Viable Joint Ventures

Viable Joint Ventures Maurice Yolles Liverpool John Moores University Business School, Liverpool, UK. February 1998 4th Systems Science European Congress, Valencia, Sept. 20-24, 1999 Abstract In management systems, methodological complementarism has been criticised by the fundamentalists of paradigm incommensurability. They tell us that because methodological paradigms are incommensurable, that methodologies cannot be used together. There is a move to theoretically counter this argument. One approach is to show a basic connection between the methodological complementarism of management systems and the cooperative strategic management theory of joint alliances that, if appropriately explored, might suggest a systemic theory of joint alliances. 1. Introduction In the field of management systems the use of methods/methodologies can be seen as a purposeful organisation of inquiry that can be applied to complex situations (Yolles, 1998a, 1999), enabling inquirers to reduce that complexity and create desirable intervention strategies that enable intended change to occur. There is an argument that the joint or complementary use of a plurality of methods/methodologies can bring more to an inquiry process than the use of a unitary approach. However, there is a fundamental argument against this (Burrel and Morgan, 1979) that such a plurality involves paradigm incommensurability that invalidates the joint use of methods/methodologies. The fundamentalists who support this argument say that inquirers cannot venture a joint inquiry involving a plurality of methods/methodologies. This is because each of the plurality has its own paradigm that will be incommensurable with that of the others. Those who do mix methods, it is claimed, may be pragmatists (Jackson, 1992) who are not operating in a theoretically legitimate way. As such their processes of inquiry may involve conflicting knowledges that derive from the different paradigms, and result in the formulation of strategies for intervention that are not consistent with intentions. To more broadly appreciate the nature of this fundamental view, consider that there is an organised activity related autonomous group of people that has associated with it a paradigm. The paradigm will be incommensurable with another paradigm belonging to another such group if they each have different conceptual extensions, or if similar conceptual extensions are qualitatively distinct thus having different meanings (Yolles, 1998, 1998a, 1999). Paradigms are therefore describable as being commensurable when they are conceptually coextensive and qualitatively similar. Mostly we can think of different paradigms as being incommensurable to some degree. Whether they are so recognised very much depends upon the language that is used to describe the conceptual extensions. Consider now the field of strategic management, where durable corporate organisation exist in complex situations and operate in ways that will affect their effectiveness and durability, and determine their futures. They can also enter into a type of mutual complementary activity called a joint alliance (Kelly and Parker, 1997) that includes strategic alliances, strategic partnering, and licensing agreements. Interestingly, there do not appear to be any fundamentalist arguments that deny that joint alliances can legitimately occur, perhaps in part because today in the complex commercial world that we find about us there are so many durable ones. Indeed, joint alliances, far from being criticised by fundamentalists, are supported by many as being one potentially good way of dealing with certain classes of complex situations. Until now no approach appears to have been made to explore the relationship between inquiry related and corporate organisations across the fields of management systems and strategic management. If inquiry related and corporate organisations were each to be seen as different species of the same genus, then it is likely that we could apply the fundamentalist argument of paradigm incommensurability to both in relative ways. In this paper our interest will be to show how corporate and inquiry organisations can be seen to be different species of the same genus, and that as a result

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fundamentalism can be applied to joint alliances as it can to the complementarism of methods/methodologies. Fundamentalism has taken hold in management systems, but as already suggested it would appear to be contrary to the practical wisdom of corporate strategic management and the theoretical arguments that support it. This contradiction should be examined more closely, first by focusing in on fundamentalism. 2. The World View Basis of Fundamentalism In order to examine the notions supported by our fundamental friends and thus to explore whether apparently valid arguments against methodological complementarism are also applicable to joint alliances, it will be appropriate to first consider the base ideas upon which rest their criticisms. This means that we shall explore the nature of paradigms. However, to do so we can with benefit broaden the exploration to that of world view. According to Yolles (1996, 1998) there are two types of world view: weltanschauung and paradigm. The term weltanschauung was first introduced into systems by Churchman (1979), and is used as part of Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland and Scholes, 1990). It is seen by some as a view that is often personal and indescribable: that is it cannot be clearly described formally through language that enables a set of explicit statements about its beliefs and other attributes that enable everything that might be expressed about the world view to be expressed. In this sense we refer to weltanschauung as an informal world view. Different from weltanschauung is the paradigm, a term explored in some depth by Kuhn (1970). Weltanschauungen become paradigms when they are formalised (Yolles, 1999), and the passage towards this requires a formalised non-normative or semiformalised shared weltanschauung to be created called a virtual paradigm that may or may not become a paradigm (Yolles, 1996). While individuals and groups may behave in ways that are determined by their weltanschauung, paradigms emerge when the groups become coherent through a degree of formalisation. Both weltanschauungen and paradigms are forms of world view that operate through culture (beliefs, values, attitudes and language), concepts established within “rational” organised structures called propositions, and norms (Ibid.). They have a relationship with each other, and with the behavioural world that is coupled to the physical or social forms that we see around us. This relationship is shown in figure 1 (Yolles, 1999), where we have collected together the types of world view and called them the cognitive domain, and these have been differentiated from the behavioural domain within which is defined by the “real” or perceived behavioural world. In order to distinguish between these two domains and the transformations that occur between them, we have also introduced the transformational domain. Transformational domain Behavioural domain representation

Behavioural world

organisation of intervention

Paradigm (formal world view)

development/ learning

formation/ consolidation

interpretation Weltanschauung (informal world view) reflection/creation

Figure 1: Relationship between types of world view and behaviour

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Cognitive domain

This model can be reformulated, with the three domains being placed together to form a deep, surface, and transforming relationship. The transforming domain involves an organising process that manifests at the surface whatever is projected from the deep domain, and vice versa. We shall refer to the transformation as transmogrification - which is a transformation that may be subject to surprises. Transmogrification is a mapping from the cognitive to the behavioural domains that manifests a structure with which is associated behaviour. We shall refer to the properties of a transmogrification that enable it to map from the one domain to the other as its morphism. In mathematics (see Bachman and Narici, 1966, p.5 and p.51) and in particular the dynamics of complex (ergodic) systems (Arnold, and Avez, 1968), two types of morphism can be defined. An isomorphism is a 1:1 transmogrific mapping, while an homeomorphism is a 1:n mapping. Relating this to figure 1, in the former only one unique transformation is possible from the cognitive to the behavioural domain. In the latter, and number of behavioural outcomes will be possible from a given cognitive situation. With this mapping idea in mind we can modify the model of figure 1, and consider the cognitive domain to be deep and embedded in a the behavioural domain. Transmogrification converts from the cognitive world to that of the physical behavioural manifest world with a homeomorphic potential. Thus for instance, if this manifest world is seen to be composed of individuals that create organisations that each have a form, then that manifest behavioural form is sensitive to the composition of individuals that defines a possibly innumerable number (n, which may be large) of situations over time. The composition of individuals who make up a situation will potentially influence the nature of that transmogrification, and a manifested physical form is the result of the homeomorphic potential that can be thought of as having a status not unlike that of a quantum field.. These forms may each be different, and have associated with them different behaviours. In contrast to this, an isomorphic transmogrification will define a unique manifestation if it has not been subjected to surprises that interfere with meaning. This conceptualisation is illustrated in figure 2, where we use a closed curve to show the homeomorphic potential of transmogrification. Manifest behavioural domain Transmogrific Domain

World view populated Cognitive Domain

Figure 2: Model identifying a relationship between World Views and Behaviour This model acts as the basis of the theory of viable systems as developed by Yolles (1999) through the work of Stafford Beer and Eric Schwarz. It also connects with the work that has appeared in artificial intelligence and language theory. Chomsky (1975), in his attempts to develop a theory of transformational grammar of language, distinguished between the semantics of a message and its syntax. Semantics occurs at a “deep” or cognitive domain of knowledge that carries meaning. Syntax is a manifestation of semantics that is created through the “surface” that has structure and from which we make utterances. A structurally similar model is used in the field of artificial intelligence (Clancy and Letsinger, 1981) that distinguishes between deep and surface knowledge. Deep knowledge is generic, being independent of any particular situation. It adopts first principles and fundamental propositions that can represent individual or shared group beliefs. It is associated with understanding, and develops according to general theories. It is also associated with deep reasoning processes, the purposes of which are: (a) to build up or maintain cognitive models perceived to be relevant to the current “reality”, (b) to make generalisations, (c) to formulate models

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relevant to surface knowledge. Deep knowledge can also be called cognitive knowledge, and is generated by a world view. Surface knowledge can be called situational or behavioural knowledge because it directly relates to a particular situation and its associated procedural behaviour. Its acquisition occurs through the collection of facts, through measures of performance, and through the creation of algorithms, procedures, or sets of rules. Such knowledge acquisition occurs through a process of learning and experience about the situation. It is related to skill, and can derive from heuristic processes. The two types of knowledge are analytically and empirically distinct. We can also use figure 2 recursively to show how we can attribute the properties of a system to a behavioural situation rather than declaring it to be one. In the same way that we can map from the cognitive to the behavioural domain, so too we can map from the domain of world views to the “explicitly imagined” behavioural domain. From this we can project a cognitive system model onto the dotted line of figure 2. This can now be designated as the boundary of a “new” cognitive domain that can be mapped into the behavioural domain. Alternatively, some may wish to see the dotted line imposed on the behavioural domain, taking it to be a system. 3. Arguing to Extending the Fundamentalist Paradigm An argument can be created that complementarism is actually important to the viability of organisations. We are familiar with the weltanschauung principle that tells us that no view of reality can be complete, that each view will contain some information about reality, but that the views will never be completely reconcilable. The principle of finding a more representative picture of reality by involving as many weltanschauungen as possible generates variety through opening up more possibilities in the way situations can be seen. Those who adhere to this principle during an inquiry consequently regard weltanschauung pluralism as desirable. We know that a plurality of weltanschauungen can form a shared weltanschauung, and that when this becomes formalised a paradigm appears. It is reasonable to consider then, that there should also be a paradigm principle that might be expressed as follows. A paradigm defines a truth system that results in a logical process that determines behaviour. The truth system is also responsible for recognising and producing what its viewholders consider to be knowledge about reality. Since different paradigms have different truth systems, knowledge across paradigms will never be completely reconcilable. Formal models of reality are built from paradigms, and each model will contain some knowledge that guides behaviour. Paradigms are created by groups of people, and a paradigm principle should be analogous to the weltanschauung principle. Thus, no formal model of reality can be complete, and finding a more representative picture of a given reality by involving a plurality of formal models generates variety through opening up more possibilities in the way situations can be addressed through action. Now, to consider the fundamentalist argument we must first direct our attention to methodology since it is here that their arguments are applied. The coordination of a plurality of methods/methodologies is concerned with the idea that different inquiry approaches will likely result in intervention into a complex problem situation, and each approach has attributes that can be used for benefit in different situations. In accordance with the paradigm principle, it recognises that they may each operate out of different paradigms, and have different rationalities stemming from alternative theoretical positions which they reflect. Each methodology will generate a view of reality and intervention strategy that is itself connected to the penchant of the methodology that spawns it. According to the principle of complementarism, the different paradigms can in principle operate in ways which are complementary to one another, each finding strength of examination and evaluation that others might not have in respect of different classes of situation. We have said that arguments against complementarism by fundamentalists are that methodologies derive from different paradigms that are incommensurable. This means they cannot be compared or used in a coordinated way. Now, paradigms create the cognitive basis that becomes manifested as behaviour, and our thesis is that since they are generically related to purposeful adaptive activity systems generic theory that applies to one must also apply to the other. Thus, if we can construct a generic theory of complementarism, then it must apply to corporate organisatons in

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the same way as it does to organisations of inquiry. Indeed, in both cases any plurality of organisations operates out of their own different paradigms, and complementarism can be seen as a conditional cooperation between them for some perceived benefit. When we use the term complementarism, it will therefore have associated with it the implicit understanding that the organisations we are referring to are viable in that they have duration and adaptability, a cognitive domain, and a behavioural domain. It is curious that fundamentalists are concerned with complementarism in the management systems field, but not in that of strategic management. From the perspective of purposeful adaptive activity systems, it seems paradoxical that it can apply to one field and not the other. We therefore suggest that fundamental arguments only hold true because their own paradigm is conceptually bounded - that is they do not possess enough conceptual extensions to enable them to explain the process of behavioural complementarism. To see more clearly what we mean by this, consider Zeno’s paradox (Gale, 1968, p387). This explains how it is impossible to move between two points A and B in space. To reach B from A you must travel half the distance to it to a point say a1, and to get from a1 to B you must reach a point half way to it at a2. This argument is recursive as you move to a3, a4, a5,.... To count the full distance that you have travelled you must add all of the half distances which forms an infinite series, suggesting mathematically that you can never reach B. The solution to the paradox is to introduce time as a new analytically and empirically independent conceptual extension that operates as a limiting factor on the summation. The introduction of this new conceptualisations has meant that a new paradigm has been created with new propositions and beliefs, and it is incommensurable with the previous paradigm. Paradoxes can be seen as fundamental contradictions of paradigms. Attempting to solve a fundamental contradiction from within paradigms is not possible. Rather, a new paradigm must appear with extra conceptual extension(s) that are able to deal with it. Like the fact that we know that we reach B from A but cannot explain how, we know that organisations operate in joint ventures even though they each have different paradigms. There is an argument that methodological complementarism can be undertaken legitimately. It extends the fundamentalist paradigm by introducing a conceptual extension that derives from the work of Habermas in his theory of human interests. Our own approach lies in a similar vein, but extends the paradigm from one to three conceptual extensions. Within the context of methodology, these can lie in a single frame of reference, and can thus be thought of as orthogonalities. They are cognitive influence, cognitive interest, and cognitive purpose. Firstly, let us consider the idea of cognitive influence. New paradigms arise through the process of knowledge recognition or creation, or knowledge migration that occurs through the cognitive influences of other paradigms. A typical example of knowledge migration is the formation of the Organisational Development paradigm (in part from Lewin’s work in 1947), that has cognitive influences from politics, sociology, and psychology. Secondly, the notion of cognitive interest relates to the structural/behavioural domain and as we shall see shortly, can be differentiated from the knowledge domain. Finally, cognitive purpose (Yolles, 1999) relates to rational and cybernetic processes that can also be differentiated from the knowledge domain. Both cognitive interests and purposes will be considered in more detail below. We can apply the lesson of Zeno’s paradox to complementarism quite simply now. We do this by saying that in the same way that time was a new conceptual extension in a new paradigm that acts as a constraint on behaviour in respect of distance, so cognitive interests and purposes act as constraints on complementarism. This then reduces the significance of paradigm incommensurability. 4. Extending the Fundamentalist Paradigm Several approaches to methodological pluralism (Jackson, 1993, pp201-202) occur through the selection of paradigms that are based on ideas within Habermas’ theory of human interests (Habermas, 1970). It tells us that human beings possess two basic cognitive interests in acquiring knowledge: a technical interest relate to the human endeavour referred to as work, and a practical interest for inter-

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action (table 1). Another cognitive interest is critical deconstraining that results in the human endeavour emancipation, seen to be subordinate to work and interaction because it results from exploitation and distorted communication. Corresponding to these three classifications of human endeavour, are three types of knowledge that can facilitate “ideal” qualities of human situations, referred to as empirical analytical sciences, historical hermeneutic sciences, and critical sciences. Table 1: Relationship between human cognitive interests and their corresponding types of knowledge

Cognitive interests

Knowledge type

Technical Work. This enables people to achieve goals and generate material wellbeing. It involves technical ability to undertake action in the environment, and the ability to make prediction and establish control. Empirical analytical sciences, concerned the with technical control of objectified processes.

Practical Interaction. This requires that people as individuals and groups in a social system gain and develop the possibilities of an understanding of each others subjective views. It is consistent with a practical interest in mutual understanding that can address disagreements, which can be a threat to the social form of life Historical hermeneutic sciences, relating to practical interest. They can provide understanding of intersubjective life, and aim at maintaining and improving mutual understanding between people.

Critical deconstraining Emancipation. This enables people to (i) liberate themselves from the constraints imposed by power structures (ii) learn through precipitation in social and political processes to control their own destinies.

Critical sciences, which recognise the limitations and dangers of inappropriately applied empirical analytical and historical hermeneutic sciences. The attempt to synthesise and systemise them to enable people to reflect on situations and liberate themselves from domination by existing power structures and processes.

Systems methodologies may be validly used in a complementary way when viewed in terms of Habermas’ classifications [Jackson, 1993, p290-291]. To do this, we should see Habermas’ classifications of cognitive interest as providing distinctions between knowledge and technical/practical behaviour. Now we are aware that (a) given knowledges derives from given paradigms, and (b) inquiry behaviour is part of method. Thus, we see that inquiry behaviour and paradigms are analytically distinct. This leads to the argument that while paradigms guide knowledge production and therefore determine knowledge type, systems methodologies should be seen to serve cognitive interests. Most approaches would seem to follow this distinction. Cognitive interests are associated with work and interaction, and as such are connected with the behavioural domain in figure 3 that uses energy as a commodity (Yolles, 1999). This leads us to consider the other domains of the figure and their relative commodities. A cognitive property of the cognitive domain is cognitive influence, the commodity of which is knowledge. That of the transmogrific domain is cognitive purposes, that has as its commodity information. All three are analytically and empirically independent. Cognitive purpose derives from the idea that paradigms have associated with them purpose, and that cognitive purpose is manifested from the paradigm. In the same way that one can construct a frame of reference that is cognitive interest related, and that constrains knowledge migration in respect of a complementary activity, so cognitive purpose similarly enables the creation of frames of reference through constraint on knowledge. There are argued to be three types of cognitive purposes that effectively correspond to Habermas’ types of cognitive interest. These are described in table 2, and have been similarly associated with knowledge type. Here, cybernetic cognitive purpose is concerned with intention and is a precursor for technical cognitive interest; rational cognitive purpose is concerned with logicorelational constructions, and determined the ability for practical behavioural matters to be dealt with; ideological cognitive purposes is connected with the manner of thinking, and is a precursor for the conception of critical deconstraining. These conceptualisations enable us to explore the variability of mappings between word views and cognitive systemic models intended to represent issues of “real world” behavioural situations. Consider that a world view is manifested in the cognitive system world by establishing a model that is intended to represent issues that should be included in the creation of an intervention strategy. This map-

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ping will be transformed, and during this process it will be susceptible to cybernetic, rational, and ideological attributes of cognitive purpose. Thus for instance, a mapping is subject to variation in information, controls, goal formation, and ethical conceptualisations. Table 2: Relationship between human cognitive purposes and corresponding types of knowledge

Cognitive purpose

Knowledge Type

Cybernetical Intention. This is through the creation and strategic pursuit of goals and aims that may change over time, enables people through control and communications processes to redirect their futures.

Rational Logico-relational. Enables missions, goals, and aims to be defined, and approached through planning. It involves logical, relational, and rational abilities to organise thought and action and thus to define sets of possible systemic and behaviour possibilities.

The science of control and communications. It has associated with it goals that derive from a belief system and knowledge; knowledge of group norms and standards enable the organising nature of cybernetic processes to be defined or redefined.

The science of reasoning. Logical processes derive from a belief and conceptual system that give rise to a propositional basis. It involves specialist type of knowledge that comes from a penchant that ultimately determines cognitive purposes.

Ideological Manner of thinking. An intellectual framework through which policy makers observe and interpret reality that has a politically correct ethical and moral orientation, provides an image of the future that enables action through politically correct strategic policy, and gives a politically correct view of stages of historical development in respect of interaction with the external environment. The science of ideas. It is an organisation of beliefs and attitudes (religious, political or philosophical in nature) that is more or less institutionalised or shared with others. It provides a total system of thought, emotion and attitude to the world and is reflected in any organising process. It refers to any conception of the world that goes beyond the ability of formal validation.

As a result of this approach, it is argued that different methodologies have different independent cognitive purposes. The methodologies can now be established within a frame of reference that connects them together through their cognitive purpose. As a result, it is possible to see each methodology as an orthogonality in a space of inquiry. Methodological cognitive purposes can be represented as goals and aims, and examples of different methodologies and their cognitive purposes are offered in Yolles(1998a). In particular, an example is also provide of how two methodologies can be used together. These are Systems Intervention Strategy (SIS) and Organisational Development (OD) that have been used together in the Open (University) Business School in order to extend inquiry processes. Moving between the two methodologies has been called the Mabey switch by Yolles (1998a), and the way that it has been done satisfied what Jackson refers to as a pragmatic approach. However, Yolles has argued that by building a frame of reference that effectively links the methodologies through their cognitive purposes, they can be used legitimately against the context of paradigm incommensurability. 5. Joint Alliances and Paradigms The term joint alliance describes various forms of cooperation between two or more organisations (Kelly and Parker, 1997). Joint alliances arise in order to satisfy cognitive influences, purposes or interests. They may occur between organisations of different size and geographical location, and different sectors (e.g., private, public, non-profit making). They are of a different nature to the more detailed legal specifications of mergers, acquisitions, or intricate partnership agreements. According to Kelly and Parker, these latter are less flexible since they tend to take more time to implement, are usually based on a rigid set of terms and conditions, are less likely to be able to adapt quickly to change, and can be difficult to decouple if the need arises. Alliances develop through the establishment of a virtual paradigm that may initially be ill-formed and unstable, and it is because of this that they can be volatile, with many dissolving prematurely. On the other hand, an alliance may have a limited cognitive influence, purpose or interest, and be intended to have a limited life span and domain of action. An example of such an alliance is the single project. A joint alliance may also be an enduring long term general agreement. If this occurs, it is usually the case that an establishable paradigm will have developed that will have associated with it recognisable patterns of behaviour.

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Joint alliances have become fashionable in a number of industries since it is believed that they can improve performance, increase competitiveness, and combat changes. The strategic motivation for alliances vary with the organisations involved and their cognitive purposes and interests. Some examples have been given by Kelly and Parker. We have selected a five of these and supposed of the types of alliances their capability of becoming viable systems in their own right (Table 3), that is to be purposeful adaptable activity systems with cognitive properties. As a result, we have proposed their associated cognitive properties. Table 3: Example alliance situations and their cognitive attributes as a viable systems Situation Cooperation in research and development New markets in Asia and eastern Europe

Cognitive Interest Share cost of innovation

Cognitive Purpose Lead time to development

Joint working with host country organisation to develop market

Developing joint control and logico-relational processes with host country organisation

Accessing segmented specialist local market Guide technical knowledge to keep up with development in technology Expand market share in stagnant or crowded markets

Help in facilitating access to local markets

Cognitive Influence Share basic knowledge of innovation Share product and market knowledge

Share product knowledge Develop new goals

Share technical knowledge

Help by facilitating market access to new markets

Once a joint alliance has been created and is seen as a purposeful adaptive activity system then its origin may be argued to centre on one of the three domains identified in figure 3. This idea links in with a classification of types of joint alliance (Kelly and Parker, 1997) that result in the three domains with indication of their centre of origin: 1. Horizontal alliances occur between competitors in an industry through functional need (Bergquist et al, 1995), thus centring on the behavioural domain of a joint venture. Collaboration across specific functions like research and development can reduce both costs and risks by sharing expertise; another form of collaboration is cross-licensing agreements that enables risks across international markets to be reduced. 2. Vertical alliances between organisations that shares the control of operations, thus centring on the cybernetic domain of a joint venture. In so doing it utilises the specialist skills associated with the partner organisations. Such a distribution can aid operational efficiency, as it can aid effectiveness; examples of such partnerships occur between organisations in the supply-delivery chain who may be suppliers, marketers, or distributors. 3. Diagonal alliances across organisations in different sectors of operational activity can occur by their pooling knowledge, expertise, resources, or technology. It thus centres on the cognitive domain of the joint venture. Diagonal alliances represent a form or operational convergence between the partner organisations when, for instance, the technologies of IT and telecommunications technologies come together through such a partnership. 6. Towards a Systemic Theory of Joint Ventures Our interest here is to formulate what will perhaps become the base of a systemic theory of joint ventures, linking joint alliance with methodological complementarism. We have argued that organisations must be seen as purposeful adaptive activity systems, as should be the joint ventures that are created between them. These ventures may be alliances between the organisations or methodological linkages operated by an inquirer. Some are arguments have been given that address the issues raised by fundamentalists against methodological complementarism. Since complementarism also occurs as alliances between corpo-

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rate organisations seen as purposeful adaptive activity systems, these arguments should also apply here, since if we are interested in developing a general theory of joint ventures the arguments must be consistent across the two fields of management systems and strategic management. Developing on the base the arguments of Berger and Luckman (1966) on the process of socialisation, it becomes axiomatic that all organisations (whether they are corporations or methodologies) have their own paradigms. If the fundamentalist arguments of paradigm incommensurability are to be held true, then this means that joint ventures between different organisations are not possible. However, this is contrary to our experiences, and so it is essential that we construct an argument that explains how they do it. The argument must clearly be consistent with that given above for methodologies, suggesting that all organisations should be seen in terms of cognitive purposes and cognitive interests. If the notion of organisational complementarism is to be seen as valid, then we must shift from the fundamentalists paradigm to one that has additional conceptual extensions. In our approach these are cognitive influence, purpose, and influence. Now, complementarism involves the creation of a virtual paradigm that enables the formulation of the nature of the cooperative behaviour. This involves a process of cognitive influence that derives from the paradigms associated with the participants involved in the cooperation. It also involves the development of cognitive purpose that enables mission and goals to arise and be pursued. Further, it involves the creation of aims by active individuals. Within joint alliance theory it is common to talk of project mission and goals. The notion has, however, also be applied to joint methodological ventures (Yolles, 1998; 1999). The arguement is that when a cognitive domain is established it results in the formation of a metasystem that directs the system. The metasystem can be used to enable an explicit relationship to be defined between an inquirer and an intervention strategy resulting from inquiry. By examining the metasystem, we are therefore examining the cognitive purposes for an inquiry. These are cognitively projected as the mission of a methodology, and there will often be associated goals that derive directly from that mission. There will also be inquiry aims. All are related to the orientation of an intervention intended for the situation being inquired into as determined by weltanschauungen and paradigms. A mission for inquiry derives from the cognitive organisation (beliefs, values, attitudes) of a paradigm, with goals that are defined in terms of a cognitive purpose. A set of methodological aims or inquiry cognitive purpose also exist that is related to the purpose for inquiry as interpreted through the weltanschauung of an inquirer. Thus for instance, in methodologies that adopt Beer’s Viable Systems Model it can be argued that the mission will be organisational viability, the goals to achieve organisational dynamic stability and adaptability, and aims of an inquiry in that organisation will relate to policy selection, coordination, integration, future development. While the inquirer’s aims are determined through weltanschauung, the mission and goals of the methodology derive from a paradigm that constrains the way the methods that derive from it are applied to the situation to be investigated. We can link joint alliance theory to methodological complementarism by developing some rules given by Kelly and Parker (1997) on formulating successful joint alliances. We have coupled them together with a possible set of rules that relate to joint methodological ventures, as proposed in table 4. These notions could be developed by formulating other characteristics that relate to tables 1 and 2, though no space is available here to do this. It is clear that an important aspect of joint alliances is culture. In joint alliances, cultural differences are often cited as the cause for failure, so this is important for their formation (Fedor and Werther, 1996). We are aware that there are a number of different attributes of culture, that include beliefs, values, attitudes, and language; and norms and standards are also important. Thus for example, managerial style is a behavioural manifestation of these, and can jar alliances. Consider an example of a current joint alliance in which cultural differences may be disruptive. The UK government has proposed the establishment of a partnership with the private sector in its metropolitan public transport system. Thus for example, it is proposed that the private sector control the underground railway infrastructure, while government maintains its control of the customer transaction processes. This will only work if each partner to satisfy its distinct cognitive purposes within its own partnership. Thus, one can envisage that government cognitive purposes are to qualitatively satisfy the public transport need, while that of the private sector is to satisfy quantitative profitability. It may be that

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unless these cognitive purposes are satisfied through some form of conceptual innovation they will appear to be contradictory and lead to the failure of the partnership. Table 4: Possible rules relating to the development of joint ventures Characteristics Cognitive Interests Cognitive Purposes Cognitive influence

Joint Alliances There should be long term mutual cognitive interests in an alliance Cognitive purposes that are seen as strategic aims and objectives of corporate organisations should compatible There should be a sharing of knowledge to enable the creation of a new paradigm that rules the alliance and guides it behaviour

The whole

The competencies of the alliance should be greater than that of any one operating partner

Culture

Cultural compatibility between partner organisations is important. For instance a general wisdom is that many organisations that have similar size and age also have a similar cultural maturity

Trust

Trust between organisations is essential, reducing the need to elaborate procedures

Interconnections

Open communications between the corporate organisations involved in an alliance is essential Change in the partner relationships can inevitably involve volatility

Relational change

Methodological Complementarism There should be a perceived inquirer interest in establishing complementarism Purposes that are seen as strategic aims and objectives of methodologies should be compatible A new virtual paradigm is essential that results from a selection and pooling of appropriate knowledge that satisfies cognitive interests or purposes. Two utility of the combined set of methodologies should be greater as a whole than that of an individual methodology Cultural compatibility between the different paradigms of with each methodology is important, so that both have the same values, common beliefs, and attitudinal approach. However, new complementarist virtual paradigms may modify the culture. Trusting that the methodologies are able to work together through appropriate knowledge migration is essential Relating the outputs of each methodology to another is essential Change in the methodological relationships can inevitably involve volatility

There are parallels in methodological complementarism. A framework should be established which illustrates how the methodologies are able to relate to each other. They can be related through cognitive interest, for instance as explained to be the case for a strategic structured approach called Total Systems Intervention (Flood, 1995), or through cognitive purposes as used by Mabey (in his Mabey Switch, (Yolles, 1999)) by linking Systems Intervention Strategy with Organisational Development. Here, cultural attributes should similarly be related, so that two methodologies that are commensurable in a core subset of its propositions may well be able to be linked by an inquirer within a joint methodological venture. This commensurability will be illustrated by the ability of the inquirer to create a virtual paradigm that enables the framework to be defined, and to use the methodologies as orthogonalities. 7. Conclusion There are parallels between the arguments that are made about the creation of joint alliances between organisations, and those that come into being under the banner of methodological complementarism. A common platform that enables them to be considered as different species of the same genus is to consider them to both be purposeful adaptive activity systems. This enables them to be considered in terms of three domains: cognitive, transformational, and behavioural, each with the cognitive properties of influence, purpose and interest. The possible importance of this is that it may provide the potential for further developing the theory associated with joint alliances, beyond that explained in the current literature. It may also more closely link in the theory of methodological complementarism, enabling us to formulate a more general viable systems theory of joint ventures. 8. References Berger, P., Luckman, T., 1966. The Social Construction of Reality. Penguin Bergquist, W., Betwee, J., Meuel, D., 1995, Building Strategic Relationships: How to extend your organisation’s reach through partnerships and joint ventures. Jossey Bass, San Fransisco.

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