16 Indian Stance On Ctbt

Emporium Current Essays 65 WTr o1 Ambiguity continues to remain the huiimark of India's nuclear policy and diplomacy. When the CTBT 'Conference of the UN Disarmament Commission resumed in Geneva, India was torn between the horns of a dilemma. It reiterated its inability to sign the draft treaty as it emerged from the Geneva conference. At the same time, it declared that it had no intention to block the passage of the accord. If there is no voting on the draft, which is what most people expect, India will go along with the international consensus on the profound need for a treaty to ban all manners of nuclear testing and at the same time record its demur with the present draft of the test ban treaty. Indhi's final position about the treaty will be known only when it menders through the complicated process of Front government in Delhi has bought time with the decision announced officially in Parliament on July 15 by the External Affairs Minister, Inder Kumar Gujral that "we will not be the spoilers" at Geneva though India will not sign the CTBT. The new government, created with components of as many as 13 political parties, almost each of them with limited political support, has to formulate its CTBT policy -- and a larger and far more complex nuclear policy - in the midst of several strong contrary pulls. There is a very vocal and organised bomb lobby which demands that India denounce the draft CTBT, make one or more nuclear explosions, declare itself & nuclear weapons power (one or two members of the lobby claim that this can be done by India even without tests), and then sign CTBT at par with the Nuclear-Five. Much less vocal but now quite assertive is the antibomb lobby which has been trying to build public opinion, wiJiout much success that India subscribe to CTBT without surrendering its nuclear option. The issue is still to be discussed at the, Steering Committee of the 13 parties that has been set up to oversee the functioning of the government. The Congress, led by P.V. Narasimha Rao which lost the rec66 Emporium Current Essays at the Disarmament Commission conference in Geneva. The Foreign Secretary, Salman Haider, told the Geneva conference in clear terms on March 21, when Rao was stili Prime Minister, "we do not believe that the acquisition of nuclear weaporfs is essential for our national security and we have followed a conscious decision in this regard. "This was as clear a statement as could be made by the Rao government in support of CTBT. After the parliamentary poll, the Hindu-nationalist party, BJP formed a government-ontria! for 13 days and then quit because it could not muster a majority to support it in the Lok Sabhn. The BJP is known to be in favour of India going nuclear. This was announced

in clear terms in its election manifesto, though as Prime Minister, Atel Behari Vajpayee tried to mute the BJP position with ambiguities so characteristic of India1*; nuclear policy. However, the bomb lobby became II the more vocal. By the time the United Front government was created with the outside support of the Congress party in parliament, there was a loud, wellorchestrated demand by the bomb lobby that India "walk out of the Geneva conference." The decision of Mr. Gujral to give Salman Haider a year's extension (he was due to retire on June 30) brought a strong attack on the Foreign Minister as the Foreign Secretary was regarded as committed to the CTBT. Mr. Gujral's first decision was to reject the bomb lobby's demand that India condemn the CTBT draft and walk out of the Geneva parleys. India deliberations trying until the end to covert the nuclear powers, particularly the United States that there must be a linkage between CTBT and a time frame for complete nuclear disarmament, he decided. Meanwhile, India's decision not to sign the CTBT "as it stood now" remained firm. The government, however, soon yielded some ground f o the bomb lobby, unwilling as it was to be seen compromising on "national security" perceived to be under threat from continued cooperation, open as well as cldestine, between a full-fledged nuclear power China - and a nuclear capable state, Pakistan covering the country's western, eastern, north-western as well as north-eastern Hanks. So on June 20, the Indian Ambassador to the Geneva conference, Ms. Arundhuti Mukherjee, declared that "our national security considerations (have) become a key factor in our decisionmaking "with regard to the CTBT. On July 15, the Foreign Minister allowed himself to be more explicit on the vital issue. In a statement in the Upper House of Parliament, Mr. Gujral reiterated India's threat perceptions from China and Pakistan (without naming cither country) and declared that India "will not allow its nuclear option to Emporium Current Essays 67 be restricted in any manner and would take all necessary measures to cope with any threat that might be posed to its security." Implicit in this statement was the Indian perception that by signing CTBT in its present form India would be signing away its option to conduct nuclear tests. This was unacceptable specially because "other countries -in our region continue with their nuclear weapons programmes whether openly or in a clandestine manner." Gujral reiterated India's complaint that the nuclear powers had shown no inclination to engage in nuclear disarmament. He also repeated India's inability to "associate itself with the international verification system" being pushed by the United States. At the same time, added the Foreign Minister, India did not ish to be the spoiler at Geneva. It adopted a "responsible" attitude towards the CTBT parleys. It had put forward various proposals aimed at making CTBT truly comprehensive and not porous enough to

enable nuclear powers to refine their warheads and develop their arsenals at tests sites and laboratories, and earnestly pleading for a linkage between CTBT and complete nuclear disarmament within a reasonable time. India would respect whatever consensus other nations might reach and would expect all nations to similarly respect the valid reason for its inability to sign the CTBT "as it stood now." India joined the Geneva deliberations when they reopened - on July 29. The CTBT draft that emerges from Genevsi will go to the UN General Assembly for final voting. India will continue to interact with the world powers about the draft treaty. There is no agreement so far on the nuber of countries that must sign the treaty before it can come into force. This will presumably require quite a bit of secret and open diplomacy. India's views will continue to be pressed during the entire process of negotiations prior to the coming into force of the CTBT. While Gujral rejected any restrictions imposed by outside powers on India's freedom to take whatever measures were necessary to protect national security, he made two constructive affirmations which deserve serious attention of the international community. First, he stressed the need for further negotiations. "We are willing to negotiate with other countries" about a time-frame for complete nuclear disarmament, he declared. Such negotiations were part of the CTBT process, and might even work as a catalyst. On its own part, the United Front government intends to conduct negotiations with China on nuclear issues. Diplomatic exchanges are now going on to prepare for high-level exchange of views. Would China be willing to conclude agreements with India committing the two powers not to im- their nuclear capability68 Emporium Current Essays against one another, and China not to station nuclear missiles on Tibet? Would China agree to have the latter commitment to be verified by a their party reconnaissance? Could China convince India that it is not engaged in any kind of nuclear collaboration with Pakistan? Could an accord be concluded between China, India and Pakistan as nuclearcapable powers and China a full-fledged nuclear power? India has definitely gone back on its clearly stated position of over three decades that a CTBT would not be a disarmament measrrc, its objective being exclusively to prevent further testing of nuclear weapons. The nuclear option is now an icon of India's security policy. That, however, does not mean that India will undertake nuclear tests and proclaim itself to be a nuclear power. Gujral's second important declaration was that "we do not need nuclear weapons now." Whether India would need them tomorrow, "I do not know." This was a clever way of using the tools of ambiguity to keep both the nuclear powers who are against proliferation and the nuclear lobby in the country satisfied for the time being. One can seriously question if the United Front government has a mandate to go in for nuclear weapons. India's "security concerns" generate a mountain of polemics. They have

not been deliberated upon by a responsible body with the transparency that one can expect of a democratic dispensation. A dozen or so voices do not reflect a national position. Nor is it of any use to claim that in any public opinion poll, the overwhelming will support exercising the nuclear option. They will because they do not know the extreme complications of the issue. Indeed the cost-benefit of going nuclear has not been worked out, nor has India developed a nuclear warfare' doctrine nor has it set-up the requistic command control mechanism. Above all, the curcl dichotomy between the acquisition of nuclear weapons with over 350 million Indians living below the poverty line will inhibit and most probably restraint any government's move to make India a nuclear weapons power unless and until there is clear and present nuclear threat from China. Prime Minister Deve Gowda' recent word-picture of how urban India has been pampered with all kinds of subsidies since independence at the cost of the 70-80 per cent of Indians who live in the villages make the dichotomy even sharper. After all, the demand for nuclear weapons is articulated by a small minority of the ura elite who have been seduced by the false majcstry of weapons of mass annihilation. •ent election to parliament, had apparently determined to go along with CTBT. Mr. Rao had personally assured President Clinton in 1993 that India jvould not obstruct the passage of CTBT