Xxii. Speedy Disposition Of Cases.docx

“Justice delayed is justice denied.” Notes on Speedy disposition of cases Sec. 16, Art. III: All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. What is the purpose of the provision? The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. Its express inclusion was in response to the common charge against the perennial delays in the administration of justice which in the past have plagued our judicial system. One need not stress the fact that a long delay in the disposition of cases not only increases the cost of seeking justice. Worse, it creates mistrust of the government itself and this may pave the way to aggrieved parties taking the law in their own hands to the great detriment of society. The provision upholds the time-honored tradition of speedy justice for as stated in the old dictum “Justice delayed is justice denied.” The oberservance of the right to a speedy disposition of their cases enhances the people's respect for the law and faith in their government. When is the right to a speedy disposition of cases violated? The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. What are the factors to consider to ascertain whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated? In ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors must be considered: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. Cases illustrating the speedy disposition of cases Tilendo vs. Ombudsman Justice Carpio Facts:

G.R. No. 165975

September 13, 2007

In December 1998, the Concerned Faculty Members of the CCSPC filed before the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against Tilendo for violation of RA 3019. The Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao endorsed the anonymous complaint to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Region XII for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation. Subsequently, the NBI subpoenaed Tilendo several times and informed him of the complaints against him. Tilendo, through counsel, requested for several extensions of time to submit his counter-affidavit. It was only on 22 October 1999 that he filed his counter-affidavit. On 26 April 2002, the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao received the NBI report charging Tilendo with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and Articles 217, 218, and 219 of the RPC. In January 2003, Tilendo filed his counter-affidavit, alleging, among others, that the dragging of the case for more than three years in preliminary investigation stage without his fault is violative of his right to speedy disposition of cases. In its Resolution dated 13 January 2004, the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao disposed of the complaint, as follows: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds probable cause to believe that the crime of Malversation and Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 were committed and that respondent DR. PAYAKAN G. TILENDO is probably guilty thereof. Consequently, let the herein attached Informations be filed with the proper court. Hence, this petition. Tilendo contends that the cases against him dragged for more than three years in preliminary investigation phase without his fault. The anonymous letters addressed to the Ombudsman were dated 4 and 28 December 1998. The Ombudsman referred the matter to the NBI which required Tilend to file his counter-affidavit, which he did only on 22 October 1999. Nothing was heard from the NBI or the Ombudsman until January 2003 when the Ombudsman directed Tilendo to submit his counter-affidavit to the various criminal charges against him. According to Tilendo, the inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation violates his right to speedy disposition of cases. Issue: Whether the resolution of the Ombudsman finding probable cause against Tilendo should be disregarded for violating the right to speedy disposition of cases. Ruling: No, the resolution should not be disregarded. The right to a speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in the Constitution. This right, however, is considered violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, which are absent in this case.

The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible. A simple mathematical computation of the time involved is insufficient. The facts and circumstances peculiar to each case must be examined. In ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors must be considered: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. In this case, there was no unreasonable delay to speak of because the preliminary investigation stage officially began when the NBI filed before the Ombudsman a complaint against Tilendo for violation of the relevant provisions of RA 3019 and the RPC. Contrary to Tilendos view, the preliminary investigation did not automatically commence upon the filing of the anonymous letters in the Ombudsman. Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 7), as amended, or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman outlines the procedure applicable to all criminal and administrative complaints cognizable by the Ombudsman. Section 2, Rule II of AO 7 clearly states that upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be: (a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; (b) referred to respondent for comment; (c) endorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; (d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation; or (e) referred for administrative adjudication; or (f) subjected to a preliminary investigation. Significantly, the Court held in Raro v. Sandiganbayan, that by referring the complaint to the NBI, the Ombudsman did not thereby delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the case to the NBI. What was delegated was only the fact-finding function, preparatory to the preliminary investigation still to be conducted by the Ombudsman. In this case, after the fact-finding investigation, the NBI reported its findings to the Ombudsman and consequently filed a complaint against Tilendo for various criminal charges. If we consider the fact-finding investigation conducted by the NBI as part of the preliminary investigation stage, then the NBI served a conflicting role. The NBI acted as the investigating body on the charges against Tilendo, and thereafter, acted as the complainant against Tilendo. This is absurd. What the NBI clearly did, in accordance with Section 2(d) of Rule II of AO 7, was to analyze the facts and gather evidence which could either exonerate or further implicate Tilendo in the offenses charged. Even assuming there was delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation, Tilendo is deemed to have slept on his right to a speedy disposition of cases. From 22 October 1999, when he submitted to the NBI his counter-affidavit, after asking for several extensions of time, Tilendo did nothing until December 2002. It seems that Tilendo was insensitive to the implications and contingencies of the projected criminal prosecution posed against him. He did not take any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter. Tilendos inaction gives the impression that he did not object to the supervening delay, and hence it was impliedly with his acquiescence. He did not make any overt act like, for instance, filing a motion for early resolution. He asserted his right to a speedy disposition of cases only when the Deputy OmbudsmanMindanao required him to file his counter-affidavit to the NBI complaint.

Tilendos contention of violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases must fail. There was no unreasonable and unjustifiable delay which attended the resolution of the complaints against him in the preliminary investigation phase. Roque vs. Ombudsman

G.R. No. 129978

May 12, 1999

Justice Panganiban Facts: Petitioner Felicidad M. Roque was a Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo was likewise a Schools Division Superintendent of the DECS COA conducted an audit on the P9.36 million allotment released by the DECS Regional Office No. XI to its division offices As a result of the audit, auditors Soriano and Enriquez found some major deficiencies and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Consequently, affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao against several persons, including petitioner Mabanglo on May 7, 1991, and against petitioner Roque on May 16, 1991. In an Order dated June 11, 1991, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found the complaints proper for a preliminary investigation. The case involving petitioner Mabanglo was docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0201 while that involving petitioner Roque was docketed as OMBMIN-91-0203. Thereafter, petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits. On March 18, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0201, which involved petitioner Mabanglo, was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding that all the respondents probably guilty of violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 3019) An Information dated March 18, 1997, for Violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila, against several respondents, among them, petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo. On April 30, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0203, which involved petitioner Roque, was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-MIndanao, recommending the filing of cases and prosecution of all the respondents for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act 3019. Two Informations similarly dated April 30, 1997, for violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, and for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic 3019, as amended, were filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila. Petitioners instituted this instant petition premised on the allegation that after the initial Orders finding the cases proper for preliminary investigation were issued on June 1991 and the subsequent submission of their counter-affidavits, until the present or more than six (6) years, no resolution has been issued by the Public Respondent and no case has been filed with the appropriate court against the herein Petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving the complaints against petitioners which violated their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases Ruling: Yes, there was unjustifiable delay in resolving the complaints. Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsmans duty, as mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to act promptly on complaints before him. More important, it violated the petitioners rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against them. Although respondents attempted to justify the six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints. Thus, in Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, this Court dismissed a Complaint that had been pending before the Office of the Ombudsman for more than six years, ruling as follows: After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and a speedy disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases... Similarly, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, this Court dismissed the Complaints, which the then tanodbayan was able to resolve only after the lapse of three years since the cases had been submitted for disposition, viz.: We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of speedy disposition of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioners constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official. In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republc Act 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such painstaking and grueling scrutiny as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged

giving [of] unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case. We are not persuaded by respondents argument that the Petition for Mandamus became moot and academic when the Complaints were resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao and the Informations were filed. The same contention was rejected in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, wherein the Court declared that the long and unexplained delay in the resolution of the criminal complaints against petitioners was not corrected by the eventual filing of the Informations. The Court ruled: It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True --- [for] the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time. x x x the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and the speedy disposition of cases against him. Accordingly, the informations x x x should be dismissed x x x. Although petitioners prayed only for the issuance of a ruling directing the dismissal of Ombudsman Case Nos. OMB-MIN-91-0201 and OMB-MIN-91-0203, this Court, in the interest of the speedy disposition of cases, resolves to dismiss the above cases directly. This ruling is in line with Angchangco, in which the Court dismissed the complaints outright, although petitioner therein sought merely to compel the ombudsman to do so.

Enriquez vs. Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 174902-06

February 15, 2008

Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez Facts: On May 9, 2000, the Office of the Ombudsman filed charges, among others, herein petitioners with administrative and criminal offenses in connection with the bidding of the Land Titling Computerization Project of the LRA. Finding sufficient basis to proceed with the investigation of the complaints, respondent required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence. Petitioners complied in submitting their counter-affidavits and evidence.

On December 12, 2002, one of those charged, filed a Motion for Early Resolution expressing alarm over the inaction of the Office of the Ombudsman, and praying that the cases be

resolved immediately considering that all the evidence have been formally offered and the parties arguments have been submitted.

Despite all these and petitioners repeated personal follow-ups, still, respondent failed to resolve the cases.

On March 24, 2006, or six (6) years from the filing of the complaints- affidavits and more than four (4) years after the parties formally offered their evidence on January 29, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on all the cases against them as respondents inordinate delay constitutes a violation of their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases. They alleged that such delay has not only besmirched their reputation but also caused them severe anxiety and great and irreparable injustice as they have been denied employment opportunities and retirement benefits rightfully due them.

Significantly, The Ombudsman, despite notice, did not interpose any objection to petitioners motion to dismiss. Yet, the cases have remained unresolved.

Owing to respondents stubborn inaction, petitioners, filed the present petition, invoking their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases. They alleged therein that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not resolving expeditiously the cases without any justification, thereby causing them to suffer grave injustice and agony.

In its Comment, filed through the Solicitor General , respondent maintains that it did not violate petitioners right to a speedy disposition of their cases; and that respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion for failing to resolve the cases, contending that the prosecutors assigned to these cases are merely exercising extreme care in verifying, evaluating and assessing the charges against petitioners to enable them to arrive at a just determination of the cases and that the delay in the ongoing review is not vexatious, capricious or oppressive.

Issue:

Whether respondent violated petitioners constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases.

Ruling:

Yes, respondent violated the right of petitioners to a speedy disposition of their cases.

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudicial or administrative bodies, so the Constitution declares in no uncertain terms. This right, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.

In a number of cases, this Court ruled that the right to a speedy disposition of a case is a relative or flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the aggrieved partys assertion or failure to assert such right, and the prejudice caused by the delay.

In determining whether these factors exist in the instant cases, let us first examine the constitutional and statutory mandate, powers and duties of respondent.

Respondent was constitutionally created to be the protector of the people, with the expressed mandate that it shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.

To attain its mandate, Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) bestowed upon respondent broad and tremendous powers and functions generally categorized as follows: investigatory power, prosecutory power, disciplinary power, contempt power, public assistance functions, authority to inquire and obtain information, and function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures.

These powers, functions and duties are aimed to enable respondent to be a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. Unfortunately, respondent has transgressed its constitutional and statutory duties. When the Constitution enjoins respondent to act promptly on any complaint against any public officer or employee, it has the concomitant duty to speedily resolve the same. But respondent did not act promptly or resolve speedily petitioners cases. The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman requires that the hearing officer is given a definite period of not later than thirty (30) days to resolve the case after the formal investigation shall have been concluded. Definitely, respondent did not observe this 30-day rule.

Here, respondent did not resolve the administrative and criminal cases against petitioners although the investigation of the said cases had long been terminated when the latter formally

offered their evidence way back on January 29, 2002. In fact, due to respondents inaction, petitioners, on March 24, 2006 or more than four (4) years from January 29, 2002, filed a motion praying the immediate dismissal of all the cases against them, contending that respondents inordinate delay in resolving them constitutes a violation of their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases. Significantly, this motion was never resisted by complainant FFIB. Nonetheless, respondent did not even bother to act on the motion.Likewise, it did not inform petitioners why the cases remain unresolved. It is unfortunate that while petitioners exerted diligent efforts by filing several motions urging respondent to resolve their cases speedily, respondent, up to now, refuses to take action thereon. Clearly, respondents inaction does not only violate petitioners right to speedy disposition of their cases guaranteed by the Constitution, but is also opposed to its role as the vanguard in the promotion of efficient service by the government to the people and in ensuring accountability in public office. Considering that respondent is tasked to determine the causes of inefficiency in the Government, and make recommendations for (its) elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency, its prolonged delay is manifestly a violation of due process. Respondents belated excuse, as alleged in its Comment on the present petition, that the prosecutors assigned to these cases are still reviewing and evaluating them with extreme care to arrive at a just determination is not only unreasonable but also an afterthought.