2nd Case-consti.docx

JIMENEZ vs. CABANGBANG CASE (1966) This is an action of Jimenez to recover damages for the publication of the alleged libelous open letter of Cabangbang dated November 14, 1958. The facts of the case are as follows: Jimenez filed an action to recover damages for the said publication of an alleged open letter of Cabangbang to the President dated November 14, 1958. Jimenez argued in his petition that the alleged libellous open letter was published in several newspapers of general circulation here in the Philippines. He pointed out that the publication was intended to impeach his reputation and to subject him to public contempt and ridicule. Cabangbang, on the other hand, contended that the said open letter was not libellous, or even if it was libellous, such open letter falls within the privileged communication accorded to him by the Constitution for he was a member of the House of Representatives and a Chairman of Committee on National Defense; thus, he will not be liable for damages. The issue raised in this case was whether or not the publication of the questioned open letter of Cabangbang to the President is a privileged communication Section 6 of Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution, which is the governing law at that time, states that the senators or members of house of representatives shall in all cases, except for treason, felony and breach of peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same, and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. For the case at bar, since the said open letter of Cabangbang did not fall within the purview of any speech and debate in the Congress, and the said open letter to the president was made when the Congress was not in session, and the act of publication of such open letter does not fall within Cabangbang’s official duty as a member of the House of Representatives, hence, such open letter in question was not a privileged communication for it did not met the requisites in order for it to be considered as a privileged communication

PUYAT v. DE GUZMAN CASE (1982) This case is in relation to the appearance in a court of an incumbent Assemblyman pursuant to Section 11, Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution. The facts of the case are as follows:

On May 14, 1979, private corporation International Pipe Industries Association (IPI) held an election of directors, and Puyat and his group won. The Acero group contested the win of the Puyat group claiming that the stockholders’ votes had not been properly counted. They filed a quo warranto case before the SEC. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for Acero which the Puyat Group objected by reason of the prohibition indicated in Art. VIII, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution Fernandez then stopped his appearance as counsel for the Acero Group. However, unknown to the Puyat Group, Fernandez had already purchased 10 shares for Php 200 from one of the members of the Acero group two weeks prior to their case being called. As soon as Fernandez received a notarized deed of sale for his purchase, Fernandez filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention. As owner of the 10 shares, he claimed legal interest in the matter for litigation. In July, 1979, SEC granted Fernandez’ motion to intervene on the basis of his ownership of the 10 shares The issue in this case was whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez may intervene in the SEC Case without violating the provisions of Section 11, Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution Sect.11, Art8 of the 1973 Constitution, which is the governing law at that time, provides for the prohibition of any member f the Batasang Pambansa to appear as a counsel before any court wherein the Government, or any of its subdivision, agency or instrumentality is the adverse party. Furthermore, it also provides the prohibition of any of the member of Batasang Pambansa to be interested financially, either directly or indirectly, to any contract, franchise or special privilege granted by the Government during his term of office. For the case at bar, ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. He is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the Acero Group. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the said group. BUT Fernandez’ shares are only 10 out of 262,843 outstanding shares which he acquired after a failed attempt to represent the Acero Group. There has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body which is the SEC" and, the Court ruled that such intervention of Fernandez is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition reflected in Sec 11, art 8 of the 1973 constitution. The

"intervention" was only a workaround to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.