Towards A Viable Systems Theory Of Joint Ventures

Towards a Viable Systems Theory of Joint Ventures Systemist, 21(2)63-80, 1999 Maurice Yolles Liverpool Business School, Liverpool, Liverpool John Moores University UK.

Abstract: In management systems, methodological complementarism has been criticised by the fundamentalists of paradigm incommensurability. They tell us that because methodological paradigms are incommensurable, that methodologies cannot be used together. There is a move to theoretically counter this argument. One approach is to show a basic connection between the methodological complementarism of management systems and the cooperative strategic management theory of joint ventures that, if appropriately explored, might suggest a systemic theory of joint ventures. Keywords: Management Systems, incommensurability, joint ventures.

methodological

complementarism,

paradigm

1. Introduction In the field of management systems a methodology can be seen as a purposeful organisation of inquiry that can be applied to complex situations (Yolles, 1998a, 1999). It helps inquirers to reduce that complexity, and create feasible and desirable intervention strategies that can facilitate change. There is an argument that the joint or complementary use of a plurality of methodologies can bring more to an inquiry process than the use of a unitary approach. However, there is a fundamental argument against this (Burrel and Morgan, 1979) that such a plurality involves paradigm incommensurability - thus invalidating the joint use of methodologies. The fundamentalists who support this argument say that inquirers cannot venture a joint inquiry involving a plurality of methods/methodologies that each have their associated paradigms because the paradigms are incommensurable. Those who do, it is claimed, may be pragmatists (Jackson, 1992) who are not operating in a theoretically legitimate way, and as such their processes of inquiry may formulate strategies for intervention that will result in unintended outcomes. The nature of this fundamental view can be more broadly appreciated. To do so, consider that there is an organised activity related autonomous group of people that has associated with it a paradigm. This will be incommensurable with another paradigm belonging to another such group if they each have different conceptual extensions, or if similar conceptual extensions are qualitatively distinct thus having different meanings (Yolles, 1998, 1998a, 1999). Paradigms are therefore describable as being commensurable when they are conceptually coextensive and qualitatively similar. Mostly we can think of different paradigms as being incommensurable to some degree. Whether they are so recognised very much depends upon the language that is used to describe the conceptual extensions. Consider now the field of strategic management, where durable corporate organisation exist in locally complex situations and operate in ways that will affect their effectiveness and durability, and determine their futures. They too can engage in a type of mutual complementary 1

activity called a joint venture (Kelly and Parker, 1997) that includes joint alliances, strategic alliances, strategic partnering, licensing agreements, and outsourcing. Interestingly, there do not appear to be any fundamentalist arguments that deny that joint ventures can legitimately occur, perhaps in part because today in the complex commercial world that we find about us there are so many durable ones. Indeed, joint ventures, far from being criticised by fundamentalists, are seen by many as being one potentially good way of dealing with certain classes of complex situations. Probably half of them that form fail (Ibid.), which is not too different from the longer-term survival rate of the average enterprise in today’s complex world. Until now no approach appears to have been made to explore the relationship between inquiry related and corporate organisations across the fields of management systems and strategic management. If inquiry related and corporate organisations are each to be seen as different species of the same genus, then it is likely that we can apply the fundamentalist argument of paradigm incommensurability to both in relative ways. This is likely to have some impact on the theory of corporate joint ventures. In this paper our interest will be exactly this, to show how corporate and inquiry organisations can be seen as different species of the same genus. As such, fundamentalist arguments can be applied to joint ventures. Fundamentalism has taken hold in management systems, but it would appear to be contrary to practical wisdom in corporate strategic management, and the arguments about joint ventures. This contradiction should be examined more closely, first by focusing in on fundamentalism. 2. The Worldview Basis of Fundamentalism It will be useful to examine the notions supported by our fundamental friends, and thus to explore whether apparently valid arguments against methodological complementarism are also applicable to joint ventures. To do this, it will be appropriate to first consider the base ideas upon which rest their criticisms. This means that we shall explore the nature of paradigms. However, in so doing we will broaden the exploration to that of worldview. According to Yolles (1996, 1998) there are two types of worldview: weltanschauung and paradigm. The term weltanschauung was first introduced into systems by Churchman (1979), and is used as part of Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland and Scholes, 1990). It is seen by some as a view that is often personal and indescribable. That is, it cannot be described formally through language that enables a set of explicit statements about its beliefs and other attributes that enable everything that might be expressed about the worldview to be expressed. In this sense, we refer to weltanschauung as an informal worldview. Different from weltanschauung is the paradigm, a term explored in some depth by Kuhn (1970). Weltanschauungen become paradigms when they are formalised (Yolles, 1999). A virtual paradigm is formed as an intermediary stage, and this requires a formalised non-normative or semi-formalised shared weltanschauung to be created in the absence of a paradigm, that may or may not become a paradigm (Yolles, 1996). While individuals and groups may behave in ways that are determined by their weltanschauung, paradigms emerge when the groups become coherent through a degree of formalisation. Both weltanschauungen and paradigms are forms of worldview that operate through culture (beliefs, values, attitudes and language), concepts established within “rational” organised structures called propositions, and norms (Ibid.). They have a relationship with each other, and with the behavioural world that is coupled to the physical or social forms that we see around us. This relationship is shown in figure 1 (Yolles, 1999). Here, we have collected 2

together the types of worldview into a cognitive domain, and these have been differentiated from the behavioural domain within which is defined by the “real” or perceived behavioural world. In order to distinguish between these two domains and the organisational transformations that occur between them, we have also introduced the organising domain.

Organising domain Paradigm (formal world view)

Behavioural domain representation

Behavioural world

organisation of intervention

development/ learning

formation/ consolidation

Cognitive domain

interpretation Weltanschauung (informal world view) reflection/creation

Figure 1: Relationship between types of worldview and behaviour

This model can be reformulated, with the three domains being placed together to form a deep, surface, and transforming relationship. The organising domain involves an organising process that manifests at the surface whatever is projected from the deep domain, and vice versa. We can also refer to the organising transformation as transmogrification - that is, a transformation that may be subject to surprises. Transmogrification is a mapping from the cognitive to the behavioural domains that manifests a structure with which is associated behaviour. We shall refer to the properties of a transmogrification that enable it to map from the one domain to the other as its morphism. In mathematics (see Bachman and Narici, 1966, p.5 and p.51) and in particular the dynamics of complex (ergodic) systems (Arnold, and Avez, 1968), two types of morphism can be defined. An isomorphism is a 1:1 transmogrific mapping, while an homeomorphism is a 1:n mapping. This is illustrated in figure 2 where in the homeomorphism n=3. D e e p d o m a in

T ra n sm o g rific a tio n

S u rfa c e d o m a in

Iso m o r p h ism (1 :1 )

H o m eo m o r p h ism (1 :3 )

Figure 2: Notions of an isomorphic/homeomorphic mapping 3

To use this, let us collapse the types of worldview (paradigm and weltanschauung) of figure 1 into a deep or cognitive domain. Transmogrification converts from the cognitive world to that of the physical behavioural manifest world. The manifest world is seen to be composed of individuals that create organisations that each have a form. It follows that the manifest behavioural form is sensitive to the composition of individuals that defines a possibly innumerable number (n, which may be large) of situations over time. The composition of individuals who make up a situation will potentially influence the nature of that transmogrification. Therefore, a manifested physical form is the result of homeomorphism. These forms may each be different, and have associated with them different behaviours. In contrast to this, an isomorphism will define a unique manifestation if it has not been subjected to surprises that interfere with meaning. This conceptualisation is illustrated in figure 3, where we use a closed curve to show the homeomorphic potential of transmogrification. The potential can be thought of as having a status not unlike that of a quantum field (Pessa, 1998, Chorpa, 1990). We can use this figure recursively to show how we can attribute the properties of a system to a behavioural situation rather than declaring it to be one. In the same way that we can map from the cognitive to the behavioural domain, so too we can map from the domain of worldviews to the “explicitly imagined” behavioural domain. From this we can project a cognitive system model onto the dotted line of figure 3. This can now be designated as the boundary of a “new” cognitive domain that can be mapped into the behavioural domain. Alternatively, some may wish to see the dotted line imposed on the behavioural domain, taking it to be a system. This model acts as the basis of the theory of viable systems as developed by Yolles (1999) through the work of Stafford Beer and Eric Schwarz. It also connects with the work that has appeared in artificial intelligence and language theory. Chomsky [1975], in his attempts to develop a theory of transformational grammar of language, distinguished between the semantics of a message and its syntax. Semantics occurs at a “deep” or cognitive domain of knowledge that carries meaning. Syntax is a manifestation of semantics that is created through the “surface” that has structure and from which we make utterances. A structurally similar model is used in the field of artificial intelligence [Clancy and Letsinger, 1981] that distinguishes between deep and surface knowledge.

Manifest behavioural domain Transmogrific Domain

World view populated Cognitive Domain

Figure 3: Model identifying a relationship between Worldviews and Behaviour 4

Deep knowledge is generic, being independent of any particular situation. It adopts first principles and fundamental propositions that can represent individual or shared group beliefs. It is associated with understanding, and develops according to general theories. It is also associated with deep reasoning processes, the purposes of which are: (a) to build up or maintain cognitive models perceived to be relevant to the current “reality”, (b) to make generalisations, (c) to formulate models relevant to surface knowledge. Deep knowledge can also be called cognitive knowledge, and is generated by a worldview. Surface knowledge can be called situational or behavioural knowledge because it directly relates to a particular situation and its associated procedural behaviour. Its acquisition occurs through the collection of facts, through measures of performance, and through the creation of algorithms, procedures, or sets of rules. Such knowledge acquisition occurs through a process of learning and experience about the situation. It is related to skill, and can derive from heuristic processes. The two types of knowledge are analytically and empirically distinct. 3. Arguing to Extending the Fundamental Paradigm In considering the fundamentalist argument we must first direct our attention to methodology since it is here that their arguments are applied. The coordination of methodological behaviour is concerned with the idea that different systems methodologies intended to be used to intervene in complex problem situations each have attributes that can be used for benefit in different situations. It recognises that they may each operate out of different paradigms, and have different rationalities stemming from alternative theoretical positions that they reflect. Each methodology will generate a view of reality and intervention strategy that is itself connected to the penchant of the methodology that spawns it. According to the principle of complementarism, the different paradigms can operate in ways that are complementary to one another, each finding strength of examination and evaluation that others might not have in respect of different classes of situation. We have said that arguments against complementarism by fundamentalists are that methodologies derive from different paradigms that are incommensurable. This means, they say, that they cannot be compared or used together in a coordinated way. Now, paradigms create the cognitive basis that becomes manifested as behaviour, and our thesis is that since they are generically related to purposeful adaptive activity systems generic theory that applies to one must apply to the other. Thus, if we can construct a generic theory of complementarism, then it must apply to corporate organisations in the same way as it does to organisations of inquiry. Indeed, in both cases any plurality of organisations operates out of their own different paradigms, and complementarism can be seen as a conditional cooperation between them for some perceived benefit. When we use the term complementarism, it will therefore have associated with it the implicit understanding that the organisations we are referring to are viable in that they have duration and adaptability, a cognitive domain, and a behavioural domain. Since we can perceive methodology in action to be a process of organised inquiry, it can be included within the generic term of organisational complementarism. It is curious that fundamentalists are concerned with organisational complementarism in the management systems field, but not in that of strategic management. From the perspective of purposeful adaptive activity systems, it seems paradoxical that it can apply to one field and 5

not the other. We therefore suggest that fundamentalist’s arguments only hold true because their own paradigm is conceptually bounded - that is they do not possess enough conceptual extensions to enable them to explain the process of behavioural complementarism. To see more clearly what we mean by this, consider Zeno’s paradox [Gale, 1968, p387]. This explains how it is impossible to move between two points A and B in space. To reach B from A you must travel half the distance to it to a point say a1, and to get from a1 to B you must reach a point half way to it at a2. This argument is recursive as you move to a3, a4, a5,.... To count the full distance that you have travelled you must add all of the half distances, forming an infinite series. This suggests mathematically that you can never reach B. A solution to the paradox is to introduce time as a new analytically and empirically independent conceptual extension that operates as a limiting factor on the summation. The introduction of the new conceptualisation means that a new paradigm is created with new propositions and beliefs, and it is incommensurable with the previous paradigm. Paradoxes can be seen as fundamental contradictions of a paradigm. Attempting to solve a fundamental contradiction from within the paradigm is not possible. Rather, a new paradigm must appear with extra conceptual extension(s) that are able to deal with it. Like the fact that we know that we reach B from A but cannot explain how, we know that organisations operate in joint ventures even though they each have different paradigms. For instance, the UK Rover car company with its own paradigm was able to cooperate in a joint venture with the Japanese Honda car company to produce a common model for a car, just as methodological pragmatists frequently mix methods. There is an argument that methodological complementarism can be undertaken legitimately. It extends the fundamentalist paradigm by introducing a new analytically and empirically independent conceptual extension that derives from the work of Habermas in his theory of human interests. Our own approach lies in a similar vein, but extends the paradigm from one to three conceptual extensions. Within the context of methodology, these lie in a single frame of reference, and can thus be thought of as orthogonalities. They are cognitive influence, cognitive interest, and cognitive purpose. Firstly, let us consider the idea of cognitive influence. New paradigms arise through the process of knowledge recognition or creation, or knowledge migration that occurs through the cognitive influences of other paradigms. A typical example of knowledge migration is the formation of the Organisational Development paradigm (in part from Lewin’s work in 1947), and that has cognitive influences from politics, sociology, and psychology. Secondly, the notion of cognitive interest relates to the structural/behavioural domain and as we shall see shortly, can be differentiated from the knowledge domain. Finally, cognitive purpose (Yolles, 1999) relates to rational and cybernetic processes that can also be differentiated from the knowledge domain. Both cognitive interests and purposes will be considered in more detail below. We can apply the lesson of Zeno’s paradox to complementarism quite simply now. We do this by saying that in the same way that time was a new conceptual extension in a new paradigm that acted as a constraint on behaviour in respect of distance, so cognitive interests and purposes act as constraints on complementarism. This then reduces the significance of paradigm incommensurability. Indeed, an argument can further be created that complementarism is actually important to viability. We are familiar with the weltanschauung principle that 6

tells us that no view of reality can be complete, that each view will contain some information about reality, but that the views will never be completely reconcilable. The principle of finding a more representative picture of reality by involving as many weltanschauungen as possible generates variety through opening up more possibilities in the way situations can be seen. Those who adhere to this principle during an inquiry consequently regard weltanschauung pluralism as desirable. We know that a plurality of weltanschauungen can form a shared weltanschauung, and that when this becomes formalised a paradigm appears. It is reasonable to consider then, that there should also be a paradigm principle that might be expressed as follows. A paradigm defines a truth system that results in a logical process that determines behaviour. The truth system is also responsible for recognising and producing what its viewholders consider to be knowledge about reality. Since different paradigms have different truth systems, knowledge across paradigms will never be completely reconcilable. Formal models of reality are built from paradigms, and each model will contain some knowledge that guides behaviour. Paradigms are created by groups of people, and a paradigm principle should be analogous to the weltanschauung principle. Thus, no formal model of reality can be complete, and finding a more representative picture of a given reality by involving a plurality of formal models generates variety through opening up more possibilities in the way situations can be addressed through action. To have paradigm pluralism, paradigm incommensurability must be addressed. 4. Methodological Complementarism by Extending the Fundamental Paradigm Several approaches to methodological pluralism [Jackson, 1993, pp201-202] occur through the selection of paradigms that are based on ideas within Habermas’ theory of human interests [Habermas, 1970]. It tells us that human beings possess two basic cognitive interests in acquiring knowledge: a technical interest relate to the human endeavour referred to as work, and a practical interest for interaction (table 1). Another cognitive interest is critical deconstraining that results in the human endeavour emancipation, seen to be subordinate to work and interaction because it results from exploitation and distorted communication. Corresponding to these three classifications of human endeavour, are three types of knowledge that can facilitate “ideal” qualities of human situations, referred to as empirical analytical sciences, historical hermeneutic sciences, and critical sciences. Systems methodologies may be validly used in a complementary way when viewed in terms of Habermas’ classifications [Jackson, 1993, p290-291]. To do this, we should see Habermas’ classifications of cognitive interest as providing distinctions between knowledge and technical/practical behaviour. Now we are aware that (a) given knowledges derives from given paradigms, and (b) inquiry behaviour is part of method. Thus, we see that inquiry behaviour and paradigms are analytically distinct. This leads to the argument that while paradigms guide knowledge production and therefore determine knowledge type, systems methodologies should be seen to serve cognitive interests. Most approaches would seem to follow this distinction.

7

Cognitive interests

Knowledge type

Technical Work. This enables people to achieve goals and generate material well-being. It involves technical ability to undertake action in the environment, and the ability to make prediction and establish control. Empirical analytical sciences, concerned with technical control of objectified processes.

Practical Interaction. This requires that people, as individuals and groups in a social system, gain and develop the possibilities of an understanding of each others subjective views. It is consistent with a practical interest in mutual understanding that can address disagreements, which can be a threat to the social form of life Historical hermeneutic sciences, relating to practical interest. They can provide understanding of intersubjective life, and aim at maintaining and improving mutual understanding between people.

Critical deconstraining Emancipation. It enables people to (i) liberate themselves from the constraints imposed by power structures (ii) learn through precipitation in social and political processes to control their own destinies.

Critical sciences, which recognise the limitations and dangers of inappropriately applied empirical analytical and historical hermeneutic sciences. The attempt to synthesise and systemise them to enable people to reflect on situations and liberate themselves from domination by existing power structures and processes.

Table 1: Relationship between human cognitive interests and their corresponding types of knowledge An example of this is the approach adopted by Flood and Jackson (1991) and Jackson (1992) referred to as a System of Systems Methodologies (SSM). Here methodologies are assigned to the domain of cognitive interest, and are seen in terms of a set of characteristics that correspond to Habermas’ technical, practical, and human deconstraining classifications. This results in a typology of methodologies. Methodologies that come from different cognitive interests can now legitimately be used together. This is because satisfying the needs of cognitive interests does not compromise any given paradigm from which a knowledge type comes. There is an methodological aside to the main argument. Flood and Romm (1995) question the validity of the SSM (though not the Habermassian argument), saying that it is possible to use methodologies for a variety of purposes, some of which go beyond their original design. SSM approach does not recognise this in that it provides undue restrictions on the way in which methodologies are seen and evolve. The relationship between cognitive interests and cognitive purposes is defined by Yolles (1997, 1998, 1998a). Here, the base viable systems model constructed in figures 2 and 3 distinguishes between, and links, three domains together that are analytically and empirically independent. The cognitive domain is linked to a behavioural domain through one of transformation that occurs through organising processes. The behavioural domain is argued to be the place in which cognitive interests are manifested, and in the organising domain, we see cognitive purposes being manifested. The notion of cognitive purpose comes from the idea that paradigms have associated with them purpose, and that cognitive purpose exists and has an autonomous status in a similar way to cognitive interest. It enables the creation of frames of reference that are cognitive purpose related. 8

There are argued to be three types of cognitive purposes that effectively correspond to Habermas’ types of cognitive interest. These are described in table 2, and similarly associated with knowledge type. Here, Cybernetic cognitive purpose is concerned with intention. It is a precursor for technical cognitive interest. Rational cognitive purpose is concerned with logico-relational constructions, and determines an ability to deal with practical behavioural matters. Ideological cognitive purposes are connected with the manner of thinking, and provide a precursor for the conception of critical deconstraining.

Cognitive purpose

Knowledge Type

Cybernetical Intention. This is through the creation and strategic pursuit of goals and aims that may change over time, enables people through control and communications processes to redirect their futures.

The science of control and communications. It has associated with it goals that derive from a belief system and knowledge; knowledge of group norms and standards enable the organising nature of cybernetic processes to be defined or redefined.

Rational Logico-relational. Enables missions, goals, and aims to be defined, and approached through planning. It involves logical, relational, and rational abilities to organise thought and action and thus to define sets of possible systemic and behaviour possibilities. The science of reasoning. Logical processes derive from a belief and conceptual system that give rise to a propositional basis. It involves specialist type of knowledge that comes from a penchant that ultimately determines cognitive purposes.

Ideological Manner of thinking. An intellectual framework through which policy makers observe and interpret reality that has a politically correct ethical and moral orientation, provides an image of the future that enables action through politically correct strategic policy, and gives a politically correct view of stages of historical development in respect of interaction with the external environment. The science of ideas. It is an organisation of beliefs and attitudes (religious, political or philosophical in nature) that is more or less institutionalised or shared with others. It provides a total system of thought, emotion and attitude to the world and is reflected in any organising process. It refers to any conception of the world that goes beyond the ability of formal validation.

Table 2: Relationship between human cognitive purposes and corresponding types of knowledge

These conceptualisations enable us to explore the variability of mappings between word views and cognitive systemic models intended to represent issues of “real world” situations. Consider that a worldview is manifested in the cognitive system world by establishing a model that is intended to represent issues that should be included in the creation of an intervention strategy. This mapping will be transformed, and during this process it will be susceptible to cybernetic, rational, and ideological attributes of cognitive purpose. Thus for instance, a mapping is subject to variation in information, controls, goal formation, and ethical conceptualisations. As a result of this approach, it is argued that different methodologies have different independent cognitive purposes. The methodologies can now be established within a frame of reference that connects them together through their cognitive purpose. Thus, it is possible to see each methodology as an orthogonality in a local space of inquiry. Methodological cognitive purposes can be represented as goals and aims, and examples of different methodologies and their cognitive purposes are offered in Yolles(1998a). In particular, an example is also provided of how two methodologies can be used together. These are Systems Intervention Strategy (SIS) and Organisational Development (OD) that have been used together in the Open (University) Business School in order to extend inquiry processes. Moving between the two methodologies has been called the Mabey switch by Yolles (1999), and the way that it has 9

been done satisfies what Jackson refers to as a pragmatic approach. However, Yolles has argued that by building a local frame of reference that effectively links the methodologies through their cognitive purposes, they can be used legitimately within the context of paradigm incommensurability. Adopting the models of Eric Schwarz in his viable systems theory to our approach (see Yolles, 1999), we can also say that cognitive interests are associated with energetic objects, while cognitive purposes rather operate through the commodity of information. In the case that we wish to classify complementarism with cognitive interest or purpose, this distinction may well contribute to our ability to do so. 5. Joint Ventures and Paradigms The term joint venture describes various forms of cooperative alliance between two or more organisations (Kelly and Parker, 1997). Joint ventures arise in order to satisfy cognitive purposes or interests. They may occur between organisations of different size and geographical location, and different sectors (e.g., private, public, non-profit making). They are of a different nature to the more detailed legal specifications of mergers, acquisitions, or intricate partnership agreements. According to Kelly and Parker, the latter are less flexible since they tend to take more time to implement. They are usually based on a rigid set of terms and conditions, are less likely to be able to adapt quickly to change, and can be difficult to decouple if the need arises. They develop through the establishment of a virtual paradigm that may initially be ill-formed and unstable, and it is because of this that they can be volatile, with many dissolving prematurely. On the other hand, an alliance may have a limited cognitive purpose or interest, and be intended to have a limited life span and domain of action. An example of such an alliance is the single project. A joint venture may also be an enduring long-term general agreement. If this occurs, it is usually the case that a local virtual paradigm will have developed that will have associated with it recognisable patterns of behaviour. Joint ventures have become fashionable in a number of industries since it is believed that they can improve performance and increase competitiveness, and combat changes. The strategic motivation for alliances vary with the organisations involved and their cognitive purposes and interests. Some examples have been given by Kelly and Parker, and we use some of these to construct a view of how they relate to cognitive interests, purposes, and influences (Table 3). Here, we apply the earlier stated notion that cognitive influences will be affective in enabling knowledge migration across worldviews. Once a joint venture has been created and seen as a purposeful adaptive activity systems then its origin may be argued to centre on one of the three domains identified in figure 3. This idea links in with a classification of types of joint venture (Kelly and Parker, 1997) that result in the three domains with indication of their centre of origin: 1. Horizontal alliances occur between competitors in an industry through functional need (Bergquist et al, 1995), thus centring on the behavioural domain of a joint venture. Collaboration across specific functions like research and development can reduce both costs and risks by sharing expertise; another form of collaboration is cross-licensing agreements that enables risks across international markets to be reduced. 2. Vertical alliances between organisations that shares the control of operations, thus centring on the cybernetic domain of a joint venture. In so doing utilises the specialist skills associated with the partner organisations. Such a distribution can aid operational efficiency, as it 10

can aid effectiveness; examples of such partnerships occur between organisations in the supply-delivery chain who may be suppliers, marketers, or distributors. 3. Diagonal alliances across organisations in different sectors of operational activity can occur by their pooling knowledge, expertise, resources, or technology. It thus centres on the cognitive domain of the joint venture. Diagonal alliances represent a form or operational convergence between the partner organisations when, for instance, the technologies of IT and telecommunications technologies come together through such a partnership. Situation

Cooperation in research and development New markets in Asia and eastern Europse

Accessing segmented specialist local market Guide technical knowledge to keep up with development in technology Expand market share in stagnent or crowded markets

Cognitive Interest

Cognitive Purpose

Share cost of innovation

Lead time to development

Knowledge Migration through Cognitive Influence Share basic knowledge of innovation

Joint working with host Developing joint concountry organisation to trol and logicodevelop market relational processes with host country organisation Help in facilititating access to local markets Develop new goals

Share market knowledge

Help by facilitating market access to new markets

Share marketing knowledge for given sectors

Develop market share

Share product knowledge Share technical knowledge

Table 3: Viable system example situations and their cognitive attributes 6. Towards a Systemic Theory of Joint Ventures Our interest here will be to formulate what will perhaps become the base of a systemic theory of joint ventures, linking joint venture with methodological complementarism. In doing so we have argued that organisations must be seen as purposeful adaptive activity systems, as should be the joint ventures that are created between them. These ventures may be alliances between the organisations or methodological linkages operated by an inquirer. We have said that there are arguments that address the issues raised by the fundamentalists of paradigm incommensurability. However, we should also apply their arguments to the formation of joint ventures, and argue how they can be overcome. Clearly, if we are interested in developing a general theory of joint ventures, the arguments must be consistent across the two fields of management systems and strategic management. Adopting as a base the arguments of Berger and Luckman (1966) on the process of socialisation, it becomes axiomatic that all organisations (whether they are enterprises or methodologies) have their own paradigms. If the fundamentalist arguments of paradigm incommensurability are to be held true, then this means that joint ventures between different organisations are not possible. However, this is contrary to our experiences, and so it is essential that we construct an argument that explains how they do it. The argument must clearly be consistent with that given above for method11

ologies, suggesting that all organisations should be seen in terms of cognitive purposes and cognitive interests. We have argued that if the notion of organisational complementarism is to be seen as valid, then we must shift from the fundamentalist paradigm to one that has new conceptual extensions. These involve the dimensions of cognitive influence, purpose, and influence. Any sort of organisational complementarism involves the creation of a virtual paradigm that enables the formulation of the nature of the cooperative behaviour. This involves a process of cognitive influence that derives from the paradigms associated with the participants involved in the cooperation. It also involves the development of cognitive purpose that enables mission and goals to arise and be pursued. Further, it involves the creation of aims by active individuals. It is common to talk of project mission and goals within joint venture theory, but not so in methodological complementarism. The notion can, however, also be applied to joint methodological ventures (Yolles, 1998; 1999). Here it is argued that when a cognitive domain is established it results in the formation of a metasystem that can be used to enable an explicit relationship to be defined between an inquirer and an intervention strategy resulting from inquiry. By examining the metasystem, we are therefore examining the cognitive purposes for an inquiry. These are cognitively projected as the mission of a methodology, and there will often be associated goals that derive directly from that mission. There will also be inquiry aims. All are related to the orientation of an intervention intended for the situation being inquired into as determined by weltanschauungen and paradigms. A mission for inquiry derives from the cognitive organisation (beliefs, values, attitudes) of a paradigm, with goals that are defined in terms of a cognitive purpose. A set of methodological aims or inquiry cognitive purpose also exists. These are related to the purpose for inquiry as interpreted through the weltanschauung of an inquirer. Thus for instance, in methodologies that adopt Beer’s Viable Systems Model it can be argued that the mission will be organisational viability, the goals to achieve organisational dynamic stability and adaptability, and aims of an inquiry in that organisation will relate to policy selection, coordination, integration, future development. While the inquirer’s aims are determined through weltanschauung, the mission and goals of the methodology derive from a paradigm that constrains the way the methods that derive from it are applied to the situation to be investigated. We can link joint venture theory to methodological complementarism by developing some rules given by Kelly and Parker (1997) on formulating successful joint ventures. We have coupled them together with a possible set of rules that relate to joint methodological ventures, as propose in table 4. This could be developed by formulating other characteristics that relate to tables 1 and 2. However, no space is available here to do this. It is clear that an important aspect of joint ventures is culture. In joint ventures, cultural differences are often cited as the cause for failure, so this is important for the formation of alliances (Fedor and Werther, 1996). We are aware that there are a number of different attributes of culture, that include beliefs, values, attitudes, and language; and norms and standards are also important. There are parallels that work along side each other in corporate joint ventures and in methodological complementarism. A local framework should be established which illustrates how corpoations/methodologies are able to relate to each other. In the case of methodologies, they can be connected through cognitive interest. Examples of this may be identified in terms of cognitive interest for Total Systems Intervention (Flood, 1995), or through cognitive purposes 12

as used by Mabey (in his Mabey Switch, (Yolles, 1999)) by linking Systems Intervention Strategy with Organisational Development. Here, cultural attributes should similarly be related, so that two methodologies that are commensurable in a core subset of its propositions may well be able to be linked by an inquirer within a joint methodological venture. This commensurability will be illustrated by the ability of the inquirer to create a virtual paradigm that enables the framework to be defined, and to use the methodologies as orthogonalities.

Characteristics Cognitive Interests Cognitive Purposes

Cognitive influence

The whole

Culture

Belief/Trust

Interconnections Relational change

Joint ventures There should be long term mutual cognitive interests in an alliance Cognitive purposes that are seen as strategic aims and objectives of corporate organisations should compatible There should be a sharing of knowledge to enable the creation of a new paradigm that rules the alliance and guides it behaviour The competencies of the alliance should be greater than that of any one operating partner Cultural compatibility between partner organisations is important. Examples of cultural characteristics are organisational size and age Trust between organisations is essential, reducing the need to elaborate procedures Open communications are essential Change in the partner relationships can inevitably involve volatility

Methodological Complementarism There should be a perceived inquirer interest in establishing complementarism Purposes that are seen as strategic aims and objectives of methodologies should be compatible A new virtual paradigm is essentail that results from a selection and pooling of appropriate knowledge that satisfies cognitive interetsts or purposes. Two utility of the combined set of methodologies should be greater as a whole than that of an individual methodology Cultural compatibility between the different paradigms of with each methodology is important

Belief in the ability for the methodologies to work together is essential Relating the outputs of each methodology to another is essential Change in the methodological relationships can inevitably involve volatility

Table 4: Possible rules relating to the development of joint ventures 7. Conclusion There are parallels between the arguments about the creation of corporate joint ventures, and the methodological alliances that form through methodological complementarism. It is appealing to therefore model them as different species of the same genus. To do this, a common platform has been created that enables them to be seen as purposeful adaptive activity systems that can be viable. We can therefore apply viable systems theory. If this is appropriate, then the exploration of methodological complementarism in terms of corporate joint ventures releases a new, fuller way of describing alliances. This work therefore provides the potential for further developing the theory associated with joint ventures, beyond that explained in the cur13

rent literature. It also has implications for the way in which management systems methodologies, intending to create intervention strategies for the future, are applied to joint venture situations. 8. References Berger, P., Luckman, T., 1966, The Social Construction of Reality. Penguin Bergquist, W., Betwee, J., Meuel, D., 1995, Building Strategic Relationships: How to extend your organisation’s reach through partnerships and joint ventures. Jossey Bass, San Fransisco. Checkland, P.B. Scholes,J., 1990, Soft Systems Methodology in Action. John Wiley & Son, Chichester Chomsky, N., 1975, Problems of Knowledge and Freedom. Pantheon, New York. Churchman, C.W. 1979, The Systems Approach, 2nd ed. Dell, New York Chorpa, D., 1990, Quantum Healing, Exploring the frontiers of mind/body medicine. Bantam Books, New York, USA Fedor, K.J., Werther Jr., W.B.,1996, The Fourth Dimension: Creating Cultural Responsive International Alliances. Organisational Dynamics, Autumn, pp39-52. Flood, R.L., 1995, Solving Problem Solving. Wiley, Chichester Flood, R.L., Romm, N.R.A., 1995, Diversity Management: Theory in Action. Systems Practice, 8(4)469-482. Gale, M., 1968, The Philosophy of Time. Macmillan, London. Habermas, J., 1970, Knowledge and interest. Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis, pp36-54, (Emmet, D., MacIntyre, A., eds), MacMillan, London Jackson, M.C., 1992, Systems Methodologies for the Management Sciences. Plenum, New York Jackson, M.C., 1993, Don’t bite my finger: Haridimos Tsoukas’ critical evaluation of Total Systems Intervention. Systems Practice, 6, 289-294. Kelly, A., Parker, N., 1997, Management Directions: Joint Alliences. Institute of Management Foundation. Kuhn, S.T., 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Pessa, E., 1998 (June 24-26), Emergence, Self-Organisation, and Quantum Theory, Proceedings of the First Italian Conference on Systemics, pp60-79. Yolles, M.I., 1997 (Aug.). From Viable Systems to Viable Inqury Systems. Systemist, 19(3)154,173. Yolles, M.I., 1998, A Cybernetic Exploration of Methodological Pluralism. Kybernetes, 27(4 and 5), 527,542. Yolles, M.I., 1998a, Exploring the Practice of Mixing Methods. OR40 Conference, Lancaster University. Yolles, M.I., 1999, Management Systems: a Viable Systems Approach. Financial Times Management, London.

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