Winter 2006-2007 The Edge

The edge The magazine of CoastNet

Winter 2007

Coasts in crisis ICM in the aftermath of the Asian Tsunami

Oil spill in Lebanon

When the levees broke – a personal account

Boscastle – regeneration after the floods

Contents CoastNet – breathing new life into coastal matters

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Editorial

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News

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Who pays the price? Manuela de los Rios considers how to minimise the costs of coastal crises and who ultimately loses the most.

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Integrated coastal planning and management

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Coasts in crisis The edge is a quarterly magazine, sent out to all CoastNet members. CoastNet is an international networking organisation that works with all coastal interests to promote the exchange of ideas, information and expertise to find long term solutions to coastal problems that benefit all. Our mission is to safeguard the world’s coast and those communities of people and wildlife that depend upon it for their future. Editor: Lesley Smeardon [email protected] Designed by: Cottier & Sidaway Printed by: Gildenburgh Ltd

Submissions To submit an article for publication, please email to the editor saving your submission as a word document. Alternatively, send to the address below. Letters can be sent to the editor but we are unable to acknowledge receipt. The editor reserves the right to edit submissions.

CoastNet: The Gatehouse, Rowhedge Wharf, High St, Rowhedge, Essex, CO5 7ET. Tel/Fax: 01206 728644 Email: [email protected] Web: www.coastnet.org.uk CoastNet is governed by an independent Board of Management and serviced by a Secretariat. Registered charity no 1055763 Registered as a company limited by guarantee, company no 3204452 The opinions expressed in the magazine are not necessarily those of CoastNet. © CoastNet, 2007

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in Asian Tsunami-affected countries Robert Kay looks at ICM in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami.

10 Regeneration after the floods – how did Boscastle do it? Fiona Fraser-Smith takes a look at community working and a partnership approach to regeneration.

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12 A very dirty war IUCN’s Communication Officer in Lebanon, Hala Kilani reports on the clean up efforts following an Israeli air strike that caused the country’s largest oil spill.

14 When the levees broke Chari Lopez gives her personal account of those days before and after the levees broke in New Orleans.

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16 CoastNet events

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Editorial As you read this issue of The edge, it will be two years since the Indian Ocean tsunami wreaked havoc on Boxing Day 2004. The devastation of coastal communities throughout India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand was unprecedented in recent history, causing huge loss of life and bringing social, environmental and economic catastrophe for millions. Natural disasters are, by their very nature, unpredictable, and can hit us at any time. Such disasters have two facets. The natural event, which is a part of the normal functioning of our planet – part of the cycle of life, and not of itself a problem. In contrast, there is the concept of disaster, a purely human concept. We choose to live and build in high risk areas, seemingly oblivious to nature’s natural pattern. This contrast between natural process and society is at the core of coastal management. And because of this, the processes that we apply in coastal management, the various tools of integration, partnership working, community engagement, understanding the science of coastal process, should be applied as much to emergency

planning and to disaster reduction strategies as to day to day coastal management issues, such as local planning and beach management. Once disaster has struck, the management landscape, as well as the real one, has changed. Disaster relief necessarily focuses on human suffering. Disaster recovery provides the opportunity to ‘build back better’ as UN special envoy Bill Clinton declared after visiting tsunami-hit areas in 2005. However, the Indian Ocean experience shows that without a special effort, the opportunity to reduce future risk and to provide environmental benefit will always be lost to short-term social and economic priorities.

It is the value of strategic planning, using robust process and good science, that is paramount if the mistakes of the past are not to be repeated. Let us hope that the spate of large-scale disasters that have occurred in the past two years, and their consequent human suffering, will help us learn from our mistakes and do better in the future.

Alex Midlen, Strategic Director

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N ew s Minister ready for flood compensation talks Speaking at the most recent All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) of coastal issues, Minister of State for Climate Change and the Environment, Ian Pearson, spoke of his interest in extending the debate on the issue of compensation for those affected by coastal flooding and erosion in the UK. “Although funding for erosion and flood management has increased by 35 per cent since 1997, there is still a long way to go”, Pearson said. He also recommended the need for a long term funding scheme and suggested: “a 20 year investment strategy concerning all aspects of water management.”

The Minister expressed his readiness to engage with affected communities and a genuine interest in continuing the debate to tackle issues such as how to take into account social justice, specifically compensation issues. The report from this meeting can be found on the CoastNet website: www.coastnet.org.uk. Next meeting of the APPG is planned for January on the issue of social justice in relation to flood and erosion risk.

New staff members at CoastNet CoastNet welcomed two new members of staff recently. Manuela de los Rios has taken the post of Information and Communications Manager (see Manuela’s article on page 6 of this issue) and Alex Midlen has been appointed as Srategic Director. Manuela de los Rios: [email protected] Alex Midlen: [email protected]

Dive straight in – new resource for coastal professionals CoastNet has now produced a dip-in resource guide to good communication when engaging the public on coastal and marine issues as reported in the last issue of The edge. Ten copies are currently being trialed and should shortly be available to coastal professionals. For anyone wishing to get hold of a copy or for further information, please contact Theresa Redding at: [email protected]

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Also in the news ● Clinton warns of slow tsunami progress Former US President Bill Clinton has voiced concern at slow progress in rehousing those left homeless by the 2004 Asian tsunami following his tour of tsunami-hit nations. The UN special envoy for tsunami aid Clinton, said that only about a third of those affected by the disaster were back in permanent housing. Full story: http://news.bbc.co.uk/ go/rss/-/1/hi/world/asiapacific/6201350.stm ● Sainsbury’s flags up sustainability of fish The supermarket chain, Sainsbury’s is planning to launch a traffic light system to show the sustainability of the fish it stocks. The retailer is planning to colour-code fish products with red, amber or green symbols according to their sustainability. However, the indicators will appear only on the supermarket’s website and at fish counters, and not on packaging. Full story: www.brandrepublic.com/ bulletins/incentive/article/596566/sai nsburys-flags-sustainability-fish/ ● Seagulls Attacking Whales Off Argentina A recent report from National Geographic warns that the seemingly docile seagull is responsible for a series of attacks on the southern right whale off Argentina’s southern Valdés Peninsula. Experts say the birds, which nest near the prime breeding waters for the endangered whales, are causing a peck of problems. “The

Coastal bid to BIG Lottery

CoastNet, in partnership with the Enviro Initiatives Foundation, has put in a bid f coastal initiatives entitled ‘coastal space successful bids will be made at the begi

N ew s gulls are landing on the whales and pecking through their skin to feed on the blubber, which is an important source of calories,” says biologist Marcelo Bertellotti of Argentina’s Patagonia University. “This is causing lesions and impacting whale behavior.” The kelp gull is a flexible eater that hunts insects and scavenges through trash heaps. British researchers first observed the attacks in 1969 but the number of aggressive birds has grown as the gull population has increased, thanks to an abundance of human-supplied food sources in coastal towns. Full story: http://news.national geographic.com/news/2006/12/0612 04-whales-gulls_2.html ● Latin America unites to defend whales Opposition to commercial hunting of, and lethal scientific research on, whales and dolphins has brought together 12 Latin American countries, which have begun to discuss a future regional agreement for preservation, in opposition to the Japanese-led bloc of countries that defend hunting. Civil society organisations fighting to protect whale species have been working “hand in hand” with government representatives with the aim of “overcoming the defeat” suffered by the conservationist bloc at the last International Whaling Commission (IWC) meeting, held in St Kitts and Nevis in June. Full story : www.ipsnews.net/news. asp?idnews=35711

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onment Council and Neighbourhood for funding under the BIG lottery for e, community place.’ Announcements of inning of 2007 so fingers crossed.

Coastal Partnerships Working Group update The Coastal Partnerships Working Group (CPWG) is making good progress since its establishment in May 2006. Activities have included: • first meeting – May 2006 • shared views to inform Marine Bill consultation – May-June 2006 • CPWG endorsed by CoastNet annual Partnerships Forum – June 2006 • CPWG email group established • additional meeting to prepare input for Defra ICZM consultation – July 2006 • second CPWG meeting – October 2006 • Establishing Coastal Partnerships Contact Group and UK-wide map of existing coastal partnerships (ongoing) At the meeting to prepare input for the Defra ICZM consultation, an institutional framework for local, regional and national delivery of ICZM was drafted. This provides a starting point for discussion about the network and partnership services needed at each level for ICZM delivery. The group estimated that £3.65 million/year will be required to provide a good framework for delivering ICZM services. This information was submitted as a CPWG response to Defra’s ICZM Strategy consultation. In October the CPWG met for a very informative meeting with presentations by Hugh Llewellyn from the Landscape Conservation Branch of Defra and Mary Lewis from the Northumberland Coast AONB. Many comparisons can be drawn between the services of 40 AONBs in England & Wales and a similar number of Coastal Partnerships. The key difference is that AONBs receive

75 per cent match funding from Central Government (through the Countryside Agency) and are underpinned by statutory measures: Section 89 of the CROW Act (2000) requires all AONBs to have management plans requiring relevant authorities to have regard to them; and many AONBs have Joint Advisory Committees of constituent local authorities under S.102(4) of the Local Government Act 1972. The next step is for the establishment and work of CPWG this year to be reported to the Coastal Futures conference in January. This will involve building on the paper used to establish the group ‘Coastal Partnerships: Working Together’, our submissions to Defra on the Marine Bill & ICZM Strategies, and ongoing work to establish a wider Coastal Partnerships Contact Group with a UK-wide map of existing initiatives. The next meeting is likely to coincide with the publication of the Government White Paper on the Marine Bill, at which time we hope to meet with the Minister to raise the profile of the work of coastal partnerships. To contact one of the committee members with your feedback or for further information: Natasha Barker (Chair): [email protected] / [email protected] Niall Benson (Vice-Chair): [email protected] Tracey Hewett (Secretary): [email protected] CoastNet is providing the CPWG with a page on its website for easy access to reports, papers and meeting minutes.

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Who’s pays the price of coastal crises? Manuela de los Rios investigates Prices going up

How to minimise the costs

Ever visited the United Nations Relief website? Every single day wars, weatherrelated disasters, waterborne diseases, pollution and other crises, mostly in coastal areas, make the headlines. And climate change continues to exacerbate the problem with ever more frequent storms and sea level rise.

To minimise the costs of coastal crises, we need to (re)construct healthy coastal ecosystems so that there is built-in resilience to both human and naturallyinduced change. The Resilience Alliance suggests three abilities are required to do this:

Learning Life goes on but change happens and will continue to do so, especially on our coasts. One out of four people live within 100 km of the coast. Because we work and live on the coast we are subject to the risks that exist in these much appreciated, but naturally dynamic and exposed areas.

Imagine... WAR in Lebanon: Amir, hotel owner, 54, loses his clients HURRICANE in New Oreleans: Julie, 27, loses her mother EROSION in UK: Phillip, 72, loses his home FLOODS in Kenya: Chuku, 14, student, loses access to drinking water OIL SPILL in Spain: Gonzalo, 52, fisherman, loses his job TSUNAMI in Sri Lanka: Sajitha, 12, loses her school

Could it be me paying? We are all vulnerable to coastal hazards; factors related to institutional capacity, technology and infrastructures are one side of the coin. On the other side, social and economic characteristics such as health, education, networks, age and gender can determine those who are most susceptible and less able to cope and recover from an event.

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Local knowledge and experience as well as access to information is essential to deal with coastal crises. In 1992, Hurricane Andrew in Florida caused 23 people to lose their lives with economic losses estimated at $26.5 billion. An equivalent tropical typhoon in Bangladesh caused 100,000 deaths and the displacement of millions. Florida’s institutional capacity, early warning systems, community experience and strong networks had been improved by learning through recent experiences while social vulnerability in Bangladesh turned the disaster into an unmanageable scale and devastation.

Buffering Natural barriers made little difference to the impact of the tsunami wave at its epicentre when it hit the Indonesian shoreline in 2004. But further away, in Sri Lanka the energy of smaller waves was reduced by natural barriers in the shape of extensive vegetation and mangroves. These barriers reduced human and property losses. Enhance the ability and capacity of natural resources, such as coral reefs, to recover from severe events and we could build ecosystem resilience and safeguard the livelihoods of fisherfolk.

the Spanish coast in 2002 demonstrates why this is important. The oil spill represented the largest environmental disaster in Spain’s history polluting thousands of kilometres of coastline. Widescale concern from the public led to thousands of volunteers turning up at beaches to help with the clean up operation only to find that tools and accommodation were not available for all. This inability for quick and effective adaptation on the part of institutions, combined with the public’s good willed, but disorganised appearance illustrates the need for a more organised, structured society.

We pay, we say – sharing responsibility For those most directly-affected, (communities, households and individuals), a far greater dialogue should be undertaken with all available actions clearly discussed so that they can make decisions and understand consequences through informed thought, eg deciding to live in a flood risk area. If there is something the ICM community all agree on, it is the need to understand the human role in creating vulnerability to evaluate risk.

Differences of power, wealth and geography pose the greatest threat to our survival and well- being. We need a new vision to redefine coastal development and policies but we must speak the same language, share recognition of threats and work towards consensus as all nations and regions share responsibility regarding mitigation, adaptation and resilience in coastal areas. Otherwise we could all be paying the price of Getting organised Active civil networks together with good mismanaged coastal crises. governance systems make it easier for Manuela de los Rios is CoastNet’s new institutions to adapt rapidly when it Information and Communications comes to managing crisis situations. The Manager. Contact her at: response to the sinking of the Prestige oil [email protected] tanker and the subsequent oil spill off

Integrated Coastal Planning and Management in Asian tsunami-affected countries

The information in this article draws on perspectives from a series of country papers formulated for a workshop on Coastal Area Planning and Management in Asian tsunami-affected countries, (www.fao.org/forestry/site/35734/en). The workshop in question was held in Bangkok, Thailand, in September 2006 and forms one of a series of UN Food and Agriculture Organisation run workshops in the region addressing the range of forestry, fisheries, aquaculture, and agriculture problems faced by Asian countries in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami.

By Robert Kay, Principal of Coastal Zone Management (Australia)

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he 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami resulted in the widespread devastation of coastal communities throughout the region from a social, environmental and economic perspective. The huge loss of life as a result of the tsunami waves was coupled with catastrophic destruction of the coastal zone in areas of India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Areas most affected were generally those where marginalised members of the population were concentrated and unsustainable management practices were endemic.

Pre-tsunami policy climate and exacerbation of impacts A lack of, or poor implementation or adherence to, policy and legislative frameworks that support coastal area management within the region contributed to the unplanned

development of the coastal zone in the pre-tsunami era and the suite of problems with which it is associated. Key issues leading to poor implementation and adherence at a regional level include: v the low capacity of affected countries to participate in Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) programmes v the lack of a focal agency or co-ordinating body for ICM v lack of integration – persistence of fragmentation and sectoral isolation v overlapping of jurisdiction and misunderstandings over responsibilities v inadequate legal frameworks to oversee implementation. Impacts of the tsunami served to compound and exacerbate pre-existing problems related to the aforementioned

unplanned development. For example, had designated setback areas been enforced along the coastal zone it is likely that the mortality rate of marginalised fisherfolk and their families throughout the region would have been significantly reduced. Although, it is important to stress that while this is both intuitively correct, and supported by anecdotal evidence, rigorous examination of this issue is still ongoing and remains a matter for debate.

Post-tsunami management challenges The need to undertake some kind of coastal management planning process within the post-tsunami rehabilitation effort was widely acknowledged throughout the region in light of the significant potential long-term benefits afforded by an integrated and crosssectoral approach. The edge Winter 2007

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Extent of areas affected by the 26 December 2004 tsunami (Source: Adapted from AusAid, 2005) While the objectives of ICM provide a sound framework for the long-term sustainability of projects in the region, there were a number of barriers to their effective employment in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami. Reasons for this included: v pressure to re-build tsunami-affected areas as quickly as possible – both to re-house local people and to encourage tourists to return. v often competing agendas of donors to promote rapid re-development on one hand, while promoting sustainable development on the other (combined with the sheer complexity and scale of the international relief effort). Also many organisations do not have the capacity or mandate to strike the balance needed to respond rapidly while also setting up programmes to facilitate sustainable development. v perception that ICM is about ecosystem management and not about land-use planning, tourism management, hazard management, urban development or sustainable livelihood promotion. v lack of understanding by donors and national governments regarding the role of ICM in a disaster situation. v procurement processes faced by tsunami-affected countries that are tied to the many different needs and systems of releasing funds by donors. v problems of engaging with locallevel coastal managers charged with

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Kamala, Thailand. April 2005, (credit: Robert Kay)

making on-the-ground land-use planning decisions. This was an extreme situation in Aceh, Indonesia where there was effectively total disruption to local government operations as staff were either killed/injured or focusing on immediate needs of family and community members. The result being that local government was not functioning and decisionmaking became problematic. Requirements for quick action resulted in many instances, in duplication and overlap of resources and effort. While the rebuilding process has strived to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, unco-ordinated initiatives have meant that rehabilitation and reconstruction in areas affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami were not always economically or environmentally sustainable. This was due, in large part, to immediate needs of post-tsunami reconstruction that resulted in relief and recovery activities guided by reactive planning perspectives. Currently, many of these projects remain incomplete, unfinished or have failed to achieve their intended impact. However, rebuilding/restoration provides the opportunity to step back and initiate long-term planning using the ICM framework/process. Almost two years after the disaster there are still a large percentage of regional coastal populations who are

highly vulnerable and ill-equipped to deal with future disasters. The critical factor in this context is that ICM planning strategies are designed to be long-term pro-active approaches while its underlying principles can be used to respond immediately after the relief stage. In a crisis situation (once immediate food and shelter needs are met) ICM was able to assist in rapid consensus-building to allow informed decisions to be made. However, this view of the role of ICM was not generally shared in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami – although there are notable local examples of its success (see photographs). Consequently, because of this perception of ICM as fundamentally a long-term process, there is an emerging view in the region that ICM practice requires modification to cope with the requirement for immediate responses on short time frames resulting from sudden events.

Approaches for sustainable ICM Examples following the Asian tsunami highlight the imperative for quick and robust ICM tools and techniques that are accepted as an approach by governments and donors alike in the case of disasters. In this context, recent collaboration among national, provincial and local emergency management agencies and local communities under the USAIDfunded US Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System (IOTWS) Program, has

Koh phi phi Thailand in the aftermath of tsunami 2006 (credit: Simon Gurney) led to development of the concept of Coastal Community Resilience(CCR) (http://www.usiotws.gov/ev_en.php?ID=2142_201&ID 2=DO_TOPIC )

The Coastal Community Resilience Process (IOTWS) CCR promotes tsunami and other hazard readiness through better and more consistent tsunami awareness and mitigation efforts among communities at risk. The main goal is to improve public safety during tsunami emergencies and to build resilience against recurring coastal events. This approach also has the advantage of enabling the building of social capital so that communities have resilience to better deal with a range of externallyimposed challenges, for example economic disasters resulting from currency crashes.

Kamala, Thailand July 2005 (credit: Professor Wong Poh Poh, National University of Singapore)

The concept of CCR blends elements of disaster management and ICM and improves communities’ ability to transition from relief, recovery to rebuilding quicker and more effectively. It provides a promising framework that has been tested through local scale workshops and bodes well for future efforts to minimise social disruption and mitigate the effects of events and impacts. While CCR is relevant to ICM it should not be viewed as a replacement. Rather, CCR appears to be a useful component to be adopted into a broader ICM framework – ie protecting against and preparing for coastal disasters is one component of the holistic planning process. Indeed, the CCR concept may become the conduit through which integration shortfalls have occurred to date in the ICM response to the tsunami as outlined in the next section.

Lessons learned relevant to posttsunami reconstruction In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami it has become clear that we must ensure long-term sustainable goals of ICM do not become compromised by reactive responses. Although efforts to rebuild and reconstruct have been well intentioned, there

are still a large percentage of regional coastal populations who are highly vulnerable and ill-equipped to deal with future disasters. In this climate, the marriage of coastal disaster response plans, principals of CCR and traditional tools and techniques of ICM may represent the way forward towards a holistic planning process. This will protect against and prepare for future coastal disasters while at the same time adding considerable benefit to sustainable responses to the 26 December 2004 tsunami disaster. Robert Kay is Principal of Coastal Zone Management (Australia) Pty Ltd, PO BOX 191, Mosman Park, Perth, Australia, 6012 Tel +61 (0)8 9284 6460 fax +61 (0)8 9383 3769 Email [email protected]

Acknowledgements & Disclaimer Thanks to (Ailbhe Travers, Coastal Zone Management Pty Ltd) for her assistance with this article and Jackie Alder for her useful comments. The funding support of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation is gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors only and do necessarily not represent the views of any other organisation.

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© Environment Agency © Environment Agency

Regeneration after the floods How did Boscastle do it ? In 2004 the Cornish village of Boscastle witnessed one of the most extreme flooding events ever experienced in Britain. At its peak, the equivalent of 100 tonnes of water flowed through the village every second. The resulting disaster affected over 1,000 people with major community infrastructure demolished. Fiona Fraser-Smith takes a look at how the community worked together to rebuild the village and finds a successful partnership approach to regeneration. On 16 August 2004 Boscastle village was ravaged by floods. It was one of the most extreme alluvial flooding events experienced in Britain. Exceptional rainfall caused the River Valency to burst its banks and within 24 hours, 200 mm of rain fell with floodwaters sweeping through the historic conservation area of the village, destroying homes, businesses, cars and the natural environment.

The local authority North Cornwall District Council acted immediately by taking control of the flooded area. After 10 days, members of the community returned to their properties to start the slow process of rebuilding their homes and businesses. Perhaps the single most important act for Boscastle’s successful regeneration was the Council establishing the

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Boscastle Regeneration Steering Group (BRSG) and the Boscastle Chamber of Commerce. With so many stakeholders responsible for the region (see ‘key players in the regeneration of Boscastle’) and with so many decisions to make, a partnership approach was essential for effective coordination and planning of Boscastle’s regneration. The first meeting was held, just five weeks after the flood. Its role? To act as a central hub and catalyst for all activities and dialogue associated with the rebuilding and regeneration of Boscastle. One of the group’s first actions was to produce a monthly newsletter with information on all aspects of Boscastle’s regeneration. In 2007, the newsletter is still produced and distributed to all households in the community through funding from Government Office.

Boscastle – the facts • Around 1,000 residents and visitors affected • Miraculously, no fatalities, with only 1 reported casualty – a broken thumb. • 7 helicopters airlifted 100 people (including 6 firefighters) to safety. • 29 out of the 31 Cornwall County Fire Brigade stations were involved in the incident and remained at Boscastle for 7 days, assisting in the clean-up operation. • 58 properties were flooded, 4 of which were demolished, • A further 40 properties were flooded in the surrounding area. • 4 footbridges along the Valency Valley were washed away. • 100 cars swept down the village into the harbour. • Infrastructure damage to buildings and services, cost estimated £2 million.

The national organisation Following the floods, the Environment Agency commissioned a special study involving various stakeholders. The findings, published in January 2005, became a major part of the subsequent planning process. The findings confirmed the affected area was an existing floodplain, with a history of less It advised that severe flooding. damaged buildings could be rebuilt or replaced within the flooded area on the assumption that an effective flood protection scheme was also installed. Planning proposals were designed to limit the impact of future flooding by reducing the depth and speed of future flood events and to re-design areas where debris became blocked. Work has now started on the scheme and is due for completion in Spring 2008. The building and engineering work will cost in the region of £4,500,000. To design a coherent flood prevention scheme the Environment Agency also worked through the Steering Group and with the major landowner in the area, The National Trust.

process due to significant knowledge of the local infrastructure as well as the historical aspects of the regeneration. Post-flood it was important to ‘retain as much of the local fabric’ of the buildings as possible and three ‘Helping the Harbour’ days where 60 – 70 local people came to help clear the harbour of stones and debris were organised. Many of the stones were re-used as people rebuilt their gardens and properties. Working strategically through the steering group, The National Trust began making plans for restoration and of the flooded improvement conservation area. Alongside the Parish Council it prepared an application for Objective 1 funding to help sustain the community and maintain visitor numbers. The application was successful with £700,000 awarded, matched by a further £700,000 from the National Trust and council. For George Findlay, Parish Council chairman at the time, the funding allowed them to “put a polish on the village and improve the appearance of their conservation area”.

The community The landowner The National Trust and its local representative Jeff Cherrington are playing an important role in the regeneration of Boscastle. As a local property owner it already had strong links with the community which were ‘galvanised by the flooding’. In addition it was able to contribute to the planning

Two years after the disaster although there is still a lot to be done, a significant amount of progress has been made. Boscastle has been able to achieve this through the partnershipbased approach of the Steering Group. The original community playing field in the valley was no longer suitable due to flood risk but through negotiation with the National Trust, the Parish Council have been able to obtain a new area. Funding provided by South West Lions Club and Objective 1 will enable them to add a children’s play area which the community did not have before the floods. Despite the enormity of the disaster in August of 2004 Boscastle has survived. They have worked together as a community and the Steering Group has enabled agencies to effectively work with each other as well as the community. Fiona Fraser-Smith Email: [email protected] Tel: 07900 212747

The key players in the regeneration of Boscastle The local authority – North Cornwall District Council – among other things it is responsible for flood and tidal defences on some rivers and streams not controlled by the Environment Agency and to develop and implement major incident plans. Was responsible for setting up the Boscastle Steering Group with the goal of consensus and communication The national organisation – The Environment Agency is responsible for flood risk management, maintaining flood defences on coasts and main designated rivers, issuing flood warnings and flood risk advice. The landowner – The National Trust is a major landowner owning river banks, footpaths, buildings as well as 300 acres of land in the immediate area including the harbour area as well as some key properties such as the Youth Hostel, Harbour Café which is being converted to make the new Visitors Centre. The community – The Parish council was responsible for representing and communicating the views of the community. Local business – The Boscastle Chamber of Commerce was set up to ensure local businesses had adequate representation in regeneration decisions. Local providers – These included companies responsible for various insfrastructure and utilities and included South West Water, BT, Western Power and County Highways. The edge Winter 2007

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Hala Kilani, IUCN’s Communication Officer for West and Central Asia/North Africa looks at the environmental effects of the recent hostilities in Lebanon and the mobilisation efforts for clean-up ebanon has constructed a stanch war legacy for itself. But the “twelfth” July war was different from all the previous ones. Not only did it claim over 1,000 civilian lives, 40 per cent of which were children and destroyed the country’s infrastructure in only one month, it also stood out in generating unprecedented environmental degradation.

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But the most concerning environmental catastrophe by far was the oil spill on Lebanon’s side of the Mediterranean Sea that came as a result of the bombing of a coastal power plant located in the southern town of Jyeh. This catastrophe was described by the Lebanese Ministry of environment as “the worst environmental disaster in the country’s history.”

A landscape devastated

Israel bombed the power plant on two occasions. After the first bombing on 13 July 2006 and despite the great risk entailed, Ministry of Environment staff hurried to the site and successfully contained the damage and the spill by building sand dams around the affected tanks. But the second bombing on 15 July succeeded in pouring an estimated 15,000 tonnes of heavy fuel into Lebanon’s marine environment.

Forest fires from phosphorous shells and over one million cluster bombs widely sparkled in the Lebanese landscape. To date, cluster bombs still litter the environment sustaining the war and its impacts. With at least 30,000 housing units completely destroyed and more than 100,000 partially impacted and in the absence of a strategy to manage such rubble, mountains of demolition waste replaced the green valleys and water bodies of the south and reclaimed coastal areas.

▼ Clean up Daileh

Mobilisation thwarted In oil spills, an early response is key to cleaning the environment but continued hostilities well into August any response from prevented materialising. Lebanon did not have expertise and equipment such as skimmers and booms to address the problem. A complete air and sea blockade obstructed the arrival of

equipment and assistance. Danger and the numerous bombed bridges hindered movement of people and vehicles. Around 150 km of the shoreline was contaminated, soiling and discolouring Lebanon’s famous rocky, pebbly and sandy beaches up to Syria with black fuel. Centuries old ports like the Phoenician port of Byblos were invaded by oil. Scenes of fishing boats floating on black, thick fuel came from different parts: Fishermen’s Wharf in Beirut and Movenpick Marina, Byblos and Tripoli harbor. The long-shore currents moving in a south-north direction transported the fuel all the way to the Syrian coast. The south-north movement of currents was accompanied by a circular motion that transferred the fuel from the sea to the shoreline. This is how large quantities of oil shored and stabilised in marinas, harbors, bays and caves.

After the ceasefire Responding to a request by the Ministry of Environment, IUCN arrived on the first day of the ceasefire (August 14) to the war-stricken country to assess the damage and propose remediation. At the time, the blockade was still imposed and the security situation critical. Strict

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security policies were still active and disallowed other international assistance and experts namely from United Nations agencies from arriving quickly. Effective response, therefore, only started 33 days after the spill. This multiplied the difficulties and the negative impact on marine life and beaches. The bombed bridges and roads complicated shoreline assessment. But commitment to environmental protection mobilised IUCN to travel along the entire affected sections of the shoreline. The damage was found to be extensive. For example, Ramlet el Baida, the only stretch of public beach still remaining in Beirut and nesting site for endangered marine turtles was heavily oiled. The oil had soaked deep layers of sand. Minister of Environment Jacob Sarraf organised a news conference in early August calling for help stating the risks, such as the danger of carcinogenesis in the case of contact with the toxic product. After this, several NGOs volunteered to clean the beach. But it was still late. The oil had gone deep and volunteers had to shovel out several layers of sand, which even now await treatment and disposal. Removal of large amounts of sand naturally poses the risk of erosion. Around the Jyeh power plant, rivers of oil had sunk due to the high pressure induced by the explosion and the burning of the light and volatile elements present in the fuel. The Italian government mobilised resources and

assistance to suction and manually remove the underwater slick. Two vessels and a dozen experts from the Italian coast guards, ministry of environment and marine research institutes arrived and worked for several months. Submerged oil takes years to degrade due to lack of oxygen and physical factors. Moreover, it gets covered with sediment, which makes the cleaning operation very difficult and tricky.

A community of people and wildlife devastated A Lebanese NGO called “Bahr Loubnan” backed by France hired fishermen and divers as part of a strategy to compensate for their losses. Many fishermen lost their boats and revenue as the spill and fear of its impact on fish decreased market demand for the product. With geography exposing half the country to the Mediterranean, the livelihoods of more than 30,000 Lebanese families depend on fishing as an economic activity. IUCN was particularly concerned for Palm Islands Nature Reserve, the only marine protected area in the country located 5.5km off the city of Tripoli. This archipelago of three islands is very rich in biodiversity. The oil had polluted this reserve, classified as a Special Protected Area under the Barcelona Convention and a Ramsar site. Palm Islands are a stop over for migrating birds, some of which are globally threatened. Endangered marine Loggerhead and Green turtles also nest in this site. Patches of mousse filled the rocky crevices of the islands and oil covered The their limestone surfaces. contamination exposed birds to oiling and turtles to suffocation. It also killed inter-tidal life, such as mussels, oysters and algae, here and in other parts of the shoreline. An important percentage of the fish food chain was therefore completely destroyed. Fishermen continue to complain of reduced numbers of catches.

The clean-up IUCN mobilised funds from the Swiss Development Agency and clean-up of the islands started end of October 2006. The Swiss also took charge of cleaning the northern side of the shore extending from a village called Anfeh to Tripoli. The United States Agency for International Development financed the cleaning of the area extending from Byblos to Anfeh with $5 million. Canadian and Japanese funds are expected to be used for the clean-up of the southern beaches neighbouring the power plant.

▲ Beirut IUCN started an impact assessment on marine life around Palm Islands as a pilot for a more extensive study of coastal biodiversity. It is also trying to raise funds to counter the damage by declaring new marine reserves. Despite all the clean-up efforts, experts agree that pollution will be felt for years. Although most of the oil may decompose in three years, traces of the black oil will continue to visually pollute the landscape and remind people of the catastrophe. “Although for us experts, the shoreline will be clean, if the public even see small traces they will feel their beaches are not yet clean,” said Xavier Kremer, a French oil-spill expert with CEDRE, an NGO which specialises in pollution. “People who live off the sea will remember this pollution all their lives. It will stain their memory forever,” Kremer said. Hala Kilani is IUCN’s Communication Officer for West and Central Asia/North Africa. Email: [email protected] The edge Winter 2007

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When the levees broke On August 29th 2005 at 0610 New Orleans time, Hurricane Katrina crashed onto the US Gulf Coast, whipping up winds of up to 170 mph tearing through flood defences of low-lying New Orleans and flooding 80 per cent of the city. A disaster zone almost the size of the UK was left in Katrina’s wake with 1,700 people losing their lives and nearly 80,000 homes destroyed. The cost of the damage wreaked by Katrina has been estimated to top around $100 billion with President Bush declaring this ‘one of the worst national disasters in our nation's history’. The statistics of disaster. Incredible? Yes. Shocking? Maybe. Detached from normality and unhinged from emotions? Definitely. Not so for Chari Lopez, a teacher living and working in New Orleans when Katrina hit. She gives Lesley Smeardon her personal account before and after the levees broke.

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The edge Winter 2007

Cat 5, was something big, so right after the party we went home, packed and left. On Sunday we were stuck in traffic for 16 hours, with stormy weather, thunder and lightning.

On the Monday morning (29 Aug) when Katrina hit, there were reports on National US TV that the levees were being breached and the city was going to flood. Were you aware of this? What were you doing in New Orleans at the time the hurricane hit? Were you living there? I was living in the Garden District in one of the university areas. I had been living there for two years and worked as a Spanish teacher in an elementary school at Algiers Point on the other side of the Mississippi River. On the Friday, right before Katrina hit, I was working in school as usual and had said to my old school mates: “Have a nice weekend. See you on Monday” I have never seen most of them again.

Katrina was first announced as a hurricane four days before it hit New Orleans, upgraded to a Cat 5 hurricane the day before. But when were you first aware of the potential devastation this hurricane could cause? After living in New Orleans for two years, another hurricane was nothing new. It’s true it was Cat 5, but the year before I had been evacuated to north Louisiana and nothing happened. None of my friends were aware how big the hurricane would be. On the Saturday night, we were at a birthday party. Nobody was thinking about leaving the city, but a local friend convinced us to go. He had never left the city before for a hurricane, but a

When I first arrived at my job, we were given hurricane-related training, and told what a Cat 4 or 5 hurricane could do. One of the possibilities was the breaching of the levees, but that was such a remote idea, no one really considered it. Every year at hurricane season we used to talk about it, but no one actually expected it to happen.

Can you describe your experiences on the day that Katrina hit? How did Katrina personally affect you? By the time the levees were breached, I was at a friend’s house in Sulphur (later to be devastated by Rita). They didn’t have a TV, so we heard the news by radio. We ran to our closest neighbour and asked them to let us watch the news. We couldn’t believe it – I was in tears. To see the place you live in and the city you love being flooded was hard to accept. A couple of days after Katrina I was able to find out that my home hadn’t been flooded although two blocks away was three feet under water. But four days later my next door neighbour phoned to say they had left their house when they saw water coming through the street. They told me how heartbreaking it was when they were leaving the city to see people who had already lost their lives in the road.

How long was it before you went back to New Orleans after the hurricane? Did you feel that you were kept well informed? It took me a month. I kept updated with what was happening through a local newspaper’s web page and through NOLA.com (New Orleans

local site). I used to check daily for those looking for disappeared people and to get information about my neighbourhood. The website was giving out information as to which postal codes were able to go back into the city. The city was still under military control and to get your house you needed to show your ID. We were able to go back to our homes after a month under certain conditions – that we brought disinfectant products and masks, got vaccinated for tetanus, took water, food and cleaning products. Most importantly we were not able to leave our homes from 8pm to 8am under the curfew. I was lucky. I lived on a second floor and my home was fine and nobody had tried to get in. Everything was very dirty and messy, but everything was just fine. I still can’t believe it when I think of all the people who lost their lives or homes and I still had all my belongings…

What was the single thing that has stayed in your memory the most, regarding the events leading up to, and after Katrina hit? I remember the day I got back for the first time in the city. The smell was awful, putrid. It was shocking to see boats in the middle of dry roads, but the strongest memory was the water marks on the houses as the waters lowered and the signs the military made when they registered the houses. They posted a sign in paint with the date, the group who checked the house and the number of dead people in each house. I saw too many numbers. Those people – your neighbours who used to live there now dead. It was the hardest thing. It is an experience that has changed my life forever.

The edge Winter 2007

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C o a s t N e t eve n t s Conferences Climate Change Location: Cardiff Date: May 2007

SEA Directive and coastal spatial strategies Location: Newcastle Date: March 2007 Registration enquiries for all conferences to [email protected]

All Party Parliamentary Group on coastal and marine issues Location: Grimond Room, Portcullis House Date: 25 January 2007 on: Social Justice in Flood and Erosion Risk Next APPG meeting: May 2007 Partnership forum 2007 Date & venue: To be confirmed.

■ For information on any of the conferences listed please contact CoastNet on 01206 728644 or by email [email protected]

CoastNet emails: Theresa Redding; [email protected] Pat Stitt; [email protected] Lesley Smeardon; [email protected] Manuela de los Rios; [email protected] Events; [email protected]

This publication is partially funded through the Corepoint project under the Interrreg 3B Programme. Corepoint aims to establish North West Europe as an internationally recognised region of excellence in coastal management by encouraging full implementation of ICZM, highlighting best practice, providing education by influencing national spatial policies – for further details please see http://corepoint.ucc.ie