Workplan For 9/11 Commission's Team 3

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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES TEAM #3 WORKPLAN INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY

Team Members: Alexis Albion Scott Allan Warren Bass Daniel Byman Bonnie Jenkins Charles Hill

Project Overview Item 1

Key Questions _ Proposed Division of Labor Summary of Join.t Inquiry Staff Work on Policy

Item 2

Suggested Readings and Briefings

Item 3

Document Requests

Item. 4

Interview Candidates

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Team #3 Project Overview: International Counterterrorism Policy The policy team seeks to understand and assess the development of U.S. counterterrorism policy before September 11,2001, the policy changes in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, and the nature of the policy today. These tasks will require reviewing overall policy priorities, identifying and evaluating the different instruments used to fight terrorism, and determining how well senior policy makers understood the threat from alQa'ida. Another integral part of the policy team's effort is examining U.S. relationships with key foreign partners and adversaries with regard to counterterrorism. When appropriate, the team will distinguish between U.S. counterterrorism policy in general and U.S. efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in particular. The nature of terrorism during the Cold War shaped U.S. counterterrorism policy when al-Qa'ida began to emerge. These earlier terrorists, in the words of RAND's Brian Jenkins, wanted "a lot of people watching and a lot of people listejiing and not a lot of people dead." Their goals were usually tied to Marxist or ethno-nationalist agendas. The most lethal terrorists during this era were thoseJpacked by states, not those operating independently. In general, terrorism during this earlier period was viewed as an important but not overriding policy concern. As al-Qa'ida and affiliated Islamist groups emerged and grew in the 1990s, the focus slowly shifted. The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center marked a turning point. For the first time, Islamist radicals sought mass casualties on U.S. soil. In contrast to the -terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, who had balked at destroying entire buildings, the new radicals wanted a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead. ~ Several government counterterrorism officials recognized the danger that al-Qa'ida posed, but U.S. policy changed unevenly at best. The 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania elevated the importance of terrorism in general and alQa'ida in particular, but policy still lagged behind the immensity of the threat. It took the September 11 attacks to dramatically change U.S. counterterrorism policy. Even today, counterterrorism policy is evolving, with important policy decisions being made almost daily. The policy team expects to follow a normal investigative regimen of document requests and review, briefings by key individuals both inside and outside government, and extensive interviews with those in a position to discuss the formulation and implementation of U.S. government policy in the counterterrorism arena. In addition, the team will draw on the work of the Congressional September 11 Joint Inquiry as appropriate. _

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Team #3 Item 1: Key Questions The policy team will seek to determine why the United States did not successfully stop al-Qa'ida before September 11 and assess the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism policy today. In the process, the team will tell the story of how counterterrorism policy evolved as the al-Qa'ida threat grew during both the Clinton and Bush administrations, examining such key events as the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the 1998 Embassy bombings, and the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole. In particular, the team plans to answer the following questions: •

Strategy. What was U.S. counterterrorism policy, and how did it evolve, particularly after 1998? Were there gaps in the strategy, and if so, how did policy makers address them? What factors hindered policy makers?

•

Instruments. What counterterrorism instruments did policy makers consider, use, or neglect—and why? How effective were instruments such as diplomacy, criminal prosecutions, renditions, fundraising restraints, disruptions, military operations, covert action, and public diplomacy? What were the limits of various instruments? How supportive were key countries such_as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan?

- •

Safe Havens. Did the United States properly confront terrorist sanctuaries, such as Sudan and Afghanistan? -Were "permissive environments" in Europe and elsewhere addressed?

•

Immediate Aftermath. How did counterterrorism policy change in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks? Why were several hard-hitting steps only taken after the attacks occurred?

•. Current and Future Policy. Does the United States have the right policies to fight al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups today? What additional changes should be made, and who should make them? Note: The policy team will work closely with other teams in its research. For example, it will support the terrorist-financing team when assessing efforts to disrupt radicals' fundraising and assist the intelligence team in determining whether policy makers received sufficient information on al-Qa'ida's unusual nature to properly structure U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

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Team #3 Item 1 continued: Proposed Division of Labor

Person

Agency**

Alexis Albion Scott Allan Warren Bass Bonnie Jenkins Daniel Byman

CIA

Charles Hill* Kevin Scheid or other person with budget experience

State, DoJ White House/NSC, OMB DoD

Issue Lead (all team members will play a role in at least two issues) Instruments Safe Havens Strategy Instruments Acting team leader; will work with all team members on their specific tasks.

Assist with-counterterrorism budget issues

•

*Senior advisor. It may be best to use him to review the research plan and work as it progresses rather than assign a particular task. Byman may be used in a similar manner after a new team leader is chosen. **T-he agency designee is largely administrative. He or she will act as the primary interlocutor for document and interview requests and liaise with other teams working _ on that agency. All team members may interview at or work with documents from -key agencies.

All team members will work on the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the assessment of current policy, and recommendations for the future. All team members will work on at least one issue in addition to the one for which they are responsible.

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Team #3 Item 1 continued: Congressional Joint Inquiry Activity in the Policy Area The Congressional 9-11 Inquiry's work on policy issues focused on the intelligencepolicy nexus, rather than on the soundness of the overall counterterrorism policy. The Inquiry discussed intelligence priorities, the dissemination of information, and the quality of analysis with policy makers in some depth. The focus of its work was on the late Clinton-early Bush administrations, with the Inquiry having more success learning about the Clinton period. Policies toward foreign partners received, at best, incomplete attention. For example, the Inquiry looked at how the policymakers' desire for a strong bilateral relationship with Country X affected intelligence gathering on Country X or on neighboring countries. However, this was only done with a few countries, and even there it was not done systematically. Moreover, the Inquiry deliberately did not try to judge whether other equities in a bilateral relationship were more or less important than counterterrorism. The Inquiry did more extensive work on the use of military force and covert action. On the former, however, it was hampered by a lack of interviews and access to many key individuals and documents outside the strict purview of intelligence. The Inquiry did not try tojudge overall counterterrorism policy in any comprehensive way. Parts of the Inquiry's work looked at issues such as warning-the public, working with state and local officials, and emphasizing law enforcement over the disruption of terrorist groups. Many of these issues, however, involved the work of non-Intelligence Community agencies (e.g. the Department of Justice, the INS), which received less attention than they deserved. In addition, the Inquiry did not do basic policy analysis such as trying to evaluate the available instruments, the limits on those instruments, and political support in Congress.

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Team #3 Item 2: Suggested Readings and Briefings 1. Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings, 2001), pp. 73-129. These pages provide an excellent overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the instruments that the United States has used to fight terrorism. 2. Michael Elliott, "Could 9/11 Have Been Prevented?" Time, August 4,2002. This article provides a fairly detailed history of efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in the Clinton and - Bush administrations. Many of the quotes suggest that former Clinton administration officials were sources for the article. 3. Daniel Byman, "Scoring the War on Terrorism," The National Interest, Summer 2003. This piece examines how well the war on terrorism has gone since September 11. 4. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 219-349. These pages review^and defend) the Clinton administration's counterterrorism policy and examine (and attack) the Bush administration's policy before September 11. This is the most detailed look at U.S. counterterrorism policy to emerge so far, though-it remains incomplete. We believe the Commissioners would benefit from briefings about general U.S. counterterrorism policy, U.S. policy tojvard al-Qa'ida before September 11, and the~ status of U.S. policy today. •

Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism, would help Commissioners understand counterterrorism policy in context before September 11.

•. Dr. Paul Pillar, currently the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, is perhaps the government's leading analyst of terrorism and could provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of different counterterrorism instruments. •

Dr. Daniel Byman, who headed the "lookback" team on the 9-11 Inquiry, could offer a staff briefing on several aspects of the Congressional Joint Inquiry , investigation, particularly covert action, foreign liaison, the use of military force, and overall U.S. counterterrorism strategy as it related to intelligence. These briefings would follow the Joint Inquiry's more narrow focus and would not reflect many of the broader issues the Commission will examine.

All three suggested briefers would probably prefer to brief in a classified or, at least, private venue in order to provide the maximum detail. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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Team #3 Item 3: Document Requests Much, if not all, of the material we will be asking for will be classified. Since we will be requesting policy documents, the focus will be the Executive/NSC/OMB, and probably the Departments of State and Justice as well. This list will grow and become more specific as the investigation proceeds. For almost all categories of documents, we will focus our requests on the period after January 1998. The documents we will be requesting include: •

Presidential Decision Directives and National Security Presidential Directives related to counterterrorism policy; • Records of discussions of counterterrorism policy, particularly among "Small Group" and "Counterterrorism Security Group" members; • NSC taskings and requests to agencies related to counterterrorism policy; • Records of the Transnational-Threats Directorate at the National Security Council. This would include briefing memos, meeting notes, and perhaps selected-e-mails related to key events; • . State Department records, from both Foggy Bottom and the field, related to counterterrorism policy^ The initial focus will be on documents from the Special ~ Coordinator for Counterterrorism's Office, the deliberations of senior State Department officials, and selected documents related to policy toward key states in the war on terrorism; • Tasking directed to the intelligence community related to counterterrorism, including tasking related to renditions and other covert action, as well as intelligence collection and analysis; • The Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and key commands' (CENTCOM, SOCOM) documents related to counterterrorism, particularly with regard to instructions to prepare military options and instructions to use force; • Military and intelligence agency briefings and memoranda related to military strikes and covert action against al-Qa'ida; and • Selected budget documents reflecting resources applied to counterterrorism. Many of the most interesting documents for the purposes of our effort will be predecisional. Such documents will provide insights into which options were chosen, which were rejected, and which were off the table. Because of the sensitivity of these documents, it may prove difficult to acquire them, which may in turn necessitate highlevel interventions. To gain a deeper understanding of counterterrorism, we also" intend to focus on the activities of several U.S. missions, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Germany, to determine how they handled counterterrorism in practice. In addition to examining directives from Washington, we also plan to look at cables and instructions to and from key counterterrorism officials at these posts. We will also interview key country team members as appropriate. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: Team 3, 9/11 Commission NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/20/2008

BOX: 00001

FOLDER: 0001

TAB: 67

DOC ID: 31206574

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Teams Workplans & Action Plans DOCUMENT DATE: 01/01/2003

DOCUMENT TYPE: List

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Team #3 Item# 4: Interview Candidates

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Closed by Statute 974-t Law-EnfoFccmcntSonsttiTB 9/11 Puraoiml Piivucy-

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE