Update On Iran Continued Defiance, No Sanctions, And More Talk Of Possible Military Action

October 22, 2007

No. 32

Update on Iran: Continued Defiance, No Sanctions, and More Talk of Possible Military Action Emily B. Landau Iran began a process of negotiations with the IAEA this summer with the aim of clearing up the lingering outstanding questions regarding its past nuclear activities. As always with Iran, this involves a complicated process, including pretalks and then endless room for further conditions and clarifications down the road. Once again Iran dangles the bait of "cooperation" as a means of gaining valuable time for pressing its program forward. Russia and China, joined this time also by Germany, are unwilling to punish Iran with a third round of sanctions until it is clear how this process is evolving. Even if talks with the IAEA were truly a critical stage in bringing Iran back from the nuclear brink – and analysts point out just why this is not the case1 – the situation would still be problematic. The reason is that even if Iran ultimately provides some answers to these old questions, it remains as defiant as ever with regard to the July 2006 demand of the UN Security Council to cease its uranium enrichment activities. On this key point there is no movement whatsoever, and Iran continues working on its program as if three UN Security Resolutions had not been taken. In fact, Iran now claims that the issue of uranium enrichment is closed. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was quoted in early October as saying that "the Iranian people are not ready to sit around a table and discuss their absolute nuclear rights. They [the world powers] have to know this." The resignation of nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and the appointment of Saeed Jalili in his stead further underscores Ahmadinejad's hard line. At the same time, there are also continued indications of internal disagreement with Ahmadinejad's approach, and his rival Hashemi Rafsanjani was recently elected speaker of the Assembly of Experts. It's not clear how advanced Iran is at this point with regard to its uranium enrichment activities: Ahmadinejad claims that Iran has already reached the 3000 centrifuges point, but this has not been verified. Some speculate that Iran may be facing some technical difficulties that are retarding progress; according to an IAEA memo received in Paris in early October, assessments are that Iran could have just under 3000 centrifuges operating by the end of the month. In late 1

See Ephraim Asculai, "The IAEA-Iran Partnership", INSS Insight, no. 29, 6 September 2007; and statements made by David Albright, as quoted in Reuters, 28 August 2007.

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September, the National Council of the Resistance of Iran (NCRI) reported on a parallel military nuclear program, but the status of this claim is not clear. As for international efforts to stop Iran, the major players have become even more divided over what steps to take. In late September, the US, Britain and France conceded to Russia, China and Germany and agreed to postpone until November a UN Security Council vote on a third round of sanctions. But the lines in Europe are shifting, with differences among states coming into sharper focus. France has taken the harshest stance since Nicholas Sarkozy was elected President, and statements by his Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, about the possible need to resort to force contribute to this new emphasis. France and Britain are pressing for a fresh round of sanctions, but Germany has softened its approach. It opposed the French idea for EU sanctions to be taken outside the framework of the UN, although it has gone along with the US-led financial sanctions. Germany also sharpened the divisions in the Security Council (although not a member of the Council, it is still a key player in this regard) by joining Russia and China in their opposition to UN sanctions. Foreign Minister FrankWalter Steinmeier even accused the US and France of hypocrisy because French and American companies conduct a good deal of business with Iran. In the case of the US, the claim is that American companies bypass the boycott by using front companies in Dubai, which explains, for example, how Coca Cola finds its way to store shelves in Tehran. Russia's position against sanctions has toughened, with Vladimir Putin recently claiming that there is no clear evidence that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons; but Russia is still also pressing Iran to comply with international demands. Putin's more vocal positions, together with his recent visit to Iran, have fueled speculation that Russia could be seeking a more independent diplomatic track vis-à-vis Iran. At the same time, the drums of war have been beating more loudly over the summer, and some have interpreted the Israeli air attack in Syria in early September as a message to Iran. However, there are recent reports of a shift in the thinking of the US administration with regard to the idea of attacking Iran, with greater emphasis given to the possibility of limited, surgical strikes on Revolutionary Guard facilities in response to the role they are playing in attacks on US soldiers in Iraq, rather than direct attacks on nuclear facilities per se. Recent reports also indicate that British Prime Minister Gordon Brown would support such measures if they came in response to large-scale Iranian attacks (through proxies) on British and US forces in Iraq. The international community is still unable to decide on a unified path in confronting Iran. In fact, Iran’s progress toward its goal, rather than having a unifying effect on the various states confronting it, is only sharpening the divisions among them. As always, there are no good options for dealing with Iran. Perhaps it is precisely this reality that is driving states to despair of the prospect of successfully halting Iran and pushing to the fore their other interests, as seems to be the case with Germany and its reluctance to pay a further price in the form of loss of trade with Iran.

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In the Middle East, which will suffer the most from the consequences of a nuclear Iran, the common interest in stopping Iran could potentially form the basis for cooperation, security understandings, and new rules of engagement among Iran’s regional adversaries. However, many of them appear instead to be opting for their own nuclear programs and may also start looking for ways to appease Iran rather than to confront it firmly through cooperative regional efforts.

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