red-tapism and unhelpful attitude (g) Any other, please specify Generally speaking, how is the term “bureaucracy” used in Pakistan? (a) (b) 85% positively (b) negatively (c) neutrally (d) variously (e) don’t know What groups, if any, comprise the “ruling/ decision making elite” of (b) Senior Pakistan other than the members of formal governance structures like military. Officers assemblies and constitutional office holders? (you may check as many as (43); applicable) (a) All CSS officers (b) Senior officers of the armed forces (d) bureaucrats ( Chiefs of Staff/ Corps Commanders) (c) The higher bureaucracy (grade 20 close to the and above generally and all field officers) (d) Only certain bureaucrats who politicians (44) are close to elected politicians (e) Members of political parties, and their extensions like labour & student unions (f) Top business people and trade bodies like FPCCI, APTMA (g) Tribal and feudal leaders (other than members of political parties, elected bodies) (h) Top professionals like lawyers, media-people, educators, NGO persons, clergy (I) Any other

If the Pakistani “ruling elite” specifically includes DMG, what’s its 17% (40%) agree role therein?(a)very important(b) fairly important (c) not so important (d) the DMG is not a part of the “ruling elite” (e) don’t Know/

5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10.

11. 12. 13 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19.

Which, if any, is the most powerful group (formal/ informal) in the bureaucracy? [open ended]

DMG (27%); politically linked (23%) Which, if any, is the least powerful group in the bureaucracy?[open] Honest, upright (25%) Generally, are our civil services still “colonial” (elitist) in their outlook? Yes 48% (a) yes (b) no (c) don’t Know/ uncertain No 47% How “colonial” (elitist) are DMG Officers compared to other civil Equally or more servants?(a) more elitist (b) less elitist (c) equally elitist (d) 77% don’t know/uncertain How would you rank the following problems being currently faced 45% ranked (c) by Pakistan? (No. 1 being the biggest challenge and No. 2 being the authoritarian and next and so on) (a) Population growth: a high rate draining already corrupt insufficient resources, (b) Poor economy (c) Authoritarian and governance as corrupt governance (d) Lack of national consensus on basic issues No. 1 (e) Unfavorable strategic climate (f) Any other (suggest your own) In your opinion, which one of the following best describes Pakistani Poor 23%; only democracy? (a) A very good world class democracy (b) An in name 52% acceptable “functional democracy” (c) A poor democracy (d) A democracy only in name How democratically inclined are Pakistani politicians? (a) highly Not inclined inclined (b) somewhat inclined (c) not inclined 75% How democratically inclined are Pakistani civil servants? (a) highly Somewhat inclined (b) somewhat inclined (c) not inclined inclined 55%; not inclined 40% How much regard for the rule of law do elected Pakistani office holders Little 47%; have? (a) Very high (b) High (c) Fair (d) Little (e) None none 47% How much regard do Pakistanis generally have for the rule of law? Fair 28%; (a) Very high (b) High (c) Fair (d) Little (e) None little 54% How much regard do Pakistani civil servants have for the rule of law? Fair 45%; (a) Very high (b) High (c) Fair (d) Little (e) None little 35% Can DMG Offrs be distinguished from other equivalent bureaucrats (c) 82% said when it comes to procedural and legal propriety? Would you say they they are better are (a) worse (b) same (c) better (d) don’t know/uncertain To what degree is elected local government essential to larger national (c) 78% democracy? (a) not essential at all (b) a small degree (c) a large degree Would you support a system of community-based administration and (b) 60% do not police in which civil servants serving as municipal administrators support this /ACs/ SHOs/ DSPs are replaced by elected/ employed local officials system from within the district or division? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t know If elected officials were to fill district administration/police posts, (d) 77% said no how great an improvement would be seen in terms of less power change excesses/ corrupt practices? (a) very great (b) substantial (c) some (d) none

20. Would you support a decentralization that replaces the present (a) yes 48% provinces with smaller administrative units based on present (b) No 45% divisions/districts? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know 21. How much has Pakistani public administration changed over the past (a) 50% 50 years? (a) very much (b) somewhat (c) little (d) not at all (e) (b) 32% uncertain/don’t know somewhat 22. If “great or substantial” how has this change been? (a) positive, for (a) 12% the better (b) negative, for the worse (c) uncertain/don’t know (b) 69% 23. In the future, would changes in DMG (a) come from within (b) have (b)32% (c)57% to be forced from outside by elected leaders/ World Bank/ etc.(c) a mix of two i.e both from internal and external sources (d) any other 24. Given the choice would you want the DMG to (a) Continue as it is (c) 77% i.e. be (b) Be disbanded totally and replaced (say by elected local officials reorganized or the Provincial Civil Services) (c) Be reorganized (d) Any other, 25. DMG Officers serve in a very wide range of government posts. How (b) 63% just generalist a service is the DMG in an age of specialization? (a) Too right generalist (b) Just right (c) Not generalist (d) Don’t know/ uncert. 26. Are DMG officers treated preferentially in terms of wide-ranging (a)48% postings? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know (b)43% 27. If “yes” to above, should restrictions be placed on DMG officers’ (a)3% horizontal mobility? (a) Yes (b)No (c) Don’t Know (b)73% 28. What best describes the relationship between bureaucrats and (a) 08% elected politicians ? (a) very good – mutually cordial and beneficial (c) 77% most of the time (b) Very bad: zero sum tussle to gain control over the other (c) Uneasy: mutual mistrust; not based on principles but interests (d) Any other, 29. Most Pakistanis blame the politicians and bureaucrats for the (a) 20% country’s sad state of governance; whom do you think is more to (b) 07% blame, if any? (a) Political heads take final decisions; under (c) 58% democratic management principles responsibility cannot be delegated therefore they are to be blamed fully (b) Bureaucrats advice the politicians, and hence are to be blamed more (c) Both are to be blamed equally (d) No, the blame is not equal, instead it is _______ (state proportion) (e) Don’t know/uncertain 30. To what extent do “lucrative” or other sought after posts go to those (a) 40% with strong political or bureaucratic links? (a) Always (b) (b) 55% Most of the time (c) occasionally (d) rarely or never 31. Until the 1973 ‘reforms’ immense prestige was associated with (a) 62% service labels like CSP, PFS, PSP, etc. Would you agree to a formal renaming of the DMG as CSP? (a)Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know/ 32. The average DMG officer spending fewer years in the districts than 62% CSP (see on other assignments, the group’s designation appears to be a No. 31) 17% misnomer; would you recommend some other nomenclature? If yes, Pakistan Admin what? [open] Service

33. The Federal civil services are selected on the basis of a quota system (a) 70% with only 10% officers selected on merit; do you support the quota (b) 27% system? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know 34. If you support the quota system, what best reflects your reason? (a)28% (a) Quotas provide fair representation to all the people in a pluralistic (b)42% country (b) Quotas give a sense of justice to all the constituents in a federal entity.(c) Any other, [design problem: should have barred those replying “NO” to item 33 from responding to this one]. 35. If you are opposed to the quota system, what best reflects your Half of the 27% reason? (a) The quota system is detrimental to the quality of who were personnel in the bureaucracy (b) The benefit of system does not opposed to quota always reach the people for whom it is designed the system is subject gave multiple to extensive misuse (c) The system diminishes societal answers competitiveness and institutionalizes poor governance (d) Any other, 36. Which of the following best reflects your opinion of the present (a) 47% CSS/DMG selection?(a) As good as is possible in present-day (b) 47% Pakistan (b) Far better than the national average for government recruitment (c) Any other, please specify 37. 10% seats of the seats in DMG, Police and Foreign Service are reserved(b)for 82% do not serving armed forces’ personnel who are inducted through a special process support this way without appearing in the CSS exam. Do you support this? of induction (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know/ uncertain 38 The FPSC comprises of official nominees from amongst retired (a) 40% bureaucrats, educators etc. Should the FPSC be constituted in any (b) 45% other way than at present? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know/ uncertain 39. A proposal for contractual employment in the bureaucracy is being (b) 69% oppose considered with a view to improve the quality of personnel and allow this system quicker termination of services of incompetent or politically inducted persons. Do you support this? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know/ uncert 40. Comparatively speaking there are fewer females in DMG than others (c) 52% CSS groups. What could be the reasons for this gender gap? Check as (d) 40% many as applicable. (a) An anti-female bias in the selection process (b) A reflection of the prevailing social norms- few candidates apply for DMG (c) A perception that females would not be effective as field officers (d) Any other, please specify [multiple answers OK] 41. If more females were to be selected for the DMG, how much would (c) 48% this change the “quality” and “citizen-friendliness level” of the (b) 38% administration? (a) A great deal of change (b) some change (c) little or no change 42. Pakistan has been rated as one of the most corrupt countries in the (a) 67% world by some international organizations. To what extent are such (b) 27% i.e. 94% ratings justified? (a) very justified (b) somewhat justified (c) feel it is not at all justified justified 43. How would you define corruption? (You may check more than one) A multiple

44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51.

52. 53.

(a) Using official stationary, cars, phones, equipment and staff for response item: personal work (b) Receiving gifts/ cultivating socially in return for (d) 96% immediate/ postponed favors (c) Acquiring land/ making business (c) 90% contacts/profits as a intangible extension of official positions i.e. (e)82% private benefit dependant upon official post. (d) Taking money/goods (b)78% directly in return for official public work (e) Helping friends/ (a)55% relatives cut official corners/ deprive state of revenues (f) Any other (f)10% By your own definition what percentage of Pakistani civil servants (a)62% are corrupt? (a) > 90% (b) 75% (c) > 50% (d) 25% or less (b)32% (e) any other, please specify What percentage of DMG officers are corrupt? (a) > 90% (b) 75% (a) 28%; (b) (c) > 50% (d) 25% or less (e) any other, please specify 38% (c) 20% What percentage of elected Pakistani politicians are corrupt? (a) 87% (a) > 90% (b) 75% (c) > 50% (d) 25% or less (e) any other __ (b) 8% Has the level of corruption in Pakistan changed over the past 20 (a)97% years? If yes, has it (a) increased greatly (b) increased slightly (c) decreased slightly (d) decreased greatly Are any of the following groups of civil servants less likely to be corrupt (a)48% than others? (You may check more than one) (d)28% (a) females as compared to males (c)22% (b) long term urban residents as compared to those with a rural background (c) members of educated families as compared to those from noneducated ones (d) children of prosperous middle class families as compared to those of poor ones (e) persons from one or more provinces/areas are more corrupt than others (f) any other, Would payment of market-driven salaries serve to substantially limit (a) 92% i.e. Yes corruption. (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t Know/ Uncertain Are there any practically enforceable reforms (unlike filing SUBJECTIVE Declarations of Assets) to reduce corruption? If so, please write them ANSWERS on the reverse of this sheet. [open] What was/were your reasons for joining DMG? (you may mark more Multiple resthan one) ponses ≠100% (a) Impressed by its status amongst available employment options (c)57% (b) Liked the outgoing nature of the field job (a)50% (c) Prospects for horizontal mobility and rapid promotion (b)48% (d) Societal/peer/family pressure (e) Any other, (d)18% If you had chosen another CSS group, please indicate your first five FSP, PSP, C&E, choices by numbering the following groups. (all listed) C&T, Accts. How satisfied are you with your employment in DMG at present? (a)10% (a) Very satisfied (b) satisfied (c) somewhat satisfied (d) not (b)42% satisfied (c)35%

54. How best can the future of DMG be described? (c)65% (a) better than now (b) as at present (c) worse than now (b)18% 55. Have you considered or could consider leaving or “moving away” (as (a)87% on a leave or posting in an international agency) from DMG ? (b)13% (a) Yes (b) No 56. If yes to No. 55 above, why? (You may mark more than one) (c)70% Excessive corruption (b) excessive politicization (e.g. lack of fairness (b)68% in postings/ transfers) (c) poor pay and benefits (d) uncertain future (d)38% prospects (e) lack of job satisfaction (f) availability of better options (e)28% (g) Any other, 57. How important is an officer’s background ( e.g. a feudal or (a)52% bureaucratic lineage) in creating connections that help the DMG (b)28% career? (a) very important (b) important (c) somewhat important (c)12% (d) not important (d)08% 58. Is there such a thing as the “DMG network” helping members in 1st (b) postings and other official/personal tasks or are other linkages like 2nd (c) family relations, linguistic, religious, ethnic stronger? Please rank in 3rd (e) order of importance for career. (a) The DMG network (b) Family 4th (f) relations like sons or sons-in-law, cousins (c) linguistic or provincial 5th (a) linkages (Pashtu, Punjabi, Urdu speaking, etc (d) religious links (e.g. 6th (d) a possible “Shia network”) (e) linkages established by having worked together (f) Personal likes and dislikes other than those listed above 59. Spending most of their careers in the provinces and competing with (b) 47% the PCS, do DMG officers suffer from a lack of “Federal identity”; if (a) 32% so to what extent? (a) to a great extent (b) to some extent (c) (c) 20% Not at all 60. Would you recommend abolishing the PCS (as DMG also has (b) 65% No provincial quotas)? (a) Yes (b) No (c) don’t know / uncertain (a) 24% Yes 61. Would you prefer an Indian IAS-like system whereby the Federal (c) 63% No officers (like those of DMG) are allocated a province for 25 years and (a) 30% Yes act like PCS officers? (a) Yes (b) No (c) don’t know / uncertain 62. How much do competence and merit count in postings? (c) 47% (a) Count very much (b) Are taken into consideration with (b) 33% other aspects (c) Do not count very much (d) Do not count at all (d) 12% (e) Don’t know/ Uncertain 63. Have you been ostracized to marginal postings/ being an OSD for (a) 57% Yes not conforming? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know (b) 35% 64. Given the choice would you prefer a field posting (a) 65% (AC/DC/Commissioner) as opposed to a secretariat/ corporate (b) 20% assignment? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know 65. Would you like to specialize in some area (like finance, planning, etc) (a) 83% in future? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know (b) 10% 66. Would you willingly accept a posting at a training institution (CSA, (a) 55% Yes NIPA, etc.)? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know (b) 40% No

67. To what extent do DMG officers make efforts in establishing political (a) 63% networks and bringing political influences to bear upon internal (b) 32% bureaucratic decisions like postings? (a) a great extent (b) a (c) 5% moderate extent (c) not at all (d) don’t know 68. How important is constant training for improvement in job (a) 80% performance? (a) very important (b) somewhat important (c) not (b) 15% important 69. How many training programs have you attended since joining 52% received no service? ________ training after If you received any official foreign training(s) (from the govt. and not initial prethose managed privately/ availed through leave) please give details service training including duration. Please use reverse side of this sheet, if required. 70. How satisfied are you with the in-service training facilities available Design fault to DMG officers and the role of Career Develop. & Training Wing of double question the Estab. Division? (a) very satisfied (b) satisfied (c) in one item: dissatisfied (d) very dissatisfied (c) 47% (d)23% 71. Would you like to have more regular training programs (say a week (a) 68% Yes every year instead of the two long mandatory trainings at NIPA and (b) 28% No Staff College?(a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know 72. Is selection for training opportunities, especially foreign ones, based (c) 48% on merit? (a) often (b) sometimes (c) never (b) 35% 73. Would you favour designated special foreign trainings for DMG and (a)85% other groups for which only intra-group competition be held (b) 8% regularly? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know 74. Are you satisfied with the present ACR (performance evaluation) (b)85% mechanism? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Uncertain/ don’t know (a) 12% 75. Is the ACR more a reflection of ? (a) personal relations with (a) 85% superiors (b) actual performance (b) 5% 76. Would you like all categories of ACRs to be shown to/ discussed by (a) 82% Reporting Officers with officers being reported (as in many (b) 12% progressive organizations)? (a) Yes (b) No (c) don’t know/ uncert. 77. How do you see the recent “out of turn” promotions in the civil (b)88% services? (a) acceptable (b) not acceptable (c) any other (a)4% 78. What is your father’s/ family occupation? Please check 22% each for (b) (a) Agriculture (landowners/ cultivators) (b) Business/ trade (c) and (e) (c) Civil Services (Federal/ Provincial) (d) Defence Forces (e) Professional: Doctor/ Engineer/ Lawyer (f) Private employment (g) Any other, 79. What best describes you; please check one in each column Largest number ____ traditionally urban _____ upper class from ex-rural, ____ traditionally rural _____ upper middle class now urban ____ rural, now urbanized _____ middle class middle class, next urban, upper middle cl.

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Syed A. Akif is a member of the 1983 batch of the District Management Group; last posted as the Additional Commissioner, Karachi, he has, inter alia, served as SDM and Political Agent in Balochistan, as the Deputy Director Hajj, Madinah Munawwarah and Secretary Cotton Export Corp. Dr. Richard C. Pratt is Associate Professor and Director of the Public Administration Program at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. Virtually every article in Pakistani newspapers – which are unfortunately the only regular source for material on the civil/public services – speak in negative terms about the steady deterioration in the higher bureaucracy of Pakistan. Figure specially made available by the Federal Public Service Commission’s Research Wing for this study. This is a constantly occurring theme in virtually every book/ article on the higher bureaucracy of Pakistan and more so those on the ICS/ CSP/ DMG lineage. The figure of 69.8 represents 63 percent for DMG and 6.8 percent for the Tribal Affairs Group, a functional analogue of the DMG. The TAG was merged back into the DMG in 1983 Kennedy, Charles, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1987. pp 218-9

http://www.questionpro.com/akira/showLibrary.do One of the gurus of social science research Earl Babbie (The Practice of Social Research, Wadsworth Publishing, 1992, p 194) “Human beings who compose any real population are quite heterogeneous.” For details see, Kennedy, Charles, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, pp. 54~108, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987.