Torts Case Digest 81-90.doc

81. AQUINAS SCHOOL V. INTON G.R. No. 184202, January 26, 2011 FACTS:  

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In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas School (Aquinas). Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis' grade three religion class. On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate the child's behavior, Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate's seat. Finally, she told the child to stay where he was on that spot of the room and finish copying the notes on the blackboard while seated on the floor. Yamyamin shoved Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not move around the classroom. As a result of the incident, Spouses Intons filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the RTC. The Spouses Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of RA 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victoria's personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis' favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus the costs of suit. Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the CA asking to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin. Finding that an employer-employee relation existed between Aquinas and Yamyamin, the CA found them solidarily liable to Jose Luis based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon the CA's belief that the school was Yamyamin's employer. The CA, however, declined to increase the award of damages. Aquinas appealed directly to this Court from the CA decision through a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinas is solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis HELD: NO. Aquinas is not solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis. The private school is not liable for the outside catechist's act of shoving a student and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not move around the classroom. The Court has consistently applied the "four-fold test" to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the right of the employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the work of the employee as well as the means and methods by which he accomplishes the same. In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamin's religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the school's grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin's teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school directress' testimony in this regard. Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher. First, Yamyamin's transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she was qualified to teach religion. Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to assume that she would behave properly towards the students. Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the school's Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for handling students. It also required her to attend a teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998.[5] Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach to ensure that she was really catechizing the students. And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom evaluation. [7] Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of the incident. It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect. The SC set aside the decision of the CA and held Aquinas School not liable in damages to Jose Luis Inton.

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83. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v. CA, et al. G.R. No. 82465. February 25, 1991 FACTS: 

Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand’s parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.

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During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was brought to Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Carmel General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

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Thereupon, spouses Castillo filed a complaint for Damages in the RTC against St. Francis High School, represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, contending that the death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son’s drowning.

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The RTC found in favor of the Spouses Castillo and against the teachers, ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay Spouses Castillo. It ruled that the teachers failed to exercise the diligence required of them by law under the circumstances to guard against the harm they had foreseen. The RTC held that: "While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late, they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students." (p. 30, Rollo) "The students, young as they were then (12 to 13 years old), were easily attracted to the sea without aforethought of the dangers it offers. Yet, the precautions and reminders allegedly performed by the defendants-teachers definitely fell short of the standard required by law under the circumstances. While the defendants-teachers admitted that some parts of the sea where the picnic was held are deep, the supposed lifeguards of the children did not even actually go to the water to test the depth of the particular area where the children would swim. And indeed the fears of the plaintiffs that the picnic area was dangerous was confirmed by the fact that three persons during the picnic got drowned at the same time. Had the defendant teachers made an actual and physical observation of the water before they allowed the students to swim, they could have found out that the area where the children were swimming was indeed dangerous. And not only that, the male teachers who according to the female teachers were there to supervise the children to ensure their safety were not even at the area where the children were swimming. They were somewhere and as testified to by plaintiffs’ witness they were having a drinking spree. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)

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The RTC dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. Said the court a quo: "As shown and adverted to above, this Court cannot find sufficient evidence showing that the picnic was a school sanctioned one. Similarly, no evidence has been shown to hold defendants Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna responsible for the death of Ferdinand Castillo together with the other defendant teachers. It has been sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin had himself not consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it. On the other hand, defendant Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs ." (p. 30, Rollo)

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The CA ruled: "Even were We to find that the picnic in question was not a school sponsored activity, nonetheless it cannot be gainsaid that the same was held under the supervision of the teachers employed by the said school, particularly the teacher in charge of Class I-C to whom the victim belonged, and those whom she invited to help her in supervising the class during the picnic. Considering that the court a quo found negligence on the part of the six defendants-teachers who, as such, were charged with the supervision of the children during the picnic, the St. Francis High School and the school principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. They cannot escape liability on the mere excuse that the picnic was not an `extra-curricular activity of the St. Francis High School .’ We find from the evidence that, as claimed by plaintiffs-appellants, the school principal had knowledge of the picnic even from its planning stage and had even been invited to attend the affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition against undertaking the picnic, nor did he prescribe any precautionary measures to be adopted during the picnic. At the least, We must find that the school and the responsible school officials, particularly the principal, Benjamin Illumin, had acquiesced to the holding of the picnic. "Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school principal must be found jointly and severally liable with the defendants-teachers for the damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the death of

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their son. It is the rule that in cases where the above-cited provisions find application, the negligence of the employees in causing the injury or damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager of the establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High School and its principal); and while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that the owner and/or manager exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or supervision of the employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in this case, the defendants-teachers). The record does not disclose such evidence as would serve to overcome the aforesaid presumption and absolve the St. Francis High School and its principal from liability under the above-cited provisions. 

The CA also ruled: "The main thrust of defendants-appellants appeal is that plaintiffs, the parents of the victim Ferdinand Castillo, were not able to prove by their evidence that they did not give their son consent to join the picnic in question. However, We agree with the trial court in its finding that whether or not the victim’s parents had given such permission to their son was immaterial to the determination of the existence of liability on the part of the defendants for the damage incurred by the plaintiffs-appellants as a result of the death of their son. What is material to such a determination is whether or not there was negligence on the part of defendants vis-a-vis the supervision of the victim’s group during the picnic; and, as correctly found by the trial court, an affirmative reply to this question has been satisfactorily established by the evidence, as already pointed out. The evidence shows that these two defendants, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, had satisfactorily explained why they were late in going to the picnic site, namely, that they had to attend to the entrance examination being conducted by the school which is part of their duty as teachers thereof. Since they were not at the picnic site during the occurrence in question, it cannot be said that they had any participation in the negligence attributable to the other defendants-teachers who failed to exercise diligence in the supervision of the children during the picnic and which failure resulted in the drowning of plaintiffs’ son. Thus, We may not attribute any act or omission to the two teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, as to make them liable for the injury caused to the plaintiffs because of the death of their son resulting from his drowning at the picnic. Accordingly, they must be absolved from any liability.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the petitioners, school, principal and teachers, are negligent. 2. Whether Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable to the case. HELD: 1. NO. The school, principal and teachers are not guilty of negligence and they cannot be held liable for damages of any kind. The petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence. Petitioners Connie Arquio, the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic. In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even respondents’ witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child. While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless. 2. NO. The CA committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent’s son. Article 2180, par. 4 states that: "The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry." Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity.

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As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score, employers will forever be exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties. The SC set aside the decision of the CA which found petitioners guilty of negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and awarding the respondents damages.

84. ST. MARYS ACADEMY v. WILLIAM CARPITANOS, et al. G.R. No. 143363 : February 6, 2002 FACTS: 

From 13 to 20 February 1995, St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.

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On June 9, 1995, Spouses Carpitanos filed a case for damages for the death of their son against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the RTC.

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The RTC ruled that: 1. St. Marys Academy is primarily liable and ordered to pay damages. It is liable for damages arising from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment. 2. James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel were also ordered to pay damages in the event of insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys Academy as their liability being only subsidiary. 3. James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and who was under special parental authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying damages, same being adjudged against St. Marys Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents. 4. Vivencio Villanueva is also ABSOLVED of any liability.

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The CA promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages but otherwise affirming the decision of the RTC, in toto. The CA held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.

ISSUE: Whether St. Marys Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. HELD: NO. St. Marys Academy is not liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos Article 218. The School, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Article 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

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Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. In this case, Spouses Carpitanos failed to show that the negligence of St. Mary’s Academy was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Significantly, respondents Spouses Carpitanos did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded. Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily . The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. 17 Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. The SC reversed and set aside the decision of the CA and of the RTC, and remanded the case to RTC for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys Academy.

85. Spouses PALISOC vs. ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES, et al. G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971

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Antonio C. Brillantes was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute. Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof. Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged. Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship, but lately on August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated. The deceased Dominador Palisoc and Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute. On March 10, 1966, Palisoc and Daffon, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark, Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he died. On May 19, 1966, Spouses Palicso as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador Palisoc filed an action for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student, Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute. The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. It held that the act of the accused Daffon in giving the deceased strong fistblows in the stomach which ruptured his internal organs and caused his death falls within the purview of Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute. Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code which reads: Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. Article 2180 of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar, since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents. CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180. NEW CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED: — The clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contained in Article 2180 of the new civil code contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In those circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil as well as the responsibilities for their sort would pass from the father and mother to the teachers. (Ciriaco L. Mercado, Petitioner vs. the Court of Appeals, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-14862, May 30, 1960).5 There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon.

ISSUE: Whether the defendants-school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with Daffon, for damages. HELD: YES. The defendants-school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with Daffon, for damages. This case was instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the school premises. Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident. There is no question, either, that the school involved is a non-academic school, the Manila Technical Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. The Court holds that under the cited codal article, the head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffsappellants for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by impleading improperly defendant Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower court found that it had been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so, notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to plaintiffs' request for admission had expressly manifested and made of record that "defendant Antonio C. Brillantes is not the registered owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is now a corporation and is not owned by any individual person."

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The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child."11 This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code. 12 In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. . As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority" 13 and "where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction." The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article.14 The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. . Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. The SC modified the decision of the CA, sentenced Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc, and absolved Brillantes from the complaint.

86. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. vs. PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., et al. G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975 FACTS: 

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On November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan filed a complaint against Archimedes J. Balingit for damages based on quasi-delict. Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. The CFI dismissed the said compliant of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan against Archimedes J. Balingit on the ground that Balingit as the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. is not the manager of an establishment contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in article 2180 of the Civil Code embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose. HELD:

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NO. Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer". The Civil Code provides: ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. The SC affirmed the decision of the CFI.

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