Use Of Surenames By Women.docx

USE OF SURENAMES BY WOMEN REMO V. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS G.R. No. 1629202 March 5, 2010 Facts: While her marriage with Francisco R. Rallonza was still subsisting, Maria Virginia V. Remo applied to renew her passport which was about to expire on October 27, 2000. With her renewal application is the request to revert to her maiden name. When her request was eventually denied, she brought her request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs also denied her request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Secretary explained that under the implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce, and death of the husband. The Office of the President also affirmed the Secretary’s ruling when Remo’s case was brought to it. The CA likewise also affirmed the ruling. Consequently, Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. She argued that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court. Issue: Whether or not Remo can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement Passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage. Ruling: Remo cannot revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.Indeed, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides, and as settled in the case of Yasin vs.Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court, a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husband’s surname upon marriage. This means that she is free to either use her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. This is so because when a woman marries, she only changes her civil status and not her name. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle. It does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) actually allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband’s surname. In the case of renewal of passport, if a woman chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will never prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 which are; 1) death of husband, 2) divorce, 3) annulment, or 4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she cannot resume her maiden name in the renewed passport. YASIN V. JUDGE SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995 Facts: Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name” on May 5, 1990. The respondent court ordered amendments to the petition because it was lacking in form and substance in accordance with Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the

petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden name and surname. Issue: Whether or not a woman is required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of court when she desires to resume her maiden name in the case of annulment, divorce under the Code of Muslim Laws, and her husband is married again to another woman Ruling: NO. When a woman marries, she does not need to apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right under Article 370 of the Civil Code. Similarly, when the marriage ties no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation. The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws. USE OF SURENAMES BY CHILDREN IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005 Facts: On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname. On March 23, 2001, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption. On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father. Ruling:

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons: First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained. Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows. Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy. Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law. Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. IN RE: JULIAN LIN WANG G.R. o. 159966 March 30, 2005 Facts: Julian Lin Carusalan Wang was born to parents Anna Lisa and Sing-Foe Wang, who were not yet married then. Eventually, when his parents got married his name was changed to Julian Lin Carusalan Wang. He had a sister but born of a different mother. His parents decided to stay in Singapore and would enrol him there. However, they were apprehensive about the use of Julia’s name especially his middle name, which might become a laughing stock because in Singapore they don’t use the letter “R” and instead use “L”. This might also be a cause of questioning as to the difference of the middle names of the siblings. These are just among the reasons raised for the request to change the name of Julian. Issue: Whether or not the change in the name be allowed for the reasons stated above. Ruling: The reason advanced by the petitioner for the request to drop his middle name is merely for convenience, it, being only sought to avoid discrimination when he studies in Singapore. This is not among the grounds recognized by law. Considering that he is still a minor, it shall be his own discretion to initiate such request when he reaches his majority age. Also, it is

maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling.

IN RE CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIAL ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980

The petition insofar as the first name is granted but denied with respect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.

This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.

USE OF DIFFERENT NAME

Facts:

The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning was published in the Times Journal in its issues of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a copy thereof together with a copy of the petition was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General. At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of the Solicitor General, upon motion of counsel for the petitioner, without objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk of Court was appointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit the same for resolution of the Court. From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears that petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibit A). She was registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June 15, 1952; she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila. Her parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken care of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street Corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, and Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. When petitioner started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. After graduating from high school, she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor.

PEOPLE V. ESTRADA G.R. No. 164368 April 2, 2009 Facts: On April 1, 2001, information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. Separate information of illegal use of alias, was likewise filed against him. In the information, that on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued. A special division in the Sandiganbayan was made to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related against respondent Estrada. At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidences to prove the allegations of the information for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury.

Issue:

After the people rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in these cases. In its joint resolution, the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file demurrers in illegal use of alias and perjury. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the people failed to present evidence that proved Estrada’s commission of the offense.

Whether or not she may be allowed for the change of name and her surname.

Issue:

Ruling:

Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142.

Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition. The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The fact that petitioner has been using a different surname and has become known with such surname does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her surname to Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted this fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code provides: Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because her uncle who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for change of name.

Ruling: No. The Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel – that mere communication to a third person is publicity – does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must manifest. The presence of Lacquia and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. Thus, Estradacould not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada’s representations to these people were made in privacy and secrecy with no intention of publicity. Bank deposits under R.A. 1405 (The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutory protected or recognized zones of privacy. Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing documents as “Jose Velarde” related to the opening of the trust account, the People of cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. Petition was denied. URSUA V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996 FACTS: Mr. Cesario Ursua petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violating Sec.1 C.A. 142 as amended by R.A. 6085 otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases.” Ursua was asked by Atty. Palmones to take his letter-request to the office of the Ombudsman because his Law frim messenger Oscar Perez has to attend to some personal matters. Ursua was advised by Oscar Perez that if acknowledgement receipt is required he can use his name to sign the said receipt. Upon entry to the Office of the Ombudsman at Davao City, he wrote Oscar Perez at the visitor’s logbook, then went to the Administrative Division where he gave the letter-request of Atty. Palmones to Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida who gave him the copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledges by writing the name Oscar Perez. Before leaving the premises, Ursua was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked for the same office. When Ursua left, Ms. Loida found out the the person who introduce himself as Oscar Perez was not himself but was Cesario Ursua. She then reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman. The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec.1 C.A.142 as amened by R.A. 6085.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. He now files a petition to review his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. That he did not violated the Sec.1 CA 142 as amended as R.A. 6085. That he has never use nay alias name; neither Oscar Perez is his alias. According to him an “Alias” is a term that uses another name habitually by which the person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as “Oscar Perez” and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law. Issue: Whether Cesario Urusa should not be really charge of the Sec.1 CA 142 as amended by R.A. 6085 otherwise known as “ An Act of Regulating the Use of Aliases” Ruling: Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. There is no question then that “Oscar Perez” is not an alias name

of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name “Oscar Perez” was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right The act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law; such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. CHANGE OF NAME BASILIO GAN V. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 207147 September 14, 2016 Facts: Emelita Basilio Gan herein petitioner was born on December 21, 1956 out of wedlock to Pia Gan, her father who is a Chinese national, and Consolacion Basilio, her mother who is a Filipino citizen.[3] The petitioner's birth certificate, which was registered in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, indicates that her full name is Emelita Basilio. On June 29, 2010, the petitioner filed a Petition for correction of name with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur. The petitioner sought to change the full name indicated in her birth certificate from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan." She claimed that she had been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in her school records from elementary until college, employment records, marriage contract, and other government records. The RTC issued an order which noted that the petition filed sought not merely a correction of entry in the birth certificate, but a change of name. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the petitioner to make the necessary amendment to her petition to conform to the requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.The petitioner filed with the RTC an Amended Petition dated August 3, 2010 for change of name. The amended petition contained substantially the same allegations as in the petition for correction of entry in the birth certificate. On August 10, 2010, the RTC set the initial hearing of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel of the Republic of the Philippines (respondent), filed its notice of appearance. The OSG authorized the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Libmanan, Camarines Sur to appear and assist the OSG in the proceedings before the RTC. The RTC then granted the petition to change the petitioner's name in her birth certificate from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan. Issue: Can the petition of change of name of Emilita be granted? Ruling: The petition is denied. A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right, a proper and reasonabale cause must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name. In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. After a judicious review of the records of this case, the Court agrees with the CA that the reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for change of name, i.e. that she has been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in all of her records, is not a sufficient or proper justification to allow her petition. When the petitioner was born in 1956, prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code then regarding the petitioner's use of surname provide: Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother. In her amended petition for change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she was born out of wedlock, she did not state whether her parents, at the time of her birth, were not

disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, which would make her a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code. If, at the time of the petitioner's birth, either of her parents had an impediment to marry the other, she may only bear the surname of her mother pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, she may use the surname of her father provided that she was acknowledged by her father. CIVIL REGISTER YASUO IWASAWA vs. GANGAN G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013 FACTS: Iwasawa is a Japanese national and he met Felisa in 2002 in one of his visits to the Philippines. Felisa introduced herself as "single" and has never married before. Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and married Felisa on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009, Iwasa noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it and to his shock, Felisa confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband passed away. Iwasawa sought to confirm the truth and discovered that she indeed was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Issue: Is the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight? Ruling: The documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public documents. Under Article 410 of the Civil Code, “the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their du e executionand genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary. The Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concrete ly establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. REPUBLIC V. JULIAN COSETENG-MAGPAYO G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2012

FACTS: Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng- Magpayo is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.” Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG." On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court. The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte. By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondent’s petition. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law. Issue: 1.

Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be made through appropriate adversarial proceedings.

2.

Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of the name of respondent’s father from his birth certificate.

Held: The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however. The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication. As earlier stated, however, the petition

of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto. Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case."A petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby." Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out. LEE V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 118387 October 11, 2001 Facts: The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in 1931.Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private respondents herein were all born and raised in the Philippines. Sometime in October 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young girl named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far from becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek Shengs mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners. Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners mother was Keh Shiok Cheng. Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners. They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in. All was well, therefore, before private respondent’s discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng. The tides turned after Keh Shiok Chengs demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his children, including those of petitioners, be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Chengs death that was to be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private respondent’s curiosity, if not suspicion. Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation into the matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners. Issue: Whether or not Rule 108 is applicable in the case at bar. Ruling:

If the purpose of the petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted. Thus, Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. It must be conceded, however, the scope of application of Article 412 was delimited to clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register. IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005 Facts: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents got married, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name would be changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang planned to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Due to this, the parents filed a petition to have Julian’s name changed to avoid discrimination. The parents alleged that Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin which may result to discrimination. The siblings might also question their relationship because of having different names. Hence, the parents requested to have Julian’s middle name removed. The trial court denied the petition. It is because the reason given for the change of name did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The court held that names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. Issue: Whether or not the law allows an individual to drop the middle name from his registered name based on the reason of the parents. Ruling: No. The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. The Court emphasized the practical or legal significance of middle names. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. The petitioners wished to drop the middle name of Julian for purposes of convenience. However, the Court

ruled that such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name. In addition, the petitioner is only a minor. The Court found that it would be best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007 Facts: Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender and first name in his birth certificate to facilitate his marriage with his fiancé. A year before, Silverio has underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. In his petition, he wants to change his first name from “Rommel” to “Mely.”

No. The court held that there is a substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished copy of the petition to the local civil registrar. As to the sex appearing in his respondent’s birth certificate, it is guided by R.A. No. 9048 since it amended the Art 412 of the Civil Code which states that no entry in a civil registrar shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Under R.A. No. 9048, Rule 108 applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register like in the case at bar. Moreover, the entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctible under Rule 108 are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code. The condition of the respondent which CAH is guided by Art. 407. The court ruled that in the absence of law on the matter, the court will not dictate on respondent’s gender especially due to respondent’s condition of CAH or being an intersex. The court allowed the respondent to choose his own gender upon reaching the age of majority. BRAZA V. CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009

Issue:

Facts:

Should the court allow the change of name?

Ma. Cristina Torres (Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo) were married on January 1978. The union bore Paolo Josef, Janelle Ann, and Gian Carlo. Pablo died on April 2002 in a vehicular accident.

Ruling: No. The SC said that considering that there is no law recognizing sex re-assignment, the determination of a person’s sex at the time of birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. It held that “while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. There is no special law in the country governing sex reassignment and its effect. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.” The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner “will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences,” i.e., substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations and substantially affect the public policy in relation to women in laws such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN G.R. No. 166676 `September 12, 2008 Facts: Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of live birth. However, as she was growing up she developed secondary male characteristics. She was diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). This is a condition where a person possesses both male and female characteristic. She also alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years. At age six she underwent an ultrasound she was discovered to have small ovaries, and at the age of thirteen her ovarian structures minimized, she had no breast or menstrual cycle. She averred also that she has become a male person in interests and in appearance. Thus he prayed before the RTC that her gender be changed from female ot male, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff. The RTC granted her prayer. However, the OSG filed a petition seeking a reversal of the ruling. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules and 108 of the Rules of Court. Held:

During the wake Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Cristina made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar showing that Patrick was “Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997" and was “Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998.” Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 1998. This resulted to the filing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register on December 2005. Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous. On Patrick's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, RTC dismissed the petition without prejudice. RTC held that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, it has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test; hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied which led to the filing of a petition for review. Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation under a special proceeding. Held: No, in a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the RTC has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. The petition’s cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille's marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick's legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and Art. 171 of the Family Code,

respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. Validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo. REPUBLIC V. LUGSANAY UY G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013 Facts: Respondent Dr. Norma Lugsanay Uy filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth and impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City as respondent. She alleged that she is an illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay born on February 8, 1952; that in her Certificate of Live Birth, her full name is “Anita Sy” but to her family and friends, as well as that indicated in her school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate,and passport, her name is “Norma S. Lugsanay” following the surname of her mother since her parents were never married; that her citizenship is Filipino, not Chinese; and that all her siblings are Filipinos bearing the surname Lugsanay. Such petition was filed before the Regional Trial Court because her alleged earlier petition for correction on her name and citizenship filed with the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City which was supposedly granted but the National Statistics Office did not bear such changes. Following the trial court directive, respondent caused the publication of an Order setting the case for hearing issued by the RTC in a newspaper of general circulation in the Gingoog City and Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks and furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office the order and petition for their information and guidance. The RTC then granted the petition to avoid confusion because of respondent’s continuous used and being known as “Norma Sy Lugsanay,” and as a Filipino citizen; directed the city civil registrar to effect the correction or change of respondent’s name and citizenship in her birth certificate; concluded that respondent’s petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third party; and held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC Order and held that respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured by the the publication and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office. As to whether the petition is a collateral attack on respondent’s filiation, it ruled in favor of respondent since her parents were not legally married and her siblings’ birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is Filipino. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court governs the Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, to wit: SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. The Court held that the changes sought by respondent were not merely clerical but were in fact substantial for it will change her filiation from legitimate to illegitimate, and her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, both affecting her rights and obligations in the Philippines. In Republic v. Valencia, the Court settled that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make. The Court held in Labayo-Rowe v. Republic that publication in a newspaper of general circulation of the notice of hearing and serving such notice thereof upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. While there may be cases like Republic v. Kho, and Barco v. CA, where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing because earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties; where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out.

However, the Court also ruled in Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated; and, in Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, if the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. CHUA vs. REPUBLIC GR no 231998, November 20, 2017 FACTS: On October 5, 1966, Chua Wee and Pacita Topenio filed a petition with the Manila Court of First Instance for the correction of the birth records in the office of the local civil registrar of their four children by changing their nationality from Chinese to Filipino, and their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate. They alleged in their petition that Chua Wee is a Chinese citizen, while Pacita Topenio is a Filipino citizen, both of legal age, single and residing at 1400 F. Doroteo St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; that they have been living as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; that out of their common-law marital relations, four children were born in Manila, namely: (1) Roberto — born on June 6, 1949; (2) Carlos — born on December 23, 1950; (3) Lucita — born on August 19, 1952; and (4) Mely — born on January 8, 1954; that the entries in the records of the Manila civil registrar to the effect that the aforesaid children are Chinese citizen and, except the fourth child Mely, are their legitimate children, are wrong; because the petitioners are not legally married and that the aforesaid four children being all illegitimate should follow the citizenship of their mother Pacita Topenio, who is a Filipino citizen. To the petition were attached the four birth certificates of the aforesaid children. There is no dispute that the birth certificates of the first three children show that their citizenship is Chinese, that they are the legitimate children of petitioners-appellants Chua Wee and Pacita Topenio and that the said parents are married, while the birth certificate of the fourth child states that her nationality is Chinese and contains the entry "NO" under the heading "Legitimate." Three birth certificates were all signed by Dr. E. Gochangco-Herrera, while the fourth one was signed by Dr. Virginia M. Mejica (Annexes A, B, C, & D). Issue: WON on the summary proceeding under Art. 412 of the New Civil Code, but on the proceeding in rem delineated in Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court which requires the publication of the petition once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Ruling: The maternal grandparents of the four minor children of the petitioners herein as well as the minor children themselves are indispensable parties, because their rights will be adversely affected thereby. The right of the children to inherit from their parents would be substantially impaired if their status would be changed from legitimate to illegitimate, aside from the fact that they would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment consequent upon the stigma of illegitimate filiation or paternity that they will bear thereafter. The legitime of the illegitimate child with the status of an acknowledged natural child is only one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child (Art. 887, 888,895, N.C.C.); and the legitime of all other illegitimate children is only 4/5 of the legitime of the acknowledged natural child (Art. 895, N.C.C.). On the other hand, the maternal grandparents' right to inherit in intestacy from the children's mother will also be prejudiced (Art. 893, N.C.C.) in addition to the fact that they will also be stigmatized as the parents of a daughter who is not legally married to a Chinaman and as grandparents

of illegitimate grandchildren. Even petitioner Pacita Topenio, if not legally married, ceases to be a compulsory heir and loses the legitime pertaining to a legitimate spouse (Art. 888, 897, N.C.C).