The Idea Of An Information Society

Technological Technological conceptions center on an array of innovations that have appeared since the late 1970s. New technologies are one of the most visible indicators of new times, and accordingly are frequently taken to signal the coming of an information society. These include cable and satellite television, computer to computer communications, personal computers(PCs), new office technologies, notably online information services and word processors, and CD-ROM facilities. The suggestion is simply that such a volume of technological innovations must lead to a reconstitution of the social world because its impact is so profound. 在從20世紀70年代后期起已經出現了的一系列革新上的技術上的概念中心。 新技術是新 時代的最可見的指標之一，和照著經常被帶說明一個資訊化社會的來。 這些包括有線電視和 衛星轉播電視， 計算機到計算機通信，個人計算機(PC)，新辦公室技術，特別是在線的訊息 服務和字處理機和cd-rom 設備。 建議僅僅是這樣的一卷技術革新必須導致社會世界的改變， 因為它的影響如此深。 During the late 1970s and early 1980s commentators got excited about the ‘mighty micro’s’ capacity to revolutionise our way of life (Evans, 1979; Martin, 1978), and none more so than the world’s leading futurist, Alvin Toffler (1980). His suggestion, in a memorable metaphor, is that, over time, the world has been decisively shaped by three waves of technological innovation, each as unstoppable as the mightiest tidal force. The first was the agricultural revolution and the second the industrial revolution. The third is the information revolution that is engulfing us now and which presages a new way of living (which, attests Toffler, will turn out fine if only we ride with the wave). 在 20 世紀 70 年代后期和早期的 20 世紀 80 年代評論員期間對 revolutionise 因¯mighty micro s 能力而激動我們的生活模式(爾文斯，1979； 馬丁，1978)，和沒有一個更多比主要的 world s 未來主義者，阿爾文托夫勒(1980)。 他的建議， 用一個值得紀念的隱喻， 額外，作那，那 些世界決定性技術革新，每一個的 3 個浪潮形成為不能自已作為潮汐力量。 第 1 是農業革命 和第二工業革命。 第 3 是現下正吞沒我們和預示一種生活的新模式的訊息革命 (證明托夫勒， 如果我們帶著波乘，將變好)。 More recently, futurism’s enthusiasms have been boosted by computing’s capacity to transform telecommunications, to in effect merge the two technologies (Toffler, 1990). It is this spread of computer communications technologies (e-mail, data and text communications, online information exchange, etc) that currently inspires most speculation about a new society in the making (Negroponte, 1995; Gates, 1995; Dertouzos, 1997). The rapid growth of the Internet especially, with its capacities for simultaneously promoting economic success, education and the democratic process, has stimulated much commentary. Media regularly feature accounts of the arrival of an information ‘superhighway' on which the populace must become adept at driving. Authoritative

voices are raised to announce that’s new order … is being forced upon an unsuspecting world by advances in telecommunications. The future is being born in the so-called information superhighways …[and] anyone bypassed by these highways faces ruin’(Angell, 1995, p.10). 近年來，computing s 能力已經推進futurism s 熱情改變電信，實際上合併兩項技術(托夫 勒，1990)。 它是計算機通信技術的傳播的這(電子郵件，數據和正文通信， 在線的情報交流， 等等)目前正在形成鼓舞大多數對一個新社會的思考(內格羅蓬特，1995； 蓋茨，1995； Dertouzos，1997)。 網際網路的迅速的發展特別，帶有它的同時促進經濟成功，教育和民主進 程的能力，已經刺激很多評論。 一訊息¯superhighway的到達的定期的媒介特徵敘述' 民眾在駕 駛時必須成為老手。威權的聲音被提升宣佈that s新命令K 因為在電信方面的發展被強加給一 個不懷疑的世界。 將來正在所謂訊息高速公路K 內面世 [並且 ]這些公路為設旁路的任何人擺 在ruin (安傑爾，1995，第10頁)面前。 More soberly, the spread of national, international and genuinely global information exchanges between and within banks, corporations, governments, universities and voluntary bodies indicates a similar trend towards the establishment of a technological infrastructure that allows instant computer communications at any time of day in any place that is suitably equipped (Connors, 1993). 更清醒， 國家，國際和真實全球情報交流的傳播， 銀行之間和在銀行內，公司，政府， 大學和自願的身體對于建立技術上的基礎設施表明一個相似的趨勢， 那在天的任何時間在 被適合裝備的任何地方(康納斯，1993)給立即的計算機通信。 Most academic analysts, while avoiding the exaggerated language of futurists and politicians, have nonetheless adopted what is at root a similar approach (Feather, 1998; Hill, 1999). For instance, from Japan there have been attempts to measure the growth of Joho Shakai (Information Society) since the 1960s (Duff et al., 1996). The Japanese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) commenced a census in 1975 which endeavours to track changes in the volume (e.g. numbers of telephone messages) and vehicles (e.g. penetration of telecommunications equipment) of information using sophisticated techniques (Ito, 1991, 1994). In Britain, a much respected school of thought has devised a neo-Schumpeterian approach to change. Combining Schumpeter's argument that major technological innovations bring about 'creative destruction' with Kondratieff’s theme of 'long waves' of economic development, these researchers contend that information and communications technologies represent the establishment of a new epoch (Freeman, 1987) which will be uncomfortable during its earlier phases, but over the longer term will be economically beneficial. This new 'techno-economic paradigm' constitutes the 'Information Age' which is set to mature early in the twenty-first century (Hall and Preston, 1988). 大多數學術分析家，在避免時未來主義者和政治家的被誇大的語言，已經不過採用在根 的一種相似的方法(羽毛，1998； 希爾，1999)。 例如， 從日本中有嘗試從20世紀60年代(煤粉 et al.，1996)起測量Joho Shakai(資訊化社會)的發展。 郵電(MPT)的日本部在1975年開始一次人 口普查， 跟蹤的努力在體積方面改變的 (例如許多電話留言)和車輛(例如設備滲透的電信的) 的訊息的使用尖端技術(伊芳東， 1991 , 1994 ) . 在英國內，一非常尊重的思想學派想出新的

Schumpeterian接近兌換。 結合Schumpeter的辯論即較大的技術革新用經濟發展的'長波'的 Kondratieff s 主題引起'有創造性的損壞'， 這些研究人員力辯訊息和通信技術描述將在它的更 早期的階段期間不舒服的確立一個新時代(自由民，1987)， 除了在長期期間將在經濟上有利。 這個新' 經濟techno 範例' '訊息時代' 形成， 哪個在21世紀早期被調整到成熟(大廳和普雷斯頓， 1988)。 It may seem obvious that these technologies are valid as distinguishing features of a new society, but when one probes further one cannot but be struck also by the vagueness of technology in most of these comments. Asking for anempirical measure – in this society now how much ICT is there and how far does this take us towards qualifying for information society status? How much ICT is required in order to identify an information society? Asking simply for a usable measure, one quickly becomes aware that a good many of those who emphasise technology are not able to provide us with anything so mundanely real-worldly or testable, ICTs, it begins to appear, are everywhere-and nowhere too. 這些技術象一個新社會的特點一樣有效，這看起來是明顯， 一探查更遠一個人不得不 以技術在這些意見中大多數內的含糊罷工也什麼時候。 要求anempirical 測量 - 在這社會內現 下，ICT在那裡是這多遠花費對有資訊化社會地位的資格的我們多少？ 為了鑑定一個資訊化 社會ICT被要求多少？ 僅僅為一個可用的措施問， 一個人迅速變得意識到絕大多數誰強調技 術不能為我們提供任何東西如此世俗真正現世的那些或者testable，ICTs， 它開始出現，到處 都是和無處也。 This problem of measurement, and the associated difficulty of stipulating the point on the technological scale at which a society is judged to have entered an information age, is surely central to any acceptable definition of a distinctively new type of society. It is ignored by popular futurists: the new technologies are announced and it is unproblematically presumed that this in itself heralds the information society. This issue is, surprisingly, also bypassed by other scholars who yet assert that ICT is the major index of an information society. They are content to describe in general terms technological innovations, somehow presuming that this is enough to distinguish the new society. 測量的這個問題， 以及在一個社會被判斷進入訊息時代的技術上的規模上規定點的相 關困難， 肯定一種社會的特色新型的任何可接受定義重點。 受歡迎的未來主義者忽視它︰ 新技術宣佈並且是unproblematically 本身推測那這使者資訊化社會。 這個問題令人吃驚也由認 定ICT是一個資訊化社會的主要的索引的其他學人為設旁路。 他們願意概括描述技術革新， 設法推測這足夠區分新社會。 Another objection to technological definitions of the information society is very frequently made. Critics object to those who assert that, in a given era, technologies are first invented and then subsequently impact on the society, thereby impelling people to respond by adjusting to the new. Technology in these versions is privileged above all else, hence it comes to identify an entire social world: the Steam Age, the Age of the Automobile, the Atomic Age (Dickson, 1974). 對資訊化社會的技術上的定義的另一種異議非常經常被做。 批評家反對認定那的那些人

在一個規定的時代，技術被首先發明然後后來對社會有影響，因此使人們不得不透過適應 新回答。在這些版本裡的技術高于其它的一切特權，因此它開始鑑定一個整個社會世界︰ 蒸 汽時代，汽車的年齡，原子時代(狄克森，1974)。 The central objection here is not that this is unavoidably technologically determinist - in that technology is regarded as the prime social dynamic — and as such an oversimplification of processes of change. It most certainly is this, but more important is that it relegates into an entirely separate division social, economic and political dimensions of technological innovation. These follow from, and are subordinate to, the premier league of technology which appears to be selfperpetuating, though it leaves its impress on all aspects of society. 中心異議這裡不是那這不可避免技術是決定論者 - 在那項技術方面被認為是最好時期社 會動態 - 以及照此一次變化的過程的過分簡單化。 最是當然這，但是更重要是降級進一完全 分開劃分社會，越來越政治尺寸的技術革新的。這些遵循的從， 並且是從屬于的，雖然它留 下它在留下印象社會的各方面，但是看起來是自身延續的的技術的首要的聯盟。 But it is demonstratively the case that technology is not aloof from the social realm in this way. On the contrary, it is an integral part of the social. For instance, research and development decisions express priorities and from these value judgements particular types of technology are produced (e.g. military projects received substantially more funding than health work for much of the time in the twentieth century — not surprisingly a consequence is state-of-the-art weapon systems which dwarf the advances of treatment say of the common cold). Many studies have shown how technologies bear the impress of social values, whether it be in the architectural design of bridges in New York, where heights were set that would prevent public transit systems accessing certain areas; the manufacture of cars which testify to the values of private ownership, presumptions about family size (typically two adults, two children), attitudes towards the environment (profligate use of nonrenewable energy alongside pollution), status symbols (the Porsche, the Beetle, the Skoda), and individual rather than public forms of transit; or the construction of houses which are not just places to live, but also expressions of ways of life, prestige and power relations, and preferences for a variety of lifestyles This being so, how can it be acceptable to take what is regarded as an asocial phenomenon (technology) and assert that this then defines the SOCIAL WORLD? It is facile (one could as well take any elemental factor and ascribe society with its name - the Oxygen Society, the Water Society, the Potato Age) and it is false (technology is in truth an intrinsic part of society) and therefore ICTs separate and supreme role in social change is dubious. 但是技術以這種方法來自社會王國不冷漠，這論證是情況。 反之，它是社會的組成部分 例如， 決定研究與開發表示優先權和從特別類型的技術的價值判斷這些被生產(例如軍用工 程大量得到更多撥款， 健康在20 世紀為大部分時間工作 - 不令人吃驚，一結果處理的前進 談及感冒)那只侏儒的最新型武器系統。 很多研究已經顯示技術怎樣承擔社會價值的印記， 在橋在紐約內的建築設計內是否，高度確定防止公眾交通運輸系統訪問肯定地區在那裡； 作證價值達私人所有權的小汽車的製造， 關於家庭尺寸(通常兩個大人，兩個孩子)的推測， 對環境(在污染旁邊的非可再生能源的放蕩的使用)的態度， 身分象徵(寶時捷，甲蟲，

Skoda)，和而不是運輸的公開形式個別； 或者不只是地方可住的房子的建設， 但是也生活 模式，威望和能力關係的表達模式， 以及多種生活模式的偏愛這如此， 它怎樣能可接受把 所被當作的作為一個不合群的現象(技術)並且認定這然後確定社會世界？ (一也能帶任何元 素原素並且用它的名字把社會歸因于是輕易的 - 氧社會，水社會，馬鈴薯時代)， 並且(技術 實際上是一個社會的固有部分)是錯誤的，因此ICTs 分開，在社會變化過程中的最高的角色 是可疑的。

Economic This approach charts the growth in economic worth of informational activities. If one is able to plot an increase in the proportion of gross national product (GNP) accounted for by the information business, then logically there comes a point at which one may declare the achievement of an information economy. Once the greater part of economic activity is taken up by information activity rather than say subsistence agriculture or industrial manufacture, then it follows that we may speak of an information society (Jonscher, 1999). 這種方法以圖表表示在訊息的活動的經濟價值方面的發展。 如果一個人能按透過訊息生 意解釋的國民生產總值(國民生產總值)的比例密謀一個增加， 然後合乎邏輯那裡來可能宣佈 一種知識經濟的成就哪一個的一點。 一旦經濟活動的更大的部分因為訊息活動被從事而不是 說生存農業或者工業製造， 然後那么我們可能談到一個資訊化社會(Jonscher，1999)。 In principle straightforward, but in practice an extraordinarily complex exercise, much of the pioneering work was done by Fritz Machlup (1902-81) of Princeton University (Machlup, 1962). His identification of information Industries such as education, law, publishing, media and computer manufacture, and his attempt to estimate their changing economic worth, has been refined by Marc Porat (1977b). 原則上簡單， 但是實際上非常複雜的鍛鍊， 普林斯頓大學(馬克盧普，1962)的德國人馬 克盧普(1902-81)做了大部分開拓的工作。 他的訊息產業的身分證明(例如教育，法律，出版， 媒介和計算機製造)， 以及估計他們改變經濟價值的他的嘗試，是被被果渣精煉的Porat(1977 b)。 Porat distinguished the primary and secondary information sectors of the economy, the former being susceptible to ready economic valuation since it had an ascribable market price, the latter, harder to price but nonetheless essential to all modern-day organisation, involving informational activities within companies and state institutions (for example, the personnel wings of a company, the research and development (R&D) sections of a business). In this way Porat is able to distinguish the two informational sectors, then to consolidate them, separate out the non-informational elements of the economy, and, by reaggregrating national economic statistics, is able to conclude that, with

almost half the United States' GNP accounted for by these combined informational sectors, 'the United States is now an information-based economy'. As such it is an 'information society [where] the major arenas of economic activity are the information goods and service producers, and the public and private (secondary information sector) bureaucracies' (Porat, 1978, p. 12). Porat 區分經濟的主要和第二訊息部門， 前者自從有一個可歸于的市場價格的對敏感準 備好經濟評估， 后者， 對價格難除了對全部現代組織不過必要， 與在公司和國家機構內的 訊息的活動有關(例如， 一家公司的人員翅膀，一個生意的研究與開發(R&D)部分)。 以這種 方法Porat能區分兩個訊息的部門， 然後鞏固他們， 分開經濟的非訊息的要素，和透過 reaggregrating 國家經濟統計， 能結束那， 結合訊息的部門，由於幾乎一半美國國民生產總 值這些解釋，'美國現下是基于訊息的經濟'。 因為這樣的它是一個'資訊化社會 [在那裡 ]經濟 活動的主要的領域是訊息貨物和服務生產者， 並且公眾和私人(次要部門訊息)官僚政 治'(1978，Porat，第12頁)。 This quantification of the economic significance of information is an impressive achievement. It is not surprising that those convinced of the emergence of an information society have routinely turned to Machlup and especially Porat as authoritative demonstrations of a rising curve of information activity, one set to lead the way to a new age. However, there are difficulties too with the economics of information approach (Monk, 1989, pp. 39-63). A major one is that, behind the weighty statistical tables that are resonant of objective demonstration, there is a great deal of hidden interpretation and value judgement as to how to construct categories and what to include and exclude from the information sector. 訊息的經濟意義的這確定數量是一項給人深刻印象的成就。它， 不驚人確信一個資訊化 社會的出現的那些 作為訊息活動的一條提升的曲線的威權的示範馬克盧普和特別是Porat通 常開始工作， 一台設備對一個新時代引導。 不過，也困難有經濟學那兒的訊息的接近(僧侶， 1989，第39-63頁)。 主要的那個， 在由於客觀的遊行示威而共振的繁重的統計表后面， 關於 怎樣建造種類和包括並且從訊息部門排除什麼，有很多隱藏的解釋和價值判斷。 In this regard what is particularly striking is that, in spite of their differences, both Machlup and Porat create encompassing categories of the information sector which exaggerate its economic worth. There are reasons to query their validity. For example, Machlup includes in his 'knowledge industries' the 'construction of Informal ion buildings', the basis for which presumably is that building for, say a university or library is different from that intended for the warehousing of tea and coffee. But how then is one to allocate the many buildings which, once constructed, change purpose (many university departments are located in erstwhile domestic houses, some even in former warehouses)? 在這方面正尤其撞上的那個， 儘管他們的差別，馬克盧普和Porat都建立圍繞誇大它的 經濟價值的訊息部門的種類。有理由詢問他們的有效。例如， 馬克盧普在他的'知識產業'裡包 括' 非正式離子大樓的建設'， 基礎因為哪個是大概是建造，說一大學或者圖書館不同于對于 茶和咖啡的儲存于倉庫來說打算的那。 但是分發一旦建造，改變目的的很多大樓的一多么那 么 (很多大學的系甚至在以前的倉庫位于以前國內房子，一些)嗎？