20 Pak Stand On Ctbt

  • December 2019
  • PDF

This document was uploaded by user and they confirmed that they have the permission to share it. If you are author or own the copyright of this book, please report to us by using this DMCA report form. Report DMCA


Overview

Download & View 20 Pak Stand On Ctbt as PDF for free.

More details

  • Words: 1,141
  • Pages: 3
Emporium Current Essays 83 PAE STAND. on 'CTBT India has taken a principled stand against CTBT as indeed it did with regard to NPT. as both these treaties do not include to programme for global disarmament. One may recall that as far back s 1954, it was India which mooted a move to ban nuclear testing. Later in 1963, India signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) which put a stop to testing in the open. India and the USA cosponsorcd talks on a ban on nuclear testing at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in January 1994. There was an apparent shift in the Indian stand after the indefinite extension of NPT in May 1995. since then, India has been insisting on linking CTBT with global disarmament including a time-table, for it. It stuck to its guns and voted against the draft treaty. China too had raised objections about the verification procedures but agreed to go along after the USA concurred in revising its proposal for a simple majority of all members to decide cases for inspection and physical verification of the errant states. To overcome India's blockade, the proponents of the treaty decided to transfer the matter to the UN General Assembly. India again stood in the way. The General Assembly was since adopted the treaty with an overwhelming majority of 158. India, of course, voted against it. The guts and consistency shown by India is based on a reasonable and convincing rationale. Not only, like NPT, CTBT is discriminatory and perpetuates nuclear apartheid, it also permits the advanced powers to continue reining their weapons through sophisticated Vfb-critical laboratory tests. It thus militates against the aims and purposes of'disarmament whicli is one of the primary goals of the conference for disarmament. Much has been said and written about India's trickery and a hidden agenda. Whatever be its real design in taking the stand in has on CTBT, the fact remains that India is working assiduously and most intelligently to safeguard and further its national interest. Inder Kumar Gujral, during his visit to Singapore declared that India was in favour of an "honest, genuine and comprehensive" testban treaty and that the one sponsored at the UN failed in all these aspects. Gujral can speak with confidence as he knows that all the people and political parties of his country;'arc firmlS behind the``Emporium Current Essays 84 Emporium Current Essays government policy. He also knows ,that India's geopolitical and geoeconomic position will not allow the USA and other Western powers to take any tough action against it because of its countervailing weight against China and for its large consumer market. Of course India is playing a well worked-out political game. Already it has secured material gains. How does one explain the sudden removal of the Kashmir question from the Security Council agenda. The procedural excuse was a handy ruse to

explain away a calculated decision. Why was Wisner sent to Pakistan to "tell" us to recognise the new realities apd acquiesce in the state assembly elections in the Held Valley and stop resistance to open and free trade between the two countries. How is it that the formidable US Secretary of State found it necessary to assured India that despite its defiance of the treaty, no sanctions would be imposed against it. Knowing the ropes well, India is pulling its weight to make the most of the current international situation. If the declared aim is tp get a seat in the Security Council and secure sophisticated, state-oftheart advanced nuclear laboratory technology, it has every right to manoeuvre Us way to strengthen its position and take risks based on principled propositions. There should be little surprise if India begins to relent and soften its conditions to join the treaty, if some of its global ambitions are viewed favourably by the powers that be. ff national interests, their protection and promotion is the touchstone by which to judge and value our policies, how have we performed with regard to CTBT? At first, Pakistan wavered and dilly-dallied. No clear picture was available. Then it started harping on the old plea that it would only sign if India did. It talked about certain flaws in the draft treaty. And then almost out of the blue it was seen waxing eloquent favouring the treaty. It made common cause with those who moved to transfer the draft to the General Assembly. Post-haste it became one of the "friends" of the treaty along with the Australians. And then it went forth to vote for the treaty with certain reservations, its representative announcing that we would sign the treaty at an appropriate time taking into account our security concerns and the position of other countries. We thus dropped even out linkage with India in the matter and generalised the issue. We have since claimed that we have done the best under the circumstances. Knowing well that we need the nuclear deterrent more than India does, that despite high expense and shortage of resources, we cannot let go our nuclear guard-considering our conventional arms capacity -- what was the need to rush to sponsor the treat) which • trinsically is aimed at stopping us in our nuclear tracks and 'napping shut our potential for upgrading our capability? If we, because of our weaknesses and vulnerability of leadership, were keen not to oppose the treaty so as not to incur the displeasure of our distant '"master", we could with reason and some diplomatic work, havc^shown some restraint and picket! up a little courage to absta'in when the votes were cast and if for certain compulsive considerations we had resohed to act as stooges (with some reservations), we at least should have been alert enough to secure something in return - a pledge for instatnce for a just and fair settlement of Kashmir. Most cavalierly we have placed ourselves in a funny 'yes and no* situation, favouring ami even lauding an agreement which we say we w ill sign only if it suits us. Having voted for it and accepted its contents, wiH we be able to withstand pressure to ratify it when the time comes? Instead of running down India, out of sheer spite, here was a great opportunity for us as the two Asian nuclear powers to stand firm together. Joining India in its principled stand we might have raised our image with the Indians on the one hand and safeguarded our

future security on the other. We missed a rare opportunity. And what have we got instead, since? A rebuke from the US Assistant Secretary of Commerce about our rank corruption, a postponement of the World Bank President's visit and the open support of the superpower (to which we are ever ready to pay homage) to India in the hitter's diabolical ramming through of elections in the so-called "disputed" Occupied Kashmir.

Related Documents

20 Pak Stand On Ctbt
December 2019 8
16 Indian Stance On Ctbt
December 2019 8
41. Ctbt
December 2019 10
Stand
December 2019 45
Stand
May 2020 31
Iim Prof On Pak
June 2020 5