The Sri Lanka Dilemma: Can An Agreement Be Reached?

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The situation in Sri Lanka, between the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority, has been degrading steadily over the last few decades. Sri Lanka has now come to the point where it is divided, with a defacto Tamil state in the north (Stokke 1022). The friction between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sinhalese majority has derailed Sri Lanka’s development both economically and socially. With flaws in the development of civil liberties, electoral law, and human rights, Sri Lanka has been stuck in a period of social stagnation for decades. The only way for Sri Lanka to keep progressing as it once was, is to find a peaceful solution to the separatist desires of the Tamil minority. The following discussion will detail how the country of Sri Lanka came into this current situation and what is to be done to solve the problems that both sides have to overcome. The conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese can be traced back to colonial times when the Sinhalese believed, according to the International Crisis Group, that “outsiders had the upper hand” (4). This feeling the Sinhalese had towards outsiders led to the ethnocentrism we see today in the holding back of Tamil development. With a majority of “70 percent of the population” (4) at the time of independence, it was not very difficult for the Sinhalese to begin a series of efforts to get ahead of the minorities. One of the early steps to promoting the Sinhalese identity was the creation of the “Sinhala Only Legislation” (5) where Sinhala was established as the only language for government business (5). This legislation, in part, led to the

“process of ‘ethnic outbidding’ in which attempts by government coalitions to come to an agreement with the Tamil Federal Party were undermined by those in opposition” (5). This was the end for minority rights in Sri Lanka. “The 1972 and 1978 constitutions promoted Sinhala Bishop 2 Buddhist hegemony, further centralised the state and failed to provide adequate protection for minority rights” (6). As conflict between the two sides arose because of the Sinhalese centered legislation, a desire for peace became important to both the Tamils and the Sinhalese. Under Kumaratunga, the government “tried to defeat the LTTE in battle while restructuring the state to accommodate Tamil grievances” (9). This point in Sri Lanka’s history was the closest they had come to federalism (9), but ultimately the bill was finally defeated in August of 2000 because of party politics (9). With the failure of finding a solution for the Tamils, there was continued conflict between the two sides, which led to the Sinhalese governments “growing popularity within the army’s lower ranks and junior officers” (12). This growing popularity eventually leads to a military that sides with the Sinhalese and is against the Tamils. This Sinhalese favouring military fights the LTTE controlled areas in the north and northeast regions of Sri Lanka, which are under defacto control by the LTTE (Stokke 1022). The Tamil region has been declared a defacto state by scholars such as Kristian Stokke, who points out the defacto Tamil government includes “revenue collection, police and judiciary as well as public services and

economic development initiatives” (1022). Public services such as “schools, hospitals, courts, and police and other law enforcement personnel” (Oberst 5) are important indicators of defacto status in the Tamil regions. The LTTE also has a military of about “15,000 troops” (2), which further proves the defacto status of the Tamil controlled regions of Sri Lanka. While the Tamil regions might have defacto control over their territory, that in no way means they are democratically running their regions. The LTTE have no problem engaging Bishop 3 in political killings if “members of rival Tamil parties, suspected Karuna sympathizers and government informants, and journalists and human rights workers” (3). The northern regions of Sri Lanka are argued to be autocratic in governance under the LTTE leadership. Instances of the refusal “to allow free elections” (3) are common and coincide with the policies of not permitting free expression and repressing the public’s ability to criticize the government (3). The LTTE will also “force civilians to attend pro-LTTE rallies” (3). This form of rule is different from what the Sinhalese use to rule the rest of the country. With these instances of forced rallies and no free elections, as laid out by Oberst, the defacto LTTE state in the northeast can be categorised as an autocratic regime, ruling over a coerced population of Tamils. An electoral democracy is present in the legitimate Sinhalese ruled portion of Sri Lanka. This portion of Sri Lanka is labelled an electoral democracy based on certain aspects that do not allow for the necessary

freedoms in a liberal democracy; situations such as “irregularities, violence, and intimidation” (3) occur in the Sinhalese national elections. There has also been growing concern over corruption of officials and the lack of government processes that can be used to hold the corrupt public officials accountable to the public for their misdeeds (3). “Sri Lanka was ranked 78 out of 159 countries surveyed in the 2005 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index” (3-4) as a result of the lack of accountability of government actors. By not having the aspect of accountability in government, it would not be fair to call Sri Lanka a liberal democracy, and therefore it must be labelled an electoral democracy. As well as corruption within the elected officials, there has been “perceived politicization of the judiciary” Bishop 4 (5) where legal decisions have been altered to “consistently defend the government in legal actions relating to political disputes” (5). This would in effect alter the outcomes of any legal decisions regarding Tamil autonomy in Sri Lanka. If a peace settlement were to be reached between the parties, there would no longer be any need for the corrupt judiciary and it would be able “to regain its former independence” (International Crisis Group 28). With repairs to the current political regime in Sri Lanka, it may be possible for peace talks to progress even further as a positive feedback loop could be created through the increased trust the Tamils would gain in the fair and independent judiciary. This judiciary repair bring a “long-term structural” (28)

reform will take time, effort and patience from both sides, but in the end will surely benefit both the Tamils and the Sinhalese as legal matters regarding issues such as human rights can now be settled in proper courts of law. The goals of the Tamil population are to obtain the separate and legitimate control over their regions of Sri Lanka, this would be a disaster for the rest of the country, as the sitting government would not allow The Tamils to separate from Sri Lanka and civil war would be a likely result. The goals for “a separate state” could fall under a form of holding together federalism if it were to be accepted by the Sinhalese majority, it could also be read as two distinct states instead of federalism however (25). In keeping with the idea of change, it is important to outline what the proper expectations of the Tamil population should be; first, “the Tigers must be pressed to say unambiguously they would accept autonomy within a united Sri Lanka, not insist on a separate state. The demand for a separate state allows Sinhalese Bishop 5 hardliners to argue that devolution would be merely a step towards separation” (25). The next logical step for the Tamils to aim for would be political autonomy in the areas it currently controls in its defacto state; this would be a form of federalism if it were to come into effect. Control however should not be given in the way of the judiciary, as this would grant more autonomy than the Sinhalese would tolerate. Autonomy should only be granted in the areas of “revenue collection, police . . . as well as public services and economic development initiatives” (Stokke 1022)

With the current situation in Sri Lanka under the current regimes, it is unlikely that a resolution will occur in the near future. The Sinhalese regime is currently not compatible with the demands of the Tamil minority who are “rooted in and committed to the rights, welfare and development of the Tamil community” (1024). Sri Lanka and its people have a long way to go before blossoming into a stable and successful example of a country in the developing world. One day the correct policies and leaders will come together and a solution will be formed, but until that day there will be continued conflict between the Tamils (mainly through the LTTE) and the Sinhalese majority.

Bibliography International Crisis Group. “Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis.” International Crisis Group Asia Report 135 (2007) International Crisis Group. “Sri Lanka’s Return to War: Limiting the Damage.” International Crisis Group Asia 146 (2008) International Crisis Group. “Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern

Consensus.” International Crisis Group Asia 141 (2007) Oberst, Robert C. “Country Report – Sri Lanka.” 2006. Countries at the Crossroads 2006: A Survey of Democratic Governance. Freedom House. 8 Nov. 2008 <www.freedomhouse.org> Stokke, Kristian. “Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE – Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka.” Third World Quarterly 27.6 (2006): 1021-1040