33. Ctbt, A Review

Emporium Current Essays H fJUfWfW A MfcMife M_ The UN General Assembly adopted a crippled Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on September 10, 1996, whereby 158 member states voted for the treaty, five states, i.e., Lebanon, Cuba, Mauritius, Tanzania and Syria abstained while India, Bhutan and Libya to and end the 31-month incessant efforts by 61 member Conference on Disarmament. CTBT is required to be signed and ratified by 44 states, including eight nuclear capable states, and three threshold states i.e., India, Pakistan and Israel, out of which 20 have yet to ratify the Chemical Weapon Convention signed in 1993. It is indeed amazing that the treaty cannot be enforced by. five nuclear powers extending their own moratorium which already exists. If the treaty has no ostensible relevance to nuclear test explosions conducted by five nuclear weapons states, it is also insignificant for 175 non-nuclear weapons states having abjured their nuclear weapon option through NPT. The question arises what is the relevance of the treaty? The US and Western nuclear powers, bitter opponents of CTBT till 1992 have suddenly become its major proponents in order to perpetuate nuclear apartheid. Having conducted 715 out of 1,030 knonn nuclear tests and exercising nuclear option, Washington was instrumental in having the NPT extended unconditionally and indefinitely. The effort is to universalisc it by foreclosing the nuclear option for threshold states. The US support to zero vie{d CTBT is conditioned by continuances of weapons related activities under a Stockpile Stewardship (SS) programme, maintenance of weapons labs and facilities to keep the latent capacity to test nuclear weapons. Frank Van Hippcl of Princeton University has pointed out that "under SS programme sub-critical tests would be a verification nightmare, making it impossible to distinguish between zero yield and low yield underground tests". In fact this sham nuclear explosion ban treaty is only the first step in the fissile materials production cut off treaty. Both these treaties arc ostensibly directed against China to freeze its nuclear warhead technology and its fissile materials availability, which the US and other NWS advance on new generations of weapons. US interest lies in selective nuclear disarmament which would enable it to*retain substantial nuclear stockpiles both for purposes of mutual deterrence and preponderant collective leverage138 Emporium Current Essays Emporium Current Essays

139 vis-a-vis rest of the world. The West vehemently objects fo the linkage of the treaty with disarmament by maintaining that it is not the disarmament treaty but a nuclear test ban treaty under negotiations, US has also been able to enlist China's support after protracted negotiations and revision of the verification clause, which originally envisaged that 26 out of 51 states could request for on-site inspection if any signatory violated the treaty. It now provides that 30 states have to agree for the same. Significantly, China has given its support after conducting its 45th nuclear test. US is using different strategies to lure India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT in fulfilment of its nuclear proliferation goals and South Asian agenda, as the support of these two countries is essential in order to make the treaty credible. One view however is that except for obduracy, it would not make any qualitative difference even if India and Pakistan sign the CTBT. Mr, Christopher Paine, US nuclear weapon expert and senior researcher at the Natural Resource Defence Council, in an interview to Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun on July 1, 1996 stated: "While India could go for untested crude weapons, Pakistan could update its nuclear capability without any explosions which the CTBT would ban as it had received detailed design data including nuclear weapon materials from China". Indian principled stand on the CTBT has been consistent, moral and courageous. It is in marked divergence and totally antithetical to Western objectives towards weapons of mass destruction India's views about the CTBT are as under: *" It believes that a meaningful treaty should inextricably be linked to global disarmament, including a time-borne framework for elimination of nuclear weapons. In 1988 it had proposed an international convention on the prohibition of threat or use or nuclear \\eapons by 2010. It is strongly viewed that with 175 states having abjured their nuclear weapons options as signatories to NPT, CTBT only targets threshold statcs-vi/.India, Pakistan and Israel. •"* India desires as all encompassing nuclear non-proliferation treaty, leading to the vertical, horizontal, qualitative, quantitative as well as global disarmament, which the proposed treaty fails to meet. Pertinently, France and China conducted series of tests recently and in the absence of the <•, ban on sub-critical testing, simulation process and techniques, qualitative improvement by three nuclear states would continue. f India feels that an iniquitous world order has been reinforced consequent to the signing of NPT by the NWS which are also permanent members of UN Security Council. f The NWS have carried out innumerable tests since midfifties, including hydro-nuclear explosions. The CTBT docs not prohibit them from cither possessing or improving the design, quantum or lethality of their nuclear weapons. Thus -(••• the fact that nuclear powers are investing billions of dollars in modern facilities to create advanced nuclear weapons with lab testing and computer as.sistcd design, to provide functional equivalent of full scale testing, makes their bona fides suspect.

** India is convinced that the US docs not believe that cither the NPT or CTBT would end the future proliferation. Consequently it is making heavy investment in Counter Proliferation Strategy (CPS), which seeks to prevent the emergence of new "rouge" states. According to William Perry "Us has to remain in preparedness to have defensive system against potential nuclear attack of non-deterrable rogue states, i.e. Iran, Iraq Libya. It also needed CPS to deal with the threat of weapons of mass destruction arising out of regional conflicts. Thus, for the US disarmament is inconceivable and unacceptable whether it be Article V of NPT or Preamble for CTBT." The pertinent question is if the US believes in the effectiveness of NPT and CTBT why is it spending enormous resources in counter proliferation strategy? •*" -India's main emphasis is on the absence of foolproof verification measures to check transfer of materials and weapons from nuclear weapons states to nonnuclear weapon states. It has no mechanism to stop proliferation through clandestine transfer of weapons and technology. Experts however maintain that Indian objections do not stem from any moral commitment to disarmament but are being used as a ploy in order to complete its ongoing multi-faceted nuclear projects ad it conduct tests in order to join the nuclear club. However, Indian obduracy has been hardened by West's policy of appeasement towards it. Despite its obstinacy Wisncr kept assuring that Indian stand would not affect US investment or trade. Warren Christopher further insured that notwithstanding its intransigence the US would not seek sanctions against India. In140 Emporium Current Essays further defiance Indian FM announced the resumption of long-range missile test, thus floating CTBT. Pakistan ostensibly shares Indian views about solemn and binding commitment from NWS for complete elimination of nuclear weapons. But unlike India's consistent and well defending stand, fully debated in Parliament and print media, Pakistan's position has been ambivalent and contradictory. Pakistan has all along maintained that it is prepared to sign the NPT and CTBT provided India docs the same. Recently, however in order to please the US. Pakistan changed its stand by suyinii that it would sign the treaty at an appropriate time taking into account its security concerns and position of other countries. The Benazir government censured by all political parties, and put in the dock by the Press, for unilaterally bartering away country's interests for political expediency, backtracked, reverting to its earlier position linking its signing of CTBT to that of India. This conditional linkage is, however, baffling, as acceding to NPT and CTBT should be decided on the basis of Pakistan's national interest alone and not as a reaction to government's Indo-centric foreign policy. If India, after extracting maximum possible concessions from the West, i.e., seat as a permanence member of UN Security Council, authorisation for export of sensitive technology, provision of equipment which would enable it to simulate nuclear explosions without conducting nuclear tests, additional

economic concessions, eventually signs the CTBT it would leave no option for Pakistan but to si};n the treaty, which would have negative consequences undermining its national security. The COAS, however, with a more rational approach maintained that "we will take any decision after much consideration even if India signs the CTBT. Another favourite theme being propagated by the government is to join the mainstream in long-term interests and let India be 'isolated'. The bait is'being given in the form of unreliable security assurances, simplistic interpretation and pressure. On August 14, FM boasted of our superior diplomacy having isolated India, how? No plausible explanation was given. While the PM for reasons of political expediency makes Pakistan signing consequent to India, the FM highlights that "Pakistan will keep its options open to sign or not after we are more or less satisfied with the CTBT draft." "Munir Akram expressed satisfaction at the safeguards for monitoring implementation of the treaty before inspection and said that "despite shortcoming, the draft treaty will constrain further development of weapons thus contributing to the goal of nuclear disarmament." Pakistan strangely supported the Australian Emporium Current Essays 141 initiative-to- bring the CTBT before UNGA as part of 'Friends of CTBT. What signals do these conflicting statements radiate and what course of action should Pakistan adopt? It must be reconciled to three cardinal facts: a)Despite a number of amendments the CTBT would only lead to nuclear apartheid not nuclear disarmament. b)- It would place a qualitative cap on nuclear potential of Pakistan. c)- Even if India agrees to join the CTBT West efforts would be to further denuclearise Pakistan's nuclear programme. If Pakistan succumbs the next step would be to rollback and eliminate its nuclear and missile capabilities already capped by Benazir government in 1989. Pakistan must realise that out of three threshold nuclear states it would be most affected as the other two are already well recognised nuclear weapons states. India according to specialists is producing substantial quantity of plutonium and enriched uranium for production of 10 to 15 nuclear bombs annually and its intentions of manufacturing nuclear submarine is also well-known. Can any sane government consider giving-up its nuclear deterrent undermining its nationalsccurity? It would be'suicidal to acquiesce to the new US strategy in South Asia at tK?'cost-of Pakistan's national interest. A consensus should therefore, be evolved through Parliament, Press and intelligentsia, whether Pakistan should sign the treaty keeping in view its

security concerns? These include peaceful and honourable settlement of Kashmir dispute and regional non-proliferation underwritten by the US and Western powers including removal of missile, threats.