Was Maharbal Right.pdf

WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT? Author(s): JOHN LAZENBY Source: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement, No. 67, THE SECOND PUNIC WAR A REAPPRAISAL (1996), pp. 39-48 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43767901 Accessed: 29-04-2017 05:51 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT?

JOHN LAZENBY

According to Livy,1 after Cannae, as Hannibal's officers crowded round to congratula his victory, his cavalry commander, Maharbal, told him that the best measure of his

that in five days {die quinto) he could be dining, victorious, on the Capitol: 'You cried, 'I'll go ahead with the cavalry - they'll know I've come, before they know I

Hannibal, who allegedly could not quite take in what had happened, said t

congratulating Maharbal on his keenness, he needed time to consider his advice, Maharbal burst out, 'So the gods haven't given everything to one man: you know h Hannibal, but you don't know how to use a victory.' It is generally agreed, Livy se concludes, that this day's delay was responsible for the salvation of the city and the Like most good stories, this one is probably apocryphal - apart from anything else does not mention Maharbal in his account of Cannae, and makes Hasdrubal and Hanno Hannibal's cavalry commanders. But it may still be ben trovato , and no less an authority than

Montgomery has declared unequivocally that 'Maharbal was right'.2 In one respect, of course, he was obviously right: Hannibal did know how to win a victory. As Montgomery says,3 'his tactical genius at Cannae can compare with the conduct of any battle in the history of warfare.' The Prussian General Staff seems to have become obsessed with the battle, and the 1914 'Schlieffen Plan' was allegedly inspired by it, though the scale was altogether different. Lack of manpower forced the substitution of a 'right hook' for Hannibal's

'double envelopment', but Schlieffen himself apparently never quite gave up the dream of a 'colossal Cannae'.4 Even General Schwarzkopf of Gulf War fame is said to be an admirer of Hannibal.

The latter' s qualities as a general have been described and admired since at least Polybius' time5 - his ability to inspire men of different races, for example, his care for his troops and knowledge of what they could and could not do - one thinks of the way he used his Numidian cavalry, for instance - his psychological insight into the minds of his enemies and his apparently never-failing capacity for finding a solution to any military problem. But if there is a single key to his success, it is perhaps the subtle mixture of bluff and double bluff he used, or, to put it

another way, what might be called his 'variations on a trap'. Simple bluff was used by him all the time, for example at the crossing of the Rhône, in the fight with the Allobroges in the gorge and perhaps most famously in the escape from Campania

1 Livy 22.51.1-4.

2 For Hannibal's cavalry commanders at Cannae see Polybius 3.1 14.7 and 116.6-8; for Montgomery's comment sec A History of Warfare (London: Collins, 1968) 97. 3 History of Warfare, 96.

4 Barbara W. Tuchman, August 1914 (London 1962) 32-33.

5 Compare 11.19.1-2; 15.15-16.

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40 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

at the end of 2 17. 6 Double bluff is, perhaps, best exemplifi

Tarentum, early in 212, when, instead of trying completely to would probably have been impossible, he ordered a party of N countryside on either side of the route, so that anyone who spo prisoner, or would merely report yet another Numidian raid.7 Of the battles, the Trebbia is an example of simple bluff. As Po

have suspected Mago' s ambush if the terrain had been wooded, b

woods for their ambushes. But none of them thought an ambush

flat and treeless terrain.8 Trasimene, on the other hand, was per

As Livy remarks,9 the place was 'born for ambush' ( loca nata in

thought this was too obvious - in any case, what general in com

expects to be ambushed ? At Cannae, Hannibal ostensibly laid all his cards on the table,

constituted a gigantic trap. The extraordinary 'reverse-refusal' o centre invited the Romans to attack them. But the placing of tw

either wing of the infantry line meant that not only would the e

centre, but that, if things went badly wrong, fugitives from th

would also be funnelled into the centre where at least they woul

slow the Roman advance. Finally, the unusual placing of the m

the confined flank near the river, with the Numidians occupying t

numerous Roman allied cavalry, meant that the latter would b

cavalry, having disposed of the weaker Roman citizen cavalry, wo

Zama, finally, shows that the master had lost none of his old c that he was weaker in cavalry than his opponent, and so could

using his cavalry to destroy the enemy's and then attack his flank

deliberately sacrificed his own in order to lure the Roman cavalr

remembering what had happened to Antigonus Monophthalm Poliorcetes, went off in pursuit of Seleucus' cavalry at Ipsus. H

all about the strengths and weaknesses of elephants. He may have

do their stuff- after all, he deployed no fewer than eighty of them

he may secretly have thought that most of them would do prec

out to the flanks and disrupt his cavalry, thus aiding the decepti

His infantry dispositions were also unusual, probably becau equally weak here, since at least a third of his foot consisted Carthaginian territory itself. He could have tried to repeat Cann centre, perhaps strengthened by an admixture of the mercenari

first line, and leaving his veterans to fill the rôle of the African

he may well have known that Scipio had served at Cannae, and

may even have known that he, too, favoured flank attacks with

So, for the first time, instead of his usual single-line formation

triple-line, but with yet another variation. He not only placed veterans of his 'Army of Italy', about 200 yards behind the seco

6 Compare Polybius 3.42-3; 3.50-1; 3.93-94.6. 7 Polybius 8.28. 8 3.71.1-4. 9 22.4.2.

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JOHN LAZENBY: WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT? 41

advanced, evidently ordered the veterans to stand fast.10 This l

- possibly the very first - of a 'true reserve'. But in additio

reserve, the plan was, presumably, that the first two lines would

of the Roman advance, and hopefully disrupt and weaken cert

principes as well. The 'Army of Italy' would then deliver th emerged triumphant but bloodied from its expected victory o words, Hannibal may once again having been planning to use

him, as he had done at Cannae, but with the difference that no

on, not on the flanks and rear. Of course it was not to be - Sci

well-organized. But who knows what might have happened returned in the nick of time?

So much for Hannibal's ability to win victories, but what o

have marched on Rome after Cannae? Here, on the short-term

I advanced in my book.11 In the first place, whatever his c himself, with the main army, could hardly have reached R

quinto '. Armies have achieved marches of fifty miles a d

marched from the Metaurus to his previous camp within six Canusium, where Hannibal had been last reported, the distance

Davout marched nearly 90 miles in 48 hours before Austerlit

marched at a much slower rate - less than 9 miles a day, fo

perhaps 10 to 15 miles a day on the ten-day march from Trasi on which route he took.14

Secondly, once he had got to Rome, he is very unlikely to ha

a coup de main , for despite Roman scaremongering, it by n

There were the two legiones urbanae raised at the beginning at Ostia and the marines he sent to Teanum Sidicinum, to s

civilians in the city, many of whom would already have seen m

whom some were in fact armed.15 Thus he would almost certa

protracted siege, since treachery in Rome's case was inconceiva

open to the serious risk of being trapped in the vicinity of the c

forces Rome could rapidly have raised. He might, of course, victory, but this kind of 'trench warfare' was never his forte,

Capua in 212/1 1 showed. Finally, an attack on Rome probably never formed part of even Polybius sometimes imply - it is significant that the onl city, in 21 1, it was for the purely strategic purpose of drawi Capua. By marching on the city in 216 he would have been ma Roman confederacy, away from the areas in which he could

Apulians, Samnites and, above all, the Campanians, who as ev

defection, have viewed the prospect of the Carthaginian gener

10 Polybius 15.11.2; 15.12.7. 11 Hannibal's War (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1978) 85-6.

12 Livy 27.50.1. For the problem of where Hannibal was see Hanni

13 David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (London 1966) 1

14 For the march up the Rhône valley see Polybius 3.50. 1 ; for the m

Polybius 3.86.9. 15 Livy 23.14.2; 22.57.7-8 and 11.

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42 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

again? Would they not have decided on a further policy of 'w

the Trebbia and Trasimene? In short, far from Hannibal's not was it not Maharbal?

Nevertheless, it might be argued that Maharbal was right in a more fundamental sense. Hannibal's strategy was evidently based on the assumption that by winning victories, he could win the support, or at least the neutrality of Rome's allies, as his repeated declarations to his non-

Roman prisoners make clear.16 Presumably he hoped thereby, not to destroy Rome, but to force her to accept his terms. Thus Livy says that he told his prisoners after Cannae that 'his war with

the Romans was not to the death - he was fighting for honour and power',17 and although this may not be very good evidence, the terms of his treaty with Philip V of Macedonia, as recorded by Polybius,18 clearly are, and they envisage the continued existence of Rome, even if victory is

secured. But could Rome be defeated without being destroyed? Her brusque rejection of Carthalo's embassy after Cannae,19 and indeed her whole history, suggest otherwise: Rome hardly ever, if ever, negotiated with an enemy from a position of defeat. If so, perhaps Hannibal's

subtleties were wasted on a people like the Romans. In particular, he may, in retrospect, seem naive to have expected the Latins and Italians to have

received him as a 'liberator'. Brought up, as he presumably was, on the somewhat uneasy relations which prevailed between Carthage and her allies, perhaps reinforced by a knowledge of Greek history, he may completely have failed to understand just how complex the relations between Rome and her allies were. Though many of the allies no doubt hated the Romans, and even more resented their position of greater or less subservience, there was no universal feeling

of 'us' and 'them': what had a Latin from Praeneste, for example, in common with a Samnite, or a Picene with a Greek from Tarentum or Locri? Thus we can well believe Livy, for instance,

when he has Roman generals question why disaffected allies should choose to side with 'Numidians and Moors' or 'foreigners and barbarians' against a people of Italy like themselves.20 However, seductive as this argument is, it really only amounts to saying that Hannibal should not have gone to war in the first place. But although it is arguable that Rome was bound to defeat

Carthage in the end, was peace a viable alternative? Only those naive enough to think that the Hannibalic War was just a war of revenge, can seriously imagine that it could have been avoided in the long term. In the short term, of course, Hannibal could have climbed down over Saguntum,

but the whole history of Roman diplomacy, and especially of her relations with Carthage after

the war, suggests that Roman demands would not have ceased with Saguntum. This would merely have been the thin end of the wedge. One is reminded of the scene in Yes, Prime Minister ,

in which the strategic expert quizzes Jim Hacker about when he would 'press the button' - when

the Russians reached Piccadilly? In this case, when were the Carthaginians to fight? When ordered to move their city ten miles from the sea?

In any case, what was the alternative? The obvious one was simply to stand on the defensive in Spain and Africa and hope to defeat any forces Rome might send. That Hannibal did anticipate the possibility of attacks on both Spain and Africa is indicated by the steps he took to safeguard

them, before he set out on the march to Italy. Polybius derives his account of these from Hannibal's own statement on the bronze tablet he set up on the Lacinian promontory.21 But

16 Compare Polybius 3.77.3-7 and 85.1-4; Livy 22.58.1-2. 17 22.58.3. 18 7.9.

19 Livy 22.58.7-9.

20 Compare Livy 23.5.1 1-13; 24.47.5. 21 3.33.6ff.

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JOHN LAZENBY: WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT? 43

Hannibal clearly never intended to remain in Spain himself, n

army had arrived there and hopefully been destroyed, as Brian

good reason to believe that had Hannibal stood on the defen have been any different. What had happened in the first war,

of disasters, particularly at sea, suggests that if Hannibal had

sent to Spain, the Romans would simply have sent more. After

later in the second war, when, despite Hannibal's continue decided not to cut their losses after the defeat of the eld

reinforcements, first under Claudius Nero, and then under th

The most that Hannibal could have hoped to achieve was s

similar to the Peace of Phoinike concluded with Philip V, which

position in Spain temporarily intact. But for how long would really believe that Rome would have acquiesced in such a com

peace with Philip was probably only concluded because Rome and did not wish to be distracted by problems in Greece. Let u

peace with Carthage was scarcely dry before the Republic ag More importantly, because we know what happened, we tend

point of Hannibal's campaign - Montgomery, for example, apparently ran out of ideas'.23 But although even I called th 'Blitzkrieg', as though Hannibal had to win his war quickly, or

In the two World Wars Germany thought she had to win the w

could not fight a war on two fronts, but Hannibal's situation w

assume that he was thinking in terms of a quick victory? After a

his father, it would have been that Rome was a power of imm

lasted twenty-three years, before it ended in the defeat of Carth

it would take less time to defeat Rome? He knew that he could

but why should he have assumed that a few quick victories wou

he planning a 'blitzkrieg' or a 'war of attrition'?

Perhaps he was not so naive as to imagine that a few quick

that held the Roman confederacy together; perhaps he unders the ties binding Rome and her allies. After all, if Philip V of

part of the secret of Rome's success was her ability to absorb o

indicates,24 why should Hannibal not have been equally astute

not be so much the lightning strike which would crack the mo

out misery of constant war-service and devastated fields and f losses in battle. The crucial difference between this and the first

war would be on the dòorstep.

Recently a student argued in an essay that 'in a war of attrit

and that set me thinking. It is true that Polybius himself, in com

Trasimene, stresses that 'the advantages of the Romans were i

and of men'.25 But this is to miss the point: Hannibal was not

on Carthage's resources, and the Romans on theirs. Having got

pay off, he would increasingly be fighting the war with R

22 The Punic Wars (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980) 93ff. 23 History of Warfare, 97.

24 SIG3 no. 543.

25 3.89.9.

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44 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

summarising Hannibal's alleged advice to Antiochus of Syri always been one and the same - that the war should be waged

supplies and troops to an external enemy' ( Italiam et commeat

hosti). In that sense, time was on Hannibal's side. Nor was he wholly mistaken, if he thought like this. If w Rome's resources in manpower in 225 with livy's list of defec to calculate that by 212 over 40% of the allies were no lon majority of the Campanians, whom Polybius classes as citize the situation improve much in 21 1, despite the fall of Capua, Campanian troops, and there are hints that disaffection w unaffected. Thus from 212 to 207 Etruria was placed under propraetor, and in 206/5 under a proconsul with two legions.2 there in 209, which grew worse in the following year,29 and was ordered to make enquiries into which Etruscan and U

planning to join Hasdrubal or had already given him help?0 Even the loyalty of the Latins was not unquestionable. A Brundisium who had betrayed Clastidium before the Treb

opportunity to try to drive a wedge between Rome and her alli

to be the last defection by Latins throughout the war, there a

Romans had their doubts about Latin attitudes after Cannae. T

his brother's successes to Carthage, the historian has Hanno as of the Latin name had defected,'32 shortly afterwards he has

supplement the Senate by granting the citizenship to Latin se

when the minds of the allies were in a state of such suspense, Even the refiisal of the Latin garrison of Casilinum of Rome's

indicates the equivocal attitude of the Latins to Rome as much communities.

But the most important indication of just how far Hannibal's strategy may have been succeeding even as late as 209, is, of course, the refusal in that year of twelve of the thirty Latin

colonies to supply their contingents of men. There is no reason to doubt the fact, and although we only have Livy's account of the reasons for it,35 it is worth noting that - according to him 26 34.60.3. The whole passage is worth quoting, since, curiously enough, it is the best summary of Hannibal's strategy to be found in any ancient source: ' sententia eius una atque eadem semper erat, ut in Italia bellum gereretur; Italiam et commeatus et militem praebituram externo hosti; si nihil ibi moveatur,

liceatque populo Romano viribus et copiis ltaliae extra Italiam bellum gerere, ñeque regem ñeque gentem

ullam parem Romanis esse.' 27 Polybius 2.24, Livy 22.61.1 1-15 (compare Polybius 3.1 18). Though there are problems with Polybius'

figures - see F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius , 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957-79) I, 196ff. - that the allies provided 50% of both the infantry and the cavalry in Roman armies is confirmed by figures for particular armies elsewhere.

28 Compare T. S. R.Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic (New York 1951) 267ff. 29 Livy 27.21.6ff.; 27.24. 30 Livy 28.10.4-5. 31 Polybius 3.69.1-4. 32 23.12.16. 33 23.22.8

34 Livy 23.20.2. 35 27.9-10.

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JOHN LAZENBY: WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT? 45

others of the allies were equally disgruntled, and that their co

continued to serve in the Roman army were worse off than tho

Carthaginians, since the latter at least came home. He also clai

the Romans became aware that all their allies felt like this, th

peace - which is just what Hannibal had wanted all along. Nor should we underestimate the strain on manpower of th battle, even if the Latins and Italians he took prisoner eventua let us remember, something like 120,000 men had been killed

in 215, Livy says,37 it was decided not to try to avenge Pos because there was 'not even any way of bringing the two co required for so great a struggle'. Again the situation does not records further problems with the levy in 212 and 207, and cl only 137,108 citizens were recorded, 'considerably fewer t

possible that at some point in the war, the wealth-qualification

citizens had to be lowered by over 60%, presumably because But could Hannibal have done more to attack the morale o

example, criticizes his failure to raise 'a proper siege-train,

reduce the fortresses upon which the Fabian strategy of the Ro

the question what 'a proper siege-train' means in the context o

at least believed that Hannibal used mantlets ( vineae ), sieg

4 machinationes ' in attacks on various places, and implies, sure

could construct what they needed on the spot41 - to talk like t

of the war Hannibal was fighting. If, as he claimed,42 he ha behalf of the Latins and Italians, he could hardly set about

strategic Latin fortresses like Beneventum and Brundisium. In

assault on Cartagena is not a valid comparison. Even if Hannibal had managed to capture Latin and Italian to

have had to garrison them, which he could ill afford to do, as

at least mainly on voluntary defection, and it is noticeable tha

towns for strategic reasons - for example, to acquire a port command routes (Nuceria, Acerrae, Nola, Casilinum). His o create a coherent pro-Carthaginian bloc southeast of a line r After his assault on Cumae in 215, he seems always to hav attempting to capture a town, but even when communities did

to him, he could not necessarily rely on their whole-hearted s

true of those who were potentially his most important allie

have livy' s word for it, but he says that the conditions upon w

36 Roman losses at the Trebbia were not many less than 30,000; at

the annihilation of Centenius' 4000 cavalry; at Cannae, if Livy' s fi 37 23.25.6.

38 25.22.2-4; 27.38.1-5; 27.36.6-7. 39 Compare P. A. Brunt, Italian Manpower 225 BC-AD 14 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) 66, 75, 403ff. 40 History of Warfare, 91.

41 23.18.8; 37.2; 25.11.10; 29.7.4ff. 42 Polybius 3.77.4. 43 26.38.1-2.

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46 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

included a clause that 'no Carthaginian general or official shou

Campanian citizen, and that no Campanian citizen should have against his will'.44 In the end, far from being an asset, the Camp round Hannibal's neck, even if we discount Livy 's tales of the

Capua had on his army - at one point he even has Marcellus de Cannae!45 In 212, for example, the Capuans' failure properly

general, Hanno, in his attempt to provision the city, led to a disa

near Beneventum, and although a year later the Capuans did sorti

as Hannibal attempted to break through the Roman lines from ou beaten back with far less difficulty than his.46

Montgomery also claims that Hannibal 'clearly ... never under

seapower',47 but, on the contrary, it is arguable that he understo

to undertake the long and laborious march to Italy, when, other

gone much more quickly and easily by sea, and once in souther to capture a port in Campania. But what could any amount of of the almost total incompetence displayed by the Carthaginian

Nor, finally, was Hannibal probably as baffled by Fabian strate Admittedly he was not able to inflict any more disasters on t

Trasimene or Cannae, but, as Polybius implies in connection

Falernus in 217, there were two edges to his ability to defeat th

would compel them to fight or would make it clear to all that he

the Romans were abandoning the countryside to him and his arm

to forget that he did continue to win victories in the field a Herdonea, which, if historical - and it is difficult to account for

brought against the Roman commander, if it is not - cost the Ro

came Second Herdonea, which cost the Roman commander an tribunes their lives, as well as those of either 13,000 or 7000 of

Numistro, which livy regards as a Roman victory but Frontinus

was twice defeated near Canusium, and, finally, in 208, alth

importance, both consuls, Marcellus and Crispinus, received mor

first time such a thing had happened in Roman history, accordin

Livy may exaggerate the alarm felt at Rome when Hasdrubal almost hysterical joy which greeted the Metaurus. But the fact

granted in the war was for that victory, and what might have h able to open his second front in 215, when, if we are to believe

from marching to Italy by his defeat at Ibera? What, for that matt

44 23.7.1.

45 23.45.4; compare 23.18.10ff. and 35.1.

46 Livy 25.13-14; 26.5-6. 47 History of Warfare, 97.

48 3.90.11. 49 For the battle see Livy 25.21 ; for the charge of perduellio 26.2.7 ff.

50 Livy 27.1.4-15: he says that one of his sources said the casualties were 13,000, another 7000. 51 Livy 27.2; Front., Strat. 2.2.6.

52 Canusium: Livy 27.33.7; the ambush: Polybius 10.32. Iff; Livy 27.33.7. 53 23.27.9ff.

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JOHN LAZENBY: WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT? 47

some of those 77,800 men sent elsewhere by the Carthaginian Hannibal instead?54

So, in the end, though the overall purpose of this confe

'reappraise' the second Punic War, I still think that Hannibal

been fought. I see no point in declaring, as Montgomery does5 complete failure'. That it was a 'failure' there is no doubt, but

has resulted in the defection of the two largest cities iii the e

itself, along with over 40% of the enemy's allies, and whe

comprehensively defeated three times, on the last occasion pe

in a single day's fighting, than any other army in European hi

as a 4 complete failure'.

Analysing Hannibal's strategy in fact tends to conceal rat

boldness. It is easy enough to see that Rome could only be def that;57 it is equally easy to see that Hannibal dared not go by

in any case bring him to an area of Italy where he could hope t

one suspects, the idea would have remained an idle dream. It t be done, and - let's face it - genius so nearly to pull it off.

University of Newcastle

54 Compare Caven, Punic Wars , 258. 55 History of Warfare, 97.

56 John Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire (London 1980) 45, says of t

1916 - that the losses of the British Army 'were probably greater than

single day,' and gives the total as 57,470. But this includes 35,493 l total of 'Killed (or died of wounds)', 'Missing' and 'Prisoners' onl were in the first category. The figures for the Roman losses at C unfortunately Polybius' (3.1 17.2-4 & 7-12) do not make sense as they andiieed not be doubted: he says that 45,500 infantry and 2,700 cav

various passages (22.49.13 & 18, 50.1 1, 52.3-4) it emerges that 19

comparable losses were more than three times as high as those of the

57 Compare the passage quoted in n.26 above.

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48 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bagnali, Nigel, The Punic Wars (London: Hutchinson, 1990).

Brunt, P. A., Italian Manpower 225 BC - AD 14 (Oxford: Oxford University Pre Caven, Brian, The Punic Wars (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980).

Dorey, T. A., & Dudley, D. R., Rome Against Carthage (London: Seeker and Warbu Lazenby, J. F., Hannibal* s War (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1978).

Livy, The War with Hannibal , translated by Aubrey de Sélincourt (Harmondswor

Books, 1965).

Montgomery of Alamein, Field Marshal Viscount, A History of Warfare (Londo

1968). Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire , translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979). Proctor, Dennis, Hannibal's March in History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). Scullard, H. H., A History of the Roman World 753-146 BC , 3rd edn (London: Methuen, 1961) 111 -221.

Scullard, H. H., Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1930). Scullard, H. H., Scipio Africanus: soldier and politician (London: Thames and Hudson, 1970). Walbank, F. W., A Historical Commentary on Polybius , 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1957 & 1967), I and II.

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