Torts Cases 3.docx

Calalas vs Court of Appeals GR 122039, 31 May 2000

. No basis for moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of FACTS: . Private respondent is Eliza Sunga who is a college freshman the contract of carriage. majoring in Physical Education in Siliman University. . SC: affirmed the decision of the CA, moral damages is deleted. . Petitioner -Defendant is Vicente Calalas who is the owner and operator of the passenger jeepney. Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. G.R. No. L-12191, 14 October 1918 FACTS: . At 10AM of August 23, 1989, Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned Jose Cangco was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company. He and operated by Calalas. lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming . As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga daily by train to the company’s office in the city of Manila where he was given by the conductor an “extension seat,” a wooden stool at the worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him back of the door of the rear end of the vehicle. to ride upon the company’s trains free of charge. During his ride in the train he arose from his seat and makes his way . On the way to Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a to the exit while the train is still on travel. When the train has proceeded passenger off. a little farther Jose Cangco step down into the cement platform but unfortunately step in to a sack of watermelon, fell down and rolled under . Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing the platform and was drawn under the moving car which resulting to his so, an Isuzu truck driven by Verena and owned by Salva bumped the arm to be crashed and lacerated. He was rushed to the hospital and left rear portion of the jeepney. sued the company and the employee who put the sack of watermelon in the platform. . As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture. The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o’ clock on the dark night. It is that time of the year that may we considered as season to harvest . Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas. Calalas filed a watermelon explaining why there are sacks of watermelon in the third party complaint against Salva. platform. The plaintiff contends that it is the negligence of the Manila Railroad Co. on why they let their employees put a hindrance in the . RTC: absolved Calalas and held Salva responsible platform that may cause serious accident. The defendant answered that it is the lack of diligence on behalf of the plaintiff alone on why he . CA: reversed ruling of the RTC on the ground that Sunga‘s cause of did not wait for the train to stop before alighting the train. action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict and that ISSUE: the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Whether or not the company is liable or there is a contributory Civil Code negligence on behalf of the plaintiff. RULING: ISSUE: W/N petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. There is no contributory negligence on behalf of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court provides some test that may find the contributory RULING: . Contention of the Petitioner: the ruling in Civil Case 3490 negligence of a person. Was there anything in the circumstances that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which and to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off of the safety of the passengers. the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist . Petition has no merit. Principle of Res Judicata does not apply was contributory negligence. because the complainant is not a party to the said civil case, there are Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common different issues, and different sources of obligation. practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was . In Civil Case 3490 the issue is whether or not Veran and Salva were by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving liable for quasi delict for damages in the jeepney. In quasi-delict, the as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was negligence or fault should be clearly established . also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit. . The issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of Article 1173, first paragraph: The fault or negligence of the obligor carriage. In breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of that case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad destination. faith, the provisions of Article 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. In the case the proximate cause of the accident is the lack of diligence . It is immaterial if the proximate cause of the collision was the of the company to inform their employees to not put any hindrance in negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause does the platform like sacks of watermelon. The contract of defendant to not apply in breach of contract. It is applicable only in quasi-delict as transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in the obligation is created by law. But where there is a pre-existing safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that regulate the relation thus created. the fault was morally imputable to defendant’s servants. Therefore, the company is liable for damages against Cangco. . No extraordinary diligence: 1. The jeepney was not properly parked; 2. The jeepney took in more passengers than allowed seating capacity; FGU Insurance Corporation vs. CA 3. Sung was seated in an extension seat. FACTS: A Mitsubishi Colt Lancer owned by FILCAR driven by a Danish tourist Peter Dahl-Jensen collided with another Mitsubishi Colt Lancer owned by Lydia Soriano driven by Benjamin Jacildone. The accident took

place at EDSA. The car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time, Dahl-Jensen did not possess a Philippine driver‘s license. FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of its contact with Soriano, paid Soriano. By way of subrogation, FGU sued Dahl-Jensen and FILCAR and Fortune Insurance Corporation. Dahl-Jensen was dropped in the complaint because summons was not served to him. TC dismissed the case for failure to substantiate the claim of subrogation. CA affirmed the TC‘s ruling based on another ground, i.e. only the fault or negligence of DahlJensen was sufficiently proceed but not that of FILCAR. ISSUE: WON on the action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company, and consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lease in driving the rented vehicle. HELD: No. To sustain a claim based on Article 2176 CC, the following requisites must concur: a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability. FILCAR did not have any participation therein. The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of DahlJensen, the former not being an employer of the latter. Par. 5 of Art. 2180 in relation to Art. 2184 of the same Code provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune x x x x If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and DahlJensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper. Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso March 4, 2014 Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Negligence – Malfeasance – QuasiDelict Remedial Law – Evidence – Hearsay Rule – Res Gestae – Startling Event In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a “better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the plane’s tourist class. After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the following: First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an

assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties. Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding the note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court. ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis. ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not presented in court is admissible in evidence. HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpacontractual and on culpa aquiliana. Culpa Contractual There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible. Culpa Aquiliana Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents. A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school.

Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (VicePresident), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his position in the school. Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article. The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then assailed the trial court's disposition before the respondent appellate court which, in a decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the trial court's orders. On 22 August 1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state: Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning should give way to present day changes. The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new challenges of progress. Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot be construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; 3 hence, the ruling in the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply to all kinds of educational institutions, academic or vocational. At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case. 5 While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with the premises of the appellate court's ruling. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would

presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasidelict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extracontractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitionerairline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231). This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus: The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties. Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides: Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis supplied). Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict. In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability.

The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the socalled "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. 9 As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold. WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.

answers were written in the handwriting of a co-employee, Joedito Gasendo. Petitioners management then sent respondent a Memo dated 27 July 1998 requiring an explanation for the incident. [7] Soon thereafter, petitioner sent a subsequent Memo dated 20 August 1998 to respondent requiring the latter to explain his delay in submitting process reports. [8] On 8 September 1998, respondent submitted a written explanation to the petitioner stating that the delay in the submission of reports was caused by the deaths of his grandmother and his aunt, and the hospitalization of his mother. He also averred that he had asked his co-employee Joedito Gasendo to write his answers to the ROL test because at the time when the examination was due, he already needed to leave to see his father-in-law, who was suffering from cancer and confined in a hospital in Manila. [9] Respondent was sent a new Memorandum dated 20 October 1998 for his delayed submission of process reports due on 14 October 1998. [10] Respondent was issued another Memo also dated 20 October 1998 regarding the discrepancies between the number of product samples recorded in his Daily/Weekly Coverage Report (DCR) and the number of product samples found in his possession during the 14 October 1998 audit. [11] The actual number of sample products found in respondents possession exceeded the number of sample products he reported to petitioner.

JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, - versus - BENJAMIN A. SILAYRO,

Respondent explained, through a Response Memo dated 24 October 1998, that he failed to count the quantity of samples when they were placed in his custody. Thus, he failed to take note of the excess This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the samples from previous months. He, likewise, admitted to committing Rules of Court, assailing the Decision, [1] dated 8 February 2006, errors in posting the samples that he distributed to some doctors during promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81983, the months of August and September 1998. [12] reversing the Decision [2] dated 7 May 2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000880-99. The On 20 November 1998, petitioner issued a Notice of Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, adjudged the dismissal of Disciplinary Action finding respondent guilty of the following offenses respondent Benjamin Silayro by petitioner Jansen Pharmaceutica as (1) delayed submission of process reports, for which he was subjected illegal for being an excessive and unwarranted penalty. The appellate to a one-day suspension without pay, effective 24 November 1998; [13] court determined that the suspension of the respondent for five months and (2) cheating in his ROL test, for which he was subjected again to a without salary as just penalty. one-day suspension. [14] Petitioner is the division of Johnson & Johnson Philippines Inc. engaged in the sale and manufacture of pharmaceutical products. In 1989, petitioner employed respondent as Territory/Medical Representative. During his employment, respondent received from petitioner several awards and citations for the years 1990 to 1997, such as Territory Representative Award, Quota Buster Award, Sipag Award, Safety Drivers Award, Ring Club Award, and a Nomination as one of the Ten Outstanding Philippine Salesmen. [3] On the dark side, however, respondent was also investigated for, and in some cases found guilty of, several administrative charges.

On the same date, petitioner likewise issued a Notice of Preventive Suspension against respondent for Dishonesty in Accomplishing Other Accountable Documents in connection with the discrepancy between the quantities of sample products in respondents report and the petitioners audit for the September 1998 cycle. In addition, the Notice directed the respondent to surrender to the petitioner the car, promotional materials, and all other accountabilities on or before 25 November 1998. It was also stated therein that since this was respondents third offense for the year, he could be dismissed under Section 9.5.5(c) of petitioners Code of Conduct. [15]

Petitioner alleged that in 1994, respondent was found guilty of granting unauthorized premium/free goods to and unauthorized pullouts from customers. [4] Petitioner failed to attach records to support its allegation and to explain the nature of and the circumstance surrounding these infractions. Respondent, for his part, admitted to have been guilty of granting unauthorized premium/free goods, but vehemently denied violating the rule on, or having been charged with, unauthorized pull-outs from customers. [5]

Before 25 November 1998 or the date given by petitioner for respondent to surrender all his accountabilities, a Memorandum dated 24 November 1998 was issued to respondent for the following alleged infractions: (1) Failure to turn over company vehicles assigned after the receipt of instruction to that effect from superiors, and (2) Refusing or neglecting to obey Company management orders to perform work without justifiable reason. [16]

The respondent was also investigated for dishonesty in connection with the Rewards of Learning (ROL) test. The ROL test is a one-page take-home examination, with two questions to be answered by an enumeration of the standards of performance by which territory representatives are rated as well as the sales competencies expected of territory representatives. [6] It was discovered that respondents

Respondent wrote a letter dated 26 November 1998 addressed to the petitioner explaining that he failed to surrender his accountabilities because he thought that this was tantamount to an admission that the charges against him were true and, thus, could result in his termination from the job. [17]

An administrative investigation of the respondents case was held on 3 December 1998. Respondent was accompanied by union representative Lyndon Lim. The parties discussed matters concerning the discrepancy in respondents report and petitioners audit on the number of product samples in respondents custody in September 1998. They were also able to clarify among themselves respondents failure to return his accountabilities and, as a consequence, respondent promised to surrender the same. They further agreed that another administrative hearing will be set, but no further hearings were held. [18] In line with his promise to surrender his accountabilities, respondent wrote a letter, dated 9 December 1998, asking his superiors where he should return his accountabilities. [19] Union representative Dominic Regoro also made requests, on behalf of respondent, for instructions, to whom petitioners District Supervisor Raymond Bernardo replied via electronic mail on 16 December 1998. According to Bernardo, he was still in the process of making arrangements with Ruben Cauton, petitioners National Sales Manager, in connection with the return of respondents accountabilities. [20] Respondent maintained that he did not receive any instructions from petitioner. In a letter dated 28 December 1998, petitioner terminated the services of respondent. [21] Petitioner found respondent guilty of dishonesty in accomplishing the report on the number of product samples in his possession and failing to return the company vehicle and his other accountabilities in violation of Sections 9.2.9 and 9.2.4 of the Code of Conduct. [22] Petitioner also found respondent to be a habitual offender whose previous offenses included: (1) Granting unauthorized premium/free goods to customer in 1994; (2) Unauthorized pull-out of stocks from customer in 1994; (3) Delay in submission of reports despite oral admonition and written reprimand in 1998; and (4) Dishonesty in accomplishing other accountable documents or instruments (in connection with the ROL test) in 1998.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the Decision of the Labor Arbiter by declaring that reinstatement was improper where respondent was dismissed for just and authorized causes. [28] In a Decision dated 7 May 2003, it pronounced that: WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainants appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION deleting the award of reinstatement. [29] Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. In reversing the Decision of the NLRC, the appellate court pronounced that the causes were insufficient for the dismissal of respondent since respondents acts were not motivated by dishonesty, but were caused by mere inadvertence. Thus, it concluded that the offenses committed by respondent merited only a penalty of suspension for five months without pay. The appellate court also noted that petitioner committed some lapses in its compliance with procedural due process. It further took into account the successive deaths and sickness in respondents family. [30] The dispositive part of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. Thus, the Decision and Resolution respectively dated 7 May 2003 and 14 October 2003 are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Judgment is hereby rendered: a)

Declaring petitioners dismissal to be illegal;

b) Reinstating petitioner to the same or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges; c) Ordering the payment of backwages (inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent), computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement; Provided that, from such computed amount of backwages, a deduction of five (5) months (sic) salary be made to serve as penalty; and

Even after respondents termination from employment, there was still contact between petitioner and respondent regarding the latters accountabilities still in his possession. Sometime in early 1999, in a telephone conversation, respondent informed petitioner that he will return his accountabilities only upon demand from the proper governmental agency. [23] A demand letter dated 3 February 1999 was d) If reinstatement is no longer feasible, ordering sent to respondent by petitioner ordering the return of the company car, the payment of separation pay comprising of one month salary per year promotional materials, samples, a slide projector, product manuals, of service computed from date of employment up to finality of this product monographs, and training binders. [24] decision, in addition to the award of backwages. On 14 January 1999, respondent filed a Complaint [25] Let the records of this case be remanded to the Labor Ariter a against petitioner and its officers, Rafael Besa, Rueben Cauton, Victor quo for the proper computation of the foregoing. [31] Lapid, and Raymond Bernardo before the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Iloilo City for (a) Unfair Labor Practice; (b) Illegal Hence, this Petition, wherein the following issues Dismissal; (c) Reimbursement of operating and representation were raised: expenses under expense reports for October and November 1998; (d) Nonpayment of salary, bonuses and other earned benefits for I December 1998 like rice allocation, free goods allocation, etc.; and (e) WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY Damages and attorneys fees. ERRED IN REVERSING THE UNIFORM FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE NLRC AND THE LABOR ARBITER. In a Decision dated 31 August 1999, the Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent committed infractions which breached company rules, II and which were sufficient grounds for dismissal. However, the Labor Arbiter found the penalty of dismissal to be too harsh considering the WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS DISMISSAL FOR HIS respondents circumstances and ordered his reinstatement without FAILURE TO TRUTHFULLY ACCOMPLISH REPORTS, payment of back wages. [26] The dispositive portion of the Decision DELIBERATE AND REPEATED FAILURE TO SUBMIT REQUIRED states that: REPORTS AND HIS DELIBERATE DISREGARD OF HIS SUPERIORS ORDER TO SURRENDER HIS ACCOUNTABILITIES WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered TANTAMOUNT TO DISHONESTY, GROSS AND HABITUAL ordering respondents firm to reinstate complainant to his former or NEGLECT OF DUTY, WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE OF COMPANY equivalent position without backwages. POLICY, AND BREACH OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM BY THE COMPANY UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE All other claims are hereby dismissed. [27]

LABOR CODE WAS LEGAL, VALID AND CARRIED OUT WITH DUE In this case, petitioner had not been able to identify an act of PROCESS dishonesty, misappropriation, or any illicit act, which the respondent may have committed in connection with the erroneously reported III product samples. While respondent was admittedly negligent in filling WHETHER OR NOT THE TOTALITY OF INFRACTIONS out his August and September 1998 DCR, his errors alone are COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT FURTHER MERITED HIS insufficient evidence of a dishonest purpose. Since fraud implies TERMINATION FROM THE COMPANYS EMPLOY willfulness or wrongful intent, the innocent non-disclosure of or inadvertent errors in declaring facts by the employee to the employer IV will not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee. [37] WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HAS ANY BASIS In addition, the subsequent acts of respondent belie a design to FOR CLAIMING AN AWARD OF REINSTATEMENT AND misappropriate product samples. So as to escape any liability, BACKWAGES. [32] respondent could have easily just submitted for audit only the number of product samples which he reported. Instead, respondent brought all This petition is without merit. the product samples in his custody during the audit and, afterwards, honestly admitted to his negligence. Negligence is defined as the The main question in this case is whether or not sufficient grounds failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent existed for the dismissal of the respondent. To constitute a valid person would have exercised in a similar situation. [38] To this Court, dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the respondent did not commit any willful violation, rather he merely failed dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 282 of the to exercise the standard care required of a territory representative to Labor Code; and, (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be carefully count the number of product samples delivered to him in heard and to defend himself. [33] August and September 1998. In this case, the Court must re-examine the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, as well as the contrary findings of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter. While it is a recognized principle that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark in the evaluation of evidence adduced during trial, this rule allows for exceptions. [34] One of these exceptions covers instances when the findings of fact of the trial court, or in this case of the quasi-judicial agencies concerned, are conflicting or contradictory with those of the Court of Appeals. [35]

In the Memorandum dated 20 November 1998, petitioner ordered respondent to return the company vehicle and all other accountabilities by 25 November 1998. Petitioner issued its first notice on 24 November 1998, even before respondent was obligated to return his accountabilities. Hence, respondent could not yet have committed any offense when petitioner issued the first notice. Confused by petitioners arbitrary action, respondent did not return his accountabilities, but immediately explained in a letter dated 26 November 1998 his reasons for failing to return his accountabilities on In the termination letter dated 28 December 1998, respondent was 25 November 1998 as previously ordered by the petitioner. dismissed on the ground that he committed the following offenses: (1) dishonesty in accomplishing the report on the number of product During the company hearing held on 3 December 1998, samples in his possession; and (2) his failure to return the company respondent offered to return his accountabilities in accordance with the vehicle and other accountabilities in violation of Sections 9.2.9 and instructions to be given by the petitioner. In a letter dated 9 December 9.2.4 of the Code of Conduct. In addition to these offenses, petitioner 1998 addressed to the petitioner, respondent reiterated his request for took into account that the petitioner committed the following infractions instructions on the return of his accountabilities. There is no showing in the past: (1) granting unauthorized premium/free goods in 1994; (2) that petitioner replied to respondents letter. The letter written by unauthorized pull-outs from customers in 1995; (3) cheating during the petitioners District Supervisor Raymond Bernardo to union ROL exam in 1998; and (4) three infractions of delayed process reports representative Dominic Regoro sent through electronic mail on 16 in 1998. December 1998 still provided no definite instructions to the respondent for the return of his accountabilities. This is the last communication Initially, the Court must determine whether the respondent violated between the parties on the matter until petitioner wrongfully dismissed the Code of Conduct with his dishonesty in accomplishing his report on the respondent on 28 December 1998 for deliberately refusing to product samples and/or failure to return the company vehicle and other surrender his accountabilities, among other grounds. The petitioner such accountabilities. The records of this case negate a finding of such does not refer in its pleadings to any instance after the company culpability on the part of the respondent. hearing was held and before the respondent was dismissed wherein it had finally instructed the respondent as to how he may turn over his Petitioner failed to present evidence that respondent was guilty of accountabilities. Per petitioners pleadings, belated demands for the dishonesty in accomplishing the DCR, wherein he was supposed to surrender of respondents accountabilities were made in January and indicate the number of product samples in his possession for August February 1999, after respondent had already been dismissed. Clearly, and September 1998. Petitioner merely relied on the fact that the the charge against respondent of insubordination to the petitioners number of product samples the respondent reported was incorrect, and instructions for the surrender of his accountabilities was unfounded the number of product samples later found in his possession exceeded since the respondent was still waiting for said instructions when he was that which he reported. Respondent admitted that when the product dismissed. samples had arrived, he failed to check if the number of product samples indicated in the DCR corresponded to the number actually Moreover, petitioner failed to observe procedural due process delivered and that he made mistakes in posting the product samples in connection with the aforementioned charge. Section 2(d) of Rule 1 distributed during the period in question. of The Implementing Rules of Book VI states that: In termination cases, the burden of proof rests with the employer For termination of employment based on just causes to show that the dismissal is for just and valid cause. Failure to do so as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code: would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and therefore was illegal. [36] Dishonesty is a serious charge, which the (i) A written notice served on the employee specifying employer must adequately prove, especially when it is the basis for the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee termination. reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.

(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.

would give this offense substantial weight and importance, it can only be presumed that petitioner did not consider the offense as sufficiently momentous to disqualify respondent from receiving an award or to even just issue the respondent a warning that a subsequent offense would result in the termination of his employment.

(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the The rest of the infractions imputed to the respondent circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his were committed during the time he was undergoing serious family termination. (Emphases supplied.) problems. His inability to comply with the deadlines for his process reports and his lack of care in accounting for the product samples in his From the aforecited provision, it is implicit that these custody are understandably the result of his preoccupation with very requirements afford the employee an opportunity to explain his side, serious problems. Added to the pressure brought about by the respond to the charge, present his or her evidence and rebut the numerous charges he found himself facing, his errors and negligence evidence presented against him or her. should be viewed in a more compassionate light. The superficial compliance with two notices and a hearing in this case cannot be considered valid where these notices were issued and the hearing made before an offense was even committed. The first notice, issued on 24 November 1998, was premature since respondent was obliged to return his accountabilities only on 25 November 1998. As respondents preventive suspension began on 25 November 1998, he was still performing his duties as territory representative the day before, which required the use of the company car and other company equipment. During the administrative hearing on 3 December 1998, both parties clarified the confusion caused by the petitioners premature notice and agreed that respondent would surrender his accountabilities as soon as the petitioner gave its instructions. Since petitioners ostensible compliance with the procedural requirements of notice and hearing took place before an offense was even committed, respondent was robbed of his rights to explain his side, to present his evidence and rebut what was presented against him, rights ensured by the proper observance of procedural due process. Of all the past offenses that were attributed to the respondent, he contests having committed the infraction involving the unauthorized pull-outs from customers, allegedly made in 1994. Again, the records show that petitioner did not provide any proof to support said charge. It must be emphasized at this point that the onus probandi to prove the lawfulness of the dismissal rests with the employer, [39] and in light of petitioners failure to discharge the same, the alleged offense cannot be given any credence by this Court. As for the three remaining violations, it is unquestioned that respondent had committed and had already been punished for them.

Petitioners inability to keep up with his deadlines and his carelessness with his report on product samples during a difficult time in his life are in no way comparable to the transgressions in the cases cited by petitioner involving other territory representatives Chua v. National Labor Relations Commission [41] and Gustilo v. Wyeth Philippines. [42] In the Chua case, it was not a mere case of delay in the submission of reports and the occasional mistakes in the DCR, but an established pattern of inattention in the submission and accomplishing of his reports. The employee therein did not even submit some of the DCRs, while other DCRs were belatedly submitted in batches covering two to three months. Doctors call cards lacked either the corresponding dates or the signatures of the doctors concerned. In the Gustillo case, the employee falsified his application form, a gasoline receipt, a report of his trade outlet calls, and misused his leaves. Evidently, the employee in this case misappropriated company resources by making claims for falsified expenses and making personal calls in lieu of trade outlet calls. In this case, respondent had not defrauded the petitioner of its property.

The gravest charge that the respondent faced was cheating in his ROL test. Although he avers that he formulated the answers himself and that he merely allowed his co-employee Joedito Gasendo to write down his answers for him, this Court finds this excuse to be very flimsy. The ROL test consists of one page and two straightforward questions, which can be answered by more or less ten sentences. Respondent could have spared the few minutes it would take to write the examination. If he had lacked the time due to a family emergency, a request for an extension would have been the more While a penalty may no longer be imposed on offenses for reasonable and honest alternative. which respondent has already been punished, these offenses, among other offenses, may still be used as justification for an employees Despite the disapproving stance taken by this Court against dismissal. Hence, this Court must now take into consideration all the dishonesty, there have been instances when this Court found the offenses that respondent committed during his employment and decide ultimate penalty of dismissal excessive, even for cases which bear the whether these infractions, taken together, constitute a valid cause for stigma of deceit. dismissal. In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Undoubtedly, respondent was negligent in reporting the Labor Relations Commission, [43] an employee intervened in the number of product samples in his custody for August and September anomalous connection of four telephone lines. It was, likewise, 1998. He also committed three other offenses in the past. First, he was established in Manila Electric Company v. National Labor Relations found guilty of and penalized for granting unauthorized free goods in Commission, [44] that the employee was involved in the illegal 1994. Secondly, he incurred delays in submitting his process reports installation of a power line. In both cases, the violations were clearly for August, September and October 1998, for which charge he was prejudicial to the economic activity of his employer. Finally, in National punished with one-day suspension. Lastly, he cheated in an ROL test Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino, [45] a school teacher in July 1998 for which he was punished with another one-day tampered with the grades of her students, an act which was prejudicial suspension. to the schools reputation. Notably, the Court stopped short of dismissing these employees for offenses more serious than the present Respondents offense of granting unauthorized free case. goods was vaguely discussed. Petitioner did not offer any evidence in In this case, the ROL test is a take-home examination this connection; it was given credence only because of respondents intended to check a territory representatives understanding of admission of the same. What acts constituted this offense and the information already contained in their Sales Career Manual, wherein circumstances surrounding it were not explained. However, the records the examinees are even instructed to refer to their manuals. The show that in the same year it was committed, in 1994, petitioner still improper taking of this test, while it puts into question the examinees gave respondent two awards: membership to the Wild Boar Society moral character, does not result in any potential loss of property or and the Five-Year Service Award. [40] Absent any explanation which damage to the reputation of the employer. Nor does respondents

previous performance show lack of knowledge required in his sales G.R. SP No. 81983, promulgated on 8 February 2006, is AFFIRMED. career. Additionally, the dishonesty practiced by the employee did not Costs against the petitioner. involve company property that was placed in his custody. Furthermore, the gravity of this offense is substantially diminished by the fact that petitioner itself had thought it unimportant enough to merit only a oneday suspension. The respondents ten years of commendable performance cannot be cancelled out by a single mistake made during a difficult period of his life, a mistake that did not pose a potential danger to his employer. The special circumstances of this case -- respondents family crises, the duration of his employment, and the quality of his work during the previous years -- must necessarily influence the penalty to be meted out to the respondent. It would be a cruel disregard of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure to impose the penalty of dismissal, without giving due consideration to the ill fortune that may befall a normally excellent employee. In National Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino, [46] special consideration was given to the fact that the respondent therein had been in the employ of the petitioners therein for 10 years and that she was a recipient of numerous academic excellence awards and recognized by her students and some of her peers in the profession as a competent teacher. The Court, in other cases, has repeatedly ruled that in determining the penalty to be imposed on an erring employee, his or her length of service must be taken into account. [47] In Brew Master International, Inc., v. National Federation of Labor Unions, [48] the emotional, psychological, spiritual and physical stress and strain undergone by the employee during a family crisis were regarded as special circumstances which precluded his dismissal from service, despite his prolonged absence from work. The Court explains the circumspection it exercises when faced with the imposition of the extremely severe penalty of dismissal thus: The employers prerogative to discipline its employee must be exercised without abuse of discretion. Its implementation should be tempered with compassion and understanding. While an employer has the inherent right to discipline its employees, we have always held that this right must always be exercised humanely, and the penalty it must impose should be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of its infraction. The employer should bear in mind that, in the exercise of such right, what is at stake is not the employees position but her livelihood as well. The law regards the workers with compassion. Even where a worker has committed an infraction, a penalty less punitive may suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. This is not only the laws concern for workingman. There is, in addition, his or her family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows upon those dependent on the wage-earner. [49] Respondents violations of petitioners Code of Conduct, even if taken as a whole, would not fall under the just causes of termination provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code. [50] They are mere blunders, which may be corrected. Petitioner failed to point out even a potential danger that respondent would misappropriate or improperly dispose of company property placed in his custody. It had not shown that during his employment, respondent took a willfully defiant attitude against it. It also failed to show a pattern of negligence which would indicate that respondent is incapable of performing his responsibilities. At any other time during his employment, respondent had shown himself a commendable worker. Nonetheless, the infractions committed by the respondent, while disproportionate to a penalty of dismissal, will not be overlooked. The suspension of five months without pay, imposed by the Court of Appeals, would serve as a sufficient and just punishment for his violations of the companys Code of Conduct. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-