1-22.docx

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE ALFREDO GUSTILO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ESAM GADI y ABDULLAH G.R. No. 116623 March 23, 1995 FACTS: Esam Gadi, a national of Saudi Arabia, was apprehended at the Manila International Airport and subsequently detained for possession of marijuana. Thereafter, an information was filed charging Esam Gadi with violation of section 81 Article 11, of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended. Three (3) days later, Esam Gadi filed an "Ex Parte Motion to Reduce Bail," but was denied. So Esam Gadi filed a motion for reinvestigation claiming that the seriousness of the offense charged warranted the grant of his motion. Admitting that this motion was filed beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, he contended that the reglementary period was not mandatory. However, the motion for "reinvestigation" was denied by the trial court. He then challenged the denial of his motion for "reinvestigation" in a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA granted the petition and reversed the trial court Order denying reinvestigation. The CA held that the five-day period for asking reinvestigation was only permissive, considering the use of the word "may.” On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that it is a mandatory rule that a motion for preliminary investigation be filed within five (5) days from the time the accused had learned of the filing of the information. It is also maintained that Esam Gadi had waived his right to preliminary investigation when he posted bail for his release. ISSUES: 1. Whether the motion for reconsideration of the respondent be granted since the reglementary period is not mandatory in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of court. 2. Whether Esam Gadi is entitled to Preliminary Investigation. HELD: The Court finds that the Court of Appeals fell into reversible error in granting the motion for "reinvestigation" of private respondent. The period for filing a motion for preliminary investigation after an information has been filed against an accused who was arrested without a warrant has been characterized as mandatory by the Court. The court also added that if the accused did not exercise his right within the five-day period, his motion for "reinvestigation" was denied. Section 7 of Rule 112 of the present Rules 2. People vs. Odilao – GR. No. 155451, April 14, 2004 Facts: That sometime during the latter part of 1997, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, having received in trust from Trans Eagle Corporation a luxury car known as "Jeep Cherokee Sport 4wd" valued at P1,199,520.00 with the agreement that they would sign the document of sale if they are interested to buy the same and with the obligation to return the said car to Trans Eagle Corporation if they are not interested, the said accused, once in possession of the said luxury car, far from complying with their obligation, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, with unfaithfulness and grave abuse of confidence, did then and there misappropriate, misapply and convert into their own personal use and benefit the same or the amount of P1,199,520.00 which is the equivalent value thereof, and inspite of repeated demands made upon them to let them comply with their obligation to return the luxury car, they have failed and refused and instead denied to have received the luxury car known as "Jeep Cherokee Sport 4WD" and up to the present time still fail and refuse to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Trans Eagle Corporation in the amount aforestated. A warrant of arrest against respondent was then issued by the Executive Judge. Upon motion of respondent, the Executive Judge issued an Order[3] dated September 28, 2000 directing the Office of the City Prosecutor to conduct reinvestigation of the case with a caveat that the reinvestigation will be terminated within ten days from receipt of the order and thereafter, submit appropriate recommendation to it. In the meantime the Executive Judge countermanded the service of the warrant of arrest. Based on his reinvestigation report[4] dated October 17, 2000 which found no probable cause, Asst. City Prosecutor Capacio filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss[5] dated October 20, 2000. On October 27, 2000, private complainant Carmen G. Bugash filed an urgent motion to disregard the reinvestigation report.[6] On November 3, 2000, private complainant filed with the DOJ a petition for review[7] seeking the reversal of the Reinvestigation Report. In an Order dated October 30, 2000, the trial court deferred the arraignment until the petition for review would have been finally resolved by the Department of Justice.[8] On February 20, 2001, the trial court issued another order holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss until the DOJ shall have resolved the petition for review.[9]

More than one year later, private complainant filed with the trial court on March 14, 2002, a Motion to Suspend Resolution of the Motion to Dismiss.[10] Thereafter, the trial court, acting on the prosecution's motion to dismiss filed on October 20, 2000 and private complainant's motion to disregard the reinvestigation report, issued an Order[11] dated May 21, 2002, (1) denying the motion to dismiss; and (2) declaring the motion to disregard the reinvestigation report to be moot and academic, rationalizing that "[t]he Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which was approved on December 1, 2000 vests now authority to the trial court to rule on the presence or absence of probable cause. If the Court finds probable cause it will issue forthwith a warrant of arrest otherwise it will dismiss the case." Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration[12] which was denied in the Order[13] dated June 13, 2002 of the RTC which likewise directed the implementation of the existing warrant of arrest against him. Issue: Whether the denial of motion to dismiss by the trial judge is proper. Held: Pursuant to Section 6 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judge of the trial court is mandated to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence to determine whether probable cause exists and pursuant to its own findings, either dismiss the case immediately if no probable cause exists, or to issue the warrant of arrest in the absence of probable cause.—Pursuant to the aforequoted rule, the judge of the trial court is mandated to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence to determine whether probable cause exists and pursuant to its own findings, either dismiss the case immediately if no probable cause exists, or to issue the warrant of arrest in the absence of probable cause. Trial court judge’s reliance on the prosecutor’s averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case against the petitioner was, to say the least, an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.—Thus, in Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., the Court held that the trial court judge’s “reliance on the prosecutor’s averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case against the petitioner was, to say the least, an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in blatant violation of this Court’s pronouncement in Crespo vs. Mogul. Having found probable cause, the trial court acted well within its authority in denying the motion to dismiss and also correct in ordering the implementation of the previously issued warrant of arrest.—Evidently, when the trial court issued the Orders dated May 21, 2002 and June 13, 2002, respectively, the trial court judge was merely performing his mandated duty to personally determine the existence of probable cause and thus arrive at a resolution of the motion to dismiss. Having found probable cause, the trial court acted well within its authority in denying said motion to dismiss and, since in the present case, a warrant of arrest had already been issued and only the service thereof had been countermanded, the trial court judge was also correct in ordering the implementation of the previously issued warrant of arrest.

3. PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA DIMATULAC vs. Hon. Sesinando Villon et al G.R. No. 127107 Oct. 12, 1998 Digested by: Angelyn Visitacion _____________________________________________________________________________________ Facts: On or about November 2, 2005 all the accused under the leadership of Mayor Santiago Yabut went to the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Some of the accused positioned themselves around the house while the others stood by the truck and the mayor stayed in the truck with the body guard. Accused Billy YAbut, Kati YAbut & Franncisco Yambao went inside the house strongly suggested to go down to see themayor outside and ask for sorry. As Dimatulac went down to the house and he was shot to kill as a consequence he died. The assistant prosecutor Alfonso Flores found that the Yabut’s were in company with one another that the offense committed was only homicide not murder and hereby subject to bail P 20,000.00 for each of the accused. The herein petitioner appealed the resolution of Alfonso Flores to the Secretary of Justice. Pending appeal to the DOJ, Judge Roura hastily set the case for arraignment. Issue: Whether or not arraignment to lesser penalty oh homicide is proper while the case is pending in the DOJ subject for Review.

Held: In the case it is not proper. Indubitably then, there was on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of information of homicide, he should have ask the petitioner as regards to the status of the appeal or warned them that the DOJ would not decide the appeal within the certain period. It is indubitable that petitioner had the right to appeal to the Secretary of Justice. Section 4 of Rule 112 of the rules of court provides that “If upon petition by the proper party the secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting any preliminary investigation to investigate or to dismiss or move for the dismissal of the complaint or information”. There is nothing that forecloses the power of authority of the secretary of justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite information already having been filed in court. The secretary of justice is only enjoined to refrain far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from action of the prosecutor once the complaint or information is filed in court. In Any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the secretary of justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. We do not hesitate to rule that court committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the Yabut’s on the assailed information for homicide. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly, joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment. So must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void.

4. Pacoy v. Afable, [G.R. NO. 157472 : September 28, 2007] FACTS: On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against Petitioner Jose M. Pacoy. Upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word “Homicide” and instead wrote the word “Murder” in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide. Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence. The respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration. In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that “disregard of rank” is merely a generic mitigating circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to murder. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and exceeds his jurisdiction in ordering the amendment of the information from homicide to murder HELD: The petition is not meritorious. The change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution. Under Section 14, Rule 110 - Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word “Homicide” and its replacement by the word “Murder.” There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from “Homicide” to “Murder” as purely formal. Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the

complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner. While the responden judge erroneously thought that “disrespect on account of rank” qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge.

5. Bonifacio et al., vs RTC Makati and Jessie John Gimenez GR No 184800 By ResIpsaLoquitor - September 01, 2013 Bonifacio et al., vs RTC Makati and Jessie John Gimenez GR No 184800 - May 5, 2010 Facts: Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed in behalf of Yuchenco Family of Yuchenco Group of Companies (YGC) and Malayan Insurance Co., (Malayan), a criminal complain for 13 counts of libel under Art. 355 in relation to Art. 353 of the RPC against the members of Paents Enabling Parents Coalition Inc (PEPCI), a group of discontented planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI) which is owned by the Yuchengco’s, for they previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits of such after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments. That PEPCI members owns and moderates a website and a blog with web domains: www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, www.pepcoalition.com, and [email protected]. Gimenez alleged that upon accessing such websites in Makati he red various article containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations attacking the Yuchengco Family. Since the article was first published and accessed by Gimenez at Makati City, pursuant to Art. 360 of the RPC as amended by RA 4363. Issue: How should an online article be treated in relation to a written defamation/libel with respect to jurisdiction of the case provided by law specifically Art. 360 of the RPC?

Ruling: Art. 360 of the RPC provides: “Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. xxxx The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC of the province or city where the libellous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. xxxx” That venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited only to: Where the complainant resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or Where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published was used as basis for the venue of the action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published. The same measures cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the point of its printing and first publication. TO give credence to Gimenez’s argument would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Art. 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and

prevent. It would do chaos wherein website author, writer, blogger or anyone who post messages in websites could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines. The information is quashed, and the case is dismissed.

6. PEOPLE VS. SALAS [143 SCRA 163; G.R. NO. L-66469; 29 JUL 1986] Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992, a 60 year old woman, identified as Virginia Talens was found lying dead in a canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga; she was last seen alive at about 3:00 o'clock early morning of March 6, 1992 by Orlando Pangan and Richard Pangan who were with her going home coming from the wake of one Leonardo Flores; both Orlando and Richard Pangan testified that accused was with them in going home at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992; Orlando and Richard Pangan reached first their house and left the two on the way and that was the last time Virginia was seen alive; just a few minutes after reaching his house and while inside his house, Orlando Pangan heard a shout; another woman, one Serafia Gutierrez, testified that she likewise was awakened by a shout at about 3:00 in the morning; Dr. Aguda who autopsied the victim found hematoma on the head and chest, an abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the neck which stabwound, the doctor claims, was the cause of death of the victim; Police Investigator Gonzales who immediately responded upon report, recovered at the scene a pin, the victim's wristwatch, earring, a ring and P135.00 money; he likewise found on March 9, 1992 when he continued his investigation bloodstain on the front door of the house of the accused which bloodstain when submitted for examination was found to be of human blood; one Resultay was with Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of March 5, 1992 in going to the wake, who claims that Virginia had money on a purse as while they were on the way Virginia bet on a jueteng she saw Virginia got money from her purse a P500.00 bill but as she had no change she instead took P8.00 from her other pocket; one Ramil Talens, a son of the victim corroborated the claim of Resultay that Virginia had with her at that time money worth P2,000.00 as in the morning of March 5, 1992 he gave her mother for safekeeping the sum of P1,500.00 which he claims his mother placed in her purse and claims further that at the wake, he asked and was given P50.00 by his mother as he also participated in the gambling thereat, however, the purse of Virginia containing about P2,000.00 was no longer to be found when she was found dead; Orlando Pangan saw the accused gambled in the wake; Virginia likewise gambled at the wake; accused had been working for three days before March 6 at Sta. Ana, Pampanga and up to March 5, 1992, but the following day, he did not anymore report for work at Sta. Ana, Pampanga, was no longer to be found and was last seen at about 3:00 morning together with Virginia Talens on their way home coming from the wake; the parents of [the] accused were informed by Investigator Gonzales that their son was the suspect and adviced them to surrender him, but since March 6, 1992 when accused left Mexico, Pampanga, he returned only on September 19, 1992 at Arayat, Pampanga, not at Mexico, Pampanga where he was ultimately apprehended by the Mexico Police on September 22, 1992 after chancing on a radio message by the police of Arayat to their Provincial commander that a vehicular incident occurred at Arayat, Pampanga where one Elmer Salas was the victim and was hospitalized at the district hospital at Arayat, Pampanga where he used the name of Rommel Salas and not Elmer Salas. The trial court rendered convicting Salas for Robbery with Homicide Issues: (1) Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of the appellant of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. (2) Whether or Not the appellant’s crime homicide or robbery with homicide. Held: There was no eyewitness or direct evidence; either to the robbery or to the homicide and none of the things allegedly stolen were ever recovered. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its findings and conclusion of culpability. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons free. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis excepting that of guilt. All the circumstances established must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one and fair and reasonable

conclusion pointing solely to the accused, to the exclusion of all other persons, as the author of the crime. The facts and circumstances consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence can constitute evidence which, in weight and probative value, may be deemed to surpass even direct evidence in its effect on the court. The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant hastily abandoned his house in Barrio San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since childhood, on that very date. Appellant was nowhere when his co-worker and barrio mate, Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellant's house to fetch him for work at around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant also abandoned his job as a painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on March 6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving behind an unfinished painting project. He was not seen again from said date. Police investigators found human bloodstains on the front door of appellant's house, on his clothing, and on his yellow slippers after the victim was killed. Despite efforts of the police to find appellant as the principal suspect, a fact known to appellant's family and neighbors, appellant did not present himself to the authorities. Appellant was apprehended only a full six months after the date of the crime, following his confinement in a hospital in Arayat, Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a Victory Liner bus in Arayat. When hospitalized, appellant used the alias Rommel Salas, instead of his true name Elmer Salas. These circumstances denote flight, which when unexplained, has always been considered by the courts as indicative of guilt. Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake they attended. The victim was, in fact, enjoying a winning streak when her son, Ramil Talens, came to fetch her but which he failed to do because his mother was winning, and she refused to leave. The purse of Talens containing cash was gone when her corpse was found in the canal with a stab wound and bruises. What was left was a safety pin which victim used to fasten the missing purse to her clothes. Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimonies of credible witnesses who positively testified that appellant was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim alive. The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the part of the principal witness for the prosecution to falsely testify against the appellant strongly tends to buttress the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony of said witnesses deserve full faith and credit. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants to save the State the trouble of having to effect his arrest. Spontaneity and intent to give one's self up are absent where the accused went into hiding for six months after the incident and had to resort to an alias when he was involved in an accident being investigated by the police authorities. Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime against property. Homicide is incidental to the robbery which is the main purpose of the criminal. In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in the generic sense, was committed." Although there was no witness as to the actual robbing of the victim, there is testimony that the victim had more or less P2,000.00; and wore gold earrings valued at P750.00. These were never recovered. While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was killed, we may conclude from four circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1) Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake. (2) The appellant knew that victim was winning. (3) The victim was last seen alive with appellant. (4) The victim's purse containing her money and earrings were missing from her body when found. The decision of the regional trial court is affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.

7. Giminez vs. Nazareno G.R. No. L-37933, April 15, 1988 (Maiksi lang, Full text na lang, walang digest) GANCAYCO, J.:

Two basic issues are raised for Our resolution in this petition for certiorari and mandamus. The first is whether or not a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned, escapes from the custody of the law. The other issue is whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who has been duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross examine witnesses who testified against him. The following facts are not in dispute: On August 3,1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr., were charged with the crime of murder. On August 22, 1973 all the above-named.accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon, Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon. All the accused, including private respondent, were duly informed of this. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private respondent escaped from his detention center and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (the petitioners herein) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the accused praying that private respondent de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides: “SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsoryprocess secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. (Italics supplied.)** Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave the private respondent the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court.1 After due trial, or on November 6,1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent. The dispositive portion is as follows: “WHEREFORE, insofar as the accused Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, and Rogelio Baguio are concerned, this case is hereby dismissed. The City Warden of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby ordered to release these accused if they are no longer serving sentence of conviction involving other crimes. The proceedings in this case against the accused Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. who has escaped on August 30,1973 shall remain pending, without prejudice on the part of the said accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to present his defense whenever the court acquires back the jurisdiction over his person."2 On November 16,1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for Reeonsideration questioning the above-quoted dispositive portion on the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on “trial in absentia” cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated November 22, 1973. Hence, this petition. The respondent court, in its Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners, expressed the opinion that under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the private respondent, who was tried in absentia, did not lose his right to cross -examine the witnesses for the prosecution and present his evidence.3 The

reasoning of the said court is that under the same provision, all accused should be presumed innocent.4 Furthermore, the lower court maintains that jurisdiction over private respondent de la Vega, Jr. was lost when he escaped and that his right to cross-examine and present evidence must not be denied him once jurisdiction over his person is reacquired.5 We disagree. First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused-private respondent when he appeared during the arraignment on August 22,1973 and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case. But the question is this—was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the trial? We answer this question in the negative. As We have consistently ruled in several earlier cases,6 jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law. Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 goast&ution aforecited a “trial in absentia” may be had when the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment, (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts show, the private respondent was arraigned on August 22,1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the lower court.7 It ‘was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter8 that private respondent escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified. The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973 Constitution, correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence of private respondent, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent and rendered a decision as to the other accused only. Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escape from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. As it has been aptly explained: “x x x The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as there were quite a number of reported instances where the pFoceedmgs against a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because of his non-appearance. What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That is the way it should be, for both society and the offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished." The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. Nor it can be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his right to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, be virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of witnessess is

a personal right and may be waived.10 Tn the same vein, his right to presend evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and protection, may be waived by him. Finally, at this point, We note that Our pornouncement in this case is buttressed by the provisions of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the intention of the framers of our Constitution, to wit: “x x x The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained. x x x.” Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidences on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 112-L in so far as it suspends Gimenez vs. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1, No. L-37933 April 15, 1988

8. In People v. Tabag (G.R. No. 116511, February 12, 1997) At about 10:00 p.m. of 11 March 1984 in Sitio Candiis, Barangay Cabidianan, New Corella, Davao, the spouses Welbino Magdasal, Sr., and Wendelyn Repalda Magdasal, together with their children Welbino, Jr., and Melisa, were massacred in their home allegedly by members of the Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force (ICHDF). On 14 March 1984, Aniceto Magdasal and Marciana Magdasal, parents of Welbino Magdasal, Sr., reported the incident to the Municipal Mayor of Asuncion, Davao, and to the police authorities of New Corella. They executed a joint affidavit on that date "to request the authorities concerned to follow up said incident and to conduct proper investigation to the end in view that justice will prevail."1 Later, they, together with one Lucrecio Dagohoy, executed sworn statements before the police authorities of New Corella.2 Yet, the identities of the killers remained unknown. The first light on the case was shed on 27 February 1985 when Sergio Doctolero, barangay captain of Buan, Asuncion, Davao, executed a sworn statements3 declaring that a member of the ICHDF, Romeo Guipo, had confessed to him that it was the team led by Sarenas Tabag that massacred the Magdasals. The real break came three days before the first anniversary of the massacre when Ernesto Mawang, a member of that team, gave his sworn statement4 naming those involved in the massacre. Not long after, another member thereof, one Pablo Oca, likewise gave a sworn statements5 corroborating Mawang's statements. On 15 July 1985, an information for murder against accused Coloma Tabag, Sarenas Tabag, Marcelino Tabag, Fernando Maglinte, Jr., Artemio Awod, Romeo Aguipo, Leopoldo Leoncio, and Ernesto Mawang was filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of New Corella, Davao.6 Accompanying the information were the abovementioned joint affidavit, sworn statements, and death certificates of the victims. The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 897.7 After examining, through searching questions, witnesses Pablo Oca and Sergio Doctolero, Judge Napy Agayan issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused. No bond was recommended for their temporary liberty, since they were charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt was strong.8 On 21 August 1985, accused Sarenas Tabag surrendered to Judge Agayan.9 The others could not be arrested; hence, an alias warrant for their arrest was issued. 10 Sarenas Tabag waived submission of his counter-affidavit and preliminary investigation. Finding probable cause against him, the MTC ordered on 28 August 1985 the transmittal of the record of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and the commitment of Sarenas at the Provincial Jail. 11 After appropriate proceedings, an information 12 was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum, Davao, charging the abovenamed accused with the crime of multiple murder. The accusatory portion thereof reads as follows:

That on or about March 11, 1984, in the Municipality of New Corella, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, all members of the ICHDF, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with Coloma Tabag, Marcelino Tabag, Fernando Maglinte, Jr., Artemio Awod, Laureno Awod, Romeo Aguipo, Leopoldo Leoncio and Ernesto Mawang, who are all still at large, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, armed with garand, armalite and carbine, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Welbino Magdasal, Sr., Wendelyn Magdasal, Welbino Magdasal, Jr. and Melisa Magdasal, thereby inflicting upon them injuries which caused their death and further causing actual, moral and compensatory damages to the heirs of the victims. The commission of the foregoing offense is attended by the aggravating circumstance of superior strength, nighttime and in band committed with the aid of armed men. Issue: Whether the trial in absentia was held proper Held: The Court ruled that the trial court erred for failing to proceed with the trial of some accused who escaped from preventive detention. Pursuant to the last sentence of paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, trial against them should continue and upon its termination, judgment should be rendered against them notwithstanding their absence unless, of course, both accused have died and the fact of such death is sufficiently established. The trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitives’ re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who testified against them. Effects of Trial In Absentia on the Rights of the Accused Trial In Absentia Trial in absentia is a stage in a criminal proceeding where the trial is being held even without the physical presence of the accused. Trial in absentia is allowed in our jurisdiction and is indeed authorized by the Constitution. Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, before a trial in absentia may be had, the following requisites must be present: 1. that there has been an arraignment; 2. that the accused has been notified; and 3. that his failure to appear is unjustified. 9. Alva vs. CA G.R. No. 157331 April 12, 2006 Bail OCTOBER 16, 2017 FACTS: Arnold Alva was accused of defrauding YUMI VERANGA HERVERA by means of false manifestation and fraudulent representation to the effect that he could process the latter’s application for U.S. Visa provided she would give the amount of P120,000.00, and by means of other similar deceit, induced and succeeded in inducing said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P120,000.00 on the strength of said manifestation and representation said accused well knowing that the same were false and untrue for the reason that the U.S. Visa is not genuine and were made solely to obtain, as in fact he did obtain the amount of P120,000.00 which amount once in his possession with intent to defraud, he wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said YUMI VERANGA HERVERA in the aforesaid amount of P120,000.00, Philippine Currency.

Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa. ISSUE: Having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present, has the accused lost his right to appeal his conviction? RULING: Yes. Under Sec. 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court: Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. – The appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio. The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. The act of jumping bail will result in the outright dismissal of petitioner’s appeal. As pointed out by the Court in the case of People v. Mapalao, the reason for said rule is that: “once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he losses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.” Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. Within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final and executory.

By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, petitioner revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate at his pleasure his chances for a reversal. This, we cannot condone. Once more, by jumping bail, petitioner has waived his right to appeal. In the case of People v. Ang Gioc, the court enunciated that:”There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him.”

10. G.R. No. 192898 : January 31, 2011SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD AND CECILIA TRINIDAD, PETITIONERS, VS. VICTORANG, RESPONDENT. Facts: On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. Petitioners the filed with the DOJ a motion for review.nOn March 3, 2009 the prosecutor then filed the information with the MTCC who later on ordered the petitioners to file their counter affidavit. The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest [5] praying, among others, for the deferment of their arraignment in view of the pendency of their petition for review before the DOJ. The MTCCgranted the motion subject to par c, section 11 rule 116 and set their arraignment on September 10, 2009. A petition for certiorari was then made to the RTC who held that the MTCC judge did not err insetting the arraignment of the petitioners after the lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ. The petitioners then filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari essentially claiming that the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only a general rule. Issue: WON the motion for review is a ground for suspension of arraignment. Held: Yes. SC granted the motion for reconsideration and reinstate the petition for review on certiorari. The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment . - Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office

of the President; Provided , that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the eviewing office. In Samson v. Daway, the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is aground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

11. People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, 193 SCRA 57, January 18, 1991 "Package of marijuana to be sent abroad" The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It’s a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint is imposed. Facts: Andre Marti and his wife Shirley wanted to send packages to their friend in Switzerland and contracted the services of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders. When asked by the forwarder if they could examine and inspect the packages, Marti refused, assuring that the packages simply contained books and cigars. However, the proprietor opened the boxes for final inspection as part of their SOP. Upon opening, they suspected that the contents were illegal drugs. The proprietor reported the incident to NBI which confirmed that the suspected content were marijuana. In the presence of the NBI agents, the boxes were opened and found dried marijuana leaves inside. After Marti was traced by NBI, he was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against him, which, according to him, is obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication. Issue: May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? NO. Held: The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties granted by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government. Its protection is directed only to governmental action. This right do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen. In this case, the evidence was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention of State authorities. Therefore, there is no reason why it should not be admitted to prosecute him. Marti, however, alleged that the NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence. The Court pointed out that: a) It was the proprietor who made a reasonable search of the packages in compliance with SOP AND b) the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected into a warrantless search and seizure. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Marti further argued that since the Constitution expressly declares as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals.

The Court answered that the Constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.

12. G.R. No. 133267. August 8, 2002.* PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILFREDO PERALTA @ WILLIE, accused-appellant. The prosecution presented Myrna and Francisco Rivera as rebuttal witnesses to deny certain allegations in the direct testimony of appellant. Myrna denied that appellant always attended the hearings at Tarlac, particularly the hearing on May 10, 1995 when appellant escaped. To support her claim, witness Myrna presented a letter from the Office of the Custodian of Records in Camp Crame.69 Francisco Rivera testified that contrary to the claim of accused, the latter did not frequent their house in Tarlac. Earlier on, accused Severo Espinosa filed a Demurrer to Evidence. This was granted by the trial court on March 3, 1997 and ordered the dismissal of the criminal charge for murder against him. On November 10, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: "ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the herein accused WILFREDO PERALTA (a.k.a.) WILLIE, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal in the crime of Murder charged in this case, and said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Appellant posits that the conviction has no sufficient basis as the prosecution has not established clearly his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He points out that there were serious flaws, contradictions and incoherence as to his identity and actual participation in the killing of Major Rivera;75 that his being identified by Francisco Rivera is fabricated and concocted to suit the theory that he is among the group that shot and killed Major Rivera; that the prosecution failed to present evidence that would corroborate Francisco’s testimony; that the prosecution failed to present the testimony of Francisco’s elder brother Ferdinand, and, Tano Basa who were also present when the incident occurred; that there was no direct statement as to the identity of the accused both on the direct and cross examination of Conrado Capitulo. Appellant also questions the presentation of two (2) state witnesses who were placed under the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice. He argues that the provisions of Section 9, Rule 119 is the applicable law and not the Witness Protection Program; that Danilo Castañeda and Noel Reyes should have been indicted together with him; that the presence of this error is a ground for the acquittal of accused-appellant. The Solicitor General on the other hand states that contrary to appellant’s contention, the prosecution was able to establish his identity as one of the assailants; that the testimonies of Francisco Rivera, Conrado Capitulo, Danilo Castaneda and Carlos Rocha were clear, positive and consistent in pointing to the accused-appellant as one of those who killed Major Rivera;78 that the guilt of accused-appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt and that all the elements of murder were present and proved in this case.

Issue: Whether THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION’S WITNESSES NOTWITHSTANDING SERIOUS FLAWS, CONTRADICTIONS AND INCOHERENCE (IN) THE TESTIMONIES AS TO THE IDENTITY AND PARTICIPATION OF ACCUSED IN THE KILLING OF MAJOR ARTHUR RIVERA. Ruling: We find the appeal of Wilfredo Peralta to be devoid of merit. This Court has held in a long line of cases that the credibility of witnesses as assessed by the trial court will generally not be disturbed. As we explained in People vs. Bolivar, et al. "Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses lies within the province and competence of trial courts. Said doctrine is based on the time-honored rule that the matter of "assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who,

unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between truth and falsehood. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses, unless it be clearly shown that the lower court had over looked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the case." State Witnesses; Witness Protection Act; It is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 (Witness Protection Security and Benefit Act) vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution; The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function.—As to the assertion of accused-appellant that the two (2) state witnesses should have been indicted with him applying Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court instead of the Witness Protection Act which was used by the Department of Justice, we also find the same to be without merit. In the case of Webb vs. De Leon, where, as in this case, the petitioners questioned the non-inclusion of Alfaro in the Information considering her alleged conspiratorial participation in the crime, this Court explained: “x x x the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion—the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasboard of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 (Witness Protection Security and Benefit Act) vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function . . . .” Clearly, no error was committed by the Department of Justice when it placed witnesses in this case under the Witness Protection Program.

13. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO VERCELES, FELIX CORPUZ, MAMERTO SORIANO (At large), PABLO RAMOS (At large), and JERRY SORIANO (State Witness), accused. MARIO VERCELES and FELIX CORPUZ, accused-appellants. Facts: Accused Felix Corpuz and Mario Verceles interposed the instant appeal. They alleged that the trial court erred in discharging Jerry Soriano as a state witness, in appreciating conspiracy among the accused, in not considering as mitigating circumstance the voluntary surrender of Mario Verceles, and in awarding damages to the private complainants. Issue: Whether the discharge as a State Witness complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Held: The appeal lacks merit. Accused-appellants contend that the discharge of Jerry Soriano did not comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court. They contend that Soriano’s testimony does not constitute direct evidence; at most, it was circumstantial in nature and of minuscule importance.10 Moreover, Jerry Soriano was the most guilty for he admitted his guilt with regard to the commission of the crime together with Mamerto Soriano.11 The requirements for the discharge and utilization of an accused as a state witness are enumerated in Rule 119, Section 1712 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz: a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the accused; c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. The trial court did not err in discharging Jerry Soriano to be utilized as a state witness. First, the testimony of Jerry Soriano was absolutely necessary as the prosecution has no direct evidence to prove the identity of the malefactors Mamerto Soriano, Felix Corpuz, Mario Verceles and Pablo Ramos. The record reveals that the five accused were together on the night the robbery and rape took place. He may not have witnessed the actual robbery and rape, but he has personal knowledge of the robbery when he saw the three accused return to the place where he and Pablo Ramos were allegedly tied, carrying with them the properties said to have been stolen. Second, Jerry Soriano’s testimony was corroborated in its material points by other prosecution witnesses and physical evidence. These are: (a) the testimony of Maribeth Bolito that there were three malefactors, one of whom sexually abused her and two of whom just stood at the door; (b) the testimony of Rosita Quilates that her properties were stolen; and (c) the testimony of SPO2 Renato Solomon that they were able to recover the stolen properties from a certain Andres Tirano who bought them from accused Mamerto Soriano. Lastly, Jerry Soriano does not appear to be the most guilty for he was not a coconspirator in the robbery with rape. He merely accompanied the accused and received three hundred pesos as his share in the proceeds of the sale of the stolen properties. Besides, the question of whether Jerry Soriano appears to be the most guilty is a factual issue. The discretionary judgment of the trial court on this matter is seldom interfered with by appellate court except in case of grave abuse of discretion.13 We find no good reason to disturb the trial court’s findings of facts. Granting ex gratia argumenti that not all the requisites of a valid discharge are present, the improper discharge of an accused will not render inadmissible his testimony nor detract from his competency as a witness. Any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution in asking for the discharge, and of the court in granting the petition, no question of jurisdiction being involved, cannot deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal provided by the Rules, and of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.14 State Witnesses; Requisites.—The requirements for the discharge and utilization of an accused as a state witness are enumerated in Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz.: a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the accused; c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Double Jeopardy; Witnesses; The improper discharge of an accused will not render inadmissible his testimony nor detract from his competency as a witness—any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution in asking for the discharge, and of the court in granting the petition, no question of jurisdiction being involved, cannot deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal provided by the Rules, and of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.—Granting ex gratia argumenti that not all the requisites of a valid discharge are present, the improper discharge of an accused will not render inadmissible his testimony nor detract from his competency as a witness. Any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution in asking for the discharge, and of the court in granting the petition, no question of jurisdiction being involved, cannot deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal provided by the Rules, and of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

14. People v Rubio; G.R. No. L-35500; 27 Oct 1932; 57 Phil 384 Published on 26 September 2017 in Legal Chyme by Claudine FACTS: Appellant’s house was searched on the strength of a warrant issued to internal revenue agents and seized from therein fraudulent books, invoices and records. ISSUE(S): Whether or not the search warrant was illegal and void for failure to particularly describe the things to be seized.

RULING: NO. While the place to be searched and the property to be seized under a search warrant must be particularly described in the warrant, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far as the conditions will ordinarily allow. By the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue.

15. . No. L-27511. November 29, 1968. IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, SIMON LUNA, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. LORENZO M. PLAZA, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur; HON. SANTOS B. Facts: After trial, the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur rendered its decision, dated April 20, 1967, holding that respondent Municipal Judge had substantially complied with Republic Act No. 3828, and consequently denied the application for the writ of habeas corpus, and dismissed the case. Hence this appeal. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in giving absolute credence to the testimony of respondent Municipal Judge. Regarding credibility of witnesses, this Court has consistently held that, as a general rule, the lower court's f indings as to the credibility of witnesses will not be interfered with by appellate courts. Thus, in the case of People vs. Sinaon1 this Court said: "Time and again, we have held that as a rule where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless there is a showing that it has overlooked certain facts of substance and value, that if considered, might affect the result of the case." Petitioner has appealed "from the decision/order" of the trial court "to the Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines, on the ground that the same is contrary to law and the Philippine Constitution" and prayed that "all the records of the proceeding and the evidence, oral and documentary, be transmitted or forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court x x x".2 Since petitioner appealed directly to this Court he must, therefore, raise only questions of law and he has thereby waived the right to raise any question of fact,3 and the findings of facts of the trial court, under the rules and precedents, must be deemed f inal and binding upon this Court.4 The findings of facts of the trial court are found in the following portion of the decision appealed from, to wit: "There is no dispute that there is a valid complaint charging the accused Simon Luna, the herein petitioner with the crime of Murder filed with the respondent Judge authorized to conduct the examination of the witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause before the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest; that the complaint is supported by the statements of the witnesses under oath in writing in the form of questions and answers and other documents attached to the complaint; that before the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, the respondent judge personally examined the witnesses for the prosecution on their statements taken by T-Sgt. Candido Patosa by reading the questions and answers all over again to the affiants who confirmed to the respondent Judge that the statements contained in their sworn statements are true; that being satisfied that the questions and answers contained in the sworn statements taken by T-Sgt. Patosa partake of the nature of his searching questions and answers as required by law, the respondent Judge adopted ,them as his own personal examination of the witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause, the order and the warrant of arrest were issued to take th accused into custody for the commission of the offense charged (Exhibits "H", "H-1", "I" and "I-1"-petitioner) ; and that the petitioner waived his right to the preliminary investigation (Exhibit "12"-respondent) and applied to be admitted to bail." Petitioner, however, claims that the failure of respondent Judge to put in writing that he adopted the questions asked by T-Sgt. Patosa and his failure to ask "searching questions" violated Republic Act No. 3828.

Republic Act No. 3828, approved June 22, 1963, inserted in section 87 (c) of 'the Judiciary Act of 1948 the following paragraph: "No warrant of arrest shall be issued by any justice of the peace in any criminal case filed with him unless he first examines the witness or witnesses personally, and the examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers." Issue: Whether the trial court erred in giving absolute credence to the testimony of respondent Municipal Judge Held: The ruling of the trial court was affirmed The Constitution, in Section 1 (3), Article III, provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination of witnesses under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Conformably to said provision, Republic Act No. 3828, approved June 22, 1963, inserted in section 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 this paragraph: "No warrant of arrest shall be issued by any justice of the peace in any criminal case filed with him unless he first examines the witness or witnesses personally, and the examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers." Before a Municipal Judge may issue a warrant of arrest under the foregoing provisions, the following conditions must first be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. The existence of probable cause depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. In line with this principle is the view that Republic Act No. 3828 does not prohibit the Municipal Judge from adopting the questions asked by a previous investigator. The ruling in Doce v. Branch II of ,the CFI of Quezon, et al., L-26437, March 13, 1968, wherein this Court held that the warrant of arrest issued therein was irregularly issued is not applicable to the case at bar for the facts are different. There, instead of searching questions and answers, there were only affidavits of respondent and her one witness. Moreover, said affidavits were sworn to before Judge Cabungcal, not before Judge Juntereal who issued the warrant of arrest. In the instant case, the respondent Judge personally examined under oath the witnesses by asking questions, that were adopted from a previous investigation, and considered by him as sufficiently searching and which questions and the answers thereto were in writing and sworn to before him prior to his issuance of the order of arrest. WHEREFORE, the decision of, the trial court dated April 20, 1967, appealed from, is affirmed. Costs against petitionerappellant. It is so ordered.

16. G.R. No. 82870. December 14, 1989.* DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, petitioner, vs. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila, Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge which denied the petitioner’s motion to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14, as well as his order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the earlier order. It appears that on 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimag-maliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD), filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, an application1 for the issuance of a search warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled “People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesio E. Prudente, Defendant.” In his affidavit,4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente’s office a bulging brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows: (a) one (1) pc.—M33 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); (b) one (1) pc.—M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc.—PRB-423 Fragmentation hand grenade (live).

On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainant’s lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent.5 Issue: Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based on hearsay evidence

17. Mata v Bayona; G.R. No. L-50720; 26 Mar 1984; 128 SCRA 388 Published on 26 September 2017 in Legal Chyme by Claudine FACTS: Respondent judge issued a search warrant against petitioner after an information was filed accusing the latter under Presidential Decree 810, as amended by Presidential Decree 1306. During the hearing of the case, petitioner discovered that the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same were not attached to the records. ISSUE(S): Whether or not the search warrant was valid. RULING: NO. Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. The failure of respondent judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record thus rendered the search warrant invalid. The writ of certiorari is GRANTED and the assailed orders are REVERSED.

18. CARANDANG V. DESIERTO (G. R. NO. 148076, January 12, 2011) Related Topics: Jurisdiction of Courts Facts: RPN-9 is a private corporation duly register ed with the SEC. Benedicto, a stockholder thereof, entered into a compromise agreement with the PCGG whereby he ceded to the government his shares of stock in RPN with an outstanding capital of 72.4% (which was later discovered to be only 32.4%). Meanwhile, the President appointed Carandang as a general manager and chief operating officer of RPN. He was charged with grave misconduct before the Ombudsman on the ground of him, as general manager of RPN, entered into contract with AF Broadcasting, Inc. despite his being an incorporator, director and stockholder of this said corporation; that he help financial and material

interest in a contract that had required the approval of his office; and that the transaction is prohibited under Section 7 (a) and Section 9 of RA No. 6713, thereby rendering him administratively liable for grave misconduct. Carandang sought the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him on the ground that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over him because RPN was not a GOCC. Consequently, he insists that he is not a public official, hence he is not subject to the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Issue: Whether or not RPN is a GOCC, which in turn renders Carandang subject to the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Ruling: No. RPN is not a GOCC. The law defines what GOCC are. Section 2 of PD 2029 states that a GOCC is a stock or a non-stock corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, which is directly chartered by a special law, or if organized under the general corporation law is owned or controlled by the government directly or indirectly through a parent corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding voting capital stock. Section2 (13) of EO 292 also gives a definition of such corporations. Due to the inability to resolve the issue regarding the actual shares owned by the PCGG, the conclusion that the government held majority shares finds no factual or legal basis. Hence, Carandang is not subject to the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

19. LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992 CRUZ, J.: Rule on Summary Procedure applies to violations of municipal ordinances; Specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances; Note that the penalty for such violations CANNOT exceed six (6) months. The prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. SC holds otherwise. FACTS: The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, Rizal.

Timeline: 1. 2. 3.

On May 11, 1990 - The offense was allegedly committed. On May 30, 1990 - The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. On October 2, 1990 (5 months after filing of complaint in fiscal’s office) -The corresponding Information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez.

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed. Lower Court Decision: MTC denies motion to quash. Appellate Court Decision: RTC sustains denial.

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner: FIRST argues that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure, whose scope includes:

Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:

B. Criminal Cases Xxx 3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; 4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.) xxx NEXT, petitioner argues that Act No. 3326, 1 the law establishing prescriptive periods for violations penalized by special acts and municipal ordinances which also provides when such periods begin to run and when the same will be interrupted, accordingly treats the Information against her as having been filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription. For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. (NOTE: The position of the fiscal seems to be in accordance with the doctrine of Brillante v. CA, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571. October 19, 2004 - - -That the filing of a complaint with the fiscals office suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense). Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows: Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses NOT subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows: a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein; b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.

In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)

Emphasis is laid on the LAST PARAGRAPH. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure. ISSUE:Whether or not Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure applies to violations of municipal ordinances. (Specifically, whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner’s motion to quash the Information on the ground of prescription, for having applied Section 1, Rule 110, instead of the Rule on Summary Procedure, as petitioner argues) HELD: No, Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure DOES NOT APPLY to violations of municipal ordinances; it does not apply to offenses which falls under Summary Procedure.

1

Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows: Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when PROCEEDINGS (JUDICIAL) are INSTITUTED against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied

The LAST PARAGRAPH of Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as argued by respondent, was an adoption of the doctrine in Francisco v. Court of Appeals - - - “that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.” 2 However, Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses NOT subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does NOT apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the LAST PARAGRAPH obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses NOT governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent. As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that Rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110. Where paragraph (b) of the Section 1 Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts.3 These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Rule on Summary Procedure provides that the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court; Running of prescriptive period tolls on the date of filing in court Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that. This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does. In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as a special law (SPECIAL RULE) prevails over Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure; Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. Going back to the Francisco case, we find it relevant to observe that the decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

2

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

3

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. - - - These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. 4

20. CRESPO VS MOGUL CASE DIGEST FACTS: Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However, Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred in a much later date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate the mater to the appellate court. The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the Court. Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition for review reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment. The accused then filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA dismissed the order and lifted the restraining order. Issue: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders fro, the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits. HELD: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.

21. STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE v. JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO 502 SCRA 446 (2006) The judge’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is a clear transgression of the Rules. Facts: Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in a criminal case to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B.

4

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.

Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State Prosecutor Pinote was at that time undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City. On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case, Pinote refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, maintaining that prior proceedings conducted in his absence were void. Judge Ayco considered the prosecution to have waived its right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses. Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by Pinote against Judge Ayco for “Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.” ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Ayco violated the Rules on Criminal Procedure for allowing the defense to present evidence in the absence of a prosecutor HELD: As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public prosecutor. If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people. Judge Ayco’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State. Judge Ayco’s lament about Pinote’s failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the hearings or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does not absolve Judge Ayco of his utter disregard of the Rules.