Toyota Case Study Assign2019.docx

TOYOTA AUSTRALIA IN PERIL On Wednesday, December 11, 2013, General Motors Holden (Holden) announced its plan to exit car manufacturing in Australia by the end of 2017. Immediately after the exit announcement by Holden, Toyota expressed its fear that it was in peril: This will place unprecedented pressure on the local supplier network and our ability to build cars in Australia. We will now work with our suppliers, key stakeholders and the government to determine our next steps and whether we can continue operating as the sole vehicle manufacturer in Australia. We will continue with our transformation journey as planned. Other stakeholders in the automotive industry also expressed similar fears. Apprehensive of Toyota’s ability to continue manufacturing, the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU) national vehicles division secretary, Dave Smith, said, “It’s now highly likely that Toyota will leave Australia. In fact it’s almost certain.” Why did Toyota fear that Holden’s exit would put unprecedented pressure on the local suppliers? How was Holden’s exit related to Toyota’s ability to build cars? Why were observers contemplating an exit by Toyota, the best-selling and most trusted brand in Australia, especially when it had been planning to continue its transformation journey? What had gone wrong with the company that had such a glorious long history of production? Should Toyota stop manufacturing in Australia? TOYOTA AUSTRALIA: A GLORIOUS LONG HISTORY OF PRODUCTION5 Toyota Australia (Toyota; see Exhibit 1), a subsidiary of Toyota Motor Corporation Japan, was founded in 1958 in Port Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. It started assembling vehicles in Australia in 1963 in the Melbourne factory of Australian Motor Industries. The first Toyota model assembled in Australia was the Tiara. Between 1964 and 1968, Toyota began assembling three more models —the Corona, the Crown and the Corolla. At its new Altona plant in Melbourne, it started producing engines in 1978, and car body panels in 1981. In 1986, for the first time, Toyota started exporting. In 1987, Toyota began the local manufacture of the Camry, which replaced the Corona, at the Melbourne plant. In 1988, Toyota’s local operations were unified to form Toyota Motor Corporation Australia. In 1994/95, Toyota stopped manufacturing in its Port Melbourne plant and shifted all its operation to its Altona plant in Melbourne. The Corolla was the first model to be built there. As a strategic shift, in 1996, Toyota expanded its reach to foreign markets by exporting the Camry to the Middle East, where it became the area’s number-one selling car. From the Altona plant, Toyota also started producing the Avalon model in 2000. Its journey with innovative products continued in the subsequent period. In 2010, it released the Camry hybrid, the first hybrid car manufactured in Australia. It launched the New Generation Camry Model in 2011. Toyota emerged as the market leader in Australia for the first time in 1991. It registered record sales of more than 186,000 cars in 2003 and remained the overall market leader for the subsequent 11 years (see Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3). The company also registered a huge success in the export market, and emerged as the leader in this segment. It exported almost two-thirds of its production (see Exhibit 4) from the Altona plant to 13 countries worldwide. In 2011, Toyota Australia, the country’s biggest automotive exporter, exported nearly 60,000 units worth $1.004 billion6 (including parts and accessories). As per a poll conducted by Readers’ Digest Australia in 2013, Toyota was the most trusted automotive brand in Australia.8 A balanced business model and innovative quality products were the keys to Toyota’s past success and had helped to build its brand.

BUSINESS MODEL

Toyota Australia followed a balanced business model (see Exhibit 5), which included a three-pronged strategy of manufacturing vehicles domestically, exporting some of its domestically manufactured vehicles and importing some components from cheaper sources. In the domestic manufacturing process, Toyota followed the “just in time” approach to production, which allowed the entire production process to be regulated by the natural laws of supply and demand. Customer demand stimulated production of a vehicle, which, in turn, stimulated production and delivery of the necessary parts. The just in time approach resulted in the right parts and materials manufactured and provided in the exact amount and place where they were needed. Along with the just in time approach, Toyota also followed “Kaizen,” the practice represented by employees making day-to-day improvements in their working practices and equipment. “Jidoka,” automation with a human touch, was another process adopted by Toyota. Such approaches to the domestic manufacturing process strengthened Toyota’s brand image by contributing to Australian society in terms of value-addition and employment, and good quality products, and supported its position as the market leader. However, Australia’s domestic market for cars was very thin. To overcome the constraint imposed by domestic demand, Toyota pursued an export-oriented strategy. As a part of this strategy, it started exporting domestically manufactured vehicles to neighbouring New Zealand in 1986. In 1996, it further expanded its export reach by starting to export to Middle East countries, and in the subsequent period, began exporting to the South Pacific Islands, Malaysia and Thailand. Toyota’s export-oriented strategy provided a larger demand base, which helped Toyota, to some extent, to overcome the constraints imposed by the lower domestic demand. Exports constituted almost 70 per cent of Toyota’s total production (see Exhibit 4).Similar to other car manufacturers, Toyota Australia operated with a small scale of operation. This lack of scale at the car manufacturing stage affected even local auto component manufacturers, by keeping their costs higher. Importing cheaper inputs helped Toyota to manage the costs of components. This business model had made Toyota the most successful car brand in Australia.

ADVERSE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Toyota, along with other players in the automotive sector, operated in a growingly adverse environment.

Competitive Fragmented Market Structure

In 2013, apart from Toyota, Australia had two car manufacturers: Ford Motor Company of Australia (Ford) and General Motors Holden (Holden). Like Toyota, these manufacturers were foreign-owned subsidiaries of global companies that had affiliates in many countries. But, for Toyota, competition was not limited to these domestic manufacturers. Australia’s low-tariff barriers and highly open trading environment since mid-1980s provided consumers with easy access to imported cars. Approximately 65 brands and 365 models — comprising passenger vehicles, sport utility vehicles and light commercial vehicles — competed for Australia’s total market of approximately 1.1 million new car sales per year, making the Australian automotive market both highly competitive and the most fragmented in the world. Structural Changes and Declining Demand

Australia, with a population of 23.1 million, representing 0.33 per cent of total world population in 2013, represented a small market for cars. In the same year, Australia’s new vehicles’ sales accounted for

just 1.3 per cent of the total global market. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, demand for automobiles in developed countries remained subdued due to slow recovery and shifted to emerging markets such as China, India and Brazil. Not only were there structural changes in the geographical distribution of demand but also changes in the composition of demand, in favour of small fuel-efficient cars, which was counter to the types of cars manufactured by Toyota.

Small Scale of Operations, Underutilization of Capacity and Higher Cost of Manufacturing

Australia was also a very small player in the global automotive production sphere. It produced just more than 200,000 units of passenger and commercial vehicles, which accounted for approximately 0.25 per cent of global production. Together, the three Australian auto manufacturers produced well below the global optimal scale of operation, which was estimated to be 200,000 to 300,000 units of vehicle per year. Toyota, the largest Australian manufacturer, with an annual installed capacity of 150,000 units produced just more than 100,000 vehicles in 2012. In the same year, Holden produced just more than 80,000 vehicle units and Ford, fewer than 40,000 units. The small scale of production kept the average cost of production of vehicles in Australia at a higher level and led to an adverse impact on the scale at which the component manufacturers operated in Australia and the cost at which they could supply the components.In addition to the lack of scale economies, the higher labour costs and other costs, such as the carbon tax and the luxury car tax, contributed to the high cost of manufacturing cars in Australia. Government Policies and Declining Protection

The Australian government had been following liberal trade policies since the mid-1980s. As a part of the opening-up strategy, quantitative restrictions were phased out and were completely eliminated by 1988. At the same time, tariffs were brought down to 5 per cent by 2010. Though, to help the automotive industry to adjust to the declining tariff levels, the government provided direct assistance to the manufacturers, it was linked to investment and to research and development expenditure. Gradually, more and more government assistance was redirected from the assembly of cars, the least competitive activity, to exports, the most competitive activity. Free Trade Agreements and Unbalanced Trading Environment

To improve the trade and capital flows, Australia had signed various free trade agreements (FTAs), such as the Thailand–Australia FTA, the Association of South East Asian Nations-Australia-New Zealand FTA and the Australia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) FTA. Although the FTAs were expected to result in a win-win situation for all the countries involved, the FTAs signed by Australia with countries such as Thailand, Japan and South Korea, had turned out to be bad news for the Australian car industry. The partner countries had either retained high tariff rates on imported cars or used subtle methods to keep the imported cars out of their domestic markets. For example, although Thailand did not impose import tariffs on Australian cars, it did impose an engine-size duty that was as high as 80 per cent, which discouraged the importation of the Australian cars. Japan not only imposed a 10 per cent tariff and a 5 per cent consumer tax on imported cars but also imposed several technical specifications, which made it almost impossible to gain regulatory approval for foreign-made cars. Similarly, in South Korea, Australian cars faced a 10 per cent tariff and a clumsy registration process, which deterred exporting. Adverse Currency Developments

Since 2001, the dramatic strengthening of the Australian dollar against the U.S. dollar (see Exhibit 6) had significantly reduced the profitability of Toyota Australia’s exports, which were primarily to the GCC countries and were committed in U.S. dollars.

In a highly open globalized economy, these various high-cost and low-demand factors, various government policies and other external developments affected the viability of Toyota Australia (e.g., the company reported losses of $32.6 billion in 2011/12) and compelled it to revisit its manufacturing and marketing strategies. TOYOTA’S EFFORTS TO COUNTER ADVERSE EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

Toyota Australia practised the philosophy of steady improvement in productivity and continuous reduction in cost, as envisioned in the Toyota Production System.25 However, the realization of the gravity of the problem, in the event of sharp adverse developments in the external environment in the late 2011, necessitated bold steps and urgent actions, to substantially improve productivity and reduce costs, in an effort to retain Toyota’s competitiveness in the domestic and international markets. Accordingly, to counteract the impact of adverse external developments, for the period 2012 to 2018, Toyota implemented a company-wide transformation project, referred to as the Toyota Australia Future Business Transformation.26 The project aimed to improve efficiency, to reduce the cost of manufacturing cars by $3,800 per car, to improve organizational and manufacturing efficiencies and to maximize sales of the domestically built Camry and Aurion models. The project adopted both internal and external costreduction strategies. It addressed its internal costs in early 2012, by reducing its workforce by 350 employees in the Altona plant, which had become redundant in the downturn in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, the Japanese earthquake and subsequent tsunami, and the floods in Thailand. External costs were addressed by reviewing the sourcing of imported components and vehicles, and the local supplier capability development and diversification. The project introduced a radical transformation to the business practices of Toyota Australia. As stated by the company’s chief executive officer (CEO), Max Yasuda, “Our business is being radically changed to counter both internal and external pressures impacting us. We are doing everything we can to strengthen Toyota Australia and ensure our long term future in this country as an importer and manufacturer.” In the subsequent period, the company also tried to further reduce its labour costs by proposing a reduction in overtime payments on work done on Sundays from 2.5 times of the base hourly wage to just 2 times; eliminating allowances such as the $0.71 per hour respiratory allowance paid to paint shop workers and the “dirt money” allowance for performing work considered to be dirty or offensive; eliminating the eight-hour day for maintenance workers and including Saturday shifts as part of the normal hours of work. The company CEO Yasuda tried to justify the proposed measures by indicating that the company would be able to gain approval for further investment at the Altona plant, necessary to maintain production of the Camry model, only if production costs were slashed by $3,800 per vehicle by 2018. But, under the strong protest from the AMWU, which blocked the vote from proceeding by taking the issue to the Australia’s Federal Court, it failed to garner the required support from its workers.

EXHIBIT 1: TOYOTA AUSTRALIA’S KEY CONTRIBUTIONS Aspect Total Employment Manufacturing Employment Vehicles Produced (2012) Vehicles Exported (2012) Vehicle Production Planned (2013) Government Support vis-a-vis Toyota Spending

Contribution 4,200 direct employees 2,500 manufacturing employees 101,424 (46% of Australian vehicle production) 74,335 (73% of production) 108,000 units: This includes four cylinder petrol and hybrid engines produced for local built cars as well as engine exports to Malaysia and Thailand commencing January 2013 Toyota spends at least $20 in connection with manufacturing in Australia for every $1 of government support. The spending is mainly for purchasing local parts from suppliers across Victoria, South Australia, New South Wales and Queensland. During 2013 Toyota spent $1.5 billion in connection with building cars in Australia.

Source: Compiled from Toyota Australia, Initial Submission to Productivity Commission Review of the Automotive Manufacturing Industry, www.pc.gov.au/ data/assets/pdf_file/0011/130124/sub031-automotive.pdf, accessed September 20, 2014.

EXHIBIT 2: TOP-SELLING CAR BRANDS IN AUSTRALIA, 2012–2013 Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Brand Toyota Holden Mazda Hyundai Ford Nissan Mitsubishi Volkswagen Subaru Honda

2013 214,630 112,059 103,144 97,006 87,236 76,733 71,528 54,892 40,200 39,258

2012 218,176 114,665 103,886 91,536 90,408 79,747 58,868 54,835 40,189 35,812

Source: VFACTS, Vehicle Sales, Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries, www.fcai.com.au/sales/2013-new-vehiclemarket, accessed April 1, 2015.

EXHIBIT 3: AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS’ AUSTRALIANMARKET SHARE BY BRAND (IN PER CENT), 1998–2012 Brand Toyota Holden Mazda Hyundai Ford Nissan Mitsubishi Other Total

1998 19.6 19 3.4 7.1 15.9 5.7 10.4 18.9 100

1999 19.5 19.7 3.4 6 16.1 6.2 8.9 20.2 100

2000 20.2 19.7 3.5 5.8 14.5 5.8 9.3 21.2 100

2001 18.3 21.4 4.4 5.2 13.8 5.6 8.8 22.5 100

2002 19.2 21.6 4.7 4.1 13.2 6.1 8.2 22.9 100

2003 20.5 19.3 5.8 3.4 13.9 6.4 8 22.7 100

2004 21.1 18.6 5.8 4.5 14.2 6.7 6 23.1 100

2005 20.5 17.7 6.7 4.9 13.1 5.7 5.8 25.6 100

2006 22.2 15.2 6.6 4.8 11.9 5.5 5.6 28.2 100

2007 22.5 14 7.4 4.8 10.3 5.7 6.2 29.1 100

2008 23.6 12.9 7.9 4.5 10.3 5.9 6 28.9 100

2009 21.4 12.8 8.3 6.7 10.3 5.6 6.1 28.8 100

2010 20.7 12.8 8.2 7.7 9.2 6.1 6 29.3 100

2011 18 12.5 8.8 8.6 9 6.7 6.1 30.3 100

2012 19.6 10.3 9.3 8.2 8.1 7.2 5.3 32 100

Source: VFACTS, Retail Sales, Key Automotive Statistics 2012, Australian Government, Department of Industry, www.industry.gov.au/industry/automotive/Statistics/Documents/KeyAutomotiveStatistics2012.pdf, accessed September 20, 2014.

Toyota

Market

EXHIBIT 4: AUSTRALIAN AUTOMOBILE MARKET AND TOYOTA’S STATISTICS, 2006–2012 Total Market Locally Made Share of Total Market Toyota Sales (incl. Lexus) Locally Made Domestic Sales Exports Production

2006 962,521 21%

2007 1,049,982 19%

2008 1,012,164 17%

2009 937,328 16%

2010 1,035,574 14%

2011 1,008,437 14%

2012 1,112,032 13%

213,839

236,647

245,653

206,827

214,718

181,624

218,176

33,000

48,372

42,629

34,756

36,778

28,084

36,304

80,000 111,610

97,688 148,931

101,668 141,467

63,345 96,817

82,670 119,455

59,949 93,618

74,335 101,424

Source: Toyota Australia, Initial Submission to Productivity Commission Review of the Automotive Manufacturing Industry, www.pc.gov.au/ data/assets/pdf_file/0011/130124/sub031-automotive.pdf, accessed September 20, 2014.

EXHIBIT 5: TOYOTA BUSINESS MODEL Inputs Domestic Supplies (Inputs)

Manufacturing

Domestic Production

Market Domestic Market (Consumption) Export Market (Consumption)

Imported Inputs

Source: Author’s own construct based on Toyota Australia, Initial Submission to Productivity Commission Review of the Automotive Manufacturing Industry, www.pc.gov.au/ data/assets/pdf_file/0011/130124/sub031-automotive.pdf, accessed September 20, 2014.

EXHIBIT 6: EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENT DURING TOYOTA AUSTRALIA’S EXPORT PROGRAM

1.2000 1.0000

USD/AUD

0.8000 0.6000

USD/AUD

0.4000

0.2000 0.0000 Year Source: compiled from Reserve Bank of Australia, “Exchange Rates,” www.rba.gov.au/statistics/historical-data.html, accessed December 2, 2014.

Historical

Data,

Statistics,

2014,

Read the above given case study and answer the following questions 1. What factors are affecting the profitability of Toyota Australia? Which of these factors can the company control to improve profitability? What strategy would you suggest to improve the profitability? (10 Marks) ANSWER: Toyota’s first commercial venture in Australia was via import of Land Cruisers for the use in a significant engineering project. Based on his experience with the cars, Toyota began importing Land Cruisers into Australia as the first licensed distributor. As described by one of their former long-term employee and board member, Toyota was a baby company, it was the sibling of a mining company which happened to stumble onto a good franchise and had enormous potentials. It began importing Toyota Land Cruisers from 1958 and commenced selling them in 1959. From this point, Toyota became a major distributor of Toyota’s, and as a distributor notably became a direct competitor of AMI Toyota, who were to distribute Toyotas as well. Toyota made its first step toward the Australian automotive manufacturing arena in 1963, under the guise of licensed assembly, however their long-term plan was always to manufacture. It was with AMI that they had their first contact. The history of Toyota manufacturing in Australia is significant as it is unique, and different to that of the other international Toyota sites. Historically, whilst the Australian manufacturing company included the Toyota name (AMI Toyota), Toyota only owned a minority stake until 1988, when operations were unified and Toyota Motor Corporation Australia (TMCA) began. This year also marked a crisis point in operations of the Australian automotive manufacturing industry, as it attempted to reinvent itself in light of legislative changes designed to improve industry efficiency. For 25 years (from 1963 to 1988) Australian Motor Industries (AMI, and later AMI Toyota) operated the then Port Melbourne plant as its own, with its own processes and procedures, although it is reported that the Toyota Production System was introduced in 1981, however it was not engaged to the level or depth across the site as an integrated system until 1988. Although AMI was not the first to assemble a Toyota outside Japan in 1963, it was the first in an English speaking country. There was some assembly under license in Mexico from 1960 to 1964, but a change in government sentiment ended the arrangement. Assembly was also conducted by the wholly owned subsidiaries in Brazil from 1958 and in Thailand from 1964 (toyota.com). In Australia however, with only a minority stake Toyota did not invest its knowledge and technology in the Australian operations to nearly the extent of its other wholly owned, internationally located manufacturing sites, which were purpose built on greenfield sites. The Toyota Production System (TPS) has been introduced and operated fully in Australia only since TMCA’s inception in 1988, making Australia Toyota site one of only ‘brown field’ site.

The pre Toyota company – Australian Motor Industries (AMI) opened its Port Melbourne factory doors in 1952 the only surviving part of the Standard Motors company which had succumbed to financial demise after failing to anticipate the level of competition and rate of change it would face in the mid to late 1950’s. Assembling for Triumph, Mercedes Benz and Ramblers, AMI was successful until the 1961 financial crisis, when again it reached the very edge of the bankruptcy precipice. Adding to the competitive forces there was also a significant number of model changes released by competitors. AMI had a history of conducting assembly for several other companies including Mercedes cars and trucks, Triumph’s Herald, American Motor’s Ramblers, but the competition from Ford and Holden proved too fierce. Part of their lack of competitiveness was that AMI were being dictated to about what models they could assemble by overseas companies, and what these companies were prepared to ship to Australia. This was unfortunately much of the time not what the Australian market considered it needed or wanted. The perception and in some cases the reality of inefficiency and poor quality was well ingrained in the psyche of the Australian public and government by this stage. The Japanese manufacturing methodologies were coveted as a solution to improving efficiency. The pressure from the government, a poor quality product, changing clients and few technical developments left AMI on a rapidly precarious financial footing. Without Toyota agreeing to license AMI with the assembly, AMI would have collapsed entirely. They were on the edge of bankruptcy, with Toyota their last hope of continuing. In a last ditch attempt to save the company, AMI executives were able to secure the assembly of the Tiara for Toyota Japan in 1963. This assembly was the very first of the Australian assembled Toyota cars to begin at AMI. In 1964, an AMI employee returned from a training program in TMC Japan with the first CKD (completely knocked down) training certificate issued by TMC Japan. It was at this point when AMI started to adopt some of the Japanese production methods, hence it was at this point the organisation attempted to start to actively try to change its culture under the indirect influence of Toyota. AMI was characterized by the degree of financial woes and chaotic, reactive responses to the pressures under which it operated. Given the environment of increasing complexity, financial pressures and unrelenting adversarial tensions between Unions and Company, Company and Government, AMI seemed inherently unable to align its internal culture with the external environment. Following rigidly the traditional, mechanistic thinking associated with the Tayloristic American mass production style it was consistently unable to respond to the pressures it faced with any long term effectiveness. Although the government had mandated import restrictions to aid the industry, the frequent closures, mergers and bankruptcies lay testament to the difficult nature of this labour intensive, dirty, and highly competitive industry (Davis 1987). Whilst for AMI, the question of Toyota coming on as a client was one of economic life or death, for Toyota, the question of coming to Australia as an assembler or manufacturer was already made. Toyota wanted volume, and with the import restrictions and assembly mandated by government manufacturing rules buying in was the only way forward. The question for Toyota was if it should establish a greenfield site or license an existing manufacturer. Given the anti-Japanese sentiment, difference in language and relative cost, it can be deduced that licensing was

the lowest risk, with the highest likelihood of return. It gave potential for a longer-term solution, as developing a new site was still possible, but licensing negated exposure. It was also their first step into an English-speaking country, removed enough from Europe and America to save face if there was disaster.

2. What is the type of market structure Toyota Australia operates? What challenges does this market structure pose for the company? ( 10 Marks) 3. Is Toyota Australia operating at the optimum scale of operation? Should Toyota expand or contract its scale of operation? What are the associated implications? What should Toyota do? Should it wait for demand and cost conditions to improve, or should it exit the market? (10 Marks)

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