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N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009

BACKGROUND GUIDE

United Nations/African Union M i s s i o n i n D a r f u r S p e c i a l i z e d

A g e n c i e s

 2008-2009 International Model United Nations Association, Inc. Used and distributed under license.

N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009

September 2008

Nick Stefanizzi Secretary-General Boston University

Rosa Akbari Director-General McGill University

Nancy Henry Conference Director Tufts University

Michelle Shevin Chief of Staff Barnard College

Cristina Rade Chief of External Relations Adelphi University

Ryan Burke Director of Security University of South Carolina

Matthew Low Under-Secretary-General University of California, Berkeley

Daniel Nowicki Under-Secretary-General Georgetown University

Deanna Maxfield Under-Secretary-General University of Southern California

Emily Robertson Under-Secretary-General Duke University

Lisa Cuesta Under-Secretary-General University of Pennsylvania

Jerry Guo Under-Secretary-General Dartmouth College

NHSMUN is a project of the International Model United Nations Association, Incorporated (IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-forprofit, all volunteer organization, is dedicated to furthering global issues education at the secondary school level.

Dear Delegates, Welcome to NHSMUN 2009! I serve as the Undersecretary-General (USG) for Specialized Agencies, and this is my fifth NHSMUN and third on staff. I served as the Director and Assistant Director for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) during my first two years on staff, and as a delegate I was on the ICJ and Security Council, so Specials has been near and dear to my heart for a very long time now. I have always thought that the intimacy and personality of our committees give our delegates a substantive experience that cannot be rivaled, and I am unbelievably excited to serve as the USG of Specials. I’m usually a junior at Dartmouth College studying Economics and Classical Archaeology, but I’m taking the fall off to work an internship with the Naval Postgraduate School in sunny Monterey, CA. My academic interests include international trade policy, the pottery of the Athenian empire, and the role of the UN in the modern world. In my spare time, I love arbitrarily changing the order of my Netflix queue and travel. My summer was spent working with your Directors to create the best background guides possible. I can attest to the amount of thought, research, and analysis that went into making Specials this year, and I can also guarantee that your conference experience will be the best possible. However, we fully expect you to put in a commensurate level of effort! Your research and analysis will be critical to make your committees a success. My only regret since I’ve become USG-Specials is that I’ll have far less interaction with delegates than I used to. So if you see me at any point during the conference, feel free to stop and ask me about archaeology, NHSMUN, college, or anything you want to chat about. I look forward to seeing you all in March, and good luck with your research! Sincerely, Jerry Guo [email protected] 860.420.7788

N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009

Nick Stefanizzi

September 2008

Secretary-General Boston University

Rosa Akbari Director-General McGill University

Nancy Henry Conference Director Tufts University

Michelle Shevin Chief of Staff Barnard College

Cristina Rade Chief of External Relations Adelphi University

Ryan Burke Director of Security University of South Carolina

Matthew Low Under-Secretary-General University of California, Berkeley

Daniel Nowicki Under-Secretary-General Georgetown University

Deanna Maxfield Under-Secretary-General University of Southern California

Emily Robertson Under-Secretary-General Duke University

Lisa Cuesta Under-Secretary-General University of Pennsylvania

Jerry Guo Under-Secretary-General Dartmouth College

NHSMUN is a project of the International Model United Nations Association, Incorporated (IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-forprofit, all volunteer organization, is dedicated to furthering global issues education at the secondary school level.

Dear NHSMUN delegates, Hello and welcome to NHSMUN’s very first simulation of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur, or UNAMID as we can call it from now on. My name is Chris Talamo, and I’ll be your Director this year. In case you haven’t been informed already, this committee will quite unique. Not only will you be deliberating over the UNAMID mandate, arguably the most important peacekeeping operation in the world today, but you will also be dealing with fast-paced crises that emerge from the conflict. Your creativity will be tested and you will have to rely on the full extent of your delegating prowess, but this committee will reward with a fun and enriching hands-on experience that most conferences simply don’t offer. I’ve led and participated in over a dozen crisis simulations, and already I’m more excited for this committee than I have ever been. Let me put business aside and introduce myself a little bit. I am an Astronomy and Physics double major at Dartmouth College, where I am currently a sophomore. My primary interest is in cosmology, particularly the particle dynamics of the Big Bang, where the physics of the large meets the physics of the small. When I’m not doing physics or MUN, I can be found pursuing one of my far-flung, diverse interests. I enjoy listening to music from the Romantic Era of the nineteenth century, particularly that of Tchaikovsky, Sibelius, and Dvorak. When I’m not listening, sometimes I’ll try my own hand at composition, too. I’m also very well read in the Greek and Roman classics, and I have this beautiful dream where half of my future home is library space filled with books. This is actually my very first year with NHSMUN, but I staffed my high school’s conference for four years and am currently the Secretary General of Dartmouth’s annual high school conference. Throughout all of my years, I’ve had a special penchant for crisis committees, especially when they are coupled with peacekeeping operations. I feel that this tangible style of committee is too often underrepresented at MUN conferences, and as a result, delegates usually only experience the “New York” side of the UN. Every single delegate’s opinion will be of immeasurable importance to the success of this committee, so it’s important to be aware of the situation. At the same time, dealing with the crises will almost assuredly be an exciting experience for everyone. Ultimately, the point of this simulation is to enhance your knowledge of international affairs, not save the world. The only advice I would impart to you before you embark on your research is ask questions. Everything about this committee, from its topics to the procedural rules that govern it, will be homegrown, and I would honestly be shocked if you didn’t have any questions before March. Once you come up with them, feel free to e-mail me at [email protected]. I’m really looking forward to this committee and meeting all of you over these next few months! Best regards, Chris Talamo [email protected] 0015 Hinman Hanover, NH, 03755

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION Delegate preparation is paramount to a successful and exciting National High School Model United Nations 2009 Conference. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in your committee; these papers are designed to give you a description of the topics and the committee. They will not give you a complete description of the topic areas and they will not contain the most up-to-date information, particularly in regards to rapidly evolving issues. We encourage and expect each delegate to fully explore the topics and be able to identify and analyze the intricacies of the issues. Delegates must be prepared to intelligently utilize their newly acquired knowledge and apply it to their own countries’ policy. You will find that your nation has a unique position on the topics that cannot be substituted for or with the opinions of another nation. The task of preparing and researching for the conference is challenging, but it can be interesting and rewarding. We have provided each school with a copy of the Delegation Preparation Guide. The Guide contains detailed instructions on how to write a position paper and how to effectively participate in committee sessions. (Note: some position papers have unique guidelines that are detailed within respective committees’ Background Guides.) The Guide also gives a synopsis of the types of research materials and resources available to you and where they can be found. A brief history of the United Nations and the NHSMUN conference are also included. The annotated rules of procedure complete the Delegate Preparation Guide. An essential part of representing a nation in an international body is the ability to articulate that nation’s views in writing. Accordingly, it is the policy of NHSMUN to require each delegate (or double-delegation team) to write position papers. The position papers should clearly outline the country’s policies on the topic areas to be discussed and what factors contribute to these policies. In addition, each paper must address the Research and Preparation questions at the end of the committee Background Guide. Most importantly, the paper must be written from the point of view of the country you are representing at NHSMUN 2009 and should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference. All papers should be typed and doublespaced. The papers will be read by the Director of each committee and returned at the start of the conference with brief comments and constructive advice. You are responsible for sending a copy of your paper to the Director of your committee. Additionally, your delegation is responsible for bringing a bound copy of all of the position papers—one for each committee to which your school has been assigned—to the conference (to be submitted during registration). Specific requirements of the bound copy have been sent to the faculty advisor/club president. In addition to position papers, each delegation must prepare one brief summary statement on the basic economic, political, and social structures of its country, as well as on its foreign policy. Please mail country summary statements to the Director-General of NHSMUN 2009 at the address below. All copies should be postmarked no later than February 16th and mailed to: Rosa Akbari, Director-General 3631 av. Henri-Julien Montréal, Québec H2X 3H4 Canada

Chris Talamo Dartmouth College 0015 Hinman Hanover, NH 03755

(Country Summaries)

(Individual Position Papers)

Delegations are required to mail hard copies of papers to the Director-General and Directors. NHSMUN Staff will not consider e-mail submissions as an adequate substitution. Delegations that do not submit position papers to Directors or Summary Statements to the Director-General will be ineligible for awards. -3-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

COMMITTEE INTRODUCTION The United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is easily one of the most ambitious peacekeeping missions pursued today. It employs almost ten thousand uniformed personnel from over fifty countries and has over US$1.5 billion at its disposal (A/C.5/62/30). Its purpose is to maintain the security of Darfur, a region of Sudan approximately the size of metropolitan France, where ongoing conflict since 2003 has killed over 200 thousand natives and displaced two million more (“UNAMID”). These figures only begin to hint at the scope of this rapidly developing conflict and the importance of this mission to the United Nations and African Union. UNAMID was created after pressure was applied on the African Union (AU) to replace its ailing African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). AMIS was first deployed in 2004, only one year after the UN first started to draw attention to the conflict in Darfur. At its inception, it was widely hailed as the long sought “African solution to an African problem,” as the mandate of AMIS largely allowed the AU to act independently of the UN and the international community. However, the execution of the mission proved to be too cumbersome due to a high turnover rate of commanders, poorly defined rules of engagement, and an overall lack of logistical planning (O’Neill 35-36). Many countries and organizations, including major donors to AMIS, such as the United States and European Union, began to criticize the failings of the mission and press the need for direct UN involvement. Despite its detractors, AMIS’s mandate was extended and the mission continued to be lauded by public figures at all levels of international government, including former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, until the mission’s integration into UNAMID (SG/SM/10653). It was not until the unanimous approval of S/RES/1769 on 31 July 2007 that the UN personally stepped in, after AMIS’s mandate expired with little improvement to show once again. UNAMID’s mandate has proven to be much more comprehensive and better equipped to respond to the rapid developments that take place in Darfur. However, the UNAMID mandate has gone beyond expectations in that it also successfully provides substantial consideration not only for the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan, but also for the refugees in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). As states bordering the region of Darfur, Chad and CAR have been forced to welcome hundreds of thousands of refugees and provide them with food and water. These two nation-states have repeatedly complained to Sudan and the international community that supporting the refugees is a substantial economic burden as well as a security threat (“Chad” 7). These international considerations were largely ignored by the AMIS mandate and only reiterate the notion that the conflict is not confined to one territory. UNAMID is also unique for being a mission whose mandate goes beyond the enforcement of an existing peace agreement or ceasefire. The mission is equipped to handle investigations of such violations, but also is responsible for the security, humanitarian oversight, and even the socioeconomic reconstruction of the region (“UNAMID”). This makes the mission as much a rebuilding operation as it is a peacekeeping mission, using the experimental technique of finding peace through economic development. Though the conflict is quite as complicated as it is dynamic, there is one key humanitarian concern that towers above the rest, and that is the question of genocide. There are powerful opinions and arguments on both sides from major players on the international stage, but no conclusion has been reached thus far. While influential countries like the United States and international activist groups have used the term genocide to describe the situation, other important organizations such as the UN and Amnesty International recognize the humanitarian abuses taking place without using such a definitive term. In the executive summary of the final report published by International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, it reads “killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds” (“Report”). This is the opinion that presently guides the actions taken by the UN Secretary-General and UNAMID. It should be noted, however, that the report was not entirely forgiving towards the combatants, as it strongly recommends to the Security Council that it refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for further investigation surrounding the human rights violations. -4-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

This committee will not replicate any present UNAMID body in existence today. It is instead a special, executive assembly of UN, AU, and UNAMID officials whose collective task is to make recommendations to the Security Council on how best to revise the UNAMID mandate before it expires in July 2009. By the end of the conference, the committee will be expected to have a written report compiling all of its recommendations to be released to the international community. This special task requires a number of important modifications that will distinguish this simulation from all the rest. Delegates will be filling roles instead of representing nations, with responsibilities ranging from the economic considerations of the World Bank Representative to the national interests of representatives from CAR, Chad, and Sudan. The Director and the Assistant Director will be representing the Joint AU-UN Representative (Rodolphe Adada) and the Deputy Joint AU-UN Representative (Henry Anyidoho), and the delegates will fill the remaining 17 positions. The procedural function of the committee will also be modified to facilitate the fast-paced debate that will take place considering the multitude of topics that must be addressed. (The specifics of the UNAMID simulation are thoroughly detailed in the next section.) The most substantial and obvious difference in this simulation will be the use of crises during committee. While delegates’ primary task will be to revise the existing mandate, the people delegates represent are ultimately responsible for the execution of the current mandate as well. Throughout committee sessions, delegates will be confronted with urgent developments in Darfur that must be addressed in a timely fashion. These developments will interrupt the committee’s deliberations on the mandate, so delegates should be prepared to rapidly change gears from mandate deliberations to crisis management lest the ground developments get out of hand. Field updates will take a number of forms, including newspaper articles, formal reports from ground forces (police and military alike), and tips from people and organizations operating in the area; as such, delegates should be familiar with all aspects of the conflict. Because this crisis format is new to NHSMUN, we will be holding a simulation crisis via e-mail during the weeks leading up to the conference. Delegates are encouraged to contact the dais at [email protected] as soon as possible in order to receive the updates surrounding this crisis. With the plethora of updates and the heavy burden of revising the UNAMID mandate, this committee will require a great deal of preparation and research with special requirements for the position paper, which will be discussed later in this guide. The intention of this committee is to give delegates a sense of how UNrelated politics takes place outside of UN Headquarters in New York. Delegates will hopefully realize that peacekeeping and security maintenance have radically different needs and requirements than resolution writing, but both are integral to the function of the United Nations. A good way to characterize this is the difference between field work and laboratory work. Laboratory work is likely what the delegates are used to: they are put in a safe, sheltered room to discuss political theory on broad, through important issues facing the international community today. This committee will be exercising fieldwork, where the pace of life will be too fast for concerns about theories and desires. The dais will recognize the practical success of delegates’ actions rather than their predicted utility. It should be noted, however, that the same NHSMUN philosophies apply to this committee. Education, as well as compromise, will be very important to the dais. Ultimately, even a failure to maintain the security of Darfur will be acceptable as long as the delegates walk away with a sense of how peacekeepers do their jobs, a side of international relations long neglected by MUN conferences.

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

SIMULATION This simulation has a slew of special needs separate from any other committee, and so many of the procedural rules that delegates may be used to are changed to accommodate for those needs. This committee is unique in that it is a crisis-driven committee with executive responsibilities for maintaining an ongoing peacekeeping operation. However, it is also unique as a committee not driven towards a resolution, but rather the revision of the mandate of this peacekeeping mission. These two obligations will be impressed upon the delegates at all times. While the delegates are expected to produce a revised mandate by the end of the simulation, they must remember their responsibilities to the existing one, and they must be willing to drop discussion of the mandate to confront any major difficulties that may arise. These different responsibilities require different procedural mechanisms, so the rules that the delegates may be used to will be heavily modified during both the mandate review and crisis management portions of the simulation. In fact, it is fair to say that the rules we use in this committee will barely resemble standard parliamentary procedure. Therefore, delegates are encouraged to read through these new procedures closely. Prior to any discussion of how debate will function during the mandate and crisis phases of the committee, delegates should be aware of the extent of their executive powers. In order to complete their obligation to fulfill the objectives of the current mandate, the members of the committee will be directly responsible for the integrity of the ceasefire. Along with this responsibility come a number of powers available to the delegates. First, it should be noted that everyone in the simulation will be playing a particular, unique role. These roles are very specialized and delegates filling each role will be responsible for fulfilling their specific duties. For example, although the force commander should be knowledgeable of all aspects of the current situation (including diplomatic matters), he or she should be especially knowledgeable of the status and deployment of the peacekeepers deployed in the region and will be considered the committee’s expert concerning such matters. In the same vein, each role will also have its own individualized executive powers. Continuing with the example of the force commander, no redeployment of the peacekeepers can be executed without the positive vote of the force commander, effectively giving him or her veto power concerning military affairs. Each role has its own departmental duties and privileges, which will come into play throughout the simulation. (For a more detailed account of the roles and their duties and function, see the Roles section.) When all of the roles are combined, the committee essentially has full executive power over the UNAMID mission. Delegates may negotiate for, request, or reapportion from the existing budget more funding for IDPs, reapportion new funds for new civil or economic programs, ask the World Bank for more investments in the region, or anything else at their immediate disposal. If you can think it, it is likely you can do it. There are important limits, however, to this power. Obviously, the committee cannot perform an action that is under the express purview of another body. For example, the committee cannot approve an international economic sanction against Sudan because that is solely the Security Council’s responsibility. Delegates must be constantly aware of where they fit in the UN bureaucracy, including who is responsible to them and who they are responsible to, if they wish to be effective on the international stage. If they do not have the authority to take an action but know of the body that can, it is certainly possible for the delegates to place pressure on the responsible organizations. For example, the committee can request more peacekeepers from the UN and the AU, but it cannot assume that it has those troops at its disposal before both bodies confirm so, nor can it assume that the two organizations will agree to their request. These may seem like obvious comments, but this balance between the committee’s executive power and the power they actually have to make requests for must be constantly and vigilantly observed. Another obvious limit to the committee’s power, though arguably the most important one of all, is the sovereignty of the countries involved. Sudan, Chad, and CAR are all states recognized by the United Nations and must be respected as such. Not only that, but each of the three countries have their own vested interests -6-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

in the conflict, including political, economic, and humanitarian considerations. Additionally, the UNAMID mission is operating domestically with the permission of Sudan; taking any actions that places that permission at risk also places the entire mission at risk. Chad and the CAR are also independent, sovereign states with national interests at stake in this dispute that also must also be respected. Committee Debate The committee’s procedural function will be broken up into the crisis and mandate segments discussed earlier, with each having its own special rules. The discussion of the mandate of UNAMID will more closely resemble the debate style used in most other committees. When the committee begins at the first session, it will utilize formal debate and speaker’s list. As committee proceeds, it is expected that delegates will utilize an indefinite moderated caucus for substantive discussion. Because moderated caucuses encourage delegates to present many ideas at once, it will become prudent from time to time for the committee to either make a speakers list or enter a round-robin of speeches so that each delegate have an extended period of time to present to the committee which proposal they support and explain the reasons why. Delegates will be able to request these through motions, and the dais may call them at any time. Alternatively, delegates may also elect to enter unmoderated caucuses as needed. Document Production The primary goal of the discussion surrounding the mandate will be to create a series of recommendations to the Security Council concerning how the mandate should be amended. This will be accomplished by creating a detailed report addressed to the Security Council. This report will not be formatted like a normal resolution. Instead of operative and perambulatory clauses, the report will be written in paragraph format broken down into subtopics. Full, English sentences will be required, and the report should use headers to distinguish the various topics it aims to address. The committee may choose to report on as many or as few topics as it deems are pertinent to the current situation. In some respects, the procedure will be similar to that of the Security Council: each proposal will require at least five sponsors and/or signatories to be considered, and all proposals will require a 2/3 majority vote from all attending members to pass. However, there are a number of important changes. Only one report will be allowed to pass, although dissenting opinions may be written as addendums to the report. This means that if there is more than one proposal being voted upon on the floor and the first one passes, all subsequent proposals will automatically fail. All work on the report should be done in committee at the conference. No prewritten work, whether it is an entire report or a section of one, will be accepted. Crisis Debate The crisis-reaction portion of the committee will be much more heavily modified. Because the debate during these segments of debate will need to be much faster in order to appropriately react to the situations that arise, the dais will encourage the committee to enter a moderated roundtable format. This new type of debate will be similar to an unmoderated caucus in that delegates may speak freely without being called upon by the dais. However, not all of the rules will be suspended and minimal restrictions will be placed on the delegates. It is expected that all delegates participate in this debate, regardless of the topic. Delegates should use this time to release, debate, and agree upon ideas at an accelerated pace, not to divide into caucus groups and debate individual proposals. Should the committee have multiple documents to write quickly or otherwise desire to break up into specialized groups, the committee may make a motion to enter an unmoderated caucus. As with discussions surrounding the mandate, the delegates will also be expected to break into rounds of speeches throughout the deliberation of the crisis in order to clear the air and to present the full reasoning behind various proposals. All motions to accomplish any of these tasks may be done in the same way as in debate over the mandate. The vagaries between the two segments will be discussed at a special rules briefing prior to the first committee session. Although this not mandatory, it is very strongly encouraged that delegates attend this session, as the Director and Assistant Director will explain how the committee will function in much greater detail. -7-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

Various Documents The resolution output for the crisis portions will also be heavily modified; in fact, because of the rapid nature of the updates, there will not be any resolutions at all. There will instead be three types of documents that the committee can pass during this time: (1) press releases, (2) communiqués, and (3) plans of action. Press releases and communiqués are similar documents, but with significantly different uses. Press releases are exactly that —announcements to the press. Reuters International is the official news agency of the United Nations and will be the one to receive and distribute all press releases produced by the committee. These documents are particularly useful for addressing the international community as a whole or for influencing public opinion. It should be noted that any press released the committee makes must reflect the face of the entire UNAMID mission. Therefore, the supporting organizations (including important donors) cannot support statements that violate the current UNAMID mandate and could put the entire operation in jeopardy. Therefore, the words of any press release must be chosen with the utmost care. Communiqués are addressed to particular recipients. Anyone who can get to a newspaper can read a press release, but communiqués are sent via secure channels to the intended recipients, whether they are countries, organizations, or individual people. Depending on the circumstances, a delegate may wish to delay presenting privileged information to the entire committee. Bear in mind, however, that information travels quickly through diplomatic circuits so delegates should not expect to be able to keep information privileged for too long. Communiqués can be written to anyone who will receive them, whether they are individuals, governments, or organizations. Action plans are of an entirely different nature. Action plans will be to this committee as resolutions are to others: they will be the delegates’ primary and most important tool for changing the situation in Darfur on the ground. Action plans exercise the invested executive powers of the committee in any way that it sees fit. Moving troops, redirecting aid, distributing pamphlets or contraceptives, or anything else the delegates can think of that does not involve diplomatic communication falls under the purview of this document. Standard resolutions take far too long to write and are ineffective for reacting to crises in a timely manner, which is why committee will not be using resolutions for crises. The action plan instead strips all of the formalities surrounding a resolution, such as preambulatory clauses, which makes the plan easier to write quickly. The action plan is simply comprised of sponsors and operatives. (An example of an action plan is included in Appendix.) Even this format is flexible, though. As long as both parts of the action plan are on paper and legible, the dais will be satisfied. Communiqués and Press Releases: Here, we should also make a note of voting procedures, as that will determine which documents actually go into effect. Communiqués that are sent from individuals concerning private matters (e.g. the EU Representative contacting the EU, UNDP contacting Attaché from Sudan, etc.) do not need to come before a public vote; they simply may be handed to the dais, which will then pass it through the appropriate channels. Jointcommuniqués from UNAMID as a whole, press releases, and action plans, however, require committee approval. Each of these documents must first have two members as sponsors (there are no signatories for these documents) before they can be entertained. Once a specific document has proper support, the dais will take the document and formally recognize it by making it available for the committee to read. Of course, the individual delegate is not expected to be sheltered from their home committees or associations. It would be unreasonable for the Force Commander not to be apprised of the situation with the troops on the ground, or for the World Bank Representative not to be kept up to date with the investments the organization is willing to make in the region. Because of this, delegates should also expect to receive communiqués from their offices and departments, which will be managed through the dais. These letters are written exclusively to the delegates to whom they are addressed, and are not shared with the remainder of the committee. A delegate who receives a private communiqué may choose to either distribute the information or keep it secret, depending on his or her motives in the committee. The delegates may also, in turn, write back -8-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

to their offices or even initiate the conversation if they have a specific question to ask of them, but delegates should keep in mind that these communiqués take time to send and the offices take time to construct responses, so speed is not included in these requests. In order to send a communiqué, a delegate need only write up what he or she desires to say, and then pass the note to the dais. These documents are meant to enhance the personal aspect of the committee, giving each delegate his or her special role and purpose that is a distinguishing mark from the other delegates. Action Plans: To begin the voting procedure on action plans, the committee must approve a motion to move into voting procedure, which requires a simple majority to pass. Once voting begins, the committee must vote on all proposals recognized by the dais. Proposals that pass are sent out to begin going into effect; proposals that fail are returned to one of the sponsors and are no longer recognized by the dais as-is. That said, the failed document may be revised and resubmitted in the same process. All proposals require a two-thirds majority as well as the approval of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to pass. Field Updates: The delegates will also be receiving documents from the world around them, which will have their own erratic formats. Some of the reports will come from Reuters International, but others will come from less formal sources. Delegates should expect official reports to come from the ground forces present in Darfur and the investigative teams that regularly look into allegations that the ceasefire has been broken. These are reports that are released directly to the management of UNAMID and are not public knowledge unless the committee chooses to make a specific report into a press release. Finally, delegates should also expect to receive very informal reports from other forces on the ground, including teams sent by NGOs and humanitarian organizations. These reports will not be easily confirmed given their source and informal nature, but are still a valuable asset to the overall operations of the mission. Timeframe All correspondence given to the committee will be accompanied with a month and day and delegates will be closely apprised of any jumps in time that take place. Of course, delegates may also ask the dais what the date is whenever they are in doubt. This system is designed to ensure that the committee always has something on the floor to discuss, while preventing long waits for larger, more time-consuming proposals to go into effect.

Clearly, this committee is functionally and procedurally unique, and these many pages of modifications to standard MUN rules may seem daunting at first. As long as the delegates come into the committee having read this document and possessing at least a rudimentary understanding of how the committee will function, however, all will be well. Delegates will learn the most about the committee just simply by being in it. Of course, if there are any questions or concerns, please send them to [email protected]. We will respond as quickly and thoroughly as possible. In summary, here is a table outlining the differences between the two debate styles:

DEBATE DIFFERENCES Mandate Debate

Crisis Debate

Preferred Debate Style

Moderated Caucus

Document Output

Mandate Revisions

Voting Requirements

2/3 Majority

Roundtable Action Plans, Communiqués, Press Releases 2/3 Majority

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

POSITION PAPER GUIDELINES Instead of the standard position paper, we will be simulating actual reports that a delegate to this body may write. The paper will be broken up into two parts: personal background and solutions. The personal background is anything but a recap of the history of the Darfur conflict. Each delegate should write a background on his/her role’s specific facet of the conflict. For example, the Sudanese attaché should write a detailed background on Sudan’s participation and influence on the development of the situation. Other delegates, such as the UNDP representative, should not only chronicle the Programme’s impact on the region, but should also investigate relative development efforts in general. If you are in doubt about how far you should research, the most advisable course of action is to either [email protected], or do more. Delegates are encouraged to research all related aspects of the Darfur conflict, as no one role in committee is completely autonomous from the rest; topics not directly related to a delegate’s assigned role, however, should not make up the most significant parts of the paper. In the solution portion of the position paper, each delegate will have a chance to demonstrate his/her creative capabilities, an important aspect of solving the crises as they will be presented. As with the background portion, delegates should focus on solutions that fall under their area of expertise. Delegates should make sure, however, to address every facet of the conflict at some point. (The subtopics listed in the Current Status should serve as a sufficient outline for topics to be discussed.) This does not mean that the topics presented in this guide should all receive simple courtesy remarks; every topic should have a well thought out solution backed by facts (which are very important to any solution). The topics corresponding to the delegate’s role should have particularly detailed solutions. Ultimately, this section is crucial as delegates’ ideas are a better indicator of the delegates’ thinking and strategies than their ability to recant background information. Overall, both sections of the guide should be written as though they were being addressed to the director of their department, government, or organization. While the e-mail account for this committee is always open for delegates so that they may use the dais’s expertise as a resource, there are some questions that I can answer. A mention of an expected page count is purposely omitted. Delegates should end their paper when they feel that they have addressed everything that they want to no matter how long that is. That said, if your paper is reaching upwards of 13 pages or more, it may be beneficial to to review and edit. The purpose of this paper is not to emulate professional-level expertise and prose, but rather gain a strong familiarity with the topic and its myriad nuances. Remember, NHSMUN is intended to be a learning experience –not a homework assignment. The Director will read and closely examine all delegates’ submission and return each with various constructive comments. In the interests of the crisis, all questions pertaining to their logistics will be happily answered. Any information regarding what topics are more important than others, however, will not be disclosed. The crises that the delegates will deal with will be comprehensive in nature and will require the input and expertise of every delegate in the room. Any questions concerning where to find information on a specific topic will be immediately forwarded to the bibliography at the end of this guide. All papers must also have an accompanying bibliography in MLA format. In-text citations should also be provided in MLA format whenever necessary.

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

HISTORY INTRODUCTION TO DARFUR While the modern Darfur conflict has much more recent origins, an examination of the history of Darfur is necessary to understand how the conflict came to be. Looking even beyond the arrival of the Europeans during the Age of Imperialism will enhance delegates’ understanding of the true state of the region. Though it was never popular in the presses of European and American newspapers, the land we know as Darfur was instrumental in the development of modern East Africa. In the language of the Fur, a tribe that principally inhabits Darfur, Darfur literally means “the land of the Fur,” a misnomer in light of the local demographics. Darfur has a rich history including a plethora of nomadic tribes fighting for the right to their lands, with Fur tribes making up only one segment of the population. Note that “tribe” and “ethnicity” are not synonymous; multiple tribes can find a common ethnic heritage while being independent entities. This may seem odd in light of the modern concept of a nation-state, which defines a political entity as a collection of people with a common culture and heritage. It may be helpful to consider ethnicity as a force connecting certain tribes with tribes as discrete political entities. Though there are fewer tribes that would describe themselves as “Arab,” people identifying as Arabs have been long present in Darfur. They originally came as traders and scholars to Africa from the Middle East in a nomadic fashion, integrating into the various societies of Darfur via marriage. Despite their mingling with Darfurian cultures, the Arab culture remained very prominent in the region, which is, in part, due to the fact that identifying as an Arab helped protect against being sold into slavery (Flint 8). It is difficult to find accurate measurements of local demographics to put all of these ethnicities into perspective. There has been no official census since 1956, which was conducted by Sudan just before declaring independence from the United Kingdom (Daly 12). Prior to that, other attempts were made by the UK to achieve a demographic measurement of Darfur’s total population, but each investigation yielded unnaturally fluctuating numbers that would jump by over 75% in both directions during spans of less than a decade (Daly 11). Information on tribes other than the Fur is even more difficult to come across due to the number of smaller tribes and their minority status. Even though there have been advances made in communications technology, demographic information like this has not permeated to Figure I: Tribal Lands in Modern Darfur (Source: Institute for Security Studies)

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

the outside world. This is especially important given that the current conflict changes demographics on a daily basis. The history that follows is not meant to be a comprehensive guide to the entire history of Darfur. Instead, key topics that delegates may normally overlook are targeted. Some topics are just briefly covered (or even omitted) as it is assumed delegates can research these issues on their own. That said, all delegates are encouraged to research all of the topics discussed here and go beyond the text. If the committee is to address the problems afflicting this region, it will require the resourcefulness and ingenuity of all delegates present, which will only be possible if each person comes to NHSMUN well researched. PRE-COLONIAL DARFUR: SHATTERING A FRACTURED NATION The Fur came to prominence in the region in the early 17th century in the aftermath of the collapse of the Tanjur Empire; the Keira, a Fur tribe, rose to prominence and established the Sultanate of Darfur. At this point, Darfur was a notable crossroads region along an African pilgrimage route to Mecca, and it also served as a hub for slave trade in the region. Darfur regularly shipped most of its exports through Egypt via the Forty Days Road. People who were not Egyptian traders, however, had little knowledge of Darfur because of the geographic barriers that the Nile’s cataracts and the Sahara Desert presented (Daly 29); the Sultanate remained relatively unknown throughout most of its history, which began in 1596. Over time and multiple rulers, the Sultanate consolidated its grip over Darfur and the neighboring region of Kordofan. Sultan Ahmed Bahr, who ruled over the widest extent of the Darfur Sultanate from 1682-1722, took his armies to the Nile River before being assassinated (Global 5). Despite consolidation, all was not harmonious in Darfur. For one, the nomadic lifestyle that persisted among most of the tribes made taxation and military mobilization difficult. This was especially problematic in the Sultanate’s southern reaches where the Baqqara people, a nomadic Muslim Bedouin group, proved particularly resistant to foreign rule. They maintained their own economy and trade practices and even bought their own weapons from foreign powers (Daly 36). In addition to this, the sheltered geography that allowed the Darfur Sultanate to grow as long as it did also prevented it from attaining technological advancements. The Sultanate made an effort to provide their military with proper weapons only after the Baqqara has already increased their own arms. Perhaps more telling, the succession of the Sultanate was not legally defined in any way. Sultans would normally father many sons among their multitude of wives and concubines, each of which had an equal opportunity at the throne. Even before the Sultan passed away, conflict among the princes, often resulting in murder and exile, became the way a prince established himself as the rightful heir to the throne (Daly 22). This produced years of dangerous political instability as claimants to the throne gradually assembled in enemy lands to conspire against the Sultanate they hoped to someday lead. Egypt was also undergoing significant changes at this time, which had dramatic impact on the evolution of Darfur. In the early nineteenth century, Egypt was recovering from a disastrous French invasion led by Napoleon. In addition, Albanian mercenaries brought to the country refused to acknowledge a new leader. Thus, Muhammad Ali, the deputy commander of the Albanians, was placed in command (McGregor 54). After some time, Muhammad Ali then not only took control as Wāli [governor], but also as the Khedive [prince] of Egypt, setting himself far above other provincial rulers in the Ottoman Empire (which Egypt was a part of despite its near-rebellious autonomy). In Sudan, Muhammad Ali saw a significant source of wealth, trade, and manpower, and an opportunity to further exemplify himself as an autonomous provincial governor. The end for the Darfur Sultanate came when the Egyptians rode into Kordofan. Ali launched an invasion of Darfur via Kordofan in 1821, becoming derailed by revolts before finally being able to take Darfur (Daly 35). Egypt continued to claim Darfur even though they had not occupied the territory, but the Sultanate persisted in a prostrated state.

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

The end of Egyptian dominance over Darfur came with the curious incident of the Sudanese Mahdist rebellion in 1881.1 Hailing from Dongola, a small village along the Nile, Muhammad Ahmad Abdallah ignited a spiritual and political rebellion when he declared himself to be the Mahdi, a movement that spread throughout Egyptian Sudan and manifested itself as a new nation. In a number of key battles throughout Sudan, the Egyptians were continuously routed, weakening the political clout of the Khedivate and forcing it to turn to European aid; the UK was the power that answered the pleas for help. They poured more men and resources into diplomatically courting Egypt, but these appointees actually encouraged Egypt to abandon Sudan and use diplomacy to encourage tribal rebellions (Daly 69). The Mahdists continued their expansion into Darfur and even into portions of Abyssinia, though they had decidedly less success in the latter region. The Mahdist state, which established its capital in the town of Omdurman, immediately ordered tribal leaders to swear fealty to them once they were conquered, an act resented by many of Figure II: Extent of Mahdist Control in Sudan the tribes. One significant rebellion was (Source: Institute for Security Studies) led by Yusuf Ibrahim, a member of the Keira family with a claim to the former sultanate. Initially allying himself with the Mahdist state, he soon decided to decline their order to swear allegiance and attempted to break Darfur away as his own demesne. He was quickly put down by Mahdist forces, but his powerful uprising was a movement with immense popular support and signaled where the loyalties of the Darfurian tribes remained (Daly 72-73). At this point, over thirty years of mobilization, defeat, conquest, and constantly changing governments had tired the region and its people. The royal family that had unified the region for so many years was trapped in hiding and was as divided as the people of Darfur. With every new invasion and administration, new divisive opinions would creep into Darfurian society, further dividing the inhabitants and placing pressure upon the tribes’ nomadic lifestyle. This pressure was transmitted to every aspect of Darfurian life, as alliances fell apart, customs were abandoned, and nomadic dar were constricted. In some unfortunate cases, tribes were entirely expelled from Darfur. However, this was only the beginning of the demolition of Darfur, for during the period of British rule, Darfur would once again find itself as a crossroad empire and attracting unwanted attention from jealous powers.

1


In the Sunni Islamic faith, it is foretold that a man known as the Mahdi will bring justice to all Muslims and signal the end of the world, bringing salvation to all of the faithful (Daly 61). Many Mahdis have risen in the past, though few have had as significant impact as the Sudanese Mahdi of the nineteenth century. 
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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

COLONIAL DARFUR: RESURGENCE AND REMISSION The onset of heavy British influence after the Anglo-Egyptian invasion of Sudan marks the decline of Darfur’s importance to Sudanese politics. After the establishment of the Mahdist state, African territories became rare due to the notorious “Scramble for Africa.” With fewer places to turn, the UK soon turned its eyes on Egypt and Sudan. Egypt was already requesting vast amounts of aid and assistance and, in the eyes of the international community, was decidedly in the British sphere of influence despite the fact that it was a de jure Ottoman province. Turning away from its noninterventionist policy in the past, the UK soon came to see the Mahdist nation as a threat after its following proliferated throughout most of modern Sudan. The preparations for the AngloEgyptian in Sudan war involved cooperation and contribution from both the British and the Egyptians. The British were to provide the command structure and the military manpower for the invasion and the Egyptians were to bear the financial costs of the war that was, in theory, for reunification with their territory (Daly 88). The war, which lasted from 1896-1899, was a definitive success for the Anglo-Egyptian force, which quickly established itself in the region. What evolved in the remains of the Mahdist nation is known as the AngloEgyptian Condominium that held power from 1899-1956, named so because the local government was nominally Egyptian, but the important posts were manned by British men who carefully oversaw the management of Britain’s ally. Khartoum was reestablished as the capital of Sudan at this time. With the fall of the Mahdist governor in November 1899, a power vacuum evolved that tempted all for a mad dash towards the throne. A man by the name of Ali Dinar emerged from the chaos and established himself as the Sultan of Darfur, a post that was previously held empty for nearly thirty years (Daly 90); the AngloEgyptian Condominium was satisfied with Dinar as the new sultanate. Indeed, as long as he complied with the Condominium’s wishes and remained a dependency, the British command in Cairo saw no problem with Darfur’s independence. Darfur had few resources for an industrialized country and the recent decades of war had torn the region apart. For many years, Sultan Ali Dinar remained independent from direct British rule, enjoying a period of benign neglect. During this period, Darfur was successful in most aspects of life and began to heal after many years of turmoil. Of course, tribal infighting remained, especially from tribes that remained loyal to the Mahdi. Such tribes continually launched small insurgencies against the Sultanate, but were never strong enough to destabilize the government (Daly 102). During Dinar’s rule, the French were expanding their Saharan Empire into modern Chad, and quickly defeated the Wadai in 1912, a non-Muslim kingdom that broke away from Darfur in the 17th century and resisted reintegration, with alarming ease. Benign neglect was no longer satisfactory for Sultan Dinar, evident as he proceeded to intensely lobby Britain for support against the French. France was actually in support of an agreement with the UK, however, to formally declare a border between Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the French protectorate of Chad. This would require the UK to occupy Darfur to enforce the border, a task the British saw no merit in pursuing. To France and the UK, Darfur was a pawn in a large colonial chess game, and to the UK, imposing a border was a liability almost not worth the time. The actual needs of the Darfur Sultanate and Dinar were ignored completely, as were the dynamic nature of the nomadic tribal lands – ultimately, this artificial border would cage the wandering tribes of Darfur and greatly affect their lifestyles and economies. In 1899 Sir Reginald Wingate, a staunch long-time opponent of Darfurian independence, was awarded command of Sudan, quickly pursuing a campaign to take down the Sultanate. This was only made easier by the United Kingdom’s 1915 declaration of Egypt as a British protectorate, further undermining the existing Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. With the declaration, Sudan became, for all intents and purposes, an independent British colony. Wingate took steps to arm and mobilize the nomads of northern Kordofan in an effort to bring down Dinar. With the help of other tribes, the British successfully invaded in 1916 and quickly routed Dinar’s armies; Dinar was killed later that year. Wingate completely reorganized the government of Darfur into a model more amenable to the UK. The British’s indirect style of colonial rule established a governmental chain of command that exploited the loyalties of existing tribal leaders. -

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

What is notable about this period is the fact that there were no social foundations established during British rule. Because everything was left in the hands of local rulers and considering that Darfur had little to offer in terms of trade or exports, the British found little reason to invest in the region. In 1928, revenue brought to Khartoum by Darfur totaled 57,575 British pounds, while the total income stood at about £6 million (Daly 139). In the Khartoum national archives, the file labeled “Economic Development, Darfur Province” has only five files within it between the dates of 1917 and 1950 (Flint 12). Schools, roads, health clinics, and other public services were completely absent from the entire province, even as the British government was trying to encourage the nomadic tribes to settle. This was not the case, however, throughout Sudan. At the Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum, there were no students in Darfur enrolled in 1929 and only one in 1934, while students even from similarly impoverished regions in South Sudan were represented in fair quantity (Daly 135). These concerns and rising complaints from the people of Darfur would continue through British and into Sudanese rule. The great depression of the 1930s and the Second World War of the 1940s only accelerated Darfur’s decline. Darfur finally had an opportunity for a turning point after the UK announced that it was opening an inquiry into Sudanese independence, which was granted in 1949 after a protracted withdrawal of British troops. Almost immediately, Egyptian nationalism spilled over into Sudan and calls for unification with Egypt spread across the protectorate (Daly 156). Darfurians in el-Fasher staged a protest against such unification in 1948, but little political change came of it. Instead, throughout the years leading to the pivotal 1953 national parliamentary election, a number of political parties formed in Darfur. Some were divided along tribal boundaries, some geographical, and one was even nurtured by the British as supporting rural provinces. When time for the elections came, however, the parties themselves were still divided and often in a state of confusion. Some candidates proved to be ineligible due to illiteracy or just did not campaign at all (Daly 174). The resulting parties were heavily divided, and Darfur sent an impotent delegation to Khartoum. During this colonial period, Darfur fell further behind the other Sudanese provinces. Infrastructure was kept at a minimum, social services were all but unheard of, and disease and famine were rampant. Worse yet, Darfur was both economically and politically powerless and unable to prevent the strife that would seize their new nation over the next fifty years. SUDANESE DARFUR: THE FORGOTTEN CONFLICT During Sudanese rule, Darfur continued to stagnate economically, prompting various political changes. From the perspective of Khartoum, Darfur was a large, sparsely populated, and financially limited province in the west. It continued to become less important in the eyes of the new rulers, as pressing issues like the still raging civil war in South Sudan. In the meantime, Darfur managed to survived three coups (1958, 1964, 1969), but never experienced any considerable growth. More importantly, the only major change that came with independence was the absence of a foreign presence. The newly independent Sudan just continued British policy of settling Darfur using highly centralized government. These are the foundations for the complaints that Darfurian rebels would raise in the present decade. The People’s Local Government Act of 1971 created a federal structure of administration for the provinces, with executive councils overlooking each of the ten provinces of Sudan (Metz 15). This worked to enhance Khartoum’s presence in the rural provinces, accelerating Darfur’s rate of assimilation into Sudanese culture while effectively destroying the nomadic dar system in one fell swoop. In 1973, a droughts hit Darfur, prompting a great famine that forced many tribes to attempt to migrate elsewhere. The strict regional government made transit difficult, however, and in the resulting confusion, many tribes began to lose their identities in favor of local affiliations. A great cultural amalgamation took place as tribes found themselves settling with other tribes. The Regional Government Act of 1980 furthered this goal by placing a centralized regional government in charge of Darfur (while South Sudan became a self-governing province). Subsequently, Khartoum had much more direct rule over Darfur and saw to it that people assimilated quickly.

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

Though famine-causing droughts continued, it was during this time that tangible (yet limited) international aid began to reach Darfur. In addition to the Second Sudanese Civil War distracting domestic and international attention away from Darfur, aid was also limited because of the region’s general inaccessibility (Daly 232). After droughts and poor harvests of 1983 and Table III: Deaths during the 1985 famine (de Waal “Famine” 12) 1984, a particularly severe famine struck Darfur again in 1985 with what little aid resources available split between Darfur and Chadian refugees. In terms of mortality rates, this famine was one of the worse that Darfur had experienced (see Table I). Aside from basic neglect, many other factors contributed to the general disarray in the region. Libya’s longstanding conflict with Chad over borders and influence was beginning to spill over into Darfur. Mercenaries sponsored by Libya’s leader, Muammar al-Ghaddafi from northern Chad were resettling in North Darfur to be retrained and rearmed. Consequently, some of the native Zaghawa tribes became accessories to the conflict. At the same time, the struggling Chadian government in Ndjamena beseeched some Darfurian tribes for help (Daly 218-219); a sizeable number answered the call. What is truly relevant, however, are the implications of the Chadian War on the development of groups involved in the modern conflict in Darfur. Pro-Libyan tribes found themselves heavily armed after the conflict. Years of Libyan propaganda that Arabs were being oppressed by the “African” governments in Darfur and Chad made these dangerous tribes quite resentful (Daly 243). Many blame this combination of variables for the emergence of the Janjaweed militias that emerged in the mid 1990s. Some also attribute tribes’ associations with the Chadian government during the 1980s as paving the foundation of the modern group, the Justice and Equality Movement (Jem). (Coincidently, the group shares the same Zaghawa tribal heritage as Chadian President Idriss Deby.) War between these groups of Darfurian tribes broke out with astonishing frequency, consistently pitting Arabs against Africans (and vice versa). Despite these violent tensions, however, the government in Khartoum and the international community found little interest in Darfur. If one was to even consider Sudan at this time, the revitalization of the Second Sudanese Civil War in the south always too precedence –the humanitarian and ethnic conflicts sprouting in Darfur seemed like mere afterthoughts in comparison. COUP D’ÉTAT AND THE RISE OF MODERN SUDAN On 30 June 1989, modern Sudan was born. A group of army officers led by Omar Hasan al-Bashir launched a successful coup that ousted elected Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdri from office; the operation was supported by Hassan al-Turabi and the National Islamic Front (NIF), an “urban-based Islamic party” shadowing Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (“National Islamic Front”); the organization always had clear aims to transform Sudan into an Islamic state ruled by shari’a law. The NIF’s ideologue, Hassan al-Turabi ultimately named alBashir as president –the post he holds to this day. Various other cabinet positions were given to NIF members, including posts for the Minister of Finance, vice-president. The timing of this coup was notable for the fact that it interrupted the largely successful 1988 Addis Ababa peace negotiation between PM Mahdri and the secular Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The NIF, rejected many stipulations in the then-unsigned peace agreement, and war broke out anew. Needless to say, the SPLM found the change to a non-secular regime particularly threatening. Darfur remained a region of violence and mobilization throughout the 1990s. Although a tentative peace agreement was signed between warring tribes in South Sudan, enforcement of the treaty was minimal and resentment continued to percolate through groups. The now deceased Sheikh Hilal Abdalla, a prominent (and somewhat controversial) figure among Islamists, claims that Arab nomads are frequently barred from their -

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

usual migratory routes by African tribes, notably the Fur (Flint 34). At the same time, Arab refugees from Chad began fleeing to Darfur, not only disrupting regional traditions and pushing natives out of ancestral grazing lands, but also absorbing food aid that many native Darfurians considered their own. Back in Khartoum, Bashir worked to consolidate power, dissolving the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC) in 1993. Although the RCC was essentially an extension of authority to fellow military officers, Bashir’s dissolution of Sudan’s acting legislative branch was seen by Africans as both an aggressive and foreboding move. From that point on, the NIF became known as the “National Congress Party” (“National Islamic Front”). In 1994, Darfur was partitioned into the three segments it remains in today: Shamal Darfur (North Darfur), Janub Darfur (South Darfur), and Gharb Darfur (West Darfur). The Zaghawa tribe concentrated in the North, the Masseleit in West Darfur, and the Fur remained around the Jebel Marra mountains in Northeastern Darfur. Some speculate that the division was carefully manufactured to ensure that African tribes remained the minority in each state. In 1995, tensions mounted inside a region located in West Darfur along the border with Chad. The region had long been a strong base for the Umma Party, a secular Islamist political group loosely related to the Mahdists and party of former PM Mahdri; the party enjoyed relative political stability and self-rule throughout most of its history. Party faithful in the region, however, became concerned that they might become disenfranchised by the African Masseleit and complained to President Bashir (Flint 57). Given the Umma Party’s Islamist leanings, Bashir had no issue sponsoring a reorganization of the region by dividing “traditional Masseleit lands into 13 emirates” with some subsequently headed by Arab groups (“Unifying Darfur’s Rebels”). This set off an explosive conflict between the native African Masseleit and the Arab tribes, with raids and murder becoming commonplace among both sides. The conflict is also often noted as the beginnings of the Janjaweed within Sudan. These Arab militias systematically raid African villages and despite their small numbers, consistent access to horses, camels, and automatic weapons makes them no match for the civilians they attack. SPARK OF CONFLICT IN DARFUR: FEBRUARY 2003 The first confirmed attack in Darfur took place on 26 February, 2003 on the town of Golo by the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF). By March 2003, the DLF regrouped and renamed itself the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), with Mini Arkoi Minawi as its leader. Although the SLA did not fully come into fruition until 2003, military training began when a group of African Zaghawa, including a young Minna Arkoi Minawi, agreed to train a few Fur men on Jabal Marra, a culturally significant extinct volcano located around the crux of the three Darfur states (Daly 296). Quickly, the SLA caught the attention of the Sudanese People Liberation Movement, which was still occasionally engaged against the Sudanese military in South Sudan. A SLA delegation was sent to meet Chairman John Garang of the SPLM in Nairobi, Kenya; Garang made an offer for the SLA to join his organization. After a polite refusal, Garang encouraged them to formulate a political platform and manifesto, which prompted the 16 March declaration of the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) and its political doctrine (Flint 89). The organization was an alliance primarily among the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit tribes, each filling up one position at the top of the SLM/A leadership; Minawi headed the SLM/A’s political wing while Abdul Waheed Mohamed Nur led its armed faction. Somewhat concurrently, another rebel organization was gaining a foothold in the region. In May 2000, a book entitled The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan was distributed all across Khartoum and Darfur. Its pages contained a scathing critique of the Khartoum government, citing many statistics that almost all of its services went only to the northern tribes that held power (Flint 16-17). The book’s message was highly Islamist, preaching not against the rule of shari’a law, but rather its implementation and the select people who benefitted from it. This strongly differed strongly with the opinions of many other Darfur-based rebel groups, notably the SLM/A, which had a definitively secularist policy (Daly 281). Although The Black Book was penned by a group calling itself “Seekers of Truth and Justice,” it is generally agreed that at least some of its authors would give rise to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in 2001 (Daly 277). Its first and current chairman, Khalil Ibrahim, is a member of the Zaghawa tribe, although it should be noted that the JEM is not a tribal movement. The JEM is very much an Islamist movement, which seeks -

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

constitutional reform and a distribution of economic investment, with ultimate hopes to continue to enforce shari’a law upon the Muslim regions. In their five-point manifesto, the JEM wrote that they are tolerant of other religions in Sudan with the stipulation that “the believers of the other faiths must not oppose Muslims’ attempts to apply the laws of their religion for themselves” (Flint 105). Because of this strong reliance on Islamic rhetoric, the JEM has been dogged by a number of suspicious throughout its years. Ibrahim, for one, used to be a public servant for Khartoum until 1998 and so is suspected of having ties with many controversial figures in the NIF (Flint 106). Perhaps the most prominent of these is Hassan Turabi, the prominent Sudanese political and religious figure who was exiled from the Sudanese government after a divisive break in the NIF in 1999. Many in Darfur, see Turabi as a major source for the abhorrent violence that was part of Khartoum’s enforcement of Islamic law. While the JEM agrees with Turabi’s politics on many points, their distaste with his practices and execution is the entire point of their movement (Flint 107).

Figure III: Death rates during the first two years of conflict (“Excess”)

Fractioning Among Rebels Almost immediately, the leadership of both the SLM/A and JEM found that communication was a looming problem. The SLM/A had no centralized military command that could organize the militant groups sent by the various tribes in the alliance (Daly 300). Oftentimes, this led to detachments being sent into large government encampments or being abandoned when aid was needed. In one particular instance, a group of 4,000 Fur were assigned by the Zaghawa military commander, Abdullah Abakir, to capture all of Jebel Marra from the government’s forces. At one point in the ensuing battle, the Fur were heavily outgunned and forced to retreat up the mountain, but eventually came out with a narrow victory and heavy losses. Later it was discovered that Minawi had taken the regiment’s telephones away, preventing them from getting in contact with the high command for additional orders or reinforcements (Flint 97). These were the foundations of an internal intertribal conflict that would later tear the SLM/A apart. -

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

The SLM/A and the JEM produced radically different platforms, but were forced to work together during the early years of the modern Darfur conflict, particularly because the JEM’s military wing was not well developed. During 2003, the rebels’ first coordinated attacks were often largely successful, catching government military forces off guard, as most prominent commanders were busy dealing with confclit in South Sudan. One such attack took place on 25 April 2003, when SLA and JEM militants attacked the airport in El-Fasher –seven air force planes were destroyed in the attack and rebels looted all sorts of weaponry and vehicles from the military base stationed there (Flint 120-121). These sporadic attacks in 2003 were instrumental to the opening months of the conflict, as it allowed the rebels to stock up on much needed weapons and ammunition before the coordinated arrival of government forces and the Janjaweed. Soon after the attacks started, reports came into Khartoum that the rebels were also targeting Arab civilians in addition to military targets. The government’s response lay with Ahmad Mohamad Haroun, Sudan’s current Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs and alleged war criminal wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Haroun was asked to raise an independent militia to combat the rebels (Flint 123). The Arab tribes were already gearing up to launch a counterinsurgency so Haroun’s job became relatively easy. Publically, Khartoum declared that it was trying to resist an open rebellion, but evidence indicates that Haroun may have had other motives and intentions. In his indictment to the judges at The Hague, ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moren-Ocampo writes “Haroun stated that since the ‘children of the Fur’ had become rebels, ‘all the Fur’ had become ‘booty’ for the Militia/Janjaweed. The Militia/Janjaweed who had heard the speech commenced a looting spree as soon as Ahmad Harun departed” (International 6). Farms, livestock, and food stores were primary targets, often with buildings burned down and resistors murdered. Witnesses also claimed that helicopters attacked their villages and aircraft, which many believe implicates the Government of Sudan (GoS) in the conflict (Flint 131). As long-time Darfur activist Professor Eric Reeves states, the Janjaweed “typically begin very early in the morning, often after an Antinov [a fighter helicopter] will push out bombs…as civilians flee from their huts, the [rebels] sweeps in” and essentially destroy everything in site (“Frontline: On Our Watch”). This open militia warfare continued until December 2003 when the government launched a large military offensive against the rebels in Darfur. Many regiments of the JEM and SLA quickly evaporated in the face of the Sudanese Army’s heavy equipment, with many of the remaining forces seeking retreat as the only possible option. On 9 February 2004, President Bashir announced the end of the rebellion, stating that the military was in “full control” of Darfur, yet the insurgency continued in a far more guerilla fashion (Flint 141-142). The military, too bulky to keep up, watched as Janjaweed, SLA, and JEM forces fought all throughout the countryside. As conflict wore on, however, the various rebel groups began to fracture. By the summer of 2004, the JEM had become highly volatile and was producing child rebel groups such as the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) (Daly 299). The SLM/A was also chafing under the rule of Minna Minawi. Many criticized his early actions for keeping his regiment of SLA in the northern Zaghawa regions where they were often not needed instead of sending them to conflict zones in the south. Even then, many accused him of inciting violence among some of the Arab tribes, notably the Zayadiya, whose villages and farmlands were reportedly devastated by Minawi’s SLM/A (Flint 136). After his ascendancy within the movement later that year, infighting grew to the point that the SLM/A lost its coherence as an organization. The group split along tribal lines into a number of factions, though Minawi retained control of the largest remnant (as well as the only one recognized by most international agencies) (Flint 163). Furthermore, infighting between the JEM and SLM/SLA grew considerably as well, with their differences in structure and policy proving impossible to reconcile. In the end, Minawi’s SLA fought and routed the weak militants of the JEM (Flint 163-164). SOUTH SUDAN: THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT (CPA) In January 2005, the conflict in South Sudan reached breaking point. After over twenty years of fighting, the Government of Sudan and SLPM/A met in series negotiations held at “Karen, Mchakos, Nairobi, Nakuru, Nanyuki and Naivasha, Kenya, under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development -

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

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(IGAD) Peace Process” to discuss the specific terms of what became the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (“ReliefWeb: CPA”). The CPA discussed security arrangements, wealth-sharing, power-sharing, and protocols on the resoulution of conflict in various regions. The CPA also detailed the various terms of a permanent cease-fire arrangement, arguably the most important aspect of any peace accord. Figure IV shows the various political regions of Sudan as stipulated by the CPA, including Darfur and South Sudan. Among these stipulations, Sudan agreed to allow South Sudan to hold an open referendum to vote on independence, also giving the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and Abyei regions to opportunity to vote on whether or not to join South Sudan. The majority of terms reinforced divisions between Khartoum (the “North”) and SPLA/M-controlled South –separate armed forces, a 50:50-split of oil wealth between the Khartoum Government and the SPLA, as well as the use of separate currencies (“Sudan CPA Provisions”). SPLM officials were also invited to joint a unity government with Bashir in Khartoum, with SLPM leader, Salva Klir instated as vice-president. To follow the January agreement, Security Council Resolution 1590 established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on 24 March 2005 with the well-outlined mission “to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement” (S/RES/1590). While the CPA was drafted in response to festering conflict in South Sudan, the implications of the agreement undoubtedly affected Darfur in the North. Many were angered by Bashir’s concessions during CPA negotiations, further fueling the existing rivalry between Figure IV: Political Regions of Sudan (“Political”) Arabs and non-Arab populations in south Sudan. In practice, a majority of these concessions’ deadlines were Blue: South Sudan Orange: North Sudan disregarded, resulting in continued rivalry between the Pink: Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile Purple: Eastern Front Green: Darfur parties. Despite all these criticisms, however, the CPA and call for the development of UNMIS was viewed by most countries as a diplomatic success. This opinion was perhaps more relative to Darfur as many noted that CPA negotiations could serve as a model for dealing with the Darfurian crisis in the North. DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT (DPA) Although as early as 2004, many warned that a “north-south peace would be held hostage to an intractable conflict in Darfur,” the international community the did not engage the Government of Sudan (GoS) about the issue until talks with the SPLM and signing of the CPA concluded (de Waal “Sudan: The DPA and its National Context”). In addition to the aforementioned implications of the CPA, smaller rebel groups, including the SLA/M and JEM were quite displeased with the SPLM’s monopoly over rebel negotiations during the drafting of the CPA. Shortly after the division of the SLM/A in November 2005, Minawi began to take a conciliatory stance toward Khartoum. The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), was signed in Abuja by only one rebel group—Minawi’s sect of the SLM/A—and the Government of Sudan. The DPA shared many of the administrative considerations that the CPA first pioneered, including proposals for governmental and even constitutional change (de Waal “Sudan: The DPA and its National Context”). Also somewhat akin to the CPA, Minawi, the leader of the rebel signatories, was granted the fourth highest position in government: Senior Assistant to the President and Chairperson. -

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The mandate also made the important stipulation that the Janjaweed are to stand down at the same rate and demonstrate “verifiable disarmament” by October 2006 (de Waal “Sudan: The DPA and its National Context”). Many critics claim that because the Darfur Arabs that make up the Janjaweed were not invited to the talks, and because there was no set definition for what the Janjaweed are, there is no way to judge what “verifiable disarmament” meant and whether or not Sudan met that condition (Flint 214). Responsibility 2 Protect (R2P) At the Sixtieth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2005, then Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin lambasted the Security Council’s lack of initiative regarding Darfur: “Too often Permanent Members the veto—real or threatened—to prevent effective action. Too often, [the international community] has debated the finer points of language while innocent people continue to die. Darfur is only the latest example” (“Statement by the Right Honourable Paul Martin…”). It was at this meeting the PM Martin introduced the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” guideline. Internalizing lessons learned from the UN Chapter VI peacekeeping mission stationed in Rwanda and headed by Canadian Romeo Dallaire, Martin stressed the importance of international intervention in situations of humanitarian crisis. The 1994 Rwandan genocide and July 1995 mass killings in Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina finally prompted a shift in traditional peacekeeping methods. Instead of calling for the creation of Chapter VI peacekeeping mandates (which limit peacekeepers’ right to use force only in situations of self-defense), the UN began to commission Chapter VII mandates, giving peacekeepers the authority to use force as a means of humanitarian intervention as well. This new paradigm in peacekeeping laid the foundations for revising UN initiatives in Darfur, ultimately leading to the Security Council’s 31 July 2007 authorization of the creation of a Chapter VII joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur. CREATION OF UNAMID As mentioned in the Committee Introduction and Vision section, 26,000 peacekeeping troops were requested for deployment; as of 23 October 2008, the arrival of a Bangladeshi Multi-role Logistics Unit brought total troop deployment just under 9,000 (“Bangladeshi Logisticts Unit…”); UNAMID’s original intent was to have the majority of troops on the ground by the end of 2008. Seeing as this goal is far from complete, relatively slow progress regarding international action has also discredited original terms drafted in the 2006 DPA. Minawi’s SLA faction was thus prompted to remove itself from the his post in Bashir’s government in October 2007 and instead threaten to “take up arms once more” and push any progress in the region to the wayside (“Darfur Rebel Group Abandons Ceasefire”). In addition to diverging political aims among all parties involved, many fear that the UNAMID intervention is destined for inevitable failure due to Khartoum’s unwillingness to properly cooperate with external actors. Leading researcher on Darfur, Alex de Waal warns that the approach to R2P used in Kosovo is thus incompatible with the situation in Darfur; political and rebel allegiances are constantly changing while Chad has now become involved on both sides of the conflict (de Waal “Why Darfur Intervention is Bad”). As he states, Khartoum views any kind of outside intervention as the “camel’s nose poking into the tent” with “the rest of the beast intend[ing] to follow” (de Waal “Why Darfur Intervention is Bad”). Even still, many cynics claim that R2P is a mere stop-gap and that “humanitarian relief is an exercise in making a disaster just about tolerable” (de Waal “Why Darfur Intervention is Bad”). Aside from concerns regarding practical implementation, the dire humanitarian situation speaks for itself. Claims of ethnic cleansing are continually tossed around by UN officials and various Member States while Bashir has now been indicted by the ICC as a war criminal. As the only multi-dimensional short and longterm aid program operating in the region, all efforts must be made to fulfill the UNAMID mandate and bring a semblance of stability back to the region and its populations.

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CURRENT STATUS Before reading this section, it is encouraged that all delegates read the UNAMID mandate (see Appendix) to gain an understanding of what the Security Council has assigned to the mission. This will allow delegates to frame the following discussion (which will not exclusively concern UNAMID actions) around their mission. In addition to the mandate, delegates should keep themselves up-to-date with Darfur Humanitarian Profile releases (found in the Library subsection of www.unsudanig.org). The goal of the following section is to have delegates fully aware of the situations they must tackle over the weekend both in the crises and in their mandate considerations. The issues here were not chosen to be comprehensive of the issue as a whole. You will not find proposed solutions to each of problems. Instead, delegates are encouraged to research past initiatives and contrast them with potential solutions that fall in line with the policies of the particular party or organization they are representing. It should also be noted that the best way to keep informed on the topics discussed below is to substantiate the accuracy of published facts and statistics by checking multiple sources –even those presented by the United Nations and its various agencies operating in the region. BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND HUMANITARIAN NEEDS In the immediate, humanitarian concerns in Darfur are of utmost concern. In its latest Humanitarian Profile released October 2008, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) states the “crisis in Darfur reached a new depth” with the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) reaching nearly 2.7 million, an increase of approximately 200,000 since July 2008 (“Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 33”). With the total number of affected persons climbing towards 5 million, humanitarian access to these populations lack of access is quite worrisome. In the figures below, the OCHA portray the increased limitation on aid transportation. Resolving increasingly limited access to already scarce resources should be included in any immediate discussions regarding Darfur and provide the region with the basic needs for survival (i.e. food, shelter, and water). Often, humanitarian crises caused by conflict suffer from donor fatigue, occurring when aid agencies’ ongoing efforts in one region are refocused to a new crisis Source: OCHA

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“hotspot” so to speak, such as post-natural disaster relief effort. With that in mind, delegates are reminded of their responsibilities to UNAMID and its mandate, ensuring that dutiful consideration is given to all aspects of the humanitarian situation. Food and W ater Security Since 2003, both Darfurian rebels and the Janjaweed have been extensively burning viable farmland during their raids on villages and tribes, leaving the people of Darfur at high risk of widespread famine. Despite the international community’s efforts to provide humanitarian aid, however, the conflict has severely limited the accessibility of many key humanitarian sites. The World Food Programme (WFP) reports that for its troubles, 43 of its drivers have been killed or remain missing and 83 trucks have been hijacked since 2003. The Programme has a grim outlook for the future: “In 2008 there was little expectation of livelihood recovery or sustainable returns of the displaced population” (WFP “Where we work – Sudan” 4). Theft outstanding, the WFP at full force found that it could not supply all of the refugees it needed to. At maximum capacity, it would transport eight thousand tons of food per month, which would only feed 500,000 people (Prunier 135). As the chart below indicates, 2007 saw some of the lowest rates of access to aid since the beginning of conflict in spite of great increases in the presence of aid workers and humanitarian agencies. PERCENT OF AFFECTED POPULATION ACCESSIBLE TO UN HUMANITARIAN AID SINCE APRIL 2004

Source: UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile, 1 July 2008.

Another key hindrance to transportation comes every year with the onset of the rainy season. Darfur has very few paved roads that are regularly maintained, and the rainfall makes many roads and passageways inaccessible (Daly 232). Increasing limits on transportation has been noted throughout the development of the conflict. Some allege that assuming Sudanese cooperation with the Janjaweed and passive resistance to humanitarian assistance is simply genocide by attrition. Without access to food aid, the Janjaweed have near limitless access to Darfurian villages, raiding their stores and leaving them to starve cut off from the outside world. -

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The theft and destruction of livestock is also a significant problem for the people of Darfur, creating an economic crisis as well as a famine. The animals themselves are not typically used as food, but are rather beasts of burden that assist in farming and cultivation; grain is the most significant part of most tribes’ diets. Oftentimes, tribe members cite that the number of animals that one owns is more important than the amount of currency a person may possess (Daly 149). This, in particular, has made it difficult to repatriate refugees back into Darfur: without new animals, sustenance farming is near impossible, even ignoring other problems like drought. With rainfall diminishing every year, water has become an increasingly prized commodity among the tribes. Though placed in the middle of the Saharan Desert, Darfur does have a major watershed –Jebel Marra. The mountain has historically been a source of water for many tribes, but the ongoing conflict and increased difficulty in migrating there has robbed many tribes of the important resource. Unlike some other issues, water scarcity has been targeted extensively in the past, as it has been viewed by many politicians as the sole reason for Darfur’s retarded growth. For example, in 1966 the Umma Party won a considerable number of seats in the Sudanese Parliament and embarked on a campaign to expand boring projects in search of underground waterbeds (Daly 190). As this program evolved, however, it became bait for the Sudanese government to attract foreign investment, often ignoring what areas needed it most or which areas would be most productive (Daly 213). Of course, water aid is limited by the same transportation restrictions as food aid –wells and other water sources are major targets for Janjaweed raids as the Arab nomads are just as dependent on stationary water reserves as the African tribes. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Camps IDPs are defined as persons forced to flee their homes due to extenuating circumstances, yet still remain within their home country. As such, Darfurian IDPs are host to a number of special considerations separate from Darfurian refugees residing in Chad and CAR. IDP camps, though naturally impoverished, are sometimes subject to Janjaweed raids who either steal the aid they have received or, occasionally, destroy the camp altogether. For this reason, getting the IDPs to receive aid is sometimes a difficulty in and of itself, as they fear attracting the Janjaweed more than they fear famine (Prunier 113). The government is also frequently accused of attacking Sudanese IDP camps. One particularly famous instance in October 2004, Sudanese forces entered the IDP camp at El-Jeer using tear gas and bulldozed many of the buildings (Prunier 121). Oftentimes, the usual response from the government is that they are relocating the refugees to a safer area. In 2004, for example, Interior Minister Abd-er-Rahim Mohamed Hussein proposed to regroup the scattered IDP camps into eighteen locations, citing camp safety as a concern (Prunier 118). One particular aspect of IDP camps that makes them so difficult to administer is their impermanent nature relative to extraterritorial refugee camps. The traffic in and out of the camp is always highly variable with IDPs either seeking to resettle on new land or flee to full refugee camps. In fact, many proponents of genocide in Darfur claim that the Janjaweed attacks on IDP camps are actually coordinated with the goal of driving the African tribes out of Darfur and into Chad. IDPs also tend to flee during the wet season when aid cannot reach the camp and resources wear thin. Of course, the traffic makes it very difficult to get estimates on how many IDPs reside in any one camp so planning the distribution of aid resources is an incredibly difficult task.

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CONCENTRATIONS OF IDPS AS OF AUGUST 2008 Source: UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

Refugees Refugees are people who have fled from the conflict and are now in another country (in this case, Chad or the Central African Republic). Though, in most conflict, the flight of refugees is primarily one-way, the Darfu dispute has taken on a number of international facets that have created problems in Chad, Sudan, and CAR to a lesser extent. Since the outbreak of the Darfurian conflict in 2003, an insurgency, the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) against the military government of Chadian President Idris Déby Itno has also developed; Chad claims the insurgency is supported by the Government of Sudan. Although Khartoum “repeatedly denie[s] backing the rebels,” there is an overwhelming amount of evidence which indicates otherwise (“Q&A: Chad Rebellion”). BBC correspondent, Stephanie Hancock, goes on to claim that Sudan is “backing the Chadian rebels to counter the threat that it faces from its own” in Darfur by (“Q&A: Chad Rebellion”). As with many borders in Africa, the border between Chad and Sudan was created artificially, dividing many tribes of the same ethnicity. As such, many JEM and SLA combatants are Zagawa, sharing the same ethnicity as President Déby. These rebels are said to “enjoy free reign in Chad, and are so close to President Déby that it is not uncommon for them to fight alongside the Chadian Army when it needs help” (“Q&A: Chad Rebellion”). Current estimates of the number of refugees residing in Chad tend to hover around 250,000, a very large number relative to other refugee situations around the world (“Darfur Conflict Zones Map”). This forces provisions to be spread very thin among the refugees and Chadian natives, often prompting violence between groups. Food, water, and firewood are the commodities needed most to sustain the people of the region. Unlike with IDP camps, access is not a major problem as Chad is much more accessible by vehicles. Limited resources, however, remain a problem, as well as Chad’s growing dissatisfaction with progress in the crisis. President Déby has made repeated threats and pleas to the international community to either stop the conflict from spilling over or to relocate the refugees elsewhere, particularly in the wake of two separate attacks on Chad’s capital, N’djamena, in 2006 and 2008 (IRIN “CHAD” 3). Africans are also no longer the only refugees that have been forced into Chad. The Darfur region is now seeing Arab tribes fight amongst themselves for the land, often turning them against each other and driving them away into Chad (Gettleman 2). This further compounds the problems currently facing the refugee camps in Chad, increasing the threat of fighting amongst the tribes there. The Chadian conflict has sent its own group of refugees fleeing into Darfur (see figure below). Recent reports indicate that about 40,000 refugees have fled to Darfur (Aly). Though the mandate of this committee should focus on Darfurian refugees living in Chad, the Chadian refugees in Darfur must also be kept in consideration and their welfare protected. The committee may want to consider cooperating with the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) when dealing with Chadian refugees.

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

CHADIAN REFUGEE CAMPS Source: UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

Health In 2004, the Médecins Sans Frontièrs (MSF) conducted an alarming survey of mortality rates among four Darfur IDP camps that sheltered about 215,400 people (Prunier 149). They found that during the refugees’ flight to the camp, the Crude Mortality Rate (CMR), a figure which includes violent deaths and those caused by disease, malnutrition, and similar causes, was as high as 7.56 per 10,000 per day (one per 10,000 per day is cause for calling the situation an “emergency”) (Prunier 150). Once they were in the camps, nonviolent deaths still kept the figure as high as 2.35 per 10,000 per day (Prunier 150). This signifies a major crisis in the health of refugees, which, thanks to international aid, has been slightly abated since the 2004 study. While NGOs have been able to assist the growing health problem in Darfur, the impermanence of the IDP camps and the sheer number of refugees (2.5 million as estimated by the UNHCR) have made it difficult to administer aid for all (UNHCR. “Chad-Darfur” 5). The most significant threats are curable diseases such as malaria or cholera; malaria currently claims approximately 4,000 live every month according to Sudanese Health Minister Ahmed Bilal Osman (“Malaria kills…”). Maintaining proper sanitary conditions is difficult in refugee and IDP camps considering their overpopulation and strained resources. It is no wonder that such preventable diseases still affect such large populations. Even still, Darfur has always been subject to poor health care. Even at Sudanese independence in 1956, Darfur only had 0.57 hospital beds per 1,000 people with little growth taking place ever since (Flint 12). This is an obvious side effect from a lack of infrastructure in Darfur and the nomadic society it operates in. Stationary hospitals simply are not conducive to migratory people unless they are well distributed and all well stocked. Progress in health standards, however, is possible. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal write “during 2005, mortality rates in Darfur came down to levels comparable to those before the war” (Flint 173). While the resurgence of the conflict in 2006 has disrupted that figure, it does prove that deaths related to disease and malnutrition can be lowered. If short-term health initiatives are implemented with the intent to develop longterm infrastructure, one can hope to eventually eliminate the risk of preventable disease within Darfur and Sudan as a whole. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Disarming the M ilitias Disarming the Janjaweed has always been a focus of the international community, beginning most notably with the passage of Security Council Resolution 1556. Operative six of that resolution: Demands that the Government of Sudan fulfill its commitments to disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities; further requests the Secretary-General to report in 30 days, and monthly thereafter, to the Council on the progress or lack thereof by the GoS on this matter; and expresses its intention to consider further actions, including measures as provided for in Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations on the Government of Sudan, in the event of non-compliance” (S/RES/1556). Although the Sudanese government was not able to hold to this deadline (which they blame on the unnaturally short time line provided by the text), this resolution is only the first in a number of steps to curb the Janjaweed’s presence in Darfur. The difficulty in enforcing this goal is that unlike the rebel groups, the Janjaweed have no central command structure. The militias are usually assemblies of local Arab tribes fighting against the African tribes for one reason or anotherand even among proponents of the theory that the Sudanese government is supporting the Janjaweed, it is generally acknowledged that they do so on a group-to-group basis. Therefore, disarming the Janjaweed is tantamount to disarming the citizens of Darfur. This also makes holding the Janjaweed accountable for their defiance of the international community a very difficult task because their fractured nature prevents them from being meaningfully represented in any peace negotiations. In response to this -

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

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difficulty, the DPA took an interesting approach: in the timetable created for the disarmament of the SLA (Minawi) and the Janjaweed, targets for the Janjaweed were to be met before those of the rebels rather than being concurrent. In reality, however, all rebels—Arab and African alike—remain heavily armed and highly disaffected. The disarmament of nonstate actors is an extremely difficult task that has just recently become a common obstacle in peacebuilding operations. Delegates are highly encouraged to look to recent lessons learned from the situation in Iraq as the majority of issues (i.e. sectoral violence, lawlessness, corruption, etc.) currently plaguing the country are a direct result of a very poorly planned (and nearly nonexistent) disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) campaign. The fragility of the situation in Darfur only fortifies the possibility for the region to follow a similar spiral of chaos. Reintegration of Forces The Sudanese government’s primary solution to the problem of disarming the Janjaweed is by attempting to reintegrate them into the armed forces and civilian-police (Civ-Pol) forces of the Sudanese state (Prunier 117). Many question the motives of such integration, but above those complaints, it has become increasingly clear that the Janjaweed are defying Khartoum more and more. The militias have not only begun to fight amongst themselves, but have also started to fracture into smaller, more uncontrollable groups of bandits (Prunier 122-123). The DPA took specific steps to address the threat that the Janjaweed might continue to raid postintegration into the Sudanese military. It required all paramilitary forces outside of Khartoum’s chain of command be disarmed. In practice, the carefully chosen wording of the DPA allowed the GoS to evade defining what the Janjaweed actually comprise while simultaneously legitimized the aggressive “disarmament” of SLA and JEM rebels. How best to reintegrate the various rebel groups of Darfur back into Sudanese society has been a matter of some debate. While Khartoum would see them resume their lifestyles in Darfur and settle peacefully, other countries, the United States in particular, have an interest in integrating armed SLA and JEM rebels into the Sudanese military as Khartoum has done with the Janjaweed. At the Abuja peace talks that produced the DPA, the United States allied with Minawi, the SLA/M leader, to spearhead the charge on this concern. The GoS resisted, but by the end of negotiations, both parties agreed that 5,000 SLA militants would be integrated into the Sudanese Army, with 3,000 receiving nonmilitary training (Flint 220). That said the permanent development of an armed force as well as civilian-police force is a distant hope. Any efforts in this realm should be viewed as particularly important by the committee as leaving the large military stockpiles that the SLA possesses in the hands of reintegrated civilians could prove disastrous for Darfur’s future, ultimately leading to raids by disaffected African tribesmen after peace is established. LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT Agricultural Development In order for the refugees of this conflict to be fully repatriated in the long-term, the agriculture and economy of the region must be restored. As noted earlier, the raids by the rebels and the Janjaweed have targeted livestock and farmland with particular voracity; simply replacing the refugees on that land will no longer do. Desertification is increasing around Darfur and the entire Saharan region while systematic burning of the existing farmlands is doing little to stem this process. Overgrazing is also a serious concern among most environmentalists and politicians alike. While northern grazing is accelerating the rate of desertification, politicians and the individual tribes have to deal with general southward migration that is forcing the tribes to live in closer proximity. Another aspect of the agrarian lifestyle of Darfur that the committee must consider is how fencing and claims to land have affected the nomadic lifestyle. Northern nomads, who have found their traditional grazing routes increasingly blocked by fencing, have started to call the enclosures zaraib al-hawa, meaning “enclosures of air” -

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(Prunier 57). While property rights can help Darfur become a populated province with equal rights, delegates must also consider the impact that permanent farmland will have upon the nomads. Ultimately, the concern that must be addressed is whether there is a proper balance of encouraged development in Darfur if it comes at the expense of the livelihoods of many nomadic tribes seeking the food and water they need to survive. Investments in Infrastructure One of the founding reasons for this conflict was the lack of development and attention paid to Darfur, and in order to ensure a lasting peace, UNAMID must find a way to guarantee such development in the future. The investments must also be used well, as the Umma Party’s 1960’s venture in water exploration proved disastrous in terms of planning (see Food and Water Security). The development of schools and hospitals should be considered particularly important by the committee seeing as Darfur has long had a severe lack of such facilities relative to even Khartoum and South Sudan. Another aspect of infrastructure development that the committee should consider is industrialization. While it may seem at first glance that the nomadic lifestyle of the Darfurian tribes is not conducive to such development, a number of large settlements (such as El Fasher) have been made with an expansive, agrarian workforce. In the past, similar ventures have been made. Yugoslavia offered to finance a tannery in Darfur (which was eventually moved to Khartoum) and the Soviet Union, in an effort to bring Sudan to their side of the Cold War, built a dairy production factory in Darfur that almost immediately went under (Daly 190). Bringing industrial infrastructure to Darfur would help provide a permanent source of income for many Darfurians (as crops are subject to highly variable prices), and would also help provide Darfur with a viable export even to other Sudanese provinces. Obvious drawbacks, however, are the poor access and high transportation costs of shipments, so important modifications to such a program would have to be made. Delegates are encouraged to look to the industrialization of other nomadic populations in the region, such as the pastoralist Tuareg people of North Africa, for ideas on ways to reconcile nomadic culture with economic assimilation. Also, exploring the history of foreign direct investment in Sudan will not only uncover proper investment plans, but also help delegates understand the underlying reasoning behind certain countries’ policies towards the Darfurian conflict. Ultimately, whatever initiatives are implemented must be culturally sustainable while economically profitable for all parties involved; this includes an effort to decrease expected investment risk I the region. Political Parity Another principle reason for the 2003 is the political underrepresentation of Darfur under the Bashir’s regime. While an important step has been taking in placing Minawi in the spot fourth in line to the presidency, parliamentary parity has yet to be achieved. The SLA still preserves its highly secularist stance on politics, drawing a stark contrast to the majority NIF’s desire to implement Islamic shari’a law within Sudan. Many of those who oppose this move, especially populations in the rural provinces, feel disenfranchised by the political monopoly that the NIF has achieved. Parliamentary reform plans have been included in both the CPA and DPA and their implementation is still under way, but it remains to be seen whether or not those plans will be successful. Otherwise, the discussion of political equality has long been glossed over in favor of military and humanitarian affairs, but should still be a task that the committee considers in its goal to revise the UNAMID mandate. It is highly suggested for delegates to explore past actions of the UN Department of Political Affairs as well as various power-sharing agreements included in previous peacekeeping mandates to gain perspective on the development of good governance within Sudan. In addition, delegates must understand relations between all parties involved in order to be able to formulate an agreement that pleases all involved.

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ROLES The roles of each delegate and how they fulfill them will be of paramount importance to the overall success of the committee. Every delegate must be the most knowledgeable on their respective subjects and must share that information with the committee when necessary to facilitate the development of rapid solutions. In this section you will find an outline of each representative’s basic job responsibilities, veto powers, and information contacts. This information is not meant to be exhaustive in any way and delegates are strongly encouraged to further research the day-to-day responsibilities of each position entails on their own. A few notes should be made about each role’s powers, and how they should be used. While every delegate will have some measure of de jure veto power over the rest of the committee, this power is to be used sparingly at best. It should be noted that veto power in the context of this committee does not translate into the veto power found in traditional committees such as the Security Council. In UNAMID, a delegate’s mere verbal indication that he/she is weary of a certain aspect of a proposal will indicate to the dais that the committee must continue working rather than putting an inevitably failing proposal to vote; the latter course just wastes time that could be instead used to strike proper compromise within the original proposal. Remember that external contacts do not answer questions regarding general research delegates should have done beforehand, such as “What does ‘SLM’ stand for?” or “Which countries border Darfur?” Personal communiqués are instead intended to provide research that could not have possibly been done prior to the conference, such as “Would the European Commission be amenable to a plan to exchange US$1 billion in investments in Northern Darfur if the territory was handed over to the EU?” The dais will also be documenting communiqués in order to ensure representatives are asking proper questions pertaining to their role. Finally, at the end of each section, a few research points that the delegates should focus on are presented. These should not be interpreted as an exhaustive list of preparatory responsibilities. All delegates should be familiar with every aspect of the conflict at hand and should research their individual areas of expertise as they relate to the current situation in Darfur.

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FORCE COMMANDER The force commander’s job responsibilities only include the military personnel that are part of the mission, not the police forces (see Police Commissioner). These personnel are entrusted with the maintenance of the security of the Darfur region, moving to counteract threats from rebel groups, Janjaweed, and Sudanese officials alike. Delegates should remember that UNAMID’s military presence is not an invasion force, nor is it particularly well-equipped, so it cannot be relied upon for aggressive or sustained combat. In committee, the force commander will be able to veto any action plan that involves the redeployment or use of the military personnel. He/she may not, however, directly message the international community concerning troops. Such communications must instead be filtered through the dais to then present to the committee as a whole. They will also be able to get in contact with their chain of command located throughout the region to receive updates or to send orders when it becomes important to do so. The delegate representing this position should be very familiar with the makeup of the UNAMID military force, paying particular attention to mechanized units and transports (e.g. number and type of helicopters), main bases of operation, as well as the efficiency and speed at which troops can be deployed (estimated from recent engagements). POLICE COMMISSIONER The Police Commissioner’s role in the overall UNAMID mission is to bring domestic day-to-day stability back to the people of Darfur. The officers serving under the Commissioner perform various security tasks in their daily work, such as investigating reports of domestic troubles or petty crimes, assisting in humanitarian efforts taking place, and providing escort for important shipments and convoys. Gender-based violence has been a particularly significant concern to UNAMID officers; the goal of minimizing the instances of such crimes is an explicitly stated goal in the UNAMID Mandate. Also included among the Police Commissioner’s job responsibilities are confidence building missions, intended to reassure all parties involved, including Sudan, Chad, CAR, and the Darfur people, that the mission is on track and showing signs of success. As with all intrastate conflicts, the development of a sound civilian-police force is an integral aspect of the entire mission’s overall success. The Commissioner will be able to veto any actions that involve the redeployment or use of his police force, but like the Force Commander, cannot make direct requests to the international community concerning his force. The Commissioner may also contact his/her chain of command, including battalion leaders serving in specific sites, for updates on their actions or progress. The delegate filling this position should be acquainted with the capabilities of his police force, including standard issue weapons and their bases of operation, as well as how investigations are performed and how frequently they occur.

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United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

ATTACHÉ FROM SUDAN The Sudanese attaché’s role is to represent the interests of the Government of Sudan (GoS) during UNAMID’s daily operations, advising at all levels of the operation. As a representative of the GoS, the attaché is also assumed to have strong allegiances to Bashir’s policies, and subsequently, with most Arab populations across Sudan. Within the committee, this delegate will likely resist any revisions to the mandate that extends the jurisdiction of UNAMID further into Sudanese territory. He/she may even attempt to reduce its existing local presence, all the while balancing Sudan’s role as a cooperative ally in the UNAMID mission. If the attaché has questions concerning policy or desires information from their government, they may contact the Sudanese government via written communiqué. The delegate representing Sudan should be very familiar with Sudan’s history with AMIS and UNAMID, as well as their opinions on the mission. They should also be familiar with the assistance that Sudan is providing the UNAMID and how much flexibility is available within that capacity. ATTACHÉ OF THE JUSTICE & EQUALITY MOVEMENT (JEM) This attaché’s role in the committee will be to represent the interests of Khalil Ibrahim’s sect of the JEM, attempting to further the complex Islamist agenda while defending its actions to the international community. This may be more difficult than it sounds, given the rebels’ notorious reputation for raiding humanitarian aid convoys. In general, the JEM will support an expansion of the mandate as long as it results in pushing Sudan out of the region without hindering JEM operations or ideologies. Increased security against the constant threat of the GoS’s infiltration and incursion into Darfur will also be a strong lobbying point for this attaché; the JEM was not party to the DPA for this very reason, refusing to sign the Agreement unless UNAMID troops were already in place. The JEM attaché will be able to resist any action plan that requires the cooperation of the JEM, but not if it is already included in the UNAMID mandate. He/she also will be able to contact the administration of the JEM for updates or information if he/she so desires. The delegate representing this rebel group should be very familiar with the history of JEM, its ideologies, as well as the sort of operations that they engage in. The delegate should also make an effort to be familiar with their major strongholds in Darfur and the extent of their zones of control. ATTACHÉ OF THE SLM/A This delegate’s role will be to represent Minna Minawi and his sect of the SLM’s interests in Darfur, which are significantly different from the JEM’s. He should be more conciliatory with the Sudanese government than the attaché from the JEM, as Mr. Minawi has served as a direct adviser to President al-Bashir, but still should take a hard line on the issues that the SLM stands for. Just like the JEM attaché, this delegate will be able to veto any action plan that requires the cooperation of the SLM, but not if it is clearly included in the UNAMID mandate. Similar to the JEM delegate, the history, ideologies, standard equipment, and recent actions of the SLM should be a top priority when researching the duties of this attaché, as well as major zones of control. ATTACHÉ FROM THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR) Throughout the Darfur conflict, CAR has frequently lobbied for the peaceful and just repatriation of all Darfurians. Many in the prefects that host these refugees share a common ethnic heritage or are even family members, and thus feel a sense of duty to protect their brethren. Hosting these refugees, however, has serious political, economic, and humanitarian consequences. For example, persistent allegations exist that Khartoum funded and supported the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UDFU), a rebel group in the northwest of the CAR. This has strained relations between the two countries, which has made care for Darfurian refugees in CAR no easier. It should be noted, however, that the government of the CAR has repeatedly expressed its dedication to non-refoulment by pledging to provide the safe return of all Darfurians residing in their country (IRIN “CENTRAL” 3). In committee, the attaché must carefully balance the pledges and responsibilities to care for existing refugees alongside citizens’ frequent complaints that resources are becoming scarcer in CAR. They will be able to veto any action plan that requires the cooperation of the CAR, but, again, only if it is not -33-

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explicitly included in the UNAMID mandate. The delegate should be very familiar with the resources available to the CAR, as well as the logistics behind providing for the refugees. Governmental relations between the CAR and the other parties involved in this conflict, including rebel groups, should also be well researched. ATTACHÉ FROM CHAD The Chadian attaché’s job at these deliberations will be to balance a plethora of strong pressures upon his/her government in N’Djamena. On the one hand, the Chadian people feel a sense of obligation to assist the Darfurian people for they share a common heritage with them, even more so than the Central Africans. Ongoing conflict in Chad coupled with the additional strain caused by refugee populations is quickly depleting all resources. Water and food supplies are exhausted and the Chadian people are finding themselves equally in need as their Darfurian guests. The attaché should certainly try to encourage extra consideration and resource allocation for the refugees as well as his/her country in any new proposals Sacrificing the refugees, however, is something that Chad will not do. An alternative solution that Chad has implored the international community to consider is relocating the refugees to another country, as chronic allegations traded between Chad and Sudan that the other is funding insurgent rebels are straining relations. The attaché will have the ability to block any action plans that require the cooperation of Chad, but not if the task is explicitly in the UNAMID mandate that Chad has already approved of. The delegate filling this position should be very familiar with the resources that Chad is currently providing to refugees and how long they can sustain these donatives. The delegate should also be familiar with the allegations levied by Sudan that they are harboring and funding the JEM and should be prepared to respond to further accusations.

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ATTACHÉ FROM CHINA The Chinese attaché should emulate the relatively staunch policy that continues to emanate from Beijing concerning the Darfur conflict. He/She should be first to defend Sudan’s right to independently handle its internal affairs, encouraging no further expansion of the UNAMID mission, but rather push for further cooperation between Sudan and the rebel groups to find a Sudanese solution to a Sudanese problem. This attaché must also keep a close eye on how the international community continues to respond to the Darfur conflict, however, and how Sudan’s (and by extension, China’s) reputation is affected by new developments. Should Sudan err in their handling of the crisis, the Chinese should be present to warn their Sudanese counterparts. This careful balance between promoting Sudan’s integral nature to the solution and overseeing their proper execution of such a solution will be this delegate’s main concern. Because China is a major participant in the UNAMID mission in terms of economic, political, and military clout, the Chinese attaché’s veto powers will be more complicated than those of other delegates. In any instance where a reapportion of UNAMID funds and/or an additional deployment peacekeeping troops is being considered, it is paramount for the committee to garner Chinese support. Although China is notorious for vetoing many international initiatives concerning Sudan, this attaché will not be able to veto any political actions taken by the committee. The attaché’s role is instead strictly limited to the extent of the UNAMID mandate as his/her foreign offices will handle all other issues (especially those regarding Chinese economic investments and policies in Sudan). The Chinese attaché may communicate with his/her superiors, however, for advice or to make recommendations regarding foreign policy and investment. The delegate filling this role should be the committee’s expert on the relations between Sudan and China. He/She should also be very familiar with the economic relations of China and Sudan, particularly focusing on Chinese oil and defense investments in Sudan and the trade that takes place. ATTACHÉ FROM THE UNITED STATES The US is another major donor to UNAMID, contributing both financial assets and military personnel. The general policy of the United States is much more aggressive against the Sudanese government than the other nations represented in this committee, particularly over the sensitive issue of genocide. The United States’ attaché will likely push for the international community to concur with their assessment of genocide, simultaneously demanding that the UNAMID mandate be stricter in terms of external oversight over the Sudanese actions. Another key concern that the US has shown a particular tenacity for is accountability within Sudan. The US has continually stated that bringing Sudanese leaders before the International Criminal Court (ICC) to be tried for crimes against humanity (again, pushing charges of genocide) as an important step in the peace building process; the US wants to see UNAMID take on a larger role in apprehending suspects. The attaché will have to represent these views in the committee while facing fierce opposition from Sudan’s allies and even the United States’ more forgiving allies. Like the Chinese attaché, any considerations regarding budgetary reapportions and/or additional should have US backing. This delegate must also respect his/her place within in the international system; he/she will have no definitive veto on broader issues such as sanctions or embargos. The attaché will have the United States Foreign Service constantly at their disposal for contact, though, and may turn to them for advice or information. The delegate representing the United States should be very familiar with the history of the US’s actions in Darfur, paying particular attention to their role in the creation and execution of AMIS and UNAMID. Another topic that this delegate should keep an eye on is the potential for a significant policy change after the 2008 election cycle. Both major parties’ candidates have taken a hard strong stance against the Sudanese government; subsequently, the US may see significant policy changes in the months following the November election (Sanders 3-5). ATTACHÉ FROM THE EU Unlike the attachés from the United States and China, the EU attaché must represent a number of diverse opinions on the matter. Consequently, this attaché does not often take as definitive a stance in political -35-

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affairs. Instead, the EU’s primary interests are a peaceful resolution to the conflict and the responsible use of the funding that they are providing. The attaché should be fully driven by these neutral objectives, supporting only measures that will make the mission more successful. The collected European countries also constitute a major donor of military troops and police as well as supplies, and so have a strong interest in their use. The EU attaché will have to represent his/her organization’s interest in maintaining the UNAMID force as a reconstruction and security force, not as a strong arm to forcibly wrest control away from the rebels and Sudan. The EU representative will have the same veto powers as the US and Chinese attachés: they can deny budget reapportions and movements of peacekeepers outside of Darfur. This delegate’s external contacts are unique as the EU “Foreign Service” is not as easily defined as the foreign service of a specific country. Instead, the attaché can contact the Directorate-General for External Relations, a division of the European Commission. All responses from this office will be EU policy, not the policy of a specific nation. The delegate filling this position should be well acquainted with the history of the EU’s involvement of UNAMID and its predecessors, as well as the extent to which the EU is providing aid to the mission. The delegate should also take the time to review the independent opinions of the EU member nations on the conflict as combined they comprise the official EU foreign policy the delegate is representing in committee.

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REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO) The DPKO can be considered the overall administrator for all UN peacekeeping operations. Their mission is “to plan, prepare, manage and direct UN peacekeeping operations, so that they can effectively fulfill their mandates” (DPKO 1). To do so, this Department oversees peacekeeping troop training missions, offers logistical support and guidance, and coordinates implementation with external organizations (DPKO 2). The representative will be present during deliberations to offer expertise to other delegates as they consider the most effective ways to change the UNAMID mandate. Unlike the other roles, there is no set policy for this position, save that the delegate representing the DPKO should do whatever they feel would make the project more successful and efficient. The DPKO representative, as the administrator directly responsible for the functions of UNAMID, can reject any action plans that create new implementation methods within the UNAMID mandate. Methods do not refer to the stated mandates of UNAMID, but rather how the committee plans to execute them. For example, an action plan to raid known Janjaweed and SLM/JEM camps and confiscate their armaments would be privy to veto because UNAMID has never before conducted such an operation. The delegate filling this role should posses a very detailed knowledge of the type of support that the DPKO usually provides for all peacekeeping missions, not just UNAMID. This includes serving as committee expert on all issues regarding disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). He/She should work alongside the Force Commander, Police Commissioner, as well as the UNDP to ensure that proper and sustainable security sector reform (SSR) occurs. He/she should also be familiar with the logistics surrounding UNAMID, as logistical support an explicit part of their organization’s mission statement. REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS (DPA) The DPA is to political strategy and planning as the DPKO is to mission execution. They are the leading UN experts on analyzing conflicts, making peace, and finding sustainable ways to protect it. In fact, their role in the UN bureaucracy is so important, an Under-Secretary-General directs this department. One unique aspect of the DPA is that they not only analyze specific situations around the world, but also perform analysis on political theory and policy issues. This representative traditionally takes on the mediating role in multi-party negotiaitnos that involve governments and rebel factions alike; he/she ensures that all parties’ concerns are both voiced and addressed to some capacity. The DPA does not have a very detailed policy on the Darfur conflict, save that they are “assisting in the diplomatic push for a lasting peace settlement” (DPA 2), and this policy should be the one that guides the DPA’s representative. The representative will have heavy influence during any diplomatic negotiations that regard short and long-term political issues; this includes the structuring of any power-sharing agreements and discussions regarding the establishment of good governance and rule of law. This representative may contact his/her Department at any point for policy guidance and/or confirmation to engage parties in negotiations. The delegate representing the DPA should be very familiar with their office, taking care to look over the various policy issues that they have written about. It would also behoove the delegate to research the various ways in which the DPA has helped other missions. A strong sense of the nature of the relations between all parties involved in the dispute will also be critical to the effectiveness of this delegate. REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) & UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (UNCHR) This delegate’s role in the committee is twofold: refugees and human rights. The separate offices of the UNHCR and the UNCHR have pooled their resources together and have sent only one delegate to this committee, who will represent the human interests surrounding the Darfur conflict. Usually, the UNHCR is seen as a more tactile organization, taking active roles in the care and repatriation of refugees, while the UNCHR deals with more abstract concepts, such as what rights an individual may have, but such lines are in no way definitive. The UNHCR currently has about 139 staffers situated in Darfur and a budget of approximately US$70 million to service refugees of the Darfur conflict (UNHCR). These are fully paid -37-

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staffers, and so can be easily moved around the region as various needs arise. This figure, of course, does not include the multitude of aid workers in Chad operating the refugee camps. Among this representatives many duties, he/she will be responsible for the maintenance of the flow of aid to the IDPs and refugees of the Darfur conflict. To help exercise this responsibility, the delegate will have great influence over any action plan concerning the refugees. He/She may also find collaborating with the DPKO and DPA as paramount when developing lasting protections over basic human rights.The main topics of research should include the overall state of the refugee camps inside and outside of Sudan, including the size and capacity of the major camps. The delegate should also be familiar with the magnitude of the influx of refugees now and in the past, and how the UNHCR and the international community have reacted to large waves of refugees. REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP) Sustainable development is a major concern in Darfur. With every passing week, more villages are burned down, more refugees flee the country, and more valuable commodities are stolen by the Janjaweed militia, making progressive development (a stated goal in the UNAMID mandate) incredibly difficult. The UNDP is impartial toward the political conflicts surrounding Darfur, which should be kept in mind by the representative (note that impartial is not the same as inactive). Instead, this representative should focus on the economic and developmental issues working to restore the homes, farms, and economies of the Darfurian people. The delegate should also keep in mind that Darfur is not the only region of Sudan that the UNDP operates in and should manage commitments accordingly. Within the committee, the UNDP representative will have the power to influence any plans that involve development projects (a task the committee should take special care not to neglect). The delegate representing this position should be well versed in the kinds of operations that the UNDP runs inside and outside of Sudan. Logistics such as materials, manpower, and monetary resources should be closely studied to evaluate the relative success of the UNDP’s efforts in Darfur. This representative will more than likely solicit loans from the World Bank as well so knowledge of the shared history between the two organizations would be beneficial. Ultimately, without proper concern given to the long-term implications of the Darfurian conflict, all efforts of this committee will be null. REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP) The World Food Programme’s charge is to fight hunger in all sorts of locales around the globe, whether they are combat zones or not. Sudan, however, is a major concern and focus for the WFP’s efforts, which service western, southern, and eastern Sudan. The WFP’s dedication to Sudan is clear: “Sudan is WFP's largest operation in the world” (WFP “Where we work – Sudan” 8). Their current operating budget is US$697 million aimed at assisting 5.6 million people deemed “vulnerable” (8). Their Darfur program accounts for 70% of this budget, feeding 2-3 million people per year (one half to one third of Darfur’s total population) (9). As with the UNDP, the WFP’s general policy is to be politically indifferent as long as a political entity is not intentionally creating or facilitating famine. Therefore, the WFP delegate should be politically neutral in committee and offer expertise on how best to distribute food to the most effective locales. In committee, the WFP representative will have influence over all matters involving food distribution, an important topic for most of the IDPs and refugees from the conflict. The delegate in this position should be familiar with the multitude of operations that the WFP executes in all regions of Sudan, and how much of that aid could be reallocated, if necessary. The representative should also be aware of the famine issues that surround the IDPs and refugees, but also the people who continue to live in Darfur.

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REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDANESE RED CRESCENT The Sudanese Red Crescent is a member of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC). All national chapters are actually independent from the International Committee of the Red Cross although they share the same basic principles and goals. Therefore, the Sudanese Red Crescent chapter is made up of Sudanese people looking to improve the state of affairs within their own country. This creates an important check on the influence of this body. While they may coordinate with other Red Cross and Red Crescent chapters, ultimately, this representative only speaks for the budget and volunteers of the Sudanese chapter. The Sudanese Red Crescent is a large organization, totaling 400,000 trained volunteers across Sudan (SCRS 5). It is generally well regarded among most humanitarian groups as a reliable source of medical treatment for civilians and combatants alike, and so enjoys a great degree of freedom within Darfur (5). However, they also run a number of educational programs, including education about immunization and AIDS, and also run a number of health clinics and pharmacies (7). Their operational budget is US$150 million, which is primarily spread across efforts in both Darfur and South Sudan (8). The chapter’s independence means that they can restrict their goals to providing medical care and treatment for Sudanese IDPs. Most of their efforts, however, are currently focused in South Sudan. Another stipulation is that their efforts are directed only towards Sudanese people –whether that includes Darfurian refugees outside of Sudan is up to interpretation. In committee, the representative will have to represent the goals of the Sudanese Red Crescent and apply them toward productive solutions in the region. This delegate will have strong sway over all issues surrounding medical care and how it is provided to the Darfurians. The delegate should research all funding sources for Darfur for the purpose of providing medical care, whether it is from the Sudanese Red Crescent or elsewhere. How aid gets to Darfur is a major concern; various modes of transportation should also be carefully investigated. CONSULTANT FROM THE WORLD BANK The World Bank serves as the financer of many post-conflict reconstruction projects around the world. Loans from the World Bank are typically in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars with very specific goals, providing countries with the financial resources necessary to rehabilitate economies and develop their often shattered infrastructures. This delegate should note, however, that the World Bank only enters a country after peace is established. In Sudan, their task is particularly interesting. Because Darfur is still a heavy combat zone, the Bank has historically been hesitant to grant large loans. Concerns over the Sudanese government’s transparency (or lake thereof) make it difficult to award loans in fear that they may never actually arrive in Darfur. Though the Bank has yet to take any tangible action, the organization is not restless. They have frequently warned that Sudan is not offering enough investments to Darfur. The Bank has also continued to participate in exploration missions to probe how much aid the region will need when peace does come and how best to distribute it (World Bank 19-20). The current major contributions to the World Bank are towards development in South Sudan. Two MultiDonor Trust Funds (MDTF) have been established, presently totaling US$212 million, though US$418 million has been promised (World Bank 21). Because of concerns surrounding a 1993 default by Khartoum, however, no loans have been made by the World Bank. The current focus of the existing investments is “access to basic human services, and sustainable and pro-poor economic growth and support the CPA” (15). Within the committee, the representative should aim to continue to investigate the financial prospects of the region and should pursue the most rapid peace that can be achieved. This delegate will have considerable discretionary power over all new development-related plans as he/she will be solicited for funds once plans are drafted. This does not include extensions of development projects already in place, only new missions that the committee may choose to create. The delegate filling this position should also be familiar with the nature of the loans that the World Bank has already distributed to Sudan to get a sense of the types of loans that the Bank distributed. The delegate should also be familiar with other investments in Darfur and where from, comparing the terms of these agreements with the World Bank’s potential loan. -39-

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BIBLIOGRAPHY UN Sources A/C.5/62/30. “Financing of the support account for peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy : note/by the Secretary-General.” 11 Jun. 2008. “The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of The Republic of The Sudan and The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army.” 9 Jan. 2005. S/RES/1556 (2004). “Resolution 1556 (2004).” 30 Jul. 2004. S/RES/1590 (2005). “Resolution 1590 (2005).” 24 Mar. 2005. SG/SM/10653. “Secretary-General Welcomes Extension of African Union Mission’s Darfur Mandate.” 21 Sept. 2006. “Statement by Right Honourable Paul Martin, Prime Minister of Canada, to the High-Level Meeting of the Sixtieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.” 16 September 2005. Non-UN Sources "An Expanding Danger." Map. New York Times. New York City, NY: The New York Times Company, 2007. "Chad 'cannot take more refugees'" BBC News. 11 Feb. 2008. British Broadcasting Company. 4 Sept. 2008 . Daly, M. W. Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide. New York: Cambridge UP, 2007. "Darfur Conflict Zones Map" BBC News. 6 Dec. 2006. British Broadcasting Company. 14 Sept. 2008 . "Darfur, Sudan: Confirmed Damaged and Destroyed Villages, February 2003 - October 2007." Map. 5 Dec. 2007. US Department of State. 20 Sept. 2008 De Waal, Alex. "Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap." Review of African Political Economy 31 (2004): 716-25. De Waal, Alex. "Famine Mortality: A Case Study of Darfur, Sudan 1984-5." Population Studies 43.1 (1989): 5-24. De Waal, Alex. “Sudan: The DPA and its National Context.” Conciliation Resources. 7 Sept. 2008 http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/dpa-context.php De Waal, Alex. “Why Darfur Intervention is a Mistake.” BBC News. 21 May 2008. British Broadcasting Company. 20 Oct 2008 . "Supporting Peace in the Sudan." Department of Political Affairs. United Nations. 7 Sept. 2008 . "Mission Statement." Department of Peacekeeping Operations. United Nations. 6 Sept. 2008 . -40-

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"Excess Deaths in the Darfur States." Map. Sudan: Death Toll in Darfur. 25 Mar. 2005. United States Department of State. 18 Sept. 2008 . Flint, Julie, and Alex De Waal. Darfur : A Short History of a Long War. New York: Zed Books, Limited, 2008. Gettleman, Jeffrey. "Chaos in Darfur Rises as Arabs Fight With Arabs." New York Times 3 Sept. 2007. Global Security. "Darfur Sultanate - 1596-1916." GlobalSecurity.org. 27 Apr. 2005. Global Security. 13 Sept. 2008 . International Criminal Court. "ICC Prosecutor Presents Evidence on Darfur Crimes." Press release. 27 Feb. 2007. 18 Sept. 2008 . IRIN. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: Slightly better conditions for Darfur refugees in northeast. Rep.No. 73781. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Networks. IRIN. CHAD: President threatens to expel Darfur refugees as attacks surge in lawless east. Rep.No. 58755. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations. Map. Federal Research Division. June 1991. Library of Congress. 12 Sept. 2008 “Malaria kills 4,000 people in Sudan each month: official.” Agence France-Presse (AFP). 8 June 2003. 19 Sept 2008 . McGregor, Andrew. A Military History of Modern Egypt : From the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War. New York: Praeger, 2006. 35+. Metz, Helen C. "INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT." Sudan: A Country Study. 1991. Library of Congress. 17 Sept. 2008 . Office of the Spokesman. "Darfur Peace Agreement." 8 May 2006. United States Department of State. 18 Sept. 2008 . O'Neill, William G., and Violette Cassis. Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur. Rep.No. University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, The Brookings Institution. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 2005. Prunier, Gerard. Darfur : The Ambiguous Genocide. New York: Cornell UP, 2007. “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General.” 25 Jan. 2005. "Q&A: Chad Rebellion" BBC News. 4 Feb. 2008. British Broadcasting Company. 14 Sept. 2008 . SCRS. "Establishment." Sudanese Red Crescent Society-SCRS. SCRS. 25 Oct. 2008 . Sanders, Edmund. "Sudan doesn't see relations improving after the U.S. election." Los Angeles Times 6 Sept. 2008. Steidle, Brian, and Gretchen Steidle Wallace. The Devil Came on Horseback : Bearing Witness to the Genocide in Darfur. New York: PublicAffairs, 2007. -41-

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Sudan Human Rights Organization. SHRO-Cairo. "Sudan Government Fails to Insure Stability and Peace in DarFur." Press release. 1 Mar. 2003. 18 Sept. 2008 . "UNAMID Deployment September 2008." Map. UNAMID: African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur. Sept. 2008. United Nations. 20 Oct. 2008 "UNAMID: African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur." 3 Sept. 2008. United Nations. 3 Sept. 2008 . UNHCR. "Chad-Darfur Humanitarian Crisis." Chad/Darfur Emergency. Oct. 2007. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 20 Sept. 2008 . "UNHCR Presence, Refugee/IDP locations in Darfur." Map. Chad/Darfur Emergency. Oct. 2007. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 20 Sept. 2008 . “Unifying Darfur’s Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace,” International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing No. 32, Nairobi/Brussels, 6 Oct 2005, p. 2. WFP. "Where we work - World view." World Food Programme. United Nations. 7 Sept. 2008 . WFP. "Where we work - Sudan." Where we work. 2008. World Food Programme. 19 Sept. 2008 . World Bank. "Sudan Country Brief." The World Bank. Apr. 2008. World Bank. 7 Sept. 2008 .

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

APPENDIX I. UNAMID MANDATE Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council, by its resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007 decided that UNAMID is authorized to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to: (i) protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers; (ii) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan. The Council also decided that the mandate of UNAMID shall be as set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007 (document S/2007/307/Rev.1), namely as follows: (a) To contribute to the restoration of necessary security conditions for the safe provision of humanitarian assistance and to facilitate full humanitarian access throughout Darfur; (b) To contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians, within its capability and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan; (c) To monitor, observe compliance with and verify the implementation of various ceasefire agreements signed since 2004, as well as assist with the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements; (d) To assist the political process in order to ensure that it is inclusive, and to support the African Union-United Nations joint mediation in its efforts to broaden and deepen commitment to the peace process; (e) To contribute to a secure environment for economic reconstruction and development, as well as the sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes; (f) To contribute to the promotion of respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Darfur; (g) To assist in the promotion of the rule of law in Darfur, including through support for strengthening an independent judiciary and the prison system, and assistance in the development and consolidation of the legal framework, in consultation with relevant Sudanese authorities; (h) To monitor and report on the security situation at the Sudan’s borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. In order to achieve these broad goals, the operation’s tasks would include the following: (a) Support for the peace process and good offices: -43-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

(i) To support the good offices of the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur and the mediation efforts of the Special Envoys of the African Union and the United Nations; (ii) To support and monitor the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and subsequent agreements; (iii) To participate in and support the major bodies established by the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements in the implementation of their mandate, including through the provision of technical assistance and logistical support to those bodies; (iv) To facilitate the preparation and conduct of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, as stipulated in the Darfur Peace Agreement; (v) To assist in the preparations for the conduct of the referendums provided for in the Darfur Peace Agreement; (vi) To ensure the complementary implementation of all peace agreements in the Sudan, particularly with regard to the national provisions of those agreements, and compliance with the Interim National Constitution; (vii) To liaise with UNMIS, the African Union Liaison Office for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and other stakeholders to ensure complementary implementation of the mandates of UNMIS, the African Union Liaison Office for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the hybrid operation in Darfur; (b) Security: (i) To promote the re-establishment of confidence, deter violence and assist in monitoring and verifying the implementation of the redeployment and disengagement provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement, including by actively providing security and robust patrolling of redeployment and buffer zones, by monitoring the withdrawal of long-range weapons, and by deploying hybrid police, including formed police units, in areas where internally displaced persons are concentrated, in the demilitarized and buffer zones, along key routes of migration and in other vital areas, including as provided for in the Darfur Peace Agreement; (ii) To monitor, investigate, report and assist the parties in resolving violations of the Darfur Peace Agreement and subsequent complementary agreements through the Ceasefire Commission and the Joint Commission; (iii) To monitor, verify and promote efforts to disarm the Janjaweed and other militias; (iv) To coordinate non-combat logistical support for the movements; (v) To assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme called for in the Darfur Peace Agreement; (vi) To contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and to facilitate the voluntary and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes; (vii) In the areas of deployment of its forces and within its capabilities, to protect the hybrid operation’s personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations-African Union personnel, humanitarian workers and -44-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

Assessment and Evaluation Commission personnel, to prevent disruption of the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement by armed groups and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks and threats against civilians; (viii) To monitor through proactive patrolling the parties’ policing activities in camps for internally displaced persons, demilitarized and buffer zones and areas of control; (ix) To support, in coordination with the parties, as outlined in the Darfur Peace Agreement, the establishment and training of community police in camps for internally displaced persons, to support capacity-building of the Government of the Sudan police in Darfur, in accordance with international standards of human rights and accountability, and to support the institutional development of the police of the movements; (x) To support the efforts of the Government of the Sudan and of the police of the movements to maintain public order and build the capacity of Sudanese law enforcement in this regard through specialized training and joint operations; (xi) To provide technical mine-action advice and coordination and demining capacity to support the Darfur Peace Agreement; (c) Rule of law, governance, and human rights: (i) To assist in the implementation of the provisions of the Darfur PeaceAgreement and any subsequent agreements relating to human rights and the rule of law and to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to respect for human rights and the rule of law, in which all are ensured effective protection; (ii) To assist all stakeholders and local government authorities, in particular in their efforts to transfer resources in an equitable manner from the federal Government to the Darfur states, and to implement reconstruction plans and existing and subsequent agreements on land use and compensation issues; (iii) To support the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement in restructuring and building the capacity of the police service in Darfur, including through monitoring, training, mentoring, co-location and joint patrols; (iv) To assist in promoting the rule of law, including through institution-building, and strengthening local capacities to combat impunity; (v) To ensure an adequate human rights and gender presence capacity, and expertise in Darfur in order to contribute to efforts to protect and promote human rights in Darfur, with particular attention to vulnerable groups; (vi) To assist in harnessing the capacity of women to participate in the peace process, including through political representation, economic empowerment and protection from gender-based violence; (vii) To support the implementation of provisions included in the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements relating to upholding the rights of children; (d) Humanitarian assistance: (i) To facilitate the effective provision of humanitarian assistance and full access to people in need. -45-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

II. UNAMID DEPLOYMENT AS OF SEPTEMBER 2008

Symbol I II X

LEGEND FOR “UNAMID DEPLOYMENT IN DARFUR” Description Company, ~60-250 personnel, led by Captain or equivalent Battalion, ~300-1000 personnel, led by Lieutenant Colonel Brigade, ~2000-5000 personnel, led by Brigadier General Infantry Engineers Signals Military Police EXAMPLE

II SENEGAL

Senegalese Infantry Battalion (~300-1000 personnel) -46-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

III. VARIOUS CHARTS

SIGNIFICANT TREATIES AND RESOLUTIONS Name CPA (2002-2004)

Resolution 1556 (2004) DPA [May Agreement] (2005) Resolution 1769 (2007)

Description Composed of a number of related agreements signed between Khartoum and the SPLM/SLPA that put an end to the Second Sudanese Civil War. The six agreements decide on a number of different topics, including the sensitive subjects of independence and political representation. Many consider this to be a model for a final solution for Darfur (see DPA below). Firm resolution passed by the Security Council that addressed a number of issues important to the early years of the conflict. Among other operatives, it condemns the janjawiid and calls upon Sudan for their swift disarmament. It also offers support for the then-fledgling AMIS mission and support for humanitarian missions in the region Early attempt to end the Darfur conflict, but was only signed between Khartoum and the SLM/SLA (Minnawi). Takes many of the ideas within the CPA that proved effective, notably including Minnawi in the top administrative level of government. The JEM and other SLM/SLA factions complain that it does nothing to address the janjawiid threat, and have chosen to continue their rebellion Unanimously passed resolution that established UNAMID as the successor to the AMIS mission. Is widely considered much more proactive, involved, and enforceable than the AMIS mandate, and so has been well-received in the international community. Delegates should observe this document as the definition of their executive privileges.

MAJOR CONFLICTS IN DARFUR Conflict or War

Khedive Annexation (1874)

Mahdist Revolt (1881-1885)

Description Important figures • Egypt: Khedive Isma’il Pascha, al-Zubayr Rahma Mansur • Darfur Sultanate: Sultan Ibrahim Hassan Causes • Egypt saw Sudan as a land of riches, and Darfur was along key pilgrimage and trade routes • al-Zubayr entered Darfur with his own force, so the Khedivate had to move in itself before al-Zubayr consolidated his power Effects • The Darfur Sultanate was abolished • Trade in Darfur saw some degree of revitalization • Egypt soon saw how few resources Darfur had, and paid little attention to the region Important Figures • Mahdists: Mahdi (Muhammad Ahmad Abdallah) • United Kingdom: Sir Charles Gordon • Darfur Sultanate: Sultan Ali Dinar Causes • Mahdi spurred a spiritual movement in Sudan, promising a new golden age for the Muslim faith. • Disenchantment with poor Egyptian rule helped spread the rebellion Effects • The invasion of Darfur was never truly complete, and the years of the rebellion saw great infighting within Darfur • The end of the rebellion marked the beginning of Egyptian dependence on the UK and the establishment of the Condominium • The Sultanate of Darfur was temporarily restored -47-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

British Annexation (1916)

Sudanese Civil War First: 1955-1972 Second: 1983-2005

Toyota War (1983-1986)

Important Figures • United Kingdom: Sir Reginald Wingate • Darfur Sultanate: Ali Dinar Causes • Personal resentment on Sir Wingate’s part of Darfur’s independence • French pressure to create a rigid border between T’chad and Sudan Effects • Darfur Sultanate permanently abolished • Subsequent neglect of Darfur under British rule meant that the region lagged in terms of infrastructure and economic development Important Figures: • Sudan: Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Abboud, President Omar al-Bashir • South Sudan: Joseph Lagu, John Garang Causes • Christian and animist tribes in the south were opposed to Islamic rule from Khartoum • The South sought more regional autonomy to manage their own affairs • The Second Sudanese Civil War was largely an extension of the First Effects • The prolonged conflict and high death tolls has retarded the development of both South Sudan and Sudan as a whole • The governmental representation clauses in the resolution of both conflicts proved that southern Christians and animists could serve in Khartoum peacefully • The CPA is a model and largely successful peace agreement lauded by many nations • A plebiscite is still planned for South Sudan to decide on the question of independence Important Figures • Chad: President Hissène Habré • Libya: Col. Muammar al-Gadaffi, GUNT Causes • Libya was attempting to assert itself as the primary power in North Africa, and refused to acknowledge Habré’s authority in Chad • He funded the GUNT to overthrow him and to annex the Aouzou Strip in Northern Chad Effects • Some of the GUNT training and staging grounds were located in Northern Darfur, making it a target for attack • Libyan propaganda instilled a sense of resentment among many Arab tribes against “African” rule The end of the conflict left large weapon stockpiles in the hands of the predominantly Arab tribes of Northern Darfur

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The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

Dar Masseleit Conflict (1995)

Important Figures: • Sudan: President Omar al-Bashir, General Mohamed Ahmad al Dabi Causes • The Masseleit tribe, which hosted many Umma party members and Mahdists, and local Arabs became increasingly estranged in the years leading up to the conflict • The question of one group’s disenfranchisement to benefit the other was a recurring worry Effects • Few people died as a result of the conflict, but it set up psychological grievances that last to this day • It helped establish the African-Arab tribal dichotomy we observe in Darfur today • Seen as the founding moments of the Janjaweed, who formed to rout the Masseleit into Chad

REBEL GROUPS IN DARFUR Rebel Group

Janjaweed

JEM

SLM/A

Description Nebulous term used for the various Arab militias throughout Darfur. May have logistical support from Khartoum, but has no semblance of a centralized leadership. Members fight for many reasons, including tribal rivalries and competition for dwindling resources among others. Overall, the goal of the militias seems to be to drive the African tribes out of Darfur via violent attacks. As their control expands, many of these groups have started to fight amongst themselves. Politically-oriented rebel group in Darfur. Has a well-published (The Black Book) proIslamist ideology. Seeks to end the NIF’s humanitarian violations rather than its enforcement of Islamic values and law. Possess only a small military force, formerly depending on the SLA for military support. Has yet to sign any peace agreement with Khartoum, but with the dissolution of the SLA, attacks have been cut. Large, tribally-oriented rebel group first established as an alliance between the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masseleit tribes. Espouses a very secularist and regional ideology, citing lack of political representation and investment as major complaints about the NIF regime. Movement always lacked centralized control, and today is splintered between various factions with Minna Minawi as the leader of the largest one. Has collaborated with the SPLM/A and the JEM, but lack of coherent leadership has made external cooperation difficult.

SIGNIFICANT FIGURES SURROUNDING DARFUR Person al-Bashir, Omar Hassan Ahmad Haroun, Ahmed Mohamed Ibrahim, Kahlil

Description President of Sudan since 30 June 1989 after a coup by the NIF. Was instrumental in the conclusion of the SPLM/SPLA rebellion, and has taken equally robust measures to end the Darfur rebellion. Currently under investigation by ICJ prosecutors for war crimes and genocide. Charged with the responsibility to raise militias to put down the Darfur rebels in 2003. There is considerable evidence that he armed and funded the Janjaweed and other Islamic militias, giving them explicit permission to loot. Has since been jailed and later placed under house arrest by Khartoum Founding leader of the JEM. Formerly a supporter and bureaucrat for the NIF, breaking ranks to form the JEM due to economic and humanitarian complaints. Has since kept a political focus to his rebellion rather than a military one. Has not signed the DPA. -49-

The 2009 National High School Model United Nations

United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur

Déby Itno, Idris

Minawi, Minna Arkoi al-Turabi, Hassan

President of Chad since 2 December 1990. His country is host to many Darfurian rebels and is victim to many anti-government insurgents based in Sudan. His capital, N’djamena, has been victim to two major attacks in 2006 and 2008. Has asked the international community to remove Darfurian rebels to alleviate political tensions with Sudan. Head of the SLM/A (Minawi), signed the DPA with Khartoum on 5 May 2006. Presently serving as the Senior Assistant to the President (fourth in the line of succession). His SLM/A faction continues to fight against other rebel groups in Darfur. Leader of the 1989 NIF coup, now he has lost influence in Sudan. Is believed to be a primary instigator of many alleged human rights violations. His wing of the NIF formerly espoused a desire to spread shari’a law to neighboring countries. Breaks with NIF leadership have forced him into political exile

IV. SAMPLE COMMUNIQUÉ: PRESIDENT BASHIR TO ATTACHÉ FROM SUDAN From: President Hasan al-Bashir (Government of Sudan) To: Attaché from Sudan CC: Chris Talamo (Joint AU-UN Representative); Jason Fortin (Deputy AU-UN Representative)

This morning I received an urgent report from military command stationed in West Darfur that the number of cross-border raids has spiked in the past weeks; they claim that all attacks originated in Chad. The JEM’s aggressive attacks and continuous violations of cease-fire brokered by your efforts are putting the entire peacekeeping operation on the brink of a total failure. The participation of the Government of Sudan (GoS) in your peace efforts cannot continue under these conditions. Hence, continued GoS cooperation will depend of the following: 1 – Withdrawl of JEM forces from the Darfur area, including heavy weapons, 2 – Proper prosecution of insurgent nonstate actors, 3 – Verification of the cease-fire I have to reiterate that any failure of UNAMID will depend on the rebels’ actions, Sincerely, President Hasan al-Bashir

V. SAMPLE ACTION PLAN Sponsors: Force Commander, Police Chief, Attaché from China, Attaché from the EU 1 – Reassign two Nigerian companies, one from from El Da’ein and the other from Graida, and station them at Malha in Northern Darfur for the purposes of investigating cases of domestic violence. 2 – Apportion US$500 thousand to expand the amount of forensics equipment in the region to assist these investigations. 3 – Assign a liaison to work with the WFP and keep them apprised of recent attacks to protect them from rebel raiding parties. -50-