Spec_pro_cases.docx

LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,- versus -SHARIA DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARIA JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER, This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 2006[1] and September 21, 2006.[2] On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.[3] Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth MontaerBarrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their children.[4] On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.[5] On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a Complaint for the judicial partition of properties before the Sharia District Court. [6] The said complaint was entitled Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer, Lillibeth K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer, and docketed as Special Civil Action No. 705.[7] In the said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent.[8] Private respondents prayed for the Sharia District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.[9] Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.[10] On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.[11] On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[12] On December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing.[13] On January 17, 2006, the Sharia District Court denied petitioners opposition.[14] Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration lacked notice of hearing, the district court held that such defect was cured as petitioners were notified of the existence of the pleading, and it took cognizance of the said motion.[15] The Sharia District Court also reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration.[16] In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal dated November 22, 2005.[17] The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence. [18] In its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Sharia District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.[19] Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues: I. RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS. II. RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED. III. RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NONPAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES. IV. RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A NOTICE OF HEARING. V. RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995. In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Sharia District Court must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction.[20] Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims Petitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District Courts jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that there has already been a determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue. Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Sharia District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims: ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over: xxxx (b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property. The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition.[21] The designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on a falsa descriptio or defective caption, courts are guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings.[22] Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Sharia District Court as a Complaint for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim, [23] such as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent.[24] These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate. We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montaer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer [25] or a motion to dismiss.[26] Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant[27] or result in having a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem.[28] Indeed, the defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction.[29]

The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.[30] In the case at bar, the Sharia District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Sharia District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Special Proceedings The underlying assumption in petitioners second argument, that the proceeding before the Sharia District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Sharia District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. [31] In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.[32] Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact. Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil action[33] applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong [34] necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant.[35] On the other hand, a special proceeding, by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact,[36] has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate,[37] pay its liabilities,[38] and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.[39] Docket Fees Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents petition in the proceeding before the court a quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedents estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners argument essentially involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket fees. Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.[40] If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court.[41] In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on the clerk of courts insufficient assessment of the docket fees.[42] As every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law, the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient assessment.[43] However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.[44] In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of courts assessment. Exception to Notice of Hearing Petitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion for reconsideration before the Sharia District Court is defective for lack of a

notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned.[45] The Rules also provide that no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.[46] However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[47] Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein.[48] In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities, and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities.[49] The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice. In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected.[50] The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process,[51] for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition.[52] In probate proceedings, what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.[53] In the case at bar, as evident from the Sharia District Courts order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Sharia District Court reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed. Prescription and Filiation Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia District Court has not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding.[54]The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent.[55] In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Sharia District Court, dated August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners. SO ORDERED. ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER,Petitioner,versus -ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER,VICTORIA S. MEDINA- G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007, Administratrix, Respondent. This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003. The undisputed facts are as follows. The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus barred, subject to certain exceptions.[5] Order dated April 9, 2003. Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in following questions: the proper disposition of the properties of the estate.In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus: (a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to should be dismissed? bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an (b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the time in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is of its filing thereat? collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.[7] (Emphasis supplied) (c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written explanation on the service A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the and filing by registered mail?[2] settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees shopping. upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of proceedings only in a suppletorymanner. Appeals,[8] that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to The Court gave due course to the petition for review the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.[3] constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees The petition is imbued with merit. within a reasonable time.[9] After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate. not entirely correct. With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides: Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus: Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of rule is not complied with. Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable. pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.[4] This means that personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special disposition of such pleading or other papers. proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case. If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against nonservice or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation forum shopping? was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the The Court rules in the affirmative. practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause whenever practicable.

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied) In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13: As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not be practicable.Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of may, signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied) In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous. As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed where, among other cases, the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[11] (Emphasis supplied) In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,[12] the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice. The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid.[13] The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibaez,[14] thus: The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[15] (Emphasis supplied) The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SETASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. NILO OROPESA,Petitioner,- versus - CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent. G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012 This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the Decision[1] dated February 29, 2008, as well as the Resolution[2] dated September 16, 2008, both rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA. The Court of Appeals issuances affirmed the Order[3] dated September 27, 2006 and the Order[4] dated November 14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively. The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow: On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and raffled off to Branch 260. In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend. In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon. Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social worker. On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental Opposition.

Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya. After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence. Thus, the (respondent) filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.

In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[10] we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the following wise: A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a guardian acts for another called the ward whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.[11] In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.

In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondents) Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006. [5] (Citations omitted.)

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an Order dated reads: September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which reads: Sec. 2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Under this rule, the WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed word incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil to provide sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, to administer his properties, Oppositors Demurrer to even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.[6] unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the and exploitation. trial court in an Order dated November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states: We have held in the past that a finding that a person is WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite petitioner-movant has failed to provide sufficient documentary and evidence.[12] We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is must be applied in the case at bar. incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27 In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, September 2006. therefore, should be placed in guardianship, petitioner raises in his Memorandum[13] the following factual matters: Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.[7] a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already; Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed through the now assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:

b.

During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Lukes Medical Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested one of his former colleagues who was visiting him to file a loan application with the Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had substantial amounts of money in various banks sufficient to cover his medical expenses;

c.

Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care and management;

d.

The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain unpaid and therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly compelled to pay the necessary taxes;

e.

Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the reason that the former would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car had been sold, respondent did not procure another vehicle and refused to account for the money earned from the sale of the old car;

f.

Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name and his daughters without the latters knowledge or consent;

g.

There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to stab himself upon the orders of his girlfriend during one of their fights;

WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.[8] A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition was filed. Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court: WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN INCOMPETENT PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP[9] After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to be without merit. Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the trial court which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by him showing respondents incompetence.

h.

Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of groceries and furniture, despite protests from his children.[14]

Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioners lack of material evidence to support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition. In fact, respondent points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed competent to run his personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said document, entitled Report of Neuropsychological Screening,[15] were quoted by respondent in his Memorandum[16] to illustrate that said report in fact favored respondents claim of competence, to wit: General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in his responses on many of the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x. xxxx General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental calculations and keep track of number sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x x. xxxx x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective solutions to problem situations. x x x. [17]

the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.[19] (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts.[20] We only take cognizance of questions of fact in certain exceptional circumstances;[21] however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is also long settled that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.[22] We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondents demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.[23] We have also held that a demurrer to evidence With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant evidence, his proof of his fathers incompetence consisted purely of having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in plaintiffs evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought.[24] their fathers real and personal properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the petition for guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his the trial court of petitioners cause of action and instead lead it to grant the evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent. other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing has shown no right to relief. to make a formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008 as well as showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. not in any way relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED. himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned Report of Neuropsychological Screening which was attached to the petition for SO ORDERED. guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as [G.R. No. 110427. February 24, 1997]The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner, at best, for although the report had negative findings regarding memory vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents. the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent. On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was of the proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that where declared incompetent by judgment[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] City, Branch 107,[2] in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the Amparo A. Evangelista.[3] She was so adjudged because of her advanced persons state of mental sanity will suffice.[18] age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 person and estate. which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on the trial courts Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal City. On September 17, 1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced role that petitioners own documentary evidence played in disproving its case a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) and, likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondents to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. [4] The physical and mental state, to wit: complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Caiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista. The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical The amended Complaint[5] pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the the absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, On the contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on that Caiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced

age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they ** (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they ** (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent ** (was) losing much money as her house could not be rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990." In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question. Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Caiza's favor,[6] the Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises and pay Caiza P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. But on appeal,[7] the decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 96.[8] By judgment rendered on October 21, 1992,[9] the RTC held that the "action by which the issue of defendants' possession should be resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal situation ** demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court." Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of October 21, 1992, but failed in that attempt. In a decision[10] promulgated on June 2, 1993, the Appellate Court[11] affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Caiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Caiza," as evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim to the property, ** it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Caiza that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Caiza's supervening incompetency can not be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out."[12] Through her guardian, Caiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the Appellate Court's judgment. She contends in the main that the latter erred in (a) holding that she should have pursued an accion publiciana, and not an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight to "a xerox copy of an alleged holographic will, which is irrelevant to this case."[13] In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's requirement,[14] the Estradas insist that the case against them was really not one of unlawful detainer; they argue that since possession of the house had not been obtained by them by any "contract, express or implied," as contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises could not be deemed one "terminable upon mere demand (and hence never became unlawful) within the context of the law." Neither could the suit against them be deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they had been occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen Caiza, which "occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the holographic will of petitioner Carmen Caiza is admitted to probate." They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's legal guardian to oust them from the disputed premises. Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994,[15] and her heirs -- the aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively -- were by this Court's leave, substituted for her.[16] Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment action is the appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the property in dispute; (b) assuming desahucio to be proper, whether or not Evangelista, as Caiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; and (c) assuming an affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Caiza after the latter's death. I It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.[17] An inquiry into the averments of the amended complaint in the Court of origin is thus in order.[18] The amended Complaint alleges:[19] "6. That the plaintiff, Carmen Caiza, is the sole and absolute owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, which property is now the subject of this complaint; ** ** **

9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law, were allowed to live temporarily in the house of plaintiff, Carmen Caiza, for free, out of her kindness; 10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has duly notified the defendants, for them to vacate the said house, but the two (2) letters of demand were ignored and the defendants refused to vacate the same. ** 11. That the plaintiff, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista, made another demand on the defendants for them to vacate the premises, before Barangay Captain Angelina A. Diaz of Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, but after two (2) conferences, the result was negative and no settlement was reached. A photocopy of the Certification to File Action dated July 4, 1990; issued by said Barangay Captain is attached, marked Annex "D" and made an integral part hereof; 12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than thirty (30) days to vacate the house, but they still refused to vacate the premises, and they are up to this time residing in the said place; 13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990 (Annex "B") sent by the plaintiff to the defendants, by her legal guardian -- Amparo Evangelista; 14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they are enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent plaintiff, because, while they are saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the plaintiff is losing much money as her house could not be rented by others; 15. That the plaintiff's health is failing and she needs the house urgently, so that funds could be raised to meet her expenses for her support, maintenance and medical treatment; 16. That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the house at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, was compelled to go to court for justice, and she has to spend P10,000.00 as attorney's fees." Its prayer[20] is quoted below: "WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of law, plaintiff, Carmen Caiza, represented by her legal guardian. Amparo Evangelista, respectfully prays to this Honorable Court, to render judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants as follows: 1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren, sons-in-law and other persons claiming under them, to vacate the house and premises at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, so that its possession can be restored to the plaintiff, Carmen Caiza: and 2. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00; 3. To pay the costs of the suit." In essence, the amended complaint states: 1) that the Estradas were occupying Caiza's house by tolerance -- having been "allowed to live temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of ** (Caiza's) kindness;" 2) that Caiza needed the house "urgently" because her "health ** (was) failing and she ** (needed) funds ** to meet her expenses for her support, maintenance and medical treatment;" 3) that through her general guardian, Caiza requested the Estradas several times, orally and in writing, to give back possession of the house; 4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to give back the house to Caiza, to her continuing prejudice; and 5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate. Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out. It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient,[21] and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.[22] The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal construction of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes the institution of an unlawful detainer suit when "the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." They contend that since they did not acquire possession of the property in question "by virtue of any contract, express or implied" -- they having been, to repeat, "allowed to live temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of ** (Caiza's) kindness" -- in no sense could there be an "expiration or termination of ** (their) right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor would an action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is no claim that they had "deprived (Caiza) of the possession of ** (her property) by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth." The argument is arrant sophistry. Caiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible

right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that act of liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of returning the house to Caiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. [23] The situation is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of the demand to vacate.[24] In other words, one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the moment he is required to leave.[25] Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals,[26] where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant upon its undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill its promise of payment despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, ** (its) continuing possession ** became illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the ** (plant's owner) was its proper remedy." It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had been more than one demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last demand,[27] the reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises.[28] Now, the complaint filed by Caiza's guardian alleges that the same was "filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990." Although this averment is not in accord with law because there is in fact a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February 27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since the complaint was actually filed on September 17, 1990, well within one year from the second (last) written demand to vacate. The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza had executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly probated. Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas had no legal right to the property, whether as possessors by tolerance or sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right of possession by sufferance, that had been legally ended. They could not assert any right of possession flowing from their ownership of the house; their status as owners is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the property had allegedly been bequeathed to them -- an event which still has to take place; in other words; prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by them would be premature and inefficacious. In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the circumstances was that involving the Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the proper remedy for Caiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to possession de jure. II The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked;[29] and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). [30] An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age. Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianship[31] dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as

the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CAIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties ** "[32] By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends. [33] It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her incompetency.[34] That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it,[35] and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose. [36] Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, viz.: "SEC. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. A guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply to such of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance." Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's defenses in the ejectment action, that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve. "the issue of ownership ** only to determine the issue of possession."[37] III As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Caiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit. While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward,[38] the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court[39] of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.:[40] "SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian.[41] That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on June 2, 1993 -- affirming the Regional Trial Court's judgment and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari -- is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 132223June 19, 2001 BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner, vs.HELEN G. BELMES, respondent. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 45650, "In the Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil – Bonifacia P. Vancil, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G. Belmes, Oppositor-Appellant," promulgated on July 29, 1997, and its Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration of the said Decision. The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals in its Decision are: "Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. "Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their father’s death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00. "Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for hearing after a 3-consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily. "On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr. "On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City. "Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing; that the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen. "On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988."1 On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the RTC order of October 12, 1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. The Court of Appeals held: "Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor children. The law on parental authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of the Family Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor children without need of a court appointment and only for good reason may another person be named. Ironically, for the petitioner, there is nothing on record of any reason at all why Helen Belmes, the biological mother, should be deprived of her legal rights as natural guardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege from Helen would be an abdication and grave violation of the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law and the constitution on family solidarity."2 On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition, raising the following "legal points": "1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential right of a parent to be appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the minors is absolute, contrary to existing jurisprudence. "2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen G. Belmes, the biological mother, should be appointed the guardian of the minors despite the undisputed proof that under her custody, her

daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped seven times by Oppositor’s live-in partner. "3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it disqualified petitioner Bonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as judicial guardian over the persons and estate of subject minors despite the fact that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S. citizenship which is clearly not a statutory requirement to become guardian." At the outset, let it be stressed that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated September 15, 1998, respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter Valerie turned eighteen on September 2, 1998 as shown by her Birth Certificate.3Respondent thus prayed that this case be dismissed with respect to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of guardianship proceedings. The said "Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its Resolution dated November 11, 1998. Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become moot with respect to her. Thus, only the first and third "legal points" raised by petitioner should be resolved. The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian. We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides: "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals,4 this Court held: "Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship." Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx." In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court ruled: "The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent." Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding. Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian. Moreover, we observe that respondent’s allegation that petitioner has not set foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides, petitioner’s old age and her conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-168846 filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two years is not certain.

Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. In Guerrero vs. Teran,7 this Court held: "Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here." WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense that Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no longer be under the guardianship of respondent Helen Belmes. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-18799 March 31, 1964 HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent. Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 27200-R) wherein, over their objection, raising the question of jurisdiction petition, the appellate court took cognizance of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Herminio Maravilla and, in consequence thereof, set aside the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as a special co-administrator of the estate of the deceased Digna Maravilla. The pertinent antecedent facts are as follows:

ordered presentation of oral evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Eliezar Lopez, and Regina and Francisco Maravilla. On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal, from the decision denying probate of the will. Some devisees under the will, likewise, appealed from said decision. On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his appointment and qualification as special administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision of the Rules of Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had already been submitted by him, before said petition for his removal was filed.1äwphï1.ñët On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed with the court a petition for appointment of Conchita as special coadministratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise, filed a similar petition February 29. On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing the (1) petition to appoint Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, (2) approval of respondent's record appeal and appeal bond, (3) petition to remove respondent as special administrator, (4) petition to appoint Conchita Kohlhaas as special coadministratrix, and (5) petition to appoint Adelina Sajo as special coadministrator. At said hearing, respondent objected to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez was special co-administratrix, on grounds that (a) the law allows only one special co-administrator (b) the order of March 16, 1959 estops the court from appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator (c) such appointment is unfair to respondent, because owns at least 3/4 of the whole property, conjugal nature, which would be subjected to the administrate of a stranger, and (d) a deadlock between two special administrators would ruin the management of the property, including those of respondent. On cross-examination of Eliezar Lopez, respondent's counsel elicited the facts that (1) Lopez was employed full time in the PCAPE, with office in Manila. and could not discharge the functions of a co-administrator, and (2) there was merely intention on Lopez part to resign from office.

On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with he Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla who died on August 12 of that same year. In the will the surviving spouse was named as the After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special couniversal heir and executor. administrator in an order dictated open court, to protect the interests of Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla. On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition to the From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that the will was not signed on Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for preliminary each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of injunction) to annul the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as special coone another. administrator, and to prohibit the probate court from further proceeding with the petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator. The Court On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction on March 9, 1960 which by Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, the court issued an order was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it more specific. appointing him special administrator of the estate of the deceased, for the reason that: On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to certify the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds ... all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of the petitioner that the principal amount in controversy in this case exceeds P200,000.00, and his late wife, Digna Maravilla, and before any partition of the conjugal and the writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of property is done, the Court cannot pinpoint which of the property subject of appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since the probate case is not the Will belongs to Digna Maravilla, exclusively, that shall be administered by on appeal before it. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition. on the the special administrator. Hence, although it is true that the petitioner grounds that the amount in controversy is less than P200,000.00 and the Herminio Maravilla has an adverse interest in the property subject of the Will, decision of the probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal before the Court finds it impossible for the present time to appoint any person other the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in than the petitioner as special administrator of the property until after the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title to partition is ordered, for the reason that the properties mentioned in the Will or possession of real estate exceeding in value P200,000.00.1 are in the name of the petitioner who is the surviving spouse of the deceased. On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the writs (certiorari and prohibition) prayed for by respondent, and declaring null will, as it was not duly signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator. of the attesting witnesses and of one another. Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the decision, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal. court a petition for appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the will, having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent. writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same not Said petition was heard on February 20, at which hearing, respondent's being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. counsel orally moved for postponement, because respondent's principal counsel (Salonga) had not been notified and was not present. The court We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the theory that "the

amount in controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of the conjugal property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna Maravilla) which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as special administrator is valued at P362,424.90. This theory is untenable. Note that the proceedings had on the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are merely incidental to the probate or testate proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla presently on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where petitioners' motion to elevate the same to the Supreme Court, on the ground that the amount herein involved is within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still pending, resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings cannot be doubted, considering that the properties therein involved are valued at P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special administrator.

the amounts decreed to some of the creditors are less than that sum (Handly et al. vs. Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).

Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not enumerated in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been decided that a special proceeding is not a "civil case" (Carpenter v. Jones, 121 Cal. 362; 58 p. 842). On the other hand, it has been held that the term "civil case" includes special proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680, N.W. 178). Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or when they may serve to supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings. (See Moran's Comments on Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.) administered and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate total deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held claim of the parties and not the combined claims against each other that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit that be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate or intestate the amount or value involved or in controversy in probate proceedings is that proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L- of the entire estate. Assuming, arguendo, that the rule in the cases cited by 2211, December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407; see also Vda. de Chantengco v. respondent is here applicable, it should be noted that respondent claims the Chantengco, et al., L-10663, October 31, 1958). In a number of cases where whole estate of at least more than 3/4 thereof. Said claim, reduced to a appeal was taken from an order of a probate court disallowing a will, this pecuniary standard, on the basis of the inventory, would amount to more Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or value involved or in than P200,000.00 and, consequently, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the controversy therein is that of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, Supreme Court. July 31, 1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vano v. Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303, June 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3045). Not having appellate jurisdiction over the The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by proceedings in probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R), considering that the amount respondent in his brief, is also inapplicable, because unlike the instant case, involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also it did not involve a contest in the administration of the estate. have original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case, which are merely incidental thereto. While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate proceedings (Spec. Proc. No. 4977, CFI of Negros Occidental) which was In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are appealable appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it becomes immaterial, in where the amount or value involved is reducible to a pecuniary standard, the view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, amount involved being either the appellant's interest or the value of the entire providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction estate according as the issues on appeal involve only the appellant's rights over "all cases in which the value in controversy exceeds two hundred or the entire administration of the estate. ... In a contest for administration of thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs", and that "all cases which an estate the amount or value of the assets of the estate is the amount in may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court, or to the Court of controversy for purposes of appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this ruling, it Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same as if it is to be observed that respondent's interest as appellant in the probate had originally been brought before it". proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) is, according to his theory, the whole estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least more than 3/4 thereof, or On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special approximately P270,000.00. Such interest, reduced to a pecuniary standard administrator, we agree with respondent that there was no need for it. Note on the basis of the inventory, is the amount or value of the matter in that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-administrator, the controversy, and such amount being more than P200,000.00, it follows that reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is merely the appeal taken in said proceedings falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of temporary and subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly the Supreme Court and should, therefore, be certified to it pursuant to appointed. Thus, it would not only be unnecessary but also impractical, if for Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended. the temporary duration of the need for a special administrator, another one is appointed aside from the husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment liquidate the community property devolves merely to protect the interests of of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator and to petitioners who, in the event that the disputed will is allowed to probate, restrain the probate court from removing respondent as special administrator. would even have no right to participate in the proceedings at all. (Roxas v. It is therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate and, Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.) consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the whole estate is the value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value of the estate In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had involved in the controversy, it is suggested that appropriate steps be taken no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question. on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals involving the probate of the will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the provisions of the Judiciary Act The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the amount on the matter. of "P90,000.00 more or less", as the amount involved in the case, upon authority of the case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil. 20). But this case is WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is set inapplicable, as it does not refer to the question of administration of the aside and another one entered also setting aside the order of the trial court estate, nor to an order denying probate of a will, but only to the recovery of a of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator. particular legacy consisting of the rentals of a fishpond belonging to the Without costs. So ordered. estate. In an analogous case involving the administration of a trust fund, the United States Supreme Court held: Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be distributed by the circuit court, in a suit to compel the stockholders of a corporation to pay their subscriptions to stock to realize the fund, amounts to more than $5,000.00, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal, which is not affected by the fact that